# Appendix — Griffin v. Dugger

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 486 U.S. 1005

## Text

Suprerve Court, 1.8.
FILED

R? Spal | JAN 2B 1988
JOUER TOPANGA,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octosper TERM, 1987

Peners L. Grirrin, et al.,
Petitioners,
¥+

Ricuarp L. Dvucacer, et al.,
Respondents.

eel
ee

APPENDIX OF OPINIONS AND STATUTES TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

——--
Ha

Jutius LeVonne CHAMBERS
Ronautp L. E.uis
CHARLES STEPHEN RaLstoNn
Crype EK. Murpuy*
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900

Harry L. Witte

JERRY G. TRayNHAM
PATTERSON AND TRAYNHAM
1213 Thomasville Road
Post Office Box 4289
Tallahassee, Florida 32315
(904) 224-9181

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

Table of Contents

Page
Decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit,
August 7, 1987 . «© «© «© «© «© « @ « la

Order of the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Florida,
Tallahassee Division,

So PS 9) ) a a ||

Order of the United States
District—Court for the

Northern District of Florida,
Tallahassee Division,

eee oe ee 8 4 ck st tke 6

Memorandum Opinion of the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida,
Tallahassee Division,

ee SS a eee

42 U.8.C. § 2000e-5 (b) . ° + - . 189a

- la -

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Northern District of Florida

No. 85-3831
Decided: August 7, 1987

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.
DEJERINETT,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Vv.
RICHARD L. DUGGER, etc., et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Before TJOFLAT and HATCHETT, Circuit
Judges, and EATON*, Senior District
Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

I.
In April 1971, Peners L. Griffin
became the first black road Prison
Officer at the Tallahassee Road Prison,

operated by the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC or Department). Be-

—
ginning in 1973, Griffin frequently
sought promotion to higher-grade correc-
tional officer poaktions, as well as
various other positions. On each occa-
sion, the FDOC turned him down.

In December 1974, Griffin’s super-
visor fired him for disciplinary reasons.
The next day, the Regional Superintendent
reinstated Griffin because the supervisor
had not followed proper termination
procedures. In early 1975, the FDOC
again terminated Griffin’s employment,
without notice, for disciplinary reasons.
He appealed the termination to the State
of Florida Career Service Commission.
The Commission found no just cause for
Griffin’s discharge and ordered the FDOC
to reinstate him with back pay. The
Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed

the Commission’s decision, and the FDOC

reinstated Griffin to his position.

“ Sa

Soon after Griffin’s reinstatement,
he filed a complaint with the FDOC’s
Equal Employment Opportunity Program
Office, charging that his two dismissals
were racially discriminatory. An inves-
tigator in that office wrote Griffin a
month later and informed him of his
conclusion that racial discrimination had
not been a factor in the dismissals.
Within a day or two of having received
that letter, Griffin filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), detailing the events
leading up to his allegedly discrimina-
tory dis-charges. A notation at the
beginning of Griffin’s complaint,
probably made by an EEOC’ counselor,
describes Griffin’s alle-gations of
racial discrimination as also _ encom-
passing "[{s)Jincerity of recruiting,

hiring, and promoting of minority groups

» 40
within the Florida’s Division of Adult
Corrections. Specific attention within
the Community Service Program."

Griffin asked the EEOC for a right-
to-sue letter and received one in July
1979. On October 15, 1979, Griffin
brought this action in the district court
against Louis L. Wainwright, as Secretary
of the FDOC, the FDOC, and the State of
Florida. Griffin alleged that the FDOC
had denied him several promotions because
of his race. He also alleged that the
FDOC impermissibly considered race in all
of its promotion decisions, as well as in
its hiring and job assignment decisions.
In hiring correctional officers, accord-
ing to Griffin, the Department’ used
written entry-level examinations having a

detrimental impact upon blacks.1

1 The district court found the
following facts concerning the FDOC’s
written entry-level examination: "Every

- @ «

Griffin sued “individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,"
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federai
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief and money
damages under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1976) (current version of 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)), 42

U.S.C. § 1981 (1976),2 and 42 U.S.C. §

person seeking a position as a correc-
tional officer is required to take a
written examination. The Department of
Administration developed the correctional
Officer I entry level test which consists
of seventy-five questions. An applicant
must receive a score of at least thirty-
eight for employment consideration."

2 §1981. Equal rights under the

law

All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and

- 6a -
1983 (1976).2 The class identified in
his complaint was composed “of all past,

present and potential black American

exactions for every kind, and to no other.

3 § 1983. Civil action for
‘vati - right

Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custon,
or usage, of a State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.

Griffin’s complaint stated that his
action was brought "pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, to redress the deprivation of the
Plaintiff GRIFFIN’s property interests in
his employment, without due process of
law." We assume that Griffin’s section
1983 claim also encompassed the theory
that the FDOC’s conduct amounted to in-
vidious discrimination in the violation
of the fourteenth amendment’s equal
protection clause.

- Ja-

citizens and residents who have been, are
or may be employees of the Defendants or
applicants for employment."4

On June 17, 1980, Griffin obtained
leave of court to amend his complaint to
add Henry L. Dejerinett as a party-
plaintiff and class representative.
Dejerinett, who is black, had applied for

an FDOC clerical position but was not

4 The claims described in the
text were presented in count I of
Griffin’s complaint, which contained two
counts. Count II, which is not pertinent
to this appeal, alleged that Griffin was
denied due process and equal protection
of the law when the FDOC terminated his
employment in 1975; Griffin alleged that
the FDOC(a) failed to give him notice of
the reason for his discharge and an op-
portunity to be heard before terminating
his employment and (b) discharged him
because of his race. Count II further
alleged that because Chapter 110 of the
Florida Statutes, which governs’ state
employment, did not require the Depart-
ment to give him notice, a hearing, or
back pay, Chapter 110 was unconstitutional.

» Ge =
hired.° On March 10, 1981, based on a
stipulation between the parties® and
without a hearing, the district court
preliminarily certified the case as a

class action with Griffin and Dejerinett

° Dejerinett subsequently filed a
timely charge of racial discrimination
against the FDOC with the Florida
Commission on Human Relations, a deferral
agency for the EEOC. He requested and
received a right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC in April 1980.

6 The parties stipulated, among
other things, that
[t]he allegations of race discrimi-
nation in the ... Complaint involve
questions of law and fact which,
under current law in the United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, are common to the class,
including statistical evidence,
evidence concerning the employment
system of the State of Florida
Department of Corrections, and the
common legal principles applied to
claims of race discrimination. The
parties maintain their right to
brief these issues on appeal, if
any.
The parties also "reserve({d) the right to
move to decertify or limit the class, or
to establish subclasses, at any time
during the pendency of this litigation."

- Qa -
representing the class of "all past,
present, and potential black employees of
the State of Florida Department of
Corrections."

On June 25, 1982, the defendants
filed a Notice Regarding the Adequacy of
the Preliminary Class Certified," which
called to the court’s attention a Supreme
Court decision rendered eleven days pre-
viously. That decision, Genera] Tel. Co.
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364,
72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), announced the
appropriate standards courts should apply
when determining class action certifica-
tions in the context of a Title VII suit,
reversing a former Fifth Circuit decision
permitting "across-the-board" class ac-
tions that had been binding precedent in

the new Eleventh Circuit.’ On July 8,

7 In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), this court adopted as binding

- 10a -
1982, the defendants moved the court, in
light of Falcon, to vacate its order
certifying the class.

To avoid the risk that the district
court might vacate its order certifying
the class, Griffin and Dejerinett took
steps to obtain an additional named
plaintiff to represent those in the class
who had applied for the position of cor-
rectional officer, failed the written
entry-level examination, and not been
hired. Accordingly, on July 8, 1982,
Alvin Smith, joined by Griffin and
Dejerinett, moved the court to intervene
as an additional named plaintiff and
class representative. In 1980 and 1981,
Smith, who is black, applied for the same
entry-level position that Griffin held.

The FpDOoc did not hire Smith, because he

precedent all decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.

- 11a -

did not have a high school diploma or a
general equivalency diploma (GED), a
prerequisite for employment as a correc-
tional officer. Smith later obtained a
GED, but when he reapplied with the FDOC
in July 1981, he failed the written
entry-level correctional officer
examination and was again denied the
job.8

On July 28, 1982, the district court
denied the defendants’ motion to decer-
tify the class and permitted Smith to

intervene? because

8 Smith never filed a _ timely
charge of racial discrimination with the
EEOC.

9 In its dispositive order, the
district court did not address’ the
intervenor’s complaint, which was filed
with Griffin, Dejerinett, and Smith’s
joint motion for leave to allow Smith to
intervene. Apparently, the court treated
the intervenor’s complaint as an amend-
ment to Griffin and Dejerinett’s conm-
plaint because it ordered that the
“action shall continue to be certified as
a class with PENERS L. GRIFFIN, HENRY L.

- g28a =
Smith, [as] an unsuccessful
applicant, certainly has an
interest in this suit which
seeks to challenge defendants’
employment practices, including
hiring. Unless he is permitted
to intervene, his interest may
not be adequately represented
by the named parties. Mr.
Smith eases this court’s con-
cern that the class’ claim
against the [FDOC]’s objective
criteria was not fairly and
adequately protected by the
named plaintiffs. Alvin Smith
is a proper representative for

potential black employees.

DEJERINETT, and ALVIN SMITH as_ named
plaintiffs representing a class of all
past, present, and potential black em-
ployees of the State of Florida Depart-
ment of corrections."

- 13a -

As to the defendants’ contention that
Smith could not be a class representative
because he had not timely filed an EEOC
complaint, the district court found that
the charges of discrimination Griffin had
filed with the EEOC included "the hiring
Claim in addition to promotion, job
Classification, discipline, and termina-
tion claims." The court thus reasoned
that the Fifth Circuit’s single-filing
rule excused Smith from having failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. See
Qatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d
496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968))"[O)nce an
aggrieved person raises a particular is-
sue with the EEOC which he has standing
to raise, he may bring an action for
himself and the class of persons similar-
ly situated....").

On July 30, 1982, the district

court entered partial summary judgment

- 248 -

for the plaintiffs, including Griffin and
Dejerinett, on the liability issue as to
the written entry-level examination. 1°
The court found that the FDOC examination
"has a disparate impact upon class men-
bers which has not been justified wy
business necessity." The plaintiffs had
sought summary judgment on two other
issues -- the class hiring and promotion
claims -- but the court denied summary
judgment on those issues because they
presented material issues of fact.

A trial was held over the five-week
period beginning August 17 and ending
September 17, 1982. The court entered
judgment on August 25, 1983, disposing of
the following issues in favor of the
defendants: whether the FDOC’s policies

and practices discriminated against past,

10 The district court said it
would consider the issue cf relief at
trial.

-15a -
present, and potential black employees;
whether the FDOC’s hiring practices as to
Henry L. Dejerinett were racially
discriminatory. The court entered judg-
ment for the plaintiffs on the liability
issue concerning the correctional officer
examination, on which it had previously
granted summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs.11 The issue of relief for the
Class of black persons who took and
failed the correctional officer written
examination is still pending. The
parties agreed that notice should be
sala to the affected members of the
class and to seek interlocutory appeal of

the district court’s decision permitting

11 The district court did not
render judgment on Griffin’s federal due
process and equal protection claims or on
his pendent state law claim for malicious
prosecution (which was first raised in
count III of Griffin’s first amended
complaint). Those claims are still
pending in the district court.

- 4624 -
Griffin, Dejerinett, and Smith to serve
as named plaintffs for a class that
included applicants with testing claims.
We granted this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Because we conclude that the district
court’s incorrectly applied the dictates
of Falcon, we vacate the district court’s
order certifying the class.
II.

As with any private class action,
the legitimacy of a private Title ViI
suit brought on behalf of a class depends
upor the satisfaction of two distinct
prerequisites. First, there must be an
individual plaintiff with a cognizabie
claim, that is, an individual who has
constitutional standing to raise chai
claim (or claims) and who has satisfied

the procedural requirements of Title

- 178 <=
vir.12 Second, the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure must be fulfilled; in other words,
the individual plaintiff must be quali-
fied to represent the members of the
class in accordance with the _ four

prerequisites of Rule 23(a),+3 and the

12 This circuit has held that the
conditions precedent to filing a Title
VII suit are not jurisdictional, but
rather are akin to a statute of limita-
tions. A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy
the conditions precedent does not, stand-
ing alone, deprive federal district
courts of subject matter jurisdiction.
Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678
F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless,
"a plaintiff must generally allege in his
complaint that ’all conditions precedent
to the institution of the lawsuit have
been fulfilled.’" Id. at 1010 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c)).

13 Rule 23(a) provides as- follows:

(a) Prerequisites to a Class
Action. One or more members of a class

may sue or be sued as representative par-
ties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the

- 18a -
action must be one of the three types

Rule 23(b) identifies.14 We emphasize

claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of
the class.

14 Rule 23(b) provides as
follows:

(b) Class Actions Maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdi-
vision (a) are satisfied, and in addi-
tion:

(1) the prosecution of separate
actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adju-
dications with respect to individual
members of the class which would es-
tablish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be disposi-
tive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding de-
Claratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the

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that any analysis of class certification
must begin with the issue of standing and
the procedural requirements of Title VII.
Thus, the threshold question is whether
the named plaintiffs have individual
standing, in the constitutional sense, to
raise certain issues. See Brown v.
Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. Unit
A July 1981)("This constitutional thres-
hold must be met before any consideration

of the typicality of claims or common-

members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual men-
bers, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of con-
centrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the diffi-
culties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.

- 20a -
ality of issues required for procedural
reasons by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23"). Only after
the court determines the issues for which
the named plaintiffs have standing should
it address the question whether the named
plaintiffs have representative capacity,
as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the
rights of others. See generally 2A.

Larson & L. Larson, Employment discrimi-
nation §§ 49.50-.51 (1986 & Supp. Nov.

1986).
A.

Under elementary principles of
standing, a plaintiff must allege and
show that he personally suffered injury.
565 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. ("To meet the
requirement for standing under Article
III, a plaintiff must establish either
that the asserted injury was in fact the

consequence of the defendant’s action or

-21ia-
that the prospective relief will remove
the harm.") (citation omitted), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58
L.Ed.2ad 131 (1978); urston v ekle,
531 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The
threshold case-or-controversy inquiry is
whether there existed a named plaintiff
with standing to raise the issue before
the court."), vacated on other grounds,
438 U.S. 901, 98 S.Ct. 3118, 57 L.Ed.2d
1144 (1978). If he cannot show personal
injury, then no article III case or
controversy exists, and a federal court
is powerless to hear his grievance. This
individual injury requirement is not met
by alleging "that injury has been suf-
fered by other, unidentified members of
the class to which [the plaintiff] be-
long{s} and which [he] purport[s]} to
represent." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 502, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2207, 45 L.Ed.2d

a TI” Se CIE I aN TRE OT rma put

- 22a -
343 (1975); see also Minority Police
Officers Assoc. v. City of South Bend,
721 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Feel-
ings of solidarity do not confer standing
to sue."). Thus, a plaintiff cannot
include class action allegations in a
complaint and expect to be relieved of
personally meeting the requirements of
constitutional standing, "even if the
persons described in the class definition
would have standing themselves to sue."

Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th

Cir. Unit A July 1981); see also Vuyanich

v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195,

1200 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S.

1073, 105 $§.Ct. 367, $3 U.84.24 507
(1984). A named plaintiff in a class
action who cannot establish the requisite
case or controversy between himself and
the defendants simply cannot seek relief

for anyone -- not for himself, and not

- 23a -

for any other member of the class.
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494,
94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).
Moreover, it is not enough that a named
plaintiff can establish a case or con-
troversy between himself and the defen-
dant by virtue of having standing as to
just one of many claims he wishes to
assert. Rather, each claim must be
analyzed separately, and a claim cannot
be asserted on behalf of a class unless
at least one named plaintiff has suffered
the injury that gives rise to that claim.
This relationship between standing and
the class action has been discussed in
some detail by the Supreme Court:

It is not enough that the

conduct of which the plaintiff

complains will injury someone.

The complaining party must also

show that he is within the

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class of persons who has been
subject to injurious conduct of
one kind possess by virtue of
that injury the necessary stake
in litigating conduct of
another kind, although similar,
to which he has not been sub-
ject.

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999, 102

S.Ct. a27vii, 2783, 73 L.Ed.2d 534

(1982) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v.

Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67, 92 S.Ct.

1965, 1968-69, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972)).

In the case before us, the named
praintiff who initiated the action,
Peners L. Griffin,1° could, and did,

allege injury as a result of the FDOC’s

15 Our analysis of the standing
and Rule 23 issues presented by this case
focuses first on Peners L. Griffin as a
sole named plaintiff. We then examine
whether the addition of Henry L. Dejeri-
nett and Alvin Smith as named plaintiffs
affected the class certification.

- 25a -

discipline and promotion practices: he
claimed that on specific occasions the
FDOC illegally disciplined him and did
not promote him, because of his race.1l®
Griffin had standing to assert discipline
and promotion claims. Because he had al-
ready met the educational and testing
requirements of a road prison correc-
tional officer and had been hired for
that position, however, he suffered no
injury as a result of the FDOC’s use of
the written entry-level examination. See
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565
F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.)"{Named p]lain-

tiffs ... possessed tenth grade educa-

16 Griffin satisfied the proce-
dural requirements of Title VII, such as
filing an EEOC complaint against his
employer within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(c) (1976), and receiving statutory
notice of the right to sue his employer,
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(f) (1). See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(detailing
conditions precedent to a Title VII
action).

- 26a -
tions and therefore lacked [constitution-
al} standing" to challenge tenth grade

educational requirement), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 835, 99 S.Ct. 118, 58 L.Ed.2d
131 (1978). Griffin thus lacked consti-
tutional standing to assert a testing

Claim.17

17 Griffin’s complaint alleged that
the FDOC had implemented policies and
practices of discrimination, including
"maintaining a racially biased working
environment" and "failing or refusing to
recruit, hire,and assign blacks on the
same basis as whites." Nothing in the
complaint, in the district court’s
certification orders, or in the record on
appeal alleged or established a causal
iink between the FDOC’s allegedly dis-
criminatory testing policy and its al-
legedly discriminatory work environment
or its allegedly discriminatory promotion
and discipline practices. Nor is there
an allegation or showing in the record
that Griffin (or Dejerinett, who was a
clerk employed by the FDOC) suffered any
specific harm resulting from the alleged-
ly discriminatory work environment. Thus
Griffin (and Dejerinett) did not estab-
lish standing to challenge the FDOC’s
testing practices. Cf. Gray v. Greyhound
Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 173-75 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cited with approval in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, __—iU.S. P

, 106 &.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 4

- 2m -
Accordingly, we hold that the
district court erred when it permitted

Griffin to raise the testing claim on

(1986).

Assuming, for the sake of argument,
that Griffin (or Dejerinett) had estab-
lished standing to assert a testing
claim, we nevertheless believe that under
General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147
102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982),
the court should not have presumptively
held that Griffin satisfied the require-
ments of Rule 23(a) so as to allow him to
represent a class of applicants with
testing claims. Griffin’s complaint
provided “an insufficient basis for
concluding that the adjudication of his
Claim of [a racially discriminatory
environment] would require the decision
of any common question concerning the
failure of [the FDOC] to hire more [black
correctional officers}]." See Falcon, 457
U.S. at i538, i02 &.Ct. at 2371. The
record does not identify any questions of
law or fact that were common to Griffin’s
claim of a racially biased working
environment and the claims of those who
failed the written entry-level correc-
tional officer examination and were not
hired. Thus, even if Griffin had
standing to litigate his right to a work
environment untainted by racial
discrimination, he could not, on that
basis, represent those with testing
claims, because he did not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a).

- 26a =
behalf of himself and on behalf of
others. We hold in the alternative that
even if Griffin somehow had constitution-
al standing to assert the testing claim,
he did not, in light of General Tel. Co.
Vv. Falicon, 457 U.S. 147, i602 &.€e. 2364,
72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), have representa-
tive capacity to assert the testing claim
on behalf of those who took the FDOC’s
written entry-level examination, failed
it, and were not hireda.18 In other
words, Griffin did not meet the pre-
requisites of Rule 23(a). We now turn to
a discussion of Rule 23(a) and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of it in

Falcon.

18 In Falcon, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for the express
purpose of discussing the contours of
Rule 23(a). Falcon, 457 U.s. at 155, 102
S.Ct. at 2369. The Court did not ques-
tion, in its opinion, whether the named
plaintiff had constitutional standing.

» 346 -
policies and practices. See e.g., Gibson
V2 Loca ] 4 Q Int ’ ] Longshoremen , s g
Warehousemen’s Union, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th

Cir. 1976); Senter v. General Motors
Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 870, 97 S.Ct. 182, 50
L.Ed.2d 150 (1976): Rich v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.
1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518
F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arling-
ton Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854, 94 S.Ct. 153,
38 L.Ed.2d 103 (1973).129

19 Although widely accepted, the
across-the-board theory was not univer-
sally endorsed. See, e€.9., Taylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270-
71 (10th Cir. 1975); Kinsey v. Legg,
Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev’d sub nom on other grounds, 557 F.2d
830 (D.C. Cir. 1977); White v. Gates
Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo.
1971); Gresham _v. Ford Motor Co., 53
F.R.D. 105 (N.D. Ga. 1970)3 Hyatt v.
United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D.
Conn. 1970). Moreover, one of the
members of the Fifth Circuit panel that
first announced the across-the-board

- 32a =
The Supreme Court repudiated that
liberal reading of the class action, and
the reasoning underlying it, in General
Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102
S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).29 In

approach, Judge Godbold, cautioned in a
specially concurring opinion that the
approach announced in the majority’s
opinion was not a replacement for precise
pleadings that allow district courts to
determine whether the requirements of
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. See
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
417 F.2d 1122, 1125-27 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Godbold, J., specially concurring).
Judge Godbold also observed that "an
over-broad framing of the class" may be
unfair and harmful to the absent class
members: "what of the catastrophic
consequences if the plaintiff loses and
carries the [over-broad] class down with
him, or proves only such limited facts
that no practice or policy can be found,
leaving him afloat but sinking the
class?" id. at 1126. Thirteen years
later, the Supreme Court favorably dis-
cussed Judge Godbold’s opinion when it
rejected the across-the board approach.
See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 160-61, 102 &.Ct. 2364, 2372, 72
L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).

20 Even before Falcon, the across-
the-board approach was placed in doubt by

the Supreme Court. In East Texas Motor
Freight Sys. . Vv. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.

- 33a -
allegations quite similar to those made
in Griffin’s initial complaint, the named
plaintiff in Falcon claimed that his en-
ployer had denied him promotions because
he was a Mexican-American. He also al-
leged class claims on behalf of all
Mexican-American employees of the company

who had not been promoted, and all

Mexican-American applicants who had not

395, 405-06, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1898, 52

L.Ed.2d 453 (1977), the Court reversed a

broad class certification:
We are not unaware that suits
alleging racial or ethnic dis-
crimination are often by their
very nature class suits, in-
volving classwide wrongs. Com-
mon questions of law or fact
are typically present. But
careful attention to the re-
quirements of Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 remains nonetheless
indispensable. The mere fact
that a complaint alleges racial
or ethnic discrimination does
not in itself ensure that the
party who has brought the law-
suit will be an adequate repre-
sentative of those who may have
been the real victims of that
discrimination.

- 348 -

been hired. Without holding an eviden-
tiary hearing, the district court certi-
fied a class consisting of those employ-
ees and applicants at one of the com-
pany’s facilities. After a trial, the
district court found that the employer
had not discriminated against the named
plaintiff in hiring, but did discriminate
against him in its promotion practices.
As to the class claims, the court reached
the converse conclusion, finding no dis-
crimination in promotion practices, but
finding the hiring practices unlawfully
discriminatory. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit, using the across-the-board
approach, upheld the class certification:

[The across-the-board rule)

permits an employee complaining

of one employment practice to

represent another complaining

of another practice, if the

- 35a -

plaintiff and the members of

the class suffer from essen-

tially the same injury. In

this case, all of the claims

are based on discrimination

because of national origin.

Falcon v. General Tel, Co., 626 F.2d 369,
375 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Supreme Court, on certiorari,
began its analysis of the case by
reiterating that Title VII does not
relieve a private party plaintiff seeking
to represent others from meeting the
requirements of the class action rule:
“An individual litigant seeking to
maintain a class action under Title VII

must meet ‘the prerequisites of numer-

21 In contrast, under Title VII,
the EEOC may seek relief for groups of
employees or applicants without having to
comply with the requirements of Rule 23.

General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,
100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).

- 36a -

osity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation’ specified in
Rule 23(a). These requirements effec-
tively limit the class claims to those
fairly encompassed by the named plain-
tiff’s claims.’" General Tel. Co.. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct.
2364, 2369-70, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (ci-
tations omitted). Although the Court
recognized "that racial discrimination is
by definition class discrimination," it
said that the mere allegation of racial
discrimination cannot answer the ques-
tions posed by Rule 23(a) or define the
class that may be certified:

Conceptually, there is a wide

gap between (a) an individual’s

claim that he has been denied a

promotion on discriminatory

grounds, and his otherwise

unsupported allegation tnat the

- 37a -

company has a policy of dis-

crimination, and (b) the exist-

ence of a class of persons who

have suffered the same injury

as that individual, such that

the individual’s claim and the

class claims will share common

questions of law or fact and

that the individual’s claim

will be typical of the class

claims.
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, 102 S.Ct. at
2370 (footnote omitted). Thus, evidence
that an employee was denied a promotion
because of illegal considerations of race
will not necessarily justify the addi-
tional inference, for example, that the
employer has adopted a general policy of
racial discrimination that is reflected

in the employer’s other employment prac-

tices, such as hiring and testing. See

- 38a -

Falcon, 457 U.&. at i188, i102 S.Ct. at
2371. The presumption that general class
claims are fairly encompassed within the
personal claims of a named plaintiff can,
at best, be characterized as tenuous.
ia. The Falcon Court held that "actual,
not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a)
[is] indispensable." Falcon, 457 U.S. at
160, 102 S.Ct. at 2372. This means that
a private Title VII class action "may
only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied." Falcon, 457 U.S. at
161, 102 &.Ct. at 2372.

The district court’s error in Falcon
can be traced to the named plaintiff’s
complaint, which "provided an insuffi-
cient basis for concluding that’ the
adjudication of his claim of discrimina-

tion in promotion would require the

- 39a -

decision of a common question concerning
the failure of petitioner to hire more
Mexican-Americans." Id. at 158, 102
6.ct. eat 2371. Without the benefit of
sufficiently specific pleadings or of a
hearing that probed beyond the pleadings
to answer the required certification
questions, see jd. at 160, 102 S.Ct. at
2372, the district court could do nothing
but presume that the named plaintiff’s
individual promotion claim was typical of
other claims that Mexican-American em-
ployees and applicants might raise. Id.
at 158-59, 102 S.Ct. at 2371. In short,
a district court must have some way of
identifying the questions of law or fact
that are common to claims of the named
plaintiff and of the class members he
seeks to represent. l[d.

The Supreme Court has thus repu-

diated the across-the board theory of

- 40a -
Title VII class actions.22 No longer
will one allegation of specific dis-
criminatory treatment be sufficient to
sustain a company-wide class action. 23
No longer will an employee complaining of
racial discrimination, for example, in
one employment practice necessarily be
permitted to represent other employees

complaining of racial discrimination in

22 "Although Falcon does not
eliminate broad-based class actions per
se, it will be a rare situation indeed
that will permit the combining of hiring,
promotion, and discharge claims in the
same class." 2 A. Larson & L. Larson,
Emp] Discriminat) § _49.52(c) (2:
(1986).

23° In Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159, 102
S.Ct. 2371 (footnote omitted), the Court
stated as follows:

"If one allegation of specific

discriminatory treatment were

sufficient to support an
across-the-board attack, every

Title VII case would be a

potential company-wide class

action. We find nothing in the
statute to indicate that Con-
gress intended to authorize

such a wholesale expansion of

class-action litigation.

- 418 -

other practices. District courts must
not presume that a named plaintiff has
satisfied the typicality and commonality
requirements of Rule 23(a). In practical
terms, this means that, as a general
rule, incumbent employees cannot rep-
resent a class that includes applicants
and that even a general policy of
discrimination will not justify a class
of both applicants and employees. See
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158-59 & n.15, 102
S.Ct. at 2371 & n.15.

In footnote fifteen of Falcon, the
Supreme Court identified exceptions to
that general rule. For example, an em-
ployee who alleges that he was a victim
of a specific discriminatory employment
practice may properly represent ap-
plicants when the employer used a biased
testing procedure to evaluate both

applicants and incumbent employees: "a

- 426 =

class action on behalf of every applicant
or employee who might have been prej-
udiced by the test clearly would satisfy
the commonality and typicality require-
ments of Rule 23(a)." Falcon, 457 U.S.
at 159, nmeiS, 102 6.Ce. at 83713 nS. in
addition, a general policy of discrimina-
tion could justify a class of both
applicants and employees "if the dis-
crimination manifested itself in hiring
and promotion practices in the _ same
general fashion, such as through entirely
subjective decisionmaking processes."
Id.

The situations the Supreme Court
identified in footnote fifteen can be
thought of as exceptions to the general
rule that applicants and incumbent
employees cannot share the same class.
We emphasize, however, that those

situations are exceptions not because

- 43a -
racial discrimination is by definition
class discrimination, a necessarily valid
proposition underlying the across-the-
board rule, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, 102
8.ct.. at 2370, But neneune the commonal-
ity and typicality requirements of Rule
23(a) can be satisfied. 24 If, after a
rigorous analysis, a district court is
satisfied that in a case similar to those
situations described in footnote fifteen
the Rule 23(a) requirements have been

met, then it should not hesitate to

24 See I H. Newberg, Newberg On
Class Actions § 3.17 (2d ed. 1985):

In the final analysis,
through its rulings and
examples, Falcon instructs that
the Rule 23(a) typicality
requirement can be _ satisfied
only by a showing of a
sufficient interrelationship
between the claims of the
representative and those of the
class, so that an adjudication
of the individual claims will
necessarily involve the
decision of common questions
affecting the class.

- 44a -

certify the class. We caution, however,
that although district courts should give
real meaning to Falcon’s footnote fif-
teen, that footnote should not be used to
defeat the general dictates of Falcon.
The footnote was not meant to sanction
broad class actions that otherwise do not
conform to Rule 23(a).

Cc.

We begin our analysis of whether the
requirements of Rule 23(a) have been
fulfilled in the case before us by
examining Griffin’s complaint.?°> The
complaint, which was filed in October
1979, almost three years before Falcon
was decided, included allegations that

the defendants discriminated on the basis

25 Our analysis takes into account
that the district court had considerable
discretion in deciding to certify the

class. See e.g., Walker v. Jim Dandy
Co., 747 F.2@ 1366, “S068 ~“feace Cir.
1984); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700

F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983).

- 45a -
of race with their written entry-level
examinations and in their hiring,
assignment, discipline, and promotion
decisions. Griffin’s action was brought
"on behalf of all past, present and
potential black American citizens and
residents who have been, are or may be
employees of the Defendants or applicants
for employment." As to Rule 23(a)’s
numerosity requirement the complaint
contains the allegation that the persons
in the class "are too numerous to join in

this action."26 The only reference to

26 In his second amended com-
plaint, Griffin made the following
numerosity allegation:

The precise total number of

persons in the class is unknown

to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

allege, on information and be-

lief, that there are more than

1,000 persons in this class.

There are many other unknown

class members. They are too

numerous to join a named Plain-
tiffs and such joinder is
impractical.

- 464 =

Griffin’s ability to represent that class
was this statement: "The Plaintiff can
fairly and adequately represent’ the
class." The complaint’s only reference
to Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement
was this statement: "The conclusory ques-
tions of whether there is a_ general
pattern and practice of discrimination by
Defendants and the question of whether
certain practices constitute illegal job
discrimination are common mixed questions
of fact and law to the class as a whole."
The complaint made no allegation whatso-
ever that Griffin could meet Rule 23(a)’s
additional requirement of typicality.?2?

Without an evidentiary hearing, the

district court preliminarily certified

27 The first reference to Rule
23(a)’s typicality requirement was in
Griffin’s second amended complaint, in
which he alleged that "the claim of the
Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of
another class members."

- 47a -

the "class of all past, present, and
potential black employees" of the FDOC,
finding that the requirements of Rule
23(a) had been met. The court’s cer-
tification ruling was based solely on a
stipulation of the parties that under the
law of the Fifth Circuit, the named
plaintiffs met the commonality require-
ment of Rule 23(a).28 the parties fur-
ther stipulated that "[t])he claims of the
named plaintiffs are, under current law
in the United States of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, similar to those of other
members of the proposed class."29 The
parties made no relevant factual stipula-
tions.

Soon after the Supreme Court decided

Falcon, the defendants moved the district

28 See supra note 6.

29 The defendants reserved the
right to move the district court to
decertify the class. See supra note 6.

- 48a -
court to vacate the order certifving the
Class. The parties filed memorandum of
law, arguing the applicability of Falcon.
On the basis of the memoranda, and with
no hearing, the district court issued an
order denying the defendants’ motion.
The court’s analysis began with the
recognition that "[tjhe Falcon decision
mandates that this court carefully
examine the requirements of Rule
23(a)."30 As to the commonality
requirement, the district court found the
following:
Plaintiffs have alleged a com-

mon practice and pattern of

30 As to the first requirement of
Rule 23(a) -- "the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable" -- the district court found
that "[(tjhe number of black persons
employed by the [FDOC] in February 1981
was 1,346.... This number alone, without
inquiry as to the number of past and
potential black employees, clearly
indicates that the class members are too
numerous to join."

- 49a -

racial discrimination which
affects defendants’ hiring,
promotion, job classification,
disciplinary, and termination
decisions. This general dis-
criminatory policy commonly
injures all members of the
class of past, present, and
potential black employees of
the Department. Plaintiffs
maintain that they will utilize
similar statistical data, simi-
lar historical background, and
the same or similar witnesses
to support their allegations of
Class-wide discrimination.
This court is satisfied that
the commonality requirement of
Rule 23 is met.

The district court found the

typicality prerequisite satisfied, but

EE

- $0a -

only because Henry L. Dejerinett, a black
male who was not hired for a clerical
position, had been added as a party-
plaintiff and as a class representative.
Even so, the court was concerned that
Griffin and Dejerinett could not ade-
quately represent those with objective
testing claims:

Plaintiff Griffin certainly can

adequately protect the inter-

ests of black employees who

have claims of discrimination

in promotions, job classifica-

tion, discipline, and termina-

tions. Plaintiff Dejerinett’s

claim is somewhat interrelated

with the class claims of a dis-

criminatory hiring police.

Plaintiffs allege that blacks

are not hired in sufficient

number because of facially

- Sila -
neutral objective criteria,
ji.e., a high school education

requirement and the _ [FDOC}

test, which have a disparate
impact on black applicants and
of a subjective barrier which
causes the almost exclusively
white decisionmakers to dis-
criminate against black ap-
plicants. The class claim
against discriminatory subjec-
tive hiring decisions is fairly
encompassed in Dejerinett’s
claim. This court, however, is
concerned that the class claim
against the Department’s ob-
jective screening criteria
which have a disparate impact
upon class members, especially
the [FDOC] test, is not fairly

and adequately protected by any

itil

- 52a -

of the named plaintiffs.

In that same order, the district
court permitted Alvin Smith to intervene
as a party plaintiff. Smith was an
unsuccessful black applicant for a
correctional officer position who had
failed the written entry-level correc-
tional officer examination. The court
wrote the following in its order: "Mr.
Smith eases this court’s concern that the
class claim against the Department’s
objective criteria was not fairly and
adequately protected by the named plain-
tiffs. Alvin Smith is a proper represen-
tative for potential black employees."

As to Griffin’s capacity to rep-
resent the "class of all past, present,
and potential black employees" of the
FDOC, we hold that, in light of Falcon,
Griffin’s complaint provided an insuffi-

cient basis by which the district court

- 53a -

could have concluded that Griffin’s
"“claim({s] of discrimination in promotion
{and discipline] would require the
: decision of any common question concern-
, ing the failure of [the defendants] to
hire more [blacks]." Falcon, 457 U.S. at
is8, 102 8.Ct. eat 2371. In our view,
Griffin satisfied neither the commonality
nor the typicality requirements of Rule

23(a).31
The district court found the

commonality requirement satisfied because

31 As the Supreme Court noted in
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13, 102 S.Ct.
at 2370 n.i3,

{tjhe commonality and typical-

ity requirements of Rule 23(a)

tend to merge. Both serve as

guideposts for determining

whether under the particular

circumstances maintenance of a

class action is economical and

whether the named plaintiff’s
claim and the class claims are

so interrelated that the inter-

ests of the class members will

be fairly and adequately pro-

tected in their absence.

- 54a -

the "general discriminatory policy"
Griffin alleged “commonly injures all
members of the class" and that in order
"to support their allegations of class-
wide discrimination," Griffin would
utilize "similar statistical data,
Similar historical background, and the
same or similar witnesses." As to the
typicality requirement, the district
court found it satisfied because
"(pjlaintiffs allege that blacks are not
hired in sufficient number because of

facially neutral objective criteria,
pe a high school education require-
ment and the [FDOC] test, which have a
disparate impact on black applicants and
of a subjective barrier which causes the
almost exclusively white decisionmakers
to discriminate against black appli-

cants."

- $5a -

To us, the district court failed to
appreciate the significance of Falcon.
The district court did not engage in the
kind of "rigorous analysis" that we
believe the Falcon court contemplated.
See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct. at
2372.

Griffin’s initial complaint, relying
on the then-valid across-the-board rule,
made no factual showing to satisfy the
Rule 23(a) requirements. Additionally,
the two amended complaints, which
included Dejerinett and Smith as named
plaintiffs, offered no facts to satisfy
the Rule 23(a) requirements. Moreover,
the named plaintiffs’ "Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Vacate Order
Certifying Class" offered little more
than conclusory statements that the named

plaintiffs satisfied the Rule 23(a)

criteria. See Nelson v. United States

- 36a -
Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 680 (11th Cir.
1983) ("(Named plaintiff] was ... obli-
gated to show, in at least a preliminary
fashion, the required commonality between
her claims and those of the putative
class.") (citations omitted). Although
the plaintiffs asserted that "(w]hether a
person impacted by one employment prac-
tice may represent other persons impacted
‘in the same manner’ by another practice
need not be reached in this case," they
nonetheless tried to take refuge in
Falcon’s footnote fifteen, which states
that a class of both applicants and
employees could be justified "if the
discrimination manifested itself in
hiring and promotion practices in the
same general fashion." Falcon, 457 U.S.
at i159 n.35,; i002 8.¢e. a 2371 n.1i5.
This is the closest the named plaintiffs

came to helping the district court con-

- 57a -
duct a rigorous Rule 23 inquiry. In
fact, the plaintiffs, although aware of
Falcon, continued to rely on the defunct
across-the-board rule by citing a former

Fifth Circuit case?2 that, in light of

32 In support of its typicality
argument, the plaintiffs’ memorandum of

law cited Herbert v. Monsanto Co., 576
F.2d 77, 88 (5th Cir.), vacated and

dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 580
F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam):

Appellee contends that because
appellant’s claim concerns only
the trucking activities of the
company and other claimants are
from different departments,
appellant’s claim is neither
factually nor legally typical.
We recognize, however, that the
typicality requirement is not
so rigid as to comprehend only
Similar fact situations. 4
Class actions were limited to
factual typicality, class
actions under Title VII would
be impossible because, except
in rare cases, the facts would
not be identical. It would be
a better test for typicality to
consider whether the types of
facts or evidence were typical
of the class. For example, if
all claims, although of dif-
ferent job classifications,
depended upon statistical

eal

- 58a -
Falcon, was no longer good law.

The district court’s commonality
analysis amounts to nothing more than a
presumption that racial discrimination as
manifested in various employment prac-
tices raises a common question of law or
fact. See Wheeler v. City of Columbus,
703 F.2d 853, 855 (5th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) ("Discrimination in its broadest
sense is the only question alleged that
is common to [the named plaintiff] and
the class she sought to create and

represent. Under Falcon this is not

evidence, and the statistics
evidenced a policy of discrim-
ination, typicality would be
satisfied.

In light of Falcon, "general statistical
evidence of underrepresentation in the
workforce will undoubtedly not suffice to
justify a single class covering different
types of discrimination such as in
hiring promotion, and discharge." 2 A.
Larson & lL. Larson, Employment Dis-
crimination § 49.52(c)(2) (1986) (inter-
preting footnote 15 of Falcon, 457 U.s.
at 159, i02 @.€es Ot Bera-

- 59a -
enough."). The district court’s typical-
ity analysis, which presumably is based
on Falcon’s footnote fifteen, is flawed.
As we have already discussed, in that
footnote the Falcon Court identified
exceptions to the general rule that
employees cannot represent a class that
includes applicants, even though the
employer’s discrimination is manifested
in various employment practices. One
situation that may justify a class of
both applicants and employees is when the
discrimination that is manifested in
various practices is effected "in the
same general fashion, such as_ through
entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes." Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159
n.15, 102 S.Ct. at 2371 n.15. The named
plaintiffs’ assertions notwithstanding,
the pleadings demonstrated that any

general policy of discrimination that the

- 60a -
FDOC may have had did not manifest itself
in the same general fashion.

When the Supreme Court used the term

"Same general fashion," it gave an
example: "entirely subjective decision-
making processes." Significant proof

that an employer makes both discrimina-
tory hiring and promotion decisions using
an entirely subjective decisionmaking
process for each employment practice is a
manifestation of a general policy of
discrimination operating in "the same
general fashion." By qualifying "subjec-
tive decisionmaking processes" with
"entirely," the Court implied that an
employer’s general policy of discrimina-
tion manifested, for example, by an
objective hiring practice and by a
subjective promotion practice would not
be discrimination operating in "the same

general fashion" sufficient to justify a

ad

- 6la -

class of both applicants and employees.

The FDOC’s decisionmaking process
for hiring correctional officers is
objective: applicants must hold a high
school diploma or a general equivalency
diploma and must pass the written cor-
rectional officer examination. In
contrast, the FDOC’s decisionmaking
process for promoting correctional
officers, and other employees, is sub-
jective: applicants for promotion need
not hold advanced degrees or pass any
additional examinations; correctional
officers are promoted on the basis of
their performance as viewed by their
superiors. The case before us is not one
that implicates ahaeiata footnote fif-
teen.

We therefore hold that Griffin, an
incumbent correctional officer complain-

ing of a subjective decisionmaking pro-

- 62a -
cess, could not represent a class that
included those who may have been victims
of a discriminatory objective decision-
making process, such as applicants for
the position of correctional officer who
took the written entry-level examination
and failed it. See e.g., Walker v. Jim
Dandy Co., 747 F.2d 136, 1365 (11th Cir.
1984) ("Following Falcon ... we hold that
[plaintiffs’] complaint provided an in-
sufficient basis for concluding that the
adjudication of [their] claim of dis-
crimination in hiring supervisory
employees would require the resolution of
common questions of law and fact concern-
ing [the employer’s} discriminatory

practices in recruitment, job assignment,

718 F.2d 1381, 1387 (Sth Cir. 1983)

("Under Falcon, plaintiff cannot serve as

- 63a -
class representative with respect to
hiring, promotion, or any other employ-
ment practices excepting discriminatory
discharge because she does not possess
the same interest and did not suffer the
same injury as the other members of the
class."); Taylor v. Block, 35 Fed.R.
Serv.2d (Callagham) 546 (D.D.C. Oct. 15,
1982) (plaintiffs who alleged they suf-
fered only promotion discrimination could
not represent across-the-board class
Claiming hiring, assignment, and training
discrimination). In other words,
Griffin, who could assert discipline and
promotion claims under Title VII, did not
have representative capacity, within the
meaning of Rule 23(a), to assert testing

claims on behalf of others.?? We now

33 Because Griffin satisfied
neither the commonalty nor the typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a), we need not
address whether he could have been an
adequate representative of the class.

- 64a -

examine whether the addition of Henry L.
Dejerinett and Alvin Smith as _ named
plaintiffs affected the class certifica-
tion question.

Iitl.

Eight months after filing his
complaint in district court, Griffin
sought leave to amend his complaint to
add Henry L. Dejerinett as a party-
plaintiff and as a class representative.
In November 1978, Dejerinett applied for
an FDOC clerical position, entitled
"Property Manager III." Dejerinett was
not required, as part of the application
process, to produce an educational degree
or to take the written entry-level exami-
nation required of correctional officer
applicants. He was required, however, to
have an interview. Dejerinett was not

hired; instead, the FDOC hired a white

See Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(a) (4)-

- 65a -

male. A month later, Dejerinett filed a
charge of racial discrimination against
the FDOC with the Florida Commission on
Human Relations, a deferral agency for
the EEOC. He requested and received a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in
April 1980. The district court, with no
written analysis of standing or Rule 23,
granted Griffin leave to amend his comn-
plaint and add Dejerinett as a named
plaintiff.

Dejerinett had standing to assert a

subjective hiring claim.34 He applied

34 There is some indication in the
record that the Florida Department of
Administration, on the basis of testing,
training, and experience, rated Dejeri-
nett as well-qualified for the clerk
position. We cannot tell from the record
whether any testing done by the Depart-
ment of Administration measured health,
physical ability, or intelligence. In
any event, because the rating took
experience and training into account,
there was a substantial subjective
component to the rating. We also note
that because Dejerinett received a well-
qualified rating (which presumably was a

- 66a -

for a clerical position, requiring no
correctional officer examination or
educational degrees, and was not hired.
Because Dejerinett never took the
correctional officer examination, and
never applied for that position, he
suffered no injury as a result of that
test. He thus’ lacked constitutional
standing to assert a testing or a hiring
claim arising out of the FDOC’s correc-
tional officer application process.
Accordingly, we hold that the
district court erred when it permitted
Dejerinett to raise the testing claim on
behalf of himself and on behalf of
others. We hold in the alternative that
even if Dejerinett somehow had constitu-

tional standing to assert the testing

reason he was granted an interview), he
did not allege that the Department of
Administration’s rating process illegally
discriminated against black applicants.

- 67a -

claim, he did not, in light of General
Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102
S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), have
representative capacity to assert the
testing claim on behalf of those who took
the FDOC’s written entry-level examina-
tion, failed it, and were not hired.3°
In other words, Dejerinett did not meet
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a).

‘The district court, in effect,
presumed the similarity of hiring claims
of those denied clerical positions to
hiring claims of those denied correc-
tional officer positions. In our view,
applicants who were subjectively denied
clerical positions cannot sufficiently
identify with other applicants who failed
an objective written examination and, on
that basis, were not hired for the

higher-ranking position of correctional

35 See supra note 18.

- 68a -

officer. See Walker v. Jim Dandy Co.,
747 F.2d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The

{[district]) court [correctly] reasoned
that because [the plaintiffs] were appli-
cants for supervisory positions, they did
not sufficiently identify with other
applicants for lower level labor jobs or
employees complaining of disparate job
assignments or pay.") The district court
abused its discretion when, in light of
Falcon, it continued to permit Dejerinett
to represent those members of the class
who took and failed the written entry-
level correctional officer examination.
B.

Intervenor Alvin Smith twice applied
for the entry-level correctional officer
position held by Griffin. Smith was
first denied the job because he did not
have a high school diploma or a general

equivalency diploma (GED), both require-

- 69a -
ments for the job. Later he obtained a
GED, but he then failed the written cor-
rectional officer examination. Conse-
quently, he was denied the position a
second time.

Smith had constitutional standing to
assert a testing claim under Title VII.
He could, and did, allege injury as a
result of the FDOC’s testing requirement:
he took and failed the written examina-
tion required of entry-level correctional
officers. Although Smith may very well
have had representative capacity, under
Rule 23(a), to assert testing claims on
behalf of other black applicants who
failed the same test and were consequent-
ly not hired, we need not address that
point. Smith did not file a timely
charge of racial discrimination with the
EEOC, a precondition to a Title VII suit.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982); Jackson

- 74a =

Vv. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d
992, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 1982); See also
supra note 12. Furthermore, as we dis-
cuss below, Smith could not avail himself
of the single-filing rule. For these
reasons, we hold that the district court
erred when it allowed Smith to intervene
as a class representative.

In Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 1968),
our predecessor circuit held that it is
not necessary for each person with the
same grievance to file an EEOC charge as
a prerequisite to class membership. Nor
is it necessary that an intervenor bring
a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite
to serving as a class representative.
Id. As long as at least one named
plaintiff timely filed an EEOC charge,
the precondition to a Title VII action is

met for all other named plaintiffs and

- 718 <-

class members. Ia.36

This rule, which has become known as
the "single-filing rule," contains two
essential requirements: "First, at least
one plaintiff must have timely filed an
EEOC complaint that is not otherwise
defective.... Second, the individual
Claims of the filing and non-filing
plaintiffs must have arisen out of
Similar discriminatory treatment in the
same time frame." Jackson, 678 F.2d at

1011-12. In the case before us, the

36 The QOatis reasoning was
extended to intervention in non-class
suits in Wheeler v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897-98 (5th Cir.
1977) (similarly situated intervenors who
had not filed EEOC charges nevertheless
could assert back pay claims if one or
more of original plaintiffs had filed
timely charges).

The Oatis rationale was further
extended in wfo Vv. it States
Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663, 665-66 (5th
Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), which held that
every original plaintiff in a multi-
plaintiff, non-class action suit need not
file charges with the EEOC.

- 12a =
first requirement was met: Griffin, one
of the named plaintiffs, timely filed an
adequate EEOC complaint, as far as it
detailed his promotion and discipline
claims. The second requirement, however,
was not satisfied. Smith, a non-filing
plaintiff, had an objective testing claim

while Griffin, on the other hand, had

sub} ive motio dad discipline
claims.

We hold that Griffin and Smith were
not sufficiently similarly situated.
That is, employee Griffin’s claims and
applicant ‘smith’s claims did not arise
out of similar discriminatory treatment.
Griffin alleged that the FDOC’s subjec-
tive promotion and discipline practices
were illegally discriminatory. Smith |
alleged that the FDOC’s objective cor-

rectional officer examination illegally

discriminated against black applicants.

- 73a =
The FDOC’s promotion and discipline
practices were not manifested in similar
fashion to its hiring and testing prac-
tices. See Ezell_v. Mobile Housing Bd.,
709 F.2d 1376, 1381 (11th Cir. 1983) (non-
filing incumbent plaintiff’s discrimina-
tory examination claim was not suffi-
ciently similar to filing plaintffs’
discriminatory discharge and broad-based,
on-going campaign of discrimination

claims to invoke single-filing rule to

excuse filing requirement) ; on ev
Employment Sec. Comm’n, 671 F.2d 835, 838

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862,
103 S.Ct. 138, 74 L.Ed.2d 117. (1982) (be-

cause non-charging plaintiff’s hiring
Claim was not "substantially identical"
to incumbent employee’s claims of
discriminatory treatment, single-filing
rule did not apply). Although both

employment practices could have _ been

- 74a -

racially discriminatory, that alone is
not enough to implicate the second
requirement of the single-filing rule.

Otherwise, "intervention [could] boot-
strap the court’s jurisdiction to
encompass claims regarding practices
broader that the ... claims properly
assertable by the named plaintffs."
Vuyanish v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 723
P.2G4 1195, 1201 (Sth Cir.) (former
employees who sought to intervene in
class action but who did not file timely
charges with EEOC could only proceed
within periphery of issues that named
plaintffs could assert), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073, 105 8.Cée. S67, 83

L.Ed.2ad 507 91984); see also Wakeen v.

Hoffman House, Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1246
(7th Cir. 1983)("[{A] class member who
does not meet the procedural prerequi-

sites for waging a Title VII suit may not

- 7 =
use the guise of a moticn to intervene to
take over as the sole class representa-
tive for someone who initiates but is not
legitimately able to continue a class
action.").

We also note that merely because a
notation at the beginning of Griffin’s
EEOC complaint stated that Griffin’s
charge also encompassed "[s]Jincerity of
recruiting, hiring, and promoting of
minority groups within the Florida’s
Division of Adult Corrections," Smith’s
status as a class representative was not
saved. As the pleadings make clear,
Griffin never had constitutional standing
to raise a testing or a hiring claim, a
fundamental requirement underlying the
Single-filing rule: “once an aggrieved
person raises a particular issue with the
EEOC which he has standing to raise, he

may bring an action for himself and the

- 76a -
class of persons similarly situated."
Qatis, 398 F.2d at 498.37 smith cannot
point to Griffin’s EEOC charge, which
arguably contained a testing claim
brought on behalf of others, to excuse
his failure to have filed his own testing
charge with the EEOC when Griffin did not
have standing to raise the testing issue.
We cannot permit the single-filing rule
to be used to circumvent the constitu-

tional requirement of standing.

37s By "standing," the Oatis court
meant "the issues as to which (the
employee] is aggrieved," Oatis, 398 F.2d
at 499, citing Title VII’s enforcement
provision that requires the EEOC to
investigate the charges of a person
Claiming to be aggrieved, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (a). By “standing,” the Oatis
court also meant, even if implicitly,
personal injury, that is, constitutional
standing. See id., at 498-99; see also,
Vuyanish v. Nat’l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195,

1200-01 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Oatis’
single-filing rule as implicating
constitutional standing cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 567, 83 L.Ed.2d 507
(1984).

- 77a -
Iv.

In sum, based on standing principles
and on the dictates of Falcon, we hold
that the district court erred when it
certified the class with the named
plaintiffs as representatives. None of
the named plaintiffs -- Griffin, Dejeri-
nett, or Smith -- should have been al-
lowed to represent the class of black
correctional officer applicants with
testing claims. The district court’s
order certifying the class is therefore

VACATED.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent. The majority holds that
Smith did not meet the second element of
the single-filing rule. That rule
states, "the individual claims of the
filing and non-filing plaintiffs must

have arisen out of similar discriminatory

treatment in the same time frame."

- 78a -

Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1011-12 (emphasis
added). One of Griffin’s claims in his
EEOC complaint was that the FbDOCcC dis-
criminated against black job applicants.
Non-filing intervenor Smith’s claim arose
"out of similar discriminatory treat-
ment," because he alleges that the FDOC
discriminated against him and other
applicants through administration of a
test with a discriminatory impact on
blacks. The majority ignores the fact
that Griffin raised the claim of dis-
crimination against black applicants in
his EEOC complaint.

The majority erroneously assumes
that if Griffin lacks standing to raise
the hiring claim in federal court, then
his raising of that claim before the EEOC
is somehow ineffective for purposes of

the single-filing rule. The majority’s

reasoning is based upon its failure to

- 79a -
differentiate between the policy under-
lying the standing requirement in federal
court and the policy underlying the
single filing rule in an EEOC action.
The policy underlying the _ standing
requirement is to ensure that a party
litigating an issue has a concrete stake
in the outcome of the case, and is
therefore motivated to vigorously
litigate the issues. The policy underly-
ing the EEOC filing requirement is to
ensure "that the settlement of grievances
be first attempted through the office of
the EEOC...." Ezel]_v. Mobile Housing
Board, 709 F.2d 1376, 1381 (11th Cir.
1983); Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968). The
purpose underlying the EEOC filing
requirement is therefore to promote the

resolution of Title VII claims out of

court. The EEOC proceeding is not

- 80a -
designed as a way-station on the road to
the federal courthouse.

By asserting a hiring grievance in
his EEOC complaint, Griffin ensured "that
the settlement of [hiring] grievances
(would) be first attempted through the
office of the EEOC." Ezell, 709 F.2d at
1381. The fact that Griffin may not have
had standing in federal district court to
raise the hiring issue is irrelevant to
the fact that his EEOC complaint gave the
EEOC an opportunity to settle the hiring
grievance before that grievance was sued
upon in federal district court. Since
Smith’s claim in federal district court
of discriminatory hiring practices is
identical to the claim of discriminatory
hiring practices asserted in Griffin’s
complaint before the EEOC, involving the
single filing rule will not frustrate the

purpose of the EEOC filing requirement:

= 396

to give the EEOC a chance to resolve
Title VII claims before they go to court.
The fact that Griffin may not have had
standing to raise the hiring claim in
court is irrelevant to the issue of
whether the EEOC has had a chance to
resolve that claim before it is taken to
court, whether by Griffin, Smith, or
anyone else.

In short, the majority has grafted
the constitutional standing requirement
for parties litigating in federal
district court onto the filing require-
ments for persons alleging Title VII
claims before the EEOC. Such a require-
ment does not, and never has, existed.
The majority, however, misinterprets
Fifth Circuit dicta to reach just that
conclusion. That dicta says, "Once an
aggrieved person raises a particular

issue with the EEOC which he has standing

- 82a -

to raise, he may bring an action for
himself and the class of persons similar-
ly situated." Oatis, 398 F.2d at 498.
The majority fails to mention that the
sole issue in the Oatis case was whether
a Title VII class action could include in
the class persons who had not previously
filed charges with the EEOC. The court
held that the class could include such
persons. The Oatis court gave its rea-
soning for this holding in the sentence
immediately preceding the language relied
upon by the majority in this case. That
sentence states, "If it is impossible to
reach a settlement with one discriminat-
ee, what reason would there be to assume
the next one would be successful."
Oatis, 398 F.2d at 498. In short, the
court in Oatis was not faced with the
question of whether an EEOC complainant

could effectively file claims with the

- 83a -
EEOC even though the complainant would
not have standing to assert the claim in
federal district court. The majority’s
application of constitutional standing
requirements to the EEOC complainant puts
the EEOC in the nonsensical position of
having to anticipate how the federal
district court will rule on the con-
plainant’s standing to litigate various
Claims if the EEOC does not resolve then.
Such a rule will result in the EEOC
narrowing its resolution of claims to
those which it anticipates the conm-
plainant will have standing to sue upon
in federal district court, regardless of
the apparent existence of the alleged
discrimination with respect to other
employees or job applicants. Such a
situation would hardly further’ the
purpose of the EEOC filing requirement:

to resolve Title VII claims out of court.

- 84a -

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) says:

Whenever a charge is filed by

or on behalf of a person claim-

ing to be aggrieved, or by a

member of the Commission,

alleging that an employer ...

has engaged in an_e unlawful

employment practice, the

Commission shall serve a notice

of the charge ... and shall

make an investigation thereof.
This provision requires the Commission
to investigate all charges which a person
"Claims" to be aggrieved of. In no way
does the provision suggest that the
Commission is limited to the investiga-
tion of claims which the complainant will
have standing to bring in a federal
court. Any suggestion in Oatis of such a
requirement is dicta that is in conflict

with the intent of the statute that the

- 85a -
EEOC resolve "claimed" discrimination out
of court. Smith should therefore be
allowed to proceed in federal district
court as a class representative for the
class of applicants who failed the

objective test.

- $64 °

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 79-1016

Decided: March 12, 1981

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.
DEJERINETT, both individually
and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
Pr
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS

On the basis of the record in this
case and the attached stipulation of the
parties, which is hereby incorporated in
this order as the findings of this court,
the court finds that this action should
be certified as a class action with the

above-named plaintiffs representing a

class of all past, -present, and potential

- $7a -
black employees of the State of Florida
Department of Corrections.

The court finds that the require-
ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) have been satisfied and that
plaintiffs have met the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). A
decision on class certification is con-
ditional and subject to modification at
any time prior to a decision on the
merits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c) (1); Jones
v, Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1098 (5th Cir.
1975).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED

i Plaintiffs’ motion to certify
the class (Document 16) is GRANTED and
the court hereby certifies this case as
an action on behalf of the following
class: all past, present, and potential

black employees of the State of Florida

- $94 «
Department of Corrections.

2. The class certification hearing
schedule,d to take place on April 2, 1981
is hereby cancelled.

DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of

March, 1981.

s/s William Stafford
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* oa =

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 791016
Decided:

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.
DEJERINETT, etc.,

Plaintiffs,
Vv.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

STIPULATION

The Plaintiffs and Defendants, by
and through their undersigned counsel,
for the purpose of permitting the Court
to determine preliminarily whether this
action shall be maintained as a class
action and for no other purpose, stipu-

late and agree as follows:

- 90a -

i. The number of persons in the
proposed class of all past, Present and
potential black employees of the state of
Florida Department of Corrections is
greater than 1,000.

2. The allegations of race dis-
crimination in the Second Amended
Complaint involve questions of law and
fact which, under current law in the
United Stares Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, are common to the class,
including statistical evidence, evidence
concerning the employment system of the
State of Florida Department of Correc-
tions, and the common legal principles
applied to claims of race discrimination.
The parties maintain their right to brief
these issues on appeal, if any.

3. Plaintiffs’ counsel are com-
petent to prosecute this action as a

class action. The named plaintiffs are

- 91a -

willing and able to prosecute this action
on behalf of the class. The parties
reserve the right to present evidence and
argument, at trial or at the hearing of
any motion filed pursuant to paragraph
"7" of this Stipulation, concerning the
allegation that the Plaintiff Griffin
withdrew his first charge of discrimina-
tion.

4. The claims of the named
plaintiffs are, under current law in the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, similar to those of other
members of the proposed class. The
parties maintain their right to brief
these issues on appeal, if any. The
Defendants believe that the employment
record of the Plaintiff Griffin is not
typical, but recognize that this issue
relates to the merits of the claim rather

than to the existence of the claim. The

- 92a -
Defendants further believe that the
claims of the Plaintiff Dejerinett are
typical only of claims concerning
employment at the Central Office of the
Department of Corrections.

S. The Defendants reserve all
defenses alleged in their amended answer
to the second amended complaint, except
their response, stated in their Eleventh
Defense, *o paragraphs numbered "8", "9",
"10", and "11" of the second amended
complaint. A response to those para-
graphs may be reasserted if the Defen-
dants move pursuant to paragraph "7" of
this Stipulation.

6. The parties do not agree as to
the appropriate dates which begin the
periods of potential liability in this
action and reserve the right to present

evidence and argument on this issue.

- 938 -

7. In the event that this action is
preliminarily certified by the court as a
class action, the parties reserve the
right to move to decertify or limit the
class, or to establish sub-classes, at
any time during the pendency of this
litigation.

8. The parties recognize that this
Stipulation may be used by the court as a
basis upon which to enter an order
preliminarily certifying this action as a
class action. The parties reserve the
right to present evidence and argument
concerning the appropriateness, vel non,
and scope of the class at trial.

9. This Stipulation and the
proposed class pertain only to the claims
of employment discrimination and not to
the other claims alleged in the second

amended complaint.

- 94a -

MITCHELL D. FRANKS

Assistant Attorney General
Department of Legal Affairs
The Capitol, Suite 1501
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-1573

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

s/s RRY L. WITTE

HARRY L. WITTE

Attorney at Law

1215 Thomasville Road

- Post Office Box 4289
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
(904) 244-9184

PATTERSON G. TRAYNHAM
Patterson & Traynham
Attorneys at Law

1215 Thomasville Road

Post Office Box 4289
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
(904) 224-9181

s/s (e) N

BRIAN E. NORTON

Attorney at Law

117 S. Martin Luther King
Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 224-8701

PAUL A. LEHRMAN

Attorney at Law

103 N. Gadsden Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
(904) 224-8687

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

- 95a -
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 791016
Decided: July 30, 1982

PENERS L. GRIFFIN, et al., etc.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, et al., etc.,

Defendants.

ORDER

The above-styled cause is a civil
rights suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 2000e alleging discriminatory
employment practices based on race. This
court, by order dated March 10, 1981
(Document 84) and on the basis of a
stipulation filed by the parties,
certified this action as a class action

with Peners L. Griffin and Henry lL.

- 96a -
Dejerinett representing a class of all
past, present, and potential black
employees of the State of Florida
Department of Corrections. The parties
have litigated this action as an across-
-the-board discrimination claim with
discovery covering the realm of employ-
ment practices including hiring, promo-
tions, job classification, discipline,
and terminations. On June 14, 1982, the
United States Supreme Court rendered a
decision faulting the Fifth Circuit’s
quasi-automatic across-the-board rule
stressing the fact that all the require-
ments of Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure must be satisfied for the

maintenance of a class action. General
leph ° outhwest v.

Falcon, slip op. No. 81-574 (U.S. June
14, 1982). Relying on Falcon, defendants

filed a motion to vacate the order

- 97a -

certifying class (Document 143) to which
plaintffs responded in Document 146.
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to
intervene (Document 141) requesting this
court to enter an order permitting
Alvin Smith to intervene as a named
plaintiff to represent the class of
applicants who defendants have denied
employment on the basis of a facially
objective selection procedure which
allegedly has a disparate impact upon
black applicants. Defendants responded
to this motion in Document 145.

Peners L. Griffin is a black
employee of the Florida Department of
Corrections. Plaintiff Griffin unsuc-
cessfully applied for several promotions
within the Department. Document 58,
Defendants’ Admissions 21-25, 30-32. He
also alleges that he had been terminated

twice for discriminatory reasons. but

- 98a -

eventually was reinstated. Document 54,
Second Amended Complaint q 14. Griffin
filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
on February 22, 1975, and received a
Notice of Right-to-Sue letter. Document
58, Defendants’ Admission 20.

Henry lL. Dejerinett, a black,
unsuccessfully applied for the position
of Property Manager III within the
Department. Document 58, Defendants’
Admissions 33 & 34. Defendant Dejerinett
alleges that he was not hired because of
defendants’ impermissible racial con-
siderations. Document 54, Second Amended
Complaint 415. He filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Document 57,
Attachment.

Defendants assert that plaintiffs

Griffin and Dejerinett cannot adequately

- 99a -

represent the class as_ preliminarily
certified. Defendants posture that, at
best, Griffin can adequately represent
employees seeking promotion within the
correctional officer lines within any
region he applied for promotion and
Dejerinett can adequately represent
applicants seeking employment’ for
clerical/office positions within region
I. Defendants further claim that neither
Griffin nor Dejerinett can represent a
sub-class of applicants rejected for
employment because they failed to receive
a passing score on the FDOA exam given to
all applicants for correctional officer
jobs. Finally, defendants urge this
court to inquire into plaintiffs’ ability
to bear the costs of this suit.

The Falcon decision mandates that

this court carefully examine the require-

ments of Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of

- 100a -
Civil Procedure. No. 81-574, slip op. at
9. The first requirement is that "the
class is no numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable." Federal
R.Civ.P. 23(a) (1). The number of black
persons employed by the Department in
February 1981 was 1,346. Document 82,
Defendants’ Admission 62. This number
alone, without inquiry as to the number
of past and potential black employees,
clearly indicates that the class members
are too numerous to join.

The second requirement is that
"there are questions of law or fact
common to the class." Fed.R.Civ.P.
23(a) (2). Plaintiffs have alleged a
common practice and pattern of racial
discrimination which affects defendants’
hiring promotion, job classification,
disciplinary, and termination decisions.

This general discriminatory policy

- 101a -

commonly injures all members of the class
of past, present, and potential black
employees of the Department. Plaintiffs
maintain that they will utilize similar
statistical data, similar historical
background and the same or similar
witnesses to support their allegations of
Cclass-wide discrimination. This court is
satisfied that the commonality require-
ment of Rule 23 is met.

The third prerequisite for maintain-
ing a class action is that "the claims or
Gefenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). This
court must inquire "whether the named
plaintift’s claim and the class claims
are so interrelated that the interests of
the class members will be fairly and
adequately protected in their absence."

Falcon, slip op. at 10 n.3. Plaintiff

- 4028.
Griffin certainly can adequately protect
the interests of black employees who have
claims of discrimination in promotions,
job classifications, discipline, and
terminations. Plaintiff Dejerinett’s
claim is somewhat interrelated with the
class claims of a discriminatory hiring
policy. Plaintiffs allege that blacks
are not hired in sufficient number
because of facially neutral objective
criteria, i.e., a high school education
requirement and the FDOA test, which have
a disparate impact on black applicants
and of a subjective barrier which causes
the almost exclusively white decision-
makers to discriminate against black
applicants. The class claim against
discriminatory subjective hiring deci-
sions is fairly encompassed in Dejeri-
nett’s claim. This court, however, is

concerned that the class claim against

- 103a -

the Department’s objective screening
criteria which have a disparate impact
upon class members, especially the FDOA
test, is not fairly and adequately
protected by any of the named plaintiffs.

The fourth requirement is that "the
representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the
class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) (4). This
court notes that plaintiffs and plain-
tiffs’ counsel have efficiently litigated
this complex action for three years, and
trial will commence in three weeks. This
demonstrates that plaintiffs are adequate
representatives of the class. The court,
however must also inquire whether there
is a conflict of interest between the
named plaintiffs and the class they seek
to represent. See Falcon, slip op. at 10
n. 13, This court is mindful of the

possible conflict of interest for

- 104a -
Plaintiff Griffin to represent applicants
who were denied employment and who, if
granted relief, might compete with him
for promotions. The United States
Supreme Court held that "[u]nder Rule 23,

the same plaintiff could not represent

these classes [of applicants]}." General
e ° west v.

446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980). This court is
of the view that if an _ unsuccessful
applicants for a correctional officer
position becomes a class representative,
that applicant can adequately represent
potential black employees. The prejudice
which may result from the conflict
between Griffin and the class of poten-
tial employees is far outweighed by the
prejudice which would result if ap-

plicants could not be members of the

Class certified in this action. As is

- 105a -
discussed more fully below, this suit has
been litigated for years as a class which
included applicants. See, e.g., Docu-
ments 54, 108, and 120. Extensive
discovery has taken place on the hiring
issue. See, e.g., Documents 37, 38, and
43. It would be greatly prejudicial, at
this late date, to exclude potential
employees from the class.

This suit is a class action for
injunctive or declaratory relief under
Rule 23(b)(2;, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants’ contention that
the class cannot encompass all the
regions in the state because employment
decisions are made independently at each
regional level is not well-taken.
Plaintiff Griffin has applied for
promotion in four out of the five regions
in the state. The propriety of defen-

dants’ behavior will be determined in a

SS

- 106a -
single action, and if plaintiffs
prevail, this court can fashion an
adequate remedy.

Plaintiffs strenuously maintain the
position that Griffin can adequately
represent the class; however, in the
alternative, plaintiffs have filed a
motion to intervene on behalf of Alvin
Smith. Mr. Smith applied for employment
as a Correctional Officer I. Initially,
Mr. Smith was denied employment because
he had not completed high school. After
obtaining his GED, he was again denied
employment because he failed the written
examination required of Correctional
Officer I applicants.

Plaintiffs did not specify in their
motion whether this was intervention of
right, Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), or permissive
intervention, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). The

foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates

- 107a -
that plaintiff may intervene as a matter
of right.

Alvin Smith, an unsuccessful
applicant, certainly has an interest in
this suit which seeks to challenge
defendants’ employment practices,
including hiring. Unless he is permitted
to intervene, his interest may not be
adequately represented by the named
parties. Mr. Smith eases this court’s
concern that the class claim against the
Department’s objective criteria was
fairly and adequately protected by the
named plaintiffs. Alvin Smith is a
proper representative for potential black
employees.

This court is of the view that this
motion was timely filed. Falcon, which
altered this circuit’s position on

across-the-board discrimination claims,

was decided cn June 14, 1982. Plaintiffs

- 108a -

filed their motion to intervene on July
8, 1982, as a result of Falcon. This
court finds that defendants will not
suffer prejudice if Smith is allowed to
intervene. Defendants have _ been on
notice since the institution of this
action that they must defend against
hiring claims. The parties have con-
ducted discovery regarding the hiring
issue, and have vigorously litigated this
claim as evidenced by the motion for
partial summary judgment (Document 108).

Defendants further contend that
Smith cannot be a class representative
because he did not timely file an EEOC
complaint. This circuit adopted the
single filing rule whereby "once an
aggrieved person raises a particular
issue with the EEOC which he has standing
to raise, he may bring an action for

himself and the class of persons similar-

- 109a -

ly situated...." S W ~
bach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
19680. An examination of Griffin’s
charges of discrimination (Document 148
Exhibits A & C) reveals that Griffin
raised the hiring claim in addition to
promotion, job classification, dis-
cipline, and termination claims.
Griffin’s charge, therefore, exhausted
administrative remedies for the whole
class and for all the claims.

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to vacate
order certifying class is DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to intervene
is GRANTED.

3. This action shall continue to be
certified as a class with PENERS UL.
GRIFFIN, HENRY L. DEJERINETT, and ALVIN

SMITH as named plaintiffs representing a

class of all past, present, and potential

- 110a -
black employees of the State of Florida
Department of Corrections.
DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of

July, 1982.

WILLIAM STAFFORD
Chief Judge

= 35084 -
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

No. TCA 79-1016
Decided: August 25, 1983

PENERS L. GRIFFIN and HENRY L.

DEJERINETT,

Plaintiffs,
and
ALVIN SMITH,

Intervenor,

all individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Vv.

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, individually

and in his official capacity as

Secretary of the Department of
Corrections of Florida; THE sTATE

OF FLORIDA? THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, and any predecessor or
successor agency; and RAYMOND W.

GEARY, individually and in his official
capacity as attorney for the Department
ef Corrections of Florida,

Defendants.

This is a civil rights class action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983 and 2000e alleging discriminatory
employment practices based on race.
Pederal jurisdiction is found in 28
U.S.C. § 1343. This action also involves
individual claims of the named plaintiff
Peners L. Griffin which are stated in
Counts II and III of the second amended
complaint. The issue of liability for
the class claims was tried before the
court without a jury from August 17,
1982, to September 17, 1982, following
which the parties submitted extensive
post-trial memoranda. From the pre-trial
stipulation, the exhibits, admissions of
the parties, and all testimony, and after
considering the legal arguments’ made
before, during, and after trial, the

court now makes its findings of fact and

* 3338 =
conclusions of law as required by Rule
52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT

I. HISTORY OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Peners L. Griffin, a black
male, became employed with defendant
Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC)
or its predecessor agency in April 1971.
Plaintiff Griffin was the first black
person hired as a Road Prison Officer at
the Tallahassee Road Prison operated by
defendant FDOC. Since January 1973,
plaintiff Griffin has applied for several
promotions, but has never been selected
Griffin received at least satisfactory
employee evaluations from his date of
hiring until sometime in 1974 when Wayne
Scott, a white male, became Chief
Correctional Counselor in Tallahassee.
Scott fired Griffin in 1974; however,

Regional Superintendent Hicks, a white

- 114a -
male, reinstated Griffin because FDOC
failed to follow proper termination
procedures. In early 1975 Griffin again
was terminated, and he filed a Career
Service appeal. The Career Service
Commission found no "good cause" for
Griffin’s dismissal and ordered his
reinstatement with back pay. On or about
February 22, 1975, Griffin also filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the
EEOC) in which he alleged discrimination
by the FDOC against blacks in discipline,
hiring, promotions, and other employment
practices. Defendants contend and
plaintiffs deny that Griffin withdrew his
1975 charge; however, this issue was
never raised at trial. Griffin requested
a right-to-sue letter and received it on
about July 23, 1979. Griffin filed this

suit as a class action on October 15,

- - 1154 -
1979.

Griffin has been disciplined several
times, and he has filed at least one
other charge of discrimination with the
EEOC against the FDOC. He requested and
received a right-to-sue letter on this
later charge on or about April 10, 1980.

Henry L. Dejerinett, a black male,
applied for the FDOC position of Property
Manager III in November 1978 Plaintiff
Dejerinett was not hired; Kenneth Hayes,
a white male, was selected. Dejerinett
filed a charge of discrimination against
the FDOC and received a right-to-sue
letter on or about April 2, 1980.

On June 17, 1980, plaintiff Griffin
sought leave of court to amend his
complaint to add Henry L. Dejerinett as a
named plaintiff. This court granted the

motion by order dated November 25, 1980

(Document 53). Plaintiffs filed a second

- 1168 -
amended complaint (Document 54) = on
December 15, 1980.

Based on the parties’ stipulation,
this court, by order dated March 10, 1981
(Document 84), certified the action as
a class action with Peners L. Griffin and
Henry L. Dejerinett representing a class
of all past, present, and potential black
employees of the FDOC. On July 8, 1982,
defendants filed a motion to vacate the
order certifying the class and plaintiffs
moved for an order permitting Alvin Smith
to intervene.

Alvin Smith, a black male, was
denied employment as a Correctional
Officer I because he had not earned a
high school diploma or a general educa-
tion degree (GED). Smith obtained a GED
but failed the written correctional
officer examination in July 1981. He,

therefore, was denied employmenc.

- $478 =
This court allowed Smith to inter-
vene to represent potential black
employees. The court also reviewed the
class certification in light of the

recent case of General Telephone Company
of the Southwest v. Falcon, 72 L.Ed.2d

740 (1982). By order dated July 28, 1982
(Document 150), the court continued to
certify this action as a class action
with Peners L. Griffin, Henry L. Dejeri-
nett, and Alvin Smith as named plaintiffs
and intervenor representing a class of
all past, present, and potential black
employees of the FDOC.

On July 30, 1982, this court entered
an order (Document 157) granting partial
summary judgment for plaintiffs and
finding that ‘the correctional officer
written examination utilized by defen-
dants in screening applicants’ for

correctional officer positions had a

- 118a -

disparate impact upon class members which
had not been justified by business
necessity. This court denied summary
judgment on the hiring and promotion
claims because the court found plain-
tiffs’ statistics used to support their
claims were flawed.

Phase I, the liability for class
claims, commenced on September 17, 1982.
Phase I, part 1, consisted mostly of
witnesses who were experts in the fields
of economics and statistics. Phase I,
part 2, was anecdotal evidence.

II. CLASS REEVALUATION

The court has a continuing duty to
reevaluate class status throughout the
litigation. Vuyanich v. Republic
National Bank of Dallas, 505 F.Supp. 224,
233 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also Cooper v.

(e) allas, 482 F.

Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d,

- 119a -

648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981). Although
defendants have not filed a post-trial
motion to decertify the class, they argue
that plaintiff Griffin voluntarily
withdrew his 1975 charge of discrimina-
tion and that there is no proof that the
charge was an “across-the-board” claim.
Defendants first raised the issue of
whether Griffin withdrew the 1975 charge
in a motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint (Document 17). This court held
that "the factual dispute regarding
plaintiff’s waiver of rights conferred by
Title VII is an issue for trial "
Document 53.

This issue was next mentioned in the
pre-trial stipulation under the heading
"Admitted Facts Requiring No Proof." It
states:

The Plaintiff, Peners L.

Griffin, filed a charge of

Discrimination, pursuant to
Title VII, on or about February

- 120a -

22, 1975. A true copy of that

charge has been filed in this

action as Exhibit "A" To a

Stipulation (Document 148) and

is properly in evidence A

Notice of Right-to-Sue was duly

issued by the Department of

Justice regarding that charge,

and this action was’ timely

filed under Title VII.

Defendants assert and Plain-

tiffs deny that Griffin

withdrew the charge
Document 166, p.1l.
This issue was not litigated at trial
and, in fact, was not raised until
defendants’ response and objections to
plaintiffs’ proposed findings and
conclusions (Document 215).

This court is of the view that
plaintiffs have both pleaded and proved
that Griffin filed a charge of dis-
crimination on or about February 22,
1975, and that he received a right-to-sue
letter. As the pre-trial stipulation

notes, the charge and letter are properly

in evidence. Defendants have failed to

- 1218 -
prove the defense that Griffin voluntar-
ily withdrew the 1975 charge. The class,
therefore, may rely on Griffin’s 1975
charge, because the Fifth Circuit adopted
the single filing rule whereby “once an
aggrieved person raises a particular
issue with the EEOC which he has standing
to raise, he may bring an action for
himself and the class of persons similar-

ly situated. .. ."™ Oatis v. Crown

Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th
Cir. 1968). |

Defendants have also argued that
there is only "the naked assertions of
Griffin and his attorneys ... that the
destroyed charge was an ‘’across-the-
-board’ claim." Document 215, 62>
This statement is inaccurate. The 1975
charge is in evidence (Document 148,
Exhibit A). A review of that charge

Clearly indicates that Griffin set forth

- 4248 -

an across-the-board claim challenging the
FDOC’s practices in hiring, discipline,
and promotions of blacks.

Griffin has alleged that these
discriminatory practices are the result
of a subjective decision-making process
which has its roots in pre-Act procedures
and continues until the present. Because
plaintiffs attempted to prove that this
discrimination pervades a pattern of
events and is not isolated incidents, the
charge could have been filed at any time.

See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,

567 F.2d 429, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1976);

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3rd Cir.

1975); Cooper v. University of Texas at

Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Tex.
1979). Defendants’ liability commences
March 24, 1972, the date which Title VII

became applicable to the FDOC. The only

« 12348 -
employees barred from the class are those
who left the employ of the FDOC more
than 300 days before the filing of

Griffin’s 1975 charge. See Laffey, 567

F.2d at 472-74; Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 246;
Cooper, 482 F. Supp. at 190.

Defendants failed to present any
evidence at trial which altered this
court’s findings that plaintiffs met the
requirements for class certification set
forth in Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Document 150). This court
now reaffirms its decision that this
action shall be certified as a class
action with Peners L. Griffin, Henry L.
Dejerinett, and Alvin Smith as_ named
plaintiffs and intervenor representing a
class of all past, present, and potential

black employees of the FDOC.

- 124a -

III. THE DEFENDANTS

Plaintiffs have sued Louie UL.
Wainwright, individually and in his
official capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Corrections of Florida.
Defendant Wainwright is the chief
executive officer of the FDOC.

Plaintiffs have also sued the State
of Florida and the Department of Correc-
tions. This court orally ruled that when
referring to the State of Florida in this
case, it shall mean the Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Defendant FDOC is
an executive department of the State of
Florida and is an employee within the
meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b).

Plaintiffs sued Raymond W. Geary,
individually and in his official capacity
as attorney for the FbDOC. Defendant

Geary was employed as general counsel for

- 125a -

the FDOC during pertinent times enconm-
passed in this litigation.

IV. THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

The Department of Corrections has
"Supervisory and protective care,
custody, and control of the inmates,
buildings, grounds, property, and all
other matters" pertaining to the state
correctional system. yaa. Stat. §
945.025 (1981). In 1981, over half of
the FDOC work force, 4451 out of 8594
jobs, was in EEO Category No. 4, Protec-
tive Services. The following positions
with the FDOC are protective service
jobs:

Correctional Counselor Chief I

Correctional Counselor Chief II

Correctional Officer Chief I

Correctional Officer Chief II

Correctional Officer Chief III

Correctional Officer I

Correctional Officer II

Correctional Officer III

Correctional Security Coordinator
Correctional Security Shift

- 1268 =

Supervisor I

Correctional Security Shift
Supervisor II

Fire Chief

Firefighter II

Prison Inspector and Investigation

Supervisor
Prison Inspector and Investigator

There are statutory qualifications
for the correctional Officer position.
The Florida Statutes required:

After July 1, 1974, any
person employed as a correc-
tional officer shall:

(1) Have reached the age of
majority.

(2) Be a citizen of the
United States.

(3) Be a high’ school
graduate or its equivalent" as
the term may be determined by
the council.

(4) Have his fingerprints
on file with the council or
agency designated by the
council.

(5) Have passed an
examination by a_ licensed
physician based on specifica-
tions established by the
council.

(6) Have a good moral
character as determined by
investigation under procedures
established by the council.

» lz7a =

Fla. Stat. $ 944.584 (1975). These
requirements have changed slightly.
Since July 1, 1980, one must be age
nineteen and after July 1, 1981, meet the
additional requirement of not having been
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude. Fla. Stat. §
943.13 (1981).

An applicant seeking a position as a
correctional officer was required to pass
a written examination consisting of
seventy-five questions to be considered
for employment. Any applicant who failed
to score at least thirty-eight on the
test was automatically excluded from
consideration. The FDOC ceased using a
written examination in August, 1982,
immediately after this court found that

it had a disparate impact.

- 148984 =

V. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

A. Hiring

When there iS a vacancy for a
correctional officer, the FDOC issues a
vacancy announcement. Applicants file
applications which are reviewed by the
personnel officer at the institution
where there is a vacancy. The applica-
tions are screened for the minimal
requirements such as age and education.
Then the applications are reviewed by a
committee which usually consists of a
chief correctional officer, a lieu-
tenant, and sometimes a personnel manager
at the location. The committee inter-
views applicants who are deemed to be
qualified and prior to August, 1982,
those who had passed the written examina-
tion. The interview normally consists of
questions about an applicant’s prior work

history, interest in the field, and

- 129a -
questions designed to determine an
applicant’s potential effectiveness as a
correctional officer. The committee
makes a recommendation to the institu-
tion’s superintendent who has the hiring
authority.

The hiring process for clerical
employees is similar to the procedure
used for correctional officers. Usually
a clerical vacancy is advertised locally
and the personnel office screens’ the
applications. The supervisor or depart-
ment head further screens the applica-
tions and after interviewing the ap-
plicants, makes a recommendation through
the personnel manager to the superinten-
dent who is the hiring authority.

B. Promotions

When there iS a vacancy for a
position above a Correctional Officer I

position, a vacancy announcement is

- 130a -

published. The applications are reviewed
by the personnel office, which forwards
applications of those who meet’ the
training and experience requirements set
forth in the class specifications to the
chief correctional officer. A committee
interviews the qualified applicants and
makes a recommendation through the
personnel officer to the superintendent
Generally the criteria considered in
promotional decisions are:

(1) seniority;

(2) training;

(3) education;

(4) time -on the job (actual
experience gained in the position sought,
such as in an “acting" capacity) ;

(5) job stability;

(6) professional development;

(7) performance evaluation;

(8) recommendations from peers
and superiors;

(9) demonstrated leadership;
and

(10) administrative experience.

C. Performance Evaluations

An employee’s supervisor completes

an employee service rating or evaluation.

- 1318 =
The employee is rated unsatisfactory,
conditional, satisfactory, above satis-
factory, or outstanding in the following
areas:

appearance;
attendance;
cooperation;
dependability;
health;

initiative;

knowledge of job;
quality of work;
quantity of work; and
safety.

RR RN RRR ON
OU ON AO UP WD bP
ee eee eee ees aes tas ee

The evaluation is routed through the
next higher level supervisor and then to
the institution’s personnel manager for
final review and filing.

VI. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

A. Theoretical Approaches

The two theories which may be
applied to a particular set of facts to
show discrimination are disparate impact

and disparate treatment. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters vv. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).

- 132a -
Liability for claims of disparate impact
arise when a facially neutral employment
practice imposes a harsher result on one
group than another and cannot be jus-
tified by business necessity. A dis-
parate impact plaintiff need not show

intentional discrimination. Griggs v.

u Ow , 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Disparate treatment is a type of
discrimination where the employer treats
some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The standards
for evaluating classwide disparate

treatment claims are found in Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters Vv.

United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and

Hazlewood School District v. United

States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The

plaintiff has the burden of proving a

prima facie case that defendant inten-

- 133a -
tionally discriminated against a pro-
tected class as its regular practice.
Plaintiff may prove the prima facie case
solely by statistics. Discriminatory
intent or motive may be inferred by the
statistics alone if the statistical

disparity is great. Payne _v. Travenol

Laboratories Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th

Cir. 1982) (citing Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1971)).

A plaintiff, however, may enhance his
case by presenting evidence of the
employer’s history of discrimination or
anecdotal testimony as to individual
cases of discrimination. Payne, 673 F.2d
at 817.

Once plaintiff has proved his prima
facie case, defendant must rebut this

showing by demonstrating that plaintiff’s

proof is either inaccurate or insig-

- 134a -

nificant. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.

If the employer fails to rebut plain-
tiff’s case, there is a violation of

Title VII. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.

The Teamsters’ pattern of proof is

appropriate for the §§ 1981 and 1983
claims as well as the Title VII claims.
Payne, 673 F.2d at 818.

B. Plaintiffs’ Statistical Case

Plaintiffs have primarily relied on
statistics to prove their claims of
discrimination. Dr. David W. Rasmussen,
Professor of Economics at Florida State
University, Tallahassee, Florida,
testified for plaintiffs at trial. Dr.
Rasmussen defined his task as determining
in an analytical way if the FDOC has been
drawing from the labor pool in a racially
random way. Dr. Rasmussen used the 1970

census and the Department of Administra-

tion’s register summaries to construct a

- 135a -
series of availability labor pools. He
then tested his proxy availability pool
of blacks against incumbents for statis-
tical significance using the approxima-
tion to the binomial distribution test
approved by the United States Supreme
Court in Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977). Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-1
amended. Dr. Rasmussen’s benchmarks for
his state workforce analyses ranged by
-23 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. D-1 amended,
Table 9) to .38 (Id., Table 2). This

court will examine Tables 9 and 2 in

detail.

- 14368 =

TABLE 9

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER I
STATE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Geographic

Actual 38 Adjusted
Year Total Black Bench-
mark?3
1972 1066 55 -23
38 Incumbents from DOC documents
entitled:

6/30/72 Division of Correc-
tions, incumbents by job class (Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit A-3).

FY 74-75 DOR Job Classification
Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-4).

6/30/77 DOR Job Classification
Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-5).

1978-1981 Minority and Female
Staffing Report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
A-6, 7, 8, 9), New hires from Plaintiffs’
Exhibit A-11.

39 Includes Service workers ex-
Clusive of private household, Farmers,
all Laborers and all Operatives, earning
less than $6000 in 1969, and having
completed 12 to 15 years of education.
Sources: 1970 Census of the Population,
Table 175 and 176.

This benchmark includes occupa-
tional groups throughout the State, ex-
Clusive of Bay, Duval, Escambia, Frank-
lin, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jefferson,
Madison, Nassau, OKaloosa, Santa Rosa,
Taylor, Walton, Washington, St. Jonns,
Leon and Wakulia counties.

FY
1974-75

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

NEW HIRES
FY 77-78

Year
1972

FY
1974-75

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

NEW HIRES
FY 77-78

1648

2518

3119

3232

3488

3415

1570

631

237

Expected

Numberr of

Black

245

379.

579.

-18

04

14

o3f

.36

~24

-45

-10

023

-23

023

Ys

ona

-23

.23

Number of
Std. Dev.

13.

84

~ 36

~S1

91

ey

~41

-28

~44

- 138a =

In Table 9 Dr. Rasmussen reached a
-23 benchmark which reflects’ four
factors: geography, occupation, income,
and education. This proxy labor pool
excludes people living in eighteen
counties which are not adjacent to
counties with major. prisons. Dr.
Rasmussen assumed that people would not
commute from these eighteen counties to
work at a prison as a_e correctional
officer. The 23 benchmark includes only
people from the 1970 census who listed
their occupations as farmers, laborers,
operatives, or service workers exclusive
of private household. Dr. Rasmussen
hypothesized that correctional officer
applicants would most likely come from
those occupational groups. The benchmark
was also adjusted for income to include
those groups whose median income was less

than $6000. in 1969. In 1970 the

starting salary for a correctional

officer was approximately $5600. Dr.
Rasmussen assumed that persons in
occupational groups earning more than an
annual salary of $6000 would be unwilling
to apply for a position as correctional
officer and receive a lower salary. ‘The
last adjustment to the benchmark was for
education Dr. Rasmussen included only
those persons with twelve to fifteen
years education because a high school
diploma or a general education degree is
a statutory requirement for correctional
officers.

After considering these four
factors, Dr. Rasmussen calculated the
appropriate benchmark at .23 which means
that black? comprised 23% of his proxy
labor pool. Dr. Rasmussen theorized that
if the FDOC drew from the labor pooi ina

racially random way, then 23% of its new

- 4404 =
hires should be black.

Table 9 was the incumbent workforce
because data on new hires is’ limited.
When Dr. Rasmussen tested his’ proxy
availability pool of blacks against
incumbents, he found statistically
Significant underrepresentation of blacks

in defendants’ workforce.

- 14238 =

TABLE 2

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER I
STATE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Income
Adjusted
Actual 49 Benchmark
Year Tot Black Maitleesos
Only4t
1972 1066 55 -38
FY
1974-75 1648 202 38
1977 2518 336 -38
1978 3119 461 -38
1979 3232 523 -38
40 Incumbents from DOC documents
entitled:

6/30/72 Division of Correc-
tions, incumbents by job class (Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit A-3).

FY 74-75 DOR Job Classification
Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-4).

6/30/77 DOR Job Classification
Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-5).

1978-1981 Minority and Female
Staffing Report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
A-6, 7, 8, 9).

41 Includes Service workers ex-
clusive of private household, all
laborers, all operatives and farmers,
earning less than $6000 in 1969.
Sources: 1970 Census of the Population,
Table 175.

1980 3488 618 -38
1981 3415 631 .38
Expected
Number of Number of
Year Black Std. Dev.
1972 405.08 22.09
FY
1974-75 626.24 21.53
1977 956.84 25.48
1978 1185.22 26.72
1979 1228.16 25.55
1980 1325.44 24.68

1981 1297.70 23.50

- 14434 -

In Table 2, Dr. Rasmussen reached a
-38 benchmark which reflects’ three
factors: occupation, income, and gender.
Dr. Rasmussen made the same assumptions
concerning occupation and income as he
did for Table 9. He also counted only
males in this benchmark because he
assumed most correctional officers were
men. Considering these factors, Dr.
Rasmussen’s proxy population consisted of
38% blacks. When Dr. Rasmussen tested
his availability pool of blacks against
incumbents, he found an even greater
underrepresentation of blacks as correc-
tional officers in the FDOC’s workforce.

Dr. Rasmussen also constructed a
benchmark using data from defendants’
register summaries. The Department of
Administration maintains a register of
persons who have completed applications

for state employment and have stated a

- 144a -

class of positions or classes of posi-
tions of employment for which they = are
eligible and have an interest in apply-
ing. The register covers a four-year
period beginning approximately October 8,
1977, and ending approximately October 8,
1981.

The Department of Administration
processes all applications of applicants
who are required to pass an examination.
During the period covered by this report,
the Department of Administration ad-
ministered the Correctional Officer I
examination only to those persons who
were interested in becoming eligible for
Correctional Officer I positions and met
the age and education requirements. Data
concerning applicants who fail the
examination are purged from the register

at the end of six months.

- 143484 -

Data concerning applicants’ are
deleted from the register upon specific
request of the applicant, upon the
expiration of a four-year period, or upon
the expiration of a six-month period for
applicants who failed the written
examination. Information concerning an
applicant remains on the register even
though the applicant may have been hired,
promoted, or otherwise become unavailable
for employment in a class of positions.

This register is the data base for
the statewide register summary. Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit No. A-1. The data
contained in the statewide register
summary is a report of the race and
gender characteristics of all applicants
who provided race and gender information.
Only half of the applicants, however,

provided this information.

- 146a -

The race and gender identifications
of those persons are reported by class
code number for each class of positions
for which such persons requested that
their eligibility be determined. Those
persons who have applied for more than
one class and for whom race and gender
are available are reported in each class
for which they have applied. Within each
class, such persons are reported only
once.

The register is also the data base
for the county register summary. Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit No. A-2. This report con-
tains race and gender information but
also indicated one or more counties where
the applicant was willing to work. Only
30% of the applicants provided this
information. Those applicants who

expressed a willingness to work in more

than one county are reported in this

- 1478 -
report in each such county in each class
of positions for which they have applied;

therefore, there would be multiple

counting of those applicants.

- 148a -

TABLE 10

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER I
STATE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Register
Actual4#2 State

Year Total Black Benchmark‘?
1972 1066 55 a >
FY
1974-75 1648 202 oaa
1977 2518 336 saa
1978 3119 461 soa
1979 3232 523 ssa
1980 3488 618 oad
1981 3415 631 saa

42 Incumbents from DOC documents
entitled:

6/30/72 Division of Correc-
tions, incumbents by job class (Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit A-3).

FY 74-75 DOR Job Classification
Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-4).

6/30/77 DOR Job Classification
Chart (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A-5).

1978-1981 Minority and Female
Staffing Report (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
A-6, 7, 8, 9).

43 The benchmark is derived from
P

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1295%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
