# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1523%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 486 U.S. 1055

## Text

87-1567 [ ssnonn

ELLE D

No. MAR 21 1988
IN Tilt JOSEPH &. SPANIOL,

CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI

October Term. 19S7

SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY.
Petitioner
t.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

~ Kenneth Scott, Esq.

*Bruce J. Chasan, Esq.

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ,
EDELMAN & DICKER

1811 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(215) 563-5600
Attorneys for Petitioner
Sun Pipe Line Company

* Counsel of Record

PACKARD PRESS LEGAL DIVISION, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA. PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, on a “motion for reconsideration” under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the failure of the United
States District Court to allow an amendment to the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, in the absence
of prejudice to the defendant, was an abuse of discretion?

2. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to judicially
review the action of the Environmental Protection Agency in
denying permission under 40 C.F.R. §§2.401 et seq. to Sun Pipe
Line Company to videotape a deposition of an agency employee
for use in a case in which the United States is not a party?

3. Whether, under the circumstances, the action of the
Environmental Protection Agency in denying permission under
40 C.F.R. §§2.041 et seg. to Sun Pipe Line Company to
videotape a deposition of an agency employee was invalid
because it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and
otherwise not in accordance with law?

THE PARTIES

Plaintiff, petitioner herein, is Sun Pipe Line Company
(“SPL”). SPL is incorporated under the law of Pennsylvania and
has its principal office in Tulsa, Oklahoma. It owns and operates
petroleum pipelines in numerous states, and it transports both
refined petroleum products and crude oil. It is presently an
indirectly-owned subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc. through a
holding company, Sun Pipe Line Company of Delaware.

Defendant, respondent herein, is the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, an agency of the United States government.

RULE 28.1 LISTING

SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES

AND AFFILIATES
HOLDING COMPANY

SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY OF DELAWARE

100% OWNED COMPANIES

Sun Pipe Line Company:
Eastern Area
Mid-Continent Area
Southwest Area
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Company
Sun Oil Line Company of Michigan
Sun Pipe Line Services Co.
JOINT VENTURES
Explorer Pipeline Company
Inland Corporation
Mid-Valley Pipeline Company

Maumee Section
West Texas Gulf Pipe Line Company

UNDIVIDED INTEREST
High Island Pipeline System
Jay Field

Mesa Pipe Line

PARENT COMPANY AND ADDITIONAI

Adamantech, Inc.

Alliance Enterprise Corporation
Helios Capital Corporation

Helios Service Company

Puerto Rico Sun Oil Company
Radnor Corporation

Sun Carriers, Inc.

Sun Company, Inc. (Parent Company

il

. AFFILIATES

Sun Company Information Systems, Inc.

Sun-Del Services, Inc.

Sun Distributors, Inc.

Sunedco Coal Company

Sun Exploration and Production Company

Sun Exploration and Production Company of Pennsylvania,
Inc.

Sun Gas Liquids, Inc.

Sun Gas Terminals and Storage (PA), Inc.

Sun Gas Transmission Company, Inc.

Sun Geothermal Company

Sun Marine Terminals, Inc.

Sunoco Credit Corporation

Sunoco Energy Development Co.

Sun Oil Trading Company

Sun Refining and Marketing Company

Sun Shale Oil Company

Sun Ship, Inc.

Sun Tech, Inc.

The Claymont Investment Company

White River Shale Oil Company

Yabucoa Sun Oil Company, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED «0.2 ccc sic ca ce ccecaces
ee RI rok oo Oe C0 eek enh Ree eas woeeee.
JF og 30.3), Se paegueeaeatee s

a, EO GTR ha e n e ce ne cao nen ee ee tees

UMNO 13s cs hunt yadda bay ead keds
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..............
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................0-00-.

A. Factual Background, The Underlying Litigation. .

B. Sun Pipe Line Company's Request To E.P.A. ...

C.

Proceedings In U.S. District Court ............

DD. Proceedings In The Court of Appeals ......

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.............

IN ITS EVALUATION OF SPL’S “MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION,” THE FAILURE OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT

TO THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 15,

ABSENT PREJUDICE TO E.P.A.. WAS AN
Ae Ce EPS IRIEN Cocks necks ascsneeaes

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION

TO JUDICIALLY REVIEW AGENCY ACTION

TAKEN PURSUANT TO AGENCY REGULA-
TIONS WHEN THE ACTION WAS ALLEGED
BY PETITIONER TO BE ARBITRARY, CAPRI-
CIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ....

TABLE OF CONTENTS— Continued)
Page
Il. WHETHER THE E.P.A. ACTION WAS ARBI-
TRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION, OR OTHERWISE NOT IN) ACCOR-
DANCE WITH LAW, WITHIN THE MEANING
OF THE APA, IS A QUESTION WHICH NEEDS
TO BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE
HEARING AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL. — 16

bee Rk Pee Pernt ty Par A ky: 1S
APPENDIX

Opinion, Appeal of Sun Pipe Line Company, 831 F.2d 22

Order Denying Petition For Rehearing (Nov. 20, 1987).. A-9

Order of Justice Byron R. White dated February 11, 1988
Extending Time To File Petition For Writ of Certio- -

rari To and Including March 21, 1988 .............. 4-10
DEANU SOc ck vcnatnvssekes asareevedae tne 4-1]
DESC. FA 6 cs 0 ins p eeacene eee A-]]

S U.S. Ga. occas etn ceanceeeiel eeeee A-1]

S 0.5.0... Fee. 62s ies nedeasar chee A-11-12
BB UGA. QR s ok hove ene ccdekes eee ee A-1]2
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE .......... A-12
Re DIO ne cia pc Uew nena ene pee eee A-]2
ehe TE on. kev ccehesastgreee eee A-12
ett CD ois cco se kctegidheseie eee A-13

Public Information; Testimony by Employees and Produc-
tion of Documents in Civil Legal Proceedings, 40
C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart C, 50 Fed. Reg. 32386 (Aug. 9,

TABLE OF CONTENTS— Continued

Page
Sun Pipe Line Companys Requests For Admissions To
Plaintiffs (February 20, 1987) And Answers Thereto,
Hudachek v . Sun Company, Inc., et al., No. S4-01115-
11-2 (excerpts and Attachments “B™ and “C” A-2]

Letter, Butler Buchanan, IIL, Esq. to Donnell L. Nantkes,
Esq.. Environmental Protection Agency, April 3, 1987 A-29

Application For Issuance of Order Requiring the United
States Environmental Protection Agency To Produce
Dr. Thomas Spittler To Testify By Videotape Deposi-
tion, MBD #57-315 (D. Mass.), filed April 29. 19ST . A-31

Letter, Patrick A. Parenteau, Regional Counsel. Environ-
mental Protection Agency. to Butler Buchanan. UI.
Esq.. April 29. 1987 AH

Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Walter J. Skinner, U.S
District Judge, Boston, Massachusetts, April 30, 1987 A-35

Motion For Reconsideration Of Order Denving The Peti-
tion of Sun Pipe Line Company To Require The
Environmental Protection Agency To Produce Dr
Thomas Spittler For A Videotape Deposition, and
Affidavit, IBD #S7-315. filed May 6, 1987 4-39

Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion For Recon-
sideration, MBD #87-315, filed May 6, 1987 AH

Order Denving Motion For Reconsideration, \IBD #S87-
31S Nav S. LOST . AD

tw

‘1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases. Page
Appeal of Sun Pipe Line Company, $31 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
ee rear ey per em erry ye Passim
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1976) ... (apaavan ae
Chrysler Corp. cv. Brown, 441 U.S. 282 (1979) ....... 13, 14
Cipriani, et al. v. Sun Pipe Line Company, et al.. No.
§3-03557-11-2 (Bucks Co. C.C.P.).. 2.2... 0.000005. 3, 4
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
PP ae eae pee em ee 14. 16
Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 337 F.2d
SL I cs dade rtneueeLounas eens oae 14. 15
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)... 2.0... . § 11, 18

Davis Enterprises, Sun Pipe Line Company. et al. t
United States Environmental Protection Agency. No.

SPL, Ess coe cccutchucesetsccues ya
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)............. WA
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 175 (1962) ..... 7, 5,9, 10. 11, 12
Giza v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

628 F.2d 748 (Ist Cir. 1980) ................... 6.5.9
Hudachek, et al. cv. Sun Company, Inc., et al.. No.

§$4-01113-11-2 (Bucks Co. C.C.P.) .............. 3, 4.5
Kiser v. General Electric Corp., $31 F.2d 423 (3d Cir.

Rey ee eer erry oe 11, 12
Kozak vc. Struth, _. Pa. __, 331 A.2d 420 (1987) .... 5
Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F.Supp. 225

fe APP errr rer rr rer yer ye ll

Local 1219, American Federation of Government Em-
ployees v. Donavan, 683 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.
PP istvaddakeadgguecsnasentbeseegundvuye 13. 14. 15

Morris ct. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977)... 0... .

vil

TABLE OF AU THORITIES— Continued
( ases Pave
Rennekamp cv. Blair, 376 Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669 (1954 .

Re ynolds Vii tals ( ompany t (row ther 572 7 Supp 285
1D. Mass. 1983 6.9

Sacks v. Reynolds Securities. In 593 F.2d 1234 (Dt
Cir. 1975 1]

Sanders v. Clemco Industries, 823 F.2d 214 (Sth Cir. 1987 12
Service t. Dulles. 354 U.S. 363 (1957 13. 14

Sheehan t. Army and Air Force Exchange Service. 619
F 2d 1132 (Sth Cir. 1980). reversed on other grounds

556 U.S. 728 (1982 13. 14, 15

Sweeney vt. Keystone Provident Insurance Company 575

F.Supp. 31 (D.Mass. 1953 10
l'nited States 1 Belanger. 598 F Supp. 595 (D.Me

L9S4 l]
(United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310 (1960 10
United States v. Springer, 491 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1974 1}

rite d Sfates ey rel Touhy Re van 440) | S 162
195] %

Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization
Services HO |} Id 715 (2d Cir. 1966 16

STAIt TES AND REGULATIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 7.9
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure lia z, S ii, 12
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15id 2. 1]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59% - 4,9, hd
Federal Rules of Evidence 5

grat > 30] 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued)

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Page
Pe asl vueee das hier eA aee ea sew es
I ny iss ce bub isiecsoseovescsns esses l4
PRED Sabacccaesecrysassnewcag tia sacs ss l4
Lf TD sh ee ere e Rawr Teer re we at
Rk eo, | erie ee ere eee 2, 15, 16
ER” | ER ore porn er neg rr ee 2
a ie ae nd ea rere ose 05s 2. 7, 13, 5
of pe EAA eer eorre ery err rr err ry ey 2
40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart C §§2.401-2.406 .. 2, 6, 12. 13, 14
Administrative Procedure Act................. 7. 14, 15, 16
Freedom of Information Act........0.0.0.0.0000000 0.00005. 6,17
ee a a err ey ren ore y)
ee | kA. rE Pree Tee eee ee 8.9
5s _) SP erre rTP ET Tae eee ere 2
OTHER AUTHORITIES
$.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945)... ......... l4
50 Fed. Reg. 32386 et seq. (August 9, 1985).......... 12, 13
United States Constitution, Full Faith and Credit

SNS ts Fre Pas e ER ERTS eRe TS LET CORE SA TTS 6

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1987

SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY,
Petitioner
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Sun Pipe Line Company respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions pertinent to this Petition are the April 30,
1987 bench ruling of the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts (A-35 to A-38), the May 8, 1987 Order
of the district court denying the “motion for reconsideration”
(A-52), and the October 16, 1987 Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 831 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
1987) (A-1 to A-8).

JURISDICTION

fhe judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
vas entered on October 16, 1987. A Petition For Rehearing
Before Original Panel And Rehearing In Banc was filed on
October 30, 1987 and denied on November 20, 1987 (A-9
By Order dated February 11, 1988, Justice White extended
the time to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to and including
March 21, 1988S (4-10
he Supre me Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment
ow pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1254 (1) and 2101 (c), and Sup

Ct. R. 20.4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The following pertinent statutes are set forth in the Appen-

> U.S.C. §§$701(a), 702, 706(2A), and 28 U.S.C. $1331
\-11 to A-12

the following pertinent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ire set forth in the Appendix: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Isa), Lid), and 59(e) (A-12 to A-13

The following pertinent regulations are set forth in th
Appendix: 40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart C, §§2.401-2.406 (A-16 to

4 -()

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4. Factual Background, The Underlying Litigation

Sun Pipe Line Company (SPL) is the owner and operator
of an underground petroleum pipeline which runs from Marcus
Hook, PA to Newark, NJ. The pipeline was punctured by a cabl:
television contractor on November 12, 1982, in Newtown
Bucks County, PA, resulting in a net loss of approximate!
50,000 gallons of unleaded gasoline into the ground. In subs«
quent months, gasoline vapors entered the basements of
number of homes in an adjacent housing development known «:
Newtown Crossing.

On or about May 15, 1983, the case of Pier Cipriani, et a/
v. Sun Pipe Line Company, et al., No. $3-03557-11-2, was filed
in the Court of Common Pleas for Bucks County. The Cipriani
case is a class action with nine families named as _ plaintiffs
Among other things, the complaint alleges property damage and
various adverse health effects suffered by the homeowners in
Newtown Crossing. The theories of liability alleged against SPI
include strict liability and negligence.

Beginning in February 1954, numerous cases were filed by
“opt-out” plaintiffs in the Court of Common Pleas for Bucks
County, including Joseph Hudachek, et al. v. Sun Company
Inc., et al., No. 84-01113-11-2, and several others. Sun Pipe
Line Company, which is a subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc., is
also a defendant in the opt-out cases. These suits are similar
the Cipriani action in that the plaintiffs are alleging propert
damage and adverse health effects as a result of the pipelin
accident. :

In April 1983, before the homeowners suits were filed, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("E.P.A.~) was invited
by the Pennsylvania Department of Health to do air monitorin:
in numerous homes in Newtown Crossing. The monitoring aros:
out of requests by certain homeowners to the Pennsylvania
Department of Health to have an independent agency do testing

to obtain unbiased results regarding the levels of hydrocarbons 4
present in their homes. On April 6 and 7, 1983. Dr. Thomas
Spittler Ph.D.. of the U.S. E.P.A. Region I Laboratory. did ai

4

monitoring with a portable gas chromatrography machine and
Tenax tubes in six homes in Newtown Crossing, and he also
sampled the ambient air outside the homes. The homes at which
Dr. Spittler did his air sampling were owned by three families
who are claimants in the Cipriani class action case and three
opt-out families, including the Hudacheks.

The air monitoring tests done by E.P.A. in Newtown
Crossing were requested by Mr. Gary Schultz of the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Health, and the results were reported by
E.P.A. to Mr. Schultz (A-24 to A-28). E.P.A. did not do the
testing pursuant to any regulatory program it was then enforc-
ing. However, the Centers for Disease Control, the Pennsylva-
nia Department of Health, and the Bucks County Department
of Health used the E.P.A. data (and data obtained by the
industrial hygiene firm hired by SPL) to develop health criteria
regarding exposure to gasoline vapors.

On February 21, 1985, the Court of Common Pleas certi-
fied the class in the Cipriani action as to common issues of fact
on liability, but it held that each plaintiff would have to prove
damages individually. The certified class consists of 200 home-
owners.

In September and October, 1986, the liability trial was held
in the Cipriani action. SPL and four other co-defendants were
held by the jury to be causally negligent for the pipeline
accident under comparative negligence principles. !

Subsequent to the jury verdict on liability, trial preparation
began in earnest on the homeowners damage claims. Two cases
in particular, the Melso claim (class action plaintiffs), and the
Hudachek claim (opt-out plaintiffs), were designated by the trial
judge as the first two claims to be tried.

In pre-trial discovery, SPL served requests for admissions
to the Hudachek and Melso plaintiffs to admit the authenticity

1. SPL was held 18% liable. The contractor who punctured the pipeline,
Tri-State Telecommunications, Inc., was held 40% liable; the cable television

company, Davis Enterprises, was held 13% liable; the township engineer, Jan
Gouza, and his firm, Pickering, Corts and Summerson, Inc., were held 15%
liable: and the firm which drew the maps omitting the pipeline, E.A. Design,
Ltd., was held 14% liable.

and truth of the reported results obtained by E.P.A.’s Dr.
Spittler. Both the Hudachek and Melso plaintiffs refused to
admit the truth of the E.P.A. results without having an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the chemist who did the work (Dr.
Spittler) (A-21 to A-28).

B. Sun Pipe Line Company's Request To E.P.A.

In January and again in April 1987, the Hudachek trial was
scheduled for May 11, 1987.2 On April 3, 1987, soon after
receipt of plaintiffs answers to the requests for admissions,
counsel for SPL wrote to the E.P.A. General Counsel in
Washington, D.C. to request permission to videotape a depo-
sition of Dr. Spittler (A-29). The circumstances behind the
request were briefly explained in the letter.®

The E.P.A. General Counsel's office referred SPL’s request
to the Regional Counsel's office in Boston. In the meantime, on
April 23, 1987, SPL obtained a commission from the court in
Bucks County to take an out-of-state deposition of Dr. Spittler.
Counsel for SPL desired one videotape deposition of Dr.
Spittler at which all interested plaintiffs) counsel could be
present. In this manner, counsel for SPL expected that Dr.
Spittler would need to testify only once for a period of 1 to 2
hours. On April 28, 1987, counsel for SPL issued a Notice of
Deposition to ‘Dr. Spittler and served copies of same to the
attorneys of record in the Pennsylvania cases.

2. Subsequently, on May 6, 1987, the state court postponed the trial date
to allow completion of additional discovery.

3. In order for expert witnesses in Pennsylvania courts to render opinion
testimony on the hazards of exposure to gasoline vapors, the testimony must be
based on the witness's personal knowledge, uncontradicted facts in evidence.
or an assumed state of facts reasonably shown by the record. Kozak v. Struth.
__Pa. __ , 531 A.2d 420, 422 (1987). Pennsylvania courts do not follow the
Federal Rules of Evidence on expert testimony. Kozak v. Struth, supra, 531
A.2d at 423. Ifa party does not prove the facts which go into the hypothetical
question framed to the expert witness, the opinion is based on unproved
assumptions and is therefore worthless guess and conjecture. Rennekamp
Blair, 376 Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669, 672-3 (1954). Thus, if SPL. does not prove the
E.P.A. results, its expert witnesses will not be able to rely on the E.P.A. data

as a basis for their opinions. Kozak v. Struth, supra, 3531 A.2d at 422-3

6

There were several telephone calls in April 1987 between
counsel for SPL and the E.P.A. Regional Counsel's office
attempting to arrange the deposition, but no agency decision
was made until after SPL’s petition was filed in the U.S. District
Court in Boston on April 29, 1987 (A-31 to A-33). The Regional
Counsel, relying on E.P.A. regulations, 40 C.F.R. Part 2,
Subpart C, §§2.401 et seq., sent a letter that date refusing SPL’s
request (A-34).

C. Proceedings In U.S. District Court

E.P.A. prepared a brief opposing SPL's petition. A hearing
was held before Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, U.S.D.J., on April
30, 1987. The court, relying on Giza v. Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, 628 F.2d 7458 (1st Cir. 1980), denied
SPL's petition but indicated it might entertain a “motion for
reconsideration’ if authority was provided (A-38). Giza had held
that the federal courts could not compel testimony by F.D.A.
employees pursuant to a state court subpoena on the basis of the
Freedom of Information Act, mandamus jurisdiction, comity, or
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. On May 6,
1987, SPL filed a “motion for reconsideration’ together with an
affidavit by counsel, a memorandum of law, and several exhibits
(A-39 to A-51). SPL alleged that Giza, supra, is distinguishable,
and that E.P.A.’s refusal to permit Dr. Spittler to testify by
videotape deposition was arbitrary and capricious agency action
subject to judicial review (A-40). SPL cited dictum in Reynolds
Metals Company vt. Crowther, 572 F.Supp. 288, 291 (D. Mass.
1983) (The narrow basis of this court’s decision [refusing to
enforce a subpoena for testimony by two O.S.H.A. employees|
clearly does not preclude appropriate judicial supervision of a
department's exercise of discretion to prohibit testimony by its
emplovees. ) (A-40, A-45).

On May $8, 1987, the court entered the following order on
SPL’s “motion for reconsideration: “DENIED. The Reynolds
Metals case cited by petitioner confirms the prior denial of the
petition. 5/8/87 W. J. Skinner, USDJ.” (A-52). All proceedings

were concluded in less than 10 days.

D. Proceedings In The Court of Appeals

In the appeal to the First Circuit, the parties briefed and
argued to questions: (1) Was there jurisdiction in the district
court to judicially review action of the E.P.A. taken under
agency regulations? (2) If so, was the agency action arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)? The E.P.A.'s brief framed
its “Issues Presented” in substantially the same terms stated by
SPL in its “Questions Presented.”

On October 16, 1987, the court of appeals rendered its
judgment and opinion holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) was the
appropriate standard for judging SPL’s “motion for reconsidera-
tion, and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying the motion. Appeal of Sun Pipe Line Company, 531
F.2d 22, 24-5 (Ist Cir. 1987) (A-5). The court held that it need
not resolve the question of whether the district court had
jurisdiction to review the agency action complained of. Id. at 24
(A-4).

The E.P.A. at no time had argued that SPL’s appeal should
be denied for failure to show an abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial judge in denying SPL’s “motion for reconsideration.
E.P.A. was content to argue that it should win the case because
the agency action complained of was committed to agency
discretion by law, and therefore there was no jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §1331 and the APA. Moreover, E.P.A. never argued
that it was in any way prejudiced by the new claim asserted by
SPL in the “motion for reconsideration.”

SPL’s petition for rehearing contended that the “motion for
reconsideration was in substance a motion to vacate the judg-
ment and amend the complaint which should have been allowed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 175,
1$2 (1962). The precise question presented was this: “Whether,
on a motion for reconsideration’ under Rule 59(e), the failure of
the trial court to allow an amendment to the complaint pursuant
to Rule 15, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, was an

abuse of discretion?” The petition for rehearing was denied
without explanation on November 20, 1987 (A-9).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Summary. Normally federal agencies have authority to
restrict testimony by their employees when they are subpoe-
naed to testify in private litigation. United States ex rel. Touhy
vt. Regan, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Giza v. Secretary of Health,
Education & Welfare, 628 F.2d 748 (Ist Cir. 1980). However,
when a federal agency has regulations establishing criteria which
govern when it will allow testimony by its emplovees in private
litigation, there is no reason why agency action in applying those
regulations should be exempt from judicial review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1331 and the APA. This case presents a novel
application of settled principles of law concerning judicial review
and it has the potential to limit the doctrine of Touhy v. Regan,
supra. It is an important question of federal law which should be
settled by this Court. Sup. Ct. R. 17. 1(c).

Whether or not the E.P.A. action in this case was arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion within the meaning of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. $706(2)(A), is certainly important to SPL, but we
recognize that the decision on this issue should most likely be
made at the district court level following remand, assuming this
Court agrees that SPL’s “motion for reconsideration” stated a
valid claim for relief.

The threshold issue is whether the district court and court
of appeals properly applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in denving SPL’s “motion for reconsideration.” It is well-settled
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed so
as to do substantial justice, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957), and cases should be decided on their merits, not
technicalities. Whatever its label, SPL’s “motion for reconside-
ration” was in reality a motion to vacate the judgment and
amend the complaint, and it should have been allowed pursuant
to F. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Foman v. Davis, supra. It was an abuse
of discretion not to allow SPL to amend its complaint. Id. The
decisions of the district court and the court of appeals were such
departures from the usual course of judicial proceedings so as to

call tor the exercise of this Court's power of supervision, and said

Y

decisions were also in direct conflict with applicable decisions of
this Court. Sup. Ct. R. 17.1(a), (ce).

I. IN ITS EVALUATION OF SPL’S “MOTION FOR RE-
CONSIDERATION,” THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT TO THE COM-
PLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 15, ABSENT PREJU-
DICE TO E.P.A., WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

At the April 30, 1987 hearing on SPL’s original petition, the
district court (Judge Skinner) citing Giza, supra, made clear his
view that SPL had produced no authority to compel the
deposition of Dr. Spittler (A-37). The colloquy between the
court and SPL’s counsel (Mr. Glovsky) shows that counsel made
an oral motion for leave to file an amended pleading which
would include authority for the requested relief. The court
appeared to grant such leave, though it suggested filing a
“motion for reconsideration. (A-38).

On May 6, 1987, SPL filed its “motion for reconsideration”
(A-39). The motion complained that “the action of the E.P.A.
Regional Counsel in refusing to permit the videotape deposition
[per the letter dated April 29, 1987]” was arbitrary and capri-
cious agency action subject to judicial review (A-40). The court
dismissed SPL’s “motion for reconsideration” within 48 hours
with a terse opinion: “DENIED. The Reynolds Metals case cited
by petitioner confirms the prior denial of the petition.” (A-52).
Drawing reasonable inferences, it appears that the trial judge
did not believe he was being turnished with any authority new
and distinguishable from Giza, supra. It is not clear how he
evaluated SPL’s motion under Rule 59(e), whether he recog-
nized that a new claim was being made, or whether he evaluated
the motion pursuant to Rule 15.

But if the court had construed the “motion for reconside-
ration” as a motion to vacate the judginent in order to allow an
amended complaint, then it should have been allowed. Foman
t. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In the case cited, involving
a will contest between a decedent's daughter and his second

wife, the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint to enforce

| )
' ‘ , , yt |
: ’ { rT
' it ; i) ? |
' _
f eis ' ' t tin ‘
, , i, ' \
; ’ ’
j
; ry [ [
7
‘ | } ‘ tic
'4 ' ’
>. ’ ‘ | |
“ap a . , ‘ ; ; ;
‘ ; ‘ | | t
i tiie)
, ' .
, | { I
; ’ ’ ’ | | {
7 , ‘ , ;
’ bint r [
eid
' .
.
~ ' ‘ .
' s
_ ’ ~*~ ’

| }
‘ | ;
cj rr} ’ rt ’ ‘ ' , foc ,? ; ' ; 4
‘ t tery tivg 7 > yanror r\ i ’ Ff HK ‘ ’
" .. %
\ ; ' i SPI ‘ : boas p ‘ — cot teeth :
‘ ‘ } | ; ‘ ‘ ’ ‘ tT} | tT |
; . , " '
; ew «¢ gent \} | Tot. ; . rre i o« '? ; 4 ; . :
tp) pit iti Va nied new ( f t Aad | I \ I
, ’ , ’ ’

j os - _
:
nieadit } srathvecor ‘ ' ie? 4 el ' rye f tf
. !

| | } ’

rhe rivil ; ca i! Le > j Rigi ; j ul j 7

——. ‘ . " }
" ') ; . ’ ; ‘
. ~ ‘ 5 ) ‘5 | |
= ’ -— on .
" : ’ " : } -
+?) |
" " " |
ers ; iy rw) , +7 st Pie ty» gee ’ ‘ ’ ;
; . ;
: - wyr ' ‘ Phy, ; ; Piyy =)
'
| ; ; 7 ; ; ; ;
‘ ith
+} ; ; ; ; ’ ; ;
‘ } " ) " ; ‘ ‘

G n. 355 U.S. 41. 48 (195 | ect t
pm ; ; +} it phe Tel ; ; 4 | ;
i ; ; ; ;% .
’ : ; ’ ’
’ ’ rive ‘+ ry, . ’ * ‘ vl ’ , , 4
Phys er Sa rf ‘ Rew Sy j ; j ys } a ‘ , | ty »?
+ Hye loredct feng ' sat ; 42:3 ;
| ; ; -) , ’ ’

A as

to cure

SPI Id. Nor were there any rep ated failure! s
cle hcvencies by amendments pre viously allowed ld

The First Circuit sought to justifv its holding by citing
SPL's “lassitude” in delaving its request to E.P.A. for Dh
We dispute this

characterization. but assuming arguendo that SPL could have

Spittler S deposition S31 B.2d at 26 (A-7

been more diligent this “delav’ was not of the tvpe which
results in untai pre juclice to the adverse party in litigation
E.P.A.). See Sanders v. Clemco Industries, 823 F.2d 214, 216-7
Sth Cir. 1987) (district court abused its discretion in not
allowing amendment to complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) in
absence of showing of untair prejudice to defendant due to
delay); Kiser v. General Electric Corp., supra at 428 (same). In
this case, E.P.A. could not show prejudice to itself if. an
unendment had been allowed to SPL s original application
Indeed, E.P.A. never invoked any procedural or technical
objection, but instew sought to have this controversy resolved

on its merits

I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO JU-
DICIALLY REVIEW AGENCY ACTION TAKEN PUR-
SUANT TO AGENCY REGULATIONS WHEN THE AC-
TION WAS ALLEGED BY PETITIONER TO BE
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION.,

The E.P.A. has regulations governing the extent to which
semplovees may testifs in private lawsuits. 40 C.F. R. §§2.40]
er. Se q SO) be dl Ke Vv 32356 August 9 iYSS \-14 to A-20

These regulations are clearly not a blanket proscription of

\
s

K..P.A emplovee testimony in privat lawsuits. As the avencys

said nn the pre amble to the re vulations

We recognize that there are situations were EPA should
cooperate with Federal, State or local authorities as part ol
the Agency s joint re sponsibility for de veloping and enfore

ing environmental standards and other policies. This regu

lation does not pre lude such activities. and numerous EPA

thie ] ils ire’ ¢ Mipowe ré dl to authorize Ste rr te Stimony

50 Fed. Reg. 32386. Further, in explaining the © evils” which the
agency expected would be avoided by the regulations, the

summary to the preamble stated as follows

The intended effect of this regulation is to ensure that EPA
employees time is spent on EPA business and to avoid the
appearance that EPA is taking sides in private litigation

ld., 50 Fed. Reg. 32386. See 40 C.F.R. §2.401(c), 50 Fed. Reg
at 32387, incorporating these and other criteria into the regula
tion (A-1S

E.P.A. must clearly exercise discretion in deciding when it
will permit its emplovees to testify in private lawsuits, but the
agency s discretion in doing so is limited by the criteria set forth
in the above-referenced regulations. It is well-settled that each
federal agency is bound by its own regulations. Service
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372, 388 (1957) (discharge of foreign
service officer held invalid due to failure of State Department to

abide by agenev regulations). As this Court said in Service

Dulles

While it is of course true that under the MeCarran Rideo
the Secretary was not obligated to impose upon himself
these more rigorous substantive and procedural standards
neither was he prohibited from doing so, as we have already
held, and having done so he could not, so long as the
Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard

to them

Id., 354 U.S. at 388

Federal judicial review of agency actions in applying federal
law is available under 28 U.S.C. $1331. Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99, 104-107 (1976); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S
282, 317 (1979): Sheehan vt. Army and Air Force Exchange
Service, 619 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Sth Cir. 1980), reversed on othe
grounds, 456 U.S. 728 (1982). Jurisdiction under $1331 is also
available for judicial review of agency action taken pursuant to
agency regulations. Local 1219, American Federation of Gort

ernment Employees tv. Donovan, 683 F.2d 511, 515-516 (D.C

I4

Cir. 1982); Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service,
619 F.2d at 1139.

Of course, the availability of judicial review is subject to two
exceptions. i.e. where “statutes preclude judicial review,” and
where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”
5 U.S.C. §701(a) (1), (2); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, supra at 317.
The latter exception applies only “where statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.”
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971), quoting $.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., 26 (1945).
Federal courts should not interpret a statute or regulation to
confer unreviewable power to an administrative agency in the
absence of a persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500-501
(1977); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 564 and n.5 (1975).

In the present case, there is no statute precluding judicial ~
review. Also, the E.P.A. regulations are not drawn so broadly
that it may be held as a matter of law that “agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.” Definite standards for
considering requests for testimony by agency employees are set
forth in the regulations themselves, e.g. 40 C.F.R. §2.401(c),
and in the preamble to the regulations. Since there is law to
apply, and since there is no evidence that Congress intended
E.P.A.’s exercise of discretion to be unreviewable, judicial
review should clearly be available.

This court must decide whether the E.P.A. regulations
themselves set forth sufficient standards which limit the agency s
discretion, thereby affording judicial review under the APA.+ It
is submitted that the agency regulations clearly provide “judi-
cially discernible limits.” and judicial review is therefore avail-
able. Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d

4. To the extent the First Circuit relied on the broad discretion conferred
in the “housekeeping statute,” 5 U.S.C. $301, see $31 F.2d at 25 (A-5), such
reliance was misplaced. The agency action complained of in this case was
ostensibly taken pursuant to agency regulations, not the “housekeeping
statute.” Accordingly, this court must look to the agency regulations. Service
vr Dulles, supra

15

29, 35-36 (3d Cir. 1976); Local 1219, American Federation of
Government Employees v. Donovan, supra at 515-6.

In sum, the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1331 and the APA. As was said in Sheehan v. Army and Air
Force Exchange Service, supra, there is subject matter jurisdic-
tion to decide this controversy, “and authority to award nonmon-
etary compensation flows from the confluence of 28 U.S.C.
§$1331(a) and 5 U.S.C. §702.” Id., 619 F.2d at 1141. The two
statutes together provide a waiver of sovereign immunity “for
actions against federal government agencies, seeking nonmone-
tary relief, if the agency conduct is otherwise subject to judicial
review.” Id., 619 F.2d at 1139.

[We add parenthetically that almost identical litigation is
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Peunsylvania, Davis Enterprises, Sun Pipe Line Company, et al.
vu. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 87-5315. Plain-
tiffs in the Davis Enterprises case seek a videotape deposition of
a second E.P.A. employee who works in Philadelphia and who
was also involved in the air monitoring at the Newtown Crossing
homes, including dates Dr. Spittler was not present. The case
has been submitted to the district court in Philadelphia on
cross-motions for summary judgment (filed January 15, 1985)
and a stipulation of facts. The parties expect the district court to
decide the jurisdictional claim, i.e., whether judicial review is
available, and, if so, whether the E.P.A.’s conduct in refusing
permission for a deposition of an agency employee was in
violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). When a decision is
rendered, it will be furnished to this Court. |

lb

Il. WHETHER THE E.P.A. ACTION WAS ARBITRARY,
: CAPRICIOUS, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OR OTH
ERWISE NOT IN) ACCORDANCE WITH LAW,
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE APA, IS A QUES
TION WHICH NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED IN AN
APPROPRIATE HEARING AT THE DISTRICT

COURT LEVEL.

ludicial review under 5 U.S¢ STOGI2NA) to determin
whether agenev action was “arbitrary” or “capricious requires
the trial court to “consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
iclear error of judgment.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park 1
Volpe 1Ol U.S. 402, 416 (1971 The standard of review for
abuse of discretion” is similar but not identical. E.g.. an abuse
t discretion occurs when an wWeneys departs from established
policies. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966), cited in Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra at 416

In its “motion tor reconsideration, SPL alleged that the
KE. P.As refusal to permit a videotape deposition of Dr. Spittler
was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion because his
testimony would further the public interest and could not be
misconstrued as taking sides in private litigation (A-40). SPI
ileged that E.P.A. misapplied the criteria in its regulations. Id
\ memorandum of law expanded upon these allegations \-44 to
\-51). In particular, SPL pointed out that the air monitoring
results obtained by Dr. Spittler were not available from any
ther witness, that the evidence was relevant, and that D1
Spittler would be testifving only as to what compounds were
tound and in what concentrations, not whether the levels were

sale or TON

The trial courts terse denial of the “motion tor reconside
tion gave no clue as to whether the court engaged in any
tnalvsis pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S-¢ STO6(2 A). On the

ntrarv, the inference must be that the court did no such thing

ne courts ruling implied that the court did not believe it Was
|

) , ) }
cing presented with any new authority for the reque sted reliet

17

The First Circuit engaged in an analysis of SPL’s new claim
for the liwited purpose of evaluating whether the district court
abused its discretion under Rule 59(e), pertaining to motions for
reconsideration. 831 F.2d at 25 (A-6). The court of appeals
thereby supplied a rationale for sustaining the district court's

|

denial of the “motion for reconsideration’ when there is no

evidence that the district court itself had such a rationale.

In particular, the court of appeals chastised SPL for attach-
ing certain addenda to its appeliate brief. 831 F.2d at 25 (A-6).
This referred to the fact that after the district court had denied
the “motion for reconsideration,” SPI> made a Freedom Of
Information Act request to E.P.A. for all documents evidencing
decisions by the agency since August 1985 wherein the agency
allowed testimony by its employees in litigation in which the
United States was not a party. The documents furnished by
PA) showed numerous occasions where employee testimony
was permitted in private litigation because it was relevant and
despite no discernible agency interest. In bringing these in-
stances to the attention of the First Circuit, SPL’s appellate brief
stated at p.23, n. 16:

We recognize that these materials were not before the
District Judge in this case, but we do not expect E.P.A. to
complain about citations to its own decisions and prece-
dents which are matters of public record. However, if this
Court deems it improper to consider these materials on
appeal, it would still be appropriate to remand this case to
the trial court for a hearing at which Addenda “B™ through
BB could be introduced into evidence.

E.P.A., in its brief to the First Circuit, did not object to the
precedents on grounds that they were not before the district
court. Instead, the agency sought to distinguish several of the
cases and it argued that other decisions should not be applied as
precedents.

The First Circuit's chastisement of SPL on this matter
underscores the fact that the court fastened onto perceived

procedural deficiencies and did everything it could to avoid

1S

deciding the case on the merits. In doing so, the court subverted
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

SPL's allegations in the “motion for reconsideration” called
for a hearing of some kind. It is well-settled that a claim should
not be dismissed unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
which would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-6 (1957).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certio-
rari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Kenneth Scott, Esq.

Bruce J]. Chasan, Esq.

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ,
I; DELMAN & DICKER

1811 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

215) 563-5600

Attorneys for Petitioner

Sun Pipe Line Company

March 21, 1988

APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 87-1529

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF ORDER REQUIRING
THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY TO PRODUCE DR. THOMAS SPITTLER
TO TESTIFY BY VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION

SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY,
Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
(Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, U.S. District Judge!

Before
Campbell, Chief Judge,
Garth,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.

Bruce ]. Chasan with whom Kenneth Scott, Wilson, Elser,

Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Richard D. Glovsky and Steven
T. Sager were on brief for appellant.
- Charles J. Sheehan, Department of Justice, Land and
Natural Resources Division, with whom Martin W. Matzen,
Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division,
Thomas E.. Hookano, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Robert
S. Mueller, United States Attorney, and Francis S. Blake,
General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, were on
brief for appellee Environmental Protection Agency.

* Of the Third Circuit, sitting bv designation

\-]

October 16, 1987

SELYA, Circuit Judge. This chameleon of a case comes
before us in a considerably different posture than it originally
assumed in the district court. Thus, we recount the factual
predicate and evolution of the litigation with exacting care
preliminary to our explanation of why we affirm the district
court.

In November 1982, a gasoline pipeline near Newtown,
Pennsylvania was accidentally punctured and a large quantity of
fuel — perhaps as much as 100,000 gallons — escaped. Under-
ground seepage and the spread of noxious fumes followed. In
April 1983, a state agency, the Pennsylvania Department of
Health, asked a federal official, Dr. Thomas Spittler,! to conduct
air monitoring in the vicinity of the ruptured pipeline. He did so
and reported the results to state health officials.

The next month, the oil leak spilled over into the local
courts. Homeowners filed a class action suit against Sun Pipe
Line Co. (Sun), appellant before us, claiming property damage
and various adverse health effects. Several other related civil
cases were subsequently filed. The state court eventually certi-
fied the class, bifurcated the class action suit, and tried the
liability phase. A jury found Sun negligent. The court then
designated representative plaintiffs and scheduled trial of their
damage claims. In discovery which Sun initiated only after the
liability verdict was in, it sought an admission of the truth and
authenticity of Dr. Spittlers test results. But, the claimants
refused.

1. Dr. Spittler was then, and apparently still is, Chief, Technical Support
Branch. Environmental Services Division, Region I Laboratory of the federal

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Region I is |. adquartered in

Massachusetts, thus explaining the appellant's choice of venue

A-3

Little daunted, Sun then requested the EPA to allow Dr.
Spittler to star in a videotaped deposition. The Pennsylvania
court authorized the taking of the deposition, but never issued a
subpoena or otherwise commanded the witness's appearance.
Nevertheless, the appellant noticed the deposition without any
means of assuring the witness's attendance and sued in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts fo:
an order compelling the EPA to produce Dr. Spittler.2 In the
meantime, the agency spurned Sun's request, declining to
deliver the witness.

After hearing, the district judge rained on Sun's parade. He
denied the application in an ore tenus bench decision, essen-
tially on the ground that the district court lacked authority to
compel a federal emplovee like Spittler, in his official capacity,
to respond to a state court subpoena.’ Within a week, Sun
abandoned its original theory of the case. It moved for recon-
sideration, focusing not on the production of Dr. Spittler’s body,
but on the propriety of EPA’s administrative refusal to allow the
deposition. In this motion, Sun argued for the first time that the
agency action should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious.
The district court abjured reconsideration and this appeal

ensued.

Appellant's current theory of the case is grounded upon
twin premises: (1) that EPA’s decision not to permit Dr. Spittler
to testify is subject to judicial oversight; and (2) that such
scrutiny, if undertaken, will demonstrate the irrationality of the
agency s action. The first of these premises implicates the
coverage of the judicial review provisions of the Administrative

2. The sole relief praved for in the complaint was “an order requiring the
Environmental Protection Agency to produce Dr. Thomas Spittler for a

videotaped deposition.” The complaint was never amended

3. The district court, in so ruling, relied principally upon our decision in
Giza v. Seeretary of HEW. 628 F.2d 748, 751-52 (Ist Cir. 1980). Given the
gravamen of the appellant's case as it then stood, Giza was clearly controlling.
See generally United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951

~ f wi Phy al ; ; have hese nittecd ¢
- C- " :
| i\\ ) I ‘5 { wall i yA iy iti Tan
' } :
’ ‘ Vrnethe rive ive'l » cies ) iT} 7 '
- i) i) rT ; ir? ity ’ il | its il il \f

’
. iv | ‘% ; res eed ft vs vdare c] ) ) ;
$2.403 Procedures when voluntary testimony is requested
'
\ re LL st tor testimon ' in} | PA ip ere cle
. } ’
~ 102] must De vrit ine st tute the ture ny tive
: ‘ ls +; . 1 ¢} | +} ; ; }
sues t*sStll ) i | cus \T if LeSTLTTNIOT oO)
, ’
‘ tive ] t¢ e*st | | | \ ‘5 | ré ] ests Te riveree cliate |
’ ] ] } ]
| tive ( rer ( i si ris tf SIvie ’ } tive is¢ |
' '
ip wees. 1 tive Othe | | spectol ( ¥¢ T«l tiv I} Sp t |
' ' ' '
(,enera r ty 1 Ulla itty tive re Th endation ot tive
' ' '
) ) e*e pel ] ) in ( v¢ ian { ) 7 i] cle siv’ q*¢
; ity ; vith tive ipprol ricate \ wa ; Ac TT sty if .

ft emp! vees in the Othe t Inspector Ge ! the Inspector
Ceneral ' his designe deter nes whetthrye iplia ce with
thre request W wuld clear| ec } the interests t EPA and
’ sponds is 8) is pract | ‘

$2.404 Procedures when an employee is subpoenaed.

’ ] }
i) 4 Opes ot subpoenas mus immediate iv i nt to tl

' , ,
( o¢ era C Wset OF his cle sivnec with the recommendations rT
' ' ’ . . :
th emi vee S$ SsUDeTVISOrS | vw (.,eneral Co S4 r his desig
| '
ee, in consultation with the ippropriate Assistant Administra
. . ,
tor, Regional Administrator or Staff Office Director, determines
' ' , , ; , ' ' .
vhether comphance with the subpoena would eal De mm the
] !
interests ol I PA ma re sponds iS SOO iS praficable
1 ' ' ' ' ' .
b it the Lene ra ( 1 \é rhs designee denies ippl ) }
’ lv with ¢] | Hy #]
\ OT ip with the s1 pan i vroithe thas wted \ he return
, , , ’ , } }
late, the emplovec st appear at the stated time and plac
? } ,
miess vdivised ry\ the ( 54 eral ( preTy Se r fis 1 signee that the
| } ] } } ’ '
. ppoet i was tf Vall issued or served or that the subpoena
| } i ] J ? 7 | ; }
as tere yitharaw! prod ‘ i 1. hese re? Mmwons al
1? , }
re spect iv retuse | pl cle i esti r produce i
; ‘ +
low mments. U nite Stat ey ] shit Raw MOUS 162
) The atorementioned cases are scheduled tor trial on
Miav LL. LYS)

G) The Environmental Protection Agency has not indicated
whether or not Dr. Spittler will honor petitioner s request

On April 23, 19ST, a commission was issued out of the

Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsvivania. autho
rizing Sun Pipe Line Company to take the ce position of Dh
Dhomas Spittler Ph.D... Director. U.S. E.P.A.. Re gion | Labo
ratory, 60 Westview Street. Lexington, MA 02173 (copy of
commission is attached and labelled Exhibit ¢

been served a CODV IS ittached

‘ \ deposition note has
und leabve le d | xhibit 1)

WHEREFORI

wales requiring the I

duce Dr. Thomas Spitth r tor a videotaped de posit
10-00 (o¢ lock 1. Thi ctl Wedne sda Via tr) | jx ~ it ;
Chics s oof Richard 1) (Cslovsk 5 | \filk Street s t
Boston NPA O98 109
SUN PIPI LINE COMI
Petiti
By Its Attorn
LAW OFFICES OF RICH
CLOVSKY
e ‘ K i ‘
K lal LD. | t
\] rk ST 5 ‘
i MIA
- 19 - ,
. } i
| b

|
he ( nirt ©

Agen

oe tithonet pravs that t

| >
nvironmental Protection

\!

\-34

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION |

I Fo. KENNEDY FEDERAL BUILDING
BOSTON. MASSACHUSETTS 02203

April 29, 1987

Mr. Butler Buchanan, III

Wilson, Elser & Morkowitz
Edelman & Dicker

IS11 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Re: Request for Deposition of Dr. Thomas Spittle:
Dear Mr. Buchanan

This letter is in re ponse to your letter, dated April 3. 19ST, to Donnell
Nantkes, Office of General Counsel requesting the deposition of Dr. Thomas
Spittler, an employee in the Environmental Services Division, Region I. U.S
Environmental Protection Agency

\ request ot this nature is governed by the regulation found at 40
(_F_R.. Part 2. Subpart C. The purpose of these regulations is to assure that
EPA emplovees official time is used for official purposes

Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §2.403, EPA emplovees may testify in private
litigation only under circumstances where the Regional Counsel determines
that compliance with such a request would clearly be in the interest of EPA
Unfortunately, after consultation with Mr. Spittler's supervisor and_ the
Regional Administrator, | have determined that your request is not clearly in
the interest of EPA Accordingls your request is hereby denied

Should vou have any questions with re spect to this matter please contact

lames T. Owens. IL. Senior Assistant Regional Counsel at (617) 565-3325

Sincerely

s Pat Pas
Patrick A. Parenteau
Ke gional ¢ unsel

1) onell Nantke ()¢,¢
Richard Glovsky. Esq
s] Milk Street

Boston, MA 02109

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR

ISSUANCE OF ORDER > MBD No. 87-315
REGARDING ENVIRONMEN-

TAL PROTECTION AGENCY

BEFORE THE HONORABLE WALTER JAY SKINNER
United States District Judge

Courtroom 6
U.S.P.O. & Courthouse
Boston, Massachusetts

April 30, 1987

APPEARANCES

For the EPA:

ANDREW S. HOGELAND, ESO.
Assistant U.S. Attornes

1107 USPO & Courthouse

Boston, MA 02109

For the Sun Pipeline Company:

RICHARD GLOVSKY, ESQ.

31 Milk Street

Boston, MA 02109

DEBORAH MEEKS, Official Court Reporter, U.S. District
Court, 204 USPO & Courthouse, Boston, MA 02109, (617)
338-8439, Computer-aided Transcription

PROCEEDINGS [2:25 p.m. |

THE CLERK: MBD $7-315, In Re Application for Issuance
of Order Regarding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
THE COURT: See you at the side bar.

AT THE BENCH

VIR. GLOVSkY: Richard Glovsky. I present Sun Pipeline.

VIR. HOGELAND: Andrew Hogeland representing the
EPA. To trv to keep it short, if we can, it’s the Government's
view that the area is controlled by Giza v. Secretary of HEW. A
copy of that is attached to the brief we filed about an hour ago.
We just got notice of the action

THE COURT: [ve read it.

VIR. HOGELAND: Briefly, Giza makes it clear that the
Federal Court does not have authority to enforce even a state
court subpoena if it’s issued. In this case, there's been no
subpoena issued nor apparently, either, one applied for.

THE COURT: I thought there was a subpoena issued in
Pennsylvania?

MR. HOGELAND: No, There’s a notice of deposition filed
and there's a commission issued to a court reporter to appear
authorizing the court reporter to take the deposition.

THE COURT: A subpoena out of the District Court in
Pennsylvania would have no effect up here?

MIR. HOGELAND: Well, It—two answers. First, it doesn't
have an effect here because there's no authority for this Court to
enforce it. There may be matters .» state court where the
Massachusetts state court would enforce the Pennsylvania state
court subpoena if there was one. But there isn t, so we think it
should be denied

THE COURT: Certainly the Federal Court has the author-
ity to enforce a deposition where the Witness is.

VIR. HOGELAND: Well, if the case is pending in another
Federal District Court and the subpoena issues out there, they
apply to this Court that issues a pursuant order, that's correct
The way it appears, though, is a state court who hasnt even
issued al subpoena

THE COURT: Was it in the state court

MIR. HOGELAND.: It still is. And the Giza First Circuit
case is the same. In fact, that was a Massachusetts state court

case and the Court of Appeals upheld a denial of the District

Court s entorcement

THE COURT; You sav vou ve attached that?

MR. HOGELAND.: Yes. It's here. And that's been followed
by Judge Keeton in another opinion I have

MR. GLOVSKY: That case has no bearing in this context

THE COURT: What do vou sav about the Giza case?

MR. GLOVSKY: I think it's contradicted, vour Honor, by
the EPA’S own regulations that sav vou have to come to Federal
Court to support a subpoena. And those regulations are also
attached. If your Honor please, we're

THE COURT: You mean these here?

MR. GLOVSKY: Yes, its—in fact. I have a copy tor the
Court.

Your Honor, we re only asking for the testimony that will go
for one hour and we'll do it at his convenience, wherever

THE COURT: Well, Td help vou if I had the authority to
do it. But the First Circuit seems to think that I don't have the
authority to do it

MR. GLOVSKY: They re saving there's no subpoena. In
that case, your Honor, we could get a subpoena and we'd be
right back here tomorrow

THE COURT: I don't think that’s the issue. See. this
regulation says that employees are prohibited from complying
with the requests for production tor subpoenas and to appeal
outside of matters that are not within the EPA. but that’s not
vou want this man because

MR. GLOVSKY: Because he went down to Pennsvivania
to, as an EPA emplovee

THE ( MOURT So | don t sce how Vou how does this help
vou at all?

VIR. GLOVSKY: Well. I think it suggests that vou have to
come to Federal Court if vou re going to « ompel the testimony

THE COURT: But it also suggests that if vou do come to
Federal Court. vou're not voing to get it

MR. GLOVSKY: Well, the regs provide that the avency can

permit the testimony if they feel in their discretion it's appro

priate
THE COURT: Well. | cant order them to ex reise thei:

discretion

NIK

iH

\IK

NIK

Vik
\

(ZLOVSAY: W
Ki

HOCkELAND
(,TLOOVNSAY 1}

HOGELAND

f“¢)i

VIK. GLOVSAY: We I tl K il rea il fashioned
mandamu
PH COURT: tit ret il it s discretionary. And if
t i tional ilmost hyvpothesi if not subiect ¢
lamu Mandamus is rese ed for iinisterial act
VIR. GLOVSKY: Well this situation, Judge, we re or
iS} I e | ! 1 thi al tire | think that suite
THE COURT: I w the hour if 1 had the
thor But | ead thi i iVvindg | lor t ha e the
wathority and. therefore. I have to advice vith regret that
MR. GLOVKSY: Mav I do this, Judge, because I just
received these papers? If I ca ache wait se sesthanats
iv i ie back to see the ¢ rt thi
THE COURT: Well, | , , W
iething. vou ought to ha ir authorit
MR. GLOVSKY: I thought we did in the regulat
THE COURT: Well. vou're wrong
VIR. GLOVSRY: [1 it always right
rHE COURT: | think the best thing t
b { it. Be i f t cos I moK f ‘ ' re @
t fet Ve! lar witli muir petitw
Vik. GLOVSKY: Can I have a dav to review the case
rHE COURT: Well, if i want to move for reconsidera
VIR. HOGELAND: Thank
Vik. GLOVSKY: Thanh hud
iHik CLERA: It t in t
bHk COURT: It t in ) f

,

A-39

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE |

OR ORDER REQUIRING THE ~
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMEN- |

TAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO — MBD#57-315
PRODUCE DR. THOMAS .

SPITTLER TO TESTIFY BY

VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENY-
ING THE PETITION OF SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY TO
REQUIRE THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY TO PRODUCE DR. THOMAS SPITTLER FOR
A VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION

Petitioner, Sun Pipe Line Company (“SPL”), by its attor-
neys, the law offices of Richard D. Glovsky, and Wilson, Elser,
Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, hereby moves for reconsidera-
tion of this Court's Order of April 30, 1987, denying petitioner's
application for an order requiring the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to produce Dr. Thomas Spittler to testify by
videotape deposition. In support of this Motion for Reconsider-
ition, petitioner avers as follows:

|. All averments in SPL’s original application filed on
,

April 29. 1987 are realleged and incorporated herein by

rt te rer’

2 The EPA filed its opposition to SPL’s original
pplication on April 30, 1987.

s. At the hearing before this Honorable Court on April
1). 19ST. the court sustained EPA‘s position mainly on the
withority of Giza v. Secretary of HEW, 625 F.2d 748 (1st
Cir. 1980). See copy of transcript attached hereto.

\-40

$. Petitioner believes the holding of Giza v. Secretary
of HEW, supra, is inapposite in the factual circumstances
here, and desires to present further argument distinguish-
ing it.

5. Petitioner would characterize this proceeding as an
action for judicial review of agency action which it contends
is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. In
particular, the action of the EPA Regional Counsel in
refusing to permit the videotape deposition of Dr. Thomas
Spittler is the agency action complained of.

6. This court has authority to review a federal agency s
exercise of discretion in refusing to permit deposition
testimony by an agency emplovee. Reynolds Metals Com-
pany t. Crowther, 572 F.Supp. 258, 291 (D. Mass. 1983).

7. The action of the EPA Regional Counsel in refusing
to permit Dr. Spittler’s videotape deposition was an abuse
of discretion because (1) such testimony by Dr. Spittler
would indeed further the public interest, as it) would
pertain to matters closely connected with EPA business,
and (2) such testimony, in the circumstances here, cannot
be misconstrued as taking sides in. private litigation. For
these reasons, which will be expanded upon in the attached
Memorandum of Law, it is clear that the EPA Regional

Counsel abused his discretion in applying the criteria of 40
C.F.R. §$2.401 et seg.. 50 Fed. Reg. 32387 (August 9,
1983).

\-4]

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honor-
able Court will reverse its prior ruling and order the EPA

Regional Counsel to permit the videotape deposition.
Law Offices of Richard D. Glovsky |

Richard D. Glovsky

31 Milk Street, Suite S10
Boston, MA 02109

617) 423-7100

By: S Richard D. Glov sky

and
WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ
EDELMAN & DICKER
By: s/ Bruce J. Chasan
Kenneth Scott

Bruce J. Chasan

Butler Buchanan, II]
IS11 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

215) 563-5600

\-42

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE

OF ORDER REQUIRING THE

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMEN-

PAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO MBD #87-315
PRODUCE DR. THOMAS

SPITTLER TO TESTIFY BY VID-

KOTAPKE DEPOSTTION

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
FOR SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY

City of Philadelphia

Commonwealth of Pennsvlvania

BRUCE J. CHASAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says

as tollows

|. | am the attorney of the record for Sun Pipe Line
Company. a Pennsylvania corporation, in numerous cases
presently pending in the Court of Common Pleas for Bucks
County, PA

>

2. All factual averments in the attached Motion For
Reconsideration Of Order Denying The Petition Of Sun
Pipe Line Company To Require The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency To Produce Dr. Thomas Spittler For A
Videotape Deposition, and all factual averments in the

A-43

accompanying memorandum of law in support thereof, are

true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief.

s/_ Bruce J. Chasan

BRUCE J. CHASAN

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED
BEFORE ME THIS 4th
DAY OF MAY, 1987.

s/ Veronica A. Love-Myers

NOTARY PUBLIC
VERONICA A. LOVE-MYERS
Notary Public, Phila., Phila. Co.

My Commission Expires Oct. 29, 1990

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF

ORDER REQUIRING THE

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMEN-

TAL PROTECTION AGENCY > MBD #87-3158
TO PRODUCE DR. THOMAS

SPITTLER TO TESTIFY BY VIDEO-

TAPE DEPOSTTION

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING
THE PETITION OF SUN PIPE LINE COMPANY TO
REQUIRE THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY TO PRODUCE DR. THOMAS SPITTLER FOR
A VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has regula-
tions governing the extent to which its employees may testify in
private lawsuits. 40 C.F.R. $§2.401 ef seq 50 Fed Reg. 32356

August 9. 1985). These regulations are clearly not a blanket
proscription of EPA employee testimony in private lawsuits. As

the agency said in the preamble to the regulations

We recognize that there are situations where EPA
should cooperate with Federal, State or local authorities as
part of the Agency's joint responsibility for developing and
enforcing environmental standards and other policies. This
regulation does not preclude such activities. and numerous

EPA officials are empowered to authorize such testimony

7)

50 Fed. Reg. 32386. Further. in explaining the “evils” which the

iWency expected would he avoided hy the regulations. the

eamble stated as tollows

A-45

The intended effect of this regulation is to ensure that EPA
employees time is spent on EPA business and to avoid the
appearance that EPA is taking sides in private litigation.

Id., 50 Fed. Reg. 32386. See also, 40 C.F.R. §2.401(c), 50 Fed.
Reg. at 32387.

Clearly EPA must exercise discretion in deciding when it
will permit its employees to testify in private lawsuits, and that
discretion is clearly subject to judicial review. Reynolds Metals
Company v. Crowther, 572 F.Supp. 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1983)
(“The narrow basis of this court's decision clearly does not
preclude appropriate judicial supervision of a department's
exercise of discretion to prohibit testimony by its emplovees. ”)

Under the facts presented in this matter, it is clear that the
EPA became involved in the aftermath of the Newtown, PA
pipeline accident to develop valid data which could be used by
state, local and federal authorities to develop health criteria.
EPA itself was not concerned with setting any standards, and it
did not do so. Dr.Spittler’s testimony is desired for the purpose
of establishing the validity of certain measurements he made in
1983 in individual homes.! This is a mere extension of the work
he did in 1983, and it clearly remains a matter of public interest.
There is very little risk of any appearance that Dr. Spittler’s
testimony will tend to favor one party or another. Furthermore,
the time involved (an estimated 1 to 2 hours for a videotape
deposition) is de minimus in light of the substantial manpower
that EPA has already devoted to the air monitoring work it did
in Newtown, PA.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

SPL’s petroleum pipeline was punctured by a cable televi-
sion contractor in Newtown Township, PA on November 12,

1982. Approximately 50,000 gallons of unleaded gasoline was

1. Dr. Spittler will not be asked to give opinions as to whether the levels
he found were safe or toxic. The parties in the Pennsylvania litigation have
industrial hygienists, toxicologists, and medical doctors to render those ivpes

of expert opinions. However, Dr. Spittler's expertise as a chemist is relevant

to show his competence to make valid, reliable measurements

‘ | the oy j Th)
\ ' ! shoclan asnan vliacont | thy ite tothe
, peapy tian - f slanne ThE entorime thei
» then basement Th Vn PrETT Taal
tes attribute various adverse health svmptoms to exposure
Van ST lrivedl in) TITLE trial 1, Tei steowurt
\ cual | | bears i| tart TL MLL LLL 1"
i ‘ { me ré thy level f liavckeo ay locen
final i THLE wv rete | , \farcl » TON 4 senet

i 1} afte’ « TT)

EPA‘s brief (at p. 7) seeks to support the Regional Counsel s
action by citing opposition to disclosure of attorney-client priv-
ileged communications, intra-agency deliberations, and opin-
ions by experts conducting work for EPA for possible use in
agency litigation. Plainly none of these concerns are implicated
in this case. In addition, all of Dr. Spittler's results have already
been disclosed. EPA cannot possibly have any interest in
maintaining confidentiality of Dr. Spittler’s results.°

3. Agency Interest. It is certainly hoped that EPA does
not take a purely parochial or narrow view in determining what
its interests are. Often the interests of the agency and the
interests of private litigants in the proper administration of
justice are in harmony. The same public concerns which. in-
duced EPA to do air monitoring in Newtown Crossing in 1983
will still be at work in the forthcoming jury trials between SPL
(and its co-defendants) and various displaced homeowners. The
jurors, in the proper administration of justice, will want to know
if any independent, non-aligned agency did any air monitoring
and if so, what were the results (if available and otherwise

admissible). The jurors may or may not give more weight to the

5. SPL has also offered to reimburse EPA for Dr. Spittler’s time, but this
offer has been discouraged

6. In United States ex rel. Touhy ve. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), the
Court upheld the Attorney Generals decision not to perimit disclosure. of
agency documents. In the present case the documents are already universally
wailable. Cf. Sweet vc. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir 1986) (Norris. |

lisse ntimg ind distinguishing Pouly

A-50

test results obtained by EPA (compared to those obtained by the
industrial hygienists retained by SPL), but it certainly would not
be surprising if they did. The EPA results may well enhance the
jury's confidence in its verdict, whatever it is.

It is unlikely that EPA’s image will be in any way tarnished
or diminished by permitting Dr. Spittler to testify by videotape
deposition. Indeed, permitting his testimony may well enhance
the administration of justice. Certainly this is something “in the
public interest,” with which EPA’s interests are not at all in
conflict. On the contrary, EPA epitomizes a “public interest”
governmental agency, and the citizens of the United States
should be able to look to it for unbiased factual information
concerning disputes about environmental matters.

Even if one viewed EPA's interests narrowly, then the counters ailing
interests referenced above will balance a not outweigh the narrow agency

mitcrests

A-51
CONCLUSION

Consideration of all elements in 40 C.F.R. §§2.401 et seq.
clearly shows that the EPA Regional Counsel failed to give
appropriate weight to the factors which auger for allowing the
deposition of Dr. Thomas Spittler. The action of the Regional
Counsel was arbitrary, capicious, and an abuse of discretion.
This court should order the Regional Counsel to permit the
deposition.

—_—

Respectfully submitted,
Law Offices of Richard D. Glovsky

By: 8 Richard D. Glovsky

Richard D. Glovsky

31 Milk Street, Suite SLO
Boston, MA 02109

(617) 423-7100

and
WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ.
EDELMAN & DICKER

By: s Bruce J. Chasan

Kenneth Scott

Bruce J. Chasan

Butler Buchanan, HI
ISLL Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 563-5600

exhibits and certificate of service omitted]

at —_ OO —————

A452

[Handwritten Order in margin of Motion For Reconsider-
ation Of Order Denying The Petition Of Sun Pipe Line Com-
pany To Require The Environmental Protection Agency To
Produce Dr. Thomas Spittler For a Videotape Deposition }:

DENIED. The Reynolds Metals case cited by petitioner
confirms the prior denial of the petition. SST WYSkinner
US.DJ.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1523%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
