# Opposition Brief — A. C. v. Iowa

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 485 U.S. 1008

## Text

ae PERE ee ERS TR oe cara aati Oe ee Te ee
ON ee bo ae A eg RT tea EN CASTS Cen eae te a i E
we ni = ces BS bee 2 tat PA ORES Sh eg b, “Be id
. ~ =

Supreme Court, US,

b) FILED

No. 87-1432 ~ MAR 25 1988

; JOSEPH F, SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

A.C., AC. S.C., $.C., and J.C.,
Petitioners

VS.

STATE OF IOWA
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

THOMAS J. MILLER
Attorney General of lowa

GORDON E. ALLEN
Deputy Attorney General
Counsel of Record for Respondent

CHARLES K. PHILLIPS
Assistant Attorney General
Hoover Building

Des Moines, lowa 50319
(515) 281-8330

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the Lowa Supreme Court err in ruling that the trial
court acted properly when it approved the removal of five
children from the foster home which was disruptive of their
relationship with their biological parent.

Il. Did the lowa Supreme Court disregard principles of
federal law concerning the rights of persons in the custody
of the State.

Ill. Does this case present a context for exercise of the
United States Supreme Court's supervisory powers.

PARTIES

The petitioner in this matter is the former guardian ad litem
of five children who have been subject to lowa child in need
of assistance proceedings. The guardian ad litem represented
the children through several years of such proceedings and
was ultimately successful in obtaining the termination of their
mother’s parental rights. The rights of the fathers were not
terminated as they were not properly served. On February 17,
1987, the petitioner, Ms. Harlan, was removed as guardian ad
litem by the trial court, which found that her representation
was harmful to the children. (lowa Supreme Court App. 939. )

Accordingly, the parties in this matter are the former guar-
dian ad litem, the State of lowa, and, at least nominally, the
three natural fathers whose rights have not been terminated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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is Ss saws cand eas Sake vd be bewkau suas iii
os he Oo eG a Whe Se wd Kae a oK wee Rees Vv
re PGS Se DN die isl dda hve wk @ aoe d Cees l
Constitutional and Statutory
ao i) ga ewcW } ae ok oso eo ad hoc l
I I dance evan cee cccsucstansves 3
Summary of Argument Against
oie ig fue vo cb oe vae eg eenacccezed 20
Argument Against Granting Writ:
I. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT DID NOT
ACT IMPROPERLY IN APPROVING THE
REMOVAL FROM THE M. FOSTER HOME
SO AS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN
TP I I, MIE oo ecw cee ccc eee 20
Il. THE PETITION DOES NOT ESTABLISH
THAT THE [OWA SUPREME COURT
DISREGARDED PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
LAW REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF
Ey Sb et) 23

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page
Il. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A
CONTEST FOR EXERCISE OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S SUPERVISORY
4. SR i i sername ites 25
RU oS Zoo a Sek kre Lee ee ORE es i eT ou bhebaeese 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1486 ((9th Cir. 1986) . 23

Brown Vv. San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Cal.
NE ha ee ihre 5 ke Pee he Gee aE ERR spk a haa 23

Crim v. Harrison, 552 F.Supp. 37 (N.D. Miss.
PIED os ics Wes ae Ban Se alee EM acd Sm + 9 35 p98 23

Drummond vy. Fulton County Department of Family
and Children’s Services, 563 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc ), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3103, 57 L.Ed.2d

EE Oe Br inc oes no as oo ae ee eevee ee
Kyees v. County Department of Public Welfare,
GOO F.2ak Ge 6 eek Ge. BOTS nnn tin ih cccenve be

Matter of Welfare of B.B.B., 393 N.W. 2d 436

Ce OR reer oe te Pere or a eee eee 25
Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F.Supp. 728 (W.D. Mich.

1980 ), aff'd, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. )

(per curiam ), cert. denied,

454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70

ee ee Be me a hike bho ewes aos Rae ee ey
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.

Sin: ST? Sis. 24, 3S C. Eek Be £4 (9977) «2002 28
STATUTES
OF 5 i oe A ae oe Sw aes oop ck eee 25
ce Ce Sections 257. «WD occ 5n ve ka xh do bene ee 25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
lowa Code Section 2432.102(G)( 1985) ............0..008. 24
ere © ieee SR AGS. 8ST CRUD bv cccccccvecvecudaeeur 25
Regulations
441 lowa Administrative Code 7.505 d)................. 24

No. 87-1432

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

ASC., AC., 3.C., $.C., ane 3G...
Petitioners

VS.

STATE OF IOWA
Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

JURISDICTION

The respondent accepts the jurisdictional statement pre-
pared by the petitioner. (Petition, p. 2.)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, section 1, states:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and

I

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, Or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.

lowa Code section 232.102(6) (1985 ) states:

In any order transferring custody to the department or any
agency, or in orders pursuant to a custody order, the court
shall specify the nature and category of disposition which
will serve the best interests of the child, and shall pre-
scribe the means by which the placement shall be moni-—
tored by the court. If the court orders the transfer of the
custody of the child to the department of human services
or other agency for placement, the department or agency
shall submit a case permanency plan to the court and shall
make every effort to return the child to the child’s home
as quickly as possible. When the child is not returned to
the child’s home and if the child has been previously
placed in a licensed foster care facility, the department or
agency shall consider placing the child in the same
licensed foster care facility. If the court orders the transfer
of custody to a relative or other suitable person, the court
may direct the department or other agency to provide ser-
vices to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian in order
to enable them to resume custody of the child.

441 lowa Administrative Code 7.5(5) states, in part:

Where no hearing is granted. No hearing will be granted

on the following issues:

*-* *

d. The renioval of children from or placement in a specif-
ic foster care setting.

STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter began with child abuse investigations in 1984
and 1985. Allegations were made that K.C. was abusing and
neglecting her children A.C.1, A.C.2, $.C.1, $.C.2 and J.C. In-
vestigtions revealed that K.C. had mental health problems and
did not provide adequate shelter or food for the children. She
let them wander about unsupervised and improperly clothed,
and, on at least one occasion, physically abused one of them.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 12-13, 17.)

The children were voluntarily placed in foster care on
March 22, 1985, in the home of L.M. and P.M. (lowa S.Ct. App.
3.) A child in need of (CHINA) assistance petition was filed
that day alleging that K.C. failed to adequately supervise her
children, or provide them with adequate food, clothing and
shelter. (lowa S.Ct App. 3.) The petition was later amended
to add the additional CHINA grounds of physical abuse, and
of the parent desiring to be relieved of the children’s care.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 7-8.) K-C., meanwhile, was admitted to the
mental health unit at a local hospital.

About two weeks after the foster care placement, K.C.
wrote a letter requesting that her children be returned when
she was released from the hospital. (lowa S.Ct. App. 3-4.) An
application for temporary removal was filed in response to
that request. (lowa S.Ct. App. 3.) In the first court order in
this matter, Judge Thomas Mott granted that application, find-
ing that K.C. continued to require hospitalization, and had lost
her home during her hospital stay. (lowa S.Ct. App. 25-26.)

At the temporary removal hearing there was a dispute over
visitation. The Department of Human Services felt visitation
would be safe and should occur. (lowa S.Ct. App. 17.) The
guardian ad litem stated that the children didn’t want visita-
tion and felt it should not be forced. (lowa S.Ct. App. 18-19.)
The court declined to interfere with the Department's discre-
tion in this matter, noting that it was wary of being manipu-
lated by the children’s expressed wishes. (lowa S.Ct. App. 20.)

The CHINA adjudication hearing was held on May 13, 1985.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 27.) An order was issued four days later.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 54.) In the order Judge Mott found that there
were five C. children, aged five months to ten years. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 54.) He found that they had been neglected, abused,
and inadequately supervised and sheltered. (lowa S.Ct. App.
55-50.)

The dispositional hearing was held in June of 1985. Before the
hearing, the Department of Human Services filed a disposi-
tional report which was later admitted into evidence. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 58.) It noted that K.C. had transferred to the Center
for Personal Development in Ames, lowa. (Court Report of 6
5/85, p. 1.) It was anticipated that she would require care
there for an extended period of time. (Court Report of 6/5/85,
p. 1.) The report stated that the children’s natural fathers had
shown no interest in gaining custody of the children. (Court
Report of 6/5/85, p. 1.) Social worker Kathy Thompson re-
commended foster care. (Court Report of 6/5/85, pp. 1-2.) At
the hearing all the parties concurred with this recommenda-
tion, and the court entered an order accordingly. (lowa $.Ct.
App. 58-59.) At this time the two oldest girls were displaying
hostility towards their mother, and towards reunification.
(Court Report of 12/13/85, p. 1.) K-C. was making “excellent”
progress in her placement in Ames. (Court Report of 12/13
85, p. 2.)

On January 6, 1986, after a December 16, 1985 review
hearing, Judge Mott issued an order approving continued fos-
ter care. (lowa S.Ct. App. 67-68.) Just prior to the hearing the
guardian ad litem had filed a motion to modify the disposi-
tional order so as to remove the Department as custodian of
the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 65.) The motion was based on
the Department's insistence on the maintenance of visits with
the natural mother, and the goal of reunification. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 65.) The motion was apparently dropped. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 614-615.)

The next six-month review hearing was scheduled for July
of 1986. Before the hearing, Psychologist Rex Shahriari filed
a report. His report contained the first hints of the develop-
ments that would change the nature of this case. Dr. Shahriari
had examined the records and evaluations of this case, and
conducted a three-hour visit with the children at the home
of the foster parents. (lowa S.Ct. App. 980.) He was positively
impressed with the foster home. (lowa S.Ct. App. 981.) He
found that the home more than adequately met the children’s
material and physical needs. (lowa S.Ct. App. 981.) There was
a significant bonding between the foster parents and the
chidren. (lowa S.Ct. App. 981.) However, Dr. Shahriari also
noted that the foster parents discussed K.C.’s Competence as
a parent in “open and frank” discussions with the children.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 981.) He stated that the foster parents
showed questionable judgment in this regard, and that their
comments regarding K.C.’s competency “has and will continue
to cause them anxiety, mistrust and fear of their biological
parent”. (lowa S.Ct. App. 981.) He opined that the foster par-
ents had, perhaps unwittingly “berated” K.C., “with the net ef-
fect being that the chances of the children having a positive
relationship with their biological mother is reduced”. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 982.) He noted that the “openness and frankness”
of the discussions seemed to be “circumscribed to | K.C.’s| in-

6

adequacies” (lowa £.Ct. App. 982), and that during the discus-
sions, the oldest children were very quiet and attentive and
tended to echo the foster parents’ opinions. (lowa S.Ct. App.
982.)

At this time K.C. was attempting to decide whether to join
a residential program in Cedar Rapids, lowa, designed to lead
to independent living. (lowa S.Ct. App. 977.) Social Worker
Kathy Thompson stated that if K.C. did not join the program,
she would be provided with numerous services designed to
aid in the return and transition of the children to the home.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 977.) At this time, increased visitation with
the children was occurring. (lowa S.Ct. App. 977.)

At the July 28, 1986 hearing, the court continued the chil-
dren’s placement in foster care, and set the matter for another
review in six months. (lowa S.Ct. App. 69-70.)

That hearing was precluded by several developments occur-
ring in September of 1986. On September 15, 1986, the De-
partment of Human Services sent a “10 day notice” terminat-
ing the children’s placement with the foster parents. The
placement was being terminated because of a lack of coopera-
tion with the case plan, and because the children’s best inter-
est demanded placement elsewhere. (lowa S.Ct. App. 75.)

The children’s guardian ad litem filed an “application for
temporary injunction, termination of parental rights, and re-
hearing as to disposition”. (lowa S.Ct. App. 71.) The applica-
tion alleged that the Department of Human Services had en-
gaged in emotional and psychological abuse of the children
by repeatedly “threatening” them that they would eventually
return to the care of the natural mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 72.)
The application alleged that the children were best off in the
care of the foster parents, who would eventually seck to adopt
them. (lowa S.Ct. App. 73.) The application requested, inter
alia: (a) a restraining order preventing the Department from

moving the children; (b) a transfer of custody from the De-
partment to the foster parents; (c) permission for the guardian
ad litem to seek a termination of parental rights. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 73-74.) The application was followed shortly by a brief
s* ting that “leading experts on the subject of child custody
and placement feel that bonding between foster children and
long-term caretakers should be legally recognized as a com-
mon law adoption, and should noi be disrupted within the
standards of the court's protection of the best interests of the
children.” (lowa 5.Ct. App. 77.)

The attorney for the natural mother resisted the application
for an injunction. (Answer and_ Resistance filed
9/15/86.) The resistance stated that continued placement in
the home of the foster parents may not be in the best interests
of the children, and that the foster parents had been aware
of concerns over the placement since early 1986. (Answer
and Resistance filed 9/15/86.) In the resistance the natural
mother also requested a hearing to determine if the guardian
ad litem should be disqualified. (Answer and Resistance filed
9/15/86.) The natural mother alleged that the commonly ac-
cepted goal of the juvenile court is the reunification of the
family, and that the guardian ad litem had indicated very early
on in the case that her goal was termination of parental rights.
(Answer and Resistance filed 9/15/86.) She alleged that the ac-
tions of the guardian ad litem were biased in favor of the cur-
rent foster parents. (Answer and Resistance filed 9/15/86. )

The application for a temporary injunction came on for
hearing on September 26, 1986. A teacher of one of the chil-
dren stated that removal from the placement might cause the
children emotional harm. (lowa S.Ct. App. 99.) A school nurse
said the children were receiving better care now than they
were in their natural mother’s care. (lowa S.Ct. App. 108. )

8

Psycholgist Eva Christiansen, who evaluated the children,
testified on behalf of the children. When asked if the Depart-
ment of Human Services’ threat to remove the children was
a good acton, she stated, “It may not be a good action. It may
be a necessary action”. (lowa S.Ct. App. 118.) She stated that
the case was at a point where a decision had to be made to
remove or keep the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 125.) Dr. Chris-
tiansen stated that she had met with the foster parents in late
1985 or early 1986 regarding their foster parent role. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 122.) She said they had been startled by her recom-
mendations as how to proceed, especially as to cooperating
with the Department. (lowa S.Ct. App. 122, 131.) Dr. Chris-
tiansen stated that she had become aware “really immediately”
that the foster parents were interested in maintaining a perma-
nent parental role for the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 123.) She
stated that, ethically, the only way she could work with them
in therapy was to work with them on their goal. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 124.) Thus, she recommended cooperation with the par-
ent and the Department, so that if termination did occur they

would be the persons most likely to get the children. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 124.) Dr. Christiansen described the foster parents’
negative feelings towards the natural mother and described
their relationship with the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 128.) Dr.
Christiansen stated that there were certain aspects of that re-
lationship that were tighter than that of a normal parent-child
relationship. (lowa S.Ct. App. 130.) She attributed this to the
desperation of the children for a normal family life, and to fos-
ter parents’ willingness to offer that sort of relationship, a wil-
lingess that not only went beyond what one would want in
successful foster parenting, but also went beyond what one
would want in successful parenting. (lowa S.Ct. App. 129-
130.) She stated that there was an aspect of mutual desper-
ation in the relationship (lowa S.Ct. App. 129), and that that
relationship interfered with the children’s ability to reunite

9

with the mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 132.)

Dr. Rex Shahriari, who had submitted the earlier report,
also testified. He reiterated his concerns regarding the effect
the foster parents were having on reunification efforts. He
stated that during his visit to the foster home there had been
“quite a bit of berating” of the natural mother, and much reit-
eration and commenting upon her past behavior. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 184.) He felt this created considerable anxiety for the
children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 184.) He stated that if this berating
was of an ongoing nature, it would reduce the possibility of
the children having a positive relationship with their mother.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 185.) When asked if the foster parents would
have a motivation for harming this relationship, he speculated
that if there was a desire to adopt the children, the probability
of adoption would increase if a wedge could be driven be-
tween mother and children (dJowa S.Ct. App. 186.) He testified
that despite the foster parents’ lack of psychological training,
it would not be unrealistic to be able to expect them to be
able to separate their feelings so a positive image could be
projected of the mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 189.)

L.M., foster father, testified. He denied saying bad things
about K.C. to the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 193-194.) He con-
ceded that he would like to adopt them. (lowa S.Ct. App. 194-
195.) He stated that the children had a negative attitude to-
wards K.C. from the first day of placement, and had always
called the foster parents mom and dad. (lowa S.Ct. App. 203.)
He testified regarding his two recent arrests on operating
while intoxicated charges. (lowa S.Ct. App. 124.)

P.M., the foster mother, testified. She stated she would like
to keep the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 217.) She stated that
she encouraged a positive image of the biological mother and
that even if she werg able to adopt the children, she would
not cut the mother out of their lives. (lowa S.Ct. App. 218.)

10

On October 1, 1986, the application to enjoin the chil-
dren’s custodian from placing the children outside the M.
home was denied. (lowa S.Ct. App. 235.) On October 2, 1987,
the natural mother filed a motion to dismiss the petition to
terminate parental rights, the motion being predicated on the
fact that, under lowa law, a guardian ad litem is not authorized
to file a petition to terminate parental rights. (lowa S.Ct. App.
236.) On October 14th, the court retroactively authorized the
guardian ad litem to file a petition, holding that her conten-
tions should be resolved on the merits. (lowa S.Ct. App. 240-
241.)

A hearing date was set for the motion to terminate parental
rights. Prior to the hearing, the attorney for the natural
mother moved that the hearing be closed because of the ex-
tensive publicity the case had engendered. ( Motion filed 12/1/
86.) The guardian ad litem responded that the children had
enjoyed the publicity and requested that the hearing remain
open. (Resistance filed 12/3/86.) On December 9, 1986, the
court ruled that the hearing would be open because there is
no statutory authorization for closing termination proceedings
under lowa law. (lowa S.Ct. App. 290. )

The termination hearing was held on December 12, 1986.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 313.) Testifying on behalf of the children,
was John Frederick Tedesco of the Des Moines Child Gui-
dance Center in Des Moines. Mr. Tedesco apparently had no
contact with the children or mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 338.)
He testified generally regarding bonding and its importance.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 324-325, 327.) He stated that even if bonding
with a foster parent did occur, rebonding with a natural par-
ent could occur. (lowa S.Ct. App. 335.) He testified that he
felt Department of Human Services’ regulations did not ad-
dress very well the situation where the natural parent ceases
to be a real parent, and ties have been developed with “new”
parents. (lowa S.Ct. App. 338.) He felt that the regulations did

11

not deal very well with the prospect of long term placements
(lowa S.Ct. App. 329), and were written from an adult point
of view. (lowa S.Ct. App. 329.)

Larry Lloyd, A.C.2’s teacher, testified. He stated that A.C.2
used the last name of M. in school. (lowa S.Ct. App. 353.) He
said she was unhappy about the prospect of being moved
from the M. home. (lowa S.Ct. App. 349-350. )

Psychologist Eva Christiansen testified again at the termina-
tion hearing. She said that she had met with K.C. for an hour
in October, and K.C. had asked her whether she should pur-
sue reunification with the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 364.) Dr.
Christiansen had told K.C. that she felt that it would be harm-
ful if she did not. (lowa S.Ct. App. 365.) Dr. Christiansen tes-
tified that, for a variety of reasons, she felt that termination
would be a harmful course of action to pursue. (Iowa S.Ct.
App. 369.) One reason was the children’s need to come to
affectionate, endearing terms with the natural parent, a need
which had not been met here. (lowa S.Ct. App. 369.) Dr.
Christiansen testified that it is not uncommon for children to
be bitter towards those who had abused them, but neither
was it uncommon for them to overcome that bitterness. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 370.) She stated that it would be unfortunate if the
children’s ability to reconcile the anger and bitterness gener-
ated by poor treatment and care were somehow blocked.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 370.) When asked if that was, in fact, what
had happened in this case, she said yes. (lowa S.Ct. App. 371.)
When asked directly if she knew of anything the M.’s did to
harm the relationship between the children and their mother,
she referred to their negative feelings towards the mother.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 362.) She stated that the children needed the
support of people who would be neutral with regard to the
outcome of the case. (lowa S.Ct. App. 377.)

Psychiatrist Jerry Lewis, who had treated K.C. since 1984,

12

testified. He affirmed that K.C. has an illness called bipolar dis-
ease. (lowa S.Ct. App. 385.) Symptoms or manifestations of
her disease included poor judgment, hallucinations, and in-
creased energy. (lowa S.Ct. App. 386.) The disease is cyclical
- it comes and goes in cycles and then disappears altogether.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 388.) It is treated with medicine. Dr. Lewis
stated that as long as K.C. stays with her medicine, maintains
contact with psychiatrists and other treatment, her prognosis
could be “pretty good”. (lowa S.Ct. App. 388.) When asked
if she could take care of her children, he stated that it was
his feeling that there was no psychiatric reason why she could
not. (lowa S.Ct. App. 389. )

Dr. Shahriari testified again in the termination hearing.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 403.) Dr. Shahriari discussed briefly his previ-
Ous statements about the effect the foster parents were having
on the efforts towards reunification. He stated that he had felt
there was “an effort, perhaps a good faith effort, to disrupt the
hope for reunification with K.C.” (lowa S.Ct. App. 423.) He
remarked on the possible inappropriateness of having young
children declaring their allegiance in this type of custody dis-
pute, and on the fact that they might feel that by declaring
allegiance to the biological parent, they are being disloyal to
the foster parent. (lowa S.Ct. App. 4106.)

A.C.1 testified at the termination hearing. She stated that
she does not care about K.C. (lowa S.Ct. App. 455), and she
doesn't care if she is better. (lowa S.Ct. App. 453-455.) She
would not Cooperate with efforts towards her going back to
K.C. (lowa S.Ct. App. 429, 443.) She would engage in desper-
ate behavior if forced to go back. (lowa S.Ct. App. 429.) She
wanteu termination of parental rights. (lowa S.Ct. App. 437.)

A.C.2’s testimony was similar to that of her sister. She

wanted termination (lowa S.Ct. App. 460 ), and did not believe
that K.C. will get better or be a good mom. (lowa S.Ct. App.

13

460-462.) Like her sister, she did not approve of the Depart-
ment of Human Services’ efforts towards reunification. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 461.)

P.M., the foster mother, testified. She described the situation
leading up to the decision to remove the children. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 477.) There was apparently some sort of dispute with
regard to the frequency with which the children called their
lawyer. (lowa S.Ct. App. 478, 489.) She felt that the children
were happy and well adjusted in her home. (lowa S.Ct. App.
480.) She did not believe removal of the children from their
home was in their best interests. (lowa S.Ct. App. 489.) She
stated that in the beginning she had a lot of hard feelings and
bitterness towards K.C., but she had replaced them with un-
derstanding. (lowa S.Ct. App. 493.) She admitted that it was
possible that as early as two weeks into the foster placement
she had made statements to fellow employees at work that she
was going to keep the C. children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 501.)

The above-noted witnesses constituted the petitioner's case.
At this point the natural mother called her witnesses. Phyllis
Murphy-Christiansen, formerly a counselor at the Center for
Personal Development in Ames, testified. (lowa S.Ct. App.
530.) She worked with young adults in order to aid them with
independent living. (lowa S.Ct. App. 531.) She worked with
K.C. (lowa S.Ct. App. 532.) She described K.C. as initially
grieving over the loss of her family but then progressing
quickly because of her “above-average motivation in the pro-
gram and in her achievement.” (lowa S.Ct. App. 532.) K.C. was
extremely remorseful over the fact that her illness had created
a bad situation for the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 535.) She
was extremely fearful of losing her emotional bond with them.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 535-539.) She was encouraged to trust the
promise that the Department had made, that if she fulfilled her
goals as far as treatment, she would get her children back.

14

(lowa S.Ct. App. 539.) Ms. Murphy-Christiansen stated that
K.C. now felt betrayed because of the fact she was now facing
termination of parental rights. She also expressed concern that
she could never materially provide for her children like the
foster parents could. (lowa S.Ct. App. 548.)

Kathy Thompson, the case’s long-time social worker, tes-
tified. She recommended against termination of parental
rights. (lowa S.Ct. App. 593.) She stated that this case is un-
usual “in the course of her employment” because of the prog-
ress made by the natural parent. (lowa S.Ct. App. 631.) She
conceded that her goal of reunification was contrary to the
stated wishes of the children and the guardian ad litem. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 591-592, 608, 638.)

Ms. Thompson testified regarding the best interests of the
children. She stated that, in her opinion, the children’s best
interests lie outside their current foster home (lowa S.Ct. App.
275), and in reunification with the natural parent. (lowa S.Ct
App. 316.) She stated that the “national” goal of social work
is the rehabilitation and reunification of families (lowa 5.Ct.
App. 318), but that the chief priority remains the best interest
of the child. (lowa S.Ct. App. 327.) She rated K.C.’s motivation
to change as real high. (lowa S.Ct. App. 578.) She stated that,
in spite of all the distractions, K.-C. had done well. She had
not broken under the pressure. (iowa S.Ct. App. 577.) She had
pursued and received future means of financial support. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 577.) She was working on furthering her education.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 577.) She was working on parenting issues
both in counseling and in Parents Anonymous. (lowa $.Ct.
App. 577.) Ms. Thompson felt that K.C. was capable of resum-
ing a parental role “now or in the near future.” (lowa S.Ct
App. 579.)

Ms. Thompson described her relationship with the children

She said that she was the focus of their anger and that that

15

was fine. (lowa S.Ct. App. 312.) She stated that their anger was
based on the fact that she was a link to K.C. (lowa S.Ct. App.
627.) She opined that the foster parents felt threatened by this
link, and part of the children’s attitude might be explained by
loyalty to the foster parents. (lowa S.Ct. App. 627.) She stated
that at the outset they were not resentful or hateful to the
natural mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 572.) She stated that they
soon changed. (lowa S.Ct. App. 572.) According to her, L.M.
had told the children that they shouldn't have to put up with
visits, and that their behavior soon began to reflect that. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 572-573.) In her opinion, the children still have
feelings for K.C. (lowa S.Ct. App. 575.) She discussed the chil-
dren's attempted “suicide” (they bought sleeping pills at a
convenience store) and said she took it seriously. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 639.) She admitted that the removal had led to the
threats, but when asked if the removal was the problem, she
stated that “I can’t erase from my mind what... in my opinion
led up to the problem, which was an alienation, in my opin-
ion, by the foster, parents of the children’s feelings toward
their natural mother.” (lowa S.Ct. App. 644.) She agreed, how-
ever, that the children should not be moved to punish the fos-
ter parents. (lowa S.Ct. App. 644. )

Ms. Thompson testified about the foster parents. They had
not received the training foster parents now receive, because
they had their license prior to the existence of the law provid-
ing for such training. (lowa S.Ct. App. 634-635.) The children
were removed from their care because they were not suppor-
tive of the case plan. (lowa S.Ct. App. 646.) She stated that
from the beginning they resisted being told how things should
be done in terms of visits and contact and reunification with
the mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 637.) She implied that their at-
titudes had affected the children at a time at which the chil-
dren were easily influenced. (lowa S.Ct. App. 626-627.)

Ms. Thompson's testimony also indicated something of her

——e

16

relationship with the guardian ad litem. It is clear that the
former wishes to keep the children apprised of the goal of
reunification, while the latter viewed that communication as
threatening the children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 615.) It is clear that
the two engaged in heated discussions, during one of which
the latter stated either that she would leave no stone un-
turned to keep the children from being returned to K.C., or
that she stated she would leave no stone unturned before
K.C.’s rights were terminated, depending on whose memory
of the incident is clearer. (lowa S.Ct. App. 609.) Finally, it is
clear that this case evolved to the point where the former still
believed that reunification with the parent was still a reasona-
ble goal, while the latter saw the parent as an obstacle to be
removed. (lowa S.Ct. App. 329-330.)

Ms. Thompson's supervisor, Jerry Sawin, testified. He stated
that the foster parents had consistently said one thing, and
done another. (lowa S.Ct. App. 686-687.) They had entered
the children’s life at a time when they were needy, and had
really “hooked into them”. (lowa S.Ct. App. 687.) He stated
that it would not be good to continue this kind of relation-
ship. (lowa S.Ct. App. 687.) He stated that he did not think
it would be in the children’s best interests to be adopted out,
given his experience with adoptions that failed because of
children later developing a concern about their natural par-
ents. (lowa S.Ct. App. 687.) Finally, he stated that, as a parent
and a social worker, he felt it was inappropriate to allow ten-
and eleven-year-olds to make life-altering decisions the ex-
tent they had been encouraged to do in this case. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 687.) If termination occurred, he opined, the children’s
future would not be stable because of the presence of their
natural fathers and the uncertainty of where they would be
placed for adoption. (lowa S.Ct. App. ©89.) Mr. Sawin agreed
and stated that the foster parents may have created some

problems for these children by creating false hopes in them

+ ac alaeee ateet

17

(lowa S.Ct. App. 715), and by placing inappropriate ties on
them. (lowa S.Ct. App. 704.)

K.C. testified. She acknowledged her mental illness and her
need for her medicine. (iowa S.Ct. App. 407.) She described
her progress and her understanding of the value of friends,
counseling and self-esteem. (lowa S.Ct. App. 722.) She stated
that she could live on her own now, but that she chose not
to because she was told that, given the gap between she and
her children, additional time would be preferable. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 732.) She stated that she would work very hard to re-
store the relationship with her children. (lowa S.Ct. App.
733.) When asked if she felt the system had failed her, she
said it had failed “us”. (lowa S.Ct. App. 733.) She then indi-
cated that it was not the system that had failed her, but the
foster parents and guardian ad litem. (lowa S.Ct. App. 733.)

The trial court issued its order on January 2, 1987. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 807.) The court first found that service had not
been properly made on the natural fathers, so termination of
their rights could not occur. (lowa S.Ct. App. 803.) The court
dismissed the termination of parental rights petition against
the mother finding, inter alia, that the best interests of the
children require the continuance of a plan to place them with
their mother. (lowa $.Ct. App. 807.) Notice of appeal was filed
on January 7, 1987. (lowa S.Ct. App. 808. )

On January 8, 1987, the Department removed the children
from the foster home in order to place them near their
mother. (lowa S.Ct. App. 812.) That plan had been endorsed
by the court in its termination order. (lowa S.Ct. App. 806. )
On January 21, 1987, the guardian ad litem again requested
that the Department be removed as custodian because of this
move. (lowa S.Ct. App. 812.) Shortly thereafter, attorneys for
the guardian ad litem began filing pleadings in this case indi-

cating that there was a lawsuit against their client regarding

18

the release of confidential information from the case, and that
they needed to look at the transcripts. (Motion to Obtain Re-
cords, filed January 21, 1987.) The State did not resist the at-
torney’s access to the transcripts. (lowa S.Ct. App. 814-815.)
However, the State did move for the removal of the guardian
ad litem on the grounds that the lawsuit deprived her of her
ability to exercise independent judgment on the children’s be-
half. (lowa S.Ct. App. 814-815.) The motion was set for hear-
ing along with a motion for a new evaluation of the children
and a motion regarding the guardian ad litem’s access to the
children. (lowa S.Ct. App. 942.)

At the hearing regarding access to the children, the execu-
tive director of the private agency caring for the children tes-
tified. (lowa S.Ct. App. 872.) He stated that his agency had
monitored contacts between the guardian ad litem and chil-
dren in order to determine whether those contacts worked
the children into a high emotional state. (lowa S.Ct. App.
874.) The agency’s intent was that the attorney-child relation-
ship not be of a sort that would again force the children to
choose sides. (lowa S.Ct. App. 876.) The director wanted their
current placement to be a “mediary” one. (lowa S.Ct. App.
875.) These concerns were explained to the guardian ad litem
and, according to the director, she had no resistance to the
monitoring at the time. (lowa S.Ct. App. 875-877.) The direc-
tor’s concern was that at the times of the meetings with the
guardian ad litem the children became very aggitated, anxious,
hyper and wrapped up in the legal proceedings. (lowa S.Ct
App. 878.) He was concerned that at those mectings they
were encouraged to keep their legal battles as their primary
point of thought, and to view them as “their last hope”. (lowa
S.Ct. App. 878.) This concern was also reflected in the
agency's report which was submitted at the hearing (lowa
S.Ct. App. 899.) The report stated that the children’s contact
with the guardian ad litem focused on the media and legal

19

political events in the case. (Pet. Ex. 1 of 2/16/87, p. 6.) The
children were “taking literally”, indications that they would re-
turn to the foster parents within the week. (Pet. Ex. | of 2/16
87, p. 6.) They then became frustrated when this didn’t occur.
(Pet. Ex. 1 of 2/16/87, p. 6.) The director opined that “there's
no question that the continuation of the situation where they
believe that someting different is going to happen from what
we understand to be the court order to be prevents them
from moving on with their life.” (lowa S.Ct. App. 880.)

The director of clinical services at the private agency also
testified. She related the incident where, after one visit with
the guardian ad litem, the children came away expecting to
be back in the foster home within one week, and were disap-
pointed when that did not occur. (lowa S.Ct. App. 903-904. )
She stated that when media “events” about the case were not
occurring, the children would go back to their schoolwork
and lead normal lives. (lowa S.Ct. App. 897.)

The court issucd its ruling on the motion to remove the
guardian ad litem on Februar, 17, 1987. (lowa S.Ct. App.
938.) The court granted the motion on two grounds. First, it
found that “if the guardian ad litem could demonstrate that
it was not possible to successfully reunite the children with
their natural mother, it would tend to justify her use of any
and all means necessary to the success of her efforts to pre-
vent removal of the children from a previous foster home, and
to effect the termination of their mother’s parental rights.”
(lowa S.Ct. App. 938.) Second, the court found the guardian
ad litem had exposed the children to the exploitation of the
news media, disclosed information to the press regarding the
children’s new homes in violation of a previous agreement,
and had failed to encourage the children to adapt to their new
homes and to rcunification. (lowa S.Ct. App. 939.) Further-
more, the court stated that her mectings with the children
had the effect of wiping out all progress made with the chil-

Ee a

20

dren and instilled them with false hopes and led to further dis-
appointments. (lowa S.Ct. App. 939.) The court concluded
that their attorney appeared to be determined to act in a man-
ner not in the children’s best interests and ordered her re-
moval. (lowa S.Ct. App. 940. )

On November 25 of 1987, the lowa Supreme Court issued
its ruling in this matter. It ordered the termination of the
mother’s rights, but affirmed the trial court in all other re-
spects. In February, 1988, the former guardian ad litem filed
this petition.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AGAINST
GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision of the lowa Supreme Court regarding the con-
stitutional rights of foster families is consistent with the major-
ity of the precedent on the issue. Petitioner's vague allegations
concerning the injustice of her removal as guardian ad litem
do not raise an issue suitable for review by the United States
Supreme Court.

ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANTING THE WRIT

l. THE lOWA SUPREME COURT DID NOT ACT IMPRO-
PERLY IN| APPROVING THE REMOVAL FROM THE
FOSTER HOME SO AS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN
TO THE NATURAL PARENT

In this case the trial court declined to interfere with the
lowa Department of Human Services’ decision to remove these
children from their foster home and to place them in another.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 245.) In a subsequent order, the court found
that the foster parents had, within a few weeks of the chil-

—s

io. ome

21

dren's placement, resolved to obtain permanent custody of
the children and had endeavored to obtain that objective.
(lowa S.Ct. App. 805.) It found that the foster parents had vio-
lated their obligations and trust as foster parents in order to
gratify their own personal wishes to have children. (lowa S.Ct.
App. 806.) Accordingly, the trial court declined to transfer
custody of the children from the lowa Department of Human
Services to the foster parents, and allowed the Department to
effectuate its plan to move the children to foster homes that
were physically closer to the natural mother, and which
would be less disruptive of the children’s then-existing re-
lationship with her. (lowa S.Ct. App. 235, 807.)

In approving this decision, the lowa Supreme Court stated:

It should be apparent that one of the paramount needs
of a child living under the stress of such unfortunate cir-
cumstances is to be free from direct or indirect proposals
by those sheltering them to make the association perma-
nent. To some it may seem innocent, even a good thing,
to offer a permanent love to a child under temporary
care. But unselfish temporary parents recognize that such
bonding is not kind. On the contrary it tends to be selfish
on the part of the adults and is highly likely to be harm-
ful to the child.

Temporary foster relationships must be designed with
the knowledge they will almost certainly end in separa-
tion. The children often return to their natural parents.
Often another solution must be found. Separation from
foster parents holds the potential to be a painful experi-
ence. Such a separation would become unnecessarily
crucl if the foster parents have ied the children to be-
lieve placement in their home was permanent.

We agree with the juvenile courts conclusion that it was
in the best interests of the children to change their place-

22

ment from the |M.’s]. Parental rights of the mother were
very much in issue at the time placement was ordered
changed. The three fathers of the children were not yet
subject to the court’s jurisdiction. Options for the chil-
dren’s future had to be kept open. It was crucial that the
children be under the care of foster parents who could
and would refrain from seeking to bond a permanent re-
lationship. .

(Petition App. 12.) The court then made three key rulings, the

latter two of which form the basis of this petition. Those rul-

ings were:

1) that lowa law does not create an expectation that a fos-
ter family relationship will be permitted to continue (Petition
App. 14);

2) that there was no due process violation in moving the
children from the foster home (Petition App. 13);

3) that the children were not denied equal protection
under the law by said removal, because even under a strict
analysis, the State has a compelling interest in removing the
children from a foster home which is discouraging reunfica-
tion with the natural parent. (Petition App. 15.)

The respondent State would assert that those constitutional
holdings were appropriate, and in line with the majority of the
precedent on these issues. Accordingly, review is not appro-
priate under Supreme Court Rule 17.1(b) and (c), as said
holdings are consistent with, not in defiance of, the existing
case law. Generally, case law holds that where state law does
not provide foster parents with an expectation of keeping the
foster family together, constitutional considerations do not
either. Ayees v. County Department of Public Welfare, 600
F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond vy. Fulton County
Department of Family & Children’s Services, 563 F.2d 1200,
1206-07 (Sth Cir. 1977) (Cen banc ), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910,
98 S.Ct. 3103, 57 LEd.2d 1141 (1978); Sherrard v. Owens,

23

484 F.Supp. 728, 740-41 (W.D. Mich. 1980 ), affd.644 F.2d 542
(6th Cir.) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct.
120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); Crim vy. Harrison, 552 F.Supp. 37
(N.D. Miss. 1982); see also Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d
1386 (1986) (suggesting Ninth Circuit is leaning towards this
position ). Brown v. San Joaquin, 601 F.Supp. 653 (E.D. Cal.

oied ptadcesnde

1985), is the exception, not the rule, and may be distin-
guished as it relied upon certain California statutes, which, un-
like the lowa Juvenile Code, clearly create in foster parents
an expectation that their relationS—ap with the child be pre-
served. 601 F.Supp. at 660.

The lowa Supreme Court found that lowa’s state law does not

provide foster parents with such an expectation. The weakness
of petitioner's assertions to the contrary are demonstrated by the
fact that, as proof of such an expectation, petitioner can only cite
to a statute which gives a previous foster family the right to be
considered as placements if return to the biological family is not
contemplated. lowa Code § 232.102(6). There is no statute or
| holding giving foster parents any such expectation when return
| to the natural parent is still a possibility. In fact, the lowa Admin-
istrative Code precludes appeals of specific foster care place-
ment issues. 441 LAC. 7.5(5 d).

The ruling of the lowa Supreme Court was proper and is not
a proper subject for review by this Court.

ll. THE PETITION DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE
IOWA SUPREME COURT DISREGARDED PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERAL LAW REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS IN STATE CUSTODY.

Under this division, the petitioner sets forth several general
statements regarding the rights of children or other individu-
als, but does not apply those statements to any of the specific
facts or findings in this case. Rather, the petitioner offers

|

generalized statements such as “juveniles have rights to free-
dom of expression” and leaves the Court the task of sifting
through the thousand-page record of this two-year-old case in
order to find facts or incidents to which such propositions
apply. Obviously. response to this type of legal argument is
difficult. The State's initial response must be that the setting
forth of a string of largely unrelated legal propositions con-
cerning federal rights does not, in and of itself, constitute an
argument for the granting of Supreme Court review under Su-
preme Court Rule 17. Petitioner has not specified what rights
have been violated, nor who has violated them. The Court is
left in the dark as to whether any of the accusations made in
this division relate to actual events, and, if they do, as to
whether any of those events are recorded in the record. All
the Court has to go by is the fact that the assertion of the
rights was somehow precluded by removal of the guardian ad
litem. The respondent State of lowa would submit that the
lack of specificity here should be fatal to the petition, as the
argument does not provide the Court with any means of asses-
sing whether important federal issues were raised in this case.

It can be argued, of course, that while the argument in Divi-
sion Il does not set forth any specific challenges to the lowa
court actions, it does implicitly contain certain vague asser-
tions regarding the First and Sixth Amendment rights of
juveniles, and does suggest that those rights were somehow
violated in this case. These assertions seem to derive chiefly
from the fact that this particular guardian ad litem was re-
moved as the legal representative of the children in interest.
It might, therefore, be useful to reiterate why that removal oc-
curred. The trial court found that the guardian ad litem: |)
continually exposed the children to the news and entertain-
ment media; 2) disclosed information regarding their new fos-
ter homes against the wishes of the court; 3) encouraged the
children to focus on the media, legal and political events sur-

Pitot an tina wate

ainsea Baie ae

sc i NBO: tet iS aA Amn tes OCIS SIRE

25

rounding the case rather than reunification with their natural
parent; 4) encouraged the children to write their former foster
home concerning problems in their new one; 5) effectively
“wiped out” the children’s progress towards stabilization with
each visit; and 6) put the children in an adversarial position
in their own neglect proceeding. (lowa S.Ct. App. 939-940. )
The court noted that the guardian ad litem maintained the
right under the First Amendment to make any statement in
public, regardless of the confidentiality that is normally main-
tained in juvenile cases. See lowa Code §§ 217.30 and 232.147
(1985) (providing for confidentiality of social services and
juvenile court information ); See also 42 U.S.C. 671(8) (provid-
ing that states who operate federally funded foster care pro-
grams must restrict disclosure of information regarding indi-
viduals served by these programs.) The trial court ordered the
removal of the guardian ad litem not because these activities
violated legal and ethical standards, which they may have, but
because these activities had the effect of harming the children
before the court. (lowa S.Ct. App. 939). See Matter of Welfare
of B.B.B., 393 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. App. 1986) ( Minnesota case
holding that standard for removal of guardian ad litem is best
interest of the child.) Ultimately, this was a case where the
children had to be protected from their legal representative.
Accordingly, it is not a good case for examining the rights of
foster care children vis-a-vis state agencies. Such an examina-
tion should be reserved for a case where the children’s inter-
ests, as Opposed to the guardian ad litem’s interests or the fos-
ter parents’ interests, are more adequately represented.

Ill. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A CONTEXT FOR
EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SUPERVISORY
POWERS.

It is difficult to respond to petitioner’s argument under this
issue. The heading makes reference to the supervisory powers

“ 26

of the United States Supreme Court, but those powers are not
referred to thereafter. What those powers are, and how they
should be exercised, is not specified. Instead, general allega-
tions of iniustice are made without elucidation on how those
allegations apply to the facts of this case, if they do at all. The
two basic themes of the allegations seem to be: 1) that the
lowa juvenic justice system improperly favors the rights of
natural families over those of foster families; 2) that the re-
moval of the children’s guardian ad litem was an improper
sanctioning of an attorney who was zealously representing her
clients. As the first theme has been dealt with in the first divi-
sion of this brief, the respondent State of lowa will focus on
the second theme in this one.

As stated in the second division, the respondent State would
assert that the removal of the guardian ad litem, which oc-
curred long after the removal of the children from the foster
home, was necessary, At the time, the trial court had before
it the testimony of officials of the private agency caring for
the children stating that the children became very anxious and
agitated after meeting with their attorney. (lowa S.Ct. App.
878.) That testimony indicated that the children left those
meetings with the impression that they would be returning to
the M. foster home within the week. (lowa S.Ct. App. 878.)
The children were apparently encouraged to focus on the guar-
dian ad litem’s legal battle to return them to the foster home,
and to view that battle as their last hope. (lowa S.Ct. App. 878-
879.) This prevented them from living normal lives in the com-
munity, and from getting on with their activities and school
work. (lowa S.Ct. App. 897.)

The trial court also had before it the history of this case
wherein children who had entered foster care with no particu-
lar animosity towards the mother who had mistreated them
ended up requesting termination in Open court, despite evi-

Aahete.

6 Lhd ay at Rete aN A LEI RCI

dence that allowing them to take sides in such a controversy
was not in their best interest. (lowa S.Ct. App. 416, 457. 572.)
Furthermore, the trial court had before it the recommendation
of an independent board overseeing lowa foster care place-
ments that the best inierests of these children required re-
moval of the gu2idian ad litem. (Report of lowa Foster Care
Review Board, dated February 12, 1987.)

Finally, the court had before it evidence that a lawsuit was
occurring wherein the guardian ad litem might be forced to
defend the release of arguably confidential information regard-
ing her clients. A normal part of that defense would include
stressing the inappropriateness of reunification and the need
to resort to heavy publicity to prevent that eventuality. There-
fore, the guardian ad litem would have a private legal and pre-
cuniary interest in Opposing reunification. Such an interest
might interfere with advocacy of the children’s best interests.

Those factors and others clearly indicate that the rulings of
the trial court and lowa Supreme Court on this issue were nec-
essary to protect the five C. children and to protect the integ-
ritv of this particular juvenile action.

28

CONCLUSION

For those reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should be
denied. The factual peculiarities of this case render it an inap-
propriate vehicle for deciding the foster care issues left open in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct.
2094, 53 L.Fd. 2d 14( 1977).

Respectfully submitted

THOMAS J. MILLER
Attorney General of lowa

GORDON E. ALLEN
Deputy Attorney General
Counsel of Record tor Respondent

CHARLES K. PHILLIPS
Assistant Attorney General

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1407%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.