# Opposition Brief — Connecticut v. Federal Communications Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 485 U.S. 959

## Text

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, INC.
IN OPPOSITION

BRENDA L. Fox
MICHAEL S. SCHOOLER *
1724 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 775-3664
Counsel for National Cable
* Counsel of Record Television Association, Inc.

February 22, 1988

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Was the Federal Communications Commission’s deter-
mination that the availability of three over-the-air broad-
cast signals constitutes “effective competition” for pur-
poses of Section 623 of the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984 arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with law?

(i)

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
Air Transport Association of America v. CAB,
792 F.2a:219 (D.C. Cec 1068) a 16
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ....................... 9
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582
CTU seis Re a oe LOI oe Ca 16

National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commission-
ers v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1224 (1985) ..........0222.... 16
United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978)...................... 16

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND REPORTS:

Amendment to the Commission’s Rules to Imple-
ment the Provisions of the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984, 52 Fed. Reg. 37461

CO Ei, SIE oie eeoreeaee 8
Implementation of Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, 52 Fed. Reg. 36801 (Oct. 1, 1987)... 8

STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, codified at 47 U.S.C. .
§ 521 et seq.

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Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS: Page
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 66
I ian cack lek rh clash 6, 10, 12
130 Cong. Rec. H10436 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)... 2,3
MISCELLANEOUS:

Broadcasting, Feb. 15, 1988, p. 18 ...............-..........--- 9

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-671

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, INC.
IN OPPOSITION

The National Cable Television Association, Inc.
(“NCTA”) respectfully submits this brief in opposition
to the Petition for 2 Writ of Certiorari filed jointly by
the State of Connecticut, the City of New York, the Na-
tional League of Cities, and the American Civil Liberties
Union (“Petitioners”). NCTA is the principal trade
association of the cable television industry in the United
States, representing the owners and operators of cable
systems serving over 80 percent of the nation’s approxi-

2

mately 43 million cable subscribers.* NCTA was an
intervenor in the proceedings below and is, therefore, a
respondent in this proceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the Federal Communications Com-
mission’s implementation of one provision of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the “Act’”’).’ That
law amended the Communications Act of 1934 to estab-
lish, for the first time, a comprehensive federal statutory
framework for the regulation of cable television. Em-
bodying a compromise between the cable television indus-
try and state and local governments, the Act generally
codified the authority of such governments to require
cable operators to obtain franchises before providing serv-
ice—authority that had been unclear and was increas-
ingly being “challenged at the FCC and in the courts.” ”
At the same time, the Act imposed limits on the require-
ments and conditions that may be imposed by franchis-
ing authorities, thereby eliminating many of the burdens
and excesses of regulation that had hampered the effi-
cient growth and development of cable in the increas-
ingly competitive marketplace of video and entertain-
ment services.

As Representative Wirth, the chairman of the House
Telecommunications Subcommittee and the bili’s prin-
cipal sponsor in the House of Representatives, explained,
“(t]he legislation protects local authority over cable tele-
vision in several important respects.”* For example, in

* NCTA has no parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliates.

1 Public Law 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (Oct. 30, 1984), codified at,
47 U.S.C. $521 et seq.

2130 Cong. Rec. H10436 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (remarks of
Rep. Wirth).

3 Jd.

3

addition to requiring cable operators to obtain franchises,
the Act permits cities to impose annual franchise fees of
up to five percent of the cable operator’s gross revenues ;*
to enforce franchise requirements for facilities and equip-
ment and for “broad categories of video programming,”
though not for specific program services;* and to require
cable operators to provide public, educational and gov-
ernmental access channels and facilities.*®

But the legislation also “contains several provisions to
provide the industry with the certainty and stability it
needs to make large financial investments to construct
and operate cable systems.” ’ In particular, Section 623
of the Act prohibits the regulation of rates for cable
service except in certain, limited circumstances. Al-
though it was understood that the Cable Act would
generally deregulate rates after a two-year transition
period,* Section 623 allows continued regulation of basic
cable service “in circumstances in which a cable system
is not subject to effective competition.”*® The Act di-

* Act, § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 542.

5 Id., § 624, 47 U.S.C. § 544.

® Id., § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531.

7 Remarks of Rep. Wirth, supra, 130 Cong. Rec. at 10436.

8 Rep. Wirth, for example, stated that the Act “[d]Jeregulates the
rates charged for basic cable service in 2 years, allowing the mar-
ketplace to dictate the price for cable programming and serv-
MBisak

*“The term ‘basic cable service’ means any service tier which
includes the retransmission of local television broadcast signals.”
Act, § 602(2), 47 U.S.C. §522(2). Cable operators typically offer
a wide range of programming services, such as distant broad-
cast signals and nonbroadcast satellite-delivered networks, in addi-
tion to the retransmission of local signals. Some of these services
may be provided along with local broadcast signals as a separately
priced package or “tier.” Others may be offered together in a
separately available tier that does not include local broadcast signals.
Still others, such as premium movie channels, may be offered alone

4

rected the Federal Communications Commission, within
180 days of the law’s enactment, to promulgate rules de-
fining “effective competition” for this purpose and estab-
lishing standards for basic rate regulation in the absence
of effective competition. It is the definition adopted by
the Commission, which the court below affirmed, that is
at issue in this case.

Completing its rulemaking proceeding within the time
period mandated by Congress, the Commission concluded
that ‘‘a cable system will be considered to face effective
competition whenever the franchise market receives three
or more unduplicated broadcast signals.” In adopting
this definition of “effective competition,” the Commission
rejected proposals of some commenting parties to require
the availability of a larger (or smaller) number of broad-
cast signals. It also rejected proposals to require, in ad-
dition to broadcast signals, the availability of -non-
broadcast alternatives to cable, such as multichannel
multipoint distribution systems and direct broadcast
satellite-services,"' that might provide an array of non-
broadcast program services comparable to those that are
often provided along with local and distant broadcast
stations as part of the cable operator’s basic service. And
it rejected proposals of the Department of Justice and
others that would, as described by Petitioners, “apply
antitrust market analysis to the ‘effective competition’
issue.” 7”

on a per-channel basis. Under the Act, only the basic tier rate may
ever be regulated, and it may only be regulated in the absence of
“effective competition.” Act, § 623(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b).

10 Report and Order, {100 (Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at Al7). (Hereinafter, the Appendix will be cited as
“Pet. App. at ——.”)

11 See Comments of National League of Cities at 45 (Jan. 28,
1985).

12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“‘Petition’”’) at 18.

5

The Commission acknowledged these proposals but ex-
plained why, in its view, “the existence of three or more
off-the-air broadcast signals in the cable market provides
viewers with adequate programming choices and presents
an effective constraint on the market power of a cable
system in the provision of basic service.” ** With respect
to the requisite number of broadcast signals, the only
empirical evidence submitted by commenting parties—
an economic analysis of cable rates in unregulated mar-
kets submitted by NCTA— indicated that, while the avail-
ability of the first, second and third broadcast signal in
a community each has an incremental competitive effect
on the price of basic cable service, additional signals
have no further effect on basic rates.* A three-signal
threshold was also indicated by a study, conducted by the
Commission’s staff, of Arbitron viewership data in mar-
kets with two, three, four and five available broadcast
signals. That study showed that viewership of basic
cable programming other than locally available broadcast
stations was sufficiently high to indicate possible market
power in markets with fewer than three available broad-
cast signals, but not in markets with three or more sig-
nals.“ Absent any empirical evidence indicating that
broadcast signals beyond the third would have any sig-
nificant effect on basic cable rates, the Commission deter-
mined that its definition of effective competition should
require no more than three such signals.

With respect to its decision to define effective competi-
tion solely in terms of availability of local broadcast sig-
nals and not to require the availability of nonbroadcast
alternatives to cable, the Commission acknowledged “that

13 Report and Order, § 100 (Pet. App. at A46).

14 See, Comments of the National Cable Television Association
and Community Antenna Television Association, Appendix A (Jan.
28, 1985).

15 Report and Order, { 99 (Pet. App. at A46-47).

6

many cable systems provide a number of services in ad-
dition to the retransmission of off-the-air signals” ** as
part of their basic service. But “[flor these additional
basic services to be a source of market power, it must
first be shown that a significant demand exists for these
services and that such demand is relatively inelastic.” **
The Commission found no evidence in the record of any
such significant or inelastic demand for access channels
or satellite program services provided as part of basic
cable service; indeed, it found evidence to the contrary.”
For this reason, the Commission rejected the notion “that
a cable system gains significant market advantage by the
provision of this additional programming in those mar-
kets where there are sufficient (7.e., three or more) off-
the-air broadcast signals.”

Finally, in opting for a standard based on available
broadcast signals rather than the multi-pronged anti-
trust market analysis urged by the Department of Jus-
tice, the Commission did not dispute the utility and valid-
ity of antitrust-style analysis in accurately assessing
market power on a case-by-case basis. But, as the Com-
mission noted in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Con-
gress specifically intended that the Commission define
effective competition in terms of “readily applicable cri-
teria” and that “[r]jegulations should specify objective
criteria to avoid the need for an independent examina-
tion of the status of competition on a community-by-
community basis.” * The Commission concluded that its

16 Report and Order, §. 100 (Pet. App. at A46).
17 Jd., n.68.

18 Jd,

19 Jd., { 100 (Pet. App. at A47).

20 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 48765, 48770
(Dec. 14, 1984), quoting Report of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, H.R. Rep. 98-934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1984)
(“House Report”).

7

standard based on availability of broadcast signals pro-
vided “a reasonable benchmark for determining effective
competition with basic cable services” and best met “the
congressional intent of an administratively manageable
standard for the Commission, franchising authorities and
cable operators.” **

None of the Petitioners sought reconsideration by the
Commission of its “effective competition” standard. In-
stead, they went directly to the court of appeals, where
they “launch[ed] a broad assault on virtually every ar-
gument cited by the FCC in support of its rules, and
every component of the rules themselves.”* The court
determined, however, that the Commission had acted
reasonably both in defining “effective competition” solely
in terms of the availability of a certain number of broad-
cast signals and in selecting three as the appropriate
number. The court found that the Commission had “con-
sidered the alternatives suggested by the commenters
and offered cogent reasons for adopting a three-signal
availability standard.” *

The court of appeals also found, however, that, while
defining effective competition to exist where three broad-
cast stations are available was wholly reasonable, the
Commission had acted arbitrarily in determining when a
broadcast station should be deemed “available.” Under
the Commission’s rules, a station would be considered
available if it placed a signal of Grade B strength over
“any portion” of the cable community. The court held
that if a signal was to be deemed available as an effec-
tive competitor to cable service, “it was incumbent upon
the FCC to craft the standard more carefully, to ensure

21 Report and Order, { 98 (Pet. App. at A45).

22 American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1563
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Pet. App. at Al41).

23 Jd. at 1564 (Pet. App. at Al44).

8

that a signal is at least theoretically available over the
entire cable community or at least some significant por-
tion of the cable community.” ** The court also rejected
two minor aspects of the standards adopted by the Com-
mission governing rate regulation in those communities
where, because fewer than three broadcast stations are
available, rate regulation remains permissible.” But
apart from these exceptions, the court held “that the
FCC’s rate regulation rules are affirmed in all re-
spects.” *6
ARGUMENT

This case raises no unusual, unresolved or extraordi-
nary issues that warrant review by this Court. In deter-
mining that the Commission acted reasonably in imple-
menting its statutory mandate, the court below applied
well-established principles of administrative law and
statutory construction. Although Petitioners seek to por-
tray the Commission’s decision as arbitrary and incon-
sistent with the Act and the court’s decision as erroneous,
their real complaint is that they would like more regu-
latory authority over rates than the Act gave them. To
the extent that there has been a “nationwide impact” on
the “traditional cable rate regulation powers” of state
and local governments, as alleged by Petitioners,*’ such
impact is directly attributable to the Act—which was
specifically intended to prohibit rate regulation except in

24 Jd. at 1572 (Pet. App. at A160-61). The Commission is cur-
rently conducting a rulemaking proceeding to amend its definition
of signal availability. See Implementation of Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 52 Fed. Reg. 36801 (Oct. 1, 1987).

25 823 F.2d at 1565-71 (Pet. App. at A145-158). The Commission
has already amended its standards in accordance with the court’s
decision. See Amendment to the Commission’s Rules to Implement
the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 52
Fed. Reg. 37461 (Oct. 7, 1987).

26 823 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. App. at A143).
27 Petition at 15.

9

limited circumstances—and not to any novel or arbi-
trary substantive or procedural approaches taken by the
Commission or by the court below.

As evidence of the impact of rate deregulation or of
changed conditions in the video marketplace becomes
available, the Commission is required by the Act to “peri-
odically review” ** its rules and, in any event, must pre-
pare a report for Congress on rate d@tegulation and “the
effect of competition in the marketplace” before October
30, 1990.” Moreover, Congress is closely monitoring the
effects of its deregulatory mandate.*” If implementation
of the Act leads to results that Congress either did not
intend or does not desire, it can and will make its views
known to the Commission and amend the Act. But Peti-
tioners present no basis whatever for concluding that, in
light of the statute, the legislative history and the rule-
making record, the Commission’s rules are in any respect
arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with
law.

I

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals ignored
and therefore “sanction[ed] a significant departure
from” *' this Court’s edict that, in construing statutes,
courts and agencies “must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress.” ** The court of ap-
peals was, however, well aware of that principle and, in
fact, relied specifically upon it in invalidating one of the
Commission’s standards governing rate regulation in the

28 Act, § 623(b) (3), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (8).
29 Td., § 623(h), 47 U.S.C. §543(h).

© The House Telecommunications Subcommittee intends to hold
oversight hearings on the implementation of the Act in March
1988. See Broadcasting, Feb. 15, 1988, p. 18.

31 Petition at 15.

82 Jd. at 16, quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).

10

absence of effective competition But it upheld the
Commission’s approach to defining effective competition
because, contrary to Petitioners’ faulty reading of the
Act, that approach was in no way inconsistent with the
explicit legislative intent.

Petitioners complain, first, that while the Act di-
rects the Commission to “define the circumstances in
which a cable system is not subject to effective competi-
tion,” the Commission erroneously interpreted its task as
defining the circumstances in which a cable system’s basic
service is not subject to effective competition. The Com-
mission’s approach was, in fact, not only reasonable on
its face but wholly consistent with the “expressed intent
of Congress.”

Thus, Congress specifically intended “that this rule-
making focus solely on whether there is effective com-
petition sufficient to warrant the regulation of rates for
basic cable service.” ** This follows from the fact that
the only rates that can be regulated under the Act, even
in the absence of effective competition, are rates for
basic service. In its comments in the rulemaking proceed-
ing, the Department of Justice explained why it would,
therefore, be irrational to define effective competition, for
purposes of the Act’s rate regulation provisions, in terms
ef anything other than basic service:

It would make little sense . . . to regulate the price
of basic cable service if all of a cable system’s mar-
ket power was derived from and could be exercised
in the provision of services that are expressly ex-
cluded from rate regulation under the Act.®

Second, Petitioners contend that, even if it was correct
to focus on effective competition for basic cable service,

83 See 823 F.2d at 1565-70.
34 House Report, supra, at 66 ( emphasis added).

35 Comments of the United States Department of Justice at 24
(Jan. 28, 1985).

11

the Commission erroneously viewed basic cable service as
only that portion of the basic tier that includes local
broadcast signals and “excluded all non-broadcast pro-
gramming (except access channels)” ** that might also
be provided on the same tier. In so doing, the Commis-
sion, according to Petitioners, ignored the unambiguous
statutory definition of “basic cable service,” which en-
compasses the entire “tier which includes . . . local tele-
vision broadcast signals.” **

The Commission, however, did no such thing. Having
observed, in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, that
“ijn essence, basic cable service is the provision of lo-
cally viewed broadcast signals” *"—because, “as a matter
of definition,’ *® basic service always includes local
broadcast signals but may or may not include various
nonbroadeast services—the Commission nevertheless se-
lected a standard that was intended to reflect the num-
ber of available local broadcast signals necessary to pro-
vide effective competition to the entire basic service pack-
age. Thus, the Commission recognized that “many cable
systems provide a number of services in addition to the
retransmission of off-the-air signals” * on their basic
service tiers. But it specifically concluded that cable sys-
tems would not gain “significant market advantage by
the provision of this additional programming in those
markets where there are sufficient (7.e., three or more)
off-the-air broadcast signals.” *!

36 Petition at 16.

87 Act, § 602, 47 U.S.C. § 522.

38 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra, 49 Fed. Reg. at 48770.
39 Td.

40 Report and Order, {| 100 (Pet. App. at A46).

41 Jd. (Pet. App. at A47). By implication, the Commission deter-
mined that cable systems might be able to exercise market power
from the provision of services other than local broadcast signals
in markets with fewer than three such signals. If, as Petitioners

12

Finally, Petitioners contend that Congress unambigu-
ously directed the Commission not to define effective
competition solely in terms of a specific number of broad-
east signals. But, as the court of appeals recognized,
that is not what the Act or the legislative history ac-
tually says. Petitioners point to no provision of the Act
imposing such a directive, and their attempt to read such
a requirement into the legislative history was correctly
rejected by the court of appeals. The legislative history
suggests, first, that the Commission, in fashioning a stand-
ard, “should consider the number and nature of [cable]
services provided, compared with the nature and number
of services available from alternative sources and, if so,
at what price,” and, second, that it “may find it relevant
to consider factors in addition to the number of over-
the-air broadcast stations in a market... .”* Thus,
as the court of appeals concluded, “[{t]he FCC’s mandate
was to ‘consider’ various alternatives, including, it seems,
one in which effective competition would be measured
solely in terms of the availability of broadcast signals.” *

If the Commission had determined that broadcast
signals alone were not sufficient to constrain market
power in the provision of basic cable.service but never-
theless selected a standard based solely on the availability
of broadcast signals, Petitioners’ challenge might have
been persuasive. But having considered the alternatives
and determined that three broadcast signals were gen-

suggest, the Commission was only concerned with whether there
was effective competition for the local broadcast component of basic
service, it would necessarily have concluded that there was always
effective competition. Even where there are only one or two avail-
able local broadcast stations, the availability of those signals to
viewers over-the-air free of charge obviously constitutes effective
competition to the provision of those same signals by a cable system.

42 House Report, supra, at 66.

43 823 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. App. at Al44).

13

erally sufficient to provide effective competition to basic
cable service, the Commission was not constrained (and
it would have been irrational) to require in its standard
the additional availability of other nonbroadcast pro-
gramming sources.“

II

Petitioners contend that, in failing to adopt a defini-
tion of effective competition that embodies “antitrust
market analysis,” the Commission violated “the. ac-
cepted and usual doctrine that requires agencies to con-
sider all relevant factors and explain departures from
longstanding policies.” ** They confuse the Commission’s
refusal to adopt the antitrust approach urged by the De-
partment of Justice with a failure to consider it. More-
over, the fact that the Commission uses marke analysis
in regulating telephone common carrier services and fa-
cilities pursuant to Title II of the Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seg. does not make its re-
jection of such an approach in implementing a wholly different
statutory task a “departure from longstanding policies.”

In its Report and Order, the Commission specifically
acknowledged that the Department of Justice had pro-

44 Petitioners also argue that, because Congress ultimately re-
jected a provision in the version of the cable bill initially passed by
the Senate, which deregulated rates whenever there were four avail-
able broadcast signals, and instead gave the Commission the respon-
sibility of determining what constituted effective competition, Con-
gress clearly did not intend that the Commission ultimately adopt
a standard based solely on broadcast signals. See Petition at 17-18.
This is a wholly unpersuasive argument. In rejecting the Senate-
passed provision, Congress cannot even be viewed as having pre-
cluded the ultimate adoption by the Commission of a similar four-
signal standard. What Congress decided was not that effective
competition could not be defined solely in terms of broadeast signals
but that it should be defined by the Commission on the basis of a
rulemaking record rather than by legislative fiat.

45 Petition at 18.

14

posed! that effective competition be defined to require “a
mininmum of five broadcast signals” ** and that “other
eriterfia be considered in addition to the signal comple-
ment.’ “7 And the Commission also explained why it
adopteed a different approach.“ The Commission sought
a starndard that would, as Congress desired, be “readily
appliccable” and “avoid the need for an independent ex-
aminaation of the status of competition on a community-
by-conmmunity basis.” ** As the National Telecommuni-
eationns and Information Administration (NTIA) had
pointeed out to the Commission, the multifaceted, anti-
trust-ttype approach proposed by the Justice Department
“woylid create an administrative nightmare, something
whicho Congress specifically sought to avoid.” ®

46 pgeport and Order, { 95 (Pet. App. at A42).

47 yqd., n.59.

48 Tyhe reason why the Commission “went so far as to dismiss, as
based upon ‘supposition and intuition,’” the Justice Department’s
five-siggnal proposal, Petition at 18, is that the Department had
itself sStated that “it appears intuitively that five broadcast stations
are neecessary,” but that “the precise number of stations could be
determnined with more accuracy if reliable empirical evidence were
availabble—and could be more or less than we suggest.” Department
of Jusstice Comments at 37 (emphasis added). Studies by NCTA
and thane Commission’s staff supplied empirical evidence that showed
that a t three-signal standard was more appropriate.

49 }{douse Report, supra, at 66.

50 Reeply Comments of NTIA 5 (Feb. 11, 1985). What the Justice
Depart'tment specifically proposed was that effective competition be
presunmed to exist if any two of the following criteria were satisfied :
First, ‘ “at least five unduplicated broadcast stations, including affili-
ates oof the three networks, can be received adequately by con-
sumers’s in the cable system’s franchise area.” Second, “the total
numbeer of channels on the basic tier, excluding local access, teletext
and sirimilar channels, is less than three times the number of broad-
cast stitations that can be received adequately in the cable system’s
franchhise area .... For the purpose of applying this criteria, the
numbeer of channels on the basic tier should be reduced by the num-
ber off substitute channels actually provided in the market by al-

eee

15

Ultimately, the Commission concluded that three broad-
cast signals would generally be sufficient to constrain
basic cable rates. And, in rejecting alternative stand-
ards that might require consideration of additional mar-
ketplace factors, the Commission explained that the
three-signal standard “meets the congressional intent of
an administratively manageable standard for the Com-
mission, franchising authorities and cable operators.” *'

Ill

Finally, Petitioners complain that the Commission
should not have been permitted by the court of appeals
to have relied upon a study conducted by its staff in the
course of the rulemaking proceeding because the study
was “virtually unavailable for public comment” ® until
the Commission issued its Report and Order. In fact,
the Commission dealt with its internal study in a man-
ner wholly consistent with sound administrative proce-
dure and precedent.

There is no legal doctrine that prevents an agency
from using its own resources to supplement or confirm
the evidence in a rulemaking record by conducting a
study in the course of the proceeding. If, in such cir-
cumstances, “[t]he staff studies were placed in the pub-

ternative delivery systems at a price comparable to that charged for
basic service.” Third, “[n]o more than 20 percent of the cable
system’s subscribers subscribe only to the basic tier as of the date
of the Act.” Department of Justice Comments, supra, at 36-41.

Senator Goldwater, the Cable Act’s principal sponsor in the Sen-
ate, specifically urged the Commission to reject this “convoluted”
standard because it was a “complicated and theoretical antitrust
approach to what Congress intended to be simple and practical rule-
making.” Letter of Sen. Goldwater to Chairman Mark S. Fowler
(Mar. 26, 1985).

51 Report and Order, { 98 (Pet. App. at A45).
52 Petition at 20.

16

lie docket at the close of the rulemaking,’™ and, by
petitioning for reconsideration, interested parties even-
tually had ample opportunity to address the staff
study,” ** the courts have held that there is no proce-
dural deficiency.” Indeed, this Court has held that, even
where a study was not disclosed until after reconsidera-
tion was denied, this “procedural lapse” was not a “suffi-
cient ground for reopening the proceedings before the
Commission.” *

In the present case, the Commission could not control
its timetable. It could not wait to issue a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking until it had conducted its own internal
studies and analyses, and it could not postpone issuing
a rule until all parties had an opportunity to comment
on those studies and analyses. The Act required that the
Commission promulgate rules and make them effective
within 180 days. In these circumstances, the Commis-
sion was required, at most, only to disclose its reliance
on these studies in its final decision and to place the stu-
dies in the public record at the close of the rulemaking
proceeding—which is precisely what the Commission
did.* Petitioners had ample opportunity to challenge the

53 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. CAB, 732 F.2d 219, 224
(D.C. Cir. 1984).

54 National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC,
737 F.2d 1095, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1224
(1985).

55 See also United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584
F.2d 519, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

56 FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 591 n.22 (1981).

57 The internal staff study was placed in the record on May 1,
1985—one day before the Commission’s Report and Order appeared
in the Federal Register. See emorandum of Bruce Franca, Policy
Analysis Branch, to Joyce Butler, Dockets Branch (May 1, 1985).
Interested parties have 30 days after a Commission decision appears
in the Federal Register in which to seek reconsideration. See 47
U.S.C. § 405.

SS ae

17

validity and relevance of the staff study—and of the
NCTA study—in petitions for reconsideration, but they
simply chose not to do so.

CONCLUEiC™

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition presents no is-
sues that warrant review by this Court and should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BRENDA L. Fox

MICHAEL S. SCHOOLER *
1724 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 775-3664

Counsel for National Cable
Television Association, Inc.

* Counsel of Record
February 22, 1988

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_1035%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
