# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — City of New Haven v. Marsh

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 848

## Text

FILED
JUL 5S 1988

YOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
CLERK

8-18

No. 88-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988

City OF NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT,
Petitioner,
v.

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY, et al.
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

NEIL T. PROTO

Counsel of Record

KELLEY DRYE & WARREN
Suite 600

1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-8333

Special Counsel
City of New Haven, CT

BRIAN MURPHY
Corporation Counsel
City of New Haven
770 Chapel Street
New Haven, CT 06510
(203) 787-8232

Toes eeteaeencaee aeeneememnenehedemeaneenteempemnttantaiaine emameemieammen aemneneataeme ene
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief was brought by respon-
Gent, Mall Properties, Inc., against re-
spondents, Secretary of the Army and of-
ficials of the United States Army Corps
of Engineers, to challenge the denial of
a permit to fill waters of the United
States, in order to construct a regional
shopping mall, under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act, section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act and section 102(2)(C) of
the National Environmental Policy Act.
Following two years of review, the Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment for
respondent, Mall Properties, Inc., on the
merits, vacated the Corps’ denial deci-
sion as being contrary to law, enjoined
the Corps on remand from engaging in

=e oe

previously accepted, long-standing regu-
latory practice (the consideration of
social and economic, as well as environ-
mental effects of the project) and did
not retain jurisdiction. Petitioner,
City of New Haven, which had successfully
sought permit denial before the Corps and
was granted intervention under Rule 24(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
by the District Court, appealed. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal because the District Court
remand order was not a final judgment.
The Court of Appeals further held that
New Haven could not appeal because the
respondent, Secretary of the neue. chose
not to appeal.

The questions presented are:

i. Whether, under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C.

» Sw

§ 1291, a District Court decision grant-
ing summary judgment on the merits, va-
cating an agency decision based on a new
legal standard and enjoining previously
accepted, long-standing federal agency
practice on remand is not a “final deci-
sion” because the District Court did not
yet grant the respondent, Mall Proper-
ties, Inc., ultimately what it wanted
(i.e., a fill permit to construct a re-
gional shopping mall).

Y + Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1291
forbids a successful party before a fed-
eral agency and one granted intervention
under Rule 24(a) of the Federai a of
Civil Procedure, from appealing an ad-
verse District Court decision because the

federal agency chooses not to appeal.

- iii -

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The petitioner is the City of
New Haven, Connecticut. The respondents
are John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the
Army, Lt. General E. R. Heiberg, Chief of
the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, Col. Thomas A. Rhen, Division En-
gineer, New England Division and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers,
Department of the Army. The respondents
also include Mall Properties, Inc., a
corporation organized under the laws of
the State of New York that maintains its
principal office in the City and County

of New York.

- iv -

OPINIONS BELOW * . . - . . . . . . . 2
JURISDICTION 7 . . . . . 7 . . . . . 2

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . 3

S TATEMENT . . . . . . . o . . * . 7. . 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION. . 23
CONCLUSION ...«+«-e-seee2e 06 «© « 98

ADDENDUM . . . . . o . . . . . . * . 1 a

(Separate Volume)
AeeemGsSe Aes st tc tb se ersten es
Repeeeee Bs «st se te te 8k Ce el HO
Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Cc
D

AppemGsasa Bcc ec sc eee ew ow 6 OSS
F
Appendix G
H

Appendi7

» 765 F.2d 937
(9th Cir. 1985). . . « « « « 45, 47

, 545 F.2d
363 (3d Cir. 1976) .... +. 22

, 744 F.2d 1424
(10th Cir. 1984) ..... + passim

674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y.

1987), aff'd, Nos. 87-6275,

87-6295, slip op.

(2d Cir. June 8, 1988) ... 42
Bersani v. EPA, Nos. 87-6275,

87-6295, slip op.
(2d Cir. June 8, 1988) ... 46

States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 47
447 U.S. 352 (1980). ... . 48, 49
324 U.S. 229 (1945). . ... 28

467 U.S. 837 (1984). ... . 26, 40,

41, 43
Cohen v. Beneficial

Industrial Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541 (1949). ... . 29, 33

- wi -

CASES - Continued PAGE

» 521 F.2d
661 (9th Cir. 1975). ... . 46

Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp.,
Bae ee ee eens « « co co 84, 36

Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
BSG €2974) «ec ec ec eo eo oc eo PRRSIS

Faulkner Hospital Corp.
vy. Schweicker, 537
F. Supp. 1058 (D. Mass.
1982), aff'd, 702

F.2d 22 (lst Cir. 1983)... 17
vy. Schweicker, 702
Gillespie v. United
States Stee] Corp.,
379 U.S. 148 (1964). as.

vy. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1035 (1984) .... 45, 47

Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561
(D. Mass. 1987), aff'd,
841 F.2d 440 (lst Cir.
1988), petition for re-
hearing denied, No.

87-1827, slip op.

(lst Cir. April 7, 1988) . . passim

- vii -

CASES - Continued PAGE

Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892) . . 23, 34

Metropolitan Edison Co.
vy. People Against

Nuclear Energy (PANE),
460 U.S. 766 (1983). ... . passim

Morton v. Ruiz,
ae Bele Gee CRORE). « 2 « 6 43

NL Industries, Inc. v.
Secretary of Interior, 777
F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985) .. 49
Olmsted Citizens For a
Better Community v.
United States, 793
F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1986) .. 44

, 592 F. Supp.

698 (D. Haw. 1983) ....., 45
Pacific Northwest Bell]

633 F. Supp. 725

(W.D. Wash. 1986). ..... 45

5973 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1978). 47

Air Force, 457 F.2d

ae Gee Gee Beeans «© « « « BA, 39
Rochester v. United States

Postal Service, 541 F.2d

es t >. eee ”

- viii -

CASES - Continued PAGE

vy. Watt, 713 F.2d 525
(9th Cir. 1983). ...... 49

Transportation-Communication
Division v. St. Louis-San
, 419 F.2d 933

Francisco Rw,
(8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 818 (1970). 30

380 U.S. 1 (1965). ..... 42

Laboratories, 636 F.2d 876
(lst Cir.), cert. denied,
663, Gy BOR Geeeae 2 6 et le 22

j , 642

F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980) . 49, 51

289 U.S. 352 (1933). .... 41
Zabel _v, Tabb, 430 F.2d 199

(5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 41

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). . 3, 18,

23, 24
ee eee eS eee
28 U.S.C. § 1291. ....... passim

- iz -

STATUTES -- Conti i

Clean Water Act,
$3 0.8.C. § i944 .

Rivers and Harbors Appropria-

tion Act of 1899,

33 U.S.C. § 403.

National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969,

42 U.S.C. § 4321 .
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). .
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)

REGULATIONS

Public Interest Review Regula-
tion of the United States

Army Corps of Engineers,
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(q)

Regulations of the Council
Environmental Quality,

on

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §

40 C.F.R. §
MISCELLANEOUS

1502.16.

1508.7

1508.8(a).
1508.8(b).

1508.14.

Connecticut Bluebook (1987 ed).

Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a).

12,

14,

14

26

48,

MISCELLANEOUS - Continued
Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 ...-+.« -
Final Environmental Impact

Statement, § § IV-10, IV-2l,
IV-22, IV-29, IV-31-34

- Zi -

PAGE

32

6-7

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

NO.
CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT,
PETITIONER,
Vv.
JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

The City of New Haven, Connecti-
cut respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit in, this case.

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals (App. p)+/

is reported at 84l
F.2d 440 (lst Cir. 1988). The denial of
the petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc (App. A) is unre-
ported at this time. No. 87-1827, slip
op. (lst Cir. April 7, 1988). The memo-
randum and order of the District Court
(App. D) is reported at 672 F. Supp. 561
(D. Mass. 1987).
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals (App. B) iis eaasell on March ll,

1988. The petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc (App. A)

1/ The opinions below and other rele-
vant materials are bound in a sepa-
rate Appendix, hereinafter referred
te as “app: .....<

was denied on April 7, 1988. The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves issues under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Add. at 5a)*’; rele-
vant provisions of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Add. at 4a-5a); the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403
(Add. at 3a-4a); the National Environmen-
tel Peitey. Act, 42 U.8.6. § § 4321,
4331(b) & 4332(2)(C)(Add. at la-3a); the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (Add. at 5a); regulations of
the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) 5 (q) (Add.

at 6a-8a); regulations of the Council on

2/ The texts of all cited statutes and
regulations are set forth in the
Addendum to this Petition, herein-
after referred to as "Add. at .

2

Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § §
1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8(a), (b), &
15C .14 (Add. at 8a-lla).
STATEMENT
As This suit for declaratory
and injunctive relief was filed by re-
spondent, Mall Properties, Inc., in the
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts on October 29,
1985 against the respondent, Secretary of
the Army and various officials of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers
("U.S.. ACOE” or “Corps"), under section
404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33
U.S.C. § 1344, section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act ("RHA"), 33 U.S.C. § 403
and section 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Mall Properties,

Inc. challenged the final decision of the

eT Re ee ee eT eee eee

New England Division of the U.S. ACOE
denying its application for a permit to
deposit one million cubic yards of fill
onto the floodplains and wetlands of the
Quinnipiac River in North Haven, Connect-
icut in order to construct a 1.2 million
square foot regional shopping mall. The
primary basis for its challenge was that
the U.S. ACOE was without’ statutory
authority to consider, as part of its
permit denial decision, the adverse so-
cial, economic and racial effects of the
proposed mall on the region, particularly
the City of New Haven.

2.a. The City of New Haven is
one of the nation's oldest (founded in
1638) and poorest municipalities (7th in
the United States according to the 1980
census; 23% of its residents are below

the poverty level). It is immediately

adjacent to North Haven and is the larg-
est municipality within the 10-town re-
gion that would be served by the proposed
mall. Moreover, the proposed mall is
less than 8 miles from New Haven's cen-
tral business district, easily accessible
by numerous roadways from various loca-
tions throughout the region (including
New Haven) and situated on the Quinnipiac
River, which flows downstream through New
Haven and into its Harbor. The Quin-
nmipiac River has historically been a
source of serious flooding problems.

b. The proposed North Haven
Mall would generate 55,000 motor vehicle
trips per day, 500 to 3,077 tons of solid
waste per year, and require the filling
of more than 30 acres of wetlands and
open water. Final Environmental Impact

Statement ("EIS") at Iv-10, IV-22,

Pe VR a ee

ee

IV-21. With specific reference to the
City of New Haven, the proposed mall
would result in the estimated loss of 600
jobs, more than one million dollars a
year in tax revenues (1982 dollars), ap-
proximately 20 percent of its’ retail
sales, one or more major department
stores and other ancillary, adverse so-
cial, economic and racial effects. Final
EIS, IV-31-34, IV-29.

3. The City of New Haven
actively opposed the respondents’ appli-
cation before the U.S. ACOE on environ-
mental (ij.e., flooding, wetlands loss),
social and economic grounds, including
the adverse aesthetic and racial strati-
fication impact it will have on_ the
region. New Haven was granted interven-
tion as of right under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 24(a) in the District

Court. App. E. The District Court

The court finds that
the City of New Haven has
met the requirements for
intervention of right. The
City of New Haven seeks to
intervene under Rule 24
primarily to protect the
economic interests the
Corps allegedly relied upon
in denying the permit.
Therefore, unlike the envi-
ronmental groups, the City
of New Haven is directly
interested in the “econom-
ics” question which plain-
tiff has raised by this
action. An adverse ruling
by the court on this issue
would limit the City’s
ability to protect its in-
terests on remand.

Plaintiff [Mall Prop-
erties, Inc.) argues that
the Corps adequately repre-
sents the City's interests
in this action. The City
replies that the government
may not represent its in-
terests adequately, arguing
that the government has a
Guty to protect the public
interest, while the City
seeks to protect its unique
interests. The City has
also outlined the history
of disagreements between

ee

the Corps and the City
which have arisen during
the permit litigation be-
fore the Corps. The court
also notes that the Corps
does not object to the

City's intervention in this

case.

App. E at 90a-92a. The District Court
denied the motion of national and local
(Connecticut and North Haven-based) envi-
ronmental and citizens groups to inter-
vene (id. at 92a), despite the participa-
tion of most such groups in the admin-
istrative proceeding below. No appeal
was taken from the District Court's
ruling.

4. The U.S. ACOE, following
six years of review and the preparation
of an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") under the National Environmental
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)),

denied respondent Mall Properties‘

application in a “proposed Final Order”

of November 15, 1984 (App. F) and a

“Final Order" of August 20, 1985 (App.

H) .=/ The August 1985 denial was based

3/7

In November 1984, the New England
Division Engineer affixed his sig-
nature to a 45-page “Record of
Decision" ("ROD")(App. F) denying
respondents’ application for a fill
permit because of: (i) the “cumula-
tive impact from other past, present
and reasonably foreseeable future
actions affecting wetlands, flood
plains and flooding"; (ii) the “ir-
retrievable loss of 25 acres of wet-
lands"; (iii) “negative impacts on
the quality of life in North Haven";
and (iv) adverse “socio-economic
impacts, in particular, those af-
fecting the City of New Haven." Id.
at 98a. The factual basis for this
last reason for permit denial was,
inter alia, that:

New Haven provides services and
an environment for a community
with a sizeable low to moderate
income population. This popula-
tion is less able to travel to
reach services at other loca-
tions. It is more dependent
upon a vibrant, viable city to
provide services and a healthy,
safe and desirable environment.

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

a 26-<

|
.

on three grounds: (i) “a net loss in
wetland resources” (App. H at 270a); (ii)
“flooding impacts" (id. at 270a); and
(iii) tDe “socio-economic impacts this
project would have on the City of New
Haven" (id. at 270a).

Before the Corps, and during the
District Court proceeding, the Department

FOOTNOTE 3/7 CONTINUED:
Id. at 98a. This November 1984 ROD

was not made public. A copy was
made available only to the respon-
dent, Mall Properties, Inc. The

fact of its existence was not made
known to New Haven until June 1985.
Neither the November 1984 ROD nor
the August 1985 ROD are designated

as “proposed” or “final” -- termi-
nology used only by the District
Court.

It is New Haven's position, sup-
ported explicitly by the New England
Division Engineer, that the August
1985 ROD is premised expressly on
and can only be understood in refer-
ence to the November 1984 ROD. §¢ee
App. H at 155a.

- ll -«-

of Interior supported the Corps’ concerns
about wetlands. App. H at 132a. Fur-
thermore, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development and the Governor's Of-
fice of Policy and Management supported
the Corps' concerns about adverse social,
economic and racial impacts (id. at 139a)
and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency supported the Corps’ concerns
about flooding (id. at 142a). All such
supporting comments were submitted to the
Corps as part of the EIS process, consid-
ered by it pursuant to NEPA and in accor-
dance with its “Public Interest Review”
regulation (33 C.F.R. § 320.4)(which re-
quires consideration of “economics” and
“the needs and welfare of the people,”
promulgated pursuant to, jnter alia,
NEPA, CWA and the RHA (Add. 6a-8a)), and

- 12 -

identified in its August 1985 ROD. App.
H at 2664.

5.a. The District Court, on
cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by all the parties, vacated the U.S. ACOE
Gecision on September 8, 1987. Mall
Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp.
561 (D. Mass. 1987). App. D. It deter-
mined that the permit denial decision,
based on the Corps’ Public Interest Re-
view regulations (33 C.F.R. § 320.4),
NEPA, the CWA and the RHA, “was not made
in accordance with law" because, inter
alia, “the Corps exceeded its authority

. by basing its denial of the permit on
socio-economic harms [to the region and
the City of New Haven] that are not prox-
imately related to changes in the physi-
cal environment,” caused by the fill.

App. D at 26a (emphasis added)(relying on

se

the “standard” set forth in Metropolitan
Edi C P i Against Nuc]

Energy (PANE), 460 U.S. 766 (1983)).
Contrary to the position of the Petition-
er and the U.S. ACOE that, under the
Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ)
and U.S. ACOE's regulations, such econom-
ic and social impacts must be considered
because they are “reasonably foresee-
able," (40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8(b), 1508.7)
indirect effects of a regional mall on
the region, the District Court stated:
"The record reveals that these impacts
would not result from any effect the mall
would have on the physical environment
generally or wetlands particularly.
Rather, it is the economic competition
for New Haven which would result from the
mere existence of a mall anywhere in

North Haven .. . [even though the] Corps

sa &

—

did find that there was no alternative
Site for the mall in North Haven." App.
D at 36a.2/

Moreover, although Metropolitan
Edison involved only the threshold ques-
tion of whether an EIS was required in
light of alleged psychological harm from
the restart of an already existing facil-
ity (see 460 U.S. at 768), the District
Court here (i) concluded the “proximately
related" standard applied to all NEPA
questions (including, for the first time,
which impacts should be addressed follow-
ing a determination to prepare an EIS for
a new project); and (ii) determined that
the reasoning of “pre-Metropolitan Edison

4/ The District Court incorrectly
stated that “North Haven is a suburb
about 10 miles from New Haven, Con-
necticut.” App. D at 26a-27a. As
stated at the outset, New Haven and
North Haven are adjacent to each
other.

~ 2

NEPA cases," including those from the
5th, 6th, 7th and 2nd Circuits concerning
whether reasonably foreseeable social and
economic impacts had to be considered in
an EIS that was premised on recognized
environmental harm, have been “eliminated
by Metropolitan Edison.” App. D at 70a.
b. The District Court also
stated that it “is elementary .. . that
in our system of government, decisions
concerning which competing constituency's
economic interests ought to be preferred
are traditionally made by democratically
accountable officials,” (App. D at 75a),
such as the Governor of Connecticut but
not the U.S. ACOE; and that, in the
legislative history of the statutes in-

volved here, there “is no suggestion that

~ 2

[the Corps] was perceived by those enact-
ing the relevant statutes to have exper-
tise concerning whether the economic in-
terests of aging cities or their newer
suburbs should as a matter of public pol-
icy be preferred.“ App. D at 75a.2/
Finally, the District Court,
relying on the First Circuit's decision
in Faulkner Hospital Corp, v. Schweicker,
537 F. Supp. at 1071 (D. Mass. 1982),
aff‘d, 702 F.2€ 22 (ist Cir. 1983), va-
cated the U.S. ACOE decision, enjoined it
from any further consideration of the
mall's social, economic or racial impacts

on the region, including New Haven, and

2/ It should be noted that New Haven
and North Haven were founded in the
17th and 18th Centuries, respective-
ly. Connecticut Blue Book (1987
ed.).

i

remanded “for further proceedings consis-
tent with this decision.” App. D at
g4a.9/

The District Court did not
retain jurisdiction. Additionally,
throughout the District Court proceeding,
the Justice Department -- on behalf of
the Corps -- supported the August 1985
permit denial decision. Moreover, no
questions were raised about the adequacy
of the evidence before the District Court

or the need for the Court to postpone its

§8/ In its Complaint, respondent Mall
Properties, Inc., sought a judgment
“directing ACOE to issue Mall Prop-
erties the subject permits...
(Complaint & 3b). At the suggestion
of the District Court, respondent
recognized that such relief was not
available to it, and that, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and other juris-
prudential considerations, the ap-
propriate judicial remedy was a re-
mand to the U.S. ACOE for further
proceedings.

“a

decision on the merits of the issues,
pending some further factual development
or the resolution of a legal issue by the
U.S. ACOE.

6.a. The City of New Haven ap-
pealed on September 14, 1987. On Novem-
ber 19, 1987 -- after the expiration of
the appeal period -- the Justice Depart-
ment informed the Court of Appeals, with-
out explanation, that it had determined
not to appeal and that New Haven's appeal
should be dismissed. No reasoning, case
citations, subsequent brief, memoranda or
affidavit was ever filed by the Justice
Department to support its motion, nor did
the Court order it to do so, - despite
Petitioner's formal request. On December
y F 1987, respondent Mall Properties
stated that it was joining the Govern-
ment's motion to dismiss.

b. On March il, 1988, a panel

» 29 <

of the Court of Appeals granted, without
Oral argument, the U.S. ACOE’s motion to
Gismiss, concluding the “remand order” of
the District Court is “not a final judg-
ment" and, therefore, not appealable un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1291. App. B at 5a.

Focusing on Mall Properties’
ultimate objective, (i.e,., to have the
Corps grant the permit to build a region-
al mall) as being the controlling crite-
rion determining “finality,” the Court of
Appeals concluded that because “the Dis-
trict Court's remand order does not grant
Mall ultimately what Mall wants,” the
“court's order is but one interim step in
the process toward Mall's obtaining its
ultimate goal.” "The litigation,” the
Court stated, “has not ended.” App. B at
8a.

Moreover, although the Court of
Appeals stated that “generally orders

- 20 -

remanding to an administrative agency are
not final, immediately appealable or-
ders,” (id. at 10a)(citing Pauls v. Sec-
retary of Air Force, 457 F.2d 294 (lst

Cir. 1972)), it also characterized other
cases where appeals were allowed as “ex-
ceptions,” to this general rule, such as
United States v. Alcon Laboratories, 636
F.2d 876 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1017 (1981). The Court, recognizing
that in one such “exception” -- Bender v.,
Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984) --
the government was allowed to appeal from
a substantive decision on the merits that
required a remand, nonetheless concluded
that because the U.S. ACOE did not appeal
here, Bender had no application to New
Haven. App. B at 16a-18a.

The Court of Appeals also con-
cluded that New Haven “has not been fore-
closed from participating in the proceed-

ings on remand" because “[p]resumably, it

a 2

can urge environmental reasons why the
permits should be denied” (id. at 18a),
and, after review by the Corps and a sub-
sequent District Court decision, New
Haven can “appeal to this Court and...
argue that the original permit denial
o WAS proper . -. « «* Id. at 18a.
Thus, “review of the socio-economic issue
the City now wants to present, is not
Genied; it is simply delayed.“ Jd. at
18a-19a.
Finally, the Court concluded
that allowing the appeal “would violate
» efficiency ... .°* Id.- at 20a.
Although stating’ that, “were review
granted now and were we to conclude the
District Court erred, an unnecessary ad-
ministrative proceeding could be averted
(fn. omitted)" (id. at 20a-21a), the
Court found, relying on Bachowski vy.
Usery, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976), that
e 23 «

“wisdom” required that “we focus on sys-
temic, as well as particularistic, im-
pacts.” Id. at 2la-22a.

7. On March 24, 1988, New
Haven filed its Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
which was denied by the First Circuit's
Order dated April 7, 1988. App. A.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the Court of
Appeals establishes a pernicious, new
rule for determining “finality” in judi-
cial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") that renders mean-
ingless the efforts of this Court, since
at least McGourkey vy. Toledo & O.C, Ry.,
146 U.S. 536, 544-545 (1892), to provide
a modicum of protection to the debilitat-
ing effect of delaying justice to an ad-
versely affected party. As a practical

matter, the Court of Appeals’ opinion

= 96 «

restricts the criteria for determining
“finality” to one factor and to the ef-
fect on one party: whether the applicant
received ultimately what it wanted from a
federal agency (in this case, an econom-
ically valuable fill permit to construct
@ mall), regardless of the fact such
relief is not judicially available. Un-
der such a standard, the Judicial Branch
becomes an advocate for the applicant;
assuring, in the end, that the substan-
tive content or the practical effect of a
District Court decision will not be mean-
ingfully reviewed until the applicant
extracts his alleged economic benefit
from the Executive Branch. This Court,
as argued below, has never articulated
such a fundamentally unfair and constitu-
tionally inappropriate rule. For this
reason alone, review by this Court is

warranted.

« 26 «

Here, however, much more is at
stake. A new, substantive legal standard
concerning NEPA, the CWA and the RHA has
been articulated by the District Court.
It is not trivial. Based on the misap-
plication of this Court's decision in
Metropolitan Edison v, PANE, the District
Court “eliminated” more than a decade of
judicial precedents from the 2nd, 5th,
7th and 6th Circuits (App. D at 70a);
and, it enjoined the U.S. ACOE's long-
standing interpretation of its statutory
obligations to consider the reasonably
foreseeable effects of a project and the
"Public Interest,” including economic
effects and the welfare of the people, in
rendering a permit decision. Jd. at 26a,
77a, 79a, 83a, 84a. It also has raised
troublesome questions about the continued

viability of the Council on Environmental

» 26 «

Quality’s NEPA regulations defining the
“human environment” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.14)
and “indirect” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.7) and
“cumulative” impacts (40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.7). See Add. at lla, 9a. In the
end, the District Court impermissibly
exceeded its role by failing to accord
any deference to the U.S. ACOE's inter-
pretation of the CWA, NEPA and the RHA
and the specific effects of this pro-
ject. Chevron U.S.A... Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984).

The District Court's decision
remains unreviewed by the Court of Ap-
peals, unreviewable by the U.S. ACOE on
remand, and unreviewable by the District
Court under the law of the case doc-
trine. The incongruous effect on New
Haven is deadening. We are estopped from
challenging it below and precluded from
appealing it now. Moreover, as a practi-

cal matter, the decision's reasoning is

—

stifling to any litigant who is dependent
on the federal government -- in civil
rights, equal employment opportunity or a
broad range of environmental cases -- to
vindicate an important public and judi-
Cially cognizable issue directly affect-
ing such a litigant. Based on an inar-
ticulated philosophy of government or the
political discomfort of being on the
“wrong side,“ an agency -- by not appeal-
ing -- can thwart the appeal of a party
that was a successful proponent before
the agency and, in the process, thwart
the agency's statutory mission and, in
this case, the meritorious reasoning of
that agency after six years of study.

The Court of Appeals’ decision
warrants the timely exercise of this
Court's .supervision on the question of
“finality” and the appeal rights of an
intervenor, the petitioner, City of New

Haven.

a: on

l.a. The Court of Appeals‘ anal-
ysis is flawed in its premise. "We do
not view the [District Court] remand or-
der,” the Court of Appeals stated, "as
meeting the traditional definition of a
final judgment, that is, one which ‘ends
the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment,’ Catlin _v. United States,
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).° App. B at
8a. This Court has eschewed such a “tra-
ditional definition” as being either the
beginning or the end of a proper analysis
of whether a decision is “final” under 28
¥.8.C. 9 2293. The correct analytical
premise is that “a decision ‘final’ with-
in the meaning of § 1291 does not neces-
sarily mean the last order possible to be
made in a case.” Gillespie v. United
States Stee] Corp.,, 379 U.S. 148, 152

=

(1964)(emphasis added). And, more re-
cently: "We know, of course, that § 1291
does not limit appellate review to ‘those
final judgments which terminate an action
- « « ,* but rather that the requirement
of finality is to be given a ‘practical
rather than a technical construction.'”"
Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 170-71 (1974)(emphasis added) (quot-
ing Cohen v., Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949)).

Having started on a faulty prem-
ise and inappropriate definition, the
Court of Appeals strayed further. Seem-—
ingly seeking a simple factual predicate
to meet the “traditional definition,” it
further defied this Court's teachings and
elevated a “verbal formula” (Eisen v.
Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 170),
from Pauls v. Secretary of Air Force, 457

= 29 «

F.2d at 297-98)("“generally orders remand-
ing to an administrative agency are not
final, immediately appealable orders"),
into a general rule; concluding that the
word “remand” in the formulation of the
District Court's relief is a talisman for
lack of finality. It is not, as _ the
Court of Appeals own case law (Faulkner
Hospital Corp, v. Schweicker, 702 F.2d 22
(lst Cir. 1983), cited by the District

Court, should have informed it.2/ The

1/ The Court of Appeals’ other cita-
tions undermined its own formulation
of an alleged “rule” correlating a
“remand” to a lack of finality. In
each of the cases it cites, a sub-
stantive decision on the merits was
expressly eschewed as premature
(App. B at 8a-lla)(see, e.g., Trans-
tation-c icati Divisi

St. Louis-San Francisco Rw., 419
F.2d 933, 934 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 818 (1970)), where-
in the remands involved were in-
tended to resolve a procedural or
evidentiary deficiency, certainly
FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

». 30 «

result: the Court of Appeals focused not
on the “practical” (Eisen, 417 U.S. at
170), but rather the “technical construc-
tion" of the District Court decision
(i.e., whether it was a “remand") and its
Singular effect on the attainment of the
respondent, Mall Properties, Inc.'s ulti-
mate goal (a regional shopping mall).

The effect is a radical, perni-
cious departure from the practical, cau-
tious approach this Court has admonished

lower courts to undertake in determining

FOOTNOTE 7/ CONTINUED:

not the case here. Moreover, the
Court -of Appeals strained its new
“rule” beyond credulity by claiming
that Bender v, Clark, 744 F.2d 1424
(10th Cir. 1984) -- where the Court
of Appeals concluded an appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 from a decision on
the merits was permissible where the
District Court had ordered a remand
-- is distinguishable from this case
only because it was the government,
not another defendant, that sought
appellate review.

ny

“finality.” In the end, the Court of
Appeals has taken a rule of limited ap-
plication (see n. 7, supra), elevated it
beyond its purpose and established a
general rule of broad application to
every case involving a “verbal formula,”
(Eisen, 417 U.S. at 170), “remand to the
agency,” contrary to its own customary
practice, the rule of the 10th Circuit in
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d at 1426, and
based, inappropriately, on the economic
agenda of the respondent, Mall Proper-
ties, Inc., vis-a-vis. the Executive
Branch.

b. The Court of Appeals failed
to recognize that the District Court
granted summary judgment, under Rule 54
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
on the substantive merits of the single
issue all the parties agreed was the fun-
damental legal linchpin to the U.S. ACOE

= 39 «

AP ttre. 5 Neate ee et lt Mi Sn

permit denial: whether, under the CWA,
the RHA, NEPA and the U.S. ACOE “Public
Interest Review" regulation, the ACOE had
the authority to consider, jinter alia,
the social and economic effects of the
proposed regional mall on the region,
particularly New Haven. The District
Court by resolving the issue as a matter
of law, vacating the agency's decision
and enjoining the Corps from any further
consideration of such effects, clearly
acted in a manner that “was not ‘tenta-
tive, informal or incomplete’ .. . but
settled conclusively [respondent Mall
pedderkéen: Inc.'s] GROG k=. «a
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171 (quoting Cohen,
337 U.S. at 546). It was, in the words
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a “final decision.”
C. This Court has not explic-
itly articulated a practical construction
(see Eisen, 417 U.S. at 170), concerning
« $3 «

“finality” directly applicable to the
broad range of APA cases wherein an agen-
cy decision is “remanded” for further
consideration. The absence of such es-
sential guidance is, once again, a grow-
ing lack of harmony (see McGourkey v.
Toledo & O.C,. Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892)),
among the Circuits and the formation of a
wholly inappropriate and harmful rule
within the First Circuit.

2.a. “(T]he danger of denying
justice [to New Haven] by delay,” (Dick-
inson _v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338
U.S. 507, 511 (1950)), permeates’ the
Court of Appeals decision. More is at
stake, however, than the indefensible
consequence of delaying resolution of the
issue concerning the U.S. ACOE's author-
ity to consider social and economic ef-
fects. New Haven has been denied the
most elementary notions of justice. By

“—

ae Stoel sal

“delaying” New Haven's ability to have
the issue even considered until it
reaches the Court of Appeals again, the
decision places petitioner in a very pre-
dictable “catch-22"; constantly forced to
argue that it has a right to be heard on
a legal issue that neither the U.S. ACOE
nor the District Court have any duty to
consider. Under such circumstances, New
Haven's “standing” under Article III to
even argue economic or social reasons for
permit denial would certainly be chal-
lenged. So too would New Haven's stand-
ing to argue some “physical environmen-
tal” issues as that term is defined by
the District Court. Moreover, it could
be two more rounds of procedural and
jurisdictional (j.e., standing) litiga-
tion before the Court of Appeals reaches
the merits of the social-economic issue,
if ever. The U.S. ACOE could deny the
- 35 -

permit again, on other grounds, and the
District Court could affirm the denial.
This, of course, is not the end
of the serious impediments the Court of
Appeals has created. Its analysis of res
judicata and law of the case provides
doubtful comfort. Dickinson, 338 U.S. at
511. In order to diminish the risk that
the Court of Appeals is incorrect on the
issues of “finality,” res judicata and
law of the case, New Haven is, as a prac-
tical matter, precluded from seeking ju-
Gicial review in any other jurisdiction
except Massachusetts even though the Dis-
trict Court below did not retain juris-
diction and petitioner is entitled to
file any subsequent challenge to the
Corps in Connecticut or the District of
Columbia. “This scenario of ‘possibil-
ities’ is too conjectural to avoid reach-

ing a more just result" (Bender v. Clark,
- 36 -

744 F.2d at 1428), particularly where, as
here, the Court of Appeals acknowledged
that “were review granted now and were we
to conclude the District Court erred, an
unnecessary administrative proceeding
could be averted." App. B at 2la.

b. By making the attainment of
the respondent, Mall Properties, Inc.'s,
economic goal the essential focus of its
analysis, the Court of Appeals made no
meaningful effort to undertake an evalua-
tion of the effect of its decision on the
parties. There is no “inconvenience and
cost{ ]," (Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171), to
Mall Properties, Inc. in the immediate
resolution of the legal issue jt has
wanted resolved since filing its Com-
plaint in October 1985. There is no dis-
cernable harm to the U.S. ACOE; no gov-
ernment project is at stake nor is the
filling of wetlands or the construction

«a 239 «

of suburban shopping malls a statutory or
policy objective. The adverse harm to
New Haven and the the administration of
the CWA, NEPA and the RHA is clear and
immediate.

The City of New Haven has ac-
tively opposed the construction of the
North Haven Mall since 1980. It took the
U.S. ACOE almost six years to render its
ROD, 45 pages in length, denying the per-
mit. The litigation has now consumed
almost three additional years. For a
municipality like New Haven -- the 7th
poorest in the United States, according
to the 1980 census, for cities over
100,000 -- such an effort has placed a
substantial burden on New Haven's tax-
payers. Moreover, the resolution of the
legal issues in this case are of funda-
mental importance to the entire metro-
politan region.

- 38 -

c. The fundamental flaw in the
District Court's reasoning stemmed from
its wholly unwarranted intrusion into
interpreting the statutory obligations of
the U.S. ACOE. Relying on the respon-
dent, Mall Properties, Inc.'s, character-
ization of the permit denial as being
based on economic competition®” rather
than social and economic jimpacts, the
District Court decided that: (i) the
U.S. ACOE is not “democratically account-
able“ (App. D at 75a) and cannot make
such a “competition” judgment ; and,
therefore, (ii) the Court “is called upon
to discern the scope of the authority to

consider economic factors which has been

8/ App. D at 36a. The notion of “eco-
nomic competition” was nowhere ad-
dressed by the U.S. ACOE in its ROD
and clearly not reflected in the
"Conclusions" reached in its Novem-
ber 1984 or August 1985 ROD's.

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

« 20 «

Gelegated to, and exercised by, the
Corps.” Id. at 42a. Unable to find any
direct legislative history under the RHA,
CWA or NEPA, that “unambiguously ex-
pressed [the] intent of Congress" (Chev-
ron _U.S.A., Inc, v,. NRDC, 467 U.S. at
843), that the U.S. ACOE was precluded
from considering social and economic fac-
tors, the District Court grafted onto
that history this Court's “proximately
related” standard from Metropolitan ‘Edi-
son (id. at 59a-60a), although such a

standard is nowhere referred to or cited

FOOTNOTE 8/ CONTINUED:

Moreover, no federal or state agency
raised any question about "“competi-
tion“; all participants before the
U.S. ACOE -- HUD, the Department of
the Interior/U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the Connecticut Office
of Policy and Management -- stated
that adverse environmental, social,
economic or racial impacts warranted
permit denial.

w 46 @

in the legislative history in this con-
text. Moreover, the District Court made
no meaningful effort to assess whether
“the agency's [interpretation] is based
on a permissible construction of the
statute” (Chevron U.S.A... Inc, v. NRDC,
467 U.S. at 843), despite the fact such
social or economic effects have been:
(i) considered by the Corps since 1933
(see United States v, Dern, 289 U.S. 352
(1933); Zabel_v,. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 207
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910 (1971)(The RHA “itself does not put
any restrictions on denial of a permit or
the reasons why the Secretary may refuse
to grant a permit ... .")); (ii) inte-
grated into the Corps‘ Public Interest
Review regulation since 1974 (App. D at
S5la); (iii) required, under the rea-

sonably foreseeable standard, to be

at 43-0

considered by the CEQ regulations~’

and (iv) formally considered, based on
Six years of legal and factual analysis
in this case and, with even greater
breath and detail, in Bersani v. EPA, 674
F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, Nos.
87-6275, 87-6295, slip op. (2d Cir. June
8, 1988)(economic viability and market-
place impacts of proposed mall on the
region considered by the U.S. ACOE and
EPA in CWA permit decision). The Dis-
trict Court, in the end, emerged as the
“democratically accountable” (App. D at
75a) Branch of government, failed to show
any deference to the U.S. ACOE's inter-
pretation of its obligations (Udal]_ v,.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)), and

2/ In fact, the District Court does not
even cite the CEQ regulations.

i oe io

“substitute[d] its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable in-
terpretation made by the .. . agency.”
Chevron U.S.A.. Inc, v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at
844.

The U.S. ACOE, for an indetermi-
nate period of time, is now free to im-
pose within the First Circuit -- if not
elsewhere -- a new legal standard con-
cerning indirect, induced or cumulative
social and economic impacts that departs
from its previously accepted practice, as
acknowledged by the U.S. ACOE in the Dis-
trict Court. See Federal Defendant's
Reply Memorandum, on Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment at 9. At stake is the
daily administration of three major
statutes: NEPA, CWA and RHA.

Moreover, no court -- including
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit relied upon by the District Court

here (App. D at 68a) -- has applied the

7: oe

“proximately related” standard beyond the
limited, threshold question of whether an
EIS should be prepared. In Qlmsted Cit-
, F Bett C x United
States, 793 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1986), the
Eighth Circuit was confronted with the
threshold question of whether an EIS was
required based not on any allegations of
environmental harm but on the possible
“introduction of weapons and drugs into
the area ... [and] .. . an increase in
esime.«.. . .*: 9@. et 265... 40 concluded
an EIS was not necessary, relying on the
“proximately related" standard of Metro-
politan Edison, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), the
fact that “we are not convinced that Olm-
sted Citizens has identified any signif-
icant impacts on the physical environment
o « «” €Olmated, 792 F.26- et 266) and
that “[e]ven before Metropolitan Edison”
(id.), a similar result would have lied.

Moreover, subsequent court decisions have

a— oe

interpreted Metropolitan Edison to be
limited to the threshold question of

whether NEPA applies in the absence of
recognized environmental impacts. See
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co, v.
Dole, 633 F. Supp. 725, 727 (W.D. Wash.
1986); Ono v. Harper, 592 F. Supp. 698,
701 (D. Haw. 1983); Animal Lovers Volun-
teer Assoc, v, Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937,
938 (9th Cir. 1985); Glass Packaging In-
Stitute v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091-93
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035
(1984). Here,- it is beyond peradventure
that: (i) Significant physical, environ-
mental impacts were present (i.e., depos-
iting one million cubic yards of fill;
harm to 30 acres of wetlands; flooding
problems, etc.); (ii) the U.S. ACOE pre-
pared a multi-volume EIS -- a legal and
factual determination not challenged be-
low; (iii) mumerous federal and state

agencies substantiated the environmental,

“ae

social and economic impacts of the pro-
ject; and (iv) the demonstrable, physi-
cal, economic and social impacts on the
region, including New Haven, was thor-
oughly documented and found by the U.S.
ACOE in its EIS and ROD‘'s. Under such
circumstances, the District Court deci-
sion -- by extending the “proximately
related" standard of Metropolitan Edison
and precluding consideration of the re-
gional mall's social and economic effects
on the region -- is directly in conflict
with those of at least the 2nd and 9th
Circuits (Rochester v. United States Pos-
tal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 973 (2d Cir.
1976); Bersani v. EPA, Nos. 87-6275,
87-6295, slip op. (2d Cir. June 8, 1988);
Davis _v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676-77
(9th Cir. 1975)); the CEQ regulations
requiring consideration of “reasonably
foreseeable" effects (including social

and economic effects that are “later in

~

time or farther removed in distance,” 40
C.F.R. 1508.8(b)); and the Corps’ own
Public Interest Review regulation; and,
without reason and contrary to sound ju-
Gicial administration, the limited hold-
ings of the 9th (Animal Lovers Volunteer
Assoc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d at 938-39)
and D.C. Circuits (Glass Packaging Insti-
tute v. Regan, 737 F.2d at 1091).
Certainly, the “issue is a seri-
ous and unsettled one ....” Bender v.
Clark, 744 F.2d at 1428. At stake is the
uncertainty in outcome of such an impor-
tant matter and the rights of numerous
permit applicants, the U.S. ACOE and the
public (Paluso v. Mathews, 573 F.2d 4, 8
(10th Cir. 1978)), as well as the fate of
thousands of acres of wetlands within New
England, if not elsewhere; all placed at
risk without appellate review. “The pub-
lic interest .. . would lose by such a

procedure.” Brown Shoe Co, v. United

—

States, 370 U.S. 294, 309 (1962).

3. The Court of Appeals deter-
mination that the Government enjoys some
special status vis-a-vis intervenors with
respect to appellate rights (App. B at
14a-15a) conflicts directly with Bryant
vy. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980),
the protection afforded by Rule 24(a) of
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and
the precedents of at least the 9th and
D.C. Circuits. If not corrected, its
consequences will be insidious; lurking,
perhaps inconspicuously for now, with
grave effect on those who, in the context
of litigation, are dependent on the gov-
ernment to vindicate individual rights or
seek judicial redress on matters of pub-
asic importance.

The City of New Haven was
granted the right to intervene under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). App.

E at 86a. As an intervenor, New

=e

Haven has the right to appeal an adverse
ruling regardless of whether the govern-
ment seeks such an appeal. Bryant v.,
Yellen, 447 U.S. at 366-68; NL Indus-
tries, Inc, v. Secretary of Interior, 777
F.2d 433, 436 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1293-94

(3.6. Gaets«s. . 29863 It would defeat the
entire purpose of Rule 24(a) if the find-
ing of “inadequate representation” had
application only in the District Court.
The Government could, with impunity and
without explanation, simply defeat the
interests of the intervenor by acquiesc-
ing in the views of its adversary through
“settlement,” whether expressed in formal
terms or undertaken with the quiet pas-
sage of the time beyond which it must
appeal. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc, v.
Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983).
The insidious nature of the

Court of Appeals determination also is

— =

founded in the absence of an explanation
for the Government's conduct. As this
Court is aware, the Record of Decision
was issued by the New England Division of
the U.S. ACOE; defending that decision in
litigation is not its responsibility.
The Justice Department's determination
not to appeal may have been premised on a
philosophical discomfort with the New
England Division's denial of a permit or
the political discomfort of being on the
“wrong side” in the Court of Appeals. It
also may have simply missed the jurisdic-
tion deadline for filing a notice of ap-
peal. Its motion to dismiss New Haven's
appeal in this case was made without ci-
tations or legal argument. In fact, in
the 5 months the U.S. ACOE's motion was
pending, it was never requested by the
Court of Appeals -- despite our insis-
tence -- to explain either why it was

made or what the effect would be if this

o $0 «

appeal proceeded. Nonetheless, the Court
cf Appeals fashioned a rule denying an
intervenor from appealing based, in part,
on its own assumptions, or those ex-
tracted from other cases, as to the Gov-
ernment‘’s motivation or the effect on New
Haven. In the end, it protected the U.S.
ACOE decision not to appeal, imposed
enormous litigation burdens on New Haven
(let alone on others who actively opposed
the issuance of the permit before the
U.S. ACOE) and radically altered the fac-
tual and legal posture of the case, with-
out any reasoning articulated by the
rule's primary beneficiary, the U.S. ACOE.

In any event, New Haven is en-
titled to “all the prerogatives of a par-
ty litigant" (United States v. AT&T, 642
F.2d at 1294), including the right to
appeal since, as is abundantly obvious
here, New Haven's interests were “not

s =

adequately represented in the decision
[by the U.S. ACOE] not to appeal.” Id.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ade f VA

Neil T. Proto

Kelley Drye & Warren

Suite 600

1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-8333

Brian Murphy
Corporation Counsel
City of New Haven
770 Chapel Street
New Haven, CT 06510
(203) 787-8232

July 5, 1988

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ADDENDUM

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
AND _ REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. Section 101(b)(5) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4331(b) provides in perti-
nent part:

(b) In order to carry out the
policy set forth in this chapter
(42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4321 et seg.],
it is the continuing responsi-
bility of the Federal Government
to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential
considerations of national pol-
icy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, pro-
grams, and resources to the end
that the Nation may--

* x x
(5) achieve a balance between
population and resource use
which will permit high standards
of living an a wide sharing of
life's amenities;

2. Section 102 of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332, provides in pertinent part:

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[Section 102(2)(C)]

The Congress authorizes and di-
rects that, to the fullest ex-
tent possible: (1) the poli-
cies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies
set forth in this chapter [42
U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seg.], and (2)
all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment shall--

(C) include in every recommen-

dation or report on proposals

for legislation and other major

Federal actions significantly

affecting the quality of the

human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible
official on--

(i) the environmental impact
of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be
avoided should the propos-
al be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to th» pro-
posed action,

(iv) the relationship between
local short-term uses of
man's environment and the
maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term produc-
tivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of
resources which would be
involved in the proposed
action should it be imple-
mented.

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Prior to making any detailed
statement, the responsible Fed-
eral official shall consult with
and obtain the comments of any
Federal agency which has juris-
diction by law or special exper-
tise with respect to any envi-
ronmental impact involved. Cop-
ies of such statement and the
comments and views of the appro-
priate Federal, State, and local
agencies, which are authorized
to develop and enforce environ-
mental standards, shall be made
available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality
and to the public as provided by
section 552 of title 5, United
States Code [5 U.S.C.S. § 552],
and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency re-
view processes;

3. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403, provides in pertinent part:

The creation of any obstruction
not affirmatively authorized by
Congress, to the navigable
Capacity of any of the waters of
the United States is hereby pro-
hibited; and it shall not be
lawful to build or commence the
building of any .. . structures
in any .. . navigable river, or
other water of the United
States, outside established har-
bor lines, or where no harbor

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lines have been’ established,
except on plans recommended by
the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of
the ALM? «ss

4. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1344, provides in perti-

nent part:

(a) , 3 al

he Discharge _into navigable
Sites. The Secretary may issue
permits, after notice and oppor-
tunity for public hearings for
the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal
Sites. Not later than the fif-
teenth day after the date an
applicant submits all the infor-
maticn required to complete an
application for a permit under
this subsection, the Secretary

shall publish the notice re-
quired by this subsection.

(b) Specification for disposal
Sites. Subject to subsection
(c) of this section, each such
disposal site shall be specified
for each such permit by the Sec-
retary (1) through the applica-
tion of guidelines developed by
the Administrator, in conjunc-
tion with the Secretary, which
guidelines shall be based upon
Criteria comparable to the cri-
teria applicable to the terri-
torial seas, the contiguous

- 4a-

zone, and the ocean under sec-
tion 1343(c) of this title, and
(2) in any case where such
guidelines under clause (1)
alone would prohibit the speci-
fication of a site, through the
application additionally of the
economic impact of the site on
navigation and anchorage.
x x ca

(d) The term “Secretary” as
used in this section means the
Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Chief of Engineers.

5. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) provides in perti-
nent part:

The reviewing court shall --
x w x
(2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency .- action, findings, and
conclusions found to be -

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or other-

wise not in accordance with law;
x x x

(D) without observance of proce-

dure required by law;

6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides:
The courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of ap-

peals from all final decisions
of the Gistrict courts ..« .

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The “Public Interest Review" regula-
tion of the Army Corps of Engineers,
33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (a) and (q), pro-

vides:

(a) Public Interest Review.
(1) The decision whether to issue a
permit will be based on an evaluation
of the probable impacts, including
cumulative impacts, of the proposed
activity and its intended use on the
public interest. Evaluation of the
probable impact which the proposed
activity: may have on the public in-
terest requires a careful weighing of
all those factors which become rele-
vant in each particular case. The
benefits which reasonably may be ex-
pected to accrue from the proposal
must be balanced against its reason-
ably foreseeable detriments. The
decision whether to authorize a pro-
posal, and if so, the conditions
under which it will be allowed to
occur, are therefore determined by
the outcome of this general balancing
process. That decision should re-
flect the national concern for both
protection and utilization of impor-
tant resources. All factors which
may be relevant to the proposal must
be considered including the cumula-
tive effects thereof: among those
are conservation, economics, aesthe-
tics, general environmental concerns,
wetlands, historic properties, fish
and wildlife values, flood hazards,

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floodplain values, land use, naviga-
tion, shore erosion and accretion,
recreation, water supply and conser-
vation, water quality, energy needs,
safety, food and fiber production,
mineral needs, considerations of
property ownership and, in general,
the needs and welfare of the people.
For activities involving 404 dis-
charges, a permit will be denied if
the discharge that would be author-
ized by such permit would not comply
with the Environmental Protection
Agency's 404(b)(1) guidelines. Sub-
ject to the preceding sentence and
any other applicable guidelines and
criteria (See §§ 320.2 and 320.3), a
permit will be granted unless’ the
district engineer determines that it
would be contrary to the public in-
terest.

(q) Economics. When private
enterprise makes application for
a permit, it will generally be
assumed that appropriate econom-
ic evaluations have been com-
pleted, the proposal is econom-
ically viable, and is needed in
the marketplace. However, the
district engineer in appropriate
cases, may make an independent
review of the need for the pro-
ject from the perspective of the
overall public interest. The
economic benefits of many pro-
jects are important to the local
community and contribute to
needed improvements in the local
economic base, affecting such
factors as employment, tax

- Ja -

revenues, community cohesion,
community services, and property
values. Many projects also con-
tribute to the National Economic
Development (NED) (i.e., the
increase in the net value of the
national output of goods and
services).

The regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.16, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7, 40
C.F.R. § 1508.8{(a)(b), and 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.14 provide:

§ 1502.16 Environmental conse-
quences.

This section forms’ the
scientific and analytic basis
for the comparisons under
§ 1502.14.- It shall consolidate
the discussions of those ele-
ments required by sections
102(2)(C)(i), (ii), (iv), and
(v) of NEPA which are within the
scope of the statement and as
much of section 102(2)(C) (iii)
as is necessary to support the
comparisons. The discussion
will include the environmental
impacts of the alternatives in-
cluding the proposed action, any
adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should

the proposal be implemented .
* x x

(1502.16 (cont.))

It shall include discus-
sions of:

(a) Direct effects and
their significance (§ 1508.8).

(b) Indirect effects and
their significance (§ 1508.8).

(c) Possible conflicts
between the proposed action and
the objectives of Federal,
regional, State, and local
land use plans, policies and
controls for the area
concerned. (See § 1506.2(d).)

(d) The environmental ef-
fects of alternatives including
the proposed action. ...

~ 2 *

(g) Urban ES 2
and the design of the built en-
vironment, including the reuse
and conservation potential of
various alternatives and mitiga-
tion measures.

§ 1508.7 Cumulative impact.

“Cumulative impact” is the
impact on the environment which
results from the incremental
impact of the action when added
to other past, present, and rea-
sonably foreseeable future ac-
tions regardless of what agency
(Federal or non-Federal) or per-
son undertakes such other ac-
tions. Cumulative impacts can

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result from individually minor
but collectively Significant
actions taking place over a
period of time.

§ 1508.8 Effects.
“Effects” include:

(a) Direct effects, which
are caused by the action and
occur at the same time and place.

(b) Indirect effects,
which are caused by the action
and are later in time or farther
removed in distance, but are
still reasonably foreseeable.
Indirect effects may include
growth inducing effects and
other effects related to induced
changes in the pattern of land
use, population density or
growth rate, and related effects
on air -.and water and other
natural systems, including eco-
systems.

Effects and impacts as used in
these regulations are synony-
mous. Effects include ecologi-
cal (such as the effects on
natural resources and on the
components, structures, and
functioning of affected ecosys-
tems), aesthetic, historic, cul-
tural, economic, social, or
health, whether direct, indi-
rect, or cumulative. Effects
may also include those resulting
from actions which may have both

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beneficial and detrimental ef-
fects, even if on balance the
agency believes that the effect
will be beneficial.

§ 1508.14 Human environment.

“Human environment” shall
be interpreted comprehensively
to include the natural and phys-
ical environment and the rela-
tionship of people with that
environment. (See the defini-
tion of “effects" (§ 1508.8).)
This means that economic or so-
cial effects are not intended by
themselves to require prepara-
tion of an environmental impact
statement. When an environmen-
tal impact statement is prepared
and economic or social and nat-
ural or physical environmental
effects are interrelated, then
the environmental impact state-
ment will discuss all of these
effects on the human environment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)
provides:

(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a stat-
ute of the United States confers
an unconditional right to inter-
vene; or (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction

- lla -

which is the subject of the ac-
tion and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair
Or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the appli-
cant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 5,
1988 I caused copies of the attached
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit and the Appendix thereto to
be served via first class mail, postage

prepaid, or by hand delivery (“*"), upon:

*Honorable Charles Fried

Solicitor General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
Room 5143

10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Daniel Riesel, Esq.

Sive, Paget and Riesel, P.C.
10th Floor

460 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Alice Richmond, Esq.
Hemenway and Barnes

60 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

Peter Shelly, Esq.

Conservation Law Foundation
of New England, Inc.

4 Joy Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02116

*Honorable Edwin Meese

Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

James Tripp, Esq.
Environmental Defense Fund
257 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10010

Katherine H. Robinson, Esq.
Connecticut Fund for the Environment
32 Grand Street

Hartford, Connecticut 06106

Peter Steenland, Esq.

Appellate Section

Land and Natural Resources Division
Department of Justice

P. O. Box 23795 (L'Enfant Station)
Washington, D.C. 20026

Edward S. Lawson

Westin, Patrick, Willard and Redding
84 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

Roberta Friedman, Esq.
383 Orange Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06511

«im

Frank Cochran, Esq.

Cochran, Cooper, et al.

P. O. Box 1898

New Haven, Connecticut 06508

July 5, 1988 hy Fi PAG

Neil T. Proto

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1979%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
