# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Onett v. Florida Bar > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_2360%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1987 - **Citation:** 484 U.S. 850 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S. 87-961 : FILED JUL 141987 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR. gx CLERK NO. in the Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1986 GEORGE L. ONETT, Petitioner, US. THE FLORIDA BAR, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA SHALLE STEPHEN FINE (Counsel of Record) 46 S. W. First Street Miami, Florida 33130 305/358-1515 Attorney for Petitioner QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 IT WAS A DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS TO REFUSE THE PETI- TIONER’S APPLICATION FOR SUBPOE- NAES AND TO DENY HIM THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS AND THE PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING All parties to the proceeding are named in the title of the case. ii od TABLE OF CONTENTS AND TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: IT WAS A DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS TO REFUSE THE PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENAS AND TO DENY HIM THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS AND THE PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES .. i PARTIES TO-THE PROCEEDING........... il TABLE OF CONTENTS AND TABLE OF AUTHORITINES................. iii og ER 8 6s yr Vv GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION en ds abe ieie sap so 000 62 vi CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS........... vil STATEMENT OF THE CASE............... 1 ES 10 ili . Page CITATIONS Accardi us. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 74 S. Ct. 499, ee Re ee I cs a ec cce keene o 10 Drogaise vs. Martine’s Incorporated, 118 So. 2d 95 (1 DCA Fla. 1960).......... 10 Florida Bar vs. Quick, 5. g Ff Me. | Sara enaen ere: 10 Re Ruffalo, 390 U. S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, oe Se Regt. | ar eS Service us. Dulles, 362 U. 8S. 363, T7 3. Ct. 1152, ee Ge 6 Ly a errr 10 State Ex Rel Florida Bar vs. Evans, ' % & by RS: y ) rere 11 United States of America vs. George L. Onett, EE SE EE 5 ek oo bak oo Ae een ele was 3 STATUTES 28 United States Code, §1257 (3) ............ vi iv OFFICIAL REPORTS The Florida Bar vs. George Onett, 504 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1987) GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS INVOKED The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida herein sought to be reviewed was entered February 26, 1987. A timely filed Petition for Rehearing was denied by order entered April 15, 1987. The statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdiction to review the judgment and opinion in question by Writ of Certiorari is 28 United States Code, §1257 (3) vi enorme. = CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 1) Constitution of the United States, Article XIV, §1. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. Pertinent portions of the Florida Bar integration rule are quoted in the Statement of the Case and Argument as appropriate. vii STATEMENT OF THE CASE This cause comes to this court on the Petition of George L. Onett for review of a judgment disbarring him entered in the Supreme Court of Florida. (Appendix 1 et seq.; further references in this Petition to the appendix hereto will be made by use of the symbol “‘A”’ with appropriate page number.) The parties will be referred to herein by proper name or by standing here or below as appropriate. The Petitioner, George L. Onett, was admitted to the Florida Bar on November 4, 1966. He had never been disciplined by the Bar prior to the instant case. The Florida Bar is an integrated Bar created by the Supreme Court of Florida under an integration rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Preamble to the integration rule specifically states in pertinent part: “. . . the following principles are expressly adopted by this court: (a) The Florida Bar, a body created by and existing under the authority of this court, is charged with the maintenance of the highest standards and obligations of the profession of law, and to that end is vested by this court, in the exercise of its inherent powers over the Florida Bar as an official arm of this court, with the necessary powers and authority. . . (d) This court has the inherent power and duty ... to determine what constitutes grounds for discipline of lawyers, to discipline for cause attorneys admitted to practice law in Florida, and to revoke the license of every lawyer whose unfitness to practice law has been duly established.” The exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law is administered pursuant to Article XI of the integration rule. Pursuant to Article XI, the Florida Bar commenced the proceedings under review here by filing a complaint against Petitioner Onett in the Supreme Court of Florida. Under the integration rule, disciplinary proceedings such as this are original proceedings in the Supreme Court of Florida. That complaint (A. 6 et seq.; amendment A. 10) charged that Onett: a) Sought to extort $15,000.00 from a Jacksonville, Florida restauranter in connection with the restauranter’s efforts to obtain a liquor license for his restaurant; and b) Sought to defraud the citizens of the State of Florida, the Department of Business Regulation and the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco with regard to their review and approval of the restauranter’s liquor license application by concealing relevant information; and c) Perjured himself before a Federal Grand Jury; and d) Asa result of the foregoing was convicted of six felony counts by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida appointed a referee to hear the matter and pursuant to notice, the matter was brought on for hearing. The Bar produced no live witnesses in its main case. It introduced three exhibits and rested. Exhibit No. 1 was a copy of the indictment against the Respondent in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Exhibit 2 was a certified copy of the judgment and commitment order in the United States District Court In and For The Middle District of Florida evidencing Mr. Onett’s conviction on several criminal charges. Exhibit 3 was a copy of the initial appeal in the criminal case, United States of America vs. George L. Onett, 725 F.2d 1561 where the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. Mr. Onett called as his witness Charles L. Nuzum who testified that immediately prior to his retirement he was director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco of the State of Florida. Prior to that time he was special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 22 years and at the time he retired from the Bureau he was deputy chief of the white collar crime section of the general investigative division at FBI Headquarters in Wshington. In the Beverage Department, the only person he reported to was Richard Burroughs, the head of the Department of Business Regulation. It was Mr. Nuzum’s duty to pass on applications for liquor licenses where there was a problem. Mr. Nuzum’s approval or disapproval was final administrative action subject only to appeal to the courts. Mr. Nuzum, when he took his post with the State of Florida, took an oath of office and was an officer of the State of Florida. Mr. Nuzum, in 1979 or 1980, was made aware of a liquor license application for a place called Abbott’s Restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. It was brought to his attention by his chief of licensing. The problem was that an application had been made for Abbott’s Restaurant by Mrs. Peter Abbott, and the problem which they envisioned was that Mr. Peter Abbott should be on the application too. Mr. Nuzum then had a visit from Michael Collins, an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and they discussed Abbott’s Restaurant. Collins told Nuzum that the Bureau was conducting a sting operation at Abbott’s Restaurant, that the investigation then dealt with alleged corruption in public life and among public officials in the Jacksonville area. He further told Nuzum that there was electronic surveillance and other technical surveillance at the Abbott’s Restaurant and that information had been obtained that there would be an effort made to obtain a liquor license, a special restaurant license for Abbott’s Restaurant through influence of some nature with the Department of Business Regulation. Mr. Collins told Mr. Nuzum that Mr. Abbott was a convicted felon and that Abbott was not actually his correct name but a name given to him under the witness protection program and he showed Mr. Nuzum a copy of Abbott’s rap sheet. sienna Subsequent to this, Mr. Nuzum was visited by Mr. Onett. Mr. Nuzum told Mr. Onett that Mr. Abbott would have to be on the application. There was some discussion as to whether Abbott should be on the application and by the end of the meeting, Onett told Nuzum that Abbott would be disclosed. The application was then amended at Mr. Onett’s instance to include Peter Abbott as an accommodation endorser and Mr. Nuzum testified that after the amendment, the man was obviously an applicant within every sense of the word. Mr. Nuzum’s legal counsel reviewed the amended application for Mr. Nuzum and told him that Abbott was an applicant and an interested party. Abbott was then fingerprinted and his fingerprint card was processed through the FBI. When Abbott’s fingerprint card was returned to the Bureau, there was no record because Abbott was under the witness protection program. Nuzum testified that from the time Onett put Abbott on the application, Nuzum was in a position to deny the liquor license on the basis that Abbott was a convicted felon which he knew from his conversation with Collins. Nuzum did not do this because he was accommodating the FBI. No improper influence was exerted or attempted to be exerted on Nuzum by Onett. Onett had asked in writing that subpoenaes be issued by the referee (A. 28 et seq.). One of the subpoenaes to Mr. Nuzum was in fact issued and Mr. Nuzum testified. The other subpoenaes where to be directed—one to the Honorable John Rawls and the other to Honorable John Moore, the Federal District Judge who presided over Respondent’s non-jury trial. The court refused to issue this process and renewed his ruling at hearing (A. 44.). Onett, through counsel, then proffered (A. 35 et seq.). The substance of the proffer was that Judge Rawls was general counsel and custodian of the records of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, an agency established under the Florida Constitution to review the conduct of judicial officers and, if necessary, to discipline them. Judge Rawls’ testimony and the records of that commission would reflect that Judge Moore, the trial judge who tried and convicted Mr. Onett in a non-jury trial, had been the chairman of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission prior to his ascent to the federal bench. Those records would also reflect that Judge Moore had pre-trial contact with the FBI investigation which produced Mr. Onett’s indictment. This contact, as reflected in those records, would have been sufficient under the present federal recusal statute to make it appear to a reasonable man that Judge Moore could not have been impartial in Onett’s trial, even if the case were tried with a jury and was not tried non- jury. Onett further proferred that Judge Moore, in a chambers conference held in his chambers on July 12, 1983, had indicated that he had some peripheral contact with the investigation and he also indicated that he had totally forgotten about it and at the trial of Onett, he did not have time to think about the past because of the pressure of his cases. Onett further proferred that Judge Moore would, if he had the opportunity to review Judge Rawls’ evidence and the documents of the Judicial Qualifications Commission concede candidly that he did TOF not meet the standard of the recusal statute. Of course, upon this admission, the conviction would have to be ' voided. \ Mr. Onett took the stand and testified that he had not offered anyone anything improper in connection with the Abbott license application and further, there was never any evidence adduced at trial before Judge Moore that he had made such an offer. He testified that he had received a $7,500.00 fee for his participation in the license application as a lawyer and that fee was reported on his federal income tax return and income tax was paid on that fee and it was not divided with anyone for any reason in any way, shape or form. Mr. Onett testified that he did not know that Peter Abbott was a convicted felon at the time of the amended application which Onett procured after talking with Nuzum. In fact, at the time the amended application was filed, Mr. Onett had never met Peter Abbott or Mrs. Abbott. He was hired by another lawyer (who was representing the Abbotts) through a telephone conversation. He never met Peter Abbott until three months after the amended application was filed and never met Jean Abbott, Peter’s wife. He never had any financial interest in Abbott’s Restaurant or the liquor license except as a lawyer. The referee filed a report (A. 15 et seq.) which is essentially a bare bones report which tracks the complaint word for word and recommends disbarment. Onett petitioned for review of the referee’s report by the Supreme Court of Florida (A. 22). Briefs were submitted by Onett and by the Bar and Onett requested oral argument. Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding that the integration rule provides for oral argument in terms as follows: “Rule 11.09: Review by Supreme Court (3Xd) Oral Argument. Requests for oral argument shall be filed in every case wherein a petition for review is filed at the time of filing the first brief. If no request is filed, the case will be disposed of without oral agreement unless the court orders otherwise.” Notwithstanding the request for oral argument, at the direction of the chief justice, the case was submitted to the court without oral argument (A. 24). The court rendered the opinion to which certiorari is here sought (A. 1 et seq.). A timely filed Petition for Rehearing (A. 25 et seq.) was denied (A. 5) and this Petition follows: In his Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint filed before the referee (A. 12 et seq.) your Petitioner raises the validity of his conviction by saying: “2. . . . but denies that he has been validly convicted thereof. Answering the third sentence thereof, he admits the authenticity of the judgment and commitment order attached as Exhibit “A” but denies that it serves as conclusive proof of his misconduct. On the contrary, he incorporates his affirmative defenses set forth below. ' nee | 3) Affirmatively answering, he avers that his asserted conviction in the case identified in Exhibit ““A” to the complaint, was had after waiver of jury trial by a court who in respondent’s belief was disqualified from sitting as judge in his cause. Further affirmatively answering, Respondent asserts and avers that for the Florida Bar to attempt to proceed to impose any punishment or sanction upon him resulting from that conviction and proceeding, his civil rights as preserved to him by the constitution of the United States and by federal statutes, specifically including without limitation, Title 28 United States Code, §1983 and would subject the Florida Bar to an action for an injunction pursuant to that statute and other available remedies.” After the filing of the referee’s report and Onett’s Petition for Review to the Supreme Court, he raised the question in the following terms as recited by the court in its opinion (A. 2): “In support, Respondent argues that he was denied due process before the referee because he was not permitted to subpoena witnesses whose evidence would have vitiated the federal convictions and shown that he was guilty of no wrongdoing.”’ He reiterated this position in his Petition for Rehearing (A. 25 et seq.). ; ARGUMENT I IT WAS A DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS TO REFUSE THE PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENAES AND TO DENY HIM THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS AND THE PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES. This court has held that a lawyer is entitled to procedural due process in a state disbarment proceeding. Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968). Indeed, even if this were an administrative | proceeding instead of a proceeding in the judicial branch, due process would require that rules promulgated and established be complied with. See Accardi us. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 74 S. Ct. 499, 98 L. Ed. 681 (1954); Service vs. Dulles, 352 U.S. 363, 77 S. Ct. 1152, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1957). In like manner, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that a disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Bar is a penal (although not criminal) proceeding and that due process requirements must be observed. Florida Bar us. Quick, 279 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973). As part of due process, a Florida Court of last resort has held that compulsory process is a vital part of the American concept of due process and a fair hearing, even in a quasi judicial proceeding, Drogaise vs. Martine’s Incorporated, 118 So. 2d 95 (1 DCA Fla. 1960). 10 aie, The Florida Supreme Court in State Ex Rel Florida Bar vs. Evans, 94 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1957) said in pertinent part: ‘“. . . In a disbarment proceeding based on conviction of a crime, the proof of conviction and an adjudication of guilt are sufficient to establish a prima facie case for disciplinary action. Due process, however, requires that the accused lawyer shall be given full opportunity to explain the circumstances and otherwise offer testimony in excuse or mitigation of the penalty.” In the case at bar, the judgment of conviction is the only evidence upon which your Petitioner could be adjudged guilty of any wrongdoing. The indictment is certainly not evidence. The testimony of Mr. Nuzum does not implicate your Petitioner but exonerates him and of course your Petitioner’s testimony does not harm him. This disbarment must be sustained on the basis of the judgment of conviction. Under the terms of the proffer as made, it is clear that the judgment of conviction could not stand and would be vitiated if this Petitioner had been afforded his due process rights to subpoena Judge Rawls and the records of the JQC and to subpoena Judge Moore and present him with the record of his pre-trial contact with this investigation. The refusal of the referee to issue process and its sanctification by the opinion to which certiorari is here sought deprives your Petitioner of the essential right to rebut by evidence the document upon which the charge against him is based. Furthermore, it deprives him of the right given to him to explain the 11 x circumstances and otherwise offer testimony in excuse or mitigation of the penalty. It must be emphasized in this case that on the record as adduced, Judge Moore has admitted pre-trial contact with the investigation. The question that remains to be decided is not whether Judge Moore had contact with the investigation before he ascended the federal bench, but the extent of that contact. We urge that if Judge Moore were in fact presented with the evidence of that contact and its extent, he would do the right thing. We are not asserting that he is corrupt (although we think it is a makable argument that he is bullheaded). Quite the contrary. What we asked and were deprived of was the opportunity to let Judge Moore see the full record, hear the evidence of Judge Rawls and do the right thing which would be on the basis of the proffer and could only be to state on the record that the conviction should be vitiated and to in fact vitiate that conviction. We are not attempting here to retry the criminal case. We are attempting here to bring into focus the facts which developed post judgment which bear on the judgment of conviction. We respectfully suggest that this case goes to the fundamental quality of the judicial system and its functioning. The manner in which it has been handled and swept under the rug creates an aura ill suited to the executive branch, much less to the judicial. Either the Supreme Court of Florida denied Onett fundamental due process when it denied him the subpoenaes he needed to establish that the charge against him could not stand or at least to mitigate and explain it, or on the other hand if we take the record in its present 12 ii i | condition with the proffer, there can be no disbarment of Onett because there can be no valid conviction. We respectfully suggest that to hold that a judgment of conviction entered by a judge clearly disqualified on the’ record can be the basis of a penal action against Onett without a hearing on the merits of Onett’s contention is more than an exaltation of form over substance, it is a denial of the basic right to present an effective defense. 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to James N. Watson, Jr., Esq., Branch Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Fl 32301, this 14th day of July, 1987. SHALLE STEPHEN FINE 14 Appendix SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA No. 67,622 THE FLORIDA BAR Complainant, US. GEORGE ONETT Respondent. [February 26, 1987] PER CURIAM. This disciplinary proceeding against George L. Onett is before us on complaint of The Florida Bar and the report of the referee. The referee recommends that Onett be disbarred. Onett petitions this Court for review of the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations of guilt and discipline. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 15, Florida Constitution, and approve the referee’s findings and recommendations. Respondent was convicted in federal district court of six felony charges: mai! fraud conspiracy, conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion, obstruction and attempted obstruction of interstate commerce by extortion, mail fraud, and two counts of perjury. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law effective October 18, 1982, under Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, rule 11.07(3). Based on App. 1 these convictions, the referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rules 1-102(AX1) (violating a disciplinary rule), 1-102(AX3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(AX4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A\X5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(AX6) (conduct that adversely reflect on fitness to practice law), as well as Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(3Xa) (commission of an act contrary to honesty, justice or good morals). Respondent urges that the referee’s recom- mendations of guilt and disbarment should be disapproved. In support, respondent argues that he was denied due process before the referee because he was not permitted to subpoena witnesses whose evidence would have vitiated the federal convictions and shown that he was guilty of no wrongdoing. Moreover, respondent urges, it was harmful error to introduce into evidence the federal indictment because it contained counts and allegations which were not proven at trial. Respondent’s argument merits only brief comment. Respondent attempted to subpoena the presiding judge in the federal trial and the general counsel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, purportedly for the purpose of showing that the presiding judge should have recused himself from the trial. Respondent does not deny that he has been convicted and those convictions affirmed on appeal, United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1984). Instead, he asks that we go behind those convictions App. 2 and, essentially, retry these criminal charges. The uncontroverted presence of a felony conviction is conclusive proof of guilt of the offense charged for disciplinary purposes. Fla. Bar Integr. Rule, art. XI, Rule 11.07(1). A referee is not empowered to go behind a criminal conviction. The Fla. Bar v. Heller, 473 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 1985): The Fla. Bar v. Vernell, 374 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1979). The denial of the subpoena and the refusal of the profferred evidence was not error and did not violate due process. Respondent’s argument on introduction of the indictment is also meritless. The judgment of conviction was conclusive proof of the commission of the felonies. The indictment merely showed that the convictions were obtained based on charges brought. The trier-of-fact normally has access to such charges even though they are not evidence of guilt. We approve the referee’s findings of facts and recommendations of guilt and discipline. Onett is disbarred effective immediately. Judgment for costs in the amount of $603.86 is hereby entered against Onett, for which sum let execution issue. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., Concur NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF _ FILED, DETERMINED. THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. App. 3 Original Proceeding—The Florida Bar John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive. Director, John T. Berry, Staff Counsel and James N. Watson, Jr., Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida. for Complainant Shalle Stephen Fine, Miami, Florida, for Respondent App. 4 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 1987 CASE NO. 67,622 THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, US. GEORGE L. ONETT, Respondent. On consideration of the motion for rehearing filed by attorney for respondent, and response thereto, IT IS ORDERED by the Court that said motion be and the same is hereby denied. A True Copy Sid J. White Clerk of Supreme Court [Supreme Court Seal] C cc: Shalle Stephen Fine, Esquire John T. Berry, Esquire James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Hon. Stephan P. Mickle, Judge App. 5 Exhibit C IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (Before a Referee) CONFIDENTIAL Case Nu. (TFB Case No. 04B86N18) THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, Vv. GEORGE L. ONETT, Respondent. COMPLAINT THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, files this complaint against GEORGE L. ONETT, Respondent, pursuant to article XI of the Integration Rule of The ._ Florida Bar, as amended, and alleges: 1. Respondent is, and at all times mentioned in this complaint was, a member of The Florida Bar, subject to the jurisdiction and Disciplinary Rules of the Supreme Court of Florida. in 1981, Respondent and Harold B. Haimowitz, along with others, sought to extort $15,000 from a local Jacksonville restaurateur in his efforts to obtain a liquor 2. From on or about November, 1979, to sometime App. 6 | ii sic license for his restaurant. Respondent accepted $7,500 cash as a partial payment towards the total extortionate amount. 3. During this same time period, Respondent and his co-extortionists sought to defraud the citizens of the State of Florida, the Department of Business Regulation, and the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Towvacco with regard to their review and approval of the “restauranteur’s liquor license application. Respondent perpetrated the fraud through intentional misrepresentation and concealment of relevant information. 4. During the investigation of these crimes, Respondent perjured himself before a federal grand jury. 5. As a result of the actions referenced to in paragraphs 2-4, Respondent was convicted of six felony counts by United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. These felonies included conspiracy to use and cause to be used the U.S. Postal Service to execute a scheme to defraud and for obtaining property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses and representations; conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion; obstructing interstate commerce by extortion; mail fraud; and making false declarations while under oath before a Federal Grand Jury; all in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 371, 1341, 1623, 1951 and 2. A copy of the Judgment and Commitment Order is attached as Exhibit A and serves as conclusive proof of Respondent’s misconduct referenced in paragraphs 2-4. App. 7 \ 6. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(AX1) (a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule); 1-102(AX3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); 1-102(AX4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 1-102(AX5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); and 1-102(AX6) (a lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.). NOTICE REGARDING WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY Please note pursuant to Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.12(1Xd) effective October 1, 1979, the Respondent in these proceedings may file a Motion to Maintain Confidentiality for the protection of a client with the court or appointed referee within twenty (20) days of this filing or confidentiality is automatically waived as to the Complaint and all further proceedings in this case. United otal Fy Disthicl Cource MilAc? Dt errata w ee et a COGS L. Gait a ED TEED Re Se vem swe. Pe. Ob-b-Cr- Joe: S55 SLT ET ee 4 Tee ERENT : In the presence wf the atturney fur the guvcenment ; Sonte Cav Stan the de tremens apacared in perwn ya thn daic ae i JUL 2 1962_ see" Lu wiltiOul COUNSCL MNewrert We court ebemed Gelendant of tight te coun! 06 svhed whether Eelendent dewia & Rene ce emul eppurnte dé By Te cuurt and the Grleadent theseupur wae? sveestiense Ut coven! As wirmcoussee w _ Arthur W. Tifford and Shalle S. Fine (Retained) ’ (Nome of cuveret) ; \ Ci GUILTY, ang the court meing satinied that t jy NOLO CONTCNULRE, eX NOT GUILTY There os ¢ Lectual buns fue the ples, - Li NOT CUILTY. Uctendent ao dehsyed Ttagec Peong & teeme* at 3 DOO enue + Pate co lsts ieee Ioree: gtenemied av Charged wl the livmwint el Conspiracy to use and causo to be used the »G& \U.S. Fostal Scrvice to execute « scheme to defraud and for obtaining property by moss taut ( Of false and fraudulent pretensegand representations; conspiracy to obstruct interstate commorce by extortion; obstructing interstate commerce by extortion; rail fraud; and making false Ceclarations while under oath before a Federal Grand Jey; all in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 371, 1341, 1623, 1951 and 2, as charcd } in Counts 1, 2, ¢, 9, 18, and 19 of the Indictment. TT) Ter ce eet hed wmener delendens had sey thing te sey why ped pmens chad net be pemneunses. Wet cue Au weellens. oot conse bf: “ wee ee By te ape eted be a Greet, tee Comet steered the Relemdent gulltg a0 charsed aud Comes.te @ and sm dered Wane bee aeten se: . aT bt thee geen y od thn Attemncre Coens d me tein aethowened ters weed steng Meet emp treets tee sees tee FIVE (5) YEARS ard FINED $7,500.00 on Count 1; FIVE (5S) YEARS and FINED $7,500.00 on Count 2, said tem of inprisorment to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 1; FIVE (S) YEARS and FRED $7,500.00 on t 18, said tema of imprisonment to run — SST Sieh the sentences imposed on Counts ard 2; and on condition that as +0 ‘Shee ats 1,2.ard 18, the defendant be confined in a jail-type or treatrent institutio- 26a for a pericd of SIX (6) MONTHS, the execution of the reninder of the sentence c! imprisonment is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation for a period of FOUR #5 ONE-HALF (%4) YEARS, coo the standing conditions of probation, to comu:ce inrediacely upon éefendant's release from confinenent. IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the imposition of sentence on Counts 4, 9 and 19 hercir. is ve.senied ant the defendant is placed on probation for a period of FOUR KD A=- vike Hel? (34) YEARS os each count, to run concurrently, upon the standlipj conditions "HUES | Of prchation. Said periods of probation Tun consecutive. to tle tern of 6 inv: isoment, but concurrently with the period of probation inzosed on Counts 1,2, awd “105 118, and shall commence immediately upon defendant's release fron confinement. IT IS FUXER ADJUDGED that the defendant shall stand comitted until the fines inzoscd herein are paid, or until the defendant is otherwise discharged by due course of law. Tne order that the defencant stand committed is stayed until July 2, 1933. (Foual confinwent sentence is SIX (6) MOVTHS, total protetion is FOUR AND QE-ivur One ($5). YESS, and total fine is TWENTY-TWO THOUSNWD, FIVE HUNDRED ($22,500.00) DOLLS). ce FA en Od Peter artes esapeart DT obered, ot an bw tad y cede oe b thet tha were! Te temete ce @ Got 0ee e wet Mey ripen S. Vt Cewed thee oF ate Hy wertelttowers oF peta tots, te Cotes wel elated Utes footed ab ptt # ot bets BP pete et ate foe tind ant wifes 2 setae beveeem potel-st we matin’ wl bee yeete in ttatiod By bee tet en a wetter ane mS Ts be ee ee eee eo ya Ths Genet ergo eemmitment ty the Custuty of the Attorney Geacral sad 1¢ wernnn ads, - { jx . ee ee " Ce. ee oe | Sueeut Msmktbriwiee so i UNE Re. eel eet wt at wnat 4 dat ote = whos COMTI Dat A Dees COMrw or '; 9 13°94 ae eaeer Jut 2 ee ‘oer by . - re) s. on be aah pai ee AA. > —— esti J oe eA net o Lf Fee F JG. HK. HOORE, 11 JULY 2, 1982 4 3Caceen Vim Ma eermr ane Gere : —! Ai livute App. 9 Exhibit D IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (Before a Referee) CONFIDENTIAL Case No. 67,622 (TFB No. 04B86N18) THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, VU. GEORGE L. ONETT, Respondent. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT COMES NOW The Florida Bar, by and through its undersigned counsel, moves the Referee to issue an order pursuant to Rule 1.190(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allowing Complainant to amend its complaint in the following manner: 1. Respondent’s actions alleged in the complaint violated Integration Rule 11.02(3Xb) (the commission by a lawyer of any act contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney, whether committed within or outside the State of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor, constitutes a cause for App. 10 discipline) in addition to those violations alleged in paragraph 5 of the original complaint. Respectfully submitted, /s/ James N. Watson, Jr. James N. Watson, Jr. Branch Staff Counsel The Florida Bar Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 222-5286 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed by certified mail #640178, return receipt requested, to George L. Onett, Respondent, at his Bar address of 950 N.E. 96th Street, Miami Shores, Florida 33138, and by U.S. Mail to Shalle Stephen Fine, attorney for Respondent at the address of 46 Southwest First Street, Miami, Florida 33130 on this 18th day of November, 1985. /s/ James N. Watson, Jr. James N. Watson, Jr. Branch Staff Counsel App. 11 Exhibit E IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (Before a Referee) CONFIDENTIAL CASE NO. 67,622 THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, US. GEORGE L. ONETT, Respondent. ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FL Bar No..024694 Respondent files his Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint in this case and says: 1. He denies the allegations of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Complaint. 2. Answering paragraph 5, he says that he denies the allegation of the first sentence thereof. Further answering, he admits so much of the second sentence thereof as recites the titles of crimes prescribed by the various sections of Title 18, U.S. Codes referred to therein, but denies that he has been validly convicted thereof. Answering the third sentence thereof, he admits the authenticity of the Judgment and Commitment App. 12 Order attached as Exhibit “‘A’’, but denies that it serves as conclusive proof of his misconduct. On the contrary, he incorporates his Affirmative Defenses set forth below. 3. Affirmatively answering, he avers that his asserted conviction in the case identified in Exhibit “A”’ to the Complaint, was had after waiver of jury trial by a Court who in Respondent’s belief was disqualified from sitting as Judge in his cause. Further Affirmatively answering, Respondent asserts and avers that for the Florida Bar to attempt to proceed to impose any punishment or sanction upon him resulting from that conviction and proceeding, his civil rights as preserved to him by the Constitution of the United States and by Federal Statutes, specifically including without limitations, Title 28, U.S. Code §1983 and would subject the Florida Bar to an action for injunction pursuant to that statute and other available remedies. WHEREBY having fully answered, Respondent prays that the Complaint be dismissed. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Shalle Stephen Fine SHALLE STEPHEN FINE Attorney for Respondent 370 Minorca, Suite 15 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (305) 444-8845 App. 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by mail to: James R. Watson, Jr., Esquire, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, this 27th day of September, 1985. /s/ Shalle Stephen Fine SHALLE STEPHEN FINE App. 14 OL Pane WN eating cE MO ES. 9 tte ~ Exhibit B IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (Before a Referee) CONFIDENTIAL CASE NO. 67,622 (TFB NO. 04B86N18) ~ THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, US. GEORGE L. ONETT, Respondent. REPORT OF THE REFEREE I. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS Pursuant to the undersigned being duly appointed as referee to conduct disciplinary proceedings herein according to The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, the following occurred: On September 10, 1985, the Florida Bar filed its complaint against Respondent and on September 27, 1985 Respondent filed his answer. On November 1, 1985, The Florida Bar filed its Response to the Motion to Maintain Confidentiality in response to Respondent’s Motion to Maintain Confidentiality which was filed on September 27, 1985. The Florida Bar filed its Request for Admissions and a Motion to Amend Complaint on November 18, 1985. Respondent filed an Objection to App. 15 Request for Admissions on December 18, 1985. The Bar responded to the Objection on January 2, 1986. The aforementioned pleadings and this report constitute the record in this case and are forwarded to the Supreme Court of Florida. Il. FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO EACH ITEM OF MISCONDUCT OF WHICH RESPONDENT IS CHARGED. 1. Respondent is, and at a'! times mentioned in this complaint was, a member of The Florida Bar, subject to the jurisdiction and Disciplinary Rules of the Supreme Court of Florida. 2. From on or about November, 1979, to sometime in 1981, Respondent and Harold B. Haimowitz, along with others, sought to extort $15,000 from a local Jacksonville restaurateur in his efforts to obtain a liquor license for his restaurant. Respondent accepted $7,500 cash as a partial payment towards the total extortionate amount. 3. During this same time period, Respondent and his co-extortionists sought to defraud the citizens of the State of Florida, the Department of Business Regulation, and the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco with regard to their review and approval of the restaurateur’s liquor license application. Respondent perpetrated the fraud through intentional misrepresentation and concealment of relevant information. 4. During the investigation of these crimes, Respondent perjured himself before a federal grand jury. App. 16 5. As a result of the actions referenced to in paragraphs 2-4, Respondent was convicted of six felony counts by United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. These felonies included conspiracy to use and cause to be used, the U.S. Postal Service to execute a scheme to defraud and for obtaining property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses and representations; conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion; obstructing interstate commerce by extortion; mail fraud; and making false declarations while under oath before a Federal Grand Jury; all in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 371, 1341, 1623, 1951 and 2. A copy of the Judgment and Commitment Order is attached as Exhibit A and serves as conclusive proof of Respondent’s misconduct referenced in paragraphs 2-4. 6. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(AX1) (a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule); 1-102(AX3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); 1-102(A\4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 1-102(AX5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 1-102(AX6) (a lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law).. Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHETHER RESPONDENT SHOULD BE FOUND GUILTY DR 1-102(AXa) (a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule). App. 17 DR 1-102(AX3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude). DR 1-102(AX4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). DR 1-102(AX5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). DR 1-102(AX6) (a lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Integration Rule 11.02(3Xb) (the commission by a lawyer of any act contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney, whether committed within or outside the State of Florida, and whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor, constitutes a cause for discipline). IV. RECOMMENDATION AS TO DISCIPLINARY MEASURES TO BE APPLIED A) Disbarment from The Florida Bar; B) Payment of $603.86 to The Florida Bar, representing its costs in bringing this action. Such costs shall be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of the Supreme Court’s Order imposing discipline. App. 18 ina NA aS CLA BCs Md a ROR DIONE Set V. PERSONAL HISTORY AND PAST DISCIPLINARY RECORD Prior to recommending discipline pursuant to article XI, Rule 11.06(9XaX4), I considered the following personal history of Respondent, to wit: Age: 56 years old Date Admitted to Bar: November 4, 1966 Prior Discipline: None VI. STATEMENT OF COSTS AND MANNER IN WHICH COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED I find the following costs were reasonably incurred by The Florida Bar: Referee Level 1. Administrative Costs $150.00 2. Court Reporter and Transcript Costs 320.36 3. Bar Counsel Travel and Expenses 133.50 TOTAL $603.86 It is recommended that such costs be charged to Respondent and that interest at the statutory rate shall accrue and be payable beginning 30 days after the judgment on this case becomes final unless a waiver is granted by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar. App. 19 DATED this 20th day of August, 1986. /s/ Stephan P. Mickle STEPHAN P. MICKLE Referee Copies to: James N. Watson, Jr., Bar Counsel of The Florida Bar George L. Onett, Respondent Shalle Stephen Fine, Attorney for Respondent App. 20 i he itt ee tes Ce EXHIBIT A — i a ate Beet eee : United ues Distvret Court aay Bite DE ter Peete ind : Lo Sea a IS, COATE L. OST Ee Ce Ee OS ESE ee fey 100 wens ne. P= L_ Ol-6-Cr-J-t? tn the presence uf the ativeney fur the government Sonn cay Tae the ds tendent appeased in perwn ya thir date —| guy 2 1902 LJ WITHOUT COUNSEL — Haweees tne cnurt sbened Crlendont Of tight te count 6nd sehee whether Erlendent Gruen te. Reve cegmul cppurnied By Ihe cuust and the Gilemdent thertupun waned aretomse oI sevewl. Xu wimmcoussee i. Athur W. Tifford and Shalle S. Fine (Retainod) ) \ Wi GUILTY, ang the court neing saiinfied tht t JNOLOCONTCNUERE, ~XyNOTCUILTY f there © @ Lag tual huis fue the plea, Le NOT GUILTY. Delendent oy dimhorged Tne Beng a tendens GQ00R af — LX Guy. 6 be te ie tree Barat: geeeieg ted as Chatged uf the ellenve|s) al conspiracy to use and causo to be used the “Ca \u. S. Fostal Service to execute a schema to defraud and for obtaining property by moss tiat ( Of false and fraudulent pretenses and representations; conspiracy to obstruct interstate conmarce by extortion; obstructing interstate commerce by extortion; rail fraud; and making false declarations while under oath before a Federal Grand Jwy; all in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 371, 1341, 1623, 1951 and 2, as charced in Counts 1, 2, 4, 9, 18, and 19 of the Indictment. a _— TT) Tie cera ated mneadar elena sat Bad sey thing te Ley why judyment chauid not he Froneunie’. Ketouee Py walla sit secs ew woe ee Ry te alt ated he he Greet, tht Coutl adpud sed Whe delendent guilty a whatzed smd Conri.u 6 ana sodered wat” bee atone + dhe hoe em atnty od thn Rttewnry Gonas d ae tein ruthowese d spre seed tens Hoet repr eemmncts tee ase tee ~PIVE (5) YEARS ard FIND $7,500.00 on Count 1; FIVE (5) YEARS and FINED $7,500.00 on Count 2, s3ic term of imprisonment to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 1; ’ FIVE (5S) YEARS and FRED $7,500.00 on Count 18, said tema of imprisonment to run ¢ concurrently with the sentences imposed on Counts 1 and 2; and on condition that as +. $ ALS ard 18, the defendant be confined in a jail-type or trcatrent institutio- for a pericd of SIX (6) MONTHS, the execution of the rensinder of the sentence c! imprisonment is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation for a period of FOS Spe O.E-iHALF ($4) YEARS, upon the standing conditions of probation, to commence isrediacely upon defendant's release fram confinewent. IT IS FUNT