# Opposition Brief — Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 486 U.S. 1032

## Text

Supreme Court, USL
| RiLBD
4 MAR 17 186

No. 87-1200 JOSEP E. SPANRGL,

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
AUBURN UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
MARK L. GROSS
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-221

cel

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the disqualification of a judge under 28
U.S.C. 455(b)(1) may be based on evidence that was not
presented to the district court assigned initial responsibili-
ty for resolving the disqualification issue.

2. Whether a state university has standing under the
Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., to challenge for its own
benefit the racially discriminatory actions of the state-
created system of higher education of which it is a part.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
tea as oe Laas dp 6 uN ead 6 klk aia o's 0 l
ka dow esevesn bade ree l
ON sll a, A 2
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ee a aly Gk a bs bleak was bade eds 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d
1285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) ...... 13
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) ........... 12-13
Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd,
462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S. 92
i St A nr 13
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) ................ 10
Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116 (Sth Cir.), cert.
ER 0, ee 8
Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d
796 (Sth Cir. 1986), cert. granted, No. 86-957 (Mar. 9,
ee ae ads vk deb d se ee esses 9, 10
- Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) ............. 1]
International Business Machines Corp., In re, 618 F.2d
i or ca oy a ws Wis Vd okt x a wd 2 aw 8
Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 103
(M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd in part and modified in part,
ge | a a
Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981) ..... 9
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
ise ds ha Gi esos ws cae cen ees on een ke ae a kirs 10
rR FR rn Dene rerenbe yp Gr hee 8, 9, 10
Pe es EE 86a ss oa er he ee ee Ka eka 7

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-1200

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.

AUBURN UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-40a)
is reported at 828 F.2d 1532. An earlier opinion of the
court of appeals (Pet. App. 139a-154a) is reported at 791
F.2d 1450. The opinion of the district court with respect to
the motion to recuse (Pet. App. 41a-61a) is reported at 582
F. Supp. 1197. The opinion of the district court with
respect to the merits of the controversy (Pet. App.
62a-138a) is reported at 628 F. Supp. 1137.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
October 6, 1987. On December 29, 1987, Justice Stevens
extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to and including January 19, 1988, and the petition
was filed on that date. The jurisdiction of this Court ts in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

STATEMENT

1. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000d ef seqg., prohibits recipients of federal financial
assistance from discriminating on the basis of race in
federally assisted programs or activities. In July 1983, the
United States filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that the
State of Alabama, the Alabama State Board of Education,
and all state-supported four-year institutions of higher
education in the State of Alabama, including Alabama
State University (ASU) and Alabama A & M (A & M), two
historically and predominantly black colleges, had been
maintaining a racially segregated system of higher educa-
tion in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Pet. App. 3a).
Both ASU and A & M, however, moved for realignment as
parties-plaintiff on the ground that their interests were an-
tagonistic to those of the other defendants (id. at Sa n.1).
In addition, John F. Knight moved to intervene as
representative of a plaintiff-class of ASU graduates, black
adults and minor children in Alabama presently attending
or eligible to attend an Alabama higher education institu-
tion in the relevant geographic area, and black citizens
who are or may be employed by these higher education in-
stitutions (jd. at 4a-Sa). The district court, with the
Honorable U.W. Clemon presiding, granted these mo-
tions (id. at 4a-Sa, 12a).

In September 1983, however, Auburn University and
the State Superintendent of Education moved, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 144 and 455, to disqualify Judge Clemon (Pet.
App. 12a).' They argued that Judge Clemon’s children
were potential members of the plaintiff-class; that Judge

' 28 U.S.C. 144 and 455 are reprinted in full at Pet. App. 13a-1Sa
n.21.

OEE

3

Clemon had represented the plaintiffs in Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 103 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
aff'd in part and modified in part, 453 F.2d 524 (Sth Cir.
1971), a case which allegedly involved some of the same
parties and presented some of the same issues; and that
Judge Clemon knew and was sponsored for the bench by a
member of the law firm that now represented Alabama
A & M (Pet. App. 12a-13a, 18a-23a). Judge Clemon sum-
marily rejected these arguments, finding that the affidavits
accompanying the motions had not been signed by “par-
ties,” as required by 28 U.S.C. 144, and that a reasonable
person viewing the true facts would not harbor doubts
concerning his impartiality, as required by 28 U.S.C. 455
(Pet. App. 12a).

Auburn University filed a petition for a writ of man-
damus to the court of appeals with respect to the dis-
qualification issue (Pet. App. 12a). The court of appeals
granted the petition and remanded the case “with direc-
tions that another judge be assigned to hear the recusal
proceedings” (No. 83-7557 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 1983), slip
op. 1). Judge Hobart Grooms was then assigned to the
case (Pet. App. 12a). He held an evidentiary hearing with
respect to this matter and, on December 19, 1983, ruled
that Judge Clemon should be disqualified (/d. at 12a-13a).
On January 19, 1984, however, Judge Grooms vacated his
order and recused himself from deciding the disqualifica-
tion issue (/d. at 13a).

Accordingly, Senior Judge David W. Dyer of the court
of appeals was assigned to the case (Pet. App. 13a). He
determined that Judge Clemon need not disqualify himself
from the underlying matter (/d. at 4la-61la). Judge Dyer
found that the affidavits filed by Auburn University and
the Superintendent of Education “fail[ed] to state material
facts with sufficient particularity to convince a reasonable
man that a personal bias exists” (/d. at 45a).

4

2. The case then proceeded to trial, with Judge
Clemon presiding (Pet. App. 5a). While the case was
pending, however, the Alabama State Board of Education
determined that it would not recertify certain
undergraduate and graduate teacher education programs
of ASU (id. at 140a-14la). ASU and the Knight inter-
venors promptly moved the district court preliminarily to
enjoin the Alabama State Board of Education from doing
so (id. at 141a). On August 21, 1985, the district court
issued the requested preliminary relief, finding that the
decision not to recertifiy the teacher education programs
was racially motivated and that the status quo should be
maintained until the underlying action brought by the
United States could be resolved (id. at 14la, 15la). On
December 7, 1985, the district court found that, until
1965, each public college in Alabama was segregated by
law and by custom, that between 1965 and 1975 the de-
fendants had engaged in a series of actions which con-
tinued the racially dual system, and that the vestiges of the
pre-1965 and 1965-1975 actions continued to exist in the
Alabama higher education system (id. at Sa-6a, 62a-138a).
Accordingly, it ordered the State, the Governor, the
Alabama State Board of Education, and the Alabama
Public School and College Authority to submit a remedial
plan consistent with its findings to “ ‘eliminate all vestiges
of the dual system’ ” (id. at 7a). All further proceedings
were stayed, however, pending disposition of the defend-
ants’ appeals (/bid.).

3. In an opinion and order rendered on June 6, 1986 in
review Of the district court’s August 21, 1985 order (Pet.
App. 139a-154a), the court of appeals upheld the pre-
liminary relief issued by the district court against denial of
recertification of ASU teacher education programs. It first
ruled that ASU did not have standing under either the
Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI to challenge for its

own benefit the racially discriminatory actions of the
state-created system of higher education of which it is a
part (id. at 14la-142a). The court found that “ASU, as a
creature of the state, may not raise a Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim under Section 1983” (id. at 144a) and that
“{njothing in Title VI or its legislative history suggests that
Congress conceived of a state instrumentality as a ‘person’
with rights under this statute” (/d. at 146a).? Concomitant-
ly, however, the court found that “the trial court’s entry of
the preliminary injunction sought by the Knight inter-
venors against the Board was entirely appropriate” (id. at
1Sla), reasoning that “[t]he standing of the * * * in-
tervenors remains unchallenged” (id. at 147a), that “even
the partial demise of ASU would impede the ability of the
trial court—and this [c]ourt on review—to remedy any
violation of law proved in the state-wide action originally
brought by the United States and joined by the Knight in-
tervenors” (id. at 152a), and that “the intervenors had a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits” (/bid.).
Thus, the court affirmed “entry of this injunction, on
behalf of the intervenors, against the members of the
[S]tate Board in their official capacities,” and reversed
“the district court’s entry of any injunction on behalf of
ASU * * *” (id. at 153a).3

4. On October 6, 1987, the court of appeals reviewed
the district court’s December 7, 1985 order, determined
that Judge Clemon should have been disqualified from
hearing the case and, accordingly, reversed and remanded

? The court, however, rejected the “broad contention that [ASU], as
a creature of state government, has no federally protected rights what-
soever under the Constitution or laws of the United States” (Pet. App.
142a).

> The Board of Trustees of Alabama State University petitioned for
certiorari on the court of appeals’ ruling as to standing. The Court
denied the petition (No. 86-749 (Feb. 23, 1987))

6

without reaching the merits (Pet. App. la-40a).* It agreed
with the district court that neither the presence of Judge
Clemon’s two minor children in the plaintiff class nor the
judge’s background as a civil rights lawyer and political
figure in Alabama required disqualification (id. at
18a-23a). But the court held that Judge Clemon’s involve-
ment as a legislator with the matters at issue in the litiga-
tion did require the trial judge’s disqualification (id. at
23a-29a).

The court rested its holding on the fact that, “[d]Juring
his tenure in the state legislature, the trial judge actively
participated in the very events and shaped the very facts
that are at issue in this suit” (Pet. App. 23a (footnote
omitted)). Specifically, it found that, “[a]s chairman of the
Senate Rules Committee, Judge Clemon played a critical
role in the confirmation of those individuals nominated
for positions on the board of trustees of the defendant in-
stitutions” (/d. at 23a-24a), and “[y]Jet Judge Clemon ex-
plicitly found at trial that the composition of defendants’
governing boards was a relevant and important factor in
this finding of liability” (id. at 25a). It further found that,
“[w]jhile in the statehouse, Judge Clemon also helped
spearhead a bill to appropriate $10,000,000 to Alabama A
& M” (ibid.), yet “[a]t trial, A & M cited the defeat of this
bill as evidence of racial animus” and thus “Judge Clemon
was again forced to make factual findings about events in
which he was an active participant” (/bid.). Finally, it
found that Judge Clemon’s involvement as a lawyer in the

+ The court also held (Pet. App. 29a-39a) that the United States had
improperly alleged that the entire system of public higher education
was covered by Title VI and had failed to identify the particular pro-
grams Or activities at individual colleges receiving federal funds. The
court instructed (/d. at 39a) that, on remand, the United States should
prepare and file a new complaint.

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., supra, litigation pro-
vided him with information relating to the discrimination
suffered by black high school principals, a subject on
which evidence was also presented in this case (Pet. App.
26a-27a). The court concluded that, as a result of his in-
volvement in these matters, 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(1) required
his disqualification, since Judge Clemon had “personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding” (Pet. App. 27a).

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the claim
that it should “not consider Judge Clemon’s activities as a
state Senator since these facts were not presented to Judge
Dyer” (Pet. App. 23a n.49). It acknowledged that “[t}he
question of whether considerations of timeliness apply
under [28 U.S.C.] 455 is a difficult one,” noting that
“Congress did not incorporate a time limitation into the
amended statute, and courts have differed as to whether
the timeliness requirement of the prior [Section] 455 sur-
vived” (ibid.). But the court ruled that, “[e]ven if the prin-
ciple of timeliness has some application to motions
brought under [Section] 455(b), it would be inappropriate
to apply this principle under the circumstances of this
case” (id. at 24a n.49). It reasoned that “[t]hose courts that
have adopted a timeliness requirement have done so ‘to
prevent litigants from abusing motions to disqualify as
dilatory tactics Or as a means to “sample the temper of the
court” before deciding whether to raise an issue of dis-
qualification’”’ (ibid. (citations omitted)), that
“{a]ppellants here were not acting to delay or to speculate
on a favorable substantive judgment in the interim”
(ibid.), that “[m]otions to disqualify Judge Clemon were
filed at the earliest stages of the litigation and aggressively
prosecuted throughout” (/bid.), that “[a]ppellants did not
discover relevant information about Judge Clemon’s ac-
tivities as a State legislator until late in the litigation, and

8

raised this ground for disqualification at the first available
moment” (ibid.); and, finally, that “[g]iven the critical im-
portance of the appearance of impartiality guaranteed by
[Section] 455,” it would not “adopt the cramped inter-
pretation of this statute asserted by appellees” (/bid.).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals does not merit
review by this Court. Although the United States adheres
to its position that disqualification was improper since the
claims were either untimely or lacking in merit, it is clear
that the disqualification issue is essentially a factual one
and that the resolution of this issue by the court below
does not conflict with any decision of this Court or of any
other court of appeals. Moreover, this Court has already
declined to review the question whether ASU has standing
to challenge for its own benefit the racially discriminatory
actions of the state-created system of which it is a part
(No. 86-749), and the question is no more deserving of
review at this time.’ Accordingly, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.

1. Petitioners initially err in suggesting (Pet. 14-15)
that the decision below conflicts with the holdings of other
courts that a litigant must raise in a timely fashion the
grounds on which it seeks to disqualify a judge under 28
U.S.C. 455(b). To be sure, there is a conflict among the
circuits on this question (compare /n re International
Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980)
(party may not await outcome of trial before seeking to
disqualify trial judge on basis of information known to
party before trial); Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982) (same); and

our brief in opposition in No, 86-749,

y

United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) (same), with United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1012 (1986)). This conflict may be short-lived,
however, because, as petitioners concede (Pet. 15 n.8), the
Seventh Circuit “appears to be ready to reconsider.”
Moreover, the court of appeals in this case did not decide
whether a time limitation applies to disqualification mo-
tions under 28 U.S.C. 455(b). Rather, it held that, even
assuming that such a limitation applies, the motion for
disqualification in this case was timely filed (Pet. App.
23a-24a n.49). The court found that “[mJotions to dis-
qualify Judge Clemon were filed at the earliest stages of
the litigation and aggressively prosecuted throughout,”
and that “{respondents] did not discover relevant informa-
tion about Judge Clemon’s activities as a state legislator
until late in the litigation, and raised this ground for dis-
qualification at the first available moment” (ibid.). Ac-
cordingly, the decision below does not add to the circuit
conflict or provide a vehicle for resolving it.

2. Petitioners similarly err in suggesting (Pet. 15-18)
that the decision below conflicts with decisions of other
courts in which remands were ordered to permit the
development of a factual record on the disqualification
issue. In the cases that petitioners cite, the remands were
ordered because the facts material to the disqualification
issue were in dispute. See Health Services Acquisition
Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, No. 86-957 (Mar. 9, 1987); Price Bros. v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981); United States v.
Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D. Nev. 1978). Here, by
contrast, the court of appeals apparently concluded that
the facts material to the disqualification issue were not in
dispute and that the issue could be resolved without further

i0

factfinding by a district court; the court of appeals be-
lieved that the undisputed facts established that Judge
Clemon was intimately involved as a state legislator with
matters at issue in this case. See Pet. App. 23a-29a. Ac-
cordingly, its decision not to remand the case for further
proceedings is not in conflict with the decisions that peti-
tioners cite.®

~ 3. Petitioners next argue (Pet. 18-22) that the facts
upon which the court of appeals relied do not require
Judge Clemon’s disqualification. But the question is in-
herently fact-bound and non-recurring. Accordingly, in
Our view, it is not sufficiently important to justify review
by this Court.’

4. Finally, petitioners err in suggesting (Pet. 22-27)
that the court of appeals erred in holding that ASU and A
& M were without standing under either the Equal Protec-
tion Clause or Title VI to challenge for their own benefit
the racially discriminatory actions of the state education
system of which they are a part. This Court has long held
that, “[b]eing but creatures of the State, municipal corpora-
tions have no standing to invoke the * * * provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in opposition
to the will of their creator.” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 441 (1939) (footnote omitted). See generally Williams

© Petitioners note (Pet. 13-14) that this Court has granted certiorari
and heard argument in Liljeberg, which involves a question concern-
ing the timeliness of a disqualification motion under 28 U.S.C. 455(a).
But petitioners properly do not ask that their petition be held pending
the disposition of Liljeberg. That case involves allegations concerning
the “appearance of impropriety” of a judge, not personal knowledge
of important facts. Accordingly, the decision there should not bear on
the proper resolution of the timeliness question that sometimes arises
under 28 U.S.C. 455(b).

’? There is no basis for petitioners’ suggestion (Pet. 14) that the dis-
qualification decision in this case was based upon Judge Clemon’s
race.

11

v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); Risty v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 270 U.S. 378, 389-390 (1926);
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); Hunter
vV. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). Title VI likewise is
designed to protect individual rights and, in enacting that
statute, Congress made no suggestion that it was granting
State-created entities any rights that heretofore were
unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf.
Regents of the University of Californiayv. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (Title VI proscribes
“only those racial classifications that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause”); id. at 328 (opinion of Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.) (same). Accordingly, the
decision of the court below — that state-created entities like
ASU and A & M may not rely on either the Equal Protec-
tion Clause or Title VI to challenge for their own benefit
the discriminatory actions of the state that created
them —is correct.

Petitioners acknowledge (Pet. 23) that “a line of cases
[from this Court exists] holding that disputes between
arms or creatures of a State do not normally implicate
federal rights.” But petitioners repeat the argument that
was advanced, and that this Court declined to review, in
No. 86-749, to wit, that the court of appeals failed to con-
sider cases “which have allowed claims such as those
asserted here when they were brought by state-created en-
tities or their board members, in pursuit of their obligation
under the Supremacy Clause to conform their conduct to
the federal Constitution or a federal statute” (Pet. 23). As
we noted in our brief in opposition in No. 86-749 (at 6),
however, the court of appeals could not consider an argu-
ment that was not presented to it. ASU did not argue to
the court of appeals that it was representing the interests
of its students, faculty, or administrators, or that it was

12

pursuing an obligation under the Supremacy Clause to
conform its conduct to the federal Constitution or a
federal statute.

Rather, ASU argued only that it had standing as an in-
stitution to seek the preliminary injunction. Thus, in
answering respondents’ argument to the court of appeals
that petitioner ASU was without standing, ASU con-
tended only that “Alabama State University as a creature
of the State has federally protected rights under the Con-
stitution and the Laws of the United States” (ASU C.A.
Br. 21). Accordingly, the court below had only to decide
“whether any given constitutional provision or law pro-
tects the interests of the body in question,” to wit, ASU.
See Pet. App. 143a-144a (emphasis added). Petitioners’ re-
characterization of the cause in this petition for a writ of
certiorari cannot change the question presented to and de-
cided by the court below.’ ;

Petitioners therefore err (Pet. 22-26) in suggesting that
the decision below conflicts with decisions of this Court
and other courts which have held that state-created entities
may challenge on behalf of their students, faculties, and
board members the discriminatory actions of their state-
creators. The school boards in the cited cases either alleged
that a state statute Or some other state action required a
constitutional or statutory duty to be violated by board
members (see, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392

’ As we noted in our brief in opposition in No. 86-749 (at 6n.1), it
may be that ASU intended to argue to the court of appeals that it was
representing the interests of its students, faculty, and administrators,
as well as the interests of the institution as a whole. But, as we also
noted there (/bid.), ASU did not make these intentions clear to the
court of appeals and, accordingly, the fault in the decision below, if
any, lies with ASU, not with the court of appeals.

13

U.S. 236 (1968)), or that they were representing the con-
Stitutional rights of their students or faculty (see, e.g.,
Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Bradley v.
School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev’d on other
grounds, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); School Bd. v. Baliles,
829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987)). Here, by contrast,
ASU alleged only that its own rights as an institution were
in issue. Thus, it is clear that petitioners ask this Court to
resolve a conflict that does not exist.

The suggestion (Pet. 26-27) that the decision below
“leaves a significant gap in the means of protecting the
constitutional rights of [their] students” is equally
meritless. The United States and the intervenors in this
litigation have adequately represented and will continue
adequately to represent the students and faculty of the
Alabama schools—the persons who would truly benefit
from the desegregation of the Alabama system of higher
education.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
Wt. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
MARK L. GROSS
Attorneys

MARCH 1988

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1988 — 20203760338

218a

Association (CCTA) request reconsideration of the interim
must carry rules on the grounds they unconstitutionally
intrude on the First Amendment rights of cable operators,
programmers and subscribers.

20. TBS argues that the interim must carry rules are
a prior restraint on constitutionally protected speech in
that they preclude cable operators’ programming selec-
tions, compel certain substitutions, and impose severe sanc-
tions for refusals to comply. Thus, it states that there is
a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity
and that a standard of review more stringent than the
O'Brien standard should apply. TBS further argues that
the new rules are unconstitutional even under the more
lenient O’Brien standard. It states that the Commission
failed to demonstrate that maximizing viewer choices is a
substantial governmental interest that would be harmed in
the absence of must carry rules. In this regard, TBS crit-
icizes the Commission for adopting interim must carry rules
despite its findings that cable systems have continued to
carry local stations since the former must carry rules were
invalidated and that viewer choice is increased where cable
systems do not carry local stations. In addition, it states
that the Commission failed to adequately investigate the
market situation with respect to the use and availability
of built-in and outdoor antennas and takes the position
that the Commissicn is obligated to show that a six month
consumer education program is insufficient to rectify any
existing problem of subscriber awareness of the need for
alternative reception capabilities.

21. TBS further states that the interim must carry rules
are not narrowly tailored to meet the purported need. In
this regard, it specifically criticizes the exemption of
smaller cable systems from must carry obligations, the 25
percent channel capacity cap, the five year term of the
interim must carry rules, the requirement that cable sys-
tems carry duplicating noncommercial stations, the viewing
standard and the requirement that must carry signals be

219a

carried on the lowest-priced separately available tier of
service. TBS thus requests that we eliminate the interim
must carry rules.

22. Century argues that the interim must carry rules
are content-based and, thus, O’Brien is not the appropriate
standard for review. In this regard, Century states that
in making their programming judgments, cable operators
exercise their editorial discretion relative to speech con-
tent. Thus, Century argues, the rules directly interfere
with communicative activity by designating certain sources
that must be included by cable editors and by according
preferences to certain favored classes of speakers, such as
those who are local and popular. Century also claims that
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (Renton)® is in-
appropriately applied by the Commission in its constitu-
tional analysis of the new regulations, as the rationale for
time, place and manner restrictions cannot be used to con-
done intrusions into program content and distribution. It
further argues that Without Renton, the Commission’s ra-
tionale cannot be sustained. Century concludes that the
Commission’s constitutional analysis of the must carry rules
improperly blends content regulation with market entry
and other non-communicative aspects of cable television.
Therefore, Century seeks elimination of the interim must
carry rules.

23. CCTA takes the position that the five year sunset
provision does not justify unconstitutionally intruding on
First Amendment rights. It cities Century Federal, Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto (Century Federal),’® for the proposition
that intrusions on cable operators’ speech rights are not
acceptable merely because they are limited in duration.
CCTA thus argues that the infirmity of the interim must
carry rules is not cured by the five year sunset provision.

°106 S.Ct. 925, 54 U.S.L.W. 4160 (1986).
' 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 1986).

220a

CCTA proposes that if the Commission decides to retain

the interim must carry rules, then it should select a shorter

interim period that is more in keeping with the regulatory

program goal of educating consumers. In this regard, it

argues that there is nothing in the record of this pro-

ceeding to suggest that a five year period is needed to
- accomplish the educational task.

24. CCTA also submits that input selector switches
should not be mandatory; rather, they should be available
for sale or lease to subscribers who request them pursuant
to a strong information requirement, somewhat like the
cable “parental control’? device. As CCTA sees it. this
modification offers two advantages: 1) it would not impose
unnecessary costs on customers who do not need or desire
an input selector switch; and, 2) it would allow a market
for built-in input selector switches to develop. CCTA con-
tends that the Commission's approach, if implemented,
would impede the development of That market because
subscribers would have no reason to buy receivers with
built-in switches if cable systems provide switches for free.

25. The Texas Cable TV Association, filing jointly with
four other cable interests. (Texas Cable) contends that the
consumer education information requirement is unconsti-
tutional since the Supreme Court has outlawed mandatory
“consumer interest’? messages of the kind adopted by the
Commission to effect its decision. In support, it cites Pa-
cific Gas and Electric v. P.U.C. of California (Pacific Gas),!!
which, it states, held that mandated access to “extra
space’ in billing envelopes for consumer advocacy group
messages violated the First Amendment rights of a reg-
ulated utility. Moreover, Texas Cable maintains that the
education program is inconsistent with the Commission’s
underbrush decisions to leave the regulation of broad-
casters’ trade practices to the FTC and the Better Busi-

106 S.Ct. 903, 54 U.S.L.W. 4149 (1986),

221a

ness Bureau, and with the 1985 Fairness Report, in which
the Commission determined that the public interest is not
served by forcing broadcasters to telecast messages on
controversial issues of public importance.

26. The Association of Independent Television Stations,
Inc. (INTV) requests reconsideration of the sunset provi-
sion of the interim must carry rules. INTV contends that
it is unlikely that the ‘fair and open competitive market
environment” for programming sought by the Commis-
sion can be achieved within five years through the input
selector switch and consumer education requirements. It
argues that various cable and broadcast industry studies
and reports, including that submitted by the Joint
Petitioners as discussed above, demonstrate that input se-
lector switches are flawed, ineffective mechanisms for re-
capturing the access to off-the-air broadcast signals that
is lost when cable service is installed.

27. INTV cites the NCTA and NAB studies, which, it
states. show the technical problems with the input selector
switch plan. Additionally, INTV states that it pointed out
in its original comment in this proceeding the difficulties
in using input selector switches with cable-ready sets and/
or videocassette recorders (VCRs). It also submits that
input selector switches are totally unusable for many TV
viewers who are prohibited from erecting outdoor TV an-
tennas, live in apartment buildings, or otherwise “cannot
or will not’ use input selector switches due to local zoning
regulation or complexity of operation.

98. INTV further argues that even if the input selector
switch rules did provide adequate subscriber access to off-
the-air broadcast signals, the market environment envi-
sioned by the Commission will never be achieved unless
and until Congress and the Commission eliminate a pan-
oply of regulatory and statutory policies that insulate cable

2 See Report and Order, supra at para. 133.

222a

systems from the market in which broadcasters compete.
According to INTV, these policies include: 1) the cable
compulsory copyright license; 2) entry barriers to cable
competition from telephone companies, broadcast stations,
and television networks; and, 3) Commission-approved ab-
rogation of local television stations’ exclusive local pro-
gram exhibition licenses. It states that sunset of the must
carry rules will, absent concurrent actions on the part of
the Commission and Congress, leave undisturbed this re-
gime of ‘‘cable friendly’ regulation that insulates cable
from the forces of marketplace competition. Thus, INTV
argues that the government interest in maximizing diver-
sity in program choices and fostering competition among
program sources will be ill-served in the absence of on-
going, limited signal carriage rules.

29. INTV is also concerned that the Commission ap-
parently “‘dismissed’’ Section 307(b) of the Communications
Act, which requires that radio frequency services be dis-
tributed ‘‘among the several states and communities” in
a fair and equitable manner, as a component of the federal
interest supporting the interim must carry rules. It sub-
mits that localism and free, local broadcast service remain
preeminent communications policy objectives and impor-
tant federal interests. INTV states that there is no sta-
tutory interest comparable to that expressed in Section
307(b) for non-local program services available only to per-
sons who are willing to pay for them. It submits that the
Commission’s seeming equation of free local broadcast ser-
vice with non-local, subscription? narrowcast services such
as cable networks is, therefore, unwarranted! It argues
that the Commission’s disregard for Section 307(b) is un-
warranted, unsupportable, and inconsistent with its sta-
tutory mandate and must be corrected on reconsideration.

30. INTV requests that the interim must carry rules be
retained until the fair and competitive market environment
we seek has actually been achieved. It suggests that we
adopt a system-by-system sunset of our must carry rules

223a

to be effective upon: 1) elimination of all the above-men-
tioned governmentally mandated protections of cable sys-
tems from the free market in which local broadcasters and
all other video program distributors must operate; and, 2)
introduction of intra-modal competition, that is, a second
cable system into the community. In the alternative, INTV
requests adoption of the “permissible signal carriage”’ rule
which it initially proposed in this proceeding. Under that
proposal, the cable operator would choose either to invoke
the compulsory copyright license by carrying all “local”
signals or to negotiate separately with copyright holders
for use of their work. INTV further submits that if we
decide to retain The five-year sunset provision, we should
indicate willingness to consider, as an aspect of our con-
sideration of continuing relief in particular situations where
continuing signal carriage rules might be necessary, the
possibility of extending the rules beyond their scheduled
expiration date.

31. To support ongoing signal carriage rules, INTV ar-
gues that the Commission’s constitutional analysis should
rely more confidently on the standard established in
O'Brien and other applicable Supreme Court decisions. In
this respect, INTV states that the Commission's analysis
is basically correct but is not complete. It submits that
the Court’s holding in Renton makes clear that regulations
which are not aimed at suppression of speech, that is,
those that are ‘‘justified’”’ without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, are constitutional if they are de-
signed to serve a “‘substantial government interest” and
“allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communica-
tions.’ INTV asserts that the interim must carry rules,
without the input selector switch rules, satisfy this test,
including the second part of it, by leaving at least 75
percent of cable system’ channel capacity free from any
signal carriage obligation. If further argues that the in-

's Renton, supra at 928-930.

224a

terim must carry rules clearly satisfy the O’Brien standard
even in the absence of the Court’s decision in Renton. In
this respect, INTV observes that the Court recently af-
firmed in United States v. Albertini (Albertini)'* that ‘‘an
incidental burden on speech is no greater than essential,
and therefore permissible under O’Brien, so long as the
content-neutral regulation promotes a substantial govern-
ment interest that would be achieved less effectively ab-
sent the regulation.”’ .

32. Richard Leghorn seeks revision of our basic ap-
proach for resolving the must carry matter. He submits
that we took the good idea of relying on input selector
switch requirements as a long term means to achieve our
goals, but then misapplied it in a manner that satisfies no
one and fails to accomplish those goals. Specifically, Legh-
orn objects to what he terms are: 1) our unnecessary and
excessive reliance on external switches; 2) the massive
information campaign required of cable operators to cure
a market dysfunction caused by the former rules; and, 3)
the five additional years of unnecessarily intrusive must
carry rules. He contends that we did not develop a com-
plete record on input selector devices and, thus, we failed
to satisfy the requirements of administrative rule making
and we further failed to identify the least intrusive means
of achieving our policy objectives. Leghorn argues that the
two-part regulatory program is technically impractical and
infringes the First Amendment rights of cable operators.

33. Leghorn argues that the Report and Order fails to
recognize that, in the long term, input selector switches
built in during the manufacture of television receivers are
significantly superior to external switches. He states that
there are a number of advantages to use of electronic,
internal switches, including: 1) purchase and maintenance
costs would be lower; 2) technical performance would be

#472 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2907 (1985).

substantially better; 3) the dangers of signal leakage to
air navigation and increased risks of lightning harm re-
sulting from poor grounding would be practically elimi-
nated; and 4) the home television environment would be
‘friendlier’ for consumers. Leghorn asserts that our input
selector switch rules will suppress demand for receivers
with internal switches because cable subscribers will not
purchase receivers with built-in switching capability when
they are provided mechanical, external switches free of
charge.

34. Leghorn characterizes the consumer education pro-
gram as, in effect, compelling cable operators to advertise
the availability of their off-the-air competition, an approach
which he says will greatly waste time and money and
engender consumer confusion and resentment. Leghorn
contends that the education requirement cannot be justi-
fied as a mere consumer protection mechanism, since it
directly forces an industry to advertise the whereabouts
of its competitors without requiring any effort by the com-
petitors themselves. Consequently, Leghorn submits that
the consumer education program is unconstitutional, as
cable operators may not wish to use their facilities to
advertise their competition, and these rules wiil in many
instances compel operators to speak. In support, Leghorn
principally cites Pacific Gas, in which he states the
Supreme Court agreed with the contention of a regulated
utility that it had a First Amendment right not to be
required to use its own property to help spread a message
with which it disagrees. Texas Cable essentially agrees
with this analysis. Leghorn proposes that responsibility for
carrying the burden of consumer education be shifted to
broadcasters and/or the Commission.

35. Finally, Leghorn asserts that the interim must carry
rules are unconstitutional. He argues that more exacting
scrutiny than the O’Brien standard is required to evaluate
these rules. In this respect, Leghorn contends that the
Commission’s interpretation of Renton in its rationale for

226a

applying O’Brien was incorrect. He argues that Renton
only applies when the regulation at issue is not directed
at the content of the communications involved, and that
it does not stand for the proposition that any regulation
is content-neutral simply because it is viewpoint-neutral.
He futher states that by contrast with the situation in
Renton, the interim must carry rules are directly concerned
with the content of speech because they rank categories
of speech and speakers. Leghorn also contends that the
Commission incorrectly applied the O’Brien test by ignor-
ing the impact the must carry rules will have on the con-
tent of a cable operator’s speech. In addition, he asserts
that the rules coerce speech by forcing cable operators to
retransmit television programming which they might net
otherwise carry.

36. In view of the above, Leghorn requests that we
conduct a supplemental inquiry to develop a public record
on the relative costs, technical performance, safety, and
consumer convenience aspects of external switches versus
switches that are built-in to television receivers, including
current designs and feasible improvements in such devices.
He proposes that, after conducting this injury, we adopt
rules generally in accordance with his earlier proposal to
require manufacturers to build switches into television re-
ceivers and related control equipment, and require cable
systems for an interim period to provide external switches
only when they choose not to carry all local VHF signals.
He maintains that the Commission has authority to man-
date these built-in switches under the All-Channel Receiver
Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §303(s). Leghorn also suggests that
his proposal be modified to require that cable operators
who do not carry all local VHF signals provide external
switches, but be permitted to charge for their installation.
He states that this will alleviate our concern that his pro-
posal would operate as an incentive for cable systems to
carry a fixed set of signals as a way to avoid expenses.
Leghorn further requests that we adopt performance spec-

to
i)

ifications as a means to ensure that manufacturers develop
switches that consumers can safely install themselves.

37. Taft Broadcasting Company (Taft) urges the Com-
mission to issue a Notice of Inquiry to investigate the
technical adequacy of input selector switches, the extent
to which viewers are in fact able to erect antennas, the
comparative quality of off-the-air signals and the cable sig-
nals of the same station, and the extent to which viewers
will choose to watch a superior quality television signal
over a signal of inferior quality even when the viewer
might prefer programming content of the inferior signal.
Taft suggests that the Commission continue to suspend
the input selector switch requirements and the five year
sunset period pending the outcome of the inquiry, but that
it implement the new must carry rules to ensure that cable
subscribers will continue to have access to off-the-air tel-
evision stations.

38. Range Television Cable Co., Inc. (Range) urges the
Commission to reconsider its input selector switch rules
to create an exemption for cable systems that provide all
available off-the-air broadcast signals to their subscribers
as part of their basic tier of cable service. Range submits
that the effect of the rules adopted is to cause cable sys-
tems carrying all local signals to incur the additional ex-
pense of installing input selector switches for no good
reason and, at the same time, cause increased costs for
subscribers.

39. Continental Cablevision, Inc. (Continental) states
that it generally supports the NCTA, CATA and NAB
petition and strongly opposes the blanket requirement to
install input selector switches without regard to whether
a cable system is inhibiting the reception of local television
signals. In this regard, Continental states that it would
not oppose a rule requiring installation of an input selector
switch at any future date (even after the sunset of the
interim must-carry rules) for subscribers of systems that

228a

cease to carry signals defined by the Commission's rules
as local. Such an exemption also is supported by the Na-
tional Independent Television Committee (NITC), which re-
quests in the alternative that the input selector switch rule
not be applied Where cabie systems are subject to full
competition, i.e., where telephone companies can offer ca-
ble television services and cable systems are not protected
by the compulsory copyright license.

40. The Office of Communication of the United Church
of Christ, Henry Geller, and Donna Lampert (UCC) submit
a joint petition criticizing the new rules as an imposed
government solution that looks good on paper but does
not realistically address the important public policy inter-
ests at issue. UCC argues that input selector switches will
never be an effective means for providing access to off-
the-air signals that are not carried by a cable system. They
point to the various technical problems with the switches
indicated in the NCTA report, although they also suggest
these problems are being exaggerated for tactical pur-
poses. UCC believes that because of the inconvenience of
switching to antenna reception and then tuning to a sta-
tion, it is unlikely that consumers will actually use switches
to gain access to a relatively few stations not carried by
their cable system. They submit that the input selector
switch requirement will impose costs on the industry and
the public and will not further our policy objectives.

41. UCC also argues that we have not properly defined
the public interest. They argue that we were incorrect in
determining that the federal interest was concerned not
with the service of particular local broadcasters, but rather
with preserving during the interim period the program
source diversity provided by the system of broadcasting.
In this respect, UCC states that the preservation of local
service is mandated by Section 307(b) of the Communi-
cations Act.

990-
22a

42. UCC argues that the proper analysis of the must
carry situation is that cable has inserted itself into the
broadcast signal distribution scheme and is, therefore, sub-
ject to reasonable Commission regulation to ensure that
its actions are consistent with the foundations of that
scheme. They assert that these foundations require the
maintenance of healthy local broadcast outlets. They ac-
knowledge that there is a changed circumstance—the de-
velopment of many cable program services and the
difficulty in carrying all broadcast and cable services on
systems with limited channel capacity—that militates
against mandatory carriage of all available broadcast sig-
nals.

43. Because of these changed circumstances, UCC sub-
mits that the Commission, if it is to act reasonably, must
restrict mandatory carriage rights to those stations truly
in need of cable carriage. They maintain that the cate-
gories of stations in need are those set forth in their
comments and replies in this proceeding. Thus, they re-
quest must carry protection be established as follows: 1)
carriage of all local stations in sparsely populated areas
(e.g. blow the top 100 markets), regardless of channel ca-
pacity; 2) carriage priority for public broadcasting stations,
community stations, and UHF independents (initial license
period) in situations involving cable systems with limited
capacity in the top 100 markets. Under the UCC proposal,
there would be no mandatory carriage for VHF stations
in the top 100 markets, regardless of cable system channel
capacity, and no mandatory carriage would be afforded
unless the station is serving as a significant local outlet,
i.e. broadcasts more than 40 percent local programming
directed to serving the needs and interests of the com-
munity.

44. They also argue that regulation that is reasonably
related to the public interest in the signal carriage matter
would not violate the First Amendment. UCC submits that
cable interests cannot insist upon the right to import dis-

230a

tant signals, to the detriment of local signals in rural areas,
of new UHF independents, or of local public broadcasting
service. Moreover, they contend that even if the O'Brien
test were used, the approac') in their proposal would easily
pass constitutional muster in that it would provide pro-
tection for an important and substantial federal interest
and its incidental impact on the alleged First Amendment
freedoms would be the minimum necessary to the fur-
therance of that interest.

45. In its reply comments, Pico Macom, Inc., which
states that it is the leading supplier of input selector
switches for the cable industry, refutes petitioners’ claims
that there are technical problems with the available input
selector switches that render them unsuitable for use with
cable service. Pico Macom submits that its current switch,
the ‘“‘“Macom AB-2” meets or exceeds all of the technical
specifications required by the cable industry, including iso-
lation, insertion loss, and return loss. It also states that
its factory testing process proves that This switch will
withstand at least 10 years of very hard use. Pico Macom
also contends that Gill Industries, as discussed below, dra-
matically overstates the extent to which the use of a prop-
erly installed input selector switch will cause objectionable
interference to television viewing.

46. Pico Macom also submits that petitioners, particu-
larly Joint Petitioners, have greatly overstated the cost of
compliance with the switch rules. It states that based on
a poll of three major distributors, cable operators can pur-
chase its switch for as little as $2.25 per switch. Pico
Macom argues that Joint Petitioners also have inflated the
long term cost of the switch by underestimating its useful
life. It states that the actual switch life of 10 years will
significantly reduce the costs of labor and hardware for
switch replacement/repair claimed by Joint Petitioners. Pico
Macom aiso submits that Joint Petitioners have overstated
the costs of providing transformers for use with switches

23la

because not every subscriber will need such a device."
Finally, it claims that petitioners have failed to recognize
that the price of switches, transformers, and jumper cables
is likely to fall by as much as 10 percent if the rule goes
into effect, as production efficiencies will be realized with
the increased demand.

Evaluation of Basic Policy Issues

47. We are not persuaded that we should alter the basic
approach of our two-part program for resolving the must
carry matter. In this respect, we find unpersuasive
petitioners’ arguments that we incorrectly assessed the
federal interest and that the two-part program is an un-
workable solution to the must carry matter. Rather, we
continue to believe that the undesired effects of our former
must carry rules will be best resolved by a regulatory
program that includes both input selector switch and in-
terim must carry requirements. This approach is both the
most effective and the least intrusive means to achieve
our objectives to alter consumers’ existing practices and
knowledge concerning the need for off-the-air reception
capability and to provide an orderly transition to a new
environment in which cable mandatory signal carriage reg-
ulation will no longer be necessary. We are confident that
the fundamental approach of the program adopted in the
Report and Order is the appropriate course of action in
this matter. However, we recognize petitioners’ argument
that the program, is adopted, imposes significant costs and
implementation burdens on the cable industry. Therefore,
we are modifying certain provisions of the program. We
believe that these modifications are responsive to

Pico Macom states that a transformer is necessary only if the
subscriber's antenna is connected with 300 ohm flat wiring. It argues
that in many instances antennas are connected to receivers with 75
ohm coaxial cable and, for support, points to the statement in Gill
Industries’ petition that 51 percent of its customers in the San Jose,
California have only coaxial leads for antenna input.

232a

petitioners’ concerns and will enhance the long-term ef-
fectiveness of the basic two-part program to achieve our
objective of ensuring viewers’ access to the maximum num-
ber of program choices available through cable and off-
the-air broadcast television facilities.

48. The Federal Interest. We find no merit in INTV’s
and UCC’s position that we incorrectly or otherwise im-
properly treated Section 307(b) of the Communications Act
as a component of the federal interest in the must carry
matter. In the Report and Order, we observed that our
assessment of the federal interest is premised on concerns
different from the Section 307(b) concerns relied upon by
the Commission in initially adopting the former must carry
rules. We found that the structure of the overall video
market has changed and that this change is primarily due
to the emergence of the cable industry as a means for
distributing new program services. These findings led us
to conclude that it is no longer appropriate nor desirable
to treat cable purely as a supplementary or auxiliary video
distribution service and to protect local television service
in competition with cable service. Therefore, consistent
with the statutory goals contained in Sections 151 and
303(g) of the Communications Act, and Section 601 of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act),’®
we determined that the public interest would be better
served by a policy that maximizes program choices rather
than one that protects one segment of the television in-
dustry by substantially limiting the ability of others to
offer service to consumers. While we did not, therefore,
rely specifically on Section 307(b), we did find that the
plan we adopted also contributes towards the Section 307(b)
statutory goals.

49. We continue to believe that it is desirable to proceed
toward an environment where we no longer wili protect

'° 47 U.S.C. §§151 and 303(g); Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§1 et seq., 98 Stat. 2779 (1984).

233a

the broadcast industry from competition with the cable
industry.'’ In maintaining this position, we are cognizant
of our mandate to distribute radio frequency services
“among the several states and communities” in a fair and
equitable manner. We believe our two-part program con-
tributes to Section 307(b) objectives by fostering inde-
pendent access to local off-the-air television services so
that such stations may operate in a fair and open com-
petitive environment with other providers of video ser-
vices. To protect the broadcast industry per se in
furtherance of Section 307(b), wouid have the effect of
limiting access to program choices. Such a policy might
diminish the overall public interest with respect to our
mandate to ‘“‘make available to all the people of The United
States a rapid, efficient communications service’’ and to
‘“‘sxenerally encourage the larger, more effective use of ra-
dio’ under Sections 151 and 303(g) of the Communications
Act. It might also impede the intent of the Cable Act, as
expressed in Section 601 thereof, to establish a national
policy that encourages the growth and development of ca-
ble services and assures that cable systems are responsible
to the needs and interests of the local communities They
serve.

50. Feasibility of Input Selector Switches. We believe
that the technical problems described by those seeking
elimination of the input selector switch requirements are
much overstated. First, improper installation of switches
by subscribers is not likely to be a cause of harmful signal
leakage. Cable subscribers generally will be able to install
these devices properly themselves if they are provided with
uppropriate instructions, including directions to immedi-

‘* Nothing in this Memorandum Opinion and Order is intended to
prejudice our decision on any of the issues raised by Satcom, Inc. in
its petition for rule making proposing rules relating to multiple own-
ership of cable systems. The Commission requested comments on that
petition in a Public Notice issued June 19, 1986, RM-5475.

234a

ately check for proper switch operation. The primary po-
tential for interference is that switches could be installed
such that the cable output would be connected directly to
the antenna, and thus would radiate th2 full bandwidth of
the input cable signal. Such connections will not be a major
problem because when they do occur, the switch will be
unable to alternate between the input sources and the
installer/subscriber will realize immediately that something
is wrong and take corrective action. Another factor that
must be considered in assessing the interference potential
of input selector switches is whether a separate terminal
device is used to receive cable service and, if so, whether
the switch is installed on the cable or receiver side of the
terminal device. Where a terminal device is used, and the
switch is between it and the television receiver, the risk
of interference resulting from improper installation is par-
ticularly low. In such cases, the direct connection of the
terminal device output to the antenna through improper
switch installation would result in radiation of only the
device output. Because the output of the device is on a
channel unused for broadcasting (generally either channel
3 or 4), the potential for interference created by acciden-
tally coupling the terminal device to the antenna is very
low. In cases where switches are built-in to television re-
ceivers and TV interface devices, the potential for inter-
ference is even less.

51. Evidence that subscribers can make complex cable
connections correctly is provided by the fact that there
have been no widespread problems or difficulties encoun-
tered by consumers-in installation of cable-ready VCRs and
receivers. We also observe that, as addressed in Gen.
Docket No. 85-301, many cable subscribers now are ac-
quiring and successfully installing their own cable terminal/
converter equipment.'* We are aware of no widespread or

'* See Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Gen. Docket No. 85-301,
50 FR 42729 (1985); and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in
Gen. Docket No. 85-301, 51 FR 31147 (1986).

235a

general problem with consumers’ installation of this equip-
ment and believe that consumers also can correctly install
input selector switches. In any event, those who contend
consumers cannot properly install switches present no
credible evidence to support their claim.

52. Second, we do not believe that input selector
switches will degrade reception of cable service or permit
signal leakage that will cause interference to off-the-air
reception. Section 15.606(a) of our rules specifies a 60 dB
isolation standard under which millions of transfer switches
have been authorized (as components of video games, com-
puters and other devices).'’* We are unaware of any in-
terference to off-the-air reception attributable to any of
these switches (mechanical or electronic), failing to isolate
the antenna port sufficiently. Therefore, we believe that
the 90 dB of isolation that Joint Petitioners claim is nec-
essary to avoid these problems far exceeds that which is
actually required in most instances. With regard to inter-
ference to cable reception, we observe that the signal
strength received by the antenna and delivered to the
receiver input terminals in most locations is substantially
less than the 40 dBmV signal claimed by petitioners. Thus,
for most installations, switch isolation of 60 dB appears
sufficient to prevent interference to cable reception. In
those areas close to broadcast transmitters, direct pick-up
interference at the receiver tuner would frequently offset
any additional protection provided by higher switch iso-
lation. In those rare instances where greater switch iso-
lation would be worthwhile, this fact could be brought to
subscribers’ attention so that they may act accordingly.
We also find no evideace in the record to indicate that

'* Section 15.606(a) specifies a maximum voltage which may be gen-
erated at the antenna terminals of an antenna Transfer switch. For a
typical cable system using 75 ohm coaxial cable and signal amplitudes
of 3.16 millivolts (+10 dBmV), the switches must exhibit an isolation
of at least 60 dB.

236a

use of properly designed input selector switches would
result in unacceptable insertion or return loss. In fact, as
discussed by ATC and Pico Macom, switches that appear
to provide acceptable technical performance are available
now. Moreover, we are aware that similar switches are
available from many other manufacturers and have been
in use by cable subscribers for some time. We are aware
of no reports of general leakage or other performance
problems with any of the switches currently available.
However, while we are confident that input selector
switches can be used without leading to harmful interfer-
ence, we recognize the importance of the switch technical
performance issue and the need for appropriate standards
to ensure that their use does not lead to harmful inter-
ference. Accordingly, we plan to initiate a separate pro-
ceeding, as discussed below, to consider technical standards
for such switches.

53. Third, we find no merit in petitioners’ arguments
that input selector switches will fail or “wear out” even
before the interim must carry rules expire. As Pico Macom
indicates, reasonably priced switches that are capable of
providing many years of service under heavy use are avail-
able now. Finally, we previously have addressed petitioners’
claims that use of input selector switches would render
unuseable certain features of cable subscribers’ television
receivers, VCRs and cable converters. As we stated in the
Report and Order, any such problems can be overcome
through relatively minor modifications to switching de-
vices. Cable operators and other equipment suppliers can
provide the information and/or assistance consumers may
need to install switches in a manner that will enable op-
eration of all the various features of video equipment.

54. Finally, we find no need to conduct further inquiry
into the feasibility of input selector switch requirements
as an effective element of our policy for resolving the must
carry matter as argued by Taft and Leghorn. We disagree
with petitioners who contend that the record in this pro-

237a

ceeding did not provide sufficient information to support
the input selector switch requirements. The record adduced
at the Report and Order stage of this proceeding addressed
issues and included evidence and information concerning
the benefits and potential problems associated with use of
input selector switches in connection with cable service.
In any event, the abundant additional information sub-
mitted on reconsideration corrects any deficiencies that
might have existed in the record. Thus, the information
currently before us with respect to switch costs, technical
performance, consumer convenience, switch compatibility
with other equipment, and use of antennas for off-the-air
reception is more than sufficient to support our decision
in this proceeding. We note, moreover, that input selector
switches have been at issue since Turner’s initial petition
for rule making to eliminate the former must carry rules
and that it was part of the Quincy court’s findings.

55. Other Input Selector Switch Issues. We also are not
persuaded by petitioners’ arguments that other policy con-
siderations render the input selector switch requirements
unworkable as part of the solution to the must carry mat-
ter. We continue to disagree with petitioners that con-
sumers will find input selector switches impractical to use.
As we indicated in the Report and Order, consumers are
becoming increasingly accustomed to switching between
alternate program input sources, particularly in conjunc-
tion with use of VCRs.

56. We also continue to reject Leghorn’s proposal to
require manufacturers to build input selector switches into
new television receivers. In the Report and Order, we fully
considered this proposal. There we indicated that it is not
desirable to require all receivers to be built with a feature
intended for use only by cable households. We further
recognized that cable subscribers purchasing cable-ready
receivers may prefer a more sophisticated external switch-
ing device and, thus, may not need built-in switching ca-
pability. We concluded that market forces are the most

238a

appropriate means to determine both the number of re-
ceivers to be produced with built-in switches and the spe-
cific design of those features. We also observe that the
desirable features of integ~al switches described by Legh-
orn also can be incorporated into switches built-in to video
peripheral equipment such as VCRs and cable converter/
controllers. Most of these features also can be made part
of stand-alone switching devices.

o7. We do not find that the input selector switch rules
should be modified to permit the exemptions requested by
Joint Petitioners, Range, NITC, and Leghorn. Those
petitioners generally seek exemptions from the switch re-
quirements in cases where cable systems either choose to
carry all available off-the-air signals or are subject to direct
competition from one or more other cable systems. Legh-
orn’s proposal to require cable systems to provide external
input selector switch requirements for an interim period
only where they do not carry all local VHF signals would
be particularly undesirable. This proposal would encourage
cable systems to carry a fixed complement of broadcast
signals (namely the VHF signals) and, thus, would be con-
trary to our intention that cable operators have the great-
est flexibility possible to tailor their program services to
meet viewer preferences. As proposed, this solution to the
must carry matter would not address in any way The issue
of access to the signals of stations other than those VHF
Stations that would qualify as “local signals.”” We also
reject Adelphia’s request that input selector switches not
be required for new cable subscribers. We believe that new
subscribers are just as likely to have the same mispercep-
tions as existing subscribers. Many ‘“‘new subscribers” in
fact have subscribed previously to cable service while the
former must carry rules were in effect.2° In addition, many

In this respect, we note that annually, approximately one-third of
new cable customers nationwide formerly subscribed to cable service.
Remarks of James P. Mooney, President and CEO, NCTA, before the
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1987.

239a

first-time subscribers also are likely to have formed the
misperception as a result of contacts with existing cable
subscribers and from information provided in media sources
and cable sales literature. Moreover, we believe it is im-
portant during the transition period to make affirmative
efforts to encourage the installation and use of input se-
lector switches.

58. Must Carry Policy. In the Report and Order, we
concluded that short-term must carry rules are necessary
to ensure that broadcasting remains a competitive alter-
native source of programming during the transition period.
We also recognized that such rules are a stringent form
of regulation that intrudes on cable operators’ free speech
rights. Thus, we found that must carry rules are neither
desirable nor sustainable as long-term solutions to the
problem of cable subscribers’ access to broadcast signals
and, in fact, would impede our objective of maximizing
program choices to viewers.

59. We are not persuaded by petitioners’ arguments that
we should alter our decision to adopt interim must carry
rules on policy grounds. First, we reject TBS’ argument
that we did not demonstrate that interim must carry rules
are warranted. In the Report and Order, we found that
there is evidence that some cable systems have ceased to
carry individual broadcast stations, refused to carry new
stations, and/or requested payment for carriage of stations.
In weighing the evidence of cable industry behavior in the
absence of must carry rules, we also considered that many
cable operators thus far may have been hesitant to act as
if there were no such rules pending the outcome of this
rule making proceeding. In particular, we observed that
NCTA leaders apparently have suggested to members that
they continue to carry local signal until this matter is
settled? We further determined that cable subscribers

21 See also Report and Order, supra at n. 109.

240a

generally have not maintained independent off-the-air re-
ception capability and that there is ample evidence that
cable penetration nationwide has reached a level such that
there is potential for this problem to affect a substantial
portion of the population. While it is difficult to provide
an accurate forecast of the effects of cable systems’ signal
carriage practices in the absence of must carry rules on
viewer access to program choices, the evidence is sufficient
to demonstrate that many cable subscribers may not have
access to local broadcast signals during the transition pe-
riod. Because a significant portion of the viewing public
might not have access to broadcast signals, the competitive
structure of the video programming industry could be ma-
terially harmed in the transition period. Thus, mandatory
signal carriage rules are needed to ensure the competitive
viability of broadcast television service during the transi-
tion to the new competitive environment.

60. Second, we disagree with the position of Joint
Petitioners and INTV that continuing must carry require-
ments are necessary on the ground that the input selector
switch and consumer education rules will not achieve their
intended objectives. As indicated above, we remain con-
fident that the input selector switch and consumer edu-
cation aspects of our program are a workable means to
ensure that cable subscribers will gain and maintain the
awareness of the need for, and have the opportunity to
acquire, capability to receive broadcast signals off-the-air.
We also remain confident that requiring must carry rules
on an interim basis will prevent disruption of the flow of
television services to the public and will facilitate an or-
derly transition to a new market environment in which
must carry regulation is no longer necessary because con-
sumers will have both the awareness and capability to use
switching devices to alternate between cable and broadcast
program services.

61. Third, we also reject INTV’s and NITC’s argument
that continuing must carry rules are needed to prevent

24la

disequilibria in the marketplace resulting from other reg-
ulatory and statutory factors. In the Report and Order,
we recognized that these other factors also may tend to
distort competition in the video market in a manner that
may adversely affect viewers’ access to program choices.
While we indicated our intention to separately examine
these other regulatory and statutory factors,” we deter-
mined that our action in the signal carriage matter is
supportable in its own right based on the evidence in the
record of this proceeding. In this regard, the D.C. Circuit
in Committee to Save WEAM v. FCC found that the Com-
mission may rely on competitive market forces to achieve
its public interest objectives even where market imperfec-
tions exist.22 While the compulsory license and the like
may prevent ideal market conditions, they do not preclude
basic competition in the market; and the latter is all that
is needed to justify reliance on market forces.** Accord-
ingly, we find no new information or evidence in these
petitioners’ submissions to alter our conclusion that these
factors are separable issues and resolution of the signal
carriage matter is not affected thereby. Therefore, we con-
tinue to maintain that there is no justification for the long-
term intrusion on cable operators’ First Amendment rights
that would be imposed by continuing signal carriage rules.

62. On the other side of this issue, it would not be
desirable to shorten the transition period as argued by

On February 12, 1987, We initiated two proceedings to address
these issues. We adopted a Notice of Proposed Rule Making Gen. Docket
No. 87-24. FCC 87-65, released April 23, 1987, which proposed to
repromulgate some form of syndicated exclusivity rules, to strengthen
the network non-duplication rules, and to delete the current non-net-
work program territorial exclusivity rules. We also adopted a Notice
of Inquiry, Gen. Docket No. 87-25, FCC 87-66, released April 23, 1987,
to examine the effects of cable’s compulsory copyright license on com-
petition between the cable and broadcast television industries.

23 808 F.2d 113, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
- 5.

242a

CCTA. We believe that our decision to allow for a five
year transition period reflects a sound predictive judgment
and rational exercise of our broad discretion to engage in
regulatory ‘“‘line drawing’’ in furtherance of our public in-
terest responsibilities.* As indicated in the Report and
Order, we determined that a five year transition period
is necessary not simply to provide consumers with suffi-
cient time to become aware of the need for independent
access to off-the-air broadcast signals, but also to acquire
or reacquire such capability if they so desire by installing
indoor or outdoor antennas. Further, this period is nec-
essary not only to educate consumers about the need for
input selector devices, but also to provide sufficient time
for the design, development, and marketing of equipment
that will provide consumers with a continuing and effective
off-the-air access capability.

63. Finally, for the reasons we indicated in the Report
and Order, we continue to reject UCC’s proposal for new
must carry rules that restrict carriage rights to only those
“significant local stations’ that are “in need” of carriage.”*
There, we found that UCC’s proposal was not only un-
suited to the current need for must carry rules during the
transition, but also that 1c would, in fact, hinder rather
than promote viewer access to program choices in the
interim period! We observe that UCC’s resubmission of its
earlier proposal in this proceeding is predicated on its
assertion that we improperly defined the federal interest
in this matter. As we indicated in the Report and Order,
and reiterate here, “[oJur objective in adopting these rules
is neither to penalize nor to benefit any particular station,”
but rather ‘to temper, during an interim period, potential
threats to the program source diversity provided by the

* See generally FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 814 (1977).

** See Report and Order, supra at paragraph 177

243a

system of broadcasting.’’”’ Inasmuch as we find that ar-
gument incorrect, as discussed above, we need not further
address UCC’s request.

64. Constitutional and Statutory Issues. After reviewing
the relevant Federal case law, we determined in the Report
and Order that intrusions on the First Amendment rights
of cable operators are subject to a more stringent standard
of review than that currently applied to broadcasters, that
the interim must carry rules could properly be classified
as content-neutral and that, using the standard for ana-
lyzing the propriety of content-neutral regulations, the
rules furthered the substantial federal interest of maxi-
mizing the viewing choices available to consumers and were
narrowly tailored to meet that objective. A number of
petitioners now maintain that our determination of the
must carry regulations’ content-neutrality was incorrect,
and make various arguments against our use or application
of the O'Brien standard’ to evaluate the constitutionality
of the overall must carry program. Petitioners further
claim that the input selector switch requirement is fatally
overbroad, that the five-year sunset provision does not
Sufficiently limit the rules’ intrusions on cable operators’
First Amendment rights, and that the consumer education
component of our overall plan unconstitutionally compels
cable operators to speak and to advertise their broadcast
competitors. We will address these arguments in turn.

65. Several petitioners address our application of
O'Brien in the Report and Order and the content-neutrality
of the interim must carry rules. TBS claims that the in-
terim must carry rules constitute a prior restraint on pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment because the

“ Report and Order, supra at paragraph 198.

* Generally, under O'Brien and subsequent cases, a government reg-
ulation that imposes an incidental burden on speech will be upheld if
it advances a substantial governmental interest and is narrowly tailored
to further that interest. Report and Order, supra, at 894.

244a

rules act to preclude cable operators’ programming selec-
tions, compel cable operators to make particular signal
substitutions, and impose sanctions for refusals to comply.
Consequently, TBS states, the O’Brien test is inappro-
priate to judge the constitutionality of the rules, and
stricter constitutional analysis should be applied. Century
and Leghorn maintain essentially that the interim rules
are not content-neutral because they improperly interfere
with the protected editorial discretion of cable operators
by designating classes and preferences of speakers and by
forcing operators to carry signals which they otherwise
may not choose to program.

66. We reject the suggestion that these rules should not
be considered as content-neutral for purposes of consti-
tutional analysis. The interim must carry rules require only
that for a limited time, cable systems must devote a limited
portion of their channel capacity to carriage of broadcast
signals available off-the-air in their community. As we
stated in the Report and Order, the interim rules make
that determination based not on the content of those sig-
nals, but on criteria wholly unrelated to their content—
namely, their proximity to the cable headend and the ex-
tent to which they are viewed. Moreover, they do not
forbid dissemination of any particular signal or signals.
Where, as here, The primary purpose of a regulation is
not the promotion or suppression of particular viewpoints,
the regulation in question is considered to be content-neu-
tral.’ The interim rules are intended to further the max-
imization of viewer choice, “‘not ... to prefer broadcast
viewpoints over those of cable operators or program-

*In contrast, the use of prior restraint analysis to determine the
constitutionally of a government regulation is appropriate only when
the restriction imposed by the regulation in question is content-based.
Prior restraint of a speaker seeks to prevent the dissemination of some
particular viewpoint. See e.g. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931):
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

245a

mers.””* Consequently, the rules are content-neutral for pur-
poses of constitutional evaluation; the use of the O'Bren
standard for evaluating content-neutral regulations is there-
fore fitting in this context.

67. The arguments of all three petitioners implicitly as-
sert that the content-neutral test itself is flawed because
the indirect effects of those rules upon programming judg-
ments should not be considered an incidental burden on
speech. This is a conclusion we are not empowered to reach;
this Commission will not second-guess the Supreme Court
on the formulation of constitutional tests and standards.
TBS Century and Leghorn all intimate that any attenuation
of cable operators’ programming discretion, no matter how
indirect, is presumptively invalid—a thesis which our review
of the pertinent case law belies.** The interim must carry
rules are “consistent with [the] definition of ‘content-neu-
tral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.’ ’* There-
fore, petitioners’ arguments must fail.

68. Adelphia and TBS argue that we have failed to dem-
onstrate a substantial federal interest to justify the new
rules. In this regard, they claim that we have failed to

Report and Order, supra at R43.

Carriage of noncommercial educational television stations during
the transitional period is required to further the uniquely important
Federal interest in ensuring continued access to programming “that is
not subject to the same market forces as commercial broadcast and
cable television.” Report and Order, supra at 879.

“ We note that even in assessing the constitutional implications of
regulations affecting newspapers, the First Amendment does not ‘‘nec-
essarily bar{ ] every regulation which in any way affects what the
newspapers publish.” Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir.
1968). cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842
(1969). See also Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945).

® Renton, supra n. 7, at 929 (quoting Virginia Board of Pharmacy
vr. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia Board of Phar-
macy), 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added)).

246a

, amass a sufficient evidentiary basis to substantiate the
existence of the problems which justify further must carry
regulation and our conclusion that input selector switches
will assist in maximizing consumer viewing choices. How-
ever, our decision in those respects has been reached after
weighing the voluminous comments and studies submitted
in this proceeding, our own studies on the changing system
for providing television service in this country and The
evolving role of cable television in that system, and various
congressional determinations and amendments to the Com-
munications Act encouraging diversity of programming and
competition in the cable television industry. We further
observed that, due to ‘‘the rapidly evolving nature of the
cable industry and changing competitive incentives result-
ing from the continuing development of satellite program-
ming services carried by cable systems and other factors

’ it is not clear that timely studies could be performed
to obtain an accurate forecast of the actual effect of aban-
doning must carry rules.*4

69. Therefore, our decision to implement the input se-
lector switch requirements and interim must carry rules
was based on the consideration of all available evidence
combined with our special expertise in this field of regu-
lation, a combination that we found was ample to dem-
onstrate the substantial Federal interest at stake and how
our solution to the must carry matter best furthers that
interest. We concluded, and still believe, that our long-
term goal of maximizing viewer chcice can be achieved
only after correcting consumers’ misperceptions that cable
systems will carry all available off-the-air signals and that
the only available means to view broadcasting signals is
through their cable systems, and after providing subscri-
bers with the opportunity to obtain the hardware to switch

4 Report and Order, supra at 894, n. 159.

247a

between off-the-air and cable program sources.**° We also
concluded that it is necessary to provide interim must
carry relief to the broadcast television industry for a time
to ensure that it remains a competitive alternative source
of programming as we move to an environment without
must carry rules. Consequently, a must carry program
limited in duration and less intrusive on cable operators
than the former rules remains necessary to ensure that
cable subscribers retain access to off-air signals during the
transitional period after the input selector switch rules
take effect.

70. Adelphia and TBS also claim that we failed to dem-
onstrate that the new rules are the least burdensome al-
ternative on cable operators to achieve any substantial
federal interest. We do not disagree with the proposition,
both as a matter of sound economic regulatory policy and
of constitutional doctrine, That we should seek the least
burdensome alternative, and we have attempted to fashion
rules adequate to the task at hand with that objective in
mind. However, in our judgment, petitioners’ argument
reveals a misunderstanding of the applicable test for es-
tablishing the constitutionality of the interim rules. The
proper standard for review was recently expressed thus
by the Supreme Court:

[R]egulations [are not] invalid simply because there is
some imaginable alternative that might be less bur-
densome on speech. Instead, an incidental burden on
speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore
is permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral
regulation promotes a substantial governmental inter-

* TBS’ argument that switches are not necessary because most cable
operators have not dropped local broadcast signals is not persuasive.
Moreover, because our interest is in ensuring maximum program
choices, even the dropping of one two signals frustrates that objective
if the owner does not have the knowledge or equipment to ubtain these
signals directly off-the-air.

248a

est that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.*

Moreover, we are afforded a broad degree of discretion
in crafting rules to accomplish our public interest
objectives*’

71. We concluded in the Report and Order that the
interim must carry rules are narrowly tailored to meet our
objectives, and that the burden on cable operators’ speech
imposed thereby is no greater than necessary to ensure
that program source diversity in broadcasting is not threat-
ened during the transition to a video marketplace without
must carry rules. We noted that the interim rules avoid
overbreadth and undue burdens on cable operators by ex-
empting cable systems with capacities of 20 channels or
less, by providing for absolute limitations on the number
of stations a non-exempt system is required to carry, by
narrowing the criteria for a broadcasting signal to be qual-
ified for must carry status, and by restricting the duration
of the rules to a five-year period. The rules further ensure
that local broadcast signals will be available to all sub-
scribers by requiring their availability on the lowest priced
tier. We believe that the refinements we are making to
both the interim. must carry rules and the input selector
switch and consumer education requirements, as described
below, further ensure that our two-part program is prop-
erly tailored and thus constitutionally permissible.*

* Albertini, supra n. 12, at 2907 (citations omitted). See also Arcara
v. Cloud Books, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 5060, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3175 (1986).

3° See Quincy, supra at 1459; see also White House Vigil for the ERA
Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

*s Adeiphia argues that the input selector switch requirements are
overboard for three reasons: 1) they fail to provide an exemption in
cases where an input selector switch would serve no purpose (for ex-
ample, in situations where all local VHF broadcast stations are carried
on a local cable system or where no local VHF signals are receivable
off-air in the cable system area); 2) they should not be applied to new

249a

72. While Adelphia and TBS urge us to adopt a solution
which is less intrusive on cable operators’ First Amend-
ment rights, specifically, the immediate elimination of all
must carry requirements, we are no* persuaded that there
is an alternative that would meet the need to preserve
cable subscribers’ access to off-the-air broadcast program-
ming during the transition period. That is, because of the
perception caused by our former rules’ requirement that
all local broadcast signals be carried on cable, subscribers
will lack both the awareness and capability in the short
run to access broadcast signals that are not carried by
cable. Although the awareness should be gained once the
consumer education programs begin, as described below,
it is our best judgment that a five year period is needed
to permit subscribers to regain the capability—by installing
both switches and antennae. Therefore, we continue to
believe that our solution to the must carry matter is the
most appropriate and effective means of ensuring that the
public interest is served.

73. CCTA claims that the five-year sunset provision for
the interim must carry rules does not cure their consti-
tutional infirmity. It cites Century Federal to support its
proposition that abridgement of cable operators’ First
Amendment rights is not permissible merely because it is
of limited duration. CCTA urges us to select a shorter
sunset period of no longer than one year for the interim
rules, and declares that the record in this proceeding does
not indicate that a five year period is the most appropriate
to accomplish the Commission’s goals.

74. Initially, we note that Century Federai is readily
distinguishable from the instant situation. That case in-

subscribers, since only previously existing subscribers would suffer from
the misperception that local broadcast signals cannot still be received
through external antennas; and, 3) they should not be mandatory, but
rather optional. See para. 16, supra. We believe these arguments are
resolved by our modifications te the input selector switch requirements,
detailed below at paras. 78-83.

250a

volved a potential cable operator’s First Amendment chal-
lenge to Palo Alto, California’s use of an exclusive
franchising arrangement to limit to one the number of
cable operators granted access to the facilities necessary
to install cables within the city. In granting a motion for
partial summary judgment, the district court held that the
insignificant (if any) disruption to the public domain caused
by the installation of more than one cable system does not
constitute a substantial or important governmental interest
so as to warrant suppression of all cable speakers save
one, and that even if the cable television market in a
particular area is a natural monopoly, no justification ex-
ists for greater governmental regulation of cable operators
than is otherwise permitted under the First Amendment.**
In contrast, the must carry matter involves not the total
suppression of a speaker to promote a governmental in-
terest of uncertain value, but an incidental burden on a
speaker’s First Amendment rights for a limited period of
time to further the substantial governmental interest in
maximizing viewer choice.

75. The propriety of a given time period to accomplish
our objectives in making the transition to a regulatory
environment free of mandatory signal carriage restrictions
is, of course, something that cannot be quantified through
empirical analysis.*° The five-year sunset period was se-
lected because, in our judgment, it is-the most reasonable
time period in which to impose limited mandatory carriage
while ensuring that the consumer education program is
completed and cable subscribers have an opportunity to
reestablish independent access to off-the-air broadcast tel-
evision service. We believe that, after that time, the mar-
ketplace can be relied upon to maximize program choices
for the nation. The five-year period also will allow us an

3° Century Federal, supra n. 8.

*” Significantly, we observe that CCTA does not suggest any method
by which this might be accomplished.

25la

ample opportunity to observe the transitional cable and
broadcast marketplace for purposes of our prospective rule
making to determine whether mandatory carriage should
continue to be required in particular instances beyond the
sunset of the interim rules. Consequently, for all these
reasons, we continue to believe that the five-year sunset
period is necessary and appropriate.

76. Texas Cable and Leghorn criticize the consumer ed-
ucation requirement of our two-part regulatory program
as adopted in the Report and Order, claiming that it is
unconstitutional because it compels cable operators to ad-
vertise the existence of their competitors and coerces cable
operators to spread a message with which the operators
may disagree. Texas Cable likens the consumer education
requirement to the kind of required ‘‘consumer interest”
message recently struck down by the Supreme Court in
Pacific Gas. Leghorn contends that case supports his po-
sition because the Court there agreed with the utility's
contention that it had a First Amendment right not to be
required to use its own property to help spread a message
with which it disagrees.

77. Petitioners’ arguments misconstrue the purpose and
function of the consumer education requirements. The re-
quirements as modified below direct only that cable op-
erators list Television stations that may be available off-
the-air in the community that are not carried on their cable
systems at the time the listing is provided, and give gen-
eral guidelines as to the information to be provided to
subscribers about the input selector switch requirements
and the carriage of local television stations. A regulated
entity may be required to provide certain information to
protect substantial or important interests of its customers.
For example, Section 631 of the Cable Act* requires cable
operators to inform subscribers in writing of the nature,

“47 U.S.C. §551.

252a

etc., of personally identifiable information collected or to
be collected about them and the possible uses of that in-
formation. The consumer education information require-
ments at issue here, including the identification of
uncarried signals, similarly further the public interest by
educating consumers about changes in the video market-
place that affect their ability to receive programming. We
believe that this requirement can be imposed under Sec-
tions 2(a), 4(i), and 303(r) of the Act to advance the im-
portant federal interest in maximizing program choices.”
We also note that the consumer education requirement
fosters Section 307(b) objectives by facilitating access to
off-the-air television. However, the guidelines do not re-
quire operators to provide any further information or in-
ducement that solicits subscribers to actually view the video
‘“‘competition”’, e.g., a description of the general format or
programming of the uncarried television station or stations
to interest subscribers in switching to their off-the-air ca-
pability to watch programs carried on that signal. Without
such an inducement, we do not believe that the mere iden-
tification of uncarried television stations as part and parcel
of our overall program of educating video consumers about
the changes in the signal carriage rules and their possible
need for input selector switches constitutes ‘‘advertising”’
of those stations.** While the Supreme Court, in Central

See U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); see also
Report and Order in CC Docket No. 81-893, 95 FCC 2d 1276, 1293-
94 (1983).

** For example, Leghorn, in characterizing the consumer education
program as ‘‘advertising,”” states that “‘Broadcasting already devote
considerable promotional effort to identifying their video fare.”” How-
ever, our program requires only the identification of a signal, not in-
formation about any programming carried on that signal. Video
consumers are induced to view a station because of desirable program-
ming, not because they are informed that a station operates on a
particular channel. These petitioners also neglect to note a crucial dif-
ference between the consumer education program and ‘‘advertising’’—
namely, that we are requiring dissemination of this information only

253a

Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York (Central Hudson),** recognized the need to
protect commercial speech due to the importance of the
information function of advertising, it does not follow that
any or all information required to be provided by a reg-
ulated entity regarding changes in rules and obligations
which affect service to its customers constitutes advertis-
ing per se.** In any event, “‘[b]ecause the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information
such speech provides ... [the] constitutionally protected
interest in not providing any particular factual information
in [a business’’] advertising is minimal.’’*

78. Insofar as a purely informational requirement like
the one adopted in this proceeding is entitled to First
Amendment protection,” it is well settled that restrictions
that incidentally burden speech are justified if the regu-
lation is content-neutral, serves a substantial governmental
interest and is not more extensive than necessary to fur-
ther that interest.** Equally permissible are restrictions on

to their business customers, not to the public at large. In addition, we
note that the Commission has imposed similar disclosure requirements
in the common carrier area. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Fur-
nishing of Customer Premises Equipment, 95 FCC 2d 1117, 1143 (1983).

“447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).

* Pacific Gas, supra at 908, n. 9, is inapposite in this regard, since
the “speech” involved there was a utility's newsletter that ‘‘extend[ed]
well beyond speech that proposes a commercial transaction.”” The Court

clearly distinguished applicable law relating to disclosure requirements
by businesses. Ja. at n. 12.

* Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct.
2265, 2285 (1985).
* Even commercial speech consisting of purely factual matter without

an advertising component is entitled to a measure of First Amendment
protection. Virginia Board of Pharmacy, supra n. 24, at 762.

* See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).

254a

false, misleading or deceptive commercial speech.** More-
over, we note that ‘disclosure’ requirements for com-
mercial speech are not subject to ‘‘a strict ‘least restrictive
means’ analvsis. ...’°° We believe that the guidelines as
to the information which must be provided to consumers
are a permissible, minimally intrusive form of directing
the manner in which that information is presented and of
assuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about
the function of the input selector switch requirement and
the meaning of and impact which the interim must carry
rules and their expiration may have on their viewing
choices and habits. In reaching this conclusion, it is im-
portant to point out what the consumer education require-
ments do not mandate. We are not attempting to confine
or limit the commercial expression of cable operators on
particular issues.*! or to particular language in describing
features and effects-of the new rules, but, rather, we seek
to provide only a measure of accuracy with regard to
commercial information disseminated in one area—that of
the general requirements and possible effects of our two-
part regulatory program. Similarly, we do not attempt to
circumscribe what may be said about the two-part pro-
gram, but only require, in the interest of educating video
consumers who are cable subscribers, a minimum of in-
formation about how our new regulations may affect their
ability to receive local television signals. Consequently,
these information requirements are narrowly tailored to
serve the important commercial speech objective of ‘‘as-
sist{ing] consumers and further[ing] The societal interest
in the fullest possible dissemination of information,’ dur-

* See Virginia Board of Pharmacy, supra n. 24, at 771-772.

* Zauderer, supra at 2282, n. 14.

= Cf. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 485 U.S. 765 (1978).
* Central Hudson, supra n. 32, at 561-562.

255a

ing the transitional period to a video marketplace free of
mandatory carriage requirements.*

79. Finally, we believe that the substantial modifications
to the input selector switch requirements we are making
herein will resolve Adelphia’s concerns that the input se-
lector switch requirements adopted in the Report and Or-
der contravene Sections 622 and 623 of the Cable Act.
The revised switch requirements will not restrict the
amount cable systems may charge for services and/or
equipment. Further, neither the input selector switch re-
quirements nor the interim must carry rules impose any
new requirement regarding the content of cable services
as addressed by Section 624 of the Cable Act. As we noted
in the Report and Order, we believe that the specific ref-
erence to the former must carry rules by the House Report

‘® Texas Cable claims that the consumer education program also is
inconsistent with our decisions to eliminate various policies regarding
trade practices of broadcasters under our “‘underbrush’’ proceedings
and with our 1985 finding that the fairness doctrine is contrary to the
public interest. We observe that the underbrush decisions eliminated
policies that often were not under this Commission’s areas of expertise
and/or were duplicative of other policies. Where alternative remedies
or market forces would serve to deter an undesired practice, we elim-
inated the policy in question. See e.g., Elimination of Unnecessary
Broadcast Regulation, 57 RR 2d 913 (1985), recon. denied, 58 RR 2d
864 (1985), affd sub nom. Telecommunications Research and Action
Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In contrast, as we have
determined in this proceeding, the must carry matter requires our
intervention to assure that the information disseminated to subscribers
is consistent with implementation of the rules and policies adopted
herein. Moreover, we find no correlation between the informational
requirement here and rules that we have raised questions about relating
to regulatory oversight of the correct balance of coverage of particular
kinds of issues by broadcasters. The latter concerns not factual ‘‘dis-
closure requirements for business corporations,” Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric, 106 S.Ct. at 911, n.12, but speech regarding matters of public
concern, which is entitled to the highest degree of encouragement and
protection. See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 FCC 2d 143, 149-50 (1985).

256a

on the Cable Act expresses Congress’ intention that we
had, and continue to have, the authority to promulgate
regulations to further the substantial Federal interests at
issue in this proceeding, including the authority to use
must carry rules and to amend them if necessary.®* Con-
sequently, the adoption of interim rules is well within our
discretion under the Cable Act and, moreover, does not
constitute a ‘‘new’’ addition to the content of cable services
within the meaning of Section 624 of the Act. On the
contrary, the new rules require considerably less to be
carried than the former rules.

Basic Policy Rule Modifications

80. While we remain confident that the basic elements
of our regulatory program are practically, technically and
legally feasible means for achieving our policy objectives,
we find that certain features of that program should be
modified to accomplish better those objectives. In partic-
ular, the input selector switch rules, as adopted, may im-
pose burdens on cable operators that are greater than
necessary to correct the viewer misperception problem and
also may tend to limit cable operators’ and consumers’
flexibility to choose switching equipment appropriate to
their specific circumstances. Also, the consumer education
requirements may not provide cable operators sufficient

* “Regulations which relate to the content of cable service and which
remain in effect include the FCC’s must-carry requirements." H.R.Rep.
No. 934, 98th Congress, 2d Sess. at 70 (1984).

> Report and Order at 896. In this connection, we observe again that
the Quincy court ruled only that The must carry requirements at issue
there were unconstitutional, and expressly reserved judgment on the
question of whether any must carry requirements could pass consti-
tutional muster.

%* The fact that the Quincy court vacated the rules does not alter
this conclusion. Section 624(f{2MA) of the Cable Act proliibits only the
adoption of new content regulations not in effect on September 21,
1983. The must carry rules were undisputably in effect on that date.

257a

flexibility to tailor their information programs to their sys-
tems’ circumstances. Finally, some aspects of our program
require clarification.

81. In considering petitioners’ statements with respect
to input selector switch costs, we recognize that the rules
as adopted may impose substantial financial burdens on
cable operators. These rules not only would require cable
systems to bear all of the costs associated with equipment
and installation for new subscribers, but also would require
them to provide switches in cases where subscribers might
not want them. We also note petitioners’ point that the
rules would require switches to be provided in areas where
there are no broadcast signals available off-the-air, such
that the switches would serve no useful purpose.

82. In addition, upon further reflection on this issue, we
find that the rules tend to limit incentives and flexibility
for cable operators to provide a range of switching equip-
ment to meet varying subscriber preferences and to ensure
better switch compatibility with video peripheral equip-
ment, such as VCRs, and specific video equipment fea-
tures. By requiring that switches be provided at no charge
or at cost, the rules reduce cable operators’ economic in-
centives to offer switch options with premium features,
such as electronic operation or remote control capability,
or to offer upgraded terminal/converter devices that in-
clude built-in switches. Subscribers will be more likely to
maintain and use independent off-the-air reception capa-
bility if the associated input selector devices are compatible
with their needs and otherwise convenient to use. More-
over, the record demonstrates that there are other ad-
vantages to the more expensive electronic switches,
including longer lifespan and better isolation. Obviously,
cable operators may not desire to provide these switches
free of charge.

83. In view of these considerations, we are adopting
substantial revisions to the input selector switch require-

258a

ments that are generally consistent with the approach sug-
gested by CCTA. Under the revised rules, cable systems
will be required to offer switches to new and existing
subscribers, but will be permitted in all cases to charge
for the purchase or lease of switches and associated hard-
ware. In addition, cable systems will be permitted to charge
for installation of switches for existing subscribers. There
will be no “at cost’’ restriction on pricing of either the
equipment or its installation for existing subscribers. How-
ever, cable systems will not be permitted to charge an
additional fee strictly for installation of switches for new
subscribers. We believe the incremental labor necessary to
include a switch along with installation of other equipment
for new subscribers is minimal and that to provide in-
stallation at no additional charge will assist in encouraging
new subscribers to acquire a switch. Cable systems will
be required to make an affirmative switch offer to their
subscribers in accordance with our original plan; however,
the rules also will include language to clarify that sub-
scribers may decline the switch offer and are not otherwise
obligated to install or maintain off-the-air reception ca-
pability. Also, we wish to clarify that consumers may use
switches and associated hardware obtained from sources
other than their cable system. We believe this will provide
a proper competitive balance in the marketing of input
selector equipment to limit the price of switches. We are
making these changes in order to encourage flexibility in
the range of switch options available to subscribers, so
that we do not inadvertently encourage use only of the
non-state-of-the-art mechanical ‘‘A/B” switch, and in order
to greatly reduce the financial burden imposed on cable
operators. By this change, not only will cable operators
not be responsible for bearing the costs of switches and
their installation, but they will not be required to provide
switches To subscribers who do not need them, for ex-
ample, because their reception of off-the-air signals is weak
or non-existent.

259a

84. We agree with petitioners who argue that there is
no need to require inpvt selector switches or consumer
education in areas where there are no broadcast signals
available off-the-air. Accordingly, we will exempt cable sys
tems that are located in such areas from any requirements
under the rules adopted in this proceeding. The most re-
liable general indicators of whether a broadcast station’s
signal is generally available off-the-air in a particular area
are its Grade B predicted contour and whether it is ‘‘sig-
nificantly viewed”’ in the cable community.” These are the
indicators of available off-the-air signals we adopted for
use in determining whether cable systems are subject to
effective competition for basic service as part of our im-
plementation of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 in MM Docket No. 84-1296. These two indicators
are also appropriate for use in determining signal avail-
ability for purposes of the exemption from the switch and
consumer education rules. The Grade B contour of a sta-
tion is the standard relied on to determine expected service
areas. Also, we recognize that in many cases, a television
station’s signal may be viewable off-the-air at distances
beyond its Grade B contour. In the latter case, reception
of the station’s signals is generally less reliable with or-
dinary roof-top antennas and may require special equip-
ment. Areas beyond a station’s Grade B contour where
its signa! is available with ordinary equipment or where
the population has tended to install Special antennas and
other equipment necessary to ensure reliable reception can

* As defined in Section 76.5(k) of our ruies, a station is significantly
viewed if its audience in noncable households meets or exceeds the
following levels: 1) for full or Partial network affiliated station—a share
of viewing hours of at least 3 percent (total week hours), and a net
weekly circulation of at least 25 percent; and, 2) for an independent
station—a share of viewing hours of at least 2 percent (total week
hours), and a net weekly circulation of at least 5 percent. See 47 CFR
§§76.5(k) and 76.54.

“ See Report and Order in MM Docket No. 84-1296, 58 RR 2d 1
(1985).

260a

be identified by whether the station is significantly viewed
in the area. Thus, the rules will exempt any cable system
serving a community where no portion of that community
is within the predicted Grade B contour of at least one
full service broadcast television station or a noncommercial
educational translator station eligible for must carry status
and no such stations are significantly viewed in the county
in which the cable community is located.

85. There also may be situations where the Grade B
contour of one or more broadcast stations overlaps all or
a portion or the cable community, yet the signals will not
be viewable in that area due to terrain shielding or other
factors. In such instances, the cable system operator may
submit showings and engineering studies that the signals
are not available anywhere within the cable community.
Such submissions shall include studies made in accordance
with Section 73.686 of our rules.**86. We also recognize
that there may be instances where a new broadcast sta-
tion, existing broadcast station with newly upgraded fa-
cilities, or existing station that becomes significantly viewed
will provide service to a community served by a cable
system previously exempt from the rules. Where such a
situation occurs prior to the expiration of the five-year
transition period, the cable system at that time will be
required to comply with all aspects of the rules as adopted
in this proceeding. Where such a situation occurs subse-
quent to the expiration of the transition period, the cable
system will be required to comply only with the consumer
education rules that continue beyond the five year period.

87. We also acknowledge the concern express. d by some
petitioners that the available supply of input selector
switches may not be adequate to enable cable operators
to begin providing switches to new subscribers within 30
days of the release of the instant decision, when the rules

*See 47 CFR §73.686.

26la

would become effective, as stated in the Order staying
their effective date.* We recognize that the production
and distribution systems for supplying input selector
switches and associated equipment may need some time
to catch up to the increased demand for this equipment
and to meet the switch technical standards to be adopted
pursuant to the proceeding will initiate shortly as discussed
below. Additional time also would enable cable operators
to more fully plan their activities for complying with the
new rules. Accordingly, the requirement for offering
switches to new subscribers will be delayed for six months
after the effective date of these rules in the same manner
as the requirement for offering switches to existing sub-
scribers. However, cable operators will be required to in-
form new subscribes at the time of installation of service
of the need to maintain off-the-air reception capability and
to provide the other information required by the consumer
education requirements immediately upon the effective date
of the rules.

88. In considering the signal leakage issue discussed
above, we recognize that there may be some cases where
consumers install switches improperly or switches fail and
signal leakage results. Cable systems will be responsible
for detecting and eliminating signal leakage in excess of
the standards set forth in Sections 76.605 and, after its
July 1, 1990 effective date, 76.611 of our rules resulting
from input selector switches regardless of whether the
switches are owned or installed by subscribes. Cable sys-
tems already are required to conduct systematic perform-
ance checks of their facilities under Section 76.601 and,
thus, this requirement will not substantially alter the reg-
ulatory burden on able operators. Moreover, the typical
cable subscriber does not have the technical expertise or
equipment to detect signal leakage. We also recognize the
importance to life and safety of preventing signal leakage

* See Order supra at n. 38.

262a

on the aeronautical frequencies and that in general cable
systems will be the only entities qualified and equipped to
detect Such signal leakage. Cable operators’ responsibility
in this regard will be limited to the minimum necessary
to detect and eliminate signal leakage in excess of that
permitted under the rules. In cases where such leakage
occurs, cable operators will be required only to disconnect
or, if ultimately necessary, discontinue service to the sub-
scriber until the leakage problem is corrected. Cable op-
erators will not be restricted from charging for services
and hardware associated with correction of switch leakage,
including the replacement, repair, or proper installation of
the switching equipment.

89. As indicated above, we do not want the revised
switch requirements to provide cable systems with eco-
nomic advantages that might permit them to charge ex-
cessive prices for switches and installation or otherwise to
be less attentive to consumer needs in this area. As an
additional measure to limit this advantage, it is necessary
to include provisions in the consumer education rules to
require cable systems to include as part of their program
a statement that switches may be obtained from other
suppliers. Cable systems also will be required to indicate
that there are a range of possible switch options, including,
for example, simple cable/broadcast manual, multiple source
input switches, electronic switches, remote control
switches, and receivers with built-in switching functions.
They will further be required to state that the list of switch
options indicted is only representative of those that may
be offered and that other options also may be available.

90. In view of the importance of consumer education to
the achievement of our goal of correcting viewers’ mis-
perceptions about the need for independent access to off-
the-air broadcast signals, we plan to maintain the con-
sumer education program as a continuing requirement be-
yond the five-year transition period. However, we recognize
that this requirement imposes some burden on cable op-

263a

erators. Therefore, we would expect to revisit the need
for continuing the consumer education requirement as part
of the proceeding announced in the Report and Order and
which we plan to complete prior to the expiration of the
transition period, to determine whether there are partic-
ular situations where must carry rules might continue to
be necessary.

91. We believe this revised approach effectively will
eliminate the major portion of the financial burden imposed
on cable operators by our original decision. It also will
eliminate the requirement for switches to be provided in
situations where they would not be used. In addition, the
revised switch requirements will provide cable operators
with the incentives and flexibility to offer a wider range
of switch options to meet varying consumer needs. These
rule modifications will not compromise our objectives To
change consumers’ misperception of the need for main-
taining access to off-the-air broadcast signals

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1508%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
