# Reply Brief — Alabama Power Co. v. Thomas

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 888

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED
No. 88-61 SEP 30 1988

WV
7

FP, SPANIOL, JR
CLERK

IN THE

Suprenw Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION AND
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Petitioners,
We

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION
AND EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE

Davip C. BRANAND HENRY V. NICKEL
1130 17th Street, N.W. (Counsel of Record)
Washington, D.C. 20036 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(202) 463-2643 MEL 8S. SCHULZE

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 9000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioner
September 30, 1988 Edison Electric Institute

Counsel for Petitioner
National Coal Association

ee ed
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

ADDRESS THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S FAILURE
TO APPLY THIS COURT’S CHEVRON DOC-
TRINE AND TO AFFORD DEFERENCE TO
EPA’S REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
gh g __REFRRIRE RSM VCNane eeneanimoncier estat fhlsWee Srnec Ne PO Co

. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO

ENSURE THAT THE DOCTRINES OF LAW
OF THE CASE AND RES JUDICATA ARE
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY REMAND PROCEEDINGS .............

Ce iieices see hcartier cst lictads biecpoies padsaretandatonansions

eT

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

Ci } Ppeeeenemmnrnretmtrr: Le a 1

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987)... 4

NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1988).. 5

Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Alabama Power Co. »v.

Sierra Club, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984) ..................... 2,4, 8,9
STATUTES:
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. (1982)
6 125, 48 UBS. S Fae Cisee) ete passim
FEDERAL REGISTER:
46 Fraud. Ter, GE € R ascinespsaivacstcccenccicenses 8
GO Fad. Heel. RIGO CD aseessivciccsuenenneans 4
MISCELLANEOUS:

H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) .... 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-61

NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION AND
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
. Petitioners,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION
AND EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE

ARGUMENT

As Petitioners explained in their Petition for Certio-
rari, the D.C. Circuit in this case essentially required
that sources conduct case-by-case demonstrations of stack
height credit, when the plain language of § 123 of the
Clean Air Act and the Agency’s interpretation of that
provision contemplate a general “good engineering prac-
tice’ (GEP) rule.’ As Petitioners explained, the lower
court’s decision in this regard ignored basic principles of
law restricting judicial intervention in agency action, as
embodied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC2 and the doc-
trines of law of the case and res judicata.

1 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18-20 (hereinafter “Pet.

—’’) ,

2 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“Chevron”).

amet aati anne

2

In response to the Petition, Federal Respondents agree
that “EPA’s decision to grandfather within-formula stack
height increases [from demonstration requirements] was
a reasonable one . . . under Section 123 . .. and should
have been sustained by the court of appeals.”* Federal
Respondents also agree that an agency “should not be
required to relitigate the merits of previously adopted
regulatory choices every time it engages in supplemental
rulemaking after a remand,” and state that the Agency
did in fact “originally interpret[] Sierra Club’s affirm-
ance of the [earlier] grandfathering provision as effec-
tively encompassing” the rule set aside by the more re-
cent D.C. Circuit decision.*

Nevertheless, Federal Respondents and Respondents
Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. (hereinafter
“NRDC”)*® oppose certiorari. Contrary to representa-
tions made before the D.C. Circuit,* Federal Respondents
now contend that this case involves only a “fact-specific
ruling [that] is not of general importance.”* Further-
more, contrary to its earlier view of Sierra Club,® the
Agency now believes that that decision is “somewhat
ambiguous” on the issue of grandfathering previous
stack height increases.° For the reasons discussed below,

3 Brief for Federal Respondents in Opposition at 25-26 (Sep-
tember 12, 1988) (hereinafter “Fed. Resp. Brief ——’”).

4 Fed. Resp. Brief 26; Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. Sierra
Club, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984).

5 Brief For Respondents in Opposition (February 12, 1988)
(hereinafter “NRDC Brief at P

6 See generally Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing (March 7,
1988) (hereinafter “EPA Rehearing Petition ——”’). The Rehear-
ing Petition is printed in the Appendix to this Brief.

7 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.
8 See generally EPA Rehearing Petition.
® Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

3

Respondents’ arguments in opposition to certiorari are
without merit.

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO AD-
DRESS THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S FAILURE TO APPLY
THIS COURT’S CHEVRON DOCTRINE AND TO
AFFORD DEFERENCE TO EPA’S REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION OF § 123.

As explained in the Petition for Certiorari, the D.C.
Circuit has twice addressed the Agency’s rules imple-
menting § 123 of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments—
a seemingly simple and straightforward statutory provi-
sion requiring EPA to establish rules within six months
providing for “good engineering practice” stack height
credit. In successive opinions, the D.C. Circuit, while
recognizing that neither § 123 nor its legislative history
is a model ef clarity, has interpreted this provision to
restrict the scope of the Agency’s authority to proceed by
general rule. In Sierra Club, the court required more
extensive use of case-by-case demonstrations for future
stack height increases. In its most recent decision, the
court extended this holding to stack height increases that
took place before its Sierra Club decision.

In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ever-expanding in-
structions on what EPA’s stack height credit regulations
must provide, Federal Respondents insist that EPA’s im-
plementation of § 123 with respect to “within-formula
stack height increases” was “reasonable” and “should
have been sustained by the court of appeals.” Peti-
tioners agree with Federal Respondents in this respect.
Petitioners disagree, however, with Federal Respondents’
view that the D.C. Circuit’s instructions on how to imple-
ment this technical statutory provision reflect due regard
for basic standards governing judicial review."

10 Jd. 25-26.
1 See id.; Pet. 18-22.

4

In Chevron, this Court announced that a reviewing
court must give deference to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its enabling statute, even if the review-
ing court itself would have adopted another interpreta-
tion of that statute. Under Chevron, therefore, the lower
court was required to defer to EPA’s reasonable inter-
pretation of the Act to allow use of a generally appli-
cable GEP formula for all sources with pre-October 1983
stacks."

Review by this Court is necessary to address the
D.C. Circuit’s failure to abide by or even acknowl-
edge the Chevron deference principle. Moreover, since
there has been confusion in the circuit courts as to the
scope and applicability of Chevron in the aftermath of
this Court’s decision in JNS v. Cardoza-Fonseca," grant-
ing certiorari in this case would give the Court an op-
portunity to clarify the scope of the Chevron doctrine.”

2 This interpretation of $123 was in fact adopted by EPA
from the pre-Chevron Sierra Club decision, which did not question
the use of the formula for pre-October 1983 stacks. See infra
pp. 6-9.

13 See Pet. 21 n.58: INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207
(1987).

14 In contrast to Federal Respondents’ recognition that its imple-
mentation of § 123 was reasonable and should have been upheld by
the lower court, NRDC, in opposing certiorari, argues that the lower
court’s decision “is not based on its adoption of a statutory inter-
pretation conflicting with the agency’s interpretation,” but rather
upon EPA’s failure to justify the grandfathering provision provid-
ing that sources with pre-October 1983 stacks may use the GEP
formula. NRDC Brief 8. NRDC ignores that the “crucial considera-
tion” in an agency's decision to adopt a grandfathering rule is the
“statutory interest” factor. Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 468. Accord-
ingly, in allowing sources with pre-October 1983 replaceraent stacks
to use the GEP formula, EPA of necessity had to find that rule to be
consistent with § 123 as well as with the lower court’s remand
order. EPA did just that. 50 Fed. Reg. 27900 (1985), Appendix
to Petition for Certiorari at 103a (hereinafter “App. ——”").
EPA therefore adopted as its own the Sierra Club court's inter-

—— OQ

5

While agreeing that the Agency’s implementation of
§ 123 was reasonable and should have been upheld by the
D.C. Circuit, Federal Respondents argue that this case
represents only “a fact-specific ruling [that] is not of
general importance,” and therefore not worthy of review
by this Court.” This assertion is surprising in light of
Federal Respondents’ representation to the D.C. Circuit
in EPA’s Petition for Rehearing that that court’s further
instructions on how to define GEP stack height credits
has “serious consequences for the Agency.” ** As Federal
Respondents then explained, the lower court’s ruling
would “deprive[] a significant number of sources of the
grandfathering protection conferred in Sierra Club,” and
would require the Agency “to devote substantial time and
resources” to yet another judicially-inspired approach to
§ 123 implementation." Federal Respondents offer no ex-
planation as to why these views have changed; nor do
they offer any response to Petitioners’ extensive discus-
sion of the importance of this case.”

pretation of § 123 to allow the use of the GEP formula by sources
with pre-October 1983 stacks. See infra pp. 6-9.

The D.C. Circuit in this case rejected EPA's interpretation
of §123. Stating an inaccurate view of the Sierra Club court's
interpretation of § 123, reached as a result of NRDC’s mischarac-
terization of that decision, see infra note 24, the court held
that sources with pre-October 1983 replacement stacks could not
use the GEP formula. NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1244-46
(D.C. Cir. 1988), App. 36a-40a. It is this continued reinterpreta-
tion of § 123 by the lower court, in a manner contrary to the
Agency’s interpretation of that provision, that has created the
need for certiorari.

1 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.
1% EPA Rehearing Petition 13, Appendix to this Brief at 12a
7 Jd.

1% See Pet. 24-26. NRDC, on the other hand, does attempt to
respond to Petitioners’ assertions regarding the importance of
this case. NRDC Brief 12-13. NRDC first argues that the court

6

In sum, the D.C. Circuit failed to show proper defer-
ence to EPA’s interpretation of § 123, under which the
GEP formula retained its vitality. Instead, it rejected
EPA’s rule without considering the Chevron doctrine,
rendering the GEP formula explicitly endorsed by- Con-
gress in § 123 and its legislative history unavailable for
most sources.” As a result, after a decade of § 123 rule-
making proceedings, EPA must again reallocate its
searce resources to development of rules implementing a
straightforward statutory provision for which Congress
expected final rules to be in place in 1978. This Court
should grant certiorari to end the confusion over § 123
and to clarify the proper roles of federal courts and
agencies in interpreting a statutory provision granting
the agency broad rulemaking powers.

II. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO ENSURE
THAT THE DOCTRINES OF LAW OF THE CASE
AND RES JUDICATA ARE APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF AGENCY REMAND PROCEEDINGS.

During the remand rulemaking following Sierra Club
and in the subsequent litigation in the court below, EPA
consistently held the view that the court in Sierra Club

did not require case-by-case demonstrations or a multi-layered
grandfathering scheme in lieu of a generally applicable GEP
formula, so long as EPA justifies the formula. As explained in the
Petition, however, Pet. 15 n.26, the burden that the lower court has
created for justification of a generally applicable formula will make
it difficult, as a practical matter, for EPA to justify the current
GEP formula.

Second, NRDC argues that even if case-by-case demonstrations
were required, they would not be burdensome because mathe-
matical models could be used instead of wind tunnels or field
studies. This claim makes no sense—the models that NRDC wants
EPA to use require that stack height be an input to the model;
the models cannot be used to assess what GEP stack height is.

19 See Pet. 19-20; H.R. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 143
(1977).

————eeeeeeaLgL.LLLLS=SaE_~S”——C

7

had affirmed the use of the GEP formula for all stacks
except future replacement stacks that increase stack
height.” EPA’s 1985 rules refiected this view of the
lower court’s opinion by (1) allowing use of the tradi-
tional 2.5H GEP formula for any pre-1979 stack upon a
showing of reliance; (2) allowing, subject to a discre-
tionary demonstration requirement, use of the refined
H + 1.5L GEP formula for any pre-October 1983 stack
not able to use the 2.5H formula, and for any post-
October 1983 original stack; and (3) requiring demon-
strations for post-October 1983 replacement stacks with
increased height.

Ignoring the Agency’s view of Sierra Club and § 123,
however, the D.C. Circuit set aside EPA’s rules allowing
GEP formula credit for past stack height increases.
Petitioners and Federal Respondents strongly objected to
the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of its prior position, explain-
ing more fully in petitions for rehearing how the deci-
sion below conflicted with the Sierra Club decision that
had guided the remand rulemaking.

Federal Respondents now suggest that Sierra Club “is
in fact somewhat ambiguous” on whether use of the GEP
formula for pre-October 1983 stacks is consistent with
§ 123," and on this basis suggest that the doctrines of
law of the case and res judicata are not important to
this case. In light of the history of this proceeding, Fed-
eral Respondents’ eleventh-hour reversal of position
should, if anything, lead this Court to examine this case
all the more closely.

Petitioners and others participated in the remand rule-
making based on the premise that the Sierra Club opin-
ion upheld the Agency’s rule allowing use of the 2.5H
GEP formula for all sources with pre-1979 stacks, as

20 See EPA Rehearing Petition 6-13, Appendix to this Brief at
5a-lla; Fed. Resp. Brief 26 (the Agency “originally interpreted”
Sierra Club in this manner).

21 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

8

long as the Agency limited use of that rule to sources
that had relied on that formula.“ The D.C. Circuit, how-
ever, gave no weight to the view of Sierra Club that
guided the remand rulemaking* nor to the history of
that rulemaking in remanding for yet additional rule
making in accordance with its contrary view of that
case.* If rulemaking participants are subject to ever-

22 See Pet. 10-11, 23.

23See EPA Rehearing Petition 6-13, Appendix to this Brief
at 5a-1la.

24In contrast to Petitioners and Federal Respondents, NRDC
disagrees that the Sierra Club court authorized use of the 2.5H
formula for all pre-1979 stacks. NRDC reads the portion of
Sierra Club addressing stack height increases as applying to all
post-1970 stacks, and argues that this reflects its arguments in
Sierra Club. Id. 8-9 and note 16.

NRDC’s arguments are belied by its 1982 brief and the Sierra
Club decision. In the 1981 rulemaking and in its 1982 brief,
NRDC argued that EPA in its 1982 rules should have adopted the
Agency’s “well-reasoned 1980 policy,” NRDC Brief in Sierra Club
at 30 (October 25, 1982); see Comments of NRDC on the 1981
Proposed Rules at 13 (November 3, 1981), which would have re-
quired demonstrations, in lieu of automatic use of the GEP
formula, for increases in stack height in the future. Pet. 7-8;
45 Fed. Reg. 42282 (1980) (“EPA has concluded that an existing
source increasing its stack height should not automatically receive
credit for the increase on the basis of the GEP formula. In the

future, any source seeking to raise its stack . . . will be required
to conduct a fluid modeling study or field study to demonstrate
the GEP height ....” (emphasis added)). NRDC’s 1982 brief

therefore presented its argument in the future tense. See, e.g.,
NRDC Brief in Sierra Club at 27 (“EPA may not apply its rule
of thumb formula to sources wishing te raise existing stacks”
(emphasis added).).

The Sierra Club decision reflects NRDC’s arguments. Thus,
the court, agreeing with NRDC’s argument on stack height in-
creases, remanded for EPA to consider whether demonstrations
should be required “before stack heights may be raised... .”
Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 460. Use of the future tense here con-

9

changing interpretations of earlier court decisions in
litigation following remand rulemaking, the administra-
tive rulemaking process will have no certainty and no
end. In this sense, EPA’s willingness to change its posi-
tion so easily in light of a decision from the D.C. Circuit
that the Agency only six months ago vigorously con-
tended was inconsistent with Sierra Club** shows that
certiorari is important to provide guidance on the scope
of judicial review of agency decisions during remand
rulemaking.

In sum, Federal Respondents were required in the
court below to do something that they clearly find dis-
turbing: “relitigate the merits of previously adopted
regulatory choices” following a remand rulemaking.
Against this background, this Court should settle that the
doctrines of law of the case and res judicata apply in
litigation over rules promulgated on remand from an
earlier court decision.

firms that neither NRDC nor the court was questioning use of
the GEP formula for past stack height increases.

Moreover, in upholding use of the traditional 2.5H formula for
pre-1979 stacks where reliance could be shown, the court in Sierra
Club did not attempt to distinguish between pre-1979 replacement
stacks (with increased stack height) and pre-1979 original stacks.
Rather, the court’s decision applied to all pre-1979 stacks. 719
F.2d at 467 (“We hold that the statute does not prevent EPA
from allowing its past rule [the 2.5H formula] to be applied to
stacks built before” 1979). Reading the Sierra Club decision as
a whole therefore shows that NRDC’s argument is without merit.

25 See generally EPA Rehearing Petition.
26 Fed. Resp. Brief 26.

10
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and those discussed in the
Petition for Certiorari, this Court should grant certio-
rari.

Respectfully submitted,
Davip C. BRANAND HENRY V. NICKEL
1130 17th Street, N.W. (Counsel of Record)
Washington, D.C. 20036 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(202) 463-2643 MEL S. SCHULZE
Counsel for Petitioner HUNTON & WILLIAMS
National Coal Association 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 9000

Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioner
September 30, 1988 Edison Electric Institute

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 85-1488 and consolidated cases

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.
Petitioners,
v.

LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND THE
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR REHEARING

On Petition for Review of Regulations of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency

The United States Environmental Protection Agency
and Lee M. Thomas, Administrator (hereinafter “EPA”
or “the Agency”), hereby petition this Court for rehear-
ing pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. App. P. 40 and
Local Court Rule 15. EPA files this petition to bring to
the attention of this Court a conflict between its Janu-
ary 22, 1988, decision and its previous decision in Sierra
Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), relating to the permissibility
of grandfathering pre-1979 within-formula stack height
increases.

2a

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

This Court’s January 22, 1988,. decision remanded to
the Agency three provisions of its July 8, 1985, stack
height regulations including that governing the “grand-
fathering of pre-October 1, 1983, stack increases from
demonstration requirements” (Slip op. at 63). In Sierra
Club this Court affirmed EPA’s decision to grandfather
stacks in existence on January 12, 1979. In the 1985
rulemaking and consistent with its interpretation of the
Sierra Club decision, EPA required stacks constructed
prior to January 12, 1979, to demonstrate reliance on the
2.5H formula’ in order to receive full credit under that
formula, and authorized credit to the H + 1.5L? for-
mula for all other pre-October 1, 1983,? stacks along with
discretionary authority for the permitting authority to
require additional studies. In establishing these require-
ments, the Agency did not distinguish between “original
design” stacks and stack “increases.” This Court’s opin-
ion, however, concludes that such a distinction is ap-
propriate, in conflict with its prior decision in Sierra
Club. EPA estimates that more than 150 sources will
be affected by this portion of the Court’s decision.

1 Section 123 of the Clean Air Act limits credit for stack height
to that dictated by “good engineering practice,’ which is limited to
two and a half times the height of [the] source [2.5H]
unless the owner or operator of the source demonstrates...
that a greater height is necessary as provided under the
preceding sentence.

42 U.S.C. § 7423(c).

2The “H + 1.5L” formula gives credit for the height of the
nearby structure plus one-and-one-half times the lesser of the
height or width of the structure.

3The Court’s opinion refers to October 1, 1983, in apparent
reliance on a typographical error in the Agency’s original Federal
Register notice. That error has been corrected to October 11,
1983, the date of the Sierra Club decision, and so appears in the
re-codified regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(kk) (2).

3a

BACKGROUND

The Court’s January 22, 1988, decision is its second
addressing EPA’s efforts to implement section 123 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7423, which governs the
award of credit for stack height in setting emission limi-
tations under the Act. Upon investigation, the Agency
discovered that the statutory 2.5H formula overestimated
“good engineering practice” stack height for some
sources. Accordingly, it promulgated a refined formula
of H + 1.5L as part of its June 9, 1982, stack height
regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (i), 47 Fed. Reg.
5,868 (J.A. 71). The June 9, 1982, regulations were
challenged by Sierra Club, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., and the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania on numerous grounds and in October 1983, the
Court issued its decision affirming portions of the regu-
lations, reversing two provisions, and remanding others
to EPA for reconsideration. Sierra Club v. EPA, 719
F.2d 4386 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204
(1984).

Two aspects of the decision in Sierra Club v. EPA are
here relevant. First, the Court affirmed EPA’s decision
to give stack height credit up “2.5H” for stacks in exist-
ence on January 12, 1979, when EPA’s refined formula
was proposed, providing the source could show it actually
relied on the 2.5H formula in constructing its stack.
See id. at 468. In addition, the Court directed the EPA
to reconsider the issue of “whether . . . demonstrations
are necessary before stack heights may be raised, even
if the final height will not exceed formula height.” Jd.
at 459-60.

In response to the Court’s remand, the Agency promul-
gated revised stack height regulations on July 8, 1985.
See 50 Fed. Reg. 27,892 (1985). In those revised regu-
lations EPA reformulated its grandfathering provision
for pre-January 12, 1979, stacks to take actual reliance
into account:

4a

“Good engineering practices” (GEP) stack height
means...

For stacks in existence on January 12, 1979, and
for which the owner or operator had obtained all
applicable permits or approvals required under 40
C.F.R. Parts 51 and 52,

Hg=2.5H,

provided the owner or operator produces evidence
that this equation was actually relied on in establish-
ing an emission limitation ....

40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (i), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,906 (J.A.
26). With respect to a source which seeks to increase an
existing stack up to the levels established by the “good
engineering practice’ formula after October 1, 1983,
EPA requires that the source perform a fluid modeling
demonstration to justify this credit. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1
(kk) (2), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,907 (J.A. 27). Within-
formula stack height increases accomplished prior to Oc-
tober 1, 1983, are subject to the provisions of 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.1(ii) (2) (1), which imposes a ceiling of 2.5H on
stack height credit for pre-January 12, 1979 stack height
increases where the source can demonstrate reliance on
the 2.5H formula. Pre-January 12, 1979, sources which
can not meet the reliance requirement, and post-January
12, 1979, increases are limited to stack height credit of
H + 1.5L. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (ii), 50 Fed. Reg.
27,906 (J.A. 26).

Following promulgation of the July 8, 1985, regula-
tions, eleven petitions for review were filed by environ-
mental, state and industry petitioners. The Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., Sierra Club, the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, and several states (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “NRDC”) challenged the two
provisions discussed above. First, and notwithstanding
this Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, NRDC chal-
lenged EPA’s decision to retain a grandfathering provi-

5a

sion for stacks in existence on January 12, 1979, based
on its argument that all sources must “control first’? be-
fore receiving any credit for stack height. See NRDC br.
at 51-54. In the alternative, NRDC challenged EPA’s
decision to retain a grandfathering provision for sources
which increased their stacks prior to January 12, 1979,
up to 2.5H, and to permit grandfathering of all other
stacks constructed before October 1, 1983, up to H +
1.5L. Id. at 31-35.

In its January 22, 1988, decision, the Court reaffirmed
its earlier decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, that sources
may continue to utilize the 2.5H formula in calculating
their emission limitations for stacks in existence on Jan-
uary 12, 1979, providing they demonstrate reliance on
that formula. See Slip op. at 42. The Court went on,
however, to impose the new requirement that before a
source could take advantage of this grandfathering pro-
vision it must have been originally designed to 2.5H.
Id. at 40. Accordingly, EPA must now reconsider its
decision to grandfather pre-January 12, 1979, sources
which increased their stacks up to formula height, re-
gardless of whether the sources relied on the 2.5H for-
mula in increasing stacks.

ARGUMENT

I. SIERRA V. EPA DOES NOT PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
ORIGINALLY-DESIGNED AND INCREASED
STACKS.

In Sierra Club v. EPA, this Court upheld EPA’s ‘deci-
sion to grandfather all stacks in existence on January
12, 1979, up to 2.5H provided the affected sources dem-
onstrated reliance on the statutory formula in construct-
ing their stacks. See 719 F.2d at 468. “Stacks in ex-
istence” necessarily include stacks originally constructed
to 2.5H and stacks subsequently raised to 2.5H. In af-
firming this grandfathering provision, the Sierra Club

6a

court did not distinguish between original and increased
stacks, and certainly never suggested that pre-January
12, 1979, original and increased stacks should be sub-
jected to different grandfathering provisions.* Nor did
NRDC advance such an argument in the earlier case.
See NRDC br. at 27-31, filed in Sierra Club v. EPA.

NRDC did challenge EPA’s decision in the 1982 regu-
lations not to impose a fluid modeling demonstration re-
quirement for stack height increases. See 719 F.2d at
456-59. NRDC’s challenge, however, appeared to be
limited to the Agency’s failure to impose a demonstra-
tion requirement for prospective stack height increases.
See NRDC br. at 30, filed in Sierra Club v. EPA (“EPA
has not met its burden of showing why its well-reasoned
1980 policy . . . may now be discarded.”). The 1980 pol-
icy referenced by NRDC was purely prospective in ap-
plication. Under this 1980 policy, pre-January 12, 1979,
stack height increases would certainly have been grand-
fathered. See 45 Fed. Reg. 42,279 (June 24, 1980). See
also EPA br. at 34 n.22.

The Sierra Club Court remanded to the Agency the
question of whether “demonstrations are necessary be-
fore stack heights may be raised, even if the final height
will not exceed formula height.” 719 F.2d at 459-60.

4In fact, when the Sierra Club court remanded the 2.5H grand-
fathering provision based on the need to demonstrate reliance,
it stated that there are 171 stacks over 500 feet which were
built between 1970 and 1979, citing a report based on FAA data
listing all stacks over 61 meters built between 1970 and 1979.
Id. at 468. It seems clear that the FAA listed all stacks regardless
NRDC br. at 9 (168 sources increased their stack height after
of whether they were original or increased stacks. Compare
1970). The Court did not state that the reliance requirement
only related to the subset of these stacks which were originally
designed to 2.5H. Thus, the figure the Sierra Club court cites
as sources needing to show reliance in order to be grandfathered
was not limited to original stacks, but included all stacks con-
structed before 1979.

7a

Because NRDC did not challenge EPA’s decision not to
require demonstrations for any pre-January 12, 1979,
stack height increases, and the Court did not distinguish
among “stacks in existence’, EPA was not required to
reevaluate a grandfathering provision for pre-January
12, 1979, stack height increases. Nothing in this Court’s
Sierra Club opinion suggests a different interpretation.

Moreover, a review of the rulemaking record makes
clear that the Agency did not consider this an open
issue. In its November 9, 1984, proposal, the Agency
stated that it did not intend to require demonstrations
for prospective stack height increases. See 49 Fed. Reg.
44,883 (J.A. 6). In its final rule, the Agency altered
its position and imposed a demonstration requirement for
all stacks seeking to raise existing stack height after
October 11, 1983. NRDC submitted comments (J.A. 851)
arguing that the regulations should not permit the grand-
fathering of pre-1979 stack height increases. As the
Sierra Club opinion on the issue of grandfathering
sources to 2.5H was considered to have related to all
sources built before 1979, the Agency did not distinguish
between original and increased stacks in its treatment of
the reliance question in the preamble to the fina! rule:

The EPA intends to “grandfather” any source that
relied on the formula in building its stack before the
date of EPA’s 1979 proposal from the effect of this
discretionary re-examination requirement.

Only in that proposal did EPA, first suggest that
such a discretionary reexamination provision might
be included in the final rule. The retroactivity anal-
ysis set out earlier therefore supports exempting
stacks built in reliance on EPA guidance before that
date from discretionary reexamination. Indeed, a
failure to “grandfather” these sources would lead
to the paradoxical result that a source that had built
a GEP stack under the traditional EPA formula

8a

would have its direct reliance interests protected by
the “grandfather” provision previously upheld by
the court, but could then lose that “grandfathered”
credit through a case-specific demonstration require-
ment showing that the traditional formula was some-
what inaccurate—the very reason behind the change
in the formula properly found non-retroactive by
EPA earlier.

50 Fed. Reg. 27,900 (J.A. 20). This discussion plainly
shows that EPA did not view the grandfathering of all
pre-1979 sources showing reliance to be an open issue.
It was resolved by Sierra Club, and the Agency declined
to go beyond the Court’s instructions.

II. NRDC CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO CHAL-
LENGE PRE-JANUARY 12, 1979, STACK
HEIGHT INCREASES IN THIS CASE.

In Sierra Club v. EPA, this Court upheld EPA’s de-
cision to grandfather pre-January 12, 1979, stacks up to
2.5H. Thus, litigation of this issue, including the per-
missibility of grandfathering stack height increases, was
foreclosed in this case.

In full compliance with the Court’s remand in Sierra
Club v. EPA, EPA formulated a demonstration require-
ment for sources seeking credit for within-formula stack
height increases after October 11, 1983. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.1(kk) (2), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,907 (J.A. 27). EPA
aiso reformulated its grandfathering provision for pre-
January 12, 1979, stacks to take actual reliance into
account. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(ii) (2) (i), 50 Fed. Reg.
27,906 (J.A. 26). In all other respects, this regulation
remains unchanged. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 51.1 (ii) (2) (i),
50 Fed. Reg. 27,906 (J.A. 26) with 40 C.F.R. § 51.1
(ii) (2) (i), 47 Fed. Reg. 5868 (J.A. 71).

Nonetheless, in this case, NRDC again challenged
EPA’s decision to grandfather all sources with pre

9a

January 12, 1979, stacks constructed up to 2.5H. See
NRDC br. at 19-35. The Court rejected NRDC’s attempt
to relitigate this issue with respect to pre-January 12,
1979, stacks originally designed to 2.5H:

the environmental petitioners in Sierra Club did not
attack the formula at all and attacked the want of
demonstrations only for stack height increases and
instances where local authorities were concerned
that the formula might overpredict GEP.

Slip op. at 42. Without explanation, however, the Court
did address NRDC’s arguments that the Agency did not
have the authority to grandfather pre-January 12, 1979,
stack height increases from the demonstration require-
ments imposed for prospective stack height increases.
NRDC could and should have made this argument in
Sierra Club v. EPA. Thus, the Court should not have
reached this issue in this case. Nor did the Agency’s
publication of revised stack height regulations reopen
this issue.

NRDC’s challenge to EPA’s decision to grandfather
pre-January 12, 1979, stack height increases up to 2.5H
is in actuality a substantive attack on a decision made
by EPA in the 1982 regulations to grandfather all stacks
in existence as of the date of the 1979 proposal. That
regulatory decision was upheld in the Sierra Club deci-
sion. Thus, any substantive challenge to the 1982 regu-
lation is barred under section 307(b)(1) of the Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1). Section 307(b) (1) of the Clean
Air Act requires that petitions for review of Agency
regulations be filed within sixty days of promulgation.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1). The failure of an affected en-
tity to file a petition within this time limitation fore-

5In the Sierra Club case NRDC challenged the grandfathering
of all pre-January 12, 1979, sources up to 2.5H. It did not sep-
arately challenge the grandfathering of pre-January 12, 1979,
stack height increases.

10a

closes any subsequent challenge. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en banc); Hawaiian Electric Co. v. EPA,
723 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984) ; City of Seabrook
v. United States E.P.A., 659 F.2d 1349, 1870 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982). See also Eagle-
Picher Ind., Inc. V. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (interpreting a similar provision of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980): Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. Vv. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 666 F.2d 595, 602
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (interpreting a similar provision of
the Hobbs Act).

EPA’s promulgation of revisions to the stack height
regulations in 1985 does not reopen this issue for fur-
ther litigation. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. EPA, No. 86-
1096, Slip op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. February 12, 1988) ; Mon-
tana Vv. Clark, 749 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985). In this case, EPA was re-
sponding to a narrow remand from the Court to re-
consider only certain discrete provisions of the 1982 reg-
ulations. While EPA did publish the unchanged portion
of the regulation at issue, 40 C.F.R. 51.1(ii) (2) (i), it
did so only to place in context the new reliance require-
ment added in response to the Court’s remand in the
Sierra Club decision. See J.A. 6, 9. The Agency did
not explain the unchanged language and did not solicit
comment on the issue of whether pre-January 12, 1979,
sources, including sources which increased their stacks,
should be subject to new demonstration requirements.
See State of Ohio v. EPA, Slip op. at 7. Accordingly,
NRDC’s challenge to EPA’s grandfathering provision
for pre-January 12, 1979, stacks is untimely.

To allow NRDC to raise in this case arguments which
should have been made in the Sierra Club litigation flies
in the face of the principle of finality section 307 was
designed to protect. As articulated by this Court in a
similar context,

lla

[t]he 60 day period for seeking judicial review set
forth in the Hobbs Act is jurisdictional in nature,
and may not be enlarged or altered by the courts.
This time limit, like other similar limitations, serves
the important purpose of imparting finality into the
administrative process, thereby conserving adminis-
trative resources and protecting the reliance inter-
ests of regulatees who conform their conduct to the
regulations.

NRDC v. Nuclear Reg. Com’n, 666 F.2d at 602 (foot-
notes omitted).

EPA informed the Court in this litigation that the
grandfathering of pre-January 12, 1979, stack height
increases had been affirmed in Sierra Club v. EPA, and
that subjecting affected sources to the threat of demon-
strations conflicted with the Court’s opinion in that case.
See EPA br. at 34. Moreover, industry intervenors ar-
gued that NRDC’s challenge to grandfathering of pre-
January 12, 1979, stacks was barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. See Intervenors’ Alabama Power Co. et al.
br. at 60.6 In remanding this issue to EPA, however,
the Court addressed neither argument.

NRDC’s failure to challenge EPA’s decision to grand-
father pre-January 12, 1979, stack height increases in
Sierra Club v. EPA forecloses it from challenging that
provision in this case. Accordingly, this Court should
have declined to entertain NRDC’s arguments on the
same grounds as it declined to revisit the issue of grand-
fathering of pre-January 12, 1979, stacks originally de-
signed to 2.5H. See Slip op. at 42.

6 NRDC made no real effort to respond to these arguments in
its Reply Brief. Certainly, it proffered no explanation of why
it could not have raised the issue of pre-January 12, 1979, stack
height increases in the Sierra Club v. EPA litigation. See NRDC
Reply br. at 16,

12a

III. THE COURT’S REMAND OF PRE-JANUARY
12, 1979, WITHIN-FORMULA STACK HEIGHT
INCREASES HAS SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS
FOR THE AGENCY.

Pursuant to this Court’s decision on January 22, 1988,
EPA must reconsider its decision to grandfather all pre-
October 1, 1983, stack height increases, including all pre-
January 12, 1979, stack height increases which would
otherwise be subject to the grandfathering provision up-
held by this Court in Sierra Club v. EPA. Under the
Court’s decision, EPA must select one of three options:
(1) design a detailed grandfathering scheme which takes
into account the “variations in regulatory history and
degrees of reliance” (Slip op. at 40), (2) validate the
accuracy of the “good engineering practice’ formulae,
or (3) require demonstrations for all stack height in-
creases.

The Court’s decision has serious consequences for the
Agency. First and foremost, it deprives a significant
number of sources of the grandfathering protection con-
ferred in Sierra Club v. EPA. EPA estimates that more
than 150 sources are adversely affected by this provi-
sion. ICF, Inc., Final Analysis of the Proposed Stack
Height Regulations, June 1985, Appendix D, Certified
Index No. IV-A-3. The Agency will be required to de-
vote substantial time and resources to addressing these
sources. At a minimum the Agency will be required to
conduct a comprehensive review of the circumstances sur-
rounding all pre-January 12, 1979, stack height increases,
in order to formulate a detailed grandfathering provi-
sion complying with the Court’s directive. Even more
onerous is a requirement that all affected sources conduct
fluid modeling demonstrations in order to retain the bene-
fit of stack height credit previously awarded. As ex-
plained by the Agency in its initial brief, EPA is aware
of fewer than ten fluid modeling demonstration centers

13a

throughout the country. See EPA br. at 21-22. See also
49 Fed. Reg. 44,883 (J.A. 6). Not only would a blanket
demonstration requirement be cumbersome administra-
tively but it would be expensive and burdensome for the
affected sources.

EPA’s final option would be to validate the accuracy
of the “good engineering practice” formulae. This is not
a meaningful alternative as it relates to sources which
increased stack height up to 2.5H. EPA concedes that
its refined formula of H + 1.5L is the more accurate
predictor of “good engineering practice” stack height
and it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible for most
pre-January 12, 1979, sources to demonstrate that 2.5H
is the appropriate measure. This difficulty is precisely
why EPA adopted, and the Court affirmed, a grand-
fathering provision protecting sources which constructed
stacks up to 2.5H prior to January 12, 1979, from ap-
plication of the refined formula.

l4a

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, EPA requests this Court to grant
its petition for rehearing on the issue cf whether pre-
January 12, 1979, stack height increases may be shel-
tered from the demonstration requirements.

Respectfully submitted,

ROGER J. MARZULLA
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Land and Natural Resources Division

/s/ Lisa F. Ryan
LIsA F. RYAN, Attorney
U.S. Depatrment of Justice
P.O. Box 23986
Washington, D.C. 20026-3986

Of Counsel: PATRICIA EMBREY, Attorney
GERALD H. YAMADA U.S. Environmental Protection
Deputy General Counsel Agency

401 M Street, S.W.
ALAN W. ECKERT Washington, D.C. 20460

Associate General Counsel

CHARLES S. CARTER

Assistant General Counsel

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

Attorneys for Respondents

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_2014%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
