# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Exxon Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 485 U.S. 975

## Text

B7* 1296

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,
AND TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

Petitioners.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIEL M. GRIBBON JOHN J. CARLIN, JR.

E. EDWARD BRUCE Counsel of Record

BRUCE N. KUHLIK 30 Vreeland Road

COVINGTON & BURLING P.O. Box 751

1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Florham Park, New Jersey 07932
P.O. Box 7566 (201) 377-3350

Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 662-6000

Attorneys for Petitioners

February 1988

9

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Supreme Court of New Jersey violated
this Court’s mandate in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S.
355 (1986), by denying petitioners a refund of state
taxes, which this Court had held were expressly pre-
empted by a federal statute, on the grounds that (1) the
statute preempted only expenditures and not, as this
Court had held, the exaction of taxes; (2) preemption
became effective almost three years later than the date
established by Congress; (3) policies of a subsequent
Congress disfavored preemption; and (4) principles of
equity warranted denial of petitioners’ claim.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The petitioners are named in the caption.*

The following respondents were defendants-respondents
in the court below: Robert Hunt, Administrator of New
Jersey Spill Compensation Fund; Clifford A. Goldman,
Treasurer of the State of New Jersey; Sidney Glaser,
Director of the Division of Taxation; Jerry F. English,
Commissioner of Environmental Protection; and the State
of New Jersey.

The following respondents are those Justices of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey who participated in the
decision below: Robert L. Clifford, Alan B. Handler,
Stewart G. Pollock, and Gary S. Stein. Additional re-
spondents are Judges Michael P. King and Sylvia B.
Pressler of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, who sat by special designation.

* Tenneco Resins, Inc., was formerly Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. Pur-
suant to Rule 28.1, all parent companies, subsidiaries (except
wholly owned) and affiliates of petitioners are listed in the appendix
at pages 64a-80a.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EE SRE a 1
GE ne 1
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ............ 2
ERE ESE SE Oe a a eae 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 7
Teen ns enmaceneimnsunst 16
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A (Opinion of the Supreme Court of
ae at el et ln la
APPENDIX B (Recommendations of the Tax
Court of New Jersey) _...... COMI At ae 27a
APPENDIX C (Remand Order of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey) _........ celica lied ca 6la
APPENDIX D (Mandate of the Supreme Court
oe eee ee 62a
APPENDIX E (Affiliates and Subsidiaries) 64a

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464

Shei SE seediradininsdceachenintaeeintladeiaaeehs aiastecalabiessnbeakacc
Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976)...
Deen Vv. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1958) .....................
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) ............
Gaines V. Rugg, 148 U.S. 228 (1898) -...0000000 0.
General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493 (1978)...
Greene V. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964) _.......
Potts, In re, 166 U.S. 263 (1897) ...............22..001.00.....
Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488

GERRI LA OFA SA oS LOAN DICE
TVA Vv. Hill, 487 U.S. 158 (1978) ............................
United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 (1962) _..........
United States v. United States District Court, 334

ere I CI ach atic eee tee caaeaics etait ccna
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 434 U.S. 425

fa ERISIS INGA el tole Mrantne Son ee teeth 1 bees a
Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90 (1967)

Constitution and Statutes:

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980:

§ 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) 2...

§ 152(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9652 (a) ....

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

RSE Net Se Rr ne ee eS

Se a I an

Pa Se A BS peeeeenenmer nae

New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act,

NJ. Stat. $§ 58:10-23.11 ef seq. ...........................

rere rs

Miscellaneous:

2 Library of Congress, S. Committee on The En-
vironment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., A Legislative History of [CERCLA]
eR | rae El tals Ae

[1 N.J.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) { 34-180.75 (1981)..

passi

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be
> wow =

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“1M © ©

11
15

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No.

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,
AND TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

Petitioners.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Exxon Corporation, The BF Goodrich Company, Union
Carbide Corporation, Monsanto Company, and Tenneco
Resins, Inc., petition for a writ of mandamus directing
the Supreme Court of New Jersey to comply with the
mandate issued by this Court in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
475 U.S. 355 (1986).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
(App., infra, la-26a) is not yet reported. The recom-
mendation of the Tax Court of New Jersey (App., infra,
27a-60a) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a).

2

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 114(c) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c), provided:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may
be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of
which is to pay compensation for claims for any
costs of response or damages or claims which may
be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in
this section shall preclude any State from using
general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing
a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance
in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of
hazardous substance response equipment or other
preparations for the response to a release of haz-
ardous substances which affects such State.

STATEMENT

This petition arises out of a suit brought by petition-
ers in 1981 in the Tax Court of New Jersey seeking a
declaratory judgment and a refund of taxes imposed
under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control
Act (Spill Act), N.J. Stat. §§ 58:10-23.11, et seg. Peti-
tioners complained that the taxes which created a Spill
Fund under the Act were preempted by Section 114(c)
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c). The Tax Court ruled
against petitioners, holding that CERCLA did not pre-
empt a state tax used to create funds to pay for hazard-
ous waste cleanup eligible for CERCLA compensation,
but instead merely prevented taxes for funds to pay
cleanup expenses that were actually paid by the “Super-
fund” established by CERCLA. Its decision was affirmed
both by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court and
the Supreme Court of New Jersey."

197 NJ. 526, 481 A.2d 271 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 15a-36a);
190 N.J. Super. 131 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 37a-46a): 4 NJ. Tax
294 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 47a-78a).

3

This Court reversed the New Jersey courts’ construc-
tion of CERCLA. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355
(1986). Recognizing that “[tjhis is an express pre-
emption case,” this Court agreed with petitioners that
“the New Jersey courts have violated the plain meaning
of the statute.” Jd. at 362, 370. Taxation is forbidden,
the Court concluded, to support “state funds that covered
Superfund-eligible expenses,” whether or not those ex-
penses were actually paid by Superfund. /d. at 375.

The Court found that two types of claims eligible for
compensation under the Spill Act—governmental cleanup
of hazardous waste sites and reimbursement of third
parties for cleanup costs—were also compensable under
CERCLA. Accordingly, it ruled that the New Jersey
tax was preempted to the extent its purpose was to pay
for these expenses, rejecting the dissent’s invitation to
uphold the entire tax on the basis of the Spill Fund’s other
non-preempted purposes. Jd. The Court specifically re-
jected New Jersey’s argument that its tax was lawful be-
cause the expenditures actually made from the Spill Fund
were not directed toward CERCLA-eligible purposes:

New Jersey argues, finally, that after the enactment
of CERCLA, * * * all Spill Fund expenditures * * *
[have been] for nonpre-empted purposes. To the ex-
tent that the Spill Act permits taxation to support
pre-empted expenditures, however, tt cannot stand.

475 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added) .*
2 The Court held that these purposes “are within the scope of

CERCLA, except to the extent that they are intended to provide
the 10% state share of remedial costs.” 475 U.S. at 375-76.

3 The state’s argument also was erroneous as a factual matter.
At the time of this Court’s decision, only a de minimis proportion
of Spill Fund expenditures had been devoted to non-preempted
purposes. See Appellants’ opening brief in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
No. 84-978, at 22-23 n.24, 25 n.26. This pattern continued following
this Court’s decision—the record before the Tax Court on remand
showed that 89% of the $49.5 million spent by New Jersey on

4

Thus making it clear that the appropriate inquiry was
the purpose of the tax, not the nature of the subsequent
expenditures, this Court held that at least a portion of
the New Jersey tax was preempted. It remanded the case
for a determination whether any portion of the tax could
be saved: the lower court was directed to consider
“whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-empted provi-
sions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted
provisions.” 475 U.S. at 376; see App., infra, 62a-63a.

On remand from this Court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court sent the matter back to the Tax Court to develop
a record and to make recommended findings. App., infra,
61a. The Tax Court thereupon embraced the very prem-
ise which this Court had rejected—that “it was not the
collection of the Spill Act tax that the [United States
Supreme] Court found to be improper but rather certain
expenditures made from the fund.” Jd. at 39a. The Tax
Court therefore ruled that petitioners would be entitled to
a refund only if the State had expended monies from the
Spill Fund for CERCLA purposes. Moreover, even
though Section 114(c) was made effective on CERCLA’s
December 11, 1980 enactment, the Tax Court held that

cleanup was devoted to sites eligible for Superfund compensation.
See Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Schedule IV.

* Attributing language to this Court that is nowhere to be found
in Exron Vv. Hunt, the Tax Court further stated:

The United States Supreme Court * * * held that, “the State
was entitled to collect taxes,” * * * but that, “the State was not
permitted to spend that money for any of the types of projects
which EPA intended to finance,” with superfund. Quite simply
put, it was the nature of certain expenditures and not the tax
collected to fund all the expenditures * * * that the Court found
to be objectionable.

App., infra, 49a (emphasis and quotation marks in original). See
also id. at 58a (“the harm which plaintiffs * * * allegedly suffered
is the improper expenditure of legal tax monies”).

5

state expenditures were preempted only if made after the
June 16, 1982 promulgation of the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) or, where applicable, the September 8, 1983
promulgation of the National Priority List (NPL). Id.
at 59a.

Finally, the Tax Court held that “the [State] Legis-
lature should be permitted a reasonable period of time
to reimburse the spill fund for the amount of pre
empted expenditures made.” App., infra, 56a. Such re-
imbursement, the Tax Court concluded, “will make the
plaintiffs whole because the constitutional infirmity and
plaintiffs’ financial harm resulted from the improper
expenditure of spill fund revenues and not the collection
of the tax per se.” Id. at 56a-57a (emphasis in original).

The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the “thought-
ful and practical” (App., infra, 20a) recommendations
of the Tax Court. Thus, it too held that Section 114(c)
of CERCLA preempted only expenditures from the Spill
Fund and not the collection of taxes. App., infra, Ta-12a,
20a, 25a-26a.° The court therefore did not determine
whether there were any portions of the tax sustained
by non-preempted purposes that could be severed from
those that this Court had held were preempted. Instead,
focusing on expenditures instead of taxes, the state Su-
preme Court concluded that the provisions of the Spill
Act allowing “preempted” expenditures could be severed
from those that allowed other expenditures. Id. at 7a-12a.

The New Jersey Supreme Court also held, like the
Tax Court, that preemption did not begin on the effec-
tive date of Section 114(c), but instead on the dates
related to publication of the NCP and NPL. /d. at 1lda-

5 For example, the Court stated that the “tax rate” was one of
the “non-preempted portions of the Spill Act.” App., infra, 8a.
See also id. at 20a (discussing “pre-empted expenditures”).

6

16a.° It thereby delayed preemption for approximately
three out of the five years that CERCLA initially was in
effect, bringing about the very “overtaxation” of indus-
try that this Court concluded Congress intended to pro-
hibit through Section 114(c). 475 U.S. at 372.

Invoking its purported equitable discretion, the state
Supreme Court said that it would treat a tax refund to
petitioners as a “remedy of last resort.” App., infra,
at 25a. Thus, the court held that no refund would be
made if the Legislature “reimburse[s] the Spill Fund
for the amount of expenditures found to be pre-empted.” 7
Id. at 25a. This followed from the Court’s view that it
is the Spill Fund—rather than petitioners—that the
remedy should “make * * * whole.” Jd. at 26a. Once the
Legislature reimburses the Fund by transferring reve-
nues from other accounts, the Fund will be “whole” and
petitioners will be denied any refunds.*

In reaching this result, the Court relied on neither an
analysis of CERCLA nor this Court’s opinion in Exxon
v. Hunt. Instead, it stated that it was “obligated to
consider” the repeal of Section 114(c), effective Octo-
ber 17, 1986, in the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), App., infra, 20a, and

8 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that even expendi-
tures made by New Jersey after promulgation of the NCP and NPL
were not preempted so long as the decision to commit the funds
was made prior to promulgation of the NCP or NPL. 7d. at 19a.

*The Tax Court had recommended that if, following reimburse-
ment by the Legislature, the amount in the Spill Fund exceeds the
$36 million cap established in the state statute, the excess amount
should be refunded to petitioners. Apn., infra, 60a. The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that, in view of the repeal of the cap,
no refund should be made following reimbursement. Jd. at 26a;
see also id. at 10a-1lla & n.2.

8’ The Court again remanded the case to the Tax Court for a
hearing on the amount of “preempted” expenditures made from
the Spill Fund that the Legislature will be invited to reimburse.

ee
:
7

it crafted a remedy which “best implements the intent
of Congress in adopting SARA,” when it prospectively
repealed preemption under CERCLA. 7d. at 25a. On
this reasoning, the state Supreme Court allows New
Jersey to retain all of the millions of dollars extracted
from petitioners pursuant to a statute that this Court
has held is, in substantial measure, expressly preempted
by act of Congress.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

From its inception, the focus of this litigation has been
on whether Section 114(c) of CERCLA entitled petition-
ers to a refund of the taxes that they paid to sustain the
New Jersey Spill Fund. The state courts initially denied
such relief to petitioners by ignoring the plain meaning
of Section 114(c), as well as this Court’s opinion in
Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7
(1983). This Court reversed. The state courts have now
ignored the rationale and mandate of this Court’s deci-
sion and have again denied petitioners relief. Mandamus
is warranted in order to bring the state courts into con-
formity with the mandate issued by this Court.

1. This Court has long held that “a clear case is
shown for issuing a writ of mandamus” where the lower
court’s decision on remand is “based upon a misunder-
standing of the mandate, and in practical, though unin-
tentional, disobedience of the command thereof that fur-
ther proceedings be had in conformity with the opinion
of this court.” Jn re Potts, 166 U.S. 2638, 268 (1897).
Similarly, the Court stated in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
Corp., 484 U.S. 425, 428 (1978) (per curiam), that if
a party “is of the view that the [court] to which the
case was remanded is failing to carry out the judgment
of this Court, its remedy is * * * to file a writ [of]
mandamus.” See also, e.g., General Atomic Co. v. Felter,
436 U.S. 493 (1978) (per curiam); Will v. United

8

States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967); United States Vv.
Haley, 371 U.S. 18 (1962).

The rule applies to state courts that have departed
from this Court’s mandate, just as it does to the lower
federal courts. In Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57, 58
(1958) (per curiam), for example, the Court granted a
motion for leave to file a mandamus petition to direct
the Supreme Court of Texas “to conform its decision to
[this Court’s] mandate.” See also General Atomic Co.
v. Felter, supra; Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976)
(per curiam) .®

2. The New Jersey Supreme Court has clearly and
substantially departed from the mandate of this Court.
The state court erred by holding that (1) only actual
expenditures from the Spill Fund, and not the tax, were
preempted by Section 114(c) of CERCLA; (2) preemp-
tion was effected not on December 11, 1980, as Congress
specifically provided, but only by subsequent federal reg-
ulatory action taken in 1982 and 1983; (3) the scope of
preemption, and any relief to petitioners, should be ex-
tremely narrow because SARA subsequently repealed
Section 114(c); and (4) the court had equitable discre-

® It also is settled that mandamus is appropriate in these circum-
stances, even though an appeal or writ of certiorari might also
be available:

A litigant who * * * has obtained [a] judgment in this Court
after a lengthy process of litigation, involving several layers of
courts, should not be required to go through that entire process
again to obtain execution of the judgment of this Court.

General Atomic Co. Vv. Felter, supra, 436 U.S. at 497; accord United
States v. United States District Court, 334 U.S. 258, 264 (1948);
United States v. Haley, supra, 371 U.S. at 20; Gaines v. Rugg, 148
U.S. 228, 243 (1893) (“although it might have been admissible to
raise the question by a new appeal * * *, we do not consider that
such remedy would have been, or would be, fully adequate, or that
a writ of mandamus is now improper’).

9

tion to regard a tax refund as a “remedy of last resort”
and to devise a remedy that protects the Spill Fund
rather than petitioners. The cumulative effect of these
errors is to deny petitioners the substantial relief to
which they are entitled under this Court’s decision and
to permit New Jersey “to flout federal law” in precisely
the manner disapproved by this Court. 475 U.S. at 376.

a. The premise of the decision below was that Section
114(c), as interpreted by this Court, preempted only cer-
tain expenditures from the Spill Fund and not the im-
position of the tax. See, e.g., App., infra, 25a-26a; pages
4, 5, supra. That premise is flatly contrary to the plain
language of both Section 114(c) and this Court’s deci-
sion. Section 114(c) prohibits a state from requiring a
person “to contribute to any fund” that has certain pur-
poses; once New Jersey established a fund having those
purposes, its administrators’ spending decisions could not
avoid preemption.

Indeed, this Court rejected the precise argument that
the state court accepted on remand. New Jersey argued
before this Court that no refund was required because
“all Spill Fund expenditures” have been “for nonpre-
empted purposes.” 475 U.S. at 376.°° This Court dis-
agreed: “To the extent that the Spill Act permits taxa-
tion to support pre-empted expenditures, however, it can-
not stand.” Jd. Thus, the actual expenditures made from
the Spill Fund are irrelevant; the sole question is the
purpose for which the tax was imposed, not the manner
in which the revenues were later expended.

Further emphasizing that Section 114(c) preempts
taxes creating certain kinds of funds, not subsequent
spending decisions, this Court held that

[Section 114(c)] is meant to forbid the States to
impose taxes to finance certain types of funds. The

10 See page 3 & note 3, supra.

10

issue in this case is whether the New Jersey Spill
Fund is, in whole or in part, the type of fund that
§ 114(c) pre-empts.

475 U.S. at 361; see also, e.g., id. at 362 (question is
whether Section 114(c) “forbids state taxation of the
type the Spill Act imposes”).

Accordingly, this Court reversed the state court “[tlo
the extent that the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the Spill Act could constitutionally impose a tax to sup-
port expenditures” for purposes covered by CERCLA.
Id. at 376. On remand, the state court was directed to
consider only “whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-
empted provisions of the statute are severable from the
pre-empted provisions,” not whether certain expenditures
could be severed. Jd. The New Jersey court did not fol-
low this mandate when it upheld the entire tax based
solely upon its inquiry regarding expenditures from the
Spill Fund.”

b. On December 11, 1980, when CERCLA was en-
acted, it was clear that two types of claims would ulti-
mately be compensable under the statute—government
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and reimbursement to
third parties for cleanup costs. It was also clear that
further regulatory action by the United States, such as
publication of the NCP and NPL, as well as collection of
the new federal tax, would be necessary before the fed-

11Tf this Court concludes, contrary to our position (pages 13-15,
infra), that the state court, despite its obduracy, should be given
another opportunity to examine the severability issue, it should be
instructed that part of the tax may be upheld only if (1) it can
reliably be determined that the New Jersey Legislature imposed
part of the tax with the sole intent of funding the non-CERCLA
purposes of the Spill Act; and (2) under New Jersey law, a court
can establish a tax rate to fund solely the non-CERCLA purposes
of the Spill Act. If these criteria are met, petitioners would be
entitled to a refund proportionate to the difference between the
court-established rate and the statutory tax rate.

Blea n -

11

eral government could actually begin to make payments
for such cleanup expenses. Congress did not, however,
defer the effectiveness of Section 114(c)’s preemption of
state taxes; collection of such taxes was immediately pre-
empted. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(a).% Ignoring the effective
date of Section 114(c), the New Jersey courts, on re-
mand, ruled that preemption did not “commence” until
either the July 16, 1982 promulgation of the NCP or the
September 9, 1983 publication of the NPL because those
documents specified the sites for which federal monies
could actually be obtained. App., infra, 15a-18a; see also
id. at 59a. The result of this substantial delay in effect-
ing preemption is inconsistent with two principles recog-
nized in Exxon v. Hunt.

First, it subjects petitioners to the double taxation
that Section 114(c) was intended to prevent. See 475
U.S. at 372 (“the decision to enact a pre-emption provi-
sion resulted in part from Congress’ concern about the
potentially adverse effects of overtaxation on the com-
petitiveness of the American petrochemical industry”)
(footnote omitted). Second, in dating preemption only
from the promulgation of the NCP and NPL because
they clarified the sites eligible for federal compensation,
the lower court has resurrected the very construction of
CERCLA, as preempting only funds for claims likely to
be paid by Superfund, which this Court disapproved in
Exxon Vv. Hunt. See 475 U.S. at 372 (specifically reject-
ing New Jersey’s argument that it could tax petitioners
to pay for its Spill Fund when “the availability of

12 Prior versions of the bills that preceded the enactment of
CERCLA had made the preemption of Section 114(c) effective
180 days after enactment. 2 Library of Congress, S. Committee on
The Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legis-
lative History of [CERCLA] at 732 (Comm. Print 1983) (H.R.
85); 3 id. at 59 (S. 1341). Congress’ elimination of the 180-day
delay in effecting preemption confirms its intent that preemption
was to take effect immediately.

12

Superfund money is sufficiently low, as a practical mat-
ter, that” it was clear such monies would not be ex-
pended at certain New Jersey sites).

e. The state court further erred by relying on the
subsequent repeal of Section 114(c) in SARA to deny
relief to petitioners. In its own words, the state court
felt “constrained to fashion a remedy * * * that least
offends the congressional purpose in repealing pre-emp-
tion.” Id. at 24a; see also id. at 20a-25a.

Again, the state court’s reasoning is contrary to Exxon
v. Hunt. This Court recognized when it rendered deci-
sion that CERLA had already expired and that reau-
thorization legislation was under consideration in Con-
gress, but it concluded that these developments were
irrelevant:

Of course, [petitioners’] claims for a refund of taxes
paid through September 30, 1985 are unaffected by
the expiration of CERCLA or by any changes in the
law after that date.

475 U.S. at 362 n.6 (emphasis added); see generally,
e.g., Greene V. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964).
The state court ignored this unambiguous directive by
relying on the policies that underlay SARA to limit the

relief to which petitioners were entitled under CERCLA.

d. The state court further departed from the mandate
by invoking its own purported “equitable powers” to
“make the Spill Fund whole” and to treat a tax refund
to petitioners as “a remedy of last resort.” App., infra,
24a, 25a. Nothing in this Court’s mandate authorized
the state court to exercise equitable discretion to limit
relief to petitioners. The only question open on remand
was the issue of severability, 7.e., whether petitioners
were entitled to a total refund or whether some portion
of the tax imposed on them could be severed and saved.
475 U.S. at 376-377. The state court erred in going
beyond the mandate. See, e.g., Sibbald v. United States,

fae al A Oe

Kee ech

13

37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 492 (1838) (the court below “is
bound by the decree [of this Court] * * * [and cannot]
give any other or further relief; * * * [nJjor intermeddle
with it, further than to settle so much as has been re-
manded”’).

Even apart from the terms of the remand, the state
court invoked equitable discretion that it did not possess.
Once a clear-cut statutory command has been violated,
courts do not have equitable discretion to develop a rem-
edy fitting their own conception of the public interest.
See TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158, 193-195 (1978). Section
114(c) was such a command—it prohibited the states
from imposing certain types of taxes. This Court deter-
mined that the Spill Act imposed, at least in part, a
prohibited tax. The state court was required to enforce
the federal statute that preempted the state tax. It could
not resort to its own conceptions of public policy or equity
to deny the refund to which petitioners were entitled
under CERCLA.

3. If the New Jersey Supreme Court had applied this
Court’s holding that the exaction of the tax—not the
actual expenditures from the fund—was preempted, it
would necessarily follow that the single tax was not sever-
able and that the entire tax must therefore fall. Because
a single tax sustained the Spill Fund, petitioners argued
below that the New Jersey judiciary could not establish
a new tax rate by eliminating only a portion of the tax.
See N.J. Const. Art. IV, § 6, para. 1. The Tax Court
agreed:

(T]he Spill Act contains a single tax that cannot
be apportioned between its preempted and _ non-
preempted purposes.

* * * *

[H]ad the [United States Supreme Court] found
that it was the ‘collection of the tax that was im-
proper, this Court should direct repayment of the

14

taxes to the taxpayers in the same proportion as the
taxes were paid.

App., infra, 47a, 56a (emphasis in original). It was, of
course, precisely the collection of the tax that this Court
had found to be preempted under Section 114(c). Ac-
cordingly, under the Tax Court’s reasoning, petitioners
are entitled to a refund of the entire amount of the tax
wrongfully collected from them.

The state Supreme Court recognized the correctness
of the Tax Court’s analysis. It noted, for example, that
“a single tax rate was struck by the Legislature” to fund
all of the purposes of the statute. App., infra, 8a. The
state Supreme Court avoided the necessary conclusion
that the entire tax must fall only by its erroneous inter-
pretation of this Court’s mandate in the respects set forth
above, particularly by holding that Section 114(c) pre-
empted only expenditures and not imposition:of the tax
itself.

The state courts’ refusal to refund to petitioners any
part of the preempted tax “flout{s] federal law” in pre-
cisely the manner that this Court refused to countenance
in its decision. 475 U.S. at 376. As this Court con-
cluded, the New Jersey tax cannot be upheld “in its en-
tirety” merely because “valid provisions” were included
“within [a] clearly invalid statute[].” Jd. Notwith-
standing this Court’s directive, the state courts have up-
held the entire Spill Tax, without inquiring into its pur-
poses, solely on the basis that certain expenditures from
the Fund were for non-CERCLA purposes.

The unwillingness of the New Jersey courts to conform
to federal law mirrors a similar recalcitrance on the
part- of the state’s administrative officials. New Jersey’s
position at the time that CERCLA was enacted was that
the state would ignore the preemptive effect of Section
114(¢c) and persist in collecting the tax until “a final

Lncaran ad Ae He ei Se ANAS * ta wi

15

determination by the courts is to contrary.” Of the
fifty states, New Jersey was the only one that con-
tinued to collect a tax of this nature during the period
of preemption.‘* As a result, the balance in the Spill
Fund increased tenfold, from $3 million in 1981 to $30
million in 1985.%° There is no justification for permitting
the state to continue to “violate[] the plain meaning
of the statute” (475 U.S. at 370) by retaining taxes
that could not legally be collected under Section 114(c).

The New Jersey courts have twice contravened federal
law by denying petitioners a refund of illegally imposed
taxes. On remand from this Court, they failed to identify
any means of severing part of the tax in a manner con-
sistent with this Court’s mandate, and they clearly indi-
cated that such a severance is not permissible. Under
these circumstances, there would be no point to another
remand. This Court should instead direct the lower court
that petitioners are to be refunded the taxes that they
paid under the Spill Act during the period that Section
114(c) was in effect.

18 [1 N.J.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) { 34-180.75 (1981).

14 See Appellants’ reply brief in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, No. 84-978,
at 18-19.

15 See Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit B, p. 7 and Exhibit H, p. 7.

16

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of mandamus should be
granted. The Supreme Court of New Jersey should be
instructed that petitioners are entitled to a refund of
taxes paid under the Spill Act during the period that Sec-
tion 114(c) was in effect.

Respectfully submitted,
DANIEL M. GRIBBON JOHN J. CARLIN, JR.
E. EDWARD BRUCE Counsel of Record
BRucE N. KUHLIK 30 Vreeland Road
COVINGTON & BURLING P.O. Box 751
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Florham Park, New Jersey 07932
P.O. Box 7566 (201) 377-3350
Washington, D.C. 20044 =

(202) 662-6000
Attorneys for Petitioners

February 1988

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
September Term 1986

A-158

EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY, UNION
CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY and TEN-
NECO CHEMICALS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

V.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR ‘OF NEW JERSEY SPILL
COMPENSATION FUND; CLIFFORD A. GOLDMAN, TREAS-
URER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SIDNEY GLASER,
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION, and THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY, UNION
CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY and TEN-
NECO CHEMICALS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
V.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR OF NEW JERSEY SPILL
COMPENSATION FUND; CLIFFORD A. GOLDMAN, TREAS-
URER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SIDNEY GLASER,
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION; JERRY F.
ENGLISH, COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION ; and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

Argued February 17, 1987—Decided December 2, 1987

2a

On remand from the Supreme Court of the United
States, whose opinion is reported at 475 U.S. ——, 106
S.Ct. 1103, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986).

John J. Carlin, Jr., argued the cause for appellants
(Mr. Carlin, attorney; Mr. Carlin and Donald J. Fay,
on the brief).

Mary R. Hamill, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondents (W. Cary Edwards, Attorney Gen-
eral of New Jersey, attorney; Deborah T. Poritz, Assist-
ant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Hamill and Nancy
B. Stiles, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J.

This case is before us for the second time. Initially,
we affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division up-
holding the Tax Court’s determination that the tax im-
posed by the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control
Act, L.1976, c. 141 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 58:
10-23.11 to -23.24, -23.34) (Spill Act), was not pre-
empted by the federal government’s adoption of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675)
(CERCLA). Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526 (1984).

The United States Supreme Court, affirming in part
and reversing in part, concluded that the tax levied by the
Spill Act was imposed for certain purposes that were
pre-empted by CERCLA, as well as for other purposes not
pre-empted by CERCLA. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S.
355, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). Accordingly, the Supreme
Court remanded the matter to this Court to determine
“the state law question whether, or to what extent, the
non pre-empted provisions of the statute are severable
from the pre-empted provisions,” id. at , 89 L.Ed.2d
at 382, “and for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.” Jd. at , 89 L.Ed.2d at 383.

ee re ey

3a

We then remanded the matter to the Tax Court to
develop a record and to make recommended findings,
otherwise retaining jurisdiction. N.J. —— (1986).
Pursuant to our order, the Tax Court has submitted the
following recommended findings:

1. The decision of the United States Supreme
Court should not be applied prospectively but should
be retroactive to July 16, 1982 with respect to ex-
penditures made on preempted removal purposes and
to September 8, 1983 as to preempted remedial ex-
penses.

2. The non-preempted purposes of the Spill Act
are severable from the purposes found to be pre-
empted by the United States Supreme Court.

3. Plaintiffs’ claims for refunds should not be de-
feated by reason of their failure to comply with the
procedural requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14.

4. Following an accounting, (and plenary hearing
if necessary) to determine the amount of monies paid
for material purchased and services rendered for
preempted removal purposes on or after July 16,
1982 and for preempted remedial purposes on or
after September 8, 1983 to March 10, 1986, (date
of the United States Supreme Court decision), the
Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period
of time to reimburse the fund for the preempted
amounts expended.

(a) If, following such reimbursement, the amount
of the fund exceeds the cap established by the Legis-
lature, such excess should be paid to plaintiffs.

(b) Should the required reimbursement not be
made, the amount of preempted expenditures should
be refunded to plaintiffs.

(ec) Such refunds should be made in proportion to

the tax paid by each plaintiff to the total tax col-
lected.

4a

5. Defendants should not be enjoined from enforc-
ing payment of the spill fund tax by plaintiffs.

[—— NJ. Tax ; (Tax Ct. 1986) slip
op. at 38, 39).]

We now modify and, as modified, adopt the recommended
findings of the Tax Court.

I

The procedural history and facts pertinent to the pre-
emption issue are set forth in the prior opinions of this
Court and the United States Supreme Court. They need
be restated here only to the extent necessary to frame
the unique issue that confronts us in respect of the
Supreme Court’s remand.

The purpose of the Spill Act, enacted in 1977, was to
finance prevention and cleanup of oil spills and hazardous
substance discharges because of their adverse effects on
the state’s environment and economy. N.J.S.A. 58:10-
23.1la. The Act levied an excise tax on major chemical
and petroleum facilities within the state, and the proceeds
of the tax have been deposited into a permanent fund
(Spill Fund) to implement the legislative goals. N.J.S.A.
58:10-23.11h. The Spill Fund may be expended primarily
to clean up discharges of hazardous substances, to com-
pensate third parties from economic losses resulting from
such discharges, and for research and administrative
costs. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.1lo. Tax collections during Spill
Fund fiscal years from 1978 through 1985 averaged
slightly Jess than 10 million dollars annually.

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, providing for the
establishment over a five-year period of a 1.6 billion
dollar trust fund, commonly known as Superfund. 87.5%
of Superfund was raised primarily by federal excise
taxes on petroleum and chemicals,’ and the balance by

1 The federal excise tax on petroleum is currently at the rate of
0.79 cent a barrel and on chemicals at rates ranging from 0.22 cent

5a

appropriations from general revenues. Superfund’s re-
sources may be expended for two primary purposes: the
first, “governmental response,” encompasses both “re-
movals” of released hazardous substances in the nature
of a “short term” cleanup, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), and
“remedial action,” to achieve a “permanent remedy” for
released hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24).
Secondly, Superfund may pay claims, consisting either
of reimbursement to private parties for hazardous sub-
stance cleanup costs consistent with the national con-
tingency plan, or reimbursement to the federal or a
state government to compensate for damages to natural
resources. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9611(a) (2)-(3). Unlike Spill
Fund, Superfund resources cannot be used to clean up
oil spills or to_ compensate third parties for economic
losses caused by hazardous substance discharges.

The pre-emption issue that was resolved by the Su-
preme Court’s decision concerned the proper interpreta-
tion of §114(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9614(c).
That section, since repealed in its entirety by § 14(a)
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1652 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(c) ), provided as follows:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may
be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose
of which is to pay compensation for claims for any
costs of response or damages or claims which may
be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in
-this section shall preclude any State from using
general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing

to $4.87 per ton. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4611. Under the Spill Act, as
originally enacted, the basic tax rate was .01 cent per barrel on
petroleum products, and on non-petroleum products the greater of
.01 cent per barrel or .4% of fair market value. L. 1976, c. 141, § 9.
As amended by L. 1986, c. 143, § 2, the tax rate is .0125 cent per
barrel on petroleum products, and on nonpetroleum products the
greater of .0125 cent per barrel or 1% of fair market value.
N.J.S.A. 58 :10-23.11h.

6a

a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance
in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of
hazardous substance response equipment or other
preparations for the response to a release of hazard-
ous substances which affects such State.

The New Jersey Attorney General’s contention was
that the pre-emption language should be construed to
prohibit only payments to a fund to be used for purposes
that are actually compensated by Superfund. The Su-
preme Couri rejected that construction and concluded
that § 114(c) pre-empted “any fund intended, in whole
or in part, to pay for the same types of expenses that
may be paid by Superfund,” 475 U.S. at ——, 89 L.Ed.2d
at 379, whether or not Superfund actually paid such
expenses.

With respect to the parameters of pre-emption the
Court’s opinion implicitly acknowledged that CERCLA
itself does not set forth criteria for determining which
removal and remedial expenses and which natural re-
source claims “may be compensated” by Superfund. Ac-
cordingly, since such criteria are set forth in the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) required by CERCLA to be
revised to reflect its provisions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(8)
(B), the Court held that “the NCP provides the ap-
propriate measure of whether a given expenditure con-
stitutes ‘costs of response or damages or claims which
may be compensated’ by Superfund.” 475 U.S. at
89 L.Ed.2d at 382.

The Court conceded that CERCLA did not pre-empt
expenditures authorized by the Spill Act for the follow-
ing purposes: to compensate third parties for damage
resulting from hazardous substance discharges; to pay
personnel and equipment costs; to administer the fund
itself; and to conduct research. Jd. at ——, 89 L.Ed.2d
at 382. In addition, the Court specifically excluded the
required State contribution to the cost of remedial ac-

,

inch sdneniaa cl

Whence ute id apa See. Btiahe me

nd

Ta

tions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c) (3) (C), from those costs
that “may be compensated” by Superfund.

The Court concluded that the Spill Act was pre-empted
by §114(c) of CERCLA to the extent that the Act
authorized expenditures, beyond the mandatory state
share, “for remedial costs for sites on the National Pri-
ority List, or for removal costs that are eligible for
Superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP.”
475 U.S. at ——, 89 L.Ed.2d at 382.

II

Recommendations of the Tax Court

No testimony was elicited in the course of the remand
proceedings before the Tax Court. As a result, the record
on remand consists solely of affidavits and exhibits sub-
mitted by the parties in support of various motions filed
with the Court.

(a) Severability

We are in full accord with the Tax Court’s conclusion
that the purposes of the Spill Act held to be pre-empted
may be severed from the remainder of the statute with-
out impairing its validity.

The critical standard for determining issues of sever-
ability is the presumed intent of the Legislature. ‘That
intent must be determined on the basis of whether the
objectionable feature of the statute can be excised with-
out substantial impairment of the principal objects of
the statute.” Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills,
60 N.J. 342, 345 (1972); accord New Jersey Chapter,
Am. Inst. of Planners v. New Jersey State Bd. of Prof.
Planners, 48 N.J. 581, 593, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 8, 19
L.Ed.2d 8 (1967); Lane Distributors, Inc. v. Tilton, 7
N.J. 349, 369-70 (1951); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Con-
struction § 44.03 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1986) at 483. As we
explained in State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516 (1958),

8a

{[A]n unconstitutional provision in a statute does
not affect the validity of a separate article or clause
of the enactment, if otherwise valid, unless the two
are so intimately connected and mutually dependent
as reasonably to sustain the hypothesis that the Leg-
islature would not have adopted the one without the
other. Where the principal object of the statute is
constitutional, and the objectionable provision can
be excised without substantial impairment of the gen-
eral purpose, the statute is operative except insofar
as it may contravene fundamental law. [Jd. at 528.]

In this unusual setting, the inquiry is whether the
Legislature would have intended the nonpre-empted por-
tions of the Spill Act, including the tax rate, to remain
in effect notwithstanding the determination that signifi-
cant statutory purposes were pre-empted by CERCLA
for a limited period. (See discussion as to the period of
pre-emption, infra at (slip op. at 14-23)). Plain-
tiffs argued in the Tax Court and before us that sever-
ability is inappropriate where, as here, a single tax rate
was struck by the Legislature to fund both pre-empted
and nonpre-empted purposes. We are not persuaded,
however, that the valid purposes of a taxing statute are
not severable from the invalid ones simply because all
of the statutory objectives are financed by the same tax.
Rather, the entire statutory scheme must be analyzed in
order to ascertain the probable intent of the Legisla-
ture as to severability. The guiding principle was suc-
cinctly stated by Judge Gibbons in Chamber of Commerce
v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1985): “This
[severability] is largely a question of whether the statute
will continue to make sense after the challenged portion
is excised.”

We observe initially that the Spill Act contains a
standard severability clause. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.liw.
However, the inclusion or exclusion of such a clause does

9a

not ordinarily resolve the issue. See State v. Lanza,
supra, 27 N.J. at 527.

We also note the Legislature’s comprehensive objectives
in passing the Spill Act:

The Legislature finds and declares that the dis-
charge of petroleum products and other hazardous
substances within or outside the jurisdiction of this
State constitutes a threat to the economy and en-
vironment of this State. The Legislature intends by
the passage of this act to exercise the powers of this
State to control the transfer and storage of hazard-
ous substances and to provide liability for damage
sustained within this State as a result of any dis-
charge of said substances, by requiring the prompt
containment and removal of such pollution and sub-
stances, and to provide a fund for swift and ade-
quate compensation to resort businesses and other
persons damaged by such discharge. [N.J.S.A.
58 :10-23.11a. ]

To implement these wide-ranging goals, the Act au-
thorizes the Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) to clean up hazardous discharges either by using
the resources of the Spill Fund or by directing the dis-
charger to perform the work at its own expense.
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f. The fund also can be used to re-
imburse innocent third parties for cleanup and removal
costs incurred by them, and to pay direct and indirect
damages sustained because of hazardous substance dis-
charges. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g. The Act imposes joint
and several liability on dischargers of hazardous sub-
stances, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and re-
moval costs, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g, and authorizes the .
imposition of treble damages on a discharger who fails to
comply with a directive to clean up a hazardous-sub-
stance discharge. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f-a. The Spill
Fund’s authorized uses were summarized in the Supreme
Court’s opinion:

10a

As we have explained above, the Spill Fund may be
used for six purposes: (1) to finance governmental
cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) to reimburse
third parties for cleanup costs; (3) to compensate
third parties for damage resulting from hazardous
substance discharges; (4) to pay personnel and
equipment costs; (5) to administer the fund itself;
and (6) to conduct research. [475 U.S. at ——, 89
L.Ed.2d at 382.]

It is also significant that the Legislature, when it
adopted the Spill Act, knew that federal funding for
hazardous waste cleanup was possible and that such fund-
ing might warrant modification of the authorized pur-
poses of the Spill Act. Section 27 of the Act provides:

If the United States Congress enacts legislation
providing compensation for the discharge of petro-
leum and hazardous products, the commissioner shall
determine to what degree that legislation provides
the needed protection for our citizens, businesses and
environment and shall make the appropriate recom-
mendations to the Legislature for amendments to
this act. [L. 1976, c.141, § 27 (codified at N.J.S.A.
58 :10-23.11z) .]

Also pertinent to the question of severability is the
provision in the Spill Act as originally enacted, L.1976,
c.141, §9, suspending the collection of taxes whenever
the Spill Fund attains certain prescribed levels.* Al-

2In its original form, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h provided, in part:

b. * * * In each fiscal year following any year in which the
balance of the fund equals or exceeds $50,000,000.00, no tax
shall be levied unless (1) the current balance in the fund is less
than $40,000,000.00 or (2) pending claims against the fund
exceed 50% of the existing balance of the fund. The pro-
visions of the foregoing notwithstanding, should claims paid
from or pending against the fund not exceed $5,000,000.00
within 3 years after the tax is first levied, the tax shall be
$0.01 per barrel transferred or 0.4% of the fair market value

lla

though these tax-suspension provisions of the Act were

repealed as of February 1, 1987, L.1986, c.143, § 2 (codi-

fied at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h-b), they were in effect dur-
ing the entire period of pre-emption. Accordingly, the
Spill Act had a self-correcting mechanism that would
suspend tax collections when existing funds were ade-
quate to discharge the statutory objectives. These pro-
visions appear to reflect the Legislature’s assumption
that if the demands on the Spill Fund were less expan-
sive than originally contemplated, the impact of the pre-
scribed tax rate on the oil and chemical industry would
be alleviated by the tax-suspension provisions built into
the Act. Although undoubtedly not adopted in anticipa-
tion of a holding that certain statutory objectives were
pre-empted by CERCLA, the presence of the tax-suspen-
sion mechanism persuasively suggests that the tax-rate
provisions of the Act are not inconsistent with a deter-
mination that the nonpre-empted purposes of the Spill
Act are severable from the pre-empted purposes during
the limited period of pre-emption.

We are also informed by the uncontroverted affidavit
| of Michael E. Catania, Deputy Commissioner of the
DEP, filed with the Tax Court in support of the State’s
motion seeking severability and prospective application
of the Supreme Court’s decision, that the Spill Fund will
require approximately 340 million dollars during the five
fiscal years beginning with 1987 to pay for “nonpre-
empted” type expenditures. Of this amount, 200 million
dollars is projected as the cleanup cost for sites ineligible

of the product, as the case may be, until the balance in the fund
equals or exceeds $36,000,000.00, and thereafter shall not be
levied unless: (1) the current balance in the fund is less than
$30,000,000.00 or (2) pending claims against the fund exceed
50% of the existing balance of the fund. In the event of either
such occurrence and upon certification thereof by the State
Treasurer, the director shall within 10 days of the date of such
certification relevy the excise tax, which shall take effect on the
first day of the month following such relevy. * * *

bee

12a

for Superfund reimbursement and 140 million dollars as
the anticipated State share of cleanup costs at Superfund-
eligible sites. The affidavit also identified anticipated in-
creases in administrative costs and in the cost of reim-
bursement of third-party claims. The affidavit states that
the projected needs of the Spill Fund for nonpre-empted
purposes are substantially higher than the anticipated
revenue from the then current tax rate.

As forecast by the Catania affidavit, the Legislature
has recently recognized the enhanced needs of the Spill
Fund by increasing the tax rate, and broadening the tax
base by redefining “major facility” to include a greater
number of oil and chemical companies. L. 1986, c. 143,
§2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h). The Legisla-
ture’s commitment of additional resources to the Spill
Fund, after the Supreme Court’s pre-emption decision,
demonstrates plainly that the Legislature’s assumption
in 1986 was that the Spill Act remained in effect, not-
withstanding the Court’s conclusion that a portion of the
act’s objectives had been pre-empted for a limited period.*

Accordingly, we are convinced on the basis of the
overall structure of the Spill Act, its comprehensive pur-
pose to facilitate the statewide cleanup of hazardous-
substance discharges, and the continuing commitment of
the Legislature to provide adequate resources for the
Spill Fund that severability of the nonpre-empted pro-
vision of the Spill Fund, during the limited period of
pre-emption, is manifestly consistent with the legislative
intent. The Spill Act “makes sense,” Chamber of Com-
merce v. Hughey, supra, 774 F.2d at 597, with or without
the pre-empted purposes.

*L. 1986, c. 143 was enacted after Congress adopted the Super-
fund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, which repealed
the pre-emption provision in CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(c).
Nevertheless, it is self-evident that the Legislature assumed that the
Supreme Court’s decision did not invalidate the Spill Act in its
entirety.

th 13a

(b) Period and Scope of Pre-emption

The conclusion that the pre-empted purposes of the
Spill Act are severable from the nonpre-empted provisions
requires that we determine the period and scope of pre-
emption and, based on that determination, the appro-
priate relief. The positions of the parties conflict sharply.
The State argues that the Supreme Court’s decision
should be given only prospective application, with the
result that the period of pre-emption would begin on
March 10, 1986 (the date of the Court’s decision), and
would end on October 17, 1986, the effective date of
SARA. If its position on prospectivity is rejected, the
State supports the Tax Court’s determination that prom-
ulgation of the NCP and the NPL mark the commence-
ment period for pre-emption of removal and remedial ac-
tions respectively, but the State argues that the pre-
emption period should end on September 30, 1985, the
date on which CERCLA’s taxing authority expired.

Plaintiff’s position is that the effective date of the
Supreme Court’s holding that the Spill Act was partially
pre-empted by CERCLA must be December 11, 1980, the
date of CERCLA’s enactment. Plaintiffs point to section
302(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9652(a), which states
that “unless otherwise provided, all provisions of
[CERCLA] shall be effective on December 11, 1980.”
Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s
references to the NCP and NPL were intended solely to
provide a frame of reference for determining whether
the Spill Act established a fund that was devoted to pre-
empted purposes, but were not intended to imply that
the effective date of pre-emption depended on promulga-
tion of the NCP and NPL. Plaintiffs further contend
that on CERCLA’s enactment New Jersey had “adequate
guidance” to know what sites would be eligible for
Superfund reimbursement and “could have amended the
Spill Act so as not to violate Section 114(c).”

l4a

We are in full accord with the Tax Court’s conclusion
that the Supreme Court’s decision in this case should not
be restricted to prospective application. Although the
Supreme Court’s opinion is silent on the issue of retro-
spective application, the remand to this Court to deter-
mine severability and “for further proceedings” carries
with it the implicit direction that we determine the re-
lief appropriate to the holding that the Spill Act is par-
tially pre-empted. If the Court conceived that its deci-
sion might apply only prospectively, which would signifi-
cantly affect the remedy we must fashion, it is reasonable
to assume that the opinion would at least have adverted
to that possibility. See Lemon v. Kurzman, 411 U.S. 192,
198, 199, 30 L.Ed.2d 151, 160 (1973) (Lemon II) (hold-
ing that there are no absolute principles available to
determine whether a given constitutional ruling should
be applied retroactively and that equitable principles and
the totality of. circumstances should guide such deter-
minations) ; accord Coons v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., 96 N.J. 419 (1984) (Coons II).

Moreover, we agree with the Tax Court that an indis-
pensable prerequisite to prospectivity is not present in
this case, since the Supreme Court’s opinion did not
“establish a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied
* * * or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed * * *.” Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106, 30 L.£d.2d 296, 306
(1971) (citations omitted). Here, the Supreme Court
relied upon a settled legal principle—the preeminence of
federal legislation under the supremacy clause, article
VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution—and ap-
plied it by construing section 114(c) of CERCLA as pre-
empting certain provisions of the Spill Act. No “clear
past precedent” was overruled nor could the question of
statutory interpretation fairly be considered an “issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-

15a

Sse cee Ged Sali

shadowed,” as that phrase was used in Chevron. The
purpose of the Chevron test is the avoidance of prejudice
arising from judicial decisions that interested parties
. could not fairly have anticipated. In this case the issue
of statutory interpretation was susceptible to either of
two resolutions, one advanced by the State and the other
advanced by plaintiffs. The Court’s holding that
CERCLA partially pre-empted the Spill Act was not suf-
ficiently unpredictable to satisfy this aspect of the Chev-
ron criteria. Accordingly, we conclude that an exclusively
prospective application of the Court’s decision is inappro-
propriate under these circumstances.

_

We also agree with the Tax Court’s conclusion that
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) promul-
gation of the NCP and the NPL marked the critical
dates on which pre-emption of remedial and removal ex-
penditures, respectively, shall be deemed to have com-
menced. The NCP sets forth detailed criteria for deter-

mining whether removal actions may be financed by

. Superfund, imposes limits on the cost and duration of
most removal actions, and prescribes the conditions under
which such limits may be exceeded. 40 C.F.R. § 300.65
(b) (2) and (8) (1987). In addition, the NCP limits
Superfund-financed remedial actions to sites listed on the
NPL, 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a) (1987), which was initially
promulgated in September. 1983 and thereafter amended
and supplemented to include additional sites.

Plaintiffs, arguing that CERCLA’s effective date of
December 11, 1980, is necessarily the date of pre-emption,
contend that New Jersey could have anticipated the im-
pact of the NCP and NLP. Plaintiffs assert that two of
New Jersey’s worst sites had qualified prior to May 1981
for an unspecified amount of funding under the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251-1376; the implication is
that qualification of such sites for Superfund reimburse-
ment was therefore inevitable. Plaintiffs also observe
that four New Jersey sites had qualified in 1981 to

nlite ill

l6a

receive money from Superfund for study and design
work, and that a substantial number of New Jersey sites
received high rankings on a list of EPA Region II sites
designated as “candidates” for remedial funding under
Superfund.

In response, the affidavit of defendant Robert E. Hunt,
Administrator of Spill Fund from 1978 to 1986, described
the difficulty experienced by DEP officials in 1981 and
1982 because “the scope of the federal program had not
been defined and Superfund financing decisions appeared
to be made by EPA on a case by case basis.” According
to Hunt, “there was virtually no money available from
Superfund at this time and no real guidance from
USEPA as to what activities would eventually be funded.”

We need not resolve the conflict whether DEP, from
the date of CERCLA’s enactment, knew or should have
known those hazardous waste sites that would be the in-
evitable beneficiaries of Superfund’s resources. Suffice it
to say that the manner in which Superfund was adminis-
tered at that time leave us highly skeptical that its opera-
tional parameters could readily have been forecast by any-
one outside the EPA. A typical account of Superfund’s
operations during this period is contained in a House Re-
port, accompanying a predecessor bill to the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:

The resources given to EPA were simply inade-
quate to fulfill the promises that were made to clean
up abandoned hazardous wastes in this country. With
political pressure on EPA to treat every site dis-
covered as a high priority, EPA was virtually guar-
anteed to fail from the moment CERCLA passed in
1980.

To compound the problem the first administrator
of the Superfund program undermined the intent of
the program. Under the initial leadership of Assist-
ant Administrator Lavelle, the program was vic-

17a

timized by gross mismanagement and policies which
limited expenditures for site cleanups, in part in an
effort to dissuade Congress from extending the fund-
ing for the program beyond its scheduled expiration
date of October 1, 1985. [H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 at 55 (1985) reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2835. ]

In any event, we are satisfied that the Supreme Court’s
reference to the NCP, supplemented by the NPL, as pro-
viding “criteria that determine what expenses, at which
sites, will be eligible for Superfund money” was intended
to demonstrate that the pre-emption period did not com-
mence before these guidelines were promulgated. The
Court explained that

{hjaving decided that “may be compensated” should
be given its ordinary meaning, we must define the
category of expenses that may be compensated by
Superfund. Fortunately, CERCLA itself furnishes
an appropriate test. Section 105(8) (B) of CERCLA,
42 USC §9605(8)(B) requires the President to
revise the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to re-
fleet CERCLA’s provisions. As part of that revision,
the President must create and revise annually a list
of sites most in need of federal efforts, now known as
the National Priorities List. The NCP currently
specifies that removal, or immediate cleanup, will be
financed by Superfund only in emergency situations,
see 40 CFR § 300.65 (1985). Remedial action will be
financed only for sites on the National Priorities
List, id., § 300.68(a). Finally, the Environmental
Protection Agency, pursuant to the NCP, has pro-
posed criteria for the use of Superfund money for
natural resource claims. See 50 Fed. Reg. 9593
(1985). The NCP, therefore, provides criteria that
determine what expenses, at which sites, will be
eligible for Superfund money. We therefore conclude
that the NCP provides the appropriate measure of

18a

whether a given expenditure constitutes “costs of
response or damages or claims which may be com-
pensated” by Superfund. [475 U.S. at ——, 89 L.Ed.
2d at 381-82 (footnote omitted) .]

We find the clear thrust of the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion to be that although CERCLA established the principle
of pre-emption, the scope of pre-emption is a regulatory
rather than statutory determination. Accordingly, until
the NCP was first promulgated by EPA on July 16, 1982,
47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982), and then revised on Septem-
ber 8, 1983, to include the first NPL, 48 Fed. Reg.
40,669 (1983), no agency guidelines existed to determine
those remedial or removal actions that would be eligible
for Superfund reimbursement, and for which funding by
the Spill Fund was thereby pre-empted.

We reject the State’s assertion that pre-emption should
cease as of September 30, 1985, the date on which taxing
authorization under CERCLA expired. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9653
(repealed by Pub. L. 99-499 §571(b), 100 Stat. 1761
(1986)). From that date until enactment of SARA on
October 17, 1986, CERCLA was funded by emergency
appropriations. We can discern no clear congressional
intention to terminate pre-emption for the brief period
during which CERCLA was financed temporarily by ap-
propriations from general revenues rather than by excise
taxes on petroleum and chemicals. Accordingly, we hold
that the period of pre-emption ended on October 27, 1986,
the effective date of SARA, which repealed the pre-
emption language in § 114(c) of CERCLA.

Our conclusions concerning the scope and period of pre-
emption will require that this matter be remanded once
again to the Tax Court. The purpose of the remand will
be to permit the parties to establish a record upon which
the Tax Court can determine the amount of Spill Fund
expenditures that was pre-empted by CERCLA. In that
connection, the State points out that establishing the be-
ginning and end of the pre-emption period does not

Bes ohh ris a a ie see Ge

19a

necessarily determine whether a particular expense in-
curred or paid by Spill Fund during the pre-emption
period should be treated as a “pre-empted” expense. The
State contends that work authorized, commenced, or com-
pleted before the pre-emption period began, but paid for
during the pre-emption period, should not be deemed pre-
empted.

We are generally in accord with the State’s position.
If expenses to remove or remediate hazardous waste that
are paid by Spill Fund before pre-emption began are not
inconsistent with CERCLA, it should follow that expenses
committed before but paid after the effective date of pre-
emption should not be treated as pre-empted. The princi-
ple is that the Spill Funds’ expenditures should not be
deemed pre-empted by CERCLA unless the essential de-
cision to commit the funds was made after promulgation
of the NCP* or NPL,° as the case may be. We leave to
the Tax Court on remand the task of determining pre-
cisely those expenditures that were permissible and those
that were pre-empted.

Remedy

Preliminarily, we note our full accord with the Tax
Court’s conclusion that any technical noncompliance by

* As noted, the effective date of pre-emption of removal actions
that meet the criteria of the NCP is July 16, 1982. We note the
State’s reference, in its Exceptions to the Recommendations of the
Tax Court, to objections communicated to EPA concerning the
vagueness of the criteria for authorization of removal actions and
the EPA’s response to the effect that the criteria are adequate.
It is self-evident that expenditures by the Spill Act for removal
actions that EPA determined to be unauthorized by the NCP cri-
teria are not pre-empted. In cases where EPA has not determined
eligibility of a removal action pursuant to the NCP criteria, the
Tax Court on remand must make that evaluation in order to deter-
mine if the expenditure was pre-empted.

5 The effective date of pre-emption of remedial actions for sites
on the NPL is the date of promulgation of the NPL, or any amend-
ment or supplement thereof, on which such site is first listed.

20a

plaintiffs with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 59:49-14 does
not affect plaintiffs’ right to relief. —— N.J. Tax at ——
(slip op. at 28).

The remedy recommended by Judge Evers is thoughtful
and practical. Essentially, the Tax Court proposed that
an accounting or hearing be conducted to determine the
amount of the pre-empted expenditures by the Spill Fund.
The Legislature would then be accorded a reasonable time
period to reimburse the Spill Fund for the entire pre-
empted amount, using any source of funds other than the
tax imposed by the Spill Act. If the Legislature does not
reimburse the Spill Fund within the designated period,
the Tax Court proposed that plaintiffs receive a refund
of so much of the pre-empted expenditures as bears the
same proportion to the total pre-empted expenditures as
the Spill Act taxes paid by plaintiffs bears to the total
amount of Spill Act taxes collected. In addition, the Tax
Court recommended that if the Legislature reimbursed
the Spill Fund and the reimbursement caused the amount
of the Fund to exceed the statutory cap originally im-
posed by the Spill Act, see supra at —— (slip op. at 12),
the entire excess over the cap would be paid to plaintiffs.

In considering the appropriateness of the Tax Court’s
recommendations as to remedy, we accept plaintiff’s
premise that ordinarily a taxpayer that pays a tax found
to be invalid is entitled to a refund. Mayor of Jersey
City v. Riker, 38 N.J.L. 225, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1876) ; accord
In Re Fees of State Bd. of Dentistry, 84 N.J. 582,. 587
(1980) ; Milmar Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 36
N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1955). In this litigation,
however, we must address a tax that has been invali-
dated only in part, and for a limited period. Further-
more, in framing the appropriate relief we are obliged to
consider the context in which repeal of the limited pre-
emption of the Spill Act occurred.

The background and need for the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act, which appropriated $9

2la

billion in additional funding to clean up hazardous waste
sites, is summarized in the report of the House of Repre-
sentatives Science and Technology Committee referred to

above, see supra at —— (slip op. at 19), that accom-
panied H.R. 2817, a predecessor to the bill ultimately
enacted by Congress:

The Superfund program to clean up abandoned
hazardous waste sites is one of the Nation’s most
important environmental programs designed to pro-
tect human health and the environment. It is also
the most beleaguered program the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) administers. If enacted,
H.R. 2817 would give EPA the flexibility to revital-
ize the Superfund program, ensure cleanup of aban-
doned hazardous chemicals, and protect human
health and the environment.

Superfund was passed in 1980 to address what
many believed was a relatively limited problem. The
EPA was instructed to find 400 hazardous waste
sites. Most believed that cleaning up a site was rela-
tively inexpensive and involved removing containers
or scraping a few inches of soil off the ground. The
| Agency was given $1.6 billion to administer the
cleanup of the 400 sites.

vo
VD ital

Today, five years later, our understanding of the
problem posed by abandoned hazardous chemicals is
entirely different. The Office of Technology Asess-
ment now estimates there may be as many as 10,000
Superfund sites across the Nation, or an average of
23 sites per Congressional district. These sites range
from industrial plants to river beds to city dumps
: where smal! businesses and households have disposed
of solvents, paints and cleaning fluids. We now un-
derstand -that a cleanup frequently goes far beyond
i simple removal of barrels. It often involves years of
j pumping contaminated water from aquifers. The

22a

total cost of completing the Superfund program is
estimated to be as much as $100 billion. The total
time will be decades.

* * *

The current reauthorization, coming when it does,
forces Congress to face a very fundamental policy
question: how to ensure in the future that there are
adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly
repudiated, mismanagement problems are behind us.

H.R. 2817 has been written with the underlying
belief that Congress should focus on ways to ensure
rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned hazardous
wastes rather than on past mistakes. It is clear from
the accumulating data on waste sites that EPA will
never have adequate monies or manpower to address
the problem itself. As a result, an underlying prin-
ciple of H.R. 2817 is that Congress must facilitate
cleanups of hazardous substances by the responsible
parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role
with a set of tough legal enforcement standards.
Equally important is the role of the communities
around Superfund sites. It is here that we can
ensure that cleanups and post-cleanup maintenance
of the sites are carried out in compliance with the
cleanup agreements for the sites. [H.R. Rep. No.
253, supra, at 54.]

In this connection, the repeal of section 114(c), the
pre-emption provision of CERCLA, was explained by the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works in
its report on §.51, another predecessor to SARA:

Clarification of section 114(c) appears desirable be-
cause of the litigation that has arisen from the origi-
nal language in the statute. The litigation has been
focused on the right of States to tax those substances
which are taxed under the Federal Superfund law.
To date, all decisions in State courts (including

23a

recent State Supreme Court rulings) have found that
the Federal Superfund law does not preempt the
rights of the States to raise taxes from these sub-
stances or through other special taxes. This litiga-
tion could continue for years. Any cloud of uncer-
; tainty over the legitimacy of these taxes should be
removed at the earliest possible time.

It is widely recognized that States must develop
their own taxes to meet their responsibilities for the
State share of the cleanup costs at Superfund sites.
In addition, States have responsibilities for managing
and cleaning up hazardous materials not covered by
the Federal program. Clarification of section 114(c)
will allow the State to move forward and develop
the tax mechanisms necessary for meeting the grow-
ing funding needs for response to hazardous sub-
i stance releases and participation in the Superfund
; program, as well as for maintaining effective State
hazardous waste programs.

Si telnet

iiss Silat Ii tend nha Sah Siar igs ee

The primary effect of the amendment will be to
remove a potential barrier to the creation of State
superfund programs. The amendment may result in
an increase in the number and pace of hazardous
i substance response actions undertaken or partially
; funded by States, since States will be able to raise
‘ funds to assist such hazardous substance response.
[S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. at 59, 60
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2835 (emphasis added). ]

In the course of Senate debate on 8.51, Senator Lauten-
berg of New Jersey offered this explanation for the pro-
posed repeal of section 114(c):

Mr. President, S. 51 clearly addresses an issue that
: has hindered State efforts to set up their own super-
: funds. Because of a suit filed in New Jersey, which
questioned the right of a State to tax the same
sources taxed by the Federal Superfund, State Super-

24a

fund programs have had a cloud over them. This has
certainly been the case in New Jersey, where the
State was extremely reluctant to spend funds out of
our spillfund without this litigation being settled.
S. 51 strikes the so-called preemption language in
existing law which created this legal ambiguity. Ap-
proval of the bill will end years of litigation and free
States to conduct aggressive cleanup programs with
their own funds. [116 Cong. Rec. $11,581 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1985 at $11581.]

Subsequently, in the debate on the conference report
of SARA, Senator Lautenberg stated that the repeal of
section 114(c) would

{o]verturn the Supreme Court’s Exxon versus Hunt
decision, which preempted State taxing authority for
State spill funds, such as New Jersey’s. This provi-
sion is critical to New Jersey’s plans for complement-
ing the Federal Superfund Program with a State
supported cleanup program. [135 Cong. Rec. $14,912
(daily ed. Oct 3, 1986) .]

These excerpts from the legislative history of SARA
reflect Congress’s recognition not only of the enormity
of the hazardous waste cleanup problem but also of the
importance of State and local cooperation to assist the
federal government in this complex and difficult under-
taking. It is obvious that the repeal of section 114(c)
was intended to encourage and facilitate State participa-
tion in the long-term cleanup effort.

Under these circumstances, we are constrained to
fashion a remedy for the collection of Spill Act taxes
during the pre-emption period that least offends the con-
gressional purpose in repealing pre-emption. On another
recent occasion involving an invalid tax statute, we used
our equitable powers to construct a remedy consistent
with the attendant circumstances. See Salorio v. Glaser,
93 N.J. 447, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 78 L.Ed.2d 682

25a

(1983) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the
Emergency Transfer Tax on New York residents who
commuted to work in New Jersey, but restricting deci-
sion to prospective application). As we observed in
Salorio, “Equitable remedies * * * ‘are a special blend
of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is work-
able,’ ” id. at 464 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon
II), supra, 411 U.S. at 200, 36 L.E£d.2d at 161).

Accordingly, we conclude that under these unique cir-
cumstances the appropriate remedy in this matter is that
which best implements the intent of Congress in adopting
SARA and the intent of the Legislature in adopting and
amending the Spill Act. The uncontradicted record be-
fore us indicates that the Spill Fund’s needs are likely to
exceed its resources for some time. The Legislature has
only recently increased both the tax rate and the tax base
in order to augment the Spill Fund’s revenues. Congress
has evidenced its intention to encourage an enhanced
State role in hazardous waste cleanup.

In this setting, a partial tax refund to plaintiffs should
be a remedy of last resort. Instead, we adopt that part
of the Tax Court’s recommendation that conditions the
payment of a pro-rata refund upon the Legislature’s fail-
ure to reimburse the Spill Fund for the amount of ex-
penditures found to be pre-empted. In our view, reim-
bursement of the Spill Fund from non-Spill Act revenues
vindicates the Spill Fund’s payment cf pre-empted ex-
penses in a manner most consistent with the objectives of
Congress and the Legislature. We conclude that a period
of six months from the final determination of the amount
of pre-empted expenditures, from which no appeal is
pending or can be taken, is sufficient for the Legislature
to take action to reimburse the fund. In this connection,
we hold that reimbursement of the Spill Fund must be
for the entire amount of pre-empted expenditures, and
reject the State’s contention that pro-rata reimbursement
proportionate to the plaintiffs’ share of Spill Act taxes

26a

is sufficient. The thrust of this remedy is to make the
Spill Fund whole.

In the event the Legislature does not appropriate funds
sufficient to reimburse the Spill Fund for the full amount
of pre-empted expenditures within such six-month period,
the Fund shall refund to the plaintiffs, pro rata, so much
of the pre-empted expenditures as bears the same pro-
portion to the total pre-empted expenditures as the Spill
Act taxes paid by plaintiffs bears to the total amount of
Spill Act taxes collected. In view of the repeal of the cap
provisions of the Spill Act as originally enacted, the Tax
Court’s recommendation in paragraph 4(a) of its Sum-
mary is no longer appropriate. —— N.J. Tax at ——
(slip op. at 39).

For the reasons stated, the recommendations of the
Tax Court, as modified by this opinion, are adopted. The
matter is remanded to the Tax Court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

Justices Clifford, Handler and Pollock and Judges
Pressler and King join in this opinion. Chief Justice

Wilentz and Justices O’Hern and Garibaldi did not par-
ticipate.

27a
APPENDIX B

TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
September Term 1984

A-66

EXXON CORPORATION, et als,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

vs

ROBERT HUNT, et als,
Defendants-Respondents.

On Remand from Supreme Court of New Jersey
RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO REMAND

JOHN F. EVERS, J.T.C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The United States Supreme Court in this matter,
(reported at 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986)) interpreted § 114
(ce) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601, et seg. as preempting contributions to any state
fund that is intended to pay for the same types of ex-
penses that may be paid by the Fund (superfund) estab-
lished under CERCLA. The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court to the extent
that it held that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and
Control Act (Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 et seq.,
could constitutionally impose a tax on plaintiffs to sup-

28a

port expenditures which are eligible for superfund financ-
ing. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court to the extent that it held that the
Spill Act could constitutionally impose a tax to support
expenditures that are not eligible for superfund financ-
ing.

The purposes of the Spill Act which were found to be
non-preempted by the Supreme Court because they are
clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA and, therefore, not
‘covered by § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. 9614(c), include: (1) to
compensate third parties for damages resulting from
hazardous substance discharges; (2) to pay personnel
and equipment costs; (3) to administer the New Jersey
spill fund; and (4) to conduct research. The purposes of
the Spill Act which the Supreme Court found to be pre-
empted by §114(c) because they fall within the scope
of CERCLA are (1) the financing of governmental clean-
up of hazardous waste sites, including remedial costs for
sites on the National Priority List (NPL) and removal
costs that are eligible for superfund compensation under
the terms of the National Contingency Plan (NCP); and
(2) the reimbursement of third parties for cleanup costs,
except to the extent that these two categories of expend-
itures are intended to provide the 10% state share of
remedial costs. The Supreme Court held that, to the ex-
tent the Spill Act permits taxation to support preempted
expenditures, it cannot stand, and remanded the case to
the New Jersey Supreme Court which remand, in per-
tinent part, stated: j

We leave to the New Jersey Supreme Court the
state law question whether, or to what extent, the
nonpre-empted provisions of the statute are sever-
able from the pre-empted provisions. . . .

. . . [T]he case is remanded for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 106 S. Ct.
1116-1117.

29a

I. ISSUES (AND PROBLEMS) PRESENTED DUE
TO THE NATURE OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT REMAND.

While that part of the Supreme Court remand which
leaves to the New Jersey Supreme Court the state law
question whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted
provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-
empted provisions is clear, the language concerning fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion is un-
clear and, it is submitted, its intent can only be ascer-
tained through an analysis of the Court’s reasoning as
expressed in its opinion. Such question arises not only

as a legal proposition but out of practical considerations
as well.

A cursory reading of the remand suggests that the
Court must focus, at least initially and perhaps exclu-
sively, on the severability issue. Following a resolution
of that question however, the question arises—what now?
Unlike the language employed in Exxon Corp. v. Eager-
ton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983), (also authored by Justice
Marshall and specifically referred to by the Justice in
the instant remand), where, after concluding that a por-
tion of an Alabama tax (on oil and gas extracted from
Alabama wells) was preempted, the high court said:

Since the severability of the pass-through prohibi-
tion from the remainder of the 1979 amendments is
a matter of state law, we remand to the Supreme
Court of Alabama for that court to determine
whether the partial invalidity of the pass-through
prohibition entitles appellants to a refund of some
or all of the taxes paid under protest. [at 197]

here the Court made no reference to the question of re-
funds whatsoever. The reasons suggested for the absence
of such refund language in the instant maiter are dis-
cussed infra, but in any event it appears that the New
Jersey Supreme Court, as well as the parties, assumed

30a

that the real question presented on remand dealt with
refunds—and then not “if” but rather “how much”.
(Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in its re
mand, directed_the Tax Court to make such calculations) .’

In an apparent attempt to formulate a method of de-
termining the exact amounts of spill fund monies which
were devoted to preempted purposes and thence a deter-
mination of the exact refunds due each plaintiff, the
parties embarked on a course of considerable “informal”
discovery. (See appendix in support of plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment). It soon became apparent (to
the parties and this Court) that such an undertaking,
if pursued to a conclusion, would be staggering in terms
of time and money. For example, Robert Hunt, (who
from January 1978 until January 1986 was the Chief
Executive of the spill fund), stated, “It would be ex-
tremely difficult, if possible at all, to determine which
expenditures were for work completed or contracted for
before April, 1981 but paid after that date,”*? and
“Numerous other examples can be given for sites where
significant amounts of spill fund monies were spent for
cleanup at a site which was eventually put on the NPL.”
(National Priority List). (Hunt affid. July 16, 1986, p.
6).8

1 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also recognized the absence of
any direction as to payment of refunds. He said:

But since the Court concludes that the Spill Act is “pre-
empted in part,” ante, at 1; accord, id., at 19, it must gon-
front the difficult question of relief. In keeping with its “par-
tial preemption” analysis, the Court should advise the New
Jersey courts how they should calculate the partial refund of
taxes to which appellants are presumably entitled on remand.
106 S.Ct. 1120. [emphasis supplied]

2 While CERCLA was effective in Decembe 1980, superfund tax
was not collected until April 1981.

3 Although Congress directed that the superfund program be
implemented through a revised NCP to be adopted by June 1981,

3la

Additionally, concerning the problems associated with
extensive discovery, David Mack, (prior to his appoint-
ment as Acting Administrator of spill fund in February
1986, Mr. Mack was a regulatory officer of the New Jer-
sey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) ),
whose responsibilities included the monitoring of the spill
fund’s activities and who was also involved in New Jer-
sey’s hazardous waste cleanup program since 1980, which
involvement included negotiating contracts and agree-
ments under the superfund program between DEP and
United States Environmental Agency (EPA), stated:

This information, (a list of expenditures at sites
on the NPL from December 1980 [effective date of
CERCLA] to the present), was provided [to plain-
tiffs], but it should be noted that the costs listed in-
clude expenditures contracted for and paid prior to
listing on the NPL; expenditures contracted for
prior to listing on NPL but paid after listing; ad-
ministrative charges billed directly to the project
account; costs later reimbursed by EPA for advanced
funding; costs EPA declared to be ineligible for
funding; and costs which may be credited in the
future against the State’s mandated 10% share. Our
records reveal the date on which invoices are paid,
but not the date on which the work was contracted
for or actually performed... .

To discover the date of performance, however,
every invoice would have to be examined. Such an
undertaking is staggering in terms of time and re-
sources when 99 New Jersey sites—the number cur-

the EPA did not meet this deadline and the NCP, revised pursuant
to CERCLA, was not published until July 16, 1982. Once published
the NCP limited superfund expenditures for remedial (long-term
cleanup) actions to sites on the NPL which was to be a compilation
of the worst sites nationwide. However, EPA did not officially
promulgate the NPL until September 8, 1983, more than a year
after the NCP was promulgated.

32a

rently on the NPL—are involved. At least 1,800- in-
voices would have to be scrutinized. Indeed, the spill
fund would have to hire either a contractor or new
staff to perform this lengthy task. Additionally,
these invoices would have to be scrutinized to deter-
mine whether non-preempted costs such as adminis-
trative costs had been included. [Mack affid. July 15,
1986, pp. 5 & 6]

Under the circumstances it was agreed that certain
legal issues, (arising primarily from the imprecise direc-
tions of the United States Supreme Court), should first
be addressed; the thought being that a decision on those
questions would possibly decrease the time and expense,
and perhaps completely avoid the need, of such a detailed
accounting. Accordingly extensive briefs were submitted
concerning the issues of prospectivity vis-a-vis retroactiv-
ity, (of the Supreme Court decision) ; severability; extent
of refunds, if any; and the applicability (and compliance
with, if applicable) of N.J.S.A. 54:14-14, (State Tax
Uniform Procedure Law) .*

II. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT DECISION BE APPLIED PROSPEC-
TIVELY?

As indicated in the Statement of the Case the United
States Supreme Court remanded this matter for the pur-
pose of determining, “whether, or to what extent, the
non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable
from the preempted provisions.” 106 S. Ct. at 1116. To
carry out the Court’s mandate, the first question to be
addressed is whether its order to determine severability
of the preempted portions of the Spill Act is to have

4 Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against enforcement of the
spill tax taxing provisions until the New Jersey Supreme Court
resolves the remand from the United States Supreme Court in
the instant matter.

Oral argument was waived pursuant to R. 1:6-2.

— ATCT eS oa ee ee

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33a

retroactive or prospective effect. The answer to that ques-
tion turns on whether the decision itself is to be applied
retroactively or prospectively. It is determined that the
decision is to have prospective effect only if it follows that
severability of the Spill Act for the period prior to March
10, 1986, the date of the United States Supreme Court
decision, is not an issue because the Act will be treated
as valid up to that date. Such decision will also deter-
mine whether plaintiffs are entitled to refunds for
amounts paid for preempted purposes prior to March 10,
1986. If it is to be applied prospectively it follows that
there can be no refunds for amounts paid prior to that
date even though the spill fund used tax monies for pre-
empted purposes. Defendants’ position is that the deci-
sion must be given prospective effect and consequently
severability is an issue only from March 10, 1986 and
further that plaintiffs are not entitled to refunds for any
tax paid prior thereto.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ motion for prospec-
tive effect ignores the limited scope of the remand by the
United States Supreme Court, which according to plain-
tiffs, was confined strictly to the question of severability.
Because the Spill Act was not devoted exclusively to pur-
poses preempted by §114(c) of CERCLA, according to
plaintiffs it was necessary for the United States Supreme
Court to remand this matter, “for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.” 106 S. Ct. at 1117.
Plaintiffs further contend that the high court was quite
explicit as to the scope that would be open on remand:

State legislation is invalid ‘to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law,’ Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Commission, 461
U.S. 190, 204 . . . (1983), and such a conflict has
been demonstrated in this case. We leave to the New
Jersey Supreme Court the Statelaw question
whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted pro-
visions of the statute are severable from the pre-

34a

empted provisions. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462
U.S. 176, 196-97 (1983).

Id. at 1116.

Thus, they assert that the only issue on remand is the
state-law question as to the possible severability of the
non-preempted provisions of the Spill Act. Defendants’
argument that plaintiffs should be denied refunds of all
taxes paid prior to the United States Supreme Court
decision does not fall within the scope of the remand,
according to plaintiffs. Thus it is argued that to hold
that the decision should be applied only prospectively
would result in a complete nullification of the Court’s
decision.

I disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that prospectivity
is a non-issue. As noted earlier I do not find the remand
language of the United States Supreme Court to be as
“crystal clear” as suggested by plaintiffs. Secondly, al-
though the courts initially espoused the common law doc-
trine that an invalidated statute must be deemed a nullity
from the moment of its adoption (“. .. in legal con-
templation as inoperative as though it had never been
passed,” Norton v. Shelton County, 118 U.S. 425, 442
(1886) ), the rigidity of the rule and the impractical and
harsh results which it compelled in invalidating all past
transactions made in reliance upon a purportedly legiti-
mate statute led the Supreme Court in Chicot Co. Drain-
age Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940),
to reason that the “broad statements” of absolute retro-
spective invalidity espoused in Norton were unjustified.

Subsequent to Chicot Co. Drainage, supra, two United
States Supreme Court cases conclusively silenced the Nor-
ton doctrine of invariable and total retroactivity. In the
first, Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the
Court held that its earlier decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969) should be
applied prospectively only. In Rodrigue the Court had

35a

held that state law would be incorporated into federal
law and applied in actions for personal injuries on fixed
structures located on the Outer Continental Shelf. The
plaintiff in Chevron had filed suit prior to the Court’s
decision in Rodrigue and had relied on the longer statute
of limitations under admirality law which at that time
was held to be applicable in actions brought under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In holding that
Rodrigue would be applied prospectively with the result
that the plaintiff’s action was not time barred, the Court
set up a three-part test to determine whether a particular
decision should be applied prospectively or retrospectively.
First, in order to be applied prospectively, the decision
“must establish a new principle of law either by over-
ruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed... .”
404 U.S. at 106. Secondly, a determination must be made
whether the purpose and effect of the new rule will be
furthered or retarded by its retrospective application.
Id. at 107. Third, the Court should weigh “the equity
imposed by retroactive application” and should avoid |
retroactivity where to do so “could produce substantial

inequitable results. . . .” Ibid.

To preclude retroactivity, defendants must satisfy all
three parts of the Chevron Oil test. EEOC v. MTC Gear
Corp., 595 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D.C. Ill. 1984). An exam-
ination of the facts here leads to the conclusion that,
while parts two and three of the Chevron test may be
satisfied, the first part is not.

In ruling that its earlier decision in Rodrigue was to
have prospective application the Chevron Court said:

Rodrigue was not only a case of first impression
in this Court under the Lands Act, but it also effec-
tively overruled a long line of decisions by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that ad-

36a

mirality law, including the doctrine of laches, applies
through the Lands Act. See, e. g., Pure Oil Co. v.
Snipes, 293 F. 2d 60; Movable Offshore Co. v. Ousley,
345 F. 2d 870; Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386
F. 2d 540. When the respondent was injured, for
the next two years until he instituted his lawsuit,
and for the ensuing year of pretrial proceedings,
these Court of Appeals decisions represented the law
governing his case. It cannot be assumed that he did
or could foresee that this consistent interpretation of
the Lands Act would be overturned. The most he
could do was to rely on the law as it then was.
[404 U.S. 107]

While acknowledging that § 114(c) of CERCLA was “not
a model of legislative draftsmanship,” 106 S. Ct. at 1109,
the Supreme Court decided the case based on the well
established principles of express preemption as applied
to the language of the statute. It held that it, (§ 114(c))
was meant to forbid the States from imposing taxes to
finance certain types of expenditures. This case is there-
fore significantly different from Rodrigue which over-
ruled a long line of decisions.

Furthermore, the situation here also significantly dif-
fers from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)
(Lemon II) where the Court held that its earlier in-
validation of a Pennsylvania statute (Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I)), should be ap-
plied prospectively. The Pennsylvania statute had _ per-
mitted the State to reimburse private sectarian schools
for certain educational services. A divided Court struck
down the Pennsylvania statute under the establishment
clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs then
sought to enjoin the State from reimbursing the schools
for the current school year although the schools had al-
ready performed the services for which they were to
obtain reimbursement. The Court refused to enjoin the
reimbursement. Nor does the instant matter present a

a /

37a

Solario type situation, (Solorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447
1983), where the Court held that its decision invalidat-
ing the emergency transportation tax (ETT) under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause would be applied
prospectively.

In Lemon II and Solario the state expenditures were
held to be invalid under general provisions of the federal
Constitution, which necessarily must await a definitive
court ruling before their contours are established. See
Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 108. Here, by contrast, Congress
commanded in December 1980 that, “no person may be
required to contribute to any fund the purpose of which
is to pay compensation for claims ... which may be
compensated under CERCLA.” 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c).
The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
preemptive language of § 114(c) which was based on the
Federal Supremacy clause, did not “establish a new prin-
ciple of law either by overruling clear past precedent on
which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed. .. .” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra,
at 106. :

Additionally it appears that defendant’s “reliance”
argument is questionable. The legislative history of
CERCLA §114(c) reveals that the defendants were
aware of the statute’s probable preemptive effect on the
spill fund. Jerry English, (former DEP Commissioner),
observed that the predecessor to § 114(c) would have the
effect of “ ‘swiss-cheese preemption’, because it would

_ shoot holes in State laws to the extent incidents or dam-

ages are compensable under the federal law. ...” The
Environmental Law Institute, Superfund; A Legislative
History 534 (1983). (Supplemental appendix to plain-
tiffs’ brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment and in support of plaintiffs’ motion for
an injunction). Of note also are the statements of Rob-

38a

ert Hunt. “Upon the adoption of the Superfund Act in
December 1980, I became concerned about the impact of
the preemption language on the spending alternatives of
the spill fund”, (Hunt affid., p. 2), and again, “. . . we
in New Jersey felt that we had to be prepared to use
the spill fund to address pressing State priorities even
if we were risking the possibility of some conflict in
regard to the preemption language contained in the
Superfund Act.” (Hunt affid., p. 4).

As earlier noted both Lemon II and Salorio involved
the invalidation of State laws on constitutional grounds.
In such cases, courts are entitled to shape their decrees
in accordance with traditional equitable principles un-
constrained by legislative directives. This case, however,
involves an explicit statement of policy by the Congress
on a matter indisputably within its authority that gives
courts no such discretion to withhold relief to persons
protected by the statute. Congress, in § 152 of CERCLA
expressly stated that § 114(c) would become effective on
passage, (in contrast with the predecessor version in H.R.
85 which had a 180 day delay in its preemption provi-
sion). Thus it is clear that under Chevron, and § 114(c),
the courts are not permitted to contradict the legislative
command based on their conceptions of equity or public
policy. In TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158, 193-95 (1978),
the Court refused to exercise any equitable discretion to
deny relief to plaintiffs once it determined that the stat-
ute had been violated and that Congress had left no room
for equity courts to carve out exceptions to its clear com-
mands. Jd. Accord Badaracco v. Comm’r., 464 U.S. 386,
398 (1984).

The finding that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision should be applied retroactively and not prospec-

tively gives rise to the next question which will now be
addressed.

ee Se ee | oY lS

—

A A PND ON

Pie bran Sain tot et

39a

Ill. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION BE
RETROACTIVELY APPLIED?

The answer to this question is found by scrutinizing
the Supreme Court decision itself. We know that § 114
(c) states:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may
be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of
which is to pay compensation for claims for any
costs of response or damages or claims which may be
compensated under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(c).

We know that the high court, based on § 114(c), found
that in some areas there was an overlap in the superfund-
spillfund purposes. We also know that those purposes
were identified as (1) the financing of governmental
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, including remedial
costs for sites on the NPL and removal costs that are
eligible for superfund compensation under the terms of
NCP; and (2) the reimbursement of third parties for
cleanup costs, except to the extent that these two cate
gories of expenditures are intended to provide the state
share of remedial costs. We further know that it was
not the collection of the Spill Act tax that the Court

found to be improper but rather certain expenditures
made from the fund.

Our remaining task is to determine whether the
“purpose” of the Spill Fund is ta pay costs that we
have found to fall within the scope of pre-emption.

Those parts of the statute that permit Spill Fund
expenditures beyond this state share for remedial
costs for sites on the National Priority List, or for
removal costs that are eligible for Superfund com-
pensation under the terms of the NCP, are pre
empted by § 114(c). 106 S. Ct. 1116 [emphasis sup-
plied]

40a

What we do not know, and what neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the Congress knew, because at
the time of enactment of CERCLA and its § 114(c) they
could not know, were the specific sites within the scope
of the preempted purposes. New Jersey knew what it did
but the United States did not know what it (the Federal
Government) would do or where.

The Court found that two of the six purposes of spill
fund were preempted.

As we have explained above, the Spill Fund may
be used for six purposes: (1) to finance govern-
mental cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) to
reimburse third parties for cleanup costs; (3) to
compensate third parties for damage resulting from
hazardous substance discharges; (4) to pay person-
nel and equipment costs; (5) to administer the fund
itself; and (6) to conduct research. Of these the
latter four are clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA,
and are therefore not covered by § 114(c). The first
two are within the scope of CERCLA, except to the
extent that they are intended to provide the 10%
state share of remedial costs. 106 S. Ct. 1116

Obviously, in recognition that such conclusion was ab-
stract and without more would not provide a resolution
to the conflict, the Court found a yardstick with which
to measure those expenditures which may be compensated
by superfund. Without an appropriate measure those
expenditures found in the above-noted two categories
would be preempted notwithstanding that, at least some
of them, could never be paid from superfund. The Court
said:
Having decided that “may be compensated” should
be given its ordinary meaning, we must define the
category of expenses that may be compensated by

Superfund. Fortunately, CERCLA itself furnishes
an appropriate test. Section 105(8) (B) of CERCLA,

4la

42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B), requires the President to
revise the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to
reflect CERCLA’s provisions. As part of that revi-
sion, the President must create and revise annually
a list of sites most in need of federal efforts, now
known as the National Priorities List. The NCP
currently specifies that removal, or immediate clean-
up, will be financed by Superfund only in emergency
situations, see 40 CRF § 300.65 (1985). Remedial
action will be financed only for sites on the National
priorities List, id. § 300.68(a). Finally, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, pursuant to the
NCP, has proposed criteria for the use of Superfund
money for natural resource claims. See 50 Fed. Reg.
993 (1985). The NCP, therefore, provides criteria
that determine what expenses, at which sites, will be
eligible for Superfund money. We therefore conclude
that the NCP provides the appropriate measure of
whether a given expenditure contitutes “costs of
response or damages or claims which may be com-
pensated” by Superfund. 106 S. Ct. 1115 [emphasis
supplied] °

Close scrutiny of the foregoing language discloses how-
ever that the NCP only specifies that removal, or immedi-
ate cleanup expenses, will be paid only in emergency
cases. As to remedial (long term) activities superfund
may pay those expenses only in connection with the sites
appearing on the NPL. Therefore, while the NCP serves
as a measure for preempted emergency (immediate)
cleanup expenses, it can only be in conjunction with the
NLP that it can likewise serve in connection with re-
medial (long term) preempted expenditures.

5 Curiously the Court used the word “will” (be financed) (be
eligible) in deciding the class of expenditures which “may” be
compensated. See Exxon v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526, 534 (1984) where
Justice Clifford, quoting from the Tax Court opinion (4 N.J.Tazx
294, 307 (Tax Ct. 1982) ), stated, “(t]he seemingly simple, but often
misused and misapplied word ‘may’ is anything but unambiguous.”

42a

It cannot be doubted that the Supreme Court was
aware that the NCP and NPL were not effective on the
date CERCLA was enacted, when the Court declared the
NCP and NPL to be the guidelines of preempted expendi-
tures. Had the Supreme Court believed that expendi-
tures made before the adoption of the NPL and NCP
were subject to the preemption provision, it is reasonably
assumed that it would have provided a second guide for
expenditures preempted during the initial period follow-
ing the adoption of CERCLA. Since no mention was
made of that time period, it is obvious that the Court did
not believe that any spill fund expenditures were pre-
empted until after the superfund program was in place
and ready to operate pursuant to the promulgated NCP
and NPL.

That conclusion is reenforced by reference to 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611 which defines the types of removal actions which
will be financed by superfund. Subsection (a) (2) states
that superfund may be used for:

Payment of any claim for necessary response costs
incurred by any other person as a result of carrying
out the national contingency plan established under
section 1321(c) of Title 33 and amended by section
9605 of this title: Provided, however, that such costs
must be approved under said plan and certified by
the responsible Federal official. . . . [42 U.S.C.
§ 9611(a) (2).] [emphasis supplied]

Without the NCP this section provides no guidance what-
soever. Prior to publication of the NCP and NPL, only
to the extent that superfund money was actually com-
mitted to New Jersey projects did the State have reason
to know that spill fund expenditures were preempted. In
those instances, according to defendants, no spill fund
monies were spent.

Further scrutiny of the above Supreme Court language
reveals that, in its reference to the use of NCP as an
appropriate measure, it recognized that the NCP speaks

43a

to the future, not to the past. Thus reason and logic
dictate that in defining the immediate cleanup purposes
which are preempted it could only be from the date of
promulgation of the NCP that the expenditures would be
preempted. Similarly it was only upon the promulgation
of the NPL that expenditures in the prohibited remedial
category are prohibited. Any other interpretation would
render unintelligible the Court’s reference to “what ex-
penses, at which sites, will be eligible for superfund
money.” 106 S. Ct. at 1115.

The revised NCP was promulgated July 16, 1982 (42
Fed. Reg. 31180) although the first NPL was not prom-
ulgated (as part of the NCP) until September 8, 1983.°
Accordingly, if spill fund is found to be severable and if
plaintiffs are entitled to refunds, the refunds will be cal-
culated from those dates.

In arriving at this conclusion I have not overlooked
plaintiffs’ claim that from the enactment of CERCLA,
New Jersey had sufficient guidance to know what sites
would be eligible for superfund and could have amended
the Spill Tax to reflect such “would-be eligibility.” 7

The following provision was included in the Federal Register
concerning those dates:

Under Section 305 of CERCLA, this revised Plan cannot take
effect until Congress has had at least sixty “calendar days of
continuous session” from the date of promulgation in which to
review the Plan. Since the actual length of this review period
is affected by congressional action, EPA will publish a notice
in the Federal Register at the end of the review period announc-
ing the effective date of the Plan.

Notwithstanding this provision and the absence of any publica-

tion in the Federal Register, defendants accept these dates as the
cates of final adoption of the NCP and NPL.

7™See Appendix in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and particularly the following exhibits which, according
to plaintiffs, prove that:

1. Chemical Control and Goose Farm had already qualified for
funding under § 311 of the Clean Water Act (Ex. E and M) leaving
no doubt that they would be included on the NPL.

[Continued]

44a

At the outset it must be noted that plaintiffs’ conclu-
sions are based on information furnished by defendants.
Furthermore it should be remembered that CERCLA was
not even signed into law until December 1980. Clearly
no expenditures prior to that date could be considered
preempted. Beyond that, taxing authority for CERCLA
was not effective until April 1981. Preemption could not
have been contemplated before that date. Moreover plain-
tiffs use figures from the Spill Fund Annual Report for
1982 and 1983 which included all expenditures made at
sites from the inception of the spill fund in 1977 until
June 30, 1983. Again, these figures include expenditures

7 [Continued]

2. The NPL itself was to be compiled on the basis of the Fed-
eral Hazard Ranking System (HRS). Seventy-two sites were sub-
mitted as candidates initially by New Jersey. (Ex. Q, p. 2).

3. Pursuant to the HRS, in February 1981, four sites in New
Jersey; Bridgeport, Burnt Fly Bog, Kin-Buc and Lipari Landfill
were selected for funding by superfund for remedial site study
and design. (Ex. N).

4. The Abandoned Site Cleanup Report issued by the DEP on
May 1, 1981 (Ex. M) disclosed that as of that date, application
for superfund money was pending on Chemical Control and Goose
Farm, and that superfund awards had already been made on Burnt
Fly Bog, Bridgeport Rental, Kin-Buc and the Lipari Landfill.

5. In July 1981, EPA listed its rating scores (Ex. O) for com-
pilation of the Interim Priority List. New Jersey had 16 sites
which received high rankings. In addition to the six above men-
tioned sites, they included Price Landfill, Pijack Farm, Spence
Farm, Lone Pine Landfill, Motel Dennis, Williams Property, Upper
Freehold, Krysowaty Farm, King of Prussia and Bog Creek Farm
(Ex. O).

6. In October 1981, EPA issued the Interim Priority List of 115
of the Nation’s worst sites. Of this number, eleven sites were
from New Jersey. (Ex. P).

7. In December 1982, EPA released its NPL; of the 418 haz-
ardous waste sites listed, 65 were from New Jersey. (Ex. Q, p. 2).

8. Since that time, the NPL has been amended so that currently
99 sites from New Jersey are on the NPL. (Ex. I, Att. II).

45a

made before CERCLA was enacted as well as for non-
preempted purposes at the sites. Furthermore, it is
irrelevant that spill fund expenditures were made for
NPL sites as there is no limitation of the use of any or
all of spill fund monies at NPL sites for non-preempted
purposes.

As to plaintiffs’ claim that certain projects “without
question” constitute removal actions within the meaning
of CERCLA, it appears that plaintiffs’ erroneously relied
on the statute, rather than the NCP for description of a
removal action and further ignored 40 C.F.R. 300.65
which establishes criteria for removal actions and limits
the amount of time or money that can be spent on a
removal action. In pertinent part 40 C.F.R. 300.65(a)
(3) states:

Removal actions, other than those authorized under
Section 104(b) of CERCLA, shall be terminated
after $1 million has been obligated for the action or
six months have elapsed, unless the lead agency de-
termines that (certain factors exist at the site).

It further appears that plaintiffs have not thoroughly
analyzed nor utilized all of the information supplied on
which they rely. By way of example, it appears that the
figures recited for the projects targeted by plaintiffs do
not necessarily represent what plaintiffs imply. Exhibit
L was provided to plaintiffs with a cover memo addressed
to a Deputy Attorney General which cautioned against
misuse of the figures provided. The figures represent the
total amounts spent at any site which has ever been in-
cluded on the NPL including money spent prior to De-
cember 1980 (effective date of CERCLA) and certainly
prior to the adoption of the revised NCP, as well as
money spent after CERCLA’s taxing authority expired.’

® CERCLA was a temporary experiment; the authorization to col-
lect the tax and to appropriate general revenues expired on Sep-
tember 30, 1985. On April 1, 1986 Congress appropriated a “one-

46a

It also includes amounts which were later reimbursed by
the Capital Fund (general revenue account) if the project
was later found to have been an emergency type removal
action which was not carried out in accordance with the
NCP. Plaintiffs cannot claim any impropriety for pre-
empted expenditures which have been reimbursed to the
spill fund.

IV. SEVERABILITY: ARE THE PREEMPTED PRO-
VISIONS OF THE SPILL ACT SEVERABLE?

It is axiomatic that the non-preempted provisions of a
statute can escape invalidity only to the extent they can
be severed from the preempted provisions. It is recog-
nized that the doctrine of severability must be applied
with caution for, in the enforcement of valid portions of
a statute which contains invalid portions also, there is a
danger of judicial usurpation of the legislative power.
Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 1 NW.
545, 556 (1949). Accordingly, the party seeking sever-
ance must establish that (1) the Legislature clearly
manifested its intention that it would not have enacted
the valid provisions independently of the invalid provi-
sions and (2) the valid and invalid provisions are not
so intimately connected with and dependent upon each
other so as to make the statute one composite whole. See
Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills, 60 N.J. 342,
345-46 (1972); Lane Distrib. Inc. v. Tilton, 7 N.J. 349,
369-70 (1951).

Admittedly funding for the cleanup and removal of
hazardous substances eligible for Superfund financing
was within the purpose of the New Jersey Spill Tax.
Equally as clear is that funding for those purposes found
to be not preempted was also included. The problem, as

shot” infusion of $150,000,000 which was available for obligations
only until May 31, 1986. P.L. 99-270. On October 17, 1986 new
Superfund legislation was adopted which provides for an appro-
priation of $9,000,000,000.

47a

presented by plaintiffs, is that all purposes are funded
by a single tax. According to plaintiffs the tax rate and
the expenditures it supports constitute an integral whole,
intimately connected and interdependent rendering it im-
possible for the court to sever the non-preempted items of
spill fund since severance would require the establish-
ment of a new tax rate. Citing the N.J. Const. Art. VI,
§ 6, par. 1 (1947), which states that the taxing power is
vested exclusively in the Legislature, plaintiffs argue
that, as a matter of constitutional law, the New Jersey
judiciary is prohibited from recomputing a tax rate for
the spill fund to reflect expenditures for non-preempted
purposes. Since the spill fund has only one tax rate
which is invalid and incapable of judicial recomputation,
the entire taxing scheme is invalid, according to plain-
tiffs.

To the extent that the Spill Act contains a single tax
that cannot be apportioned between its preempted and
non-preempted purposes, plaintiffs are correct. To the
extent that the fact of a single tax rate renders the act
incapable of severability, plaintiffs’ argument misses tne
point.

As the Supreme Court noted, the issue of whether an
invalid portion of a state statute is severable from the
remainder of the statute is an issue of state law. This
Supreme Court has consistently applied the long estab-
lished “principle of separability” noting that “the essen-
tial inquiry is whether the lawmaking body designed that
the enactment should stand or fall as a unitary whole.”
State v. Lanze, 27 N.J. 516, 527 (1958). The inclusion
of a severability clause in the statute, as is included in
the Spill Act, will not necessarily resolve the issue com-
pletely. Such a clause will reverse the presumption that
an act is only intended to “operate as an entirety... .”
Id. at 528. However, the court must also determine

~ whether the required severance would have been within
the Legislature’s intention or whether the Legislature

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1305%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
