# Opposition Brief — Cooper v. Williamson County Board of Education

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 1006

## Text

No. 87-662 DEC 8 3987

JOSEPH F. SPANICL.
CLERK

—

In The

SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1987

FREEMAN M. COOPER,
Petitioner,
VS
WILLIAMSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et. al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Robert G. Wheeler, Jr.
2917 Foster Creighton Dr.
Nashville, TN 37204

Counsel of Record for the Respondents

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the district court and Sixth Circuit erred in deny-
ing Petitioner’s attorneys fees pursuant to Section 706 (k)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000 e-5 (k) for work performed in a hearing pursuant to
the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act after he had won his Ti-
tle VII Action.

2. Whether or not the lower courts erred in stating that the
teacher tenure hearing was not so related to the Title VII
Action previously won by the Petitioner as to justify the
payment of fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 (k).

3. Whether or not the lower courts erred in ruling that the
work performed by Petitioner’s counsel after his appoint-
ment to the principalship at Fairview High School for so-
called “monitoring” services was not compensable under
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 (k).

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented for Review .... 2.2.0... ccc cc ccceee i
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|. PP ETRTT UTE Teer eee Ce eee rae 1
ements OF Web Cane ss cs .dcnuee cs dace knee 1-3
Summary of Reasons for Denying the Writ............. 3-4
menses of Denying tht WE... 6 i. cs. ivi wawens 4-10

CNOUR. wn ik ck cenaacsutdecueeer eee 11

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Pages

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolfe Bros. & Co.,
240 U.S. 251, 257-258, 36 S.Ct. 269
py Se 8) rr 10

New York Gas-Light Club, Inc. v. Carey,
ids og gw be ses nee cacnsees 6

Northcross v. Board of Education,
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
Re 5

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council,

TOD nese esovcesssvasesecs 3,4,5,6,8
wv

Rudolph v. United States,

370 U.S. 269, 271, 82 S.Ct. 1277, 1278,

eg ie
Webb v. Board of Education of Dyer County,

471 US. , 85 L.Ed.2d 233,
er cas akcescssbeaesace ~4-5
STATUTES:
Cee ude nso acesbeavviseers 9

Tennessee Code Annotated 49-5-511 et. seq... ........... 3

l
OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is cor-
rectly citied in the Petition at 820 F. 2d 180 (6th Cir. 1986),
and is correctly set out in the Appendix in the Petition at la-
lla. The same is not repeated herein.

The order denying the Petition for Rehearing and Sugges-
tion for Rehearing En Banc is also correctly set out in the
Petition’s Appendix at 12a-13a and is not repeated herein.

The district court’s memorandum decision and order deny-
ing fees are correctly set out in the Petition’s Appendix at 14a-

31a and 32a and are not repeated | herein.

oO

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The following addition to the statement of facts submitted
by the Petitioner is submitted:

1. No request has ever been made by plaintiff’s counsel at
the district court level for fees for that portion of the
proceedings identified as Phase Two in the Petition. The Peti-
tion for an Interim Award of Fees filed with the district court
and from which this appeal lies plainly states that “The period
covered in this petition is from October 1984 to and inciuding
April 1, 1985,...”! Phase Two pre-dates October 1984.

2. That portion of the Petition identified as Phase Three at
pages 6 and 7 is incomplete. The grounds upon which dismis-
sal proceedings were commenced against Petitioner in

'Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 214

2

January, 1985, were inefficiency, neglect of duty, insubordina-
tion and incompetency.* The causes of problems at Fairview
High School were due to the Petitioner’s refusal to meet the
eed waaaenneie of the principalship he fought so hard to at-
tain.

Moreover, on November 21, 1987, defendant Kenneth L.
Fleming filed a “Motion for Relief’ in the district court seek-
ing permission to file certain charges against Petitioner in ac-
cordance with the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act.* Due to his
concern that the filing of such charges might be construed to
violate the district court’s order of June 22, 1984, Mr. Fleming
requested permission to produce proof to satisfy the court that
the charges were unrelated to the court’s previous order and
that they dealt strictly with day-to-day operations of the
school under state law.>

In December 1984, Petitioner responded to Mr. Fleming’s
motion and asserted that: (1) The district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, which was one of
purely state law; (2) Mr. Fleming had no standing to file the
motion; and (3) the district court should abstain from hearing
purely state law claims.®

On December 28, 1984, the district court dismissed Mr.
Fleming’s Motion for Relief, stating that its previous order of
7 22, 1984, mandated compliance with applicable state
law.

On January 7, 1985, Mr. Fleming formally presented his
charges to the school board and a hearing was held pursuant

&3Sixih Circuit Joint Appendix 94-103

4&5Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 65-68

°Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 69-77 -
7Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 78-79

3

to state law, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 49-5-S11 et seq. State law
was followed throughout the administrative proceedings.

3. That portion of the Petition identified as Phase Five (at
pages 9 & 10) is incomplete in that the School Board made no
findings of fact on any of the charges but simply dismissed
them with no elaboration.®

4. During the proceedings identified as Phase Six in the
Petition, the Petitioner was asking for constructive discharge
during a time that he was purportedly out sick but had not
formally requested sick leave of the school system.°

The Petitioner recognized that the state dismissal hearings
were not a part of the Title VII action when he asserted that
the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
school board proceedings since they were a matter of purely
state law. He further conceded that the dismissal charges
brought by the Superintendent were not based on the district
court’s order of June 22, 1984, but rather on the Tennessee
Teacher Tenure Act. (See note 6 supra.)

SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The case of Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council, 106 S.Ct. 3078 (1986) is distinguishable from the
case at bar. The Sixth Circuit had the benefit of the Delaware
Valley Citizens Council, id., case upon the Petitioner’s ap-
plication for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.
Not one judge of the entire Sixth Circuit requested a vote on
the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The original panel con-

’Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 270
*Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 192

4

cluded that the issues were fully addressed on original sub-
mission of the case.!° Delaware Valley does not destroy a trial
judge’s statutory discretion in the awarding or denial of attor-
ney’s fees in a Title VII case with the factual circumstances as
appears in this case.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. CONTRARY TO PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
THIS CASE’S RULING FROM THE SIXTH CIR-
CUIT IS NOT IN CLEAR CONFLICT WITH
PENNSYLVANIA V. DELAWARE VALLEY
CITIZENS’ COUNCIL

The statute in question, Section 706 (k) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) states as
follows:

In any action or proceeding under
this subchapter the court, in its dis-~
cretion, may allow the prevailing
party. other than the Commission or
the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney’s fee as part of the costs...

It is readily evident from this statute tha’ discretion still ex-
ists over the awarding of attorney’s fees in this case.
Delaware Valley acknowledged that discretion when quoting
from Webb v. Board of Education of Dyer County, 471 U.S.,
85 L.Ed. 2d 233, 105 S Ct. 1923 (1985).

There, we noted that for the time
spent pursuing optional administra-
tive proceedings properly to be in-
cluded in the calculation of a

Pet. App. 12a-13a

5

reasonable attorney’s fee, the work
must be “useful and of a type or-
dinarily necessary” to secure the
final result obtained from the litiga-
tion. Id. at , 8&5
L.Ed 2d 233, 105 S Ct 1923. Ap-
plication of this standard is left to the
discretion of the district court.
Id. , 85 L Ed 2d 233, 105 S —
Ct 1923. (Cited from Delaware Val-
ley, 92 L.Ed 2d 453, 454.) (Emphasis —
supplied)

Whereas the Court in Delaware Valley opined that the work
performed by the citizen’s committee was “useful and of a
type ordinarily necessary to secure the final result,” Judge
Wiseman was equally correct in denying the sought for fees
when the final result in the instant case had already been ob-
tained.

The type of case presented in Delaware Valley was much
more akir: to the relief sought in Northcross v. Board of
Education, 611 F. 2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980). In the former the plaintiffs sought to compel
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a vehicle
emission inspection and maintenance program pursuant to the
Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. 7410. In the latter the plaintiffs
sought the desegregation of a school system. In both, wide
sweeping changes occurred and extensive work by the
plaintiffs attorneys was “useful and necessary” to affect such
change.

In this case the Petitioner brought an employiment dis-
crimination case in which he prevailed and for which his at-
torneys were paid. He was given a job as a principal in the
Williamson County School System. No long term monitoring
process was necessary thereafter to see if he secured his

6

remedy. And, again, when the school superintendent filed a
motion for relief with the district court to proceed according
to the state tenure law, the Petitioner’s attorneys asserted that
the two proceedings, the hearing pursuant the state tenure act
and the previously filed Title VII case, were entirely separate;
the relief sought by the Superintendent was brought under the
State tenure act, not the Title VII relief previously awarded the
Petitioner.!!

Thus, Delaware Valley and this case are readily distin-
guishable. The remedy sought in Delaware Valley had not
been attained at the time of the disputed work by its attorneys.
Petitioner’s attorneys had obtained the remedy sought and
been paid for their work.

II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT
DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE STATE
DIMISSAL HEARING UNDER THE TENNES-
SEE TEACHER TENURE ACT WAS NOT AN
“ACTION OR PROCEEDING” UNDER 42U.5.C.
2000 E-5 (K)

It is the Respondents’ position that Delaware Valley, supra.,
does not overrule New York Gas-Light Club, Inc. v. Carey,
447 U.S. 54 (1980). The procedural structure established by
Title VII and referred to in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion’? still
remains an integral part of Title VII law. The Sixth Circuit
was correct in finding that the state proceedings in this case
were not referred to the School Board by the district court
pursuant to Title VII. The Sixth Circuit expressly held that
when the fees at issue were incurred, “No issues remained for
resolution in Cooper’s Title VII claim.” The Petitioner seeks

‘Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 73
'2Pet. App. Sa

7

to create the misimpression that Judge Wiseman’s words “...a
fair hearing and give everybody due process” show that the
district court deferred a federal question to the school board.
The district court later rejected this mischaracterization.!?

This argument also makes little common sense. Why would
a federal judge defer a federal civil rights question to the very
body the Judge had ruled had discriminated against the
plaintiff?

The Petitioner also mischaracterized the Judge’s instruc-
tions to Cooper in which the Judge told Cooper to comply
with the school system’s sick leave policy and to comply with
his duty under the Board’s mandate to develop a management
action plan.!4

It should be noted here that the district court left avenues
open to the Petitioner under the original action, and the Sixth
Circuit readily acknowledged his right to come back before
the district court in the form of a contempt petition.!>
Petitioner’s attorneys chose not to pursue a contempt petition
after having taken the Superintendent’s deposition. !

Thus, under the facts of this case the Sixth Circuit was cor-
rect in stating that “the district court did maintain jurisdiction
over Cooper’s case, but merely as a procedural step to ensure
compliance.”!”

'3Pet. App. 25a

M4Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 212
‘Pet. App. 6a-7a

16Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix 160
7Pet. App. 8a

8

Il. UPON CLOSE CONSIDERATION OF THE
WORK PERFORMED THE DISTRICT COURT
AND THE COURT OF APPEAL DID NOT ERR
IN DENYING THE REQUESTED FEES

Generally, the first time frame that the Petitioner seeks fees
is from June 22, 1984, the date of the district court’s order
granting him his remedy, until August 1984, the time at which
he was specifically placed as principal of Fairview High
School. As stated previously, there has been no request for
these fees at the district court level since the petition only per-
tains to those fees incurred between October 1984 and April
1, 1985. (see note 1 supra.)

The second phase of the fees that are sought by the
petitioner pertain to the time after which he was placed as
principal of Fairview High School and until the commence-
ment of dismissal proceedings. During that period of time so-
called monitoring functions were being performed by
Petitioner’s attorneys. The district court properly rejected
those functions as being unreasonable.!® The Petitioner’s at-
torneys were not hired to run Fairview High School on a day
to day basis and the functions for which they are seeking
reimbursement amount to just that. The district court properly
rejected those fees and the Sixth Circuit properly affirmed that
decision in stating that the remedy for which the Petitioner
had first brought his case had long since been awarded.!? Ad-
ditionally, the Sixth Circuit properly differentiated Delaware
Valley and Northcross, supra. in that the work involved in
those cases were to insure complicated, long term compliance

'8Pet. App. 29a
\9Pet. App. 7a-8a

9
with the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7694 (d) and a complicated
and long term school desegregation plan.

The third and final phase for which the Petitioner’s attor-
neys seek fees for this case are in defending the dismissal
charges under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act. The
Petitioner mischaracterized the nature of the proceedings.
Even if the proceedings had resulted in the Petitioner’s dis-
missal, that outcome would not have affected his remedy un-
der his Title VII case, i.e. a principalship and the right to be
free from racial discrimination.

The Petitioner’s reliance on the fact that his competency,
insubordination, inefficiency and neglect of duty was an issue
in both the Title VII action and the dismissal proceedings is
misplaced. Plaintiffs would have us believe that “competency,
inefficiency, insubordination, and neglect of duty” is stagnant
and does not change with time or differing circumstances. The
dismissal proceedings involved an entirely different creature:
Petitioner’s competency, inefficiency, insurbordination, and
neglect of duty since the execution of the reinstatement order.

Petitioner’s contention that the district court’s orders in
connection with the state administrative proceedings made the
school board hearing a judge-made prerequisite to the
Petitioner obtaining further relief in federal court under Title
VII is without merit. In denying applicable motions, the dis-
trict court “resisted attempts by both parties to involve this
court in the state proceedings. The court did not make the
plaintiff’s participation in the state proceedings an intregal
part of his Title VII remedy, but merely refused to condone or
enjoin the initiation of those proceedings.”

Pet. App. 25a

10

The district court simply did not require the plaintiff to par-
ticipate in the state court proceedings as a condition precedent
to obtaining further relief in federal court.

IV. THE CASE HAS NO SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND
THE-IMMEDIATE FACTS AND PARTIES.

This Court generally seems to extend certiorari jurisdiction
only to adjudicating Constitutional issues, questions of na-
tional importance, settlement of conflict among the circuits,
etc. As the Court has said, certiorari jurisdiction “‘is a jurisdic-
tion to be exercised sparingly and only in cases of peculiar
gravity and general importance, or in order to secure unifor-
mity of decision”. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co-v. Wolfe Bros. &
Co., 240 U.S. 251, 257-258, 36 S.Ct. 269, 271, 60 L.Ed. 629,
633 (1913). None of these extraordinary matters seem to be
present in the case at bar.

Thus, even if the case were wrongly decided below, in
granting certiorari, this Court would be performing a mere er-
ror-correcting function that would be of no importance except
to the litigants themselves. In such a case, the Court considers
the granting of a writ to be inappropriate. Rudolph v. United
States, 370 U.S. 269, 271, 82 S.Ct. 1277, 1278, 8 L.Ed.2d
484, 486 (1962).

1]
CONCLUSION

For reasons set out herein, the Respondents respectfully
urge the Court to deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

—_—_

By: Gere” ». \WGe ==

Robert G. Wheeler, Jr.

Attorney at Law

2917 Foster Creighton Dr.
Nashville, TN 37204
(615) 726-0570

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1060%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
