# Appendix — Robinson v. Secretary of Transportation

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 944

## Text

1 YQ6EPH F. SFANIOL, JR.
———— ——CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1987

ARTHUR B. ROBINSON,
Petitioner.

V.

Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
ALLAN McARTOR, National Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration,
Respondents.

APPENDIX

DARRELL S. ELLIOTT

Darrell S. Elliott, P.C.
Steele Park Building

50 South Steele, Suite 777
Denver, Colorado 80209
(303) 329-0331

Attorney for Petitioner

= ie

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Aviation Administration,
Defendants-Appellees.

TENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) UnhetSaaeaCisestet Appa
ARTHURB. ROBINSON, ) June 10, 1987
PlaintiffAppellant, _) ROBERTL.HOECKER
) Clerk
VS. )
) No. 83-2122
DREWLEWIS, Secretary of t )
he Department ofTransportation, )
andJ.LYNNHELMS, National _)
Administrator of the Federal )
)
)

ORDERANDJUDGMENT

Before SEYMOUR andSETH, Circuit Judges, and
ELLISON, District Judge*

Plaintiff-Appellant, Arthur B. Robinson, appeals from
adverse judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado following trial to the
court on his complaint of deprivation of rights under Title
VII of the 1964Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000 et seq.

This action was instituted after Plaintiff was terminated

*Honorable James O. Ellison, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.

on December 14, 1979 from the training program of the
Federal Aviation Administration for air traffic controllers
in Colorado. Plaintiff had been in the training program
since August 16, 1971.

Plaintiff had been previously terminated in December,
1974 after which he filed a discrimination complaint al-
leging he was trained on a particularly low volume traffic
sector whereas Anglo trainees were placed in high volume
sector training. The subsequent investigation by the
Department of Transportation resulted in a decision in
favor of Plaintiff. Accordingly, he was reinstated to his
former position in 1976.

During the pendency of his original complaint, the
training program had been reorganized from a three-phase
program to a thirteen-phase program. He reentered the
program at phase eight pursuant to the directive of the
Department of Transportation that he be given full and fair
training, and if that training was successfully completed,
that he be promoted retroactively according to the dates
he would have been promoted if he had been afforded the
opportunity to successfully complete his training without
interruption. Plaintiff now asserts he was denied full and
fair training as directed by the Department of Transporta-
tion.

Plaintiff successfully completed phases eight and nine
and was progressing to phase ten when a position opened
for phase eleven classroom radar training. Plaintiff and a
white male trainee interrupted their phase ten training to
take advantage of the phase eleven opening. He success-
fully completed phase eleven and then agreed to complete
his phase ten training before proceeding to phase twelve.
When he completed phase ten, his entry into phase twelve
training was delayed due to difficulty in receiving
credible training hours because of lower traffic volumes
and staff vacations in the months of December and
January during which he entered training. However, when

~

PLANO PIT Ke Mergers

his phase twelve training began, Plaintiff was allowed to
choose the sector inwhich he would be trained.

Plaintiff was first trained on sector 34 under George
Shrader. In addition to the required sixty hours, Shrader
provided twelve hours of remedial training but ultimately
concluded Plaintiff’s performance to be unsatisfactory. In
July,1979 Plaintiff was given a certification test and cer-
tification was denied. Based upon Plaintiff’s failure to
successfully complete his certification check after one
hundred hours of training, he was eventually terminated.
Plaintiff requested a Facility Employee Performance
Review Board to review his training. The Board affirmed
the decision that Plaintiff’s training should be terminated
and recommended he be offered reassignment to a posi-
tion in a flight service station.

Plaintiff was informed that he could request a volun-
tary down grade pursuant to FAA Order 3330.30B. Plain-
tiff never made such a request and was removed from his
trainee position.

Plaintiff appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
Board. The removal was affirmed after hearing. Plaintiff
then appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission which appeal was also denied. This action
was then filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered
following a two-day trial which concluded that Plaintiff
had failed to prove he was the victim of discrimination.
Judgment was awarded to the Defendants and the action
dismissed.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred
in concluding Plaintiff was not discriminated against be-
cause of his race.

1No authority is cited by the trial court, however, the paragraphing
clearly denotes the McDonnell test was applied.

The trial court held Plaintiff "established a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, based upon a legitimate in-
ference of continuing effects from the previous dis-
criminatory denial of an equal training opportunity".

The court found that this case could not be resolved
by the customary inquiry of whether the Defendants have
shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refus-
ing certification because of the affirmative duty to remedy
past discrimination by providing effective training.

Presumably, the trial court followed the three-step
analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green,
411 U.S. 792(1973) in analyzing the shifting burden of
proof in a discrimination case. 1 Recognizing that the ul-
timate burden ofproof remains at all times with the Plain-
tiff, the trial court incorporated into its findings the
factual ingredient of past discrimination as to this Plain-
tiff. In fact, a review of the record in its entirety reveals
that the court’s determination that Plaintiff established a
prima facie case is based primarily upon the fact of past
discrimination. It is further apparent that the trial court
correctly considered the evidence adduced by both parties
in concluding that a prima facie case had been made. See
ine, 450

U.S.248 (1981). Otherwise, the court’s determination
that "this is not a case which can be resolved by the cus-
tomary inquiry ofwhether the defendants have shown a
legitimate non-discriminatoryreason for refusing cer-
tification" has no meaning in the context in which it is
stated. This court affirms the trial court’s decision that
Plaintiff established a prima facie case and further agrees
with the trial court’s assessment that the record reflects
that Plaintiff was given more than adequate training op-
portunities anc that the delays in training were based
primarily upon forces over which the Defendants had no
control such as vacation schedules, union related reassign-
ments, and low volume traffic months. Had Plaintiff’s

training been undertaken during the months of December
and January, Plaintiff might well be reurging acomplaint
that his training was inadequate because it was too easy.
No evidence was presented that the Defendants in any way
manipulated the traffic in sector 34 after Plaintiff’s volun-
tary participation in choosing that sector for his training.
Defendants came forward with evidence showing a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing cer-
tification. Plaintiff then had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the Defendants so that the
Defendants’ proffered explanation was unworthy of
belief. This Plaintiff wholly failed to do. See Sabol v.
Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009 910th Cir. 1975).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is af-
firmed in all respects.

JAMESO.ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 81-M-704 FILED
United States District Court
Denver, Colorado
ARTHUR B.ROBINSON, June 30, 1983
Plaintiff,

James R. Manspeaker

Clerk
¥.

DREW LEWIS, Secretary of the Department
of Transportation, and J. LYNN HELMS,
National Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Administration,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

Arthur Robinson, a black, claims racial discrimination
in his termination from employment as Air Traffic Con-
trol Specialist(ATCS) by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) of the Department of Transportation, effective
December 14, 1979. That termination was appealed to the
Merit Systems Protection Board which found no dis-
crimination. The matter then went to the Equal Employ-
ment Commission which concurred in the decision finding
nodiscrimination based on race. Mr. Robinson then filed
this civil action and received a trial de novo as provided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. Section2000e, et seq.

The plaintiff applied for employ ment by the FAA when
he was an employee of the United States Postal Service

in 1970. Because of some delay, including pending traf-
fic charges, Mr. Robinson did not enter on duty with the
FAA until August, 1971. He was assigned to the Air Route
Traffic Control Center at Longmont, Colorado, for train-
ing. Mr. Robinson successfully completed the first two
phases of his training and was terminated, effective
December 6, 1974, for a failure to complete the third
phase ofcontroller training. Mr. Robinson filed a formal
complaint of discrimination on June 12, 1974, alleging
that he was given unequal training because of his race.
After an investigation, the Department of Transportation
concluded that this allegation was true. More specifical-
ly, the DOT found that in the control room training, Mr.
Robinson was assigned primarily to Sector 31,with very
light traffic, whereas caucasian trainees under the same
supervisor had been assigned to sectors with heavier
volume and which were therefore conducive to better
training. Accordingly, it was directed that Mr. Robinson
be restored to the position of ATCS and provided with the
necessary training to reenter the third phase of the train-
ing program and upon satisfactory completion of full and
fair training, the plaintiff was to have been promoted
retroactively according to the dates hewould have been
promoted if he had been afforded an adequate opportunity
to complete the Phase III training. That decision was ef-
fective September 7, 1976. As a result,Mr. Robinson
returned to the Longmont center for additional training.
At that time, the regular training program had been
changed from three phases to 13 phases. Normally,
phases II, III and IV involved classroom work given at a
training center in Oklahoma City. Phases IX and X con-
sisted of on-the-job training at the interphone position in
the control room. Phase XI was classroom work on radar
training and phases XII and XIII involved on-the-job
training in the radar position in the control room.

When Mr. Robinson returned, he agreed that it was not
necessary for him to repeat the first seven phases of train-
ing and, accordingly, he worked in the control room at the
interphone position on assignment to several different
sectors. He also did regular staff work, including work on
the flight strip printer.

The plaintiff was assigned to the radar classroom and
laboratory training and completed it on November 18,
1978. In the normal progression, he would then have
moved to on-the-job training in the radar position in the
control room. However, Mr.Robinson had not yet
received certification on Sector 31. Accordingly, it was
recommended and the plaintiff agreed that he would return
to the interphone position on Sector 31 before beginning
radar on-the-job training.

That radar training did not begin until March, 1979.
For the OST radar training, Mr. Robinson was assigned to
George Shrader as the instructor. Mr. Shrader is a very
fundamentalist person who takes some pride in being
called "a gun-toting, bible banging bigot.". Mr. Shrader
and Mr. Robinson agreed that the training would be done
on Sector 34. Mr. Shrader did not find Mr. Robinson’s per-
formance to be satisfactory, and the plaintiff was assigned
to another instructor, Mr. James Carr, for additional
remedial training. After completion of those remedial
hours, a certification test was given to the plaintiff on
July17, 1979. At that time, another controller, Mr. Her-
ron, was "plugged into" the plaintiff’s position as well as
Mr. Adair, the supervisor. Mr. Adair was not satisfied
with the performance and certification was denied. Be-
cause of the denial of certification, Mr. Robinson was ter-
minated from employment, effective December 14, 1979.

The plaintiff has established a prima facie case of ra-
cial discrimination, based upon a legitimate inference of
continuing effects from the previous discriminatory
denial of an equal training opportunity. The agency had

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an affirmative obligation to remedy that past discrimina-
tion by providing effective training. Accordingly, this is
not a case which can be resolved by the customary inquiry
of whether the defendant has shown a legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reason for refusing certification, free from
any discriminatory intent.

While the nickname accepted by Mr. Shrader might
generate some concern about his racial attitudes, the
record does not support any finding of bigotry on his part.
His fundamentalism is reflected in his demanding attitude
concerning performance, rather than any preconception
about the plaintiff based on his race. Upon the basis of
the entire record, I find that Arthur Robinson was given
more than adequate training opportunities. There is an in-
dication that the delay between the classroom and
laboratory radar training and the on-the-job radar training
was a disadvantage to him. However, that delay does not
appear to have been the result of any racial attitude. It is
clear that December and January are difficult months for
assigning training. In December, there are vacations as-
sociated with the holiday season. In January, the union
contract, then in effect, called for the new bidding of jobs
and many reassignments of personnel, causing disruption
in schedules. Apparently, there was some unfortunate loss
of records concerning the final certification of the inter-
phone training on Sector 31, and that was a part of the
cause for the four-month delay.

The plaintiff has perceived unfairness in the assign-
ment to Sector 34, which he considered to be more dif-
ficult than other available sectors for OJT radar training.
Yet, the evidence shows that Mr. Robinson was well ac-
quainted with all of the sectors and agreed to that assign-
ment. Indeed, it is to be noted that his previous complaint
was that his assignment to Sector 31 for interphone train-
ing was inappropriate because that sector was too easy.

There is no merit to the contention that the certifica-
tion check was done unfairly because Mr. Herron was
"plugged in" as the monitor for safety purposes. To the
contrary, that assignment was made to avoid any inference
of unfairness by using the normal practice of assigning the
training instructor, Mr. Carr, because of any possible con-
flicts between Mr. Carr and Mr. Robinson.

In considering the contested issues in this case, this
court is acutely aware that the performance standards ap-
plied to the plaintiff involved a considerable amount of
subjectivity and that such evaluations require close
scrutiny. Additionally, this court appreciates the critical
importance of the work of an airtraffic controller and the
human disasters which can occur as a result of any error
or inadequacy in performance. After careful considera-
tion of all the evidence in this case, including my percep-
tion of the instructors and supervisor who testified in this
case, considering their demeanor and manner as witnesses
on the stand, I find that the plaintiff’s race was not a fac-
tor in the denial of his certification and the resulting ter-
mination of his employment. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that this civil action is dismissed and judg-
ment shall enter for the defendant, without the award of
costs.

Dated: June 30, 1983

BY THE COURT:

Richard P. Matsch, Judge

RRO:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

JAMES R. MANSPEAKER, CLERK

U.S. Courthouse, Room C-145
June 30, 1983 1929 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294

James W. Whitlow

Office of Chief Counsel

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

Stephen Klein Asst. U.S. Attorney
Richard S. Shaffer

818 17th St., Ste. 510

Denver, CO 80202

RE: 81 M704 ARTHUR B. ROBINSON vy.
DREW LEWIS, et al.

Enclosed please find a copy of FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER
signed by Judge Richard P. Matsch June 30, 1983 and a
copy of JUDGEMENT signed by Stephen P. Ehrlich,
Chief Deputy Clerk on June 30, 1983 in the above entitled
action.

JAMES R. MANSPEAKER,

CLERK

BY
Alicia N. Hoegh, Deputy Clerk

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Arthur B. Robinson
Petitioner, )
) Petition No. 03800169

v. )

)

Department of Transportation )
Respondent. )

)

DECISION
INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 1980, Arthur B. Robinson (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner) initiated a petition to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for
review of the initial decision-of the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board (MSPB) rendered May 1,1980, on his allega-
tions of discrimination based on race (black) in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seg. The initial decision ofthe
MSPB became its preliminary decision on June 5, 1980.
The MSPB decision found that the Department of
Transportation (hereinafter referred to as agency) had not
engaged in discrimination based on race as alleged by
petitioner. Because the petition involves an action pend-
ing subsequent to January 10,1979, the effective date of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, it is governed by
the provisions of that Act and EEO Regulations 29 C.F.R.
Section 1613.414 et seq. Although those Regulations
only provide for complainants to petition the EEOC for
review of preliminary decisions of the MSPB, the present
petition was accepted for consideration by the Commis-

te ee

sion pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Section 1613.416 because of
the confusion occasioned by the enactment of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 and the implementation of
regulations under the Act

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was employed by the agency as an Air Traffic
Control Specialist (ATCS). His position description re-
quired the acquisition of higher and higher levels of
knowledge and skills until he was a fully certified ATCS.
On October 1, 1979, the agency issued petitioner a notice
of proposed removal because ofhis failure to satisfactori-
ly complete Phase 13 (on-the-job radar training) of the En
Route Air Traffic Training Program. The agency sub-
sequently decided to remove petitioner, effective-
December 14, 1978.

The En Route Traffic Training Program Guide
provided for 60 hours of training to qualify on each con-
trol position of operation and,when necessary, up to 40
hours of additional remedial training., The Guide also re-
quired that the ATCS demonstrate his ability as measured
by a prescribed set of performance evaluation factors and
standards. Petitioner received 60 hours of training on
Sector 34. Since his performance was consistently below
the acceptable training standards, petitioner was given an
additional 40 hours of remedial training by a second train-
ing instructor. Both of petitioner’s instructors testified that
petitioner often exceeded the acceptable error rate estab-
lished by the Training Program Guide, although he did
not fall below the acceptablestandards on every training
session. The instructors’ testimony is corroborated by the
evaluation forms prepared by eachinstructor after each
training session. Petitioner failed his certification check
on Sector 34, and therefore failed tasuccessfully complete
Phase 13 of the training program.

A Facility Employee Performance Review Board met
to review the training of petitioner. The Board recom-
mended that petitioner’s training be terminated and that
he be reassigned to a position commensurate with his
training and his ATCS skills. Petitioner was offered such
a position by the agency; however, he declined the offer.
As a result, petitioner was subsequently removed.

Petitioner contended that his removal was the result
of racial discrimination. In support of this allegation,
petitioner made reference to a previous discrimination
complaint filed when he failed Phase 3 of the training
program in 1974. In that case,the agency found that
petitioner had been discriminated against because he was
not afforded the same training as non-black employees.
The agency ordered that petitioner be reinstated and af-
forded full and fair training opportunities. Petitioner con-
tends that the instant action is a continuation of the
previous discrimination in that the training he received
during Phase 13 was inadequate and that he was treated
differently than other trainees. In support of this conten-
tion, petition eralleged that, unlike other trainees, he was
not afforded priority training as required by agency train-
ing policy; that his training in Phase 13 was delayed for
four months without cause; that he was assigned to train
on Section 34, asector more difficult to train on than other
sectors; and that an instructor other than his assigned
training instructor monitored his certification check on
Sector 34. The record indicates that petitioner was the
only black trainee out of a group of approximately 10
trainees in Phase 13.

The agency maintained that petitioner’s removal was
not based upon considerations of his race but upon an ob-
jective and nondiscriminatory evaluation of his training
progress. The agency claimed that not only did petitioner
receive the same quality training as other trainees, but he
received additional and personalized instruction. Any dif-

ee

ferences in the training given to petitioner in comparison
with other trainees, was purportedly a response to the par-
ticular circumstances and progression of petitioner’s
training program.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Under the principles of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) a complainant alleging
employ ment discrimination in violation of Title VII must
carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the agency to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the al-
leged discriminatory personnel action. Finally, the com-
plainant must be afforded an opportunity to show that the
agency’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were in facta _
pretext for discrimination.

In the present case, petitioner succeeded in estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that he was treated differently in some respects than other
trainees and that he was the only black in his training
group. The agency presented evidence that petitioner’s
progress in the training program, as measured by objec-
tive criteria applicable to all trainees, was below accept-
able standards. However, the agency presented sufficient
evidence to show that any differences in training received
by petitioner was the result of legitimate, nondis-
criminatory criteria.

Petitioner contended that he was not given priority
training as required by Agency Order ZOV 3120.28.
Petitioner claimed that the Order specified that persons
with one year in grade were to be given priority training
in order to qualify for promotion. However, the Agency
Training Officer testified that the Order only applied to
the resolution of any potential conflict between trainees
vying for training on a day to day basis because of the

overlapping of ATCS shift. The Training Officer testified
that what petitioner was referring to was a trainee who was
considered "time critical" because of time in grade. Such
"time critical". employees were handled administratively
by the agency and were not covered by Agency Order
ZoV3120. 28. Moreover, petitioner was not considered

"time critical" because he had not been ingonsideration for
promotion and therefore was not entitled to any priority
training status. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, only
one trainee in the program had been declared “time criti-
cal." The agency’s evidence supports the view that
petitioner was treated no differently than other trainees in
this regard.

Petitioner also alleged that his training in Phase 13
was delayed for four months after the classroom portion
of his radar training, thereby lessening his chances of
qualifying during Phase 13. The record establishes that
when petitioner entered the classroom portion of the radar
training, he was half-way through his on-the-job training
on an interphone (non-radar)position (Sector 31). After
completing the classroom radar training, petitioner had
the choice of going directly into Phase 13 on-the-job radar
training, or of completing his on- the-job training for the
interphone position. After consulting with his supervisor,
petitioner agreed to complete his on-the-job interphone
training before proceeding to Phase 13 training. Because
of staffing requirements, it took petitioner four months to
complete his interphone training. The record indicates
that such a delay is not unusual because of the staffing
needs of the airport tower. Only one other trainee in
petitioner’s class was in the same position as petitioner
and he also agreed to return to on-the-job interphone train-
ing before proceeding to Phase 13 training. Therefore, the
evidence does not support petitioner’s contention that the
delay in his Phase 13 training was the resultof racial dis-
crimination.

Petitioner’s Phase 13 training began on Sector 34, a
sector he claimed was the most difficult sector to qualify
on. He stated that since it was such a difficult sector, his
Supervisor should have advised him about the difficulty
of the sector or selected another sector for him to qualify
on. However, the evidence establishes that petitioner had
already qualified on an interphone position on Sector 34
and was well aware of the difficulty of the sector.
Petitioner’s supervisor gave all trainees the choice of
which sector they wanted to qualify on in Phase 13 train-
ing; petitioner selected sector 34. While few trainees
selected Sector 34, trainees did select other sectors to train
on that were just as complex and difficult as Sector 34.
Petitioner’s allegation that he was required to train on a
sector more difficult than other trainees were required to
train on is therefore without merit.

Regarding the assignment of another instructor to
monitor petitioner’s certification check on Sector 34,
petitioner stated that such action was unusual and made
him nervous. The record indicates that such a procedure,
although unusual, was used for some trainees. Moreover,
petitioner’s instructor recommended such a procedure to
petitioner’s supervisor in an attempt to be more fair to
petitioner. Petitioner’s instructor felt that because he was
more familiar with petitioner’s weaknesses and past mis-
takes, he might be more prone to interrupt thecertification
process in the event problems arose in petitioner’s control
of the air traffic. The certification check was still con-
ducted by petitioner’s supervisor and another instructor
was only used to monitor the check for the purpose of in-
terceding inthe control of air traffic if such action was
warranted. Whether such action made petitioner nervous
or not, the evidence establishes that the reason for using
the procedure was nondiscriminatory.

The evidence of record establishes that the agency’s
conduct of petitioner’s training was based on legitimate

and nondiscriminatory reasons. The petitioner failed to
present any evidence to show that the agency’s legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons were actually a pretext for dis-
crimination. The evidence shows that petitioner received
as much or more training as other trainees, and that any
differences in his training program were the result of the
specialized circumstances and progress of his training.
Petitioner failed to successfully complete Phase 13 of his
training. Pursuant to agency procedures, petitioner was
offered a position commensurate with his training in lieu
of his removal. Because of his declination of that offer
and his failure to successfully complete his Phase 13 train-
ing, the agency initiated petitioner’s removal pursuant to
agency regulations. Petitioner failed to establish that
such actions were the result of discrimination based on

race.
CONCLUSION

The decision of the EEOC is to concur in the prelimi-
nary decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board find-
ing no discrimination based on race as alleged by
petitioner.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Section 1613.417(d), the
petitioner is hereby notified that this is the Commission’s
final decision and that petitioner has a right to file a civil
action in the appropriate United States District Court
within thirty (30)calendar days of receipt of this decision.

FOR THE COMMISSION:

4/19/8)
DATE

Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat

alk

DENVER FIELD OFFICE
Building 46, Denver Federal Center
Box 25025
Denver, Colorado 80225

CERTIFIED MAIL NOS. 8980108 & 8970109

Return Receipt Requested
Date:

May 1, 1980
Mr. Arthur B. Robinson
3710 York Street
Denver, CO 80205

Dear Mr. Robinson:
Enclosed is a copy of the initial decision in the appeal
described beiow.
Appeal of: Arthur B. Robinson
Action appealed: Removal
Initial decision: Appeal is affirmed.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph H. Hartman
Presiding Official

Enclosure
cc: Owens Oliver
Attorney at Law
7903 Ralston Road
Arvada, CO 80002
cc: Daniel Peterson
Federal Aviation Administration
10455 E. 25th Avenue ARM-7
Aurora, CO 80010
cc: Director of Personnel & Training

(TAD-10) Dept. of Transportation

Washington, D.C. 20590

cc: Office of Personnel Management
Attn: Jeannette Nevile

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD DENVER FIELD OFFICE

ARTHUR B. ROBINSON
DECISION NO. DEO75209051

v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DECIDED
May 1, 1980

INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 1980, Mr. Arthur B. Robinson appealed
from the action of the Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, Denver, Colorado,
removing him from the position of Air Traffic Control
Specialist, GS-2152-11, effective December 14, 1979.

JURISDICTION

Because this appeal involves an action pending sub-
sequent to January 10, 1979, the effectis e date of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, it is governed by that Act.
Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111(1978) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5 U.S.C.).

An employee in the competitive service, ‘who is not
serving a probationary period under an initial appointment
and who is not otherwise excluded by statute, is entitled
to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board)
under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701 from a removal from the Federal
service. 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7511-7514. Regulations of the Of-
fice of Personnel Management governing removal from
employ ment from the Federal service are in accord with 5

U.S.C. Secs. 7511-7514. 44 Fed. Reg. 47033 (1979)
(codified at 5 C.F.R. Part 752C).

The record in this matter shows that appellant occupied
a position in the competitive service. He was not serving
a probationary period under an initial appointment at the
time of his removal. Accordingly, his appeal was found
to be within the appellate jurisdiction of the Board.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7513(a) and 7701(c) (1)(B),
the Board must sustain this removal action if it is sup-
ported by the preponderance of the evidence and was
taken for such cause as would promote the efficiency of
the service. The agency has alleged that appellant was
removed because he had failed to satisfactorily complete
Phase 13 (on-the-job radar training) of the En Route Air
Traffic Training Program.

The agency Training Program Guide provides for 60
hours of creditable training to qualify on each control
position of operation and, when necessary, up to 40 hours
of additional remedial training. The guide also requires
that the demonstration of ability, during training, will be
measured against a prescribed set of on-the-job training
evaluation factors which involves sets of tolerance levels
for errors for each training session. In this case the
tolerable errors were as follows: Separation - 0; Coor-
dination and Communication - 2;Traffic Management and
Control judgment - 3; Operating Methods and Procedures
- 3; and, Equipment and Phraseology - 3.

In specification 1, the agency has alleged that appel-
lant exceeded the above tolerance levels in one or more of
the factors during the first 60 hours of creditable hours of
training during thirteen separate training sessions. In
specification 2, the agency has alleged that appellant ex-
ceeded the same tolerance levels in one or more of the fac-

PO Ao

tors during the additional 40 hours of remedial training
during nine separate training sessions.

In support of the above allegations, the agency
presented the testimony of appeilant’s supervisor and his
instructors during the time in question. The agency also
presented the various evaluation forms for each training
session which shows that the errors were committed as
Stated in the proposal notice. The forms, in all cases, were
signed by appellant, his instructor and supervisor either
on or subsequent to the particular training session.

In response to the charge and attendant specifications
appellant has conceded that he committed the errors with
the exception of the one factor involving Phraseology.At
the hearing, it was established that the agency had a policy
of recording on tape, at various times, the employee’s
voices while they were communicating with En Route air
traffic. Appellant obtained some of the taped recordings
of his voice and asked another employee, Mr. Michael
Violette, to review the tapes for quality of Phraseology.
After establishing that he had some experience in review-
ing tapes of this type and based upon his past history of
training people for this type of work, Mr. Violette tes-
tified that he had reviewed three tapes and he felt that
appellant’ s phraseology was good, if not excellent. It is
noted that Mr.Violette was sure that the tapes involved
transmissions to pilots on Sector 34, but he could not iden-
tify the time periods during which the tapes were
recorded.

The record shows that appellant had two instructors
during his on-the-job radar training. Mr. George Shrader
was his training instructor during the first 60 hours and
Mr. James Carr was the instructor during the 40 hours of
remedial training. Both instructors testified and it is cor-
roborated by the various evaluation forms prepared by
each instructor that appellant ex ceeded the tolerance level
on the equipment and Phraseology factor during the

course of his training. It is noted that appellant did not
ex ceed the tolerance level on this factor on each and every
training session. I do not find any conflict between the
testimony of appellant’s instructors and Mr. Violette be-
cause it is evident that appellant’s phraseology was satis-
factory during some of his training sessions. Therefore,
it is possible that the tapes reviewed by Mr. Violette were
recorded during those sessions when appellant did not
have any problems with his phraseology.

In view of the foregoing, I find that the weight of the
evidence supports a finding that appellant’s instructors
properly evaluated him on the phraseology factor as well
as the other factors as set out in the proposal notice. It is
noted that appellant exceeded the tolerance level of the
other factors as well as the Equipment and Phraseology
factor and his ability to perform his job was judged on the
basis of all the factors and not just on the one set out
above. Accordingly, I find that the preponderance of the
evidence supports the agency charge that appellant failed
to satisfactorily complete Phase 13 of his training
program, and it is sustained.

In connection with his appeal, appellant has alleged
that the agency’s decision,to remove him was based on ra-
cial discrimination because he is black. If appellant can
establish that prohibited discrimination tainted the
removal action, the removal cannot be sustained. 5
U.S.C.A. Sec. 7701(c)(2)(B).

In support of his allegation, appellant has referred to
a previous action wherein the agency had found that he
had been discriminated against by agency officials and it
had ordered corrective action. In that action, appellant
was removed on December 6, 1974. The basis for his
removal was his inability to successfully complete Phase
3 of the training program. The agency found that appel-
lant was discriminated against by agency officials when
he was not afforded the same training as non-black

employees. The corrective action ordered by the agency
at that time, was retroactive restoration with full and fair
training opportunities in Phase 3.

Appellant contends that the instant action is a con-
tinuation of the previous discriminatory acts by agency of-
ficials. He has contended that the training he received
during Phase 13. was inadequate and that he was treated
differently than other trainees in the way he was trained.
In support of his contentions, appellant! states that: (1) He
was not afforded priority training as required by agency
training policy, (2) his training in Phase 13 was delayed
for four months without cause,(3) he was assigned to a
sector (34) which he considered to bemore difficult than
other available sectors for on-the-jobtraining, and (4)
during his certification check, another instructor (Mr.
Harold Herron) monitored sector 34 instead of his
assigned training instructor (Mr. James Carr).

Regarding priority training and the delay in training,
appellant stated that Agency Order ZOV 3120.28 requires
that trainees, who are approaching time-in-grade and in
need of training in order that they may be considered for
promotion, are to receive first priority in training. Appel-
lant contends that he should have been given priority con-
sideration under that order because other employees from
his training class (classroom radar) were placed in a
priority status and they did not have any greater right to
priority training status than he did in November 1978. He
further argues that, instead of receiving priority con-
sideration,his on-the-job radar training was delayed for
four months after he had completed the classroom train-
ing on radar. Appellant claims that the delay lessened his
chances of qualifying during Phase 13 because he was not
as familiar with the various sectors as he had been im-
mediately after completing the classroom section on radar.

Mr. Benham Ignacio, Agency Training Officer, tes-
tified that appellant had misinterpreted the intent of that

Order. It is Mr.Ignacio’s position that the Order related
only to the resolution of any potential conflict between
trainees vying for training on the same sector on the same
position. Mr. Ignacio stated the conflict in question is
caused by the need to maintain overlapping crews of Air
Traffic Controllers to facilitate proper control over air
traffic. When two crews that overlapped reported for
work and each crew had trainees on the same sector, the
supervisors used the Order as guidance to resolve the
question of which trainee would receive training on the
sectorduring that shift and which one would not be trained
if aconflict existed. Mr. Ignacio stated that this deter-
mination was made on a day-to-day basis, and it was not
intended as a means for placing any trainee on an uninter-
rupted training scheduled for the entire phase of training
as indicated by appellant. Mr.Ignacio further testified that
the training status appellant had referred to was called
critical training and it was handled administratively and
is not addressed in the referenced Order. He also stated
that it was his responsibility, as training officer, to decide
whether a trainee will be declared "time critical" and it
was his position that appellant was not time critical at
anytime during the training program. Mr. Ignacio pointed
out that he had reviewed the records of all trainees who
completed classroom radar at the same time as appellant
and he noted that the various trainees differed in their
stages of training. It also is noted that only one of the
trainees who testified was declared time critical contrary
to appellant’s previous statement about priority training
Status of other trainees within his class.

The evidence in this record establishes that while
trainees attended various classes together, each trainee
was pursuing an individual course of training. This was
especially true where on-the-job training was involved.
When appeliant entered the classroom portion of radar
training, he was half way through his on-the-job training

j

of a non-radar position (31) and agreed with his supervisor
that he should complete that training before proceeding to
Phase 13 training. Only one other trainee within
appellant’s class was in the same position as appellant and
healso returned to on-the-job training on a non-radar sec-
tor. Appellant’s supervisor, Mr. Doak Adair, testified that
appellant was afforded equai treatment in training and that
any delay in training on radar was due only to staffing re-
quirements of thefacility and appellant’s completion of
non-radar on-the-job training (interphone). Management
officials also testified that,with the additional 40 hours of
remedial training, appellants’ proficiency in working with
radar sectors should have been restored sufficiently to
allow him the opportunity to qualify on Phase 13 regard-
less of the four month delay. It also was pointed out by
Mr. Ignacio that he had experienced asimilar delay in com-
pleting his training when he was atrainee. During cross
examination, Mr. Ignacio testified that it had taken him
seven months to complete training on his first inter-
phoneposition. In view of the above, I find that the agen-
cy did notviolate its Order or deny appellant priority
training under the Order, and that the agency had a
legitimate reason for delaying appellant’s entry into Phase
13 training.

Regarding appellant’s assignment to sector 34, he has
contended that it was the most difficult sector to qualify
on, and since his supervisor (Mr. Adair) was responsible
for assigning him to asector for certification purposes, Mr.
Adair should have advised him about sector 34 or selected
another position for certification purposes. Appellant
Stated that he was not aware of the work load of sector 34
until he was assigned to it. The undisputed evidence
shows that appellant was given the opportunity to choose
the sector that he wanted to be trained on,and he selected
sector 34. Mr. Adair testified that appellant had com-
pleted his training for the interphone positions forall the

sectors within his group and was aware of the amount of
traffic on each sector. Mr. Adair also testified that while
he is responsible for assignment of trainees toa sector for
training, he allows the trainee to choose the sector if he
is familiar with the various traffic patterns. Mr. Adair fur-
ther testified, that other sectors under his supervision are
just as complex as sector 34, and other trainees have been
assigned to those sectors for certification purposes. In
view of the above, I find that appellant’s contention that
he was required to train on a sector more difficult than
other trainees were required to train on is without merit.

Regarding the assignment of another instructor to
monitor the sector during the certification process, appel-
lant stated that such action was unusual and made him
nervous during his certification. Appellant further con-
tends that it affected his ability to concentrate. The
evidence shows that, normally, appellant’s instructor will
monitor the sector during the certification process.
Appellant’s instructor, at that time, was Mr. James Carr.
Mr. Carr testified that he had recommended to Mr. Adair
that another instructor should be assigned to monitor the
Sector during the appellant’s certification because it
would be more fair to the appellant. Mr. Carr stated that
he might have interceded in the sector sooner than some-
body else when problems arose arid he wanted the appel-
lant to have every opportunity to complete his
certification. Mr. Adair testified that based on the recom-
mendation, another Air Traffic Control Specialist from
appellant’s crew was assigned to monitor the sector.
There is no evidence in this record to show that this ac-
tion was taken to interfere with or cause any problems for
appellant during the certification process. The cer-
tification check was stillconducted by Mr. Adair and Mr.
Herron was monitoring only for the purpose of interced-
ing in the control of air traffic if such action was war-
ranted.

After having reviewed the evidence, I find that
appellant’s allegation that the agency decision to remove
him was based on race discrimination is not supported by
the preponderance of the evidence.

The evidence in this case shows that appellant received
as much training as was available under the training
program. He was assigned to two different training in-
structors during the training process, and, in one instance,
had another Specialist monitor the sector during the cer-
tification process to assure that he was afforded impartial
treatment during that process. Appellant was still unable
to qualify or pass the certification check for Phase 13. Mr.
Ignacio testified that agency policy makes it clear that any
person hired for an air traffic control career must progress
from the entrance grade through the full performance level
of the position he was hired for. In this case, appellant
was required to successfully complete all phases of his
training. Mr. Ignacio stated that appellant had successful-
ly completed his training through Phase 13 and was
eligible for assignment to a tower or a flight service sta-
tion. In lieu of separation, the agency offered appellant
reassignment to one of those positions, but he declined the
offer. In view of his declination and his failure to qualify
for his position, the agency initiated his removal.

In summary, I find that the preponderance of the
evidence supports the agency’s action, that appellant was
not discriminated against by the agency because of his
race, and that the removal action was warranted. There-
fore, I find that the action was taken for such cause as does
promote the efficiency ofthe service.

INITIAL DECISION
The agency action is affirmed.

This is an initial decision. It will become a final
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board on June

5, 1980, unless a petition for review is filed with the Board
or the Board reopens the case on its own motion.

Any party to the proceeding, the Director of OPM, and
the Special Counsel may file a petition for review. The
Director may request review only if he/she is of the
opinion that the decision is erroneous and will have a sub-
Stantial impact on any civil service law, rule, or regulation
under the jurisdiction of the Office of Personnel manage-
ment. The Board may grant a petition for review, after
providing an opportunity for response by other parties,
due diligence, was not available when the record was
closed; or
(2) The decision of the presiding official is based on an
erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation.

All petitions for review shall set forth objections to
the initial decision, supported by references to applicable
laws or regulations, and with specific reference to the
record. The petition for review must be received by the
Secretary of the Merit Systems Protection Board,
Washington, D.C. 20419, no laterthan June 5, 1980.
Three copies of the petition must be filed with the
Secretary.

The appellant has the right to petition the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to consider the
Board’s final decision on the issue of discrimination.
Such a petition must be filed with the Equal Employ ment
Opportunity Commission, Office of Review andAppeals,
24U1 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506.

The appellant also has the right to file a civil action
under the antidiscrimination laws in any appropriate U.S.
District Court. Either a petition to EEOC or a civil action
in a U.S. District Court must be filed no later than 320
days after the appellant’s receipt of the final decision.

Except for actions filed under the anti discrimination
laws, apetition for judicial review of a final Board
decision must be filed in the appropriate U.S. Court of Ap-

peals or in the U.S.Court of Claims no later than 30 days
after receipt of notice of the Board’s final decision.

For the Board:

Joseph H. Hartman
Presiding Official

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

DATE: August 21, 1979
TO:DV-§31

SUBJECT: Facility Employee Performance Review Board
- ATCS Arthur Robinson

FROM: Central Area Officer, DV-531
TO: Chief, Denver Center

A Facility Employee Performance Review Board was
convened on August 15, 1979, to review the training, per-
formance, progress, and desires of ATCS Arthur Robin-
son. Mr. Robinson’ s training was terminated on July 25,
1979, for failing to progress satisfactorily on Sector 34
radar. The board consisted of thefollowing members:

fichael P. Hipsher,, Chairman; Benham E.Ignacio,
EPDO, Member; David L Lee, Team Supervisor, Mem-
ber; Wilbur A. Heiser, Team Supervisor, Member; James J.
Torres, ATCS,Member representing ARM-9.

Listed is a chronology of Mr. Robinson’s training since
hisreinstatement on October 13, 1976:

. Reinstatement
to Denver Center. Started the first seven phases of the
thirteen-phase training program. These phases were non-
pass-fail, a condition of his reinstatement.

April 19, 1977 (Phase VIII). Began non-radar training
on Sectors 31 and 36.

Results: Satisfactory.

June 9, 1977 (Phase 1X). Began non-radar OJT training
(interphone).

Results: August 27, 1977, Sector 33/36 interphone cer-
tification) 55 hours. November 13, 1977, Sector 32 inter-
phone certification) 59 hours.

November 17, 1977 (Phase X), Began non-radar OJT
training (interphone).

Results: January 7, 1978, Sector 34 interphone cer-
tification) 29 hours.
February 27, 1978, Sector 37 interphone certification ) 41
hours. May 27, 1978, Sector 35 interphone certification )
56 hours.
June 15, 1978, began Sector 31 interphone training (did
notcomplete training prior to Phase XI training which
began onSeptember 11, 1978).

September 11, 1978 (Phase XI). Began radar DYSIM
training on Sectors 31 and 36.

Results: Satisfactory.

March 1979, Completed Sector 31 interphone certifica-

tidn. The certification form is not present in Mr.
Robinson’s training records, although both Mr. Robinson
and his Team Supervisor, Doak Adair, agreed the certifica-
tion had taken place.
NOTE: Mr. Robinson completed Phase XI DYSIM train-
ing on November16, 1978. He was assigned Sector 31 in-
terphone to complete the last of the interphone positions
prior to beginning radar OJT training. Thirty-eight hours
ot training had been completed prior to Phase XI.

Fourteen training hours were logged in December. Only
five training hours were logged in January due to staffing.
Only five training hours were logged in February due to
Staffing.

_March 19, 1979 (Phase XII), Began radar OST training
on Sector34.

May 9, 1979, Completed 72 hours of radar training on
Sector 34.

Results: Unsatisfactory - 40 hours of remedial training
requested.

July 17, 1979. Completed 40 additional hours of
remedial training on Sector 34.

Results: Unsatisfactory.

July 25, 1979. Letter sent to Mr. Robinson from Team
Supervisor Doak Adair advising termination of training.

Mr. Robinson seemed to have many problem areas. The
reports indicate that so many of the problems would occur
time after time, indicating a lack of progress. This lack
of progress made it impossible for him to certify on Sec-
tor 34 radar. In summary,his problems involved:

1. Communication, This was a major problem
throughout the training on Sector 34 radar. Instructors
stated that pilots and adjacent sectors had problems under-
standing Mr. Robinson. Mr.Robinson had problems hear-
ing or understanding what was said to him.

. Coordination. Many instances of either incomplete
or pe coordination. This may be due in part to the
problems ofcommunication.

3. Separation. Many times the instructor had to point
out where there was a Separation problem and sometimes
would have to intervene.

4. Equipment. Has a problem understanding and
remembering how to set up and adjust equipment.

S. Computer. Continually had a problem with computer
entries. At times would make error in entry and not catch
it.

6. Procedures. Had problems understanding some of
the sector operating procedures.

7. Phraseology. Did not adhere at times to standard
phraseology and had many problems using wrong or
mixing up theaircraft identification.

8. Speed. Due to the many problems encountered, Mr.
Robinson was unable to attain the speed needed to be cer-
tified on Sector 34 radar. He seemed to do fairly well
when traffic was light. However, when traffic would build

then the problems became worse and, at times, the instruc-
tor had to intervene to take over the sector completely.

9. Weather. Didn’t seem to understand the importance
of turbulence and adverse weather and its effect on aircraft
inflight. Had to be told to issue turbulence reports and
areas of weather.

10. Radar Vectoring. Had probiems determining when
a vector was needed. Also had trouble with headings and
just how they would affect the aircraft.

Some other problems encountered were in the areas of
Stripmarkings, military procedures, NAVAIDS, and ap-
proach plates.

The board interviewed Mr. Robinson to obtain his view
on the training he had received and his desires for the fu-
ture. Michael Curtis sat in as Mr. Robinson’s PATCO rep-
resentative. The board also interviewed Doak Adair, Mr.
Robinson’s Team Supervisor.

MR. ROBINSON'S FEELINGS |

Mr.. Robinson discussed situations that affected his
training:

1. Mr. Adair let Mr. Robinson select the sector he
would begin radar training on. Mr. Robinson felt he
should have been assigned a sector in accordance with
Order ZDV 3120.28. Mr. Robinson said he did not know
that Sector 34 "got so busy" when he initially selected it
to begin training.

2. Should have started radar training after completion
of Phase XI instead of finishing the last 22 hours of the
allowable 60 hours on Sector 31. He should have been
declared time critical so that he could receive his promo-
tion.

3. Unfairly evaluated by instructors Shrader and Carr.

4. Had to work around some FPL’s assigned the inter-
phone position because they would not perform their as-
signed duties. This presented an additional workload to
him.

5. Mr. Robinson felt some personnel would deliberate-
ly send him "deals." .

6. Felt the certification on March 19, 1979, was unfair.
‘ a. Certification should have been stopped due to

weather and traffic.

b. Instructor should not have intervened because
the traffic was separated.

c. Another instructor (Harold Herron) was plugged
in with Mr. Robinson during the certification. Mr.
Robinson felt it should have been Mr. Adair.

7. Felt his concentration was destroyed because of in-
structor comments.

a. During one training session Mr. Shrader stated
"you should have known that you’ve been in train-
ing seven years."

b. Received word from Bill Dew that Doak Adair
had stated he was "not hacking the program and
wouldn’t be signed off."

8. Felt the additional time given him that was not logged
was just holding him back from his certification.

9. Felt he was being harassed when Mr. Shrader would
discuss approach plates during a classroom training ses-
sion on their day in lieu of a mid. Mr. Robinson was train-
ing on high altitude and felt only high altitude procedures
should be discussed.

\IR. ROBINSON'S DESIRES

Requests:

1. Change of crew.
2. Change of sector.
3. DYSIM refresher problems.
4. Begin initial OJT radar training again.
5. Be declared time critical.
MR. ADAIR’ S FEELINGS
Mr. Adair was interviewed to review Mr. Robinson’s
training progression.

1. Mr. Adair stated that Mr. Robinson was very incon-
sistent in his daily training. One day he would do a good
job; the next one or two days his performancé would be
unsatisfactory.

2. Mr. Robinson committed many repetitive errors.

3. Felt that counseling was sufficient - that Mr. Robin-
son knew the status of his progress.

4. Was aware that a personality conflict may have ex-
isted, but that Mr. Robinson had not mentioned it in any
of the counseling sessions; therefore, he was not con-
cerned.

5. Concerning the problem of Mr. Bill Dew talking to
Mr. Robinson. Mr. Adair had asked Mr. Dew to talk with
Mr. Robinson to see if he could detect or help with any
problems. Mr. Adair said he did not tell Mr. Dew that Mr.
Robinson would never get signed off.

6. Had to use Mr. Robinson in staffing during January
and February due to shortage of controllers. The time
critical problem never was discussed.

7. Was asked about controllers not performing their in-
terphone duties while Mr. Robinson was on radar. Mr.
Adair stated he had noticed the problem on one occasion,
but that corrective action had been taken.

MR. CURTIS’ FEELINGS

1. Mr. Robinson should have been started on radar after
Phase XI, although he had completed more than half of his
interphone training on Sector 31.

2. Should not have started on Sector 34 even though he
chose it.

3. Should have received mox- training on Sector 31
during January and February regardless of poor staffing.
This could have been done by declaring Mr. Robinson
time critical.

BOARD’ S DELIBERATIONS

neil

(NOTE: Mr. Torres disagreed with several of board’s
decisions and the recommendations. Those paragraphs
will be properlynoted. )

1. Mr. Robinson’s statement that he did not know that
Sector 34"got so busy" is not a valid reason for failing to
meet certification requirements. Mr. Adair offered Mr.
Robinson aselection of any sector to begin radar training.
Mr. Robinsonwas certified on Sector 34 interphone and
knew the traffic flow.

2. Phase XI radar DYSIM was completed in November
1978; however,radar training was not started until March.
Mr.Robinson had completed 38 of the allowable 60 hours
on Sector 3 linterphone prior to Phase XI training. It was
logical to complete thelast 22 hours of Sector 31 prior to
Starting radar training.

3. The personality conflict between Mr. Robinson and
Mr. Shrader was not of significant importance because Mr.
Robinson never did complain or request another instruc-
tor. (This comment excludes Mr. Torres.)

4. There was no evidence to support the statement that
other controllers were handing Mr. Robinson "deals."

5. The certification on Sector 34 radar was fair and un-
biased. Mr. Hferron was plugged into the radar jack with
Mr. Robinson while Mr. Adair observed from the over-
head. (This comment excludes Mr. Torres.)

6. Additional time given but not logged was an asset in-
Stead of a detriment.

7. That Mr. Shrader was not harassing Mr. Robinson by
reviewing approach plates during non-contro] time even
through Mr. Robinson was currently working ona high al-
titude sector. The instructor has a commitment to recog-
nize deficiencies and correct them regardless of the phase
of training.

; DIN
1. All phases of required training had been ad-
ministered. Mr. Robinson received more than the allow-

an

able training time - 72 hours of initial radar training and
40 hours of remedial radar training for a total of 112 hours.
(100 hours is allowed).

2. Counseling sessions were conducted advising Mr.
Robinson of his training status.

3. Repetitive errors were committed and documented
on a daily basis.

4. Personality conflict may have existed between Mr.
Robinsonand Instructor George Shrader sometime during
the first 72 hours of training; however, a change of instruc-
tor was never requested. When Mr. Robinson was ques-
tioned why he did not ask for another instructor he stated,
"I don’t want to make waves."

5. A break in training did occur between the end of
Phase XI and beginning OJT radar training on Sector 34.
North Are a staffing was the prime reason; however, any
training time lost during this period was adequately made
up during remedial training.

6. Acertification was attempted on March 19, 1979.
Separation was not insured on two occasions and Mr. Her-
ron had to intervene. An interview with Mr. Adair con-
firmed the intervention was necessary to insure safety.
BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION

The board (excluding Mr. Torres) recommends
Mr. Robinson’straining be terminated and he be recom-
mended for reassignment tothe flight service option. Mr.
Robinson is a dependable employeeand is a hard worker.

Mr. Robinson be reinstated in the OJT radar training
program. The reasons are listed below:

1. Mr. Robinson only had one instructor (Mr. Shrader)
for the first 72 hours of training; instructors should be
rotated.

2. A major personality conflict existed between Mr.
Robinsonand Mr. Shrader. Mr Adair was aware of the
problem and should have taken corrective action. Also,

ew eee —

when Mr. Carr (Mr.Robinson’s instructor at that time)
recommended an instructor change, Mr. Adair ignored the
request.

3. ATCS Herron should not have been plugged into the
radarposition with Mr. Robinson during the certification
while Mr.Adair monitored from the overhead. This made
Mr. Robinson nervous. Mr. Adair should have been
plugged into the sector with Mr. Robinson.

4. Mr. Robinson shouid never have been reassigned to
the North Area after reinstatement.

5. Mr. Shrader’s comment to Mr. Robinson during a
training session: "you should have known that you’ve
been in training seven years."

MICHAEL P. HIPSHER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 81-M-704

ARTHUR B. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,

VS.

DREW LEWIS, Secretary of the Department
of Transportation, and J. LYNN HELMS,
National Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration,

Defendants.

REPORTER’ S TRANSCRIPT
Trial to the Court
Day One, Morning Session
Volume I

Proceedings before the HONORABLE RICHARD P.
MATSCH, J udge, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado,commencing at 8:35 a.m. on the 15th day
of December, 1982, in Courtroom C-202, United States
Courthouse, Denver, Colorado.

APPEARANCES

RICHARD S. SHAFFER, Attorney at Law, Denver,
Colorado, appearing for the plaintiff.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE by
STEPHEN KLEIN, Attorneyat Law, Denver, Colorado
and OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL OF THEFEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION by JAMES W. WHIT-
LOW, Attorney atLaw, Washington, D.C., appearing for
the plaintiffs.

Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) Mr. Robinson, were you -- THE
COURT: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 is received, if you’re in
doubt about it. Go ahead.

Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) Were you discharged by the
Federal Aviation Administration in 1979?

A. I was.

Q. When?

A. December the 14th, 1979.

Q. What occurred between July 17th, 1979 and Decem-
ber the14th, 1979?

A. Mr. Kiss gave me a letter proposing to remove me.
I wrote letters to the regional office and to him. I stated
why I felt that I hadn’t received proper training: the delay
in training whereas opposed to the other trainees proceed-
ing with their training after coming out of classroom and
lab, the working of the printer, why I had to wait why I
could not have gone into an earlier class, and this nature
of things.

Q. And when did you say you were finally terminated?

A. December the 14th, 1979.

Q. Mr. Robinson, do you have any of those tapes that
were made of your work as a trainee, when you were work-
ing on sector 34 for example?

A. Yes, sir. I think there are two tapes -- I mean two
Sessions on each side. Both sessions -- I mean two ses-
sions on each side.

Q. And do those reflect your work at that period of

time?

A. Yes, sir, including the certification.

MR. SHAFFER: I move at this time for the admission
of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18. There is only one copy one ver-
sion of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18. They are these two casset-
tes.

THE COURT: What’s the purpose of offering them?
They’re not going to mean very much to me.

woe a

/

MR. SHAFFER: I understand that. We wil! sub-
sequentlycall Mr. Robert Smith as a witness for the piain-
tiff. He is or at least was until the time of the strike, a
traffic controller - journeyman controller. And we would
be prepared to ask Mr. Smith, who has never heard these
tapes, to listen to them and comment upon them, if the
Court desires to so proceed.

THE COURT: I don’t know. Mr. Klein, what’s your-
position on this? This is a bit different.

MR. KLEIN: Well, Your Honor, I have the same objec-
tion I’ve been making. I have not heard them myself. I
don’t know what the relevance of itis. In addition to that,
as I understand it they are tapes of a particular training
session on the radar scope.

THE COURT: Is that right? Are they tapes of sessions
other than the certification?

MR. SHAFFER: I would advise the Court that some
weeksago and I’m sorry that I don’t have the specific date,
perhapsMr. Klein can inform the Court -- I called Mr.
Klein, aware of my problem with getting these materials
to him. And I specifically advised him that I had these
tapes and the dates of these tapes. This is several weeks
ago.

MR. KLEIN: It was on -- as it savs in mv motion to ex-
clude evidence, it was on December the 3rd, after I
received a phone call from your office. Your Honor, later
that afternoon I received a call from Mr. Shaffer. And he
told me that he had tapes and other documents that he was
-- what he was intending tointroduce. By the way, the
tapes are the only ones that he’s now trying to introduce.
The documents that have already come in are even dif-
ferent from that conversation, but he told me --

THE COURT: Let’s just stay with the tapes.

MR. KLEIN: The tapes, he mentioned those to me. And
I said to Mr. Shaffer that I assumed that early next
week, this was December 3rd, Friday, that he would

deliver his documents to me, his exhibits to me. And he
said he would get back to me the first of next week, which
was December 6. And it was on December 9th, when I had
not heard from Mr. Shaffer at all, that I filed my motion.

MR. SHAFFER: I did state to him the specific dates
ofthe tape.

THE COURT: Well, but if we were to receive them it
would be necessary that Mr. Smith listen to them, and then
it would be necessary for somebody from the defendant’s
side to listen to them so that they could be prepared to tes-
tify to their perceptions, right?

MR. SHAFFER: I agree. It’s a tedious process, Your-
Honor.

THE COURT: And that’s why it’s not going to come in.
We’ re not going to interrupt the trial now to perform that
kind of an evaluation as preparation for testimony. I
mean, that should certainly have been done before trial,
and I’m not going to delay this trial to do it now. So, !'m
ex cluding them on the basis of counsel’s objection that he
didn’t know he was going to meet that kind of evidence.
That is your objection?

MR. KLEIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You win one. How is that marked? Are
those 18”

MR. SHAFFER: Exhibit 18, I think.

THE COURT: I don’t know. You don’t have to leave
them here. It’s on the record that 18 constitutes the ac-
tual, guess, copy of a tape recording as you ’ve identified
it.

Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) Mr. Robinson, are you presently
employed?

A Yes, I am.

Q. In what capacity?

A. With the Worldwide Service as a storeroom man at
LowryAir Force Base.

Q. As a what?

A. Storeroom man.

; Q. And what --

A. In other words, I keep records of all purchases com-
ing in and distribution of goods going out.

How long have you been so employed?
Approximately 16 months, but only four months as a
storeroom man.

What did you do before that?

Washed pots and pans.

At Lowry?

At Lowry.

POPO

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0989%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
