# Opposition Brief — Hall v. Hawaii

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 803

## Text

FIL
.
G SEP P1988
No. 88-212 siti taentan: sa
=GEERR
In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988

Rosert W. Hatt,

Appellant,
v.

State or Hawan, University or Hawan, tHE WituiamM S.
RicHarpson ScuHoou or Law, Ausert J. Simone, STEPHEN
G. Bess, Guapys A. Branpt, Grecory Dreta Cruz, JULIA
FrouuicH, Ropert M. Fustrmoro, James G. Gary, DANIEL
M. IsHn, Kennetu N. Kato, Stantey Y. Muxar, WALTER
R. Steicer, Burt S. Tsucurya, Roprn Campaniano, Marvin
J. AnpEerson, Ricuarp 8. Mituer, JupirH M. KirKEnpDaALL,
Wruramson B.C. CuHanc, IRENE Ryprnski, Lawrence H.
Kam, Bone Uate, Write Dominco, Dean Kavuxka, JEREMY
T. Harrison, JaMEs H. DanNENBERG, Ronatp C. Brown,
AND JOHN E. Picxkron,
Appellees.

fa’
Vv

ON APPEAL FROM THE INTERMEDIATE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

fay
Vv

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

fa’
Vv

Warren Price, ITI*

Attorney General

State of Hawaii
*Counsel of Record

Steven 8S. MicHakEts
Deputy Attorney General
Room 405, State Capitol
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
(808) 548-4740

Counsel for Appellees

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831

1i/o2

5

a.)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether appellant has properly invoked this
Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2) when, rather than drawing in question on fed-
eral grounds the validity of a state statute, appellant chal-
lenges the application of preclusion arising out of a fed-
eral judicial decree, 7.e., Hall v. State, 791 F.2d 759 (9th
Cir. 1986) (‘‘Hall I’’)?

2. Whether, assuming the above does not bar review,
appellant may obtain review of claimed federal constitu-
tional improprieties in the state court’s disposition of fed-
eral preclusion defenses when such claimed wrongs were
not timely raised in or passed upon by the lower state
courts in the case?

‘

3. Whether, assuming the papers whereon appeal was
taken may be treated as a petition for certiorari, or man-
datory appellate jurisdiction exists despite the foregoing,
the Court lacks jurisdiction under the independent and
adequate state ground doctrine or under the Constitution’s
Eleventh Amendment?

ll

4. Whether, assuming the above do not bar review,
any substantial question is presented by a state court’s
application of the doctrine of federal merger and bar and
collateral estoppel when (a) claims arising under federal
law, and upon which state law provides no greater pro-
tection, were decided on their merits in the prior federal
proceeding; (b) claims arising under state law against the
defendants in the prior proceeding in their individual
capacities and arising out of the identical set of transac-
tions were not dismissed pursuant to United Mine Work-
ers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); (ce) the present federal
and state claims arise in a factual context that is ma-
terially identical to that presented in the prior federal ac-
tion; and (d) all defendants in the present state court pro-
ceeding are in privity with those in the earlier filed fed-
eral action?

5. Whether, even assuming appellant has properly
alleged error in the state court’s application of federal pre-
clusion principles, appellant on the record developed in the
state court has standing or is able to show prejudicial
error in light of numerous alternative grounds for affirm-
ing the judgment, including, but not limited to, the facial
defects in appellant’s state court complaint, the undisputed
record on summary judgment, and the recent decision of

Peers Tee

iil

the Supreme Court of Hawaii adverse to appellant in State
of Hawaii v. Hall, No. 12636?"

* Appellant, who appears pro se, is a 53 year-old white male
resident of the State of Hawaii who applied in admission years
1984-86 to the William S. Richardson Schoo! of Law at the Uni-
versity of Hawaii at Manoa, an agency of the State of Hawaii.
See Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 304-5, 304-6, 304-62 (1985). Appellees
in this appeal include the State of Hawaii, the University of
Hawaii, the School of Law, and twenty-six University officers
and student members of the admission committees of the
School of Law named in their official and individual capacities.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-168 (1985). The
officials and student committee members include Albert J. Si-
mone, President of the University of Hawaii since August 8,
1985, and Acting President since June 1, 1984; Stephen G. Bess,
Gladys A. Brandt, Gregory Dela Cruz, Julia Frohlich, Robert M.
Fujimoto, James G. Gary, Daniel M. Ishii, Kenneth N. Kato,
Stanley Y. Mukai, Walter R. Steiger, Burt S. Tsuchiya, and Robin
M. Campaniano, members at various times of the Board ol
Regents of the University of Hawaii; Marvin Anderson, at vari-
out times the Chancellor of the University of Hawaii at Manoa;
Richard S. Miller, Dean of the School of Law in admission
year 1984; Judith Kirkendall, Registrar at various times for the
School of Law, Williamson B.C. Chang and Irene Rypinski, mem-
bers of the School of Law faculty and admissions committee in
admission yeat 1984; Lawrence H. Kam, Assistant Dean and
member of the admissions committee in admissions years 1984-
86; Ronald C. Brown and John E. Pickron, members of the faculty
and admission committee in admission years 1985-86; Bode
Uale, Willie Diomingo, and Dean Kauka, students at the School
of Law and members of the admission committee in admission
year 1984; Jeremy T. Harrison, acting Dean of the School of
Law in admission year 1985, and Dean of the School of Law
in admission year 1986; and James H. Dannenberg, Deputy
Attorney General and later First Deputy Attorney General through
about May 1986, who acted as co-defense counsel for defendants
in Hall | up until his appointment as a District Judge for the
District of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, and resignation from the
Department of the Attorney General.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED i
TABLE OF CONTENTS _.. I ee viene . iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vv
OPINIONS INVOLVED 2
PERU UTIEIE cscs ee nes als clcestledenideanitnien 3
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES INVOLVED 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Www. . 6
ARGUMENT . slanienaanacetliapeasoae. 12
I. Appellant Has Not Drawn In Question a State

I.

111.

lV.

Lf

Statute and Therefore the oo Appe llate
Jurisdiction Fails. ene aiediiaubieaee

Appellant’s Federal Constitutional Claim Was
Not Properly Presented in the Courts Below. ..

A ppellant’s Claims in this Court are Barred by
the Independent and Adequate State Ground
Doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment.

Appellant’s Challenge to the Lower Courts’
Analysis of Federal Preclusion Doctrine is In-
Se a tet ee eee,

In Light of the Substantial Alternative Grounds
for Entry of Judgment, Review Should Be
Denied. icVinat

Co aI Eee A a a EE

16

18

21

TABLE Ol’ AUTHORITIES

Page
Aguiar v. Hawaii Housing Authority, 55 Haw.

Sa ee ec ee ED | wertscatetnnennntntimcaien 26
Airgo, Inc. v. Horizon Cargo Transp., Inc., 66

Haw. 590, 670 P.2d 1277 (1983) 20... 17
Ala Moana Boat Owners v. State, 50 Haw. 156,

I re ee Oe pits eens 17
Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3084 (1987) 000... 26
Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945) 0... 16
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 8S.

Ct. 1645 (1988) WW. SIRT Real - aeabisibatidaaadbecedea 17
Big Island Small Ranchers Assoc. v. State, 60

Haw. 228, 588 P.2d 430 (1978) .. 95
Bullen v. DeRego, 724 P.2d 106 (Haw. 1987) . 24)
Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Association

w. Aidaracm, TIA TTB. BES CEPI) cccccenccseccsstsctatieneienes 15
City Bank v. Saje Ventures II, 748 P.2d 812

CHE. Bint, RD eeecccentntee annie 16
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 797 (1986)

2) ee sitiiia ibaa oinanebanain . 23
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470

Ce 2 ee: ee . 20
Costa v. Able Distributors, Inc., 3 Haw. App. 486,

GR ae Sk Ce ateeeeeeeeenieak 26
Demorest v. City Bank, 321 U.S. 36 (1944) 19
Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942) 1d
District of Columbia Court of Appeais v. Feld-

— ww Lis S Fh - ; aeeeneeeermmnmee. re 16
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 125 (1908) Bs 21
Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979) 26

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Frishy v. Schultz, 108 8. Ct. 2495 (1988) . 18

Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) 15

Gibb v. Spiker, 718 P.2d 1076 (Haw. 1986) 26
Hall v. State of Hawaii, 791 ¥ 2d 759 (Oh Cir.

had gg eee ee passim
Hall v. State of Hawaii, 756 P2d 1048 (Haw.

1988) (**/all I1’*) ieee 2, 10,11, 15, 21
Harnett v. Billman, 800 V.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1986) 23
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) . 16
Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) 295
Hoover v. Romwin, 467 U.S. 588 (1984) 25
Hulsman v. Hemmeter Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 647

P.2d 713 (1982) spdimnidinmsitiness | 23
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 16
Island Tobacco Co. v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co..

63 Haw. 289, 627 P.2d 260 (1981) : 19
Jacober v. Sunn, 715 P.2d 813 (Haw. App. 1986) 26
Johnson v. Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442
Julius Rothschild & Co. v. State, 66 Haw. 76, 655

P.2d S77 (1982) (per curiam) tartans ———
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 ee eee Fee
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684

fe ee ke ae
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 US.

461 (1962) salcslscaadehantatetannsiy' 4a
Lawlor v, National Screen Service, 349 US. 32°

TES E NE 5 aay

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 454 U.S. 422 (1982) 19
Makanui v. Doe, 721 P.2d 165 (Haw. App. 1986) 26
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedu

Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) , 23
Martin-Trigona v. United States, 779 F.2d 72

(D.C. Cir. 1985) 22
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) 19
Maruwland v. United States. 381 U.S. 41 (1965) be
Met 'arthy wv. Ye mpuh u. 5 Haw. App. 45, 678 P2d

11 (1984) ll
McGoldrick vr. ompaqne Generals . ou LS. 430

(1940) 4
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals Co. rv. Thompson,

478 U.S. 804 (1986) JA
Meyer v. Territory. 36 Haw. 75 (1942) mh
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1082 (1983) IS
Mizoguchi v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,

66 Haw. 373. 663 P.2d 1071 (1983) lj
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 89 U.S. (20 Wall)

590 (1875) Is
Nakano v. Matayoshi, 6S Haw. 142, 706 Pd 814

(1085) 19
Nevada v. lmted States. 463 U.S. 110 (1083) Zz
Nal we s @. City of Moss Point, 701 Od ab (5th

Cir. LOSS) 73
Olim v. Wakinekona,. 461 U.S. 238 (1983) 25

Oshorn v. Bank of the Lnited States, 9 Wheat.
738 (1824) 24

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S, 265 (1986) 20, 21, 25
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 ( 1979) _ 22, 23
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 8. Ct. 849 (1988)... 24
Pennhurst State School and Hospital vr. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) 00 8 18, 20, 28
Perry Education Association v. Pe rry Local Edu-
cators’ Association, 460 US, 37 S oe
Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) 18

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) : Se HT

Regents of the Universia of Michigan v. Ewing,

474 U.S. 214 (1986) 25
Rose v. Oba, 717 P.2d 1029 (Haw. 1986) teeta. Sa
Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917) | ae
Sharma v. State, 66 Haw. 632, 673 P2d 1030 _—

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984) = nS ih eg,

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S, 238 (1984) 15, 16

Simou v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare a Org. .
426 U.S. 26 (1976) paeiialaicaossenicaasiensies aaa

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) - iaiiiaianciaiaig ae

State of Hawaii vr. Hall, 66 Haw. 300, 660 P2d
33 (1983) (per curiam) . RSS = 7

State of Hawaii v. Hall, No. 12636 (Haw. titel

fe a a OE oe ea a 27
State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983) 19
State v. Tookes, 67 Haw. 608, 699 P24 983 (1985)... = 49

Straub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) 0D

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) ..... 9
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.

144 (1938) ms iS acaniaamaeseanedl 19
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) 22
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S, 229 (1976) 10, 19
Waugh v. University of Hawai, 63 Haw. 117, 621

P.2d 957 (1980) 26
Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981) 18
Wilder v. Tanouye, No. 12167 (Haw. App. Mar.

17, 1988) 27
Wygant v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) 25
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

U.S. Const., Art. I] 3, 14
U.S. Const., Eleventh Amendment 3, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23
Haw. Const. art. I, § 5 (1978) 4
Haw. Const. art. 1, §6 (1978) 4
MS ee 4
Haw. Const. art. X, 41 (1978) i)
STATUTES :

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) 9
18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982) i)
hh eee meenes . 3, 4,18

28 T.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982)
28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982)

12, 14, 15
13

x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Oe Ms © ROME ccoakcbsdecrnieleianmsniconencal eet 8
UE SD) ey |. 4 eR Cae ae rete 12
ee Ween PARE ORD oe cee ela ae 25
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)
RS Rae Se ce ccc ca ace biccslsoe 9
Re Cass. sce secede ceslntieecrasin 9
RS UAL: Se RD cae es iatatebis 9
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-1(4) (1985) 26
Haw. Rev. Stat. ¢ 304-5 (1986) ill
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 304-6 (1985) ill
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 304-62 (1985) cc cccccsccccssssmeccesecnsceeen il
caw. Rov. Stat. 6378 (1066) 25
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2(1) (1985) onc ccccsasssccessssasesnee 5)
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-2 (1985) ow. nadibbiecenninotaatinah tasted 4)
maw. Rev, Stat, 6 490-3 (1985) 5
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-4 (1985) nec ccccsscseacsemmeens ea 4)
Haw. Rey. Stat. § 662-15(4) (1985)

Pr

tan

Court RULEs:

U.S. S. Ct. R. 15.1(g)

Haw. R. Civ. P. 56(f)

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
OTHER AUTHORITY:
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, com-
eee EE Dx ccnsnscbscisccnslnininsns siesta sirpiannabesisnsnante 1]

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, com-
pa CE) aise eencsteercsssscenssnasntcenacneipnnacnaaotnccennn 22

No. 88-212
In on
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

ray
Vv

Roserr W. Hatt,
Appellant,
v.

Strate or Hawau, Universitry or Hawau, THE Wituiam 8S.
RicHarpson Scuoou or Law, Aveert J. SIMONE, STEPHEN
G. Bess, Guapys A. Branpt, Grecory Deta Cruz, JULIA
I’RoHLICH, Ropert M. Fustmoro, James G. Gary, DAnreL
M. IsHu, Kennetu N. Kato, Stantey Y. Muxkar, WALTER
R. Sreicer, Burr S. Tsucnrya, Ropixy CaMpaNIANO, Marvin
J. Anperson, Ricuarp S. Minuer, Jupira M. Krrkenpat1,
WituraAmson B.C. CuHanc, Irene Rypinski, LAwrence H.
Kam, Bope Uate, Wittig Dominco, Dean Kavuxa, JEREMY
T. Harrison, James H. Dannenserc, Ronaup C. Brown,
AND JOHN E. Pickron,
Appellees.

ty.
Vv

ON APPEAL FROM THE INTERMEDIATE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

ray

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

ray
Vv

Appellees, in their respective capacities, pray that
this Court dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, or
for want of a properly presented or substantial federal
question, or that the Court affirm the judgment below. If

ee
nae

2

the Court treats the papers whereon appeal is taken as a
petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the In-
termediate Court of Appeals entered May 26, 1988, appel-
lees further pray that certiorari be denied.

)
OPINIONS INVOLVED

The opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals of
the State of Hawaii in appeal No. 11992 (‘*Hall II’’) is
reported at 756 P.2d 1048 (Haw. App. 1988), and is re-
printed in the Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement
(‘‘J.S. App.’’) 1. The order of the Supreme Court of
Hawaii denying appellant’s Application for Writ of Cer-
tiorari is not reported and is reprinted at J.S. App. 20.
The order of the Cireuit Court for the First Cireuit of the
State of Hawaii of which review was sought in the state
court proceedings below is not reported and is reprinted
in Appendix ‘‘A’’ to the Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
(‘‘Motion App.’’).

The unappealed judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Cireuit in appeal No. 85-1698
(“Hall I’’), is reported at 791 I°.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1986),
and is reprinted at J.S. App. 26. The order of the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii in Civil
No. 84-1072, from which Hall I arose, is not reported and
is reprinted at J.S. App. 22.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in ap-
peal No. 12636 (Haw. Aug. 18, 1988) (‘‘Hall III’’) is not
reported and is reprinted in Motion App. ‘‘D.”’

>)

———————————ewn

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals
of the State of Hawaii was entered on May 26, 1988, and
a timely filed application for writ of certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court of Hawaii on June 13, 1988. The
jurisdictional statement was timely filed on August 4,
1988. Although this appeal is not barred by the terms of
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662, this case is without this
Court’s jurisdiction for numerous reasons relating to,
inter alia, the limits on the authority conferred by 28
U.S.C. § 1257, Article III, and the Eleventh Amendment.

These jurisdictional matters are briefed below.

©

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED

Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the United States
Constitution provides in relevant part:

The Judicial Power [of the United States] shall ex-
tend to... Cases... [and] to Controversies ....

Section 1257 of Title 28, United States Code, provides
in relevant part:

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of any state on the ground of

|;

4

its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States, and the decision is
in favor of its validity.

(3) By writ of certiorari, . . . where any title
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution, treaties or stat-
utes of, or commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States.

Although no state statute, regulation, or rule, has been
properly drawn in question within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1257, the following provisions of Hawaii law are
relevant to the preclusion issues presented by the instant
appeal, and are reprinted for the convenience of the Court

and appellant.
Article I, § 5 of the 1978 Hawaii Constitution provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law, nor be denied the
equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoy-
ment of the person’s civil rights or be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof because of race, reli-
gion, sex, or ancestry.

Article I, section 6 of the 1978 Hawaii Constitution
provides:

The right of the people te privacy is recognized and

shall not be infringed without the showing of a com-

pelling state interest. The legislature shall take af-

firmative steps to implement this right.

Article I, section 8 of the 1978 Hawaii Constitution
provides:

No citizen shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any
of the rights or privileges secured to other citizens, un-
less by the law of the land.

d

Article X, section 1 of the 1978 Hawaii Constitution
provides:

The State shall provide for the establishment, support
and control of a statewide system of public schools
free from sectarian control, a state university, public
libraries and such other educational institutions as
may be deemed desirable, including physical facilities
therefor. There shall be no discrimination in public |
educational institutions because of race, religion, sex |
or ancestry; nor shall public funds be appropriated

for the support or benefit of any sectarian or private

institution.

Seetion 378-2(1) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1985)

provides :

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (1)
For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual in compensation
or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment because of race, sex, age, religion, color, an-
cestry, physical handicap, marital status, or arrest and
court record.

Sections 480-2, 480-3, and 480-4, of the Hawaii Re-

vised Statutes (1985) provide in selected part:

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are unlawful.

This chapter shall be construed in accordance with
judicial interpretations of similar federal antitrust
statutes.

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce in the State, or in any section of this State is
illegal.

6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. This ease arises out of efforts of the William 8.
Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii to
provide ‘‘expanded opportunities for Hawaii’s students

1 As is true for

to acquire education and training in law.’
most law schools, ‘‘|ejach year many more qualified per-
sons apply ... than can be admitted,”’ and, in 1984-86, from
300 to 350 of the 400 to 450 applicants each year were re-
jected as the 80 seats in each elass were filled.2) Appellant
Robert W. Hall, a white male Hawaii resident whose un-
dergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School
Admission Test (LSAT) scores made if mathematieally

impossible for him to gain admission? was denied admis-

1 Haw. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 797-71, 1971 Haw. Sen. j.
1144, 1145 (legislative history of Law School enabling Act).

2 Affidavit of Jeremy T. Harrison dated June 27, 1986, at 14
(“Harrison Aff.) (1 Record on Appeal 242), Motion App. C-33,
see also Aff. of Williamson Chang dated Dec. 13, 1984, at 7 21,
No. 84-1072 (D. Haw. Dec. 14, 1984) (“Chang Aff.”) (1 R.A.
281), Motion Anp. C-31. Under two protective orders issued
on July 18, 1986, and October 1, 1986, of which appellant had
notice at all relevant times, if appellant chose to defend against
appellees’ motion for summary judgment by relying on these
filed affidavits, the lower courts were to “consider the affi-
davit[s} in [their] entirety in ruling upon the motion.” 2 R.A.
182, 185; 6 R. 333-34. These ‘‘rule of completeness” provisions
were brought into play because appellant, by pointing to state-
ments in the appellees’ *:i:davits taken out of context, sought
to prove to the state cou shat material fact questions existed.
See, e.g. Affidavit of Robert VV. Hall dated July 3, 1986, at {© 11,
16-20, 23-26, relied on, Mem. in Opp. © 23 (Haw. Cir Sept. 16,
1986), 6 R.A. 260; Amended Complaint © 38, No. 86-1646 (Haw
Cir. May 2, 1986), Motion App. B-21, reincorporated and relied
on, Mem. in Opp. 719 (Haw. Cir. Sept. 15, 1966), | RA. 2
(Chang Aff.). See generally Order (Haw. Cir. Jan 14 1987), Mo-
tion App. A-3.

3 Harrison Aff. 1 7, Motion App. C-36; Chang Ar *

App. C-31. +

7

sion to the regular class in these three admission vears.*
Given his background of business success and lack of social
disadvantages, appellant was also rejected from the Law
School’s ‘‘Pre-Admission Program,’? which is modeled
upon programs approved by Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and its progeny.
Appellant in all three years also failed to disclose or ex-
plain material facts relating to a 1980 incident at the Wai-
kiki Yacht Cub, in which, in the words of the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, appellant ‘fired a gun wildly into a
crowd of people, hitting three people below the waist and
narrowly missing a fourth,’’® and which led to appellant’s
indictment on four counts of attempted murder and re-
lated weapons charges upon which appellant was acquitted
on a theory of ‘‘pathological intoxication’? from white
wine.’ In at least his 1984 Application, Appellant also
overstated his undergraduate GPA by stating the average

* See id.

* See Harrison Aff. 115, 7, Motion App. C-36, 37; Chang Aff.
‘14-16, Motion App. C-29, 30.

® State v. Hall, 66 Haw. 300, 301, 660 P.2d 33, 34 (1983). The
Law School became aware of the criminal action against appel-
lant after the filing of the 1984 application but before the 1984
civil action in Hall I. See Chang Aff. © 12, Motion App. C-29.
Under clearly stated Law School application forms, appellant
was informed in each of the three years in which he applied
that signing the application warranted that “the information
you have given to the Law School is complete and truthful, and
that no information reasonably relevant to your admission to
the School has been purposely withheld.” Id.; see also Harri-
son Aff. 17 9, 14, 17-23, Motion App. C-36-39, 40-43 (admission
criteria in 1985 and 1986 and appellant’s refusai in all three ad-
mission years to admit or explain the 1980 shooting incident).

’ Id. at 303, 660 P.2d at 35. Appellant's own criminal defense
attorneys admitted, in pleadings in the criminal action, in evi-

(Continued on following page)

8

only of grades received at Chaminade University, where
he was scheduled to be vraduated in 1984, while failing to
refer to substantially lower grades he had received from
State Teachers College at the University of Maryland at
Towson, in 1951-54, and at evening college at Armstrong
College, Savannah, Georgia, in 1955-09. Harrison Aff.
q 11, 12, Motion App. (*.37, 38; see also Chang Aff. © 15
(Motion App. C-29)- Appellant also did not explain this
overstatement in subsequent application years, although tis
materiality was made clear to him prior to the filing of
his application im 1985. Harrison Aff. "* 14-16, Motion
App. C-29. After his rejections, the Appellant filed two
lawsuits to overturn the Law School’s adverse decisions.
(Continued from previous page)

dence below, that appellant's temporary lack of capacity was
demonstrated by “scientific, unbiased tests thoroughly conduct-
ed and analyzed,” manifesting “the skepticism appropriate under
the circumstances.” Memorandum in Support of Motion tor
Judgment of Ac quittal Based on Physical Disorder, Cr. No. 54332
(Haw. Cir. Jan. 4, 1982), Ex. 1 to Det. Reply Mem. 7 R.A. 41.

in an action to seal the records in the criminal case, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected on the merits appellant's
claim that the acquittal in Cr. 54332 was not based on “patho-
logical intoxication” and held there was “no constitutional or
statutory basis for sealing the record.” State v. Hall, No. 12636
(Haw. Aug. 18, 1988), Motion App. D. The preclusive effect
of the state Circuit Court's denial in November, 1987, of the
motion to seal was timely raised in the state Court of Appeals
in this case, see Appellees’ Motion for Retention of Oral Argu-
ment, No. 11992 (Haw. App. May 23, 1988) (and accompanying
documents), but was not reached by the state Court of Appeals
in the case now beiore this Court. Should this Court need to
reach the effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 of appeal No. 12636,
the state court order, appellant's brief, and the affidavit of Dep-
uty Prosecutor Thomas Pico, see Motion App. D, E, F, inira, are
printed here. The affidavit of Mr. Pico was presented below in
this case in the state Court of Appeals and the appellant's brief
in No. 12636, although not so presented, assists In explaining
the August 1988 order. See Maryland v. United States, 381 US
41, 53 n.38 (1965).

9

2. In the first case, filed in United States District
Court in autumn 1984, and dismissed on summary judg-
ment in January 1985, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Cirenit on June 10, 1986 upheld the entry of
summary judgement against Mr. Hall on a host of federally
based claims* against appellees or their privies. The effect
of these claims, if granted, would have been to force the
Law School to jump appellant over dozens of applicants
with hicher qualifications who were denied admission, or
to restrain enforcement of Hawaii laws that bar those who
do not graduate from law school from sitting for the
Hawaii bar examination. Hall v. State of Hawau, 791
F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1986) (‘‘Hall I’’), J.S. App. 26, 30
(eoneurrine with the distriet eourt’s conelusion ‘‘that
Hall’s federal claims entirely lacked a fonndation’’); see
also id. at 22-25 (district court order); Motion App. C
(complaint from Civil No, 84-1072 (D. Haw.)).

a. The Court of Appeals also rejected claims aris-
ing under Hawaii law brought against apnellees or their
>rivies in their individual ecanacities. These claims were
not barred by sovercign immunity and Pennhurst State
School and Hosp. vr. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(‘‘Pennhurst I1’’), nor did the Ninth Cirenit exercise its
discretion to dismiss claims without prejudice under United
Vine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See Hall I,
791 F.2d at 761, J.S. App. 31.

* These claims purported to arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, 2000d, and 2000e (civil rights and employment
discrimination); 18 U.S.C. § 245 (criminal law): 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(sex discrimination); 15 U.S.C. §1 (antitrust); and the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.

—————eeaeEeEeeeee ees

10

3. Appellant did not seek review in this Court of his
loss in the inferior federal courts. Instead, he filed a
new action in the courts of Hawaii. See Complaint, Hall
». State. No. 86-1646 (Haw. Cir. filed May 2, 1986) (‘Tall
11”), Motion App. B. Appellees pleaded merger and
har and collateral estoppel, as well as numerous other de-
fenses hased on governing etandards and a record of undis-
puted material facts? The state trial Court eranted sum-
mary judement hased on ‘‘arguments advanced at the hear-
ine. the memoranda and evidence filed herein, and the
records and previous orders herein and in Hall [7),” and
the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. Hall v. State
of Hawaii. 756 P.2d 1048 (Haw. App. 1988) (‘‘Hall IT’’).

a. The state Court of Appeals reasoned that, because
of jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts in Hall I,
‘<all of Hall II’s federally based claims are barred,’’ J.S.
App. 14. The court held. further, that ‘‘[e]ven if Hall has
a cause of action for violation of any right he might have
under the state constitution or the statutes he has cited,
he would be collaterally estopped from proving that the

result of the constitutional or statutory violation was to

® The sole evidence of purported unlawful discrimination sub-

mitted in Hall | was an appendix to a 1983 university report
addressing admissions at the Law School, which contained crit-
icism that the facially non-discriminatory criteria for admission
to the Pre-Admission program “as a practical matter translate
‘nto motivated applicants who are other than Caucasian, Chinese,
japanese and Korean.” Ex. E-14 to Complaint, Hall 1, 4 R.A. 47.
Appellees had urged the Ninth Circuit to reject this evidence as
insufficient under Washington v Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and
the Court of Appeals did not even mention it in rejecting the
claims in Hall |. See 791 F 2d at 761. This evidence was also
the sole basis for appellant's claim of discrimination in Hall Il,
and we likewise urged its rejection in that action.

ll

nulawfully discriminate against him.’’ 7d. 16. Althouch
judgement in the Ninth Cirenit in all T was entered after
appellant’s rejection in all three years (June 10, 1986),
the Hawaii appellate court reasoned that, even if the date
of judgment in the federal district court (Jannary 23, 1985)
was the operative date for federal preclusion purposes,
appellant was barred because ‘‘Hall IT presents no dis-
cernible change in the ‘material operative facts’ from those
complained of in Hall 1."?) J.S. App. 17 (quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Judaments § 24, comment (f) (1982)).
The court held all defendants in Hal! I] other than a
Deputy Attorney General who defended Hall 7. and who
was charged in Hall IIT with libel, were in privity with
those in Hall J, and that the libel claim was barred by the
absolute privilege for statements ‘‘in preparation for Hall
I’s defense.”’ J.S. App. 18-19 (citing MeCarthy v. Yem-
puku, 5 Haw. App. 45, 678 P.2d 11 (1984)). At no time
in the state trial court did appellant preserve any federal
constitutional objection to the entry of judgment on the
basis of the preclusive effect of Hall J, and neither the

© Appellant's objection to the entry of judgment on the basis

of Hall | was stated in his Memorandum in Opposition to Mo-
tion to Dismiss, Or in the Alternative, For Summary Judgment,
No. 86-1646 (Haw. Cir. filed Sept. 15, 1986), in the following
words:

The defendants’ argument that the federal court com-
plaint and the state court complaint are the same is first
moot, since the federal court refused to take jurisdiciton
[sic] over the entire Amended Complaint in Civil No. 84-
1072. Second the representation is belied by a paragraph
by paragraph reading of both amended complaints, the
best evidence from which to make that comparison.« The
federal court Amended Complaint in Civil No. 84-1072 is

(Continued on following page)

12

state Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court of Hawaii

passed on such a claim in their recent opinions and orders.

-—_—_—_——0

ARGUMENT

This appeal should be snmmarily dismissed. Although
the appeal escapes the forthcoming elimination of man-
datory review it fails to draw in question a state statute
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and, aceord-
inely, the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction fails. Even were
a state statute drawn in issue, or the authority under 28
U.S.C. § 2103 empioyed to treat the papers whereon appeal

(Continued from previous page)

attached hereto as Exhibit “VV”. The plaintiff requests that
the court take judicial notice of the Amended Complaint
in Civil No. 84-1072 and make a paragraph by paragraph
comparison unless the court is willing to reject the de-
fendants’ “same cause of action” argurnent out of hand.
The instant Amended Complaint is an entirely re-written
complaint covering three years of admissions applications,
new evidence, and new state claims; the federal complaint
covered just one admissions year. One paragraph does
not make a complaint.

Id. at 13 918, 6 R.A. 281; see also id. at 4, 7 1, 2, 6 R.A. 267,
268. Appellant stated constitutional opposition to entry of
judgment on factual claims in Professor Chang’s and Dean Har-
tison’s affidavits, but did not clearly object on federal consti-
tutional grounds to a preclusion bar. He stated:

The Circuit Court does not have the statutory or the con-
stitutional right to deorive the plaintiff of a trial by jury
on the Amended Complaint by the substitution of a sum-
mary judgment hearing where the court has already denied
discovery. The plaintiff claims all of his due process and
constitutional rights unfettered by the Hawaii Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Id. at 11, © 16, 6 R.A. 274.

13

is taken as a petition for certiorari, appellant fails to
demonstrate, at least with respect to his constitutional
claims, how the foundation for presentation of those claims
was laid in the courts below. Although as a general mat-
ter a state court’s rulings upon the preclusive effect of a
federal judicial decree present questions that may be re-
viewed in this Court under 28 U.S.C, ¢ 1257(3), none of
appellant’s federal claims in this ease should be deemed
reviewable let alone substantial. Appellant’s principal
claim—that the state courts overenforced the judgment
in Hall I by precluding the presentation of parallel state
law causes of action—ultimately seeks this Court’s effort
to extend the scope of state law in contravention of the
well-established independent and adequate state ground
doctrine and the rule of Pennhurst State School and Hos-
pital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), that official-capa-
city claims against state officials arising under state law
are not cognizable in the Courts of the United States.

Even if the Court were to reach the merits of appel-
lant’s attack on the state Court of Appeals’ application of
settled preclusion principles, further review would be in-
appropriate. Given the record, the state courts did not
misapply the privity or ‘‘change in cireumstanees’’ doe-
trines, and, for this reason, appellant’s attempts to revive
his federal causes of action are meritless. Appellant’s
attack on the Court of Appeals’ decision to bar the state
law claims set forth in Hall II, as well as embodying these
faults, misinterprets the ‘‘jurisdictional incompetence’?
afforded by the Eleventh Amendment, and, therefore.
ignores the impact of the state-law individual capacity
claims adjudicated in Hall I as well as the issue preclusive

14

consequences, under a variety of state law doctrines with
which Hawaii courts are uniquely familiar, of the judg-
ment in Hall J on appellant’s state claims. Indeed, in
light of the record showing appellant, given his relative
qualifications for admission to the study of law, would not
be benefitted even if a preclusion bar were lifted, this is
not a case where Article TIT standing is supported, and,

thus, review should be denied.

I. Appellant Has Not Drawn in Question A
State Statute and Therefore the Mandatory
Appellate Jurisdiction Fails.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), no appeal lies where there
is not ‘‘drawn in anestion the validity of a statute of any
state on the eround of its being repugnant to the Con-
stitution, treaties or laws of the United States.’’ Nowhere
in the jurisdictional statement does appellant identify
which, if any, state statute is drawn in question, and, more
important, how on federal grounds any such statute has
been drawn in question. Appellant argues the judgment
constitutes ‘‘affirmance of the admissions rules and regu-
lations of the University of Hawaii which have the effect
of law,’’ Juris. Stmnt. 18, but ‘‘not every government ac-
tion which has the effect of law is legislative action.”’
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’
Association, 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983). Whether or not for
purposes of federal law, namely, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), the

admission policies of the School of Law constitute a ‘‘stat-

15

ute of any state,’ what is challenged in this appeal is
not the federal validity of the School of Law’s admission
policies, but that of the Hawaii Intermediate Court of
Appeals’ decision, in applying the doctrine of federal pre-
clusion, not to even reach appellant’s attack upon those
policies. In this ease, even assumine. arquendo, that Uni-
versity of Hawaii admission policies, for purposes of
§ 1257(2), are state statutes, here the state Court of Ap-
peals’ express refusal to reach the federal validity of those
statutes by reason of the compulsion of the federal com-
mon law of preclusion precludes review by way of 28
U.S.C. § 1257(2). See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 495-96 (1967); cf. Silkwwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 247 (1984) (no appeal when issue is decided
‘‘without reference to the [purported] state statute’’). Tn-
deed, appellant’s basis for mandatory jurisdiction is at
the least doubly flawed, for there is no indication in the
record that appellant preserved his appeal to this Court
by making the ‘‘explicit and timely insistence,’’ through-
out the state trial court proceedings and on appeal to the
state Court of Appeals, that ‘‘a state statute, as applied,
is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws.’’
Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Alder-
son, 324 U.S. 182 (1945). Appellant notes only that the
issue necessary to preserve § 1257(2) review here was
raised in the Supreme Court of Hawaii on the application
for certiorari. Juris. Stmnt. at 7. Appellant’s cited grounds

"Appellees concede that the issue under § 1257(2) is not gov-
erned by whether such policies must be promulgated as formal
rules under the state Administrative Procedure Act, see infra p. 26,
cf. Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 268 (1942)
(whether state judgment is final is controlled by federal law).

eee

16

of error in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, id. at 8,
however, are bereft of any basis for preserving a manda-
tory appeal here, and, indeed, the questions presented here
do not advert to any claim that would require notation of
probable jurisdiction, even if the claims are otherwise with-
in the Court’s jurisdiction or are substantial. Given the
‘‘nolicy that statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly
construed,’’ Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at
247, the present appeal should be dismissed.

II. Appellant’s Federal Constitutional Claim Was
Not Properly Presented in the Courts Below.

This Court has made clear that, regardless of the
souree by which review of state court judgments is ob-
tained in this Court, ‘‘[e]ven if [this Court] were not
jurisdictionally barred from considering claims not pressed
or passed upon in the state court, as has sometimes been
stated, ... the long-standing rule that this Court will not
consider such claims creates, at the least, a weighty pre-
sumption against review.’’ Heath v. Alabama, 474 US.
82, 87 (1985): see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 218-22
(1983): S. Ct. R. 15.1(¢); 21.1(h). Moreover, it is insuffi-
cient to raise the question properly for the first time in
a state appellate court, if it is the practice of the state
appeals courts not to consider issues not properly pre-
served in the inferior state courts. See Bailey v. Ander-
son, 326 U.S. 203, 207 (1945); cf. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.18 (1983).
Hawaii appellate courts follow the general rule that they
will not, except for important reasons, consider federal
questions presented for the first time on appeal. See,
e.g., City Bank v. Saje Ventures II, 748 P.2d 812, 816

17

(Haw. App. 1988) (citing, e.9., Mizoguchi v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Haw. 373, 383, 663 P.2d 1071,
1077 (1983)). See also Ala Moana Boat Owners v. State,
50 Haw. 156, 158, 434 P.2d 516, 518 (1967) (on require-
ments for briefing issues in the state appellate courts).

Appellant’s constitutional claim that his ‘‘federal due
process rights and access to the court’s rights’’ are
abridged by the state courts’ application of federal pre-
clusion doctrine, Juris; Stmnt. i, were not properly pre-
sented in the state trial courts, a point appellees pressed
in the state Court of Appeals. See Appellees’ Answering
Brief at 25 n.9, No. 11992 (Haw. filed July 15, 1987) (citing
Airgo, Inc. v. Horizon Cargo Transp., Inc., 66 Haw. 590,
596, 670 P.2d 1277, 1281-82 (1983)). Indeed, appellant vir-
tually admits this to be so by seeking an exemption from
the pressed or passed upon rule under Saunders v. Shaw,
244 U.S. 317, 320 (1917). Juris. Stmnt. at 6. Saunders,
however, is inapt, because appellees throughout asserted
the effect of Hall I, as the state trial court briefs, see
supra n.10, the state trial court order, Motion App. A,
and the state appeals court decision, J.S. App. 11-12, show.
Here the judicial act complained of was not ‘‘done un-
expectedly at the end of the proceeding, when the plaintiff
in error no longer had any right to add to the record.’’
Saunders, 244 U.S. at 340. Appellant was on notice from
the beginning that appellees sought to end the case on the
basis of Hall I, and could have timely opposed entry of
judgment in the trial court on the ground that doing so
would violate purported rights to procedural due process
or a federal right of access to the courts. He did not do
so. See Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108

a i

18

S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (1988) (quoting Webh v. Webb, 451 U.S.
493, 501 (1981)). The state courts on appeal for this very
reason did not pass on any federal constitutional claim
arising out of their construction of preclusion doctrine.
Though such claims are meritless, neither should this
Court.

III. Appellant’s Claims in this Court are Barred
by the Independent and Adequate State
Ground Doctrine and the Eleventh Amend-
ment.
It has heen the law for more than a century that un-
der 28 U.S.C. ¢ 1257 this Conrt has no jurisdiction to re-
view a state court decision that rests upon an indepen-

dent and adequate state ground. Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 89 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 686 (1875). Although the
rule is frequently invoked in the favor of a_prevail-
ing plaintiff to prevent review by a nonprevailing de-
fendant, see Michigan ». Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the
principles underlving the rule, ‘‘!rjespeet for the inde-
pendence of state courts, as well as avoidance of render-
ing advisory opinions,’’ 77. at 1040, apply equally when
ineluded within the federal question under review—here
the breadth to be given the federal judgment in Hall T in
precluding state law causes of action—are issues gov-
erned by state law, on which the decisions of the state
courts are dispositive. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico
Association v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 339 n.6 (1986) ;
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688
(1959); cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 1501 (1988)
(reversing lower federal court view of state law).

Appellant urges that it was federally improper for the
lower state courts to extend the preclusive consequences

19

of Hall I’s rulings upon appellant’s federal canses of ac-
tion to those claims arising under parallel provisions of
the Hawaii constitution and statutes. The essence of the
state court’s ruling, however, is that ‘‘fe]ven if Hall has
a cause of action under the state constitution or the stat-
utes he has cited, he would be collaterally estopped from
proving that the result of the constitutional or statutory
violation was to unlawfully discriminate against him.’’
See J.S. App. 16. Necessarily ineluded within this deter-
mination is a finding, as a matter of Hawaii law, that the
cited state laws out of which appellant’s purported state
law rights arose provide, in the instant cirenmstances, no
ereater protection than their federal counterparts. This
finding, of course, is consistent with Hawaii precedent.
E.q., Nakano v. Matayoshi, 68 Haw. 142, 152-53, 706 P.2d
814, 821 (1985) (citing United States ». Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)); State v. Tookes, 67
Haw. 608, 615, 699 P.2d 983, 988 (1985) (citing Washinag-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)); State v. Mueller,
66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983) (citing Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)); Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., 63 Haw. 289, 297, 627 P.2d 260, 266-67
(1981) (federal antitrust standards). The state court’s
decision not to extend the rights conferred by state law in
such a manner as would render Hall I of no issue preelu-
sive effect is thus a matter over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. Demorest v. City Bank, 321 U.S. 36, 42
(1944) ; see generally Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 454
U.S. 422, 482 (1982) (citing Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277 (1980)).

This is particularly so in light of the very principles
behind the Eleventh Amendment which appellant wrongly

|

20

believes have been unfairly applied. Neither the Eleventh
Amendment, nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity, to be
sure, protect state officials in their individual capacities
from claims for damages based on state law. See Papasan
v. Allain 478 U.S. 265, 278 n.11 (1986). However, ‘‘it is
difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sover-
eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials
on how to conform their conduct to state law.’’ Pennhurst
IT, 465 U.S. at 106. Under the Eleventh Amendment, every
federal court is obligated to ‘‘ ‘examine each claim in a
ease to see if the court’s jurisdiction over that claim is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’ ’’ County of Oneida
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 251 (1985). Here,
except insofar as he asserts that the rule applied by the

lower courts is wrong on its face—that a claim arising
under state law may never be barred by litigation upon
parallel federal claims—appellant seeks a federal writ
directed to state judges in breach of now-settled pre-
cepts of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that bar en-
forcement of state-created rights through exercises of the
judicial power of the United States. Under the law cor-
rectly viewed, however, if this Court finds that the pre-
clusion theories adopted by the lower courts are not
facially erroneous, this Court’s inquiry is at an end. In-
deed, any claim against the State, the University, the Law
School, or for damages from appellees in their official ca-
pacities, or for equitable enforcement of state law, cannot
he aided by this Court in light of the Amendment. See
Papasan, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78.

21

IV. Appellant’s Challenge to the Lower Courts’
Analysis of Federal Preclusion Doctrine is In-
substantial.

Even if the Court may properly reach appellant’s at-
tack on the state Court of Appeals decision, that attack
is wholly unworthy of this Court’s attention. As to ap-
pellant’s federal claims, appellant’s claimed grounds of
error are totally without merit. Appellant would make
a nullity of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in any
case in which state law claims could be pleaded upon the
same subject matter. Under appellant’s theory, even if
he had won in Hall I, appellees could wipe out that fed-
eral order by bringing a declaratory judgment proceeding
in state court to exonerate themselves under state law.
See Juris. Stmnt. at 10 (asserting that Hall J is a ‘‘moot
judgment’’). Although ‘‘Young’s applicability has been
tailored to conform as precisely as possible to those spe-
cifie situations in which it is ‘necessary to permit the
federal courts to vindicate federal rights,’ ” Papasan, 478
U.S. at 277, it remains a central feature of our constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Moreover, it is black letter law
that the Eleventh Amendment did not protect the Hall I
defendants in their individual capacities, see 478 U.S. at
278 n.11, and those defendants, and their privies, are en-
titled to the full benefit of their federal victory. Given this
fact, there is no issue that appellant’s federal claims as
to all defendants in Hall IJ for admission years 1984
through 1986, when the case was still pending in the fed-
eral courts, were barred. Even if one takes January 1985
—the date of entry of judgment in the federal district court
—as the relevant date, but see Lawlor v. National Screen
Service, 349 U.S. 322 (1955), appellant points to no change

99

in the “material operative facts” relating to his federal
claims in admission years 1985-86. J.S. App. 18; see also
Restatement (Second) of Judqments §27 comment ¢
(1982); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130-31
(1983) (following second Restatement). Indeed, if any-
thing, because appellant’s objective qualifications (under-
graduate grades and LSAT scores) did not improve, and,
by reason of appellant’s continued dissembling over the
1980 Waikiki Yacht Club incident and prior grades, appel-
lant’s relative qualifications diminished. The decision to
bar plaintiff's claims as to admission years 1985 and 1986
is fully consistent with decisions in the courts of appeals,
see Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1315 (4th Cir. 1986) ;
Martin-Triqona v. United States, 779 F.2d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir.
1985), and appellant points to no true conflict with a deci-
sion of a court of appeals or of a sister state court. Appel-
lant’s claim that “those who were never parties to the origi-
nal litigation appear to be at risk’’ (Juris. Stmnt. 16) is
plainly inapt. Appellant clearly was a “party to the origi-
nal litigation,’’ and no claim could be made that the privity
analysis set forth in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at
136-43, was violated below. See id. at 136-37 (no dispute
that original parties and ‘‘their successors can rely on the
decree”). Moreover, it has been the law since at least
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), that
mutuality of parties is not necessary to obtain issue pre-
clusion against a private litigant by reason of a federal
judgment. Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154,
163 (1984) (mutuality when preclusion is sought against
the sovereign).

Appellant’s real complaint, apparently, is over the
extension of Hall I’s bar to his state law claims. Juris.

23

Stmnt. 13. But appellant ignores at least two points that
are each sufficient to destroy any claim that, under the
circumstances here,’if. was inappropriate to bar the state
law claims. First, the Eleventh Amendment protects
States. It does not protect state officials in their individ-
ual capacities, and pendent claims arising under state law
may still be heard in the federal courts against state of-
ficials in such capacities, Pennhurst I] notwithstanding.
Indeed, under Hawaii law, when a state employee is exon-
erated, “it follows that the employer would also be im-
mune.” Hulsman v. Hemmeter Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61-62,
647 P.2d 713, 717 (1982) ; cf. City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 797, 799 (1986) (per curiam). Dismissal of ap-
pellant’s individual capacity state claims in Hall J barred
any judgment against appellees here. Second, the essence
of issue—as opposed to claim—preelusion is that it bars
relitigation of facts previously decided “and necessary to
the outeome of the first action” even “upon a different
eause of action.” Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326
n.5. Claims that a jurisdictional competency requirement
applies to limit the merger and bar effect of a federal
adjudication that, because of the lack of State consent,
could not reach state claims against a State, cf. Marrese
v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 383 n.3 (1985), do not by their own terms apply to
collateral estoppel. Where, as here, appellant’s state
claims were defeated on collateral estoppel grounds, deci-
sions such as Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556,
562 (5th Cir. 1983), are totally inapplicable.

Any claim, even if properly presented, that applica-
tion of the doctrines of merger and bar and collateral
estoppel oa this record are unconstitutional cannot be

24
taken seriously. The right to present one’s claims may
well enjoy certain constitutional protections, but those
protections, in this context, extend only to the right to ‘‘a
‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the claim or issue.”’
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-
81 (1982) (emphasis added). No claim can be made—par-
ticularly when appellant did not appeal from Hall /—that

’

appellant did not receive the ‘‘process due’’ in federal
court. On this record, no substantia! federal issue is pres

ent, and added review of the claims ought to be denied.”

V. In light of the Substantial Alternative Grounds
for Entry of the Judgment, Review Should Be
Denied.

“‘The familiar rule of appellate court procedure in
federal courts [is] that, without a cross-petition or appeal,
a respondent or appellee may support the judgment in his
favor upon grounds different from those upon which the
court below rested its decision,’’ McGoldrick v. Com-
pagqnie Generale, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940), and that this
Court need not be bound by a state court’s determination
that a complaint states a federal claim. See Straub v.
City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318 (1958). Moreover, in
eases arising from the state courts, litigants must show

, 7?

more than ** ‘unadorned speculation that reversal on a
federal defense would give rise to relief as a matter of
state law. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 8S. Ct. 849, 855

(1988) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare

2 If the State courts rejected Hall’s claims on state law grounds,
see |.S. App. 18-19, no federal issue is raised. See Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 818 (1986)
(dissenting op.); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat.
738, 824 (1824).

25

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976)). The laws governing
this Court’s authority make clear that the Court ‘‘shall
give judgment ... without regard to errors or defects

which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982).

Although the court below chose to decide this case on
the basis of federal preclusion principles, appellant’s
complaint and the record below could not possibly give
rise to any valid claim. As a matter of federal law, once
the amended complaint is stripped of ‘‘legal conclusion[s]
couched as ... factual allegation[s],’’ Papasan, 478 U.S.
at 286, appellant’s concerns over the School of Law’s sys-
tem of weighting the GPA or LSAT score are wholly
frivolous in light of Reagents v. Ewina, 474 U.S. 214 (1986)
Appellant’s other claims seek relief from the very sort of
‘*lelompetitive consideration of race and ethnie origin,’
U'mversity of California Reaents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
420 (1978) (op. of Powell, J.): id. at 324, 328 (op. of Bren
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.), that the Court
has upheld. See also Wuaant v. Jackson. 476 U.S. 267, 283
n.11 (1986) (op. of Powell, J.): Johnson v. Santa Clara
County, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1452 (1987). Appellant has no claim
for employment discrimination, see Hishon v. King &
Spauldina, 467 U.S. 69, 74 & n.5 (1984): Haw. Rev. Stat.
ch. 378 (1985). nor for breach of the antitrust laws, see
Hoover v. Ronwin, 467 U.S. 588 (1984): Bia Island Small
Ranchers Assoc. v. State, 60 Haw. 228, 588 P.2d 430 (1978)

(same). Nor has appellant shown any property right (or

derivative federal or state richt to a hearing), see Olin v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983): Sharma wv. State.
66 Haw. 632, 673 P.2d 1030 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
836 (1984). Even in the state courts, all of appellant’s claims

i |

26

for damages would be barred by sovereign immunity, see
Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979)
(state constitutional claims); Makanui v. DOE, 721 P.2d
165 (Haw. App. 1986) (federal constitutional claims) ;
see also Julius Rothschild & Co. v. State, 66 Haw. 76, 659
P.2d 877 (1982) (per curiam) (tort claims); Meyer v.
Territory, 36, 75, 77 (1942) (contract claims) ; Jacober v.
Sunn, 715 P.2d 813, 821 (Haw. App. 1986) (statutory
claims); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 662-15(4) (1985) (intentional
tort claims), or by officer’s immunity, see Anderson v.
Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987); Bullen v. DeRego, 724
P.2d 106 (Haw. 1987) (following federal immunity anal-

ysis for state law claims). It is also quite clear, whether
the University is an ‘‘agency’’ for purposes of the state
Administrative Precedure Act, see Waugh v. University
of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 621 P.2d 957 (1980), that it is
exempted by the ‘‘internal management’’ exclusion from
having to promulate its admission policies by means of
public rule-making procedures. See Haw. Rev. Stat.
§$91-1(4); Aguiar v. Hawaii Housing Auth., 55 Haw. 478,
488 n.17, 522 P.2d 1255, 1262 n.17 (1974); see also Rose v.
Oha, 717 P.2d 1029 (Haw. 1986); Gild v. Spiker, 718 P.2d
1076 (Haw. 1986). On summary judgment, it was undis-
puted that appellant was mathematically incapable of
being admitted to the regular class in the years in which
he applied to the Law School, and that appellant’s record
raised independent compelling reasons to deny an offer
of admission. In response appellant rested ‘‘‘on the
hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested
proof,’? Costa v. Able Distributors, Inc., 3 Maw. App.
486, 489, 653 P.2d 101, 104 (1982), and, under the discre-
tion conferred by Rule 56(f), Haw. R. Civ. P., which is

27

identical to its federal counterpart, failed to show
‘** “how postponement of a ruling on the motion [would]
enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the
movants’ showing.’’? Wilder v. Tanouye, No. 12167 (Haw.
App. Mar. 17, 1988). Appellant was simply not a victim
of unlawful state action. Further review could not pos-
sibly give rise to a victory for appellant, either in this
Court or in the courts below.’® Accordingly, review should
be denied.

—n —- Q--—-———_-- --
CONC JUSION

For the reasons above, the appeal should be dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, or for want of a properly
presented or substantial federal question, or the judg-
ment affirmed. If the Court chooses to treat the papers
whereon appeal is taken as a petition for certiorari, the
Court should deny the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Warren Price, ITI*

Attorney General

State of Hawaii
*Counsel of Record

Steven S. MIcHAELs
Deputy Attorney General
Room 405, State Capitol
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
(808) 548-4740

Counsel for Appellees

3 Although the order in appeal No. 12636, Motion App. D, is
not fully dispositive of this case, it clearly limits, until reversed,
appellant’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1738.

APPENDIX

A-1

APPENDIX A

CORINNE K. A. WATANABE 1429
Attorney General
State of Hawaii

ROBERT A. MARKS 2163
STEVEN S. MICHAELS 3852
Deputy Attorneys General

Hawaii State Capitol, Room 405
415 South Beretania Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Telephone: 548-4740

Attorneys for Defendants
Ist CIRCUIT COURT

STATE OF HAWAII
FILED
1987 JANUARY 14 P 1:38

B. NAKAMAEJO
CLERK

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAII

Civil No. 86-1646
ROBERT W. HALL, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.

STATE OF HAWAII, a State of
the United States, et al.,

Defendants.

A-2

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING PLAINTIFE’S MOTION TO
STRIKE AND FOR SANCTIONS,
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S SECOND
MOTION TO STRIKE, OBJECTION,
AND FOR SANCTIONS, AND DENYING
ALL OTHER MOTIONS FILED BY
PLAINTIFF
Date: November 18, 1986
Time: 10:30 a.m.

Judge: Hon. Robert G. Klein

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS, ORIN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFEF’S
MOTION TO STRIKE AND FOR SANCTIONS,
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION TO
STRIKE, OBJECTION, AND FOR SANCTIONS AND
DENYING ALL OTHER MOTIONS FILED BY
PLAINTIFF

The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Altern-
ative, for Summary Judgment, filed on June 27, 1986, and
the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and for Sanctions, filed
October 29, 1986, and Second Motion to Strike, Objection |
and for Sanctions, filed on November 5, 1986, as well as |
various other motions brought by Plaintiff, came on for
hearing on November 18, 1986 at 10:30 a.m. before the
Honorable Robert G. Klein. Present at the hearing were
Steven S. Michaels and Robert A. Marks, Deputy Attor-
neys General, appearing for the Defendants, and Robert
W. Hall, appearing for himself.

The Court, having considered the arguments advanced
at the hearing, the memoranda and evidence filed herein,

A-3

and the records and previous orders herein and in Hall v.
State of Hawaw, No. 84-1072, (D. Hawaii, judgment en-
tered January 23, 1985), aff’d, 791 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1986)
(‘‘Hall I’’), hereby finds and concludes as follows:

1. Kxercising the discretion afforded the Court by
Rule 56(f), Hawaii R. Civ. P., the Court has reviewed the
affidavits submitted in connection with the motions dis-
posed of here, and finds that plaintiff has not sufficiently
set forth what admissible evidence giving rise to a genuine
issue of material fact would be produced by additional dis-
covery. See Hall v. State of Hawaii, 791 F.2d at 761.

2. At the hearirg on the motions disposed of here, the
Court gave the Plainti‘f additional leave to provide a clear
and concise affidavit setting forth a basis under Rule 56
(f), Hawaii R. Civ. P., for this Court to refuse the appli-
eation for judgment. The Court refrained from deciding
the instant motions until December 8, 1986, so that Plain-
tiff would have an added opportunity to assert his rights
under Rule 56(f), Hawaii R. Civ. P. No additional affi-
davits were submitted by Plaintiff.

3. With respect to the Plaintiff’s various motions to
strike, the Court finds that the Defendants’ attorneys
acted in good faith and within the letter and the spirit of
Exhibit A to Rule 2, Hawaii Sup. Ct. R. The Court also
finds that the evidence advanced by the Defendants in con-
nection with their Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative
for Summary Judgment, and the other motions disposed
of here, is relevant to those motions and properly subject
to consideration in connection with those motions.

4. After a review of the record in this action, in
Hall I, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the

|

A-4

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, and, in any event, within the meaning of
Rule 56, Hawaii R. Civ. P., there are no material facts in
dispute and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.

5. The Court further finds that the Defendants’ Mo-
tion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judg-
ment, is adequately supported whether the Plaintiff’s var-
ious motions to strike are granted or denied.

Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:

1. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment is granted, and any
and all claims appearing in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
are dismissed with prejudice.

2. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and for Sane
tions, and the Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Strike, Objec-
tion and for Sanetions are denied.

3. All other motions filed by Plaintiff in this action,
whether or not properly noticed for hearing, are denied.

DATED Honolulu, Hawaii, January 13, 1987

/s/ ROBERT G. KLEIN
ROBERT G. KLEIN
JUDGE OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DECLINED—RH
ROBERT W. HALL
Plaintiff pro se

B-1
APPENDIX B

ROBERT W. HALL
583 Kamoku Street, #2605
Honolulu, Hawaii 96826
(808) 942-1766
Pro Se

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAII
CIVIL NO. 86-1646

ROBERT W. HALL, an individual,

Plaintiff,
vs.

STATE OF HAWAII, a State of the United States;
UNIVERSITY OF HAWATITI, a Hawaii corporation and a
land-grant college; THE WILLIAM S. RICHARDSON
SCHOOL OF LAW, a division of the University of
Hawaii; ALBERT J. SIMONE, as an individual and in his
capacity as acting President or President of the Univers-
ity of Hawaii; STEPHEN G. BESS, as an individual and
as a Regent of the University of Hawaii; GLADYS A.
BRANDT, as an individual and as a regent or as the
Chair of the Board of Regents of the University of
Hawaii; GREGORY DELA CRUZ, as an individual and
as a regent of the University of Hawaii; JULIA FROH-
LICH, as an individual and as as Chair or regent of the
Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii; ROBERT
M. FUJIMOTO, as an individual and as a regent of the
University of Hawaii; JAMES G. GARY, as an individual
and as a regent of the University of Hawaii; DANIEL M.
ISHIT, as an individual and as a regent of the Univer-
sity of Hawaii: KENNETH N. KATO, as an individual
and as a regent of the University of Hawaii; STANLEY
Y. MUKAI, as an individual and as a regent of the Uni-
versity of Hawaii; WALTER R. STEIGER, as an indi-

B-2

vidual and as a regent of the University of Hawaii; BURT
K. TSUCHIYA, as an individual and as a regent of the
University of Hawaii; ROBIN COMPANIANO, as an in-
dividual and as a regent of the University of Hawaii;
MARVIN J. ANDERSON, as an individual and as Chan-
cellor of the University of Hawaii; RICHARD 8S.
MILLER, as an individual and as Dean of the School of
Law; JUDITH M. KIRKENDALL, as an individual and
as Registrar and Director of Student Affairs of the School
of Law; WILLIAMSON B.C. CHANG, as an individual
and as a member of the Admissions Committee of the
School of Law; IRENE RYPINSKI, as an individual and
as a member of the Admissions Committee of the School
of Law; LAWRENCE H. K.AM, as an individual and as a
member of the Admissions Committee of the School of
Law; BODE UALKE, as an individual and as a member of
the Admissions Committee of the School of Law; WILLIE
DOMINGO, as an individual and as a member of the Ad-
missions Committee of the School of Law; DEAN
KAUKA, as an individual and as member of the Admis-
sions Committee of School of Law; JEREMY T. HAR-
RISON, as an individual and as the acting Dean and as
Dean of the School of Law; JAMES H. DANNENBERG,
as an individnal and as a deputy attorney general of the
State of Hawaii; RONALD C. BROWN, as individual and
as Chair of the Admissions Committee of the School of
Law; JOHN E. PICKRON, as an individual and as a
member of the Admissions Committee of the School of
Law; JOHN DOES 1-20, JANE DOES 1-20, DOE PART-
NERSHIPS 1-20, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-20, DOE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-20, and DOE ENTI-
TIES 1-20,

Defendants.

ry

tS SD.

B-3

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES, DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, AN APPLICATION

FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS;

SUMMONS

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
ist CIRCUIT COURT
STATE OF HAWAII

FILED

1986 MAY—2 PM 1:03
H. SETO
CLERK

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES,
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE AN APPLICATION
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
The plaintiff ROBERT W. HALL, pro se comes now
with this complaint and petitions this court for an injune-
tion or in the alternative, for a writ of mandamus against
the above-named defendants in their official capacity, and
also in their individual capacities, and as reasons and
grounds therefore, plaintiff alleges the following facts:

GENERAL—APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS

1. The plaintiff prays for all the relief to which he
is entitled, whether specifically named in this complaint or
not. This action arises under Article I, Section 8; the
First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States; and the laws of the United
States including but not limited to the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 1870, and 1871: Title IX of the Education Amend-

B-4

ments of 1972; Title 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968;
Titles VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; all of the above
as amended and as hereinafter more fully appears. The
matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum of ten thousand dollars.

2. The jurisdiction of this court is also invoked as
being a suit in equity authorized by law to be brought to
redress the deprivation under color of unconstitutional
state law, statute, regulation, custom and usage of a state
of rights, privileges, and immunities seenred by the laws
and Constitution of the United States, viz., Sections 1983
and 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States providing for the equal rights of citizens and of all
other persons within the jurisdiction of the United States,
as amended and as hereinafter more fully appears.

3. The jurisdiction of this court is also invoked under
Article I, Section 4, Due Process and Equal Protection ;
Article I, Section 6, Rights of Citizens; Article IT, Section
2), Construction, Article TIT, The Legislature, Section 1,
Legislative Power: Article V, Section 5, The Judiciary,
Administration: Artiele IX, Edueation, Section 1, Public
Education; Section 4, University of Hawaii; Section 5,
Board of Regents: Powers, providing for equal rights of
citizens and all other persons within the jurisdiction of the
State of Hawaii; the Hawaii Administrative Procedures
Act, Chapters 91; the Publie Agency Meetings and Records
law, Chapter 92; the Hawaii Fair Employment Practice
Law, Title 21, Chapter 378-1 et seq., Hawaii Revised Stat-
utes; Chapters 304 (Universityof Hawaii), 661 (Actions
By and Against the State), 662 (State Tort Liability Act),
and 663 (Tort Actions), Hawaii Revised Statutes; state

B-5

and federal common law, and contract law: all of the above
as amended and as hereinafter more fully appears.

4. The jurisdiction of this court is also invoked under
the Hawaii Revised Statutes, Trade Regulation and Prae-
tice, Monopolies; Restraint of Trade, Section 480-4(a) and
Section 480-9.

5. The jurisdiction of this court is also invoked under
the Hawaii State Constitution and tort laws and is a com-
plaint for slander and libel leading to defamation, and for
the constitutional and statutory invasion of privacy. Juris-
diction is claimed but is not limited to Article 1, Section 6
of the Hawaii State Constitution, applicable tort law and
20 USC Subsection 1232(g), Family Educational and Pri-
vacy Rights.

6. The jurisdiction of this court is also invoked as a
request for declaratory judgment under Chapter 632, HRS,
for the purpose of determining a question in actual con-
troversy between the parties, to wit, whether the practice
of the defendants in denying plaintiff, on account of equal
opportunity, his age and his race, his national origin, and
his economic circumstance, the right to be admitted to and
pursue courses of study at the state and federally sup-
ported University of Hawaii constitutes a denial of the
right of the plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the laws of the United States and the
laws and Constitution of the State of Hawaii.

7. All of the parties to this action, both plaintiff and
defendants, are citizens of the United States and on infor-
mation and belief, are citizens of the State of Hawaii. The
plaintiff is a resident of the State of Hawaii. On informa.

B-6

tion and belief, the defendants are or were at the time the
allegations of this complaint occurred, residents of and
domiciled in, said state.

8. Defendant ALBERT J. SIMONE is the duly ap-
pointed, qualified, formerly acting, and now President of
said university, and as such governs and controls the sev-
eral colleges and schools of said university by the power
vested in him by the Board of Regents; STEPHEN G.
BESS, GLADYS A. BRANDT, GREGORY DELA CRUZ,
JULIA FROHLICH, ROBERT M. FUJIMOTO, JAMES
G. GARY, DANIEL M. ISHII, KENNETH N. KATO,
STANLEY MURAI, WALTER R. STEIGER, BURT Is.
TSUCHIYA ead ROBIN COMPANIANO are or were all
regents of the said university during a period of time cov-
ered by the allegations of this complaint, with power under
the Hawaii Revised Statute section 26-11, to formulate
policy, and to exercise control over the university through
its executive officer, the president of the university;
MARVIN J. ANDERSON is the former Chancellor of the
Manoa campus of the University of Hawaii and possessed
the power and the responsibility to appoint investigatory
committees and to review the actions of the Admissions
Committee of the School of Law; RICHARD 8S. MILLER
is the former Dean of the School of Law who made a final
review of the recommendations of the Admissions Commit-
tee during his term office; JEREMY T. HARRISON is
the current Dean of the School of Law; JUDITH M.
KIRKENDALL is the Registrar and Director of Student
Affairs who makes the recommendations to the Admissions
Committee with regard to initial qualifications or disquali-
fication; WILLIAMSON B. C. CHANG, IRENE RYPIN-
SKI, LAWRENCE H. KAM were the faculty members,

B-7

and BODE UALE, WILLIE DOMINGO, and DEAN
KAUKA were the student members of a six member Ad-
missions Committee of the School of Law for the 1984-85
school year admissions selection who possessed the author-
ity to pass upon the eligibility of applicants who seek to
enroll as students therein, including plaintiff; RONALD
C. BROWN, LAURENCE KAM and JOHN PICKRON
were the faculty members of the Admissions Committee
for the School of Law for the 1985-86 school year admis-
sions selection; Defendant STATE OF HAWAII is a state
of the United States of America; THE UNIVERSITY OF
HNAWAITI (hereinafter ‘‘University’’) is a corporation
and a federally funded land-grant college existing under
the laws of the State of Hawaii; and THE WILLIAM S.
RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW (hereinafter ‘‘School
of Law”’ or ‘‘Law School’’) is a law school of the Univer-
sity of Hawaii.

9. Defendants connected with the State of Hawaii
and the University of Hawaii have the duty under Hawaii
Revised Statute Section 304-1 to govern the university in a
manner consistent with an ‘‘available to all’’ policy man-
dated by the legislature. The University of Hawaii has
been found by a lawful order of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Hawaii dated January 22, 1985 (Hall vs.
State of Hawaii, Civil No. 84-1072), to be an agency of the
State of Hawaii. As an agency of the State of Hawaii,
THE WILLIAM 8S. RICHARDSON SCHOOL OF LAW
is bound by state law to comply with all of the terms and
conditions of the State of Hawaii Administrative Proced-
ures Act (‘‘APA’’), Chapter 91, and Public Agency Meet-
ings and Records, Chapter 92, HRS.

10. Defendants operate as a public, tax supported,
land-grant institution the only law school in the State of

B-8

Hawaii. The tuition of each person admitted to the School
of Law is heavily subsidized by the state and federal gov-
ernments. The School of Law at the University of Hawaii
is accredited and is approved by the national Council of
the American Bar Association on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar. The University of Hawaii is en-
gaged in interstate commerce and is a recipient of federal
funds and largess.

11. The University is bound by the guidelines and
instructions of the Law School Admissions Services, Ine.
and the Law School Admission Counsel, Inc. when using
LSAT test scores to grant or deny admission to the School
of Law. The LSAC advises all law schools not to use
LSAT test seores as the sole criterion for admission to the
law School.

12. The University is bound by by academie scientific
ethical and moral considerations to refrain from conduct-
ing psychological, psychometric or admissions experimen-
tal testing on humans without the informed consent of the
test subjects, all of whom with regard to LSAT tests, must
be volunteers.

13. The University and the School of Law have a
legal, ethical and moral duty to use only those tests in the
admissions process, (1) where wholesale cheating has not
occurred, (2) to make a reasonable and prudent effort to
determine that cheating has not occurred with regard to
LSAT test scores presented for admission, (2) that are
valid aceording to psychometric standards and that do
what they purport to do, (3) that do not subject non-volun-
teer humans to psychological or psychometric experimental
testing without their informed consent according to stand-
ards such as those published in the Standards for Eduea-

B-9

tional and Psychological Testing by the American Fiduca-
tional Research Association, American Psychological As-
sociation, National Council on Measurement in Education,
and (4) that do not constitute an outright fraud on those
applicants for admission who are required to take LSAT
tests.

14. The University and the School of Law are bound
by legal, ethical and moral considerations to avoid all dis-
crimination based upon race, national origin, sex and age
and to comply with Hawaii state law including the Hawaii
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in establishing and
implementing forms, rules and regulations in the admis-
sions process relating thereto.

15. The University and the School of Law are bound
by legal, ethical and moral considerations and by its own
pronouncements to implement forms, rules and regulations
that foster openness and avoid secreey and unwarranted
subjective considerations in the admissions process.

16. This complaint constitutes an allegation of mas-
sive fraud, conspiracy and wrongdoing by the University
and the School of Law and their officials, in their individ-
ual and official capacities, in the operation of the Univer-
sity of the School of Law with particular regard to the ad-
missions process. This complaint constitutes but is not lim-
ited to an allegation that the University authorized and
commissioned a committee to study the admissions process
and then hid the full report from the public when the result
proved embarassing to the University; the University by
its own admission, discriminates with regard to race, na-
tional origin and economic circumstance in granting or
denying admission to the School of Law; the University

B-10

knew or should have known that wholesale cheating is go-
ing on with regard to the LSAT test; the University par-
ticipates, encourages and turns a blind eve to wholesale
LSAT cheating; the University and the School of Law use
an unlawful system or ranking applicants that permits the
maximum subjective ranking of any publicly funded Amer-
ican university known to the plaintiff; the School of Law
admussions committee is stacked in favor of recent grad-
uates of local, public high schools and the University of
Hawaii; the University and the School of Law manipu-
lates admissions rankings based upon a subtle, shrewd and
unlawful form of discrimination; that University pro-
nouncements of Openness and communication with the com-
munity amount to little more than verbal opium for the
masses that cannot be believed by any rational person who
has ever dealt with the University; the University and the
School of Law promote an admissions program that makes
some applicants and taxpayers more equal than other ap-
plicants and taxpayers without sufficient objective evi-
dence to support their established policies; that the Uni-
versity and the School of Law demands to know the politi-
eal affiliations and activities of all applicants; that real
control of the admissions process lies outside the Univer-
sity and the School of Law; and the University and the
School of Law have not complied with and are not in com-
pliance with and refuse to comply with the Hawai Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act (APA), Chapter 91 or the
Public Agency Meetings and Records Act, Chapter 92,
HRS, despite demands from the plaintiff that they comply

with both laws.

17. The plaintiff alleges that the University and the
School of Law through their legal agent, James H. Dan-

creeipaay’ 2

sae Ahaha AF 0s Bate

B-11

nenberg, Deputy Attorney General, prior to the filing by
the defendants of any pleadings before any court of law,
deliberately and willfully slandered and libeled the plain-
tiff with the intent to defame, and with the intent to un-
constitutionally and illegally invade the privacy of the
plaintiff by unlawfully providing information including the
plaintiff’s LSAT score, to Ka Leo, the University of
Hawaii newspaper, and to the daily press, for publication
in violation of the Hawaii constitutional and applicable
Hawaii state and federal laws protecting the rights of the
plaintiff.

18. The plaintiff alleges that the University and the
School of Law refuse to implement lawful procedures as
required by law to redress grievances internally within
the University and refuse to implement lawful procedures
in the administration of the University and the School of
Law; and the University Board of Regents refused and
continue to refuse to hear the grievances of the plaintiff
before or after the filing of litigation despite its lawful
obligation to hear those grievances.

19. The plaintiff alleges that the University and the
School of Law requires the submittal of the results of the
LSAT exam by all applicants and thereby forces non-
volunteer applicants to subject themselves to experimental
psychometric and psychological experimentation on hu-
mans without the informed consent of the applicants. A
- major portion of the LSAT exam is experimental and is
not counted toward the LSAT score. The makers of these
tests are in a profit making business and enjoy enormous
benefits as a proximate result of the coerced LSAT test
taking. In addition, the University knew or should have
known that the LSAT exam is a fraud and does not do

B-12

what it purports to do. The University and the School of
Law unlawfully use the results of the LSAT exam to deny
admission to applicants in violation of the explicit instrue-
tions of the makers of the LSAT exam.

20. The plaintiff has filed a prior action in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Hawaii (Civil No. 84-
1072) that contained some of the allegations contained in
this complaint, but only with regard to his application for
the 1984-85 Law School year. The following year, a new
admissions committee was formed. The district court com-
plaint is currently under appeal before the Ninth Cireuit
Court of Appeals after the distriet court granted the de-
fendants summary judgment. Prior to summary judgment,
the plaintiff withdrew all state law allegations barred by
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. This instant action covers the plaintiff’s applica-
tions for both the 1984-85 school year and also his applica-
tions for the 1985-86 and 1986-87 school vears. The de-
cision of the appeals court (or any subsequent appeal)
may or may not have an impact on this action which is
being filed in order to save the plaintiff’s statute of limita-
tions time and in order to bring substantial amounts of
new evidence to the attention of the state court, along with
the state law allegations barred from federal court by the
Eleventh Amendment, in conformance with the State of
Hawaii’s arguments before the district court.

21. THIS COMPLAINT CONTAINS STATE AL-
LEGATIONS AND CLAIMS FOR EVENTS AND IN-
JURIES BARRED BY THE ELEVENTH AMEND-
MENT FROM FEDERAL COURT ADJUDICATION
THAT WERE WITHDRAWN FROM FEDERAL
COURT WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE DEFEN-

B-13

DANTS; THIS ACTION CONTAINS ALLEGATIONS
AND CLAIMS WITH REGARD TO EVENTS THAT
OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF THE
DISTRICT COURT ACTION, AND THIS ACTION IS
ALSO THE RESULT OF THE RECEIPT BY THE
PLAINTIFF OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW, RELEVANT
INFORMATION THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE
ATTEMPTED TO HIDE FROM THE PLAINTIFF
THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE IN HIS
POSSESSION WHEN CIVIL NO. 84-1072 WAS FILED.

COUNT I

22. Plaintiff was at the time of his application(s) for
admission to the School of Law, a fifty or fifty one-year
old, Caucasion, male, citizen and resident of the State of
Hawaii since 1960, a B.G.S. graduate of Chaminade Uni-
versity of Honolulu, an accredited university, with dis-
tinction, and a 3.83 grade point average (maximum 4.00
scale), who desires to be admitted as a student to said uni-
versity at the current fall session after the cause has been
heard and determined without delay, in order to avoid irre-
parable harm. At the time of his second application for
the 1985-86 school year, the plaintiff had completed three
graduate level courses as an unclassified student with the
School of Psychology at the University of Hawaii earning
two A’s and one B in those courses. At the time of his
1986-87 application, the plaintiff had completed most of the
requirements for an M.S. degree in counseling psychology
at Chaminade University of Honolulu. That course of
study ineluded psychological and psychometric testing.
The plaintiff is ready, willing and able to pay the requisite
uniform fees and conform to the lawful uniform rules and
regulations for admission. The plaintiff is currently com-

B-14
pleting the requirement’s for an M.S. degree in counseling
psychology at Chaminade University of Honolulu and ex-
pects to graduate this summer.

23. On January 29, 1984, on February 25, 1985 and
again on February 27, 1986, the plaintiff applied for ad-
mission to said University School of Law. Plaintiff com-
plied with all the /awful instructions, rules and regulations
of the University and the School of Law. On May 4, 1984
and at several other times subsequently, plaintiff supplied
additional information to the School of Law Admissions
Committee.

24. Plaintiff received a letters from Judith M. Kirk-
endall, Registrar and Director of Student Affairs dated
May 7, 1984 and May 2, 1985 denying the plaintiff admis-
sion to the law seool. The 1986-87 application is still pend-

ing.

25. The information booklet of the School of Law
outlines a Pre-Admission to Law School Program that pro-
vides ‘‘students from disadvantaged population groups
under-represented in the Hawaii Bar with an opportunity
to improve and to demonstrate their ability to do law
school work. The students who are selected from among
applicants with re.ccds not strong enough to justify ad-
mission into the regular program, must nonetheless show
enough promise to indicate potential for successful com-
pletion of law study and significant contribution as law-
yers.’’ The only requirement to continue after the first
vear of work is a 2.00 grade point average with students
earning a 1.6 to 1.99 grade point average admitted under

probation.

26. An October 24, 1983 University Secret Admis-
sions Review Committee Report obtained by the plaintiff

B-15

noted that the School of Law places ‘‘strong emphasis on
three special areas with regard to all applications. First,
whether the applicant has any particular skills which
would qualify him to practice law in a specialty currently
understaffed by the Bar. Thus, for example, someone who
spoke fluent Korean or was particularly knowledgeable
about the law of the sea would stand a better chance for
admission. Second, applicants who come from racial and
ethnic groups currently under represented in the Bar are
also given special consideration. Finally, the duration and
quality of residency in the State of Hawaii is considered a
positive feature. The majority of the applicants are resi-
dents of Hawaii.’’ The secret report further states that
with regard to the Pre-Admissions Program the terms
‘‘economically and educationally disadvantaged’’ as a
practical matter translate into motivated applicants who
are other than Caucasion, Chinese, Japanese and Koreans.

27. Plaintiff alleges that ‘‘anything that departs
from an unqualified and unlimited open policy implies
some sort of ideology of preferences. And what one pre-
fers, one tends to endow with merit.’”? (Kraft, Ivor, Race,
Merit and the Fourteenth Amendment) Such preferences
are clearly unconstitutional, illegal under state and federal
law and are prima facie evidence of the efficacy of the
allegations of the plaintiff.

28. When a classification denies an individual oppor-
tunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his
or her race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as
suspect. The University’s admissions program of explicit
racial classification has never been countenanced by any
court. It tells applicants who are not ‘‘minorities’’ that no
matter how superior or strong their qualifications, they

B-16

will never be allowed the chance to compete for admission
with all other applicants. Racial and ethnic classifications
are inherently suspect and call for exacting judicial seru-
tiny (see, Bakke).

29. In modern history, Hawaii has no history of dis-
crimination towards minorities such as the discrimination
the blacks were subjected to in the southern United States
that warrants any preferential admissions policies or ex-
traordinary measures whatsoever, and in any event, ‘‘pre-
ferential arrangements for minority students cannot be
established on a permanent basis.’ (The Director of the
Office of Civil Rights In Re: DeFunis v. Odegaard record,
82 Wash. 2d 11; 507 P. 2d 1169 (1973), vacated per curiam
as moot, 416 U.S. 312; 94S. Ct. 1704 (1974), pp. 1201-1203
and Kraft, Ivor, Race, Merit and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, p. 25.) Discrimination on racial grounds is always
and invariably subject to the strictest serutiny. (In Re:
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 [1967]). ‘Judge Lloyd
Shorett of the King County Superior Court, citing Brown,
found that DeFunis had been deprived of equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered
his admission to the Law School. ‘In my opinion,’ said
Judge Shorett, ‘the only safe rule is to treat all races alike
and I feel that is what is required under the equal) protec-
tion clause.’ *’ (DeFunis Record, 116 and Kraft, Ivor,
Race, Merit and the Fourteenth Amendment.) If educa-
tional corrections need to be made, the place to make them
is at the secondary level, not at the graduate level. The
only proper way to obtain an education is to earn it. Plain-
tiff has earned an opportunity for an education.

30. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants associated
with the University of Hawaii and the State of Hawaii,

B-17

individually and collectively, have designed and are sup-
porting a system of arbitrary, capricious, administrative
action, along with unlawful procedures, discrimination and
‘*stonewalling’’ with regard to any information on any
aspect of this dispute. In addition, the University of
Hawaii, despite disclaimers to the contrary, has no timely,
established system of review, and there is no practical way
to scrutinize or to challenge the admissions process despite
strict state law guaranteeing open and fair rules and pro-
cedures.

31. The plaintiff alleges that the School of Law oper-
ates a ‘“‘blackball’’ system with regard to admissions where
all members of the admissions committee must agree or an
application is not accepted. Any one member of the faculty
ean also effectively block an application.

32. Defendants have established and are maintaining,
under color of unconstitutional rules of the University and
laws of the State of Hawaii, a policy, custom, and usage of
denying to qualified plaintiff applicant the equal protec-
tion of the laws by refusing him admission to the Univer-
sity School of Law on the basis of race, national origin or
age through the device of protecting certain ‘‘slots’’ for
those of specific race or national origin, and have con-
tinued the policy of refusing to admit qualified Caucasion,
resident of Hawaii applicants into said School of Law,
while at the same time admitting applicants on the basis or
race or national origin with equal or less qualifications
than plaintiff. The plaintiff has not been able to compete
for all of the ‘‘slots’’ in the School of Law classes for two
years in violation of the guidelines laid down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Bakke decision.

B-18

33. The procedures of the Defendants as outlined in
this complaint create a multi-layered, subtle, fine-mesh
system of diserimination by which those applicants of a
certain age who were born and raised in Hawaii, who grad-
uated from secondary schools and who attended college in
Hawaii and who are of a particular age, racial and/or
national origin extraction, will more easily pass through
the filter where older Caucasion residents of the State of
Hawaii who did not attend and graduate from secondary
schools in Hawaii will not enjoy the same equal opportun-
ity to compete for all the seats in three vears of Law
School classes, tokenism and disclaimers not withstanding.

34. The plaintiff specifically alleges that the conduct
of the defendants as officials in their official capacities
clearly violates established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
The defendants are essentially the University of Hawaii,
its School of Law and their respective officials as officials
and as individuals, who are responsible for the implemen-
tation and the perpetuation of these unlawful and unconsti-
tutional practices. Since this action involyes the School of
Law, and not a less legally informed agency such as the
School of Medicine, the officials must be held to high
standards for it is they who have a monopoly and the man-
date in the State of Hawaii, to teach and maintain high
standards of lawful conduct in the exercise of their duties.

35. As a proximate result of the malicious and un-
lawful acts of the defendants which plaintiff HALL has
suffered as outlined in Count I, he should be awarded gen-
eral damages on his behalf and against defendants in the
amount of $50,000; with nominal, special, compensatory or
actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial. In ad-

B-19

dition, as a proximate result of the unlawful, malicious,
secretive, reckless and willful disregard and deprivation
of the lawful and constitutional rights of the plaintiff and
the public trust, HALL should be awarded punitive, or
exemplary damages on his behalf and against the defen-
dants jointly and severally in the amount of $500,000.

COUNT II

36. Paragraphs 1 through 35 are incorporated herein
by referenee. The defendants claim that they use a three-
part method of evaluating applicants, LSAT score, under-
vraduate grade-point average (GPA) and subjective score.
Most mainland publiely funded law schools use a system
where the total number of points that can be obtained runs
over 1,000 points. In the case of the Rutgers Law School
the maximum number of points is 2,188, or 2,868 at the end
of two stages, one of which includes a subjective evalua-
tion. The Rutgers subjective evaluation is based solely
upon (1) edueation, (2) work experience, (3) personal
information inelnding an essay, (4) a recommendation,
and (5) grade inflation (see, Doherty, par. 37 below).
The Hawaii system, however, has a total maximum of only
15 points, five points in each of the three categories. Most
mainland public law schools that strive for fairness and
objectivity no longer use a subjective seore in the admis-
sions process (see, PFYA score used at the University of
Minnesota in McAdams v. Regents of University of Min-
nesota, 508 F.Supp. 354 [1981], at 357). The 1,000 to 2,000
points or so are computed under a formula involving only
the LSAT seore and the undergraduate GPA at some
schools. Those schools who still use a subjective component
use a procedure that is quite different from the procedure

B-20

used at the University of Hawaii, and is similar to that
used at Rutgers. Their procedures do not permit subjec-
tive discrimination. Several schools weight the under-
graduate GPA as counting proportionately more than the
LSAT. The University of Hawaii School of Law has never
published its eriteria for subjective evaluations. That
failure to disclose permits, of conrse, the maximum sub-

jectivity in an evaluation.

37. In Doherty (see, Doherty vs. Rutgers, 651 F.2d
893 [8rd Cir. 1981]), standing to bring an action was de-
termined on the basis that the addition of the maximum
subjective score, 680 points, did not bring Doherty’s seore
above the cut-off point for that year. In the instant ease,
the addition of the maximum subjective score would have
brought the plaintiff well above the eut-off point for any

year.

38. The system used in Hawaii is very shrewd. With
a high point number system, the applicants are neatly
spread in rank. With a total score of fifteen, most appli-
cants are compressed into a limited number of ranks. The
beauty of the Hawaii system in eliminating applicants, is
that a second subjective choice can then be made by pick-
ing and choosing within a numerical rank crowded with
applicants without obvious flagrant discrimination. The
first discriminatory choices are made by manipulating the
subjective score. Another discrimination occurs by over-
weighting LSAT scores that fall below the past ‘‘eut-off’’
point of 27. A score of 25 for example, is assigned a nu-
merical score of -—2, a very heavy weighting for only two

b

points below the desired minimum or the alleged “cut-off”

score of 27. The evaluation point assignment used at the

B-21

Law School is not spread evenly over the total LSAT point
range of 0 through 48, and is enormously discriminatory
in its application. The question of the use ‘‘eut-off’’
scores, a policy that the School of Law, is another issue
in this complaint. When challenged on that point in Rob-
mson v, Williams (University of Mississippi Law School),
Civil No. WC 74-66-K (N.D. Miss.), the University of
Mississippi Law School immediately caved in and reported,
‘“‘The Law School has ceased to use any minimum LSAT
score in the admission process’’. None of this information
has ever been published or made uniformly public to ap-
plicants. In the plaintiff’s case, a maximum subjective
score of 5 added to his undergraduate grade point average
score of 5 would have given him a 10 seore. The appli-
cation of a negative score with regard to the LSAT score
is challenged herein, but even if this system survives chal-
lenge, the application of the -2 would have given the
plaintiff an 8 score, well within the scores of those accept-
et for admission in both admissions years. This informa-
tion with regard to the system used by the Law School
was obtained from an affidavit filed in Civil No. 84-1072
in U.S. District Court, and is without prejudice to dis-
covery or cross-examination by the plaintiff. Not only
is the School of Law admissions system shrewd, it amounts
to an arrogant, unlawful, private use of public funds.

39. Hawaii separates itself from many mainland law
schools another way. The Law School Admissions Counsel
(LSAC) has published firm instructions that the LSAT
should not be used as the sole criteria for admission or
the denial of admission. The reason for this instruction
is that the LSAT is not a valid predictor of first year law

school suecess. Validity improves (but is still terrible)

if the LSAT is matehed with the undergraduate GPA.
Hawaii ignores that LSAC caution and gets rid of many
of those it does not subjectively want by an LSAT cut-off
point and by overweighting with minus scores, those who
fall below 27. That eut-off is apparently adjusted and
for the last two years, has stood at 27. One way is just
effective as the other for usine the LSAT seore to elim-
inate applicants. There were exceptions, of course, for
those who had special merit. None of this information
is published or routinely provided to prospective appli-
eants.

40. The manner in which the University of Hawaii
uses LSAT scores in the admissions process is unlawful
for several reasons. The first is the perception that most
people have as to what the LSAT test (or any other Edu-
cational Testing Service [ETS] test) is. TheLSAT exam
tests how well a person does on the LSAT exam and noth-
ing more. The LSAT test is not an aptitude test. The
test is a massive fraud, pure and simple. That fraud
has never been adjudicated on the merits in any court.
The vast majoritv of those who do well on the LSAT
exam do well by simply cheating by taking a coaching
course. National LSAT statisties are invalid for several
reasons ineluding the availability of superior coaching
courses in major metropolitan areas and the fact that the
random selection statistical basis of the test is destroyed
by that coaching and several other psychometric reasons.
The coaching courses teach students how to cast out the
wrong answers by process of elimination without ever
knowing why the right answer is right. The better coach-
ing courses have determined by computer analysis, several
patterns in LSAT test construction which can easily be

B-23

taught to students who spend weeks of their time and
who pay a substantial fee. Nothing is learned in the
process except how to heat the test. By definition, such
a test cannot be called an aptitude test. By the statistics
published by its authors (known as correlation statistics),
the exam is also a fraud since it simply does not do what
those who use it purport it will do. It does not fairly pre-
dict first year law school performance, a fact well known
in psychometrie circles.

41. As a proximate result of the malicious and un-
lawful acts of the defendants which plaintiff HALL has
suffered, he should be awarded general damages on his
behalf and against defendants in the amount of $50,000;
with nominal, special, compensatory or actual damages in
an amount to be proven at trial. In addition, as a proxi-
mate result of the unlawful, malicious, secretive, reckless
and willful deprivation and disregard of the lawful and
constitutional rights of the plaintiff and the public trust,
HALL should be awarded punitive, or exemplary damages
on his behalf and against the defendants jointly and sev-
erally in the amount of $500,000.

COUNT ITI

42. Paragraphs 1 through 41 are incorporated herein
by reference. The plaintiff has made several lawful at-
tempts to determine the validity of the admissions proced-
ures used at the University under the APA, Chapter 91,
and Chapter 92, HRS. One such attempt was made on
October 5, 1985 direct to the President of the University
of Hawaii, Albert J. Simone and another was made on De-
ecember 11, 1985 to Judith M. Kirkendall, Registrar and

B-24

Director of Student Affairs at the William S. Richardson
School of Law.

43. Despite the applicability of the APA to all agen-
cies of the State of Hawaii and the finding of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Hawaii on January 22,
1985 that the University is an agency of the State of
Hawaii, the University and the School of Iaw have at all
times, refused and failed to respond to the lawful requests
of the plaintiff to provide evidence that the rules and regu-
lations ineludine the admissions procedures used at the
University and the School of Law were adopted in lawful
compliance with the APA, Chapter 91, HRS.

44. The plaintiff alleges that the rules and regula-
tions of the University in general, and specifically the ad-
missions procedures utilized to exclude the plaintiff from
the School of Law, have not been adopted in lawful com-
pliance with the APA, Chapter 91, HRS.

45. The plaintiff requests declaratory judgment; that
this court issue a judicial declaration as to the validity of
the rules and regulations and other requests outlined in the
October 5 and December 11, 1985 letters, and declare all
University and School of Law admissions rules and regu-
Jations invalid that violate constitutional or statutory pro-
visions, or exceed the statutory authority of the agency, or
were adopted without compliance with statutory rule-
making procedures, in accordance with Section 91-7, HRS.

COUNT IV

46. Paragraphs 1-45 are incorporated herein by ref-
erence. On August 7, 1984, the plaintiff made a request
under HRS Section 92-51 and 92-21, Publie Reeord Access

B-25

& Copying Request. The request was made to Marvin J.
Anderson, in his capacity as Chancellor, University of
Hawaii. The request was ignored.

47. The plaintiff requests that a hearing be sched-
uled, and the court find that the denial was not for just
and proper cause, and that the court grant an order un-
der part 92-52 ordering the appropriate official at the
University to provide the documents requested in the Au-
oust 7, 1984 letter.

COUNT V

48. Paragraphs 1-47 are ineorporate herein by refer-
ence. In September of 1984, counsel for the defendants
James H. Dannenberg spoke to the press about the U.S.
District Court case. These contacts occurred after the
plaintiff had filed Civil No. 84-1072 in U.S. District Court,
but occurred prior to the filing of any pleadings of any
kind by the defendants in the U.S. District Court. One
member of the press that Mr. Dannenberg spoke to was a
reporter by the name of Norman Lee, a reporter for Ka
Leo O Hawaii, the University of Hawaii newspaper. In
that discussion, Mr. Dannenberg provided Mr. Lee with
the information that the plaintiff’s LSAT score was 25,
‘‘two points below the UH law school’s established mini-
mum requirement secore’’. Mr. Dannenberg obtained that
information from the plaintiff’s confidential, personal Uni-
versity records with the cooperation of and in a conspir-
acy with University officials. That information supplied
by Mr. Dannenberg was published by Ka Leo on Septem-
ber 14, 1984 in a front page, headlined article by Mr. Lee.

B-26

49. The information concerning the LSAT score sup-
plied by Mr. Dannenberg to Mr. Lee for publication was
not only as an invasion of the plaintiff’s constitutional and
lawful right to privacy, but also was a deliberate attempt

to libel and slander with the intent to defame, the plain-
tiff.

50. As a proximate result of the malicious and un-
lawful acts of the defendants outlined in Count IV which
plaintiff HALL has suffered, he should be awarded gen-
eral damages on his behalf and against defendants in the
amount of $50,000, nominal, special, compensatory or ac-
tual damages in an amount to be proven at trial. In addi-
tion, as a proximate result of the unlawful, malicious,
secretive, reckless and willful deprivation and disregard
of the lawful and constitutional rights of the plaintiff and
the public trust, HALL should be awarded punitive, or ex-
emplary damages on his behalf and against the defendants
jointly and severally in the amount of $500,000.

COUNT VI

51. The plaintiff specifically alleges that the defen-
dants have conspired under the definition of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1985(3) and 1986 for the purpose of depriving the
plaintiff, directly and indirectly, of equal protection of the
law, that the defendants as conspirators committed the
acts alleged in this complaint in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, and that the plaintiff has been injured in the
form stress and mental suffering, he has been deprived of
the property right to an education, and he has been de-
prived of having and exercising the rights or privileges
of a citizen of the United States as are outlined in this com-

B-27

plaint. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants had actual
knowledge of the discriminatory act by virtue of but not
limited to the filing of Civil No. 84-1072 in U.S. District
Court, and by virtue of correspondence, meetings and
telephone conversations with the plaintiff.

52. As a proximate result of the malicious and un-
lawful acts of the defendants in Count VI which plaintiff
HALL has suffered, he should be awarded general dam-
ages on his behalf and against defendants in the amount of
$50,000; and nominal, special, compensatory or actual dam-
ages in an amount to be proven at trial. Im addition, as
a proximate result of the unlawful, malicious, secretive,
reckless and willful deprivation and disregard of the law-
ful and constitutional rights of the plaintiff and disregard
of the publie trust, HALL should be awarded punitive, or
exemplary damages on his behalf and against the defen-
dants jointly and severally in the amount of $500,000.

COUNT VII

53. Paragraphs 1-52 are incorporated herein by refer-
ence. Defendants have established and are maintaining,
under color of unconstitutional laws or rules of the State
of Hawaii, a policy, custom, and usage of denying to the
qualified Caueasion plaintiff applicant the equal protec-
tion of the laws and are engaging in acts of violation of the
state anti-trust laws, acts of restraint of trade, conspiracy
and monopoly by refusing the plaintiff the educational
opportunity to qualify for the employment of the practice
of law in the State of Hawaii, while at the same time ad-
mitting applicants with equal or less qualifications than
plaintiff. Applicants who are admitted and who graduate

B-28

qualify to take the Bar examination. Plaintiff does not
qualify under current, unconstitutional rules, to take the
Bar examination and to practice as a licensed attorney in
the State of Hawaii.

54. The federal courts have held that whatever vari-
ous states may require before allowing applicants to take
the Bar examination, so long as they are applicable to
every citizen alike, it should be of no concern to the fed-
eral (and presumably state) courts. The plaintiff alleges
that with the unique (among all the fifty states) central
political and administrative control that the state admin-
istration exerts in all aspects of governmental life in
Hawaii, admission to the only ABA approved Law School
in the State of Hawaii is very much a part of this process,
and the applicable rules and reguiations are not applicable
to every citizen alike (see, Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d
499 [1966]). The applicable rules and regulations in
Hawaii create a system where some citizens are unlaw-
fully treated very specially and with enormous diserimina-
tion over other citizens.

55. The said action of defendants will effectively bar
plaintiff from the luerative practice of law now closed to
him because of a lack of graduation from a law school ap-
proved by the Council of the American Bar Association
on Lega! Education and Admissions to the Bar, and will be
obliged to aecept less remunerative employment. ‘‘As the
High Bench remarked in Brown, ‘education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.’
and debates over education scmetimes go deeper than
debates on race.’’ (Kraft, Ivor, Race, Merit and the Four-
teenth Amendment.)

B-29

56. The said action of defendants also denies the
plaintiff the right and privilege to obtain a heavily sub-
sidized law education in said law school; it places plain-
tiff at great disadvantage with regard to obtaining a law
education within said state, as compared with other resi-
dents and non-residents of said state; it amounts to denial
to plaintiff, a citizen of the United States and of the State
of Hawaii, and others similarly situated of liberty and
property without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Hawaii. The
courts have held that denials of licenses can be viewed
about equally as well as complaining of a deprivation of
the personal liberty to pursue the ealling of one’s choice
or of the profits or emoluments deriving therefrom (see,
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 [19691). In the instant
case, the state requires graduation from their ABA ap-
proved School of Law, the only one in the State of Hawaii,
as a prerequisite to application for a license to practice
law, or to take the bar examination which is also a pre-
requisite to licensing.

57. Plaintiff has been damaged in that kis pleadings
have been stricken in Civil No. 85-0151 (Order Striking all
Pleadings Filed by Robert W. Hall and/or Bertha S. Hall
on Behalf of the Hall Trusts and Enjoining the Further
Unauthorized Practice of Law filed February 4, 1986, Cir-
euit Court of the First Cirenit, State of Hawaii), appar-
ently as a sanction for the alleged unlicensed representa-
tion of inter-vivos trusts for his son where he and his wife
retain a personal interest in the trusts. Civil No. 85-0151
is a foreclosure action with regard to the plaintiff’s prin-
cipal residence. Plaintiff alleges that the unlawful and

B-30

proximate acts of the defendants as alleged in this action
deprive the plaintiff of his lawful and constitutional right
to defend, and the legal knowledge to defend, his personal
and family interests, and that as a result, the defendants
herein must be held accountable for the damages that have
occurred and will likely oceur to the plaintiff by their un-
lawful actions, ineluding responsibility for the imminent
foreclosure of their principal residence, and future, sim-

ilar injuries,

08. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of
the defendants, the plaintiff is suffering irreparable in-
jury and is threatened with irreparable injury in the
future by reason of the acts herein mentioned. Plaintiff
has no timely, practical, plain, adequate remedy to redress
the wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of other
than this suit for a declaration of rights, damages and an
injunction. Any other remedy to which plaintiff could be
remitted would be attended by such uncertainties and de-
lays as to deny substantial relief, would involve a multi-
plicity of suits, cause further irreparable injury, and oe-
casional damages, vexation, and inconvenience, not only to

plaintiff, but to defendants as governmental agencies.

99. As a proximate result of the malicious and un-
lawful acts of the defendants outlined in Count V which
plaintiff HALL has suffered, he should be awarded gen-
eral damages on his behalf and against defendants in the
amount of $50,000, nominal, special, compensatory or ac-
tual damages including interest in an amount to be proven
at trial. In addition, as a proximate result of the unlawful,

malicious, secretive, reckless and willful disregard of the

lawful and constitutional rights of the plaintiff and the

B-31

public trust, HALL should be awarded, punitive, or ex-
emplary damages on his behalf and against the defendants
jointly and severally in the amount of $500,000, all dam-
ages trebled or otherwise multiplied in accordance with
applicable law.

Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray that:

1. This court adjudge, decree, and declare the rights
and legal relations of the parties to the subject matter
here in controversy, in order that such declaration shall
have the foree and effect of a final judgment or decree.

29 This court enter a judement or decree declaring

that the said admissions policy, custom, usage, rules, regu-
lations and practice of the defendants in denying plaintiff
the right to enroll, enter, and pursue courses of study at
the School of Law at the University of Hawaii on account
of his age, race or national origin, or any other unlawful
consideration, is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and is therefore uncon-
stitutional or unconstitutional or is illegal under appli-
“able state or federal law, as an unlawful admissions pol-
icy or as the admissions policy was applied specifically
to the plaintiff.

3. This court issue a permanent injunction forever
restraining and enjoining defendants and each of them,
from denying plaintiff the right to enroll and pursue
courses of study at the School of Law at the University

of Hawaii on account of the failure of the University and
the School of Law to comply with Chapters 91 & 92, HRS
(see, 56 H. 680, 548 P.2d 253); his age; his length of resi-
dence in the State of Hawaii; the location of the sec-

B-32
ondary schools or colleges he did or did not attend: his
letters of reference or lack thereof; his community ser-
vice or lack thereof; his race; his national origin; or any
other unconstitutional or illegal subjective factors or any
requirement not legally published under Chapter 91, HRS,
in the information hooklet of the Law School of the Uni-

versitv of Hawaii.

4. In the alternative, that this court issue a_per-
manent injunction prohibiting the University of Hawaii
from using the current School of Law admissions proce-
dure while finding the entire admissions process for the
1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years unconstitutional,

illegal, null and void.

». That in the alternative, this court then issue a
writ of mandamus requiring the University of Hawaii to
re-select applicants to the School of Law for the 1984-85,
1985-86 or 1986-87 school vears from a group of. applicants
who are legal residents of the State of Hawaii who meet
whatever lawful admissions requirements remain, by lot
or by any other lawful means, and one of that group shall
he the plaintiff.

6. That in the alternative, this court issne a writ of
mandamus compellig defendants to register plaintiff as
a first vear student at the coming fall semester of the

School of Law of the University of Hawaii.

7. That this court enter a judgment or decree de-
claring that the said Hawaii Revised Statute Section 605-
14, conspiracy, custom, usage and practice of the defen-
dants Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii with regard

to the ‘‘unauthorized practice of law’’, is a denial of the

equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First,

B-33
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States and in violation of the federal and state
anti-trust, monopoly and restraint of trade laws cited
herein, and is therefore unconstitutional, illegwal, null and
void under the existing federal and state laws, above-
named.

8. That this court issue a permanent injunction for-
ever restraining and enjoining defendants and each of
them, from denying plaintiff the right to represent with
their consent, any member of his family before any fed-
eral or state court of law in the State of Hawaii.

9. That this court enter a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff against defendants jointly and severally for nom-
inal, special, compensatory or actual damages jointly and
severally in an amount to be proven at trial, general dam-
ages of $250,000 and punitive or exemplary damages of
$2,500,000, trebled where applicable.

10. Plaintiff further prays that the court allow him
his costs and compensation for his time in appearing as his
own attorney at the reimbursement of $75.00 per hour, and
such further, other, additional, or alternative relief as may
appear to the court equitable and just.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury pursuant to all
the provisions of Rule 38(b) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil
Procedure

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_2149%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
