# Appendix — Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department of Social Services

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 829

## Text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

DAVID GLEN MEYERS, et al., Petitioners,
Vi

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
sie FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

LINSEY J. FREEMAN, ESQ.
219 Broadway
Richmond, CA 94804
(415) 235-5651
Counsel of Record

VAUGHN E. SPUNAUGLE, ESQ.
207 - 37th Street
Richmond, CA 94805
(415) 620-0398

Counsel for Petitioners

June 10, 1987

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion and Judgment
OF DOuUrt OF Reese «. «+ « ss ww ~ = ©

Memorandum Decision of
District Court oe Cat ee oe oe ae ee ae 27a

David Glen MEYERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
Vv. :
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.,
Defendant-Appellees.
No. 85-2127
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 11, 1986.

Decided March 16, 1987.

Father, his children and his parents
brought civil rights action against various
parties, including social service workers,
court employees and county department of
social services based on their actions dur-
ing dependency proceeding. The United
States District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of California, Marilyn H. Patel, J.,

la

granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Schroeder, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) so-
cial services worker was entitled to prose-
cutorial immunity for his role in initiation
of dependency proceedings; (2) employees

of conciliation court who allegedly refused
to allow father visitation rights and at-
tempted to bias foster parents were enti-
tled to quasi-judicial immunity; and (3)
county department of social services could
not be held liable for unauthorized activi-
ties of its employees.

Affirmed.

1. Social Security and Public Welfare -5

Social services worker was entitled to
prosecutorial immunity for his role in initi-
ating dependency proceedings against fa-
ther. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

2. Social Security and Public Welfare «5

2a

Social workers are entitled to absolute
immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial
functions connected with initiation and pur-
suit of child dependency proceedings.

3. Social Security and Public Welfare #5

Social services worker was entitled to
qualified immunity for ordering father to
stay away from his home before dependen-
cy hearing. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's
Ann.Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code § 16501.

4. Courts <55

Employees of conciliation court who
allegedly refused to allow father visitation
rights and attempted to bias foster parents
were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity;
employees were performing judicial func-
tion at direction of court, controversy in-
volved pending case to which they had been
assigned, and events at issue arose directly
and immediately out of confrontation be-

tween employees and parties in that case.

3a

42 U.6.C.A. § i963.
5. Civil Rights -13.7

County department of social services
could not be held liable for unauthorized
activities of its employees during child de-

pendency proceeding. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Vaughn E. Spunaugle, Richmond, Cal.,
for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jeffrey G. Nevin, San Francisco, Cal.,
and Thomas A. Watrous, Martinez, Cal.,
for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Califor-

nia.

Before SCHROEDER, CANBY and
BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we must decide whether a

social service worker performing duties re-

4a

lated to the filing of child custody and
abuse proceedings has absolute prosecuto-
rial immunity. We must also decide wheth-
er principles of quasi-judicial immunity ap-
ply to court employees participating under
court directives in the resolution of family
disputes.

The plaintiffs are David Meyers, his
children and i parents. They brought this
Civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against David's former wife Amy, and nu-
merous individual and governmental de-
fendants. They claimed that the defend-
ants conspired, under color of state law and
without due process of law, to prevent the
adult plaintiffs from associating with the
minor plaintiffs in deprivation of a liberty
interest. The district court dismissed as
to all defendants. The plaintiffs appeal
only the dismissals as to appellees Haaland,
a social worker, Allison and Crossley, em-

Sa

ployees of the Family Conciliation Court,
and the Contra Costa County Department
of Social Services (DSS). We hold, first,
that Haaland was entitled to absolute pros-
ecutorial immunity for all of his actions
except those which preceded the institution
of judicial proceedings and as to those ac-
tions, qualified immunity applies; second,
that Allison and Crossley were entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity for their actions;
and, third that the plaintiffs never demon-
strated that the acts complained of were
pursuant to a policy or practice of the DSS.
We affirm the district court in all respects.
Haaland

Haaland was a social casework specialist
employed by the DSS in its Children's Pro-
tective Services Unit. Among his numer-
ous responsibilities were the initiation and
pursuit of dependency petitions in cases of
Suspected child neglect and abuse. His

6a

bilateral

alleged conduct about which plaintiffs com-
plain in this appeal was directly related to
those functions.

Plaintiffs claim that, beginning on Octo-
ber 9, 1981, Haaland conspired with Amy
Meyers to deprive David Meyers of custody
of their children. According to the com-
plaint, after being told by Amy that David
had molested their son Paul, Haaland on
barked on a course of conduct designed to
separate Paul from his family by supervis-
ing an investigation and filing verified de-
pendency petitions with the juvenile court
of the Contra Costa County Superior Court
requesting that the minor children be de-
clared dependents of the juvenile court and
removed from the custody of their father.

In this appeal plaintiffs place particu-
lar emphasis on the ailegation that on Octo-
ber 23, 1981, Haaland ordered David to stay

away from his home until after a judicial

Ja

hearing could take place on October 26,
altheugh Haaland knew that the police de-
partment had terminated its investigation
for lack of evidence. At the October 26
hearing, Haaland stated that he would ar-
range for supervised visitation between
David and his children. Accordina to the
complaint, Haaland permitted David only
one opportunity to visit with his children
between the date the petition was filed,
October 26, and the date it was dismissed
pursuant to Haaland's recommendation,
November 17.

The complaint also states that in a Janu-
ary 19, 1982 custody hearing, Haaland in
furtherance of his conspiracy with Amy to
deprive David of custody, testified to his
conclusion that David had molested Paul.
Haaland's role appears to have ceased at
this point. David was eventually reunited
with his children when a superior court

8a

ieee

awarded him custody on January 23, 1984.

All of Haaland's challenged actions ex-
cept for the January 1982 testimony took
place within a short period of time--be-
tween October 9, 1981, and November 17,
1981. All revolve around Haaland's initi-
ation of dependency proceedings against
David. They include his instructions to
David before proceedings were instituted
to stay away from the children until custo-
dy had been resolved, and his subsequent
testimony against David in the dependency
proceedings. The district court held that
Haaland was entitled to absolute immunity
for these actions. We agree as to all ex-
cept actions which were taken before the
institution of judicial proceedings.

It is beyond question that Haaland is
entitled to absolute immunity for the testi-
mony he gave during the dependency pro-
ceedings and the custody hearing because

9a

witnesses, including government witnesses,
are immune from liability for their testimo-
ny. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103
S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).

[1] Haaland should be accorded prose-
cutorial immunity for his role in the initi-
ation of dependency proceedings against
Meyers. The Supreme Court has held that
prosecutorial immunity derives from a need
for the exercise of independent judgment in

\

the conduct of public duties. MImbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423, 96 S.Ct. 984,
991, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Prosecutorial
immunity is absolute, rather than qualified,
in order to permit prosecutors to perform
vedic duties without fear of even the threat
of section 1983 litigation. If the prosecu-
tor were only gualifiedly immune,

the threat of § 1983 suits would under-

mine performance of his duties no less

than would the threat of common-law

10a

rE EE om

suits for malicious prosecution. A prose-
cutor is duty bound to exercise his best
judgment both in deciding which suits to
bring and in conducting them in court.
The public trust of the prosecutor's of-
fice would suffer if he were constrained
in making every decision by the conse-
quences in terms of his own potential
liability in a suit for damages.... Fur-
ther, if the prosecutor could be tints to
answer in court each time ... a person
charged him with wrongdoing, his ener~

gy and attention would be diverted from
the pressing duty of enforcing the crimi-
nal law.

Frequently acting under serious
constraints of time and even information,
a prosecutor inevitably makes many deci-
sions that could engender colorable
claims of constitutional deprivation. De-

fending these decisions, often years after

lla

a

owl

they were made, could impose unique

and intolerable burdens upon a prosecu-
tor responsible annually for hundreds of
indictments and trials.

Id. at 424-26, 96 S.Ct. at 992-93; see also

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98

S.Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)
("{a]bsolute immunity is ... necessary to
assure that judges, advocates, and witness-
es can perform their respective functions
without harassment or intimidation").

{2} Although child services workers do
not initiate criminal proceedings, their re-
sponsibility for bringing dependency pro-
ceedings, and their responsibility to exer-
cise independent judgment in determining
when to bring such proceedings, is not very
different from the responsibility of a crimi-
nal prosecutor. The social worker must
make a quick decision based on perhaps
incomplete information as to whether to

12a

commence investigations and initiate pro-
ceedings against parents who may have
abused their children. The social worker's
independence, like that of a prosecutor,
would be compromised were the social

worker constantly in fear that a mistake
could result in a time-consuming and finan-
cially devastating Civil suit. We therefore
hold that social workers are entitled to
absolute immunity in performing quasi-
prosecutorial functions connected with the
initiation and pursuit of child dependency
proceedings. Such a holding is consistent

with the holdings of other courts. See,

e.

-, Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456,

1458 (6th Cir.1984); Pepper v. Alexander,

599 F.Supp. 523, 526-27 (D.N.M.1984) ;

Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558

F.Supp. 1093, 1098-99 (W.D.N.Y.1983).
[3] We do not agree, however, that all
of Haaland's alleged conduct falls within -

l3a

the scope of quasi-prosecutorial activities.
On October 23, Haaland allegedly ordered
Meyers to stay away from his home until
after the hearing before the: juvenile court.
At that time, Haaland had not yet initiated
dependency proceedings. Haaland is not
entitled to absolute immunity for this act.

In Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th

Cir.1986) (en banc), we examined the con-
tours of both judicial and prosecutorial im-
munity. We stated:

Prosecutorial immunity has developed
along much the same lines as judicial
immunity. Immunity extends to protect
a prosecutor who acts within his or her
authority and in a quasi-judicial capaci-
ty.... Where a prosecutor acts as an
advocate "in initiating the prosecution
and in presenting the state's case," abso-
lute immunity applies.

Id. at 1076 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at

l4a

431, 96 S.Ct. at 995). Haaland's ordering
of Meyers away from his home can be
characterized neither as advocatory or qua-
si-judicial. Haaland's action did not aid
him in the preparation or presentation of
his case to the juvenile court. Compare

Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149 (2d

Cir.1984) (absolute immunity for social ser-
vices attorney who requested warrant to
insure testimony of witnesses.). Rather
than contributing to an informed judgment

by an impartial decisionmaker as an advo-

cate, Haaland acted unilaterally prior to the

Operation of the judicial process. We do
not suggest that Haaland's alleged action
was necessarily improper; it was merely
not that of an advocate.

Furthermore, the policy considerations

that support quasi-judicial immunity do not

apply to Haaland's action. In Sellars v.
Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert.
15a

denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70
L.Ed.2d 644 (1981), we considered the justi-
fication for the doctrine of quasi-judicial
immunity. After examining the benefits of
absolute immunity for certain decisionmak-

ers, we stated:

Nevertheless, the balance might not be
struck in favor of absolute immunity
were it not for the presence of safe-
guards built into the judicial process that
tend to reduce the need for private dam-
age actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct.

Id. at 1300. We then quoted a portion of
the following passage from Butz.

The cluster of immunities protecting
the various participants in judge-super-
vised trials stems from the characteris-
tics of the judicial process rather than
its location....

l6a

...- [T]he safeguards built into the ju-
dicial process tend to reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of
controlling unconstitutional conduct.

The insulation of the judge from political
influence, the importance of precedent in
resolving controversies, the adversary
nature of the process, and the correcta-
bility of error on appeal are just a few of
the many checks on malicious action by
judges.... Because these features of
the judicial process tend to enhance the
reliability of information and the impar-
tiality of the decisionmaking process,
there is a less pressing need for individu-
al suits to correct censtitutional error.
438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14.
Haaland's alleged decision to order Mey-
ers away from his house was made in the
absence of such "safeguards built into the

judicial process." Haaland himself was not

l7a

subject to the checks operating on judicial
decisionmakers, nor was his decision part
of or ancillary to pending judicial proceed-
ings supervised by a judge.

Although absolute freedom from the
threat of unfounded lawsuits is an ideal
condition for decisionmaking, such freedom
is the rare exception to the rule. See id.
at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 2911-12. We conclude
that, like the decisions of other officials
acting in a non-judicial role, it is the
qualified immunity standard which must govern
Haaland's immunity defense for the al-
leged action of ordering Meyers from his
house. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,

104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Har-

low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, iG2 3.Ct.

2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). See also Du-

chesne v. Sugarman, 506 F.2d S17 (2a Cir.

1977) (applying qualified immunity doctrine

to conduct of social worker when no court

~

18a

proceedings had been filed). Haaland's de-
q cision to order Meyers away from his house
is sufficiently protected by that doctrine.
In Duchesne, the social worker actually
| took custody of the children, instituted no
' court proceedinas, and for many months
refused the parent's demands for a hear-
ing. 566 F.2d at 822-24. The Second Cir-
cuit held that the parent's rights had been
violated and that triable issues were raised
as to the applicability of the qualified im-
munity defense. Id. at $33. We have
found no cases Similar to this one, however,
in which the social worker acted promptly
to institute vroceedings after unilaterally
attempting to influence a parent-child rela-
tionship. Under the doctrine of qualified
immunity, executive officers are shielded
from liability where "their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable per-

19a

son would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S.

at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Under California
law, social workers are given broad general
authority to protect and promote the wel-
fare of all children; to prevent or remedy
problems which may result in the neglect

or abuse of children. Cal.Welf. & Inst.
Code § 16501 (West Supp.1987). The rele-
vant pre-1982 section provided that a

"child protective services program ... shall
take such actions as are considered neces-
Sary to protect the child and correct the

Situation....” Cal.Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 16501 (West 1980). Haaland's conduct
On October 23, which indisputably involved
no physical interference with parental cus-

tody, cannot be said to have violated clearly

‘
2 Pa RR SRNR Gh BIRR PAC GR TO Nag hn RR Bae NTR ih ei aaa a ca a

er ahs.
en ae

established statutory or constitutional

rights.

She mAL TOG

Allison and Crossley
[4] Crossley is a "Supervising counselor"

20a

StS Ree UOT Ae OE ene

and Allison is an "associate counselor"

of the Family Conciliation Court. Their
positions were created by the Family Con-
ciliation Court Act and they are employees
of the court. Their duties, as described by
Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 1744, encompass medi-
ation of custody and visitation disputes,
investigating matters pertaining to such
disputes, and providing reports to the
courts.

During the fall of 1977, the parents, Amy
and David Meyers, together with the pater-
nal grandparents, participated ina series of
voluntary counseling sessions conducted by
Allison under the auspices of the Family
Conciliation Court. The adult plaintiffs al-
lege that during these sessions Allison be-
came biased against them. They further
allege that at some point during the latter
half of 1981, but before October 8, 1981,

Amy made allegations of child abuse to

2la

Se. TRAPP Le Rela Re Si 6 Se : Laas Meee full PR hes SR cote eta at es PE lee RIN ee ve ee 4 f

oN

Allison who willfully failed to discuss them
with David or to otherwise investigate
them. The complaint alleges that on No-
vember 16, 1981, David and Amy attended
a mandatory conciliation session with a
counselor from the Family Conciliation
Court, and that upon learning of the ses-
sion, Allison induced Crossley to reassign
the case to her in spite of her bias against
David. ‘

The complaint further alleges that from
November 19, 1981, through January 21,
1982, Allison refused to arrange for visita-
tion between David and his children in will-
ful violation of a court order requiring her
to arrarge such visits. The complaint con-
tinues that on or about April 7, 1982, Cross-
ley and Allison visited the foster parents in
whose care the court had placed the chil-
dren and attempted to induce them to re-

fuse David and his parents the right to see

22a

the children.

The district court held that Allison and

Crossley, as officers of the court, were

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. We
have granted quasi-judicial immunity to

various officers of the court. See, e.g.,

Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1486 (9th

Cir.1986) (clerk of the United States Su-

preme Court); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d

4
‘@
a
3 ;
q
4
A
4
oe
%
#

Z. J
AS

155, 158 (9th Cir.1985) (probation officers) ;

Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303 (parole officers).

face oS ete

2 Based on these precedents, we agree

- with the district court that as officers of

4 the court Allison and Crossley have abso-
lute immunity in the performance of duties
authorized by the statute. Although the
plaintiffs allege that certain actions taken
by Allison and Crossley constituted viola-
tions of court orders, absolute immunity is
lost only if these actions were "clearly and
completely outside the scope of [Allison's

23a

and Crossley's] jurisdiction." Demoran,
781 F.2d at 158. Their actions were not
outside that scope.

Allison and Crossley were performing a

judicial function at the direction of a court.

The controversy involved a pending case to
which they had been assigned, and the
events at issue arose directly and immedi-
ately out of a confrontation between the
defendants and parties in that case. The
allegations that Allison and Crossley re-
fused to aliow David visitation rights and
attempted to bias the foster parents are
not materially different from the allegation
that a judge and prosecutor conspired to
deprive a prisoner of effective counsel and

access to legal materials. In Ashelman,

we held the latter allegation insufficient
to overcome judicial and prosecutorial immu-

nity. 793 F.2d at 1078.

24a

The County Department of Social Services

[5] The district court held that the
plaintiffs had made an insufficient showing
that the acts complained of in this case
were pursuant to an established policy or
practice as required by Monell v. Depart-

ment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691,

98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

We agree with the district court that
a close reading of the first count of the
complaint indicates that it is not the poli-
cies themselves that are alleged to give
rise to the constitutional deprivations of
which plaintiffs complain. Rather, the
complaint states that various unautho-
rized actions were committed by the
named defendants in furtherance of an
alleged conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of
custody of the children.

Because municipalities are not liable for

the unauthorized activities of their employ-

25a

ss

ees, the district court correctly dismissed
the claim as to DSS.
Affirmed.

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge, dissenting
in part:

I believe that the Meyers have stated -
sufficient allegations of deprivation of stat-
utory and constitutional parental rights by
alleging that Haaland ordered David Meyers
to stay away from his home. I would
remand for resolution of the factual issues

involved in a qualified immunity defense.

26a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID GLEN MEYERS, GEORGE)
ALBERT MEYERS, GEORGIA )
ANN MEYERS, PAUL DAVID )
MEYERS, a minor, MATTHEW )
CHRISTOPHER MEYERS, a )
minor, ANGELA JENNIFER )
MEYERS, a minor, by their)
next friend, )
DAVID GLEN MEYERS.

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, AMY GARCIA
MEYERS, NANCY BOWMAN,
HAROLD HAALAND, also
known aS HAROLD BUEIDE,
FAMILY CONCILIATION COURT)
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF )
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, KAY )
CROSSLEY, AGNES H. )
ALLISON, JAMES PALMER, )
and FAMILIES UNITED )
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT )
BOARD, INC., a corpora- )
)
)
=

)
)
)
)
)
)
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY )
)
)
)
)
)

tion,

Defendants.

NO. C-84-6381-MHP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged violations

27a

of their constitutional rights resultin

from state proceedings removing the minor
plaintiffs (Matthew, Angela and Paul Meyers)
from the custody of their father (David
Meyers) and paternal grandparents (George
and Georgia Meyers). Named as defendants in
their official and individual capacities are
the children's mother Amy Meyers, the Contra
Costa County Department of Social Services
("DDS"), DDS social worker Haaland, the
Family Conciliation Court of the Suverior
Court of Contra Costa County ("FCC"), FCC
Director Crossley, FCC Counselor Allison,
Families United Resource Development Board
("FU"), FU psychologist Palmer, and FU em-
ployee Bowman.

The gravamen of the civil rights claim
is that the various defendants conspired to
deprive the adult plaintiffs of contact with
the children. Plaintiffs also bring pendent
state claims for intentional infliction of

28a

emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, libel, and slander. They
seek $16 million in damages for each alleged
constitutional violation and $20 million for
each pendent claim.

Defendants have moved to dismiss or for
summary judgment. Having considered the
parties' papers and heard oral argument the
court grants defendants' motions and dis-
misses the §1983 and vendent state claims.

Background

The facts as presented in the complaint
and the parties' supporting papers are as
follows: On October 8, 1981 Amy Meyers
("Amy") and Haaland allegedly entered into a
conspiracy to deprive Davis Meyers ("David")
of the custody of his children. Amy told
Haaland that David had sexually molested
one of the children (Paul), and a Haaland's
instruction brought Paul to the DSS Chil-

dren's Protective Service facility the next

29a

day. Haaland "interrogated" Paul at that
time, and summoned Richmond and San Pablo
police officers who again "interrogated"
Paul about the charges. Complaint at 4 42.
When David arrived at the DSS facility to
look for Paul he too was detained and inter-
rogated by the police officers. Paul was
taken to Brookside Hospital for a medical
examination. +/
On October 23 the San Pablo Police De-
partment informed David it had terminated its
investigation of the child molestation
charges for lack of evidence. David communi-
cated this fact to Haaland and informed
Haaland he was going home to see his chil-
dren. Haaland allegedly ordered David to
Stay away from his home pending a hearing on
October 26 regarding a dependency petition
filed by Haaland pursuant to Cal. Welf. &
2/

See Haaland Dec. at

Inst. Code §300(a)
«5. David claims that Haaland knew or should

30a

have known the statements in the petition
were false. Complaint at 6 46.

David, his attorney, Amy and Haaland
appeared before a Juvenile Court Referee on
October 26. The Referee detained Pail in
Amy's custody due to "immediate and urgent
necessity for [his] protection. See Find-
ings and Order of Referee on Detention
(Reply Brief of Harold Haaland, Exh. A).
Plaintiffs claim that as a result of this
hearing Haaland unlawfully assumed control of
visitation over the children. Complaint at
7 17.2/

The hearing on the dependency petition
was continued until November 17, David, his
parents, and his attorney attended the hear-_
ing, at which time the petition was dis-
missed pursuant to Haaland's recommendation.
Haaland states that he so recommended

"because the mother was doing everything she

3la

could to protect the child and had agreed to
continue protective services on a voluntary
basis . . ." Haaland Dec. at #7. Plaintiffs
claim that this dismissal denied them an
opportunity to be heard regarding the allega-
tions against them. Complaint at 8 #8. How-
ever, plaintiffs' attorney withdrew his ob-
jection to the dismissal. Haaland Dec. at
q7.

Meanwhile, Amy had initiated divorce
proceedings and had obtained a temporary re-
straining order forbidding David from oc-
cupying or approaching the family residence.
On November 16 David and Amy attended a man-
datory conciliation session with an FCC
counselor. Plaintiffs claim that defendant
Allison, who had developed an "aversion to
and bias against" the plaintiffs following
voluntary counseling sessions in 1977, in-
duced defendant Crossley to assign the Meyers

case to her. Plaintiffs allege that Allison

32a

acted pursuant to a conspiracy with Amy.
Complaint at 9 42, 10 43, 11 45.

At a Superior Court hearing on November
19 the court awarded temporary custody to Amy
pursnant to the following stipulation re-
garding visitation: "Visitation shall take
place under the supervision of the Concilia-
tion Court and in the presence of a neutral
adult to be selected by the Conciliation
Court." Complaint at 11 #6. Plaintiffs
allege that defendant Allison refused to ar-
range for visitation between November 19,
1981 and January 29, 1982 in violation of
court order.

Haaland referred the Meyers case to FU
for psychological examination in November
1981. In January 1982 defendant Palmer
issued a report concluding that David had
sexually molested Paul and recommending no
contact between Paul and his father or

grandparents. Plaintiffs claim that Palmer

33a

was acting in concert with Haaland and Amy
and knew or should have known that the al#
legations were false. Complaint at 12 48.
On January 29, 1982 a second custody/
visitation hearing commenced before the
Superior Court. Haaland and Palmer testified
at the hearing. Plaintiffs allege that the
defendants knew or should have known their
testimony was false. Complaint at 12 49.
The hearing was continued until February 5,
at which time the court awarded custody to
Amy and found that visitation between David
and the children should commence as soon as
an appropriate "neutral" monitor was ap-
pointed. The court expressed concern re-
garding Amy's attitude towards reestablish-
ment of contact between the father and the
children and stated that without a signifi-
cant change in this attitude the court would
remove the children from her custody and

place them with the father or a third party.

34a

Myers v. Myers, No. 228557, slip op. at 2

(Sup. Ct. February 5, 1982) (FU Motion to
Dismiss, Exh. A).

Foster care parents (the Richardsons)
took custody of the Meyers children on March
29 pursuant to court order. The court or-
dered Crossley to make a home visit to the
Richardsons and make a written report.
Plaintiffs allege that Crossley and Allison
visited the Richardsons' home on March 29,
1982 and attempted to influence the Richard-
sons against David and his parents. Com-
plaint at 12 412. Plaintiffs further allege
that Amy so harassed the Richardsons in
furtherance of her conspiracy with Haaland
that on April 9 the Richardsons surrendered
custody of the children to Amy. Complaint
at 14-15 413. David eventually was awarded

custody in January 1984. Myers v. Myers,

No. 228557, slip op. at 2 (Sup. Ct. January

23, 1984) (FU Motion to Dismiss Exh. B).

35a

Discussion

. + Counts One and Two

Counts one and two of the instant com-
plaint attempt to state claims under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. The first count pertains to those
activities prior to the dismissal of the
dependency petition on November 17, 1981,
i.e., the initial removal of the minor
plaintiffs from the custody of the father.

The second count addresses alleged violations
relating to the custody proceeding before the
Superior Court. For the reasons set forth
below, the complaint fails in the first
instance because the constitutional viola-
tions alleged do not state claims under 42
U.S.C. §1983. Even were the alleged viola- ;
tions sufficient, the complaint would fail
because plaintiffs may not proceed under

that statute against any of the named defen-

dants.

36a

A. Failure to State a Claim

Section 1983 provides a cause of action
for the "deprivation of any right, privilege
or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Defendants do not dispute that the
right of both parents and children to remain
together without the "coercive interference
of the awesome power of the state" is a

liberty interest protected by the constitu-

tion. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817,
825 (2nd Cir. 1977). However, the existence
of a protected right alone does not suffice
to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. In
order to survive a motion to dismiss, plain-
tiffs must also allege that they were de-
privec of their liberty interests under color

of state law without due process. Parratt v.

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981) (distinguish-

ing between the existence of a protected

37a

interest and the deprivation of that interest
without due process). This plaintiffs have
failed to do.

In Parratt v. Taylor, the Court ruled

that when an individual is deprived of
property by the unauthorized, negligent con-
duct of state officials there is no due
process violation as long as the state pro-
vides meaningful post-deprivation remedies.
The Court reasoned that pre-deprivation
remedies are not feasible when,a state em-
ployee acts ina random and unauthorized man-
ner rather than pursuant to state procedures
because the state cannot predict when such
actions will occur. The Court found its
decision consistent with prior rulings that

either the necessity of

quick action by the State

or the impracticality of

providing any meaningful

predeprivation process,
4 when coupled with the

availability of some mean-
ingful means by-which to

38a

assess the propriety of
the State's action at some
time after the initial
taking, can satisfy the
requirements of procedural
due process.

451 U.S. at 539 (footnote omitted). The
Supreme Court applied this reasoning to un-
authorized intentional deprivation of
property in Hudson v. Palmer, __U.S. __,
104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). The Ninth Circuit
has extended Parratt to deprivations of

liberty interests. Haygood v. Younger, 718

F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983), rehearing

granted en banc, 729 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1984);

Bretz v. Kelman, 722 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.

1983); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents,

* 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom

4 cara eanensNR UaE

Parratt and its progeny do not apply
when state policies and procedures are
claimed to violate constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs allege that the DSS regulations as

: 39a

iH

carried out by Haaland, including its policy
of “crediting all allegations of child sexual
abuse regardless of circumstances," violated
their constitutional rights. Complaint at

8 49. The complaint is no more specific as
to the particular policies at issue. However,
the policy articulated by plaintiffs, the
actions of Haaland as alleged, and the pro-
visions of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §300

et seq. convince the court that the purpose
of the policies of which plaintiffs complain
is to provide immediate relief to children

in an emergency situation. Accordingly,
policies allowing for immediate removal of a
child from the custody of a parent charged
with sexual abuse do not violate due process
as long as the parent may be heard on the
action at a subsequent proceeding. Ewing

v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 598

(1950) ("no hearing at the preliminary stage
[of an administrative proceeding] is required

40a

-
.
‘

< ake ——

> .
_ — *
—__

_

by due process as long as the requisite
hearing is held before the final administra-

tive order becomes effective"). See also

Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d at 826 (find-

ing that "the initial removal of the children
without parental consent or a prior court
order was permissible" in response to an

emergency Situation); Williams v. Birzon,

576 F. Supp. 577, 579 (W.D.N.¥. 1983), aff'd
740 F.2d 955 (2nd Cir. 1984) ("the state's
obligation to protect the health and safety
of minor children authorizes an award of
temporary custody without a pre-deprivation
hearing”). The complaint itself indicates
that plaintiffs were present at hearings on
the matter within three weeks of the initial
deprivation. Thus, plaintiffs cannot claim
that the DSS policies themselves violated
their constitutional rights.2/
Moreover, a close reading of the first

count of the complaint indicates that it is

4la

not the policies themselves that are al-
leged to give rise to the constitutional
deprivations of which plaintiffs complain.
Rather, the complaint states that various un-
authorized actions were committed by the
named defendants in furtherance of an alleged
conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of custody
of the children. For example, Haaland is
charged with detaining and interrogating
David, ordering him to stay away from his
home, and assuming control of visitation »
without lawful authority, and with filing a
false dependency petition. Such actions are
precisely the types of unauthorized conduct
which, for purposes of §1983, can be cor-
rected by the opportunity for post-depriva-
tion review.

As noted, the complaint itself makes
clear that plaintiffs were afforded an op-
portunity to be heard on the award of tempo-
rary custody to the mother shortly after the

42a

children were removed from the father: Paul
was first removed from David's custody on
October 9, 1982, and hearings on the matter
were held on October 26 and November 17. The
instant case thus differs significantly from

Duchesne v. Sugarman, where the court found

a due process violation when the state did
not seek to obtain ratification of its order
to retain custody of the children for 36
months after they were taken from the mother,
and only after the mother had initiated
habeas corpus proceedings. 566 F.2d at 826.
The court finds due process requirements

satisfied in this case. Accord Whelehan v.

County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1102

(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (distinguishing Duchesne and

finding state remedies subsequent to removal
of child from parental custody adequate to
satisfy due process).

The complaint further alleges that
Haaland's dismissal of the dependency

43a

petition violated plaintiffs' rights because
it deprived them of the opportunity to be
heard regarding the allegations against them.
Even if the dismissal of the petition im-
pinged on protected liberty interest, the
complaint fails to state a claim for depri-
vation of constitutional rights in light of
state procedures designed to compel commence-
ment of juvenile court proceedings. See Cal.
Welf. & Inst. Code. §331.°/ Moreover, the
complaint itself makes clear that custody/
visitation hearings were commenced before
the Superior Court two days after Haaland
dismissed the petition.

Finally, count two of the complaint
charges various defendants with depriving
the adult plaintiffs of their constitutional
right of contact with the children by inter-
fering with the visitation agreement estab-
lished by the Superior Court. This count
also charges defendants with improperly

44a

a I NE the DMS NN iB

influencing the custody determination. The
actions of which plaintiffs complain, which
allegedly were "overt acts" in furtherance
of the alleged conspiracy, include Allison's
failure to arrange for visitation of the
children by the father, Palmer's filing of
a false report, Palmer's and Haaland's
giving of false testimony at custody hear-
ings, and Allison's and Crossley's attempt
to influence the Richardsons.

Again, these allegations fail to state
a claim because adequate state post-depriva-
tion remedies were available to redress the
alleged violations. For example, plaintiffs
had ample recourse to state contempt pro-
cedures to compel state officials to comply
with the orders of the Superior Court re-
garding visitation. Moreover, the facts as
alleged show that the custody proceedings be-
fore the Superior Court were ongoing after

the initial award of custody to Amy and that

45a -

the adult plaintiffs ultimately were awarded
custody of the children. The court finds the
continued opportunity to litigate the cus-
tody determination in this case satisfies

the requirement of due process. Accord

Williams v. Birzon, 576 F. Supp. at 579-80
(finding that the numerous opportunities to
challenge an award of temporary custody af-
forded plaintiff adequate due process of law).
In sum, the availability and, indeed,
the utilization of various state proceedings
in which the adult plaintiffs could litigate
custody and/or visitation of the children
precludes an action for deprivation of con-

stitutional rights under §1983. It is the

opportunity for a meaningful hearing that

determines the adequacy of procedural due
process, not the result of such a hearing.
"While it is conceivable that state judicial
machinery might be used to deprive a person
of his property without due process of law[,]

46a

in order to make out such a case under

the Civil rights act, a plaintiff must show
that federally protected rights were denied
in state proceedings whieh were so abused or
manipulated that they were in effect a nul-
Laity.” Gili v. Gill, 412 Pf. Supp. 1153, 11257
(E.D. Pa. 1976). The facts pleaded in the
instant complaint do not make such a showing.
B. Failure to Name Proper Defendants
Plaintiffs argue that their allegations
of conspiracy to deprive them of custody of
the children, coupled with the identification

of various "overt acts," suffice to survive
a motion to dismiss. However, the instant
complaint is wholly lacking in specific
facts showing that Amy, Haaland, the FCC em-
ployees, and the FU employees conspired to
deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights. Conclusory allegations are insuf-
ficient to state claims under the civil
rights statutes. Hutchinson v. United

47a

=

States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).

Moreover, many of the "overt acts," such as
the allegations regarding Crossley and
Allison's visit to the Richardsons, are not
the proximate cause of the alleged depriva-
tions.

Even if the overt acts alleged would
constitute acts in furtherance of conspiracy
to violate plaintiffs' civil rights, this
action must be dismissed because plaintiffs
may not proceed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against
any of the named defendants.

1. The Family Conciliation Court

Cal. Civ. Pro. §1740 provides that
"{eJach superior court shall exercise the
jurisdiction conferred by this chapter, and
while sitting in the exercise of such juris-
diction shall be known and referred to as the
"family conciliation court." Thus, the FCC
is the same entity as the Superior Court.

State courts are not subject to suit under

48a

1

42 U.S.C. §1983. O'Connor v. Nevada, 686

F.2d 749 (9th Cir.) cert. denied., 459 U.S.
1071 (1982) (dismissing civil rights action
against state court under Eleventh Amendment).

2. Allison and Crossley

Crossley is a "Supervising counselor"
and Allison is an "associate counselor" of
the FCC. Their positions are created by the
Family Conciliation Court Act; they are
hired and fired by the Court, and their
duties are described by statute. Cal. Civ.
Pro. §1744. These duties encompass those
described in the instant complaint: conduct-
ing mediation of custody and visitation dis-
putes, investigating matters pertaining to
such disputes, and providing reports to the
court. Inasmuch as Crossley and Allison are
officers of the court and the actions of
which plaintiffs complain were performed in
the course of their employment, they are en-

titled to "quasi-judicial" immunity, even for

49a

°
allegedly conspiratorial acts. Agnew v.

Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).

Plaintiffs argue that immunity should
extend to officers of the court only if they
perform prosecutoral functions. Plaintiffs
ignore the developments in the doctrine of
immunity in civil rights cases, which extends
immunity to numerous officers of the court,
including those performing functions similar

to these defendants. See, e.g., Burkes v.

Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971) (quasi-judicial
immunity extended to probation officers. and

court-appointed psychiatrists).

3. Harold Haaland

Haaland is a social worker employed by
the Contra Costa County Department of Social
Services. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300 et
seq. gives him the discretion to determine
whether to take a child into protective

50a

custody and whether to file a dependency
petition with the state in cases of suspected
child abuse. These duties resemble those of
a prosecutor with respect to child welfare
cases.

Haaland argues that he should be af-
forded absolute immunity for his actions in

this case. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409 (1976), the Court granted prosecutors
absolute immunity from liability under 42
U.S.C. §1983. The court reasoned the "pub-
lic trust" would suffer if prosecutors had
to make decisions regarding which cases to
initiate and pursue while contemplating per-
sonal liability for their actions. 424 U.S.
424-25. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 512 (1978) ("Absolute immunity is
necessary to assure that judges, advocates,
and witnesses can perform their respective

functions without harassment or intimida-

tion").

Plaintiffs appear to concede that
Haaland is immune from suit to the extent

that his actions are prosecutorial. How-

ever, they argue that he should not be af-
forded immunity for non-prosecutorial actions
taken after he dismissed the depnendency

petition. Plaintiffs cite Morrison v. Jones,

607 F.20 21269, igre (9th Cir. i973), cert.

denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980), for the provosi-
tion that DSS employees should not be af-
forded immunity. This case is not on point.

The DSS employee at issue in Morrison was the

Director of the Department, who was afforded
qualified immunity in light of his position
aS an executive officer. The non-prosecu-
torial duties of a social worker such as
Haaland are far different from the duties
performed by a DSS Director and raise ques-
tions of policy not addressed by the Morrison
ef

court.—

In Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F.

52a

|
)
|
)
)

Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) the court ex-

tended the immunity afforded prosecutors in

ees performing both prosecutorial and inves-
tigative functions in cases of child abuse.

Plaintiffs in Whelehan sued a county social

worker and other defendants for damages sus-
tained when their child was removed from
their custody’ pursuant to a lawful but er-
roneous charge of child sexual abuse. The
court wrote,

The great importance of the
child-protective function
served by these defendants
is beyond question. If
these defendants, and others
who serve like functions in
society, were forced to exe-
cute their duties with one
eye constantly regarding the
possibility of incurring
liability for their conduct,
the detriment to society and
the judicial system would be
at least as great as if they
were prosecutors of the kind
specifically protected by
Imbler.

Id. at 1098.

This court is persuaded by the reasoning

in Whelehan and grants Haaland absolute im-
munity for all actions in connection with his
employment with DSS. The court is particular-

ly impressed, as was the Whelehan court, with

the discretion afforded DSS employees such as
Haaland in performing their duties of
responding to, investigating, and acting upon
reports of suspected child abuse. The in-
stant case is distinguishable from Doe v.

County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.

Y. 1980) in this respect for the Doe court
based its refusal to grant absolute immunity
to a social worker on its finding that the
defendant had virtually no discretion in
performing her duties.

Finally, in addition to the immunity
afforded Haaland for actions taken in per-
forming his duties, he is entitled to abso-
lute immunity for his testimony at the
custody/visitation hearing. Briscoe v.

54a

LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police officer

and private party witnesses held absolutely
immune from liability for allegedly perjured
testimony at a criminal trial).

4. Department of Social Services

Plaintiffs name the Contra Costa County

Department of Social Services as a party to

this action. Essentially, a suit against the
' :
Department 1S a suit against the County.

) Municipalities are subject to suit under

$1983. Monell v. Department of Social Ser-

vices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, they
may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983
for the actions of their employees under a
theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691.
The gravamen of this complaint is that
Haaland's actions outside the scope of his
authority violated plaintiffs' rights. Under
Monell, plaintiffs may not hold the County
liable for the alleged misconduct of its
employee.

55a

In order to state a §1983 claim against
a municipality, plaintiffs must allege that
"under color of some official state policy
[the municipality] 'causes' an employee to
violate another's constitutional rights."
Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. As noted, plain-
tiffs do allege that Haaland acted pursuant
to an official policy that all allegations of
sexual abuse be credited regardless of cir-
cumstances. For the reasons set forth in
Part IA of this order, the court finds this
policy does not violate plaintiffs' consti-
tutional rights. Moreover, this court fails
to see how this policy itself "caused" the
deprivations plaintiffs claim they suffered.
Plaintiffs have not shown an "affirmative
link" between the occurrence of misconduct
and the policy or custom at issue. Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).

.¥ Families United

FU is a state-licensed psychological]

56a

=

clinic which treats incest victims and
families. Section 1983 pertains only to
constitutional violations under color of
state law. Plaintiffs make no showing that
FU is a “state actor.”

Indeed, the complaint states no allega-
tions against this defendant. It states only
that Haaland referred the Meyers case to FU,
and FU employee Palmer conducted interviews
and testified at one of the custody hearings.
Apparently, plaintiffs seek to impose lia-
bility on FU for the alleged misconduct of
Palmer in concert with Haaland. Even if
Palmer were a state actor, plaintiffs could
not impose §1983 liability on FU for the
actions of its employee under a theory of
respondeat superior. Powell v. Shopco Laurel

cos, eee £40 506 (4th Cir. 1982).

6. James Palmer
A private party could be said to act
under color of state law if he or she jointly

57a

engages with state or local officials in

conduct prohibited by the constitution.

Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S.

144, 152 (1970). However, conclusory allega-
tions that Palmer conspired with Haaland to
deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights do
not suffice to state a claim that Palmer
acted under color of state law. Glaros v.
Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 685 (lst Cir. 1980)
(general allegations of cooperation between
private and state actors do not state a claim
of action under color of state law).

"[T]o determine whether [a private
party] acted under color of state law, the
circumstances surrounding the private
[action] must be examined in their totality."
Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 384 (9th

Cir. 1983). In Howerton, the court found
that private landlords were state actors for
the purposes of an eviction when they "de-

liberately cloaked themselves with the

58a

authority of the state in effecting re-
possession of the trailer premises." Id. at
384-85. The private landlords repeatedly re-
quested the aid of the police, and the police
“intervened at every step." Id. at 385.
Plaintiffs herein merely allege that
Palmer conducted an interview of the Meyers
family and prepared a report at the behest
of a state official. Assuming arguendo that
such activities implicate constitutionally-
protected rights, they hardly rise to the
level of the actions attributed to the pri-
vate landlords in Howerton. Instead, this
case iS similar to Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d
435 (9th Cir. 1983), where the court de-
clined to find a conspiracy between two pri-
vate banks and government officials to vio-
late plaintiff's constitutional rights. The

there was no showing here
that the banks 'deliber-
ately' participated with

59a

the government with the
purpose of violating
[plaintiff's] civil rights,
or that they knew of the
alleged objective. In-
stead, the banks merely
acquiesced in what appeared
to them to be a proper FBI
investigation.

707 F.2d at 438.

For the reasons set forth above, the
court finds that Palmer was not a state actor
with respect to his activities in the instant
case. Further, even if he were a state actor
he would be entitled to absolute immunity for
his testimony as a witness in the January
1982 custody proceeding under Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).

7. Nancy Bowman

The complaint does not allege improper
conduct on the part of Bowman. Plaintiffs
acknowledge that the complaint is insuffi-
cient as to her and request an opportunity

to amend. In light of the court's rulings

above, the motion to amend is denied.

60a

8. Amy Meyers

Plaintiffs claim that Amy entered into a
conspiracy with Haaland and others to deny
them contact with the children. For the
reasons stated above, the allegations of con-
spiracy do not suffice to transform Amy into
a "state actor." Indeed, the complaint
states no specific facts as to "overt acts"-
performed by this defendant.

II. Counts Three through Sixteen

These counts state claims for the common
law torts of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, slander, and libel. They do
not state claims cognizable under 42 U.S.C.
$1983. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (common law defamation not action-
able under §1983). The Supreme Court con-
Sistently has ruled that the civil rights
acts should not render the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "a font-of tort law.” Id. at 7/01.

6la

In view of the court's dismissal of

the federal causes of action, the court de-
clines to assume jurisdiction over the pen-

dent claims. See United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Accordingly, they are dismissed as well.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6 - 1985

/s/ Marilyn Hall Patel

MARILYN HALL PATEL >
United States District Judge

ts 62a

rUOQGQTR OTES

1/ Haaland's declaration sets forth a very
different version of the facts. However, for
purposes of this motion the court will view
the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs.

2/ A dependency petition initiates proceed-
ings in juvenile court to declare a minor a
ward or dependent child. Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code. §325. Minors subject to physical abuse
in the home come under the jurisdiction of

the statute. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §300(d).

ay Haaland states in his declaration that
the court requested he supervise visitation.
Haaland Declaration at 45

4/ The Ninth Circuit has granted a rehear-
ing en banc of Haygood v. Younger, Bretz v.

Kelman, and Piatt v. MacDougall. Haygood v Vv.

Younger, 729 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1984). This
court will apply the extant law pending a
ruling by the en banc panel. In view of the
court's determination in Part II of this
order, a reversal of Haygood and related
cases will not affect the disposition of the

instant case.

./ The court notes that Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code §334 provides for a hearing within 15 or
30 days of the filing of a dependency peti-.
tion. Plaintiffs do not allege that the
statutory procedures were not followed.

6/ As noted, Haaland's declaration indi-

cates that plaintiffs' counsel acceded to the
dismissal. Thus, the claim that plaintiffs
were denied a hearing on the petition is mis- |
leading.

7/ For example, under Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code 4202.5 DSS workers are assigned the
duties of probation officers with respect to
victims of child abuse as described under
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §300 et seq. The

Ninth Circuit has afforded probation officers
quasi-judicial immunity. Burkes v. Callion,

403 U.S. 908 (1971).

DATE: June 10, 1987

_

a
LINSEY J. FREEMAN,
219 Broadway
Richmond, CA 94804
(415) 235-5651

Counsel of Record

y

ESO.

VAUGHN E. SPUNAUGLE, ESQ.
207 - 37th Street
Richmond, CA 94805

(415) 620-0398

Counsel for Petitioners

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_2257%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.