# Opposition Brief — Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1846%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 488 U.S. 824

## Text

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NO.

In The
Supreme Court of the United

States
October Term, 1988

RIGHT TO LIFE ADVOCATES, INC., ETC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,

VS.

AARON WOMEN'S CLINIC,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TEXAS

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

John W. Berkel

JOHN W. BERKEL, P.C.
3420 Two Houston Center
Houston, Texas 77010
(713) 655-0008

Attorney of Record for
Respondent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the requisite state action and jurisdiction exists
sufficient to warrant the granting of the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.

Whether the State of Texas violated Federal due process
requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment when it
decided that Petitioners had no standing to raise an
unmeritorious defense.

Whether Roe v. Wade should be overruled.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

PETITIONERS:

RIGHT TO LIFE ADVOCATES, INC. "d/b/a
ABORTION ABUSE ADVICE & INFORMATION
SERVICE, ABORTION ABUSE & ADVISORY
INFORMATION HOTLINE, and _ CRISIS
PREGNANCY CENTER OF HOUSTON";

CRAIG K. ANDERSEN;

J. (SIM) BAILEY;

LEE P. HELMKE;

GARY LOTH;

BARBARA A. MARTONE;

JOHN A. MARTONE;

KATHY MATHEMS;

SHEILA MCINTOSH; and

. JOSEPH J. PESL.

. RESPONDENT:

AARON WOMEN'S CLINIC (which is an assumed
name of ORIENT SALES CORPORATION, a
corporation).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..................20ee0ees 1

I. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, THIS DISPUTE
BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES DOES NOT
INVOLVE THE REQUISITE STATE

Il. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED OVER
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAL FOR THE
REASON THAT SAME WERE NOT
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT.................. 2

III. THE TEXAS COURTS DID NOT VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS CAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THEIR
DECISION SINCE PETITIONERS HAD NO
STANDING TO RAISE THEIR DEFENSE
OF UNCLEAN HANDS AND THEIR
DEFENSE WAS UNMERITORIOUS
(GERMANE TO PETITIONER'S POINTS

iv

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IV. ROE V. WADE SHOULD NOT BE
OVERRULED (GERMANE_- TO
PETITIONER'S POINTS OF ERROR III
AND IV)

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Company, 129

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Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029,

Ge E tittindindttdicmitnchasctisdbinxdccsicescecs. 1
Humphries-Mexia Company v. Arsneaux, 116 Tex.

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Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.

Ges ee Be ED BE CRUEED cn dcccccccccccscccncccoscccess |
Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 341
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Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102

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Riley v. Davidson, 196 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1946, writ refd n.r.e.) .0..........cccceeeeeee 4
Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ............0cceeeeee 2, 3,5
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (S. Ct.

N.J. 1980, appeal dismissed sub nom.) ....................64. l

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE, UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THIS
DISPUTE B EN PRIVATE PARTIES DOES
NOT INVOLVE THE REQUISITE STATE ACTION.

It is well settled that the exercise of an individual's right of
free speech and assembly on a privately owned shopping
center, irrespective of its size or the character of the property,
is not a protected activity under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); Hudgens
y. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196

infringement of constitutional rights and it does not protect
against conduct of purely private actors. The defendants make
no pretense of satisfying the “state action” requirement
necessary to invoke the protection of the Federal Constitution.
See, e.g. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (S. Ct.
N.J. 1980, appeal dismissed sub nom.), Princeton University
yv. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 867, 70 L.Ed.2d 855
(1982).

Petitioner's attempt to cure this jurisdictional defect by
arguing that state action exists (the decision of the Texas Court
of Appeals and Texas Supreme Court) and that such supports
a violation of the United States Constitutional Amendment
Fourteen is not well founded. The Texas Court of Appeals
denied Petitioner's argument of unclean hands for the reason
that 1) Petitioners did not show injury to them so as to be

2

entitled to raise the defense (all of the cases cited by Petitioners

in support of their injury argument in fact involved parties that

themselves had legal or proprietary interests in the subject

matter of the dispute) and 2) Respondents were not guilty of
unclean hands inasmuch as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 |
(1973) established the legality of pregnancy terminations

within the limitations set forth in Roe vy. Wade. Petitioner's

second point of error complaining of the decision of the Texas

Supreme Court upholding the Court of Appeals is founded on

the same argument. Such an argument presents no issue to

this Court under the Federal Constitution.

Analogously, Petitioner's attempt to present to this Court
another constitutional challenge to Roe v, Wade is not well
founded. Such must be raised in the context of state action,
referenced previously, and no party to this lawsuit, nor the
actions of any party, constitute such state action as is required
before a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court would be
well founded.

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE DENIED OVER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN
THIS APPEAL FOR THE REASON THAT SAME
WERE NOT PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT.

Petitioner's arguments made under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Texas Constitution and the numerous
challenges to Roe v. Wade were not preserved in the Trial
Court. (Tr 27, 41). According to Petitioner's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Roe v. Wade is requested to be reconsidered on
the basis of what is allegedly substantial social and policy
grounds. This was not adequately presented to the Trial Court
as the Statement of Facts and the Transcript constituting the

record transmitted to this Court will readily reveal.

Petitioner's pleadings in the Trial Court did not plead, and
Petitioner's evidence proffered in the Trial Court did not
support, the arugments and challenges that Petitioners now
seek to make in this Court to Roe v, Wade. Rather,
Respondent's suit was challenged by defenses allegedly raised
under the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendement to the Federal
Constitution. Though Petitioners have proposed to raise
certain other constitutional issues in the Trial Court, such are
issues not carried forward to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Having failed to raise such issues in their petition in the Trial
Court (when Respondent would have had the opportunity to
controvert same with evidence relating to such issues, which
Respondent did not have the opportunity to do), Petitioners are
precluded from raising those issues in this Court.

THE TEXAS COURTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
DUE PROCESS CAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT IN THEIR DECISION SINCE
PETITIONERS HAD NO STANDING TO RAISE
THEIR DEFENSE OF UNCLEAN HANDS AND
THEIR DEFENSE WAS UNMERITORIOUS
(GERMANE TO PETITIONER'S POINTS OF
ERROR I AND ID)

Petitioner's argument must fail in the first analysis for the
reason that Respondent's are not guilty of unclean hands. Roe
y. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), within the standards set forth
therein, established the legality of pregnacy terminations. This
stands as the law of the land and any potentially contrary law
(referenced in Petitioner's Points of Error III and ['V) could not
stand in the face of this Court's decision. Operating a legal
business in a lawful manner cannot constitute unclean hands as
a matter of law.

Additionally, as held by the Texas Court of Appeals, a
party such as Petitioner asserting the equitable defense of
unclean hands to injunctive relief (all arising under Texas State
Law) must, as a matter of Texas State Law, show that such
party, and not some third-party, was injured by the conduct of
the party seeking the injunction (Respondents). Omohundro
v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 341 S.W.2d 401, 410 (1960).
The Court of Appeals examined all cases cited by Petitioners
and found that such cases did not deviate from the requirement
of injury to the complaining party. Each of the cases cited by
Petitioners in their Petition for a Writ of oe to this
Court, are distinguishable. In Wi i
Amusement Company, 129 Tex. 40, 100 S. W. 2d 695 (1936)
the Supreme Court ruled that the amusement company that
sued the city to enjoin the city from enforcing the city's
existing anti-lottery ordinance was not entitled to the injunction
because its business violated the public policy and law of the
State and thus the amusement company did not come into
Court with clean hands. In Humphries-Mexia Company v.
Arsneaux, 116 Tex. 603, 297 S.W. 225 (1927), the oil
company and water company had colorable rights to the
property in question and would have the requisite standing. In
Riley v. Davidson, 196 S.W. 2d 557, 559-560 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the Court of Appeals
held that one who could suffer a health injury could raise the
defense of unclean hands against the party (the owner of the
water supply line) committing acts in violation of the health
law. In all of these cases, the parties before the Court had real
interests in the controversy and were acting to protect their
rights. Distinguished from this line of cases is the current
situation where Petitioners are not suffering the harm, if any,
by pregnancy termination. As against a challenge to
Petitioner's inability to fullfill a Texas legal prerequisite to
asserting a Texas defense to a Texas equitable remedy,
Petitioners have not shown the requisite standing as would be
required to sustain Petitioner's position.

a Se NNER AN ah

IV.

ROE V. WADE SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED
(GERMANE TO PETITIONER'S POINTS OF
ERROR III AND IV)

It should be inititally noted that Petitioner's strain to confer
jurisdiction on this Court to overrule Roe v. Wade within the
context of Petitioner's unclean hands defense (referenced in I,
surpa) Given that such arguments fail, the underlying
rationale for presenting another challenge to Roe v. Wade in
this Court must also fail. In the absence of Petitioner's
standing, as described above, Petitioners do not present a valid
jurisdictional or procedural challenge to Roe v. Wade in their
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Additionally, Roe v. Wade has been examined and re-
examined on numerous occasions by this Court. The same
reasons as caused this Court to decide Roe v. Wade initially
stand as arguments as to why Roe v. Wade should not be
overruled. Roe v. Wade having withstood numerous
constitutional challenges since its decision, and Petitioner's
arguments primarily re-presenting many of these arguments,
this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari presents no new
constitutional arguments that should be reviewed.

As to the additional reasons referenced in Petitioner's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, such are. not supported by
evidence in this record, were not raised in the. Trial Court and
in fact (when considered and reviewed), do not provide.
sufficient grounds for overruling Roe v._ Wade (as against the
numerous considerations weighing in favor of the initial Roe
v. Wade decision and its support since the decision).

6

CONCLUSION

For the reasons and authorities stated, it is submitted
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be

; 3420 Two Houston Center
“4 Houston, Texas 77010
(713) 655-0008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing has been mailed certified, return receipt requested to
Mr. Thomas C. Sanders, 5874 San Felipe, #1250, Houston,
d Mr. Richard W ude, P. 0. Box 674,
77375 on this day of July, 1988.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1846%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
