# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Schwartz v. Dean

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 926

## Text

, | Supreme Court, U.S.
S?2-3 78 FILED
AUG 6 1987

WEAOT RE RTA R
JOSEPH FO SPaNn'oL. ir.
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

NO.

IN RE “AGENT ORANGE”
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION

Sub nom. NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., ET AL
and JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., ET AL,
Petitioners

Vv.

DAVID DEAN,
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C.
NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ
BARRY S. BERGER

MARTIN R. NATHAN

723 Main, Suite 325
Houston, Texas 77002

JOHN M. O’QuINN, P.C.

JOHN M. O’QUINN

3200 Texas Commerce Tower
Houston, Texas 77002

— —_ —
‘Alpha Law Brief Co., Inc.— 8748 Westpark — Houston, Texas 77063 — 789-2000

I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. The District Court having found that the consensual

fee sharing Agreement (“Agreement”) entered into
in December of 1983, as amended in December of
1984 among the nine member Plaintiffs’ Manage-
ment Committee (PMC) in the mt lIti-district “Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation” was valid and
should be enforced, did the Court of Appeals, upon
appeal of the District Court’s Order by one of the
members of the PMC, “Dean”, err in reversing the
holding of the District Court by holding that:

(1) Said fee sharing agreement was invalid and
should not be enforced in view of its potential
for creating conflict between counsel and mem-
bers of the class?

(2) Said “Agreement” violated ‘established prin-
ciples’ governing awards of attorneys fees in
such cases?

II. Did the subject fee sharing agreement violate any

III.

rules of ethics so as to require judicial intervention
rather than abstention?

Did Dean lack standing to challenge the “Agree-
ment” among the nine constituent members of the
PMC which he promoted, solicited and agreed to
on grounds of estoppel, and lack of clean hands in
equity to have standing to challenge his own “Agree-
ment”?

IV. Was the “PMC” a de facto ad hoc law firm as deter-

mined by the District Court for the purpose of allo-
cation of fees among the constituent members of
the PMC?

V. Was Rule 23(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

violated by the District Court’s upholding the valid-
ity of the fee sharing class which did not adversely
affect the distributable awarded class funds?

II

VI. Did the Court of Appeals err in rejecting the “clearly

VIL.

erroneous” standard of review of Lindy II and in
imposing its “de novo” review of the findings of the
District Court in this class “equitable fund doctrine”
case?

Did the Court of Appeals err in its holding that this
class litigation was not of the type that was to be
encouraged policywise when it involved the very
conduct of the Vietnam War and the decision to
defoliate the jungles with Agent Orange dioxin, a
principal issue in the 1964 presidential election and
is still newsworthy 23 years later, because it pre-
sented difficult legal obstacles?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............
COREY TE PRUE obo ec esis cceccccccccess

el ucduiscdecses
Seareeeer OF THE CASE .......................

PEFORMANCE OF THE FEE SHARING AGREEMENT
DOES NOT VIOLATE ETHICAL STANDARDS ....

A. There Has Been No Improper Sharing of Fees ...

B. Establishment Of The Fee Sharing Agreement Did
Not Create Any Improper Conflict Of Interest Be-
tween The Lawyers And The Clients ...........

ee ae a re

APPENDIX:

EXHIBIT A—Opinion of Second Circuit reversing
District Court, 818 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir.
oo) SESS ee ee

EXHIBIT B—Opinion of Second Circuit affirming in
part and reversing in part regarding
award of attorneys fees to the class,
818 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1987) ......

EXHIBIT C—Affidavit of Newton B. Schwartz ....

EXHIBIT D—Order of Second Circuit Denying Mo-
tions for Rehearing and Rehearing En
ST Wierw hv estes sd keene eed ¥48.5.0% «

la

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Central Railroad & Banking v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) 15
Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., 457 F.Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D.

ON. FORE s0cbc ne batwd kone thamctsinaasaand 16, 25

City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2nd Cir.

1974), on remand, [1976-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) {] 60,913

at 68,980 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), appeal after remand, 560

ee wt fe ss rere rere eer Orr Te 13, 16
In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 571 FS.

481 (E.D. N.Y. 1983), 611 F.Supp. 1221, 1454, 1460-

1461 (1985), reversed in part 818 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir.

ok eer re rey Frere Perr ee rr ree 5, 8,9
In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 395, 400
TERRE SO. ai hav ahcdacds pec nuthesasaadan COukes 16, 22, 25

In Re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, [1979-1980]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) {97,116 at 96,195 (E.D. Pa.

DUFUR cn cs ee eed oaks cn Gaes capendseacdsetnsted ss 15, 16, 25
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
pe MR Rn a mn ene marae 29

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Stand-

ard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973) on

remand 382 F.Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974) appeal after

remand 540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976) (en banc) ....13,15, 26
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,

Uo... SOG SB, CE SR, See CE en aeie kc eaes 11
Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 18,

1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library) ...... RS, 21,22, 23
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) .......... 15,29

Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
§ 96,921 at 95,863 (D. Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 614
ee” Ce ee EE atk kee ed ee oe Ka aaa 16, 25

Vv

Page
STATUTES
2B UBL. SIS) OO. a cccbiewassccasvaiasiseas 3
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Ne BEGG) vb casncddakesennscaentdenssdametakekiakes 2,13, 24

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I TOD | bc chide) 0p nate eet adn vise es 18, 21
Sk SOE dase vas > nineteen skh deen deeb ienseeeeel 23, 24
re irre ee Penge are rene heen nna ea 23, 24
Se ee a Sicd viendo cdakeandsndendee eked esata 23
ar Oe Ua haca tks 60d sn0kdauariean tceenadee aes 23

AMERICAN BAR ASSICIATION MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

ee BS on ccvcdSvcaan cee cenbeeesne select ie 18, 19, 20
Ne SAMOS cc ccdcancvencs sch cdeese sibacnetedeuseas 24

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FORMAL OPINIONS
Opinion No. 204 (Nov. 24, 1940), reprinted in ABA,
Opinions On Professional Ethics at pp. 490-93 (1967) .. 21,22
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INFORMAL OPINIONS

Informal Opinion No. 85-1514 (April 27, 1985), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct
Ot we. GERAIS ov ivcccasasrcccsnwedantansngevers 22

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Mnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

NO.

IN RE “AGENT ORANGE”
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION

Sub nom. NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., ET AL
and JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., ET AL,
Petitioners

v

DAVID DEAN,
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

To The Honorable Supreme Court of the United States:

Petitioners NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., a Texas
Professional Corporation and its three constituent mem-
bers, Newton B. Schwartz, Barry S. Berger and Martin
M. Nathan and JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., a Texas
Professional Corporation and JOHN M. O’QUINN,
an individual Texas lawyer, pray that a Writ of Certi-
orari issue to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
on April 21, 1987. It reversed the orders of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

2

which upheld a fee sharing agreement signed by all
members of the Agent Orange Plaintiffs’ Management
Committee (hereinafter “PMC”). Motions for Rehear-
ing and Rehearing En Banc were denied on July 1, 1987.

This case involves important questions as to attorneys
fees awarded under Rule 23(e) Fep. RULES Civ. Proc.
under This Court’s “equitable fund doctrine” and Agree-
ments promoted by Respondent David J. Dean, a New
York lawyer, (“DEAN”) in which he represented as an
inducement to participate that each participating attorney
would receive a 3-1 return on contributions expended
in the successful prosecution of the lawsuit on behalf of
the class. Dean later reneged after the settlement of the
class action for $180,000,000.00 and the award of $4.7
million dollars to the class attorneys. There was no im-
pact upon the class as to such total for attorneys fees
under the Agreements, but only upon Respondent DEAN*
who induced all other class attorneys to participate based
upon his representations. The difficult class action was
settled on the eve of trial after extensive discovery and
substantial efforts of time, talent and energy and commit-
ment of resources by the “PMC” against formidable
opponents, well financed, and overcoming difficult legal
obstacles.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversing that of the District Court is reported
at 818 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir. 1987) (and its related opinion
affirming in part and reversing in part regarding award

* The other two members of the PMC affected, Schlegel and
Musslewhite did not renege on the “Agreement” although substanti-
ally affected. See illustrative chart at page 8, infra.

3

of attorneys fees to the class is reported at 818 F.2d 226
(2nd Cir. 1987). They are attached hereto in the ap-
pendix respectively marked Exhibits “A” and “B”. Mo-
tions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc were denied
on July 1, 1987. Attached hereto as Exhibit “D”.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit entered its judgments on April 21, 1987. It denied
Petitioners’ timely Motions for Rehearing on July 1,
1987. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1) et seq.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C., a Texas
Profession Corporation and its constituent members, New-
ton B. Schwartz, Barry S. Berger and Martin Nathan and
JOHN M. O’QUINN, P.C., a Texas Professional Cor-
poration and JOHN M. O’QUINN, an individual Texas
practitioner with associates, are two constituent members
of the nine-member Plaintiffs Management Committee
(“PMC”) which included Respondent “DEAN” and
seven other members of the “PMC”. David Dean, a
member of the PMC, appealed the holding of the District
Court which found that the fee sharing agreement entered
into by the nine constituent members of the PMC, includ-
ing David Dean, in December of 1983, (as revised and
amended in December of 1984) was valid, and should
be enforced. The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court holding that the fee sharing agreement under which
six of nine members of the PMC including Petitioner
who agreed to advance funds for litigation and receive
a threefold return on said advancement of funds to be
paid out of the total ‘pot’ of legal fees awarded the nine

4

constituent members of the PMC by the District Court
out of the total class settlement funds, was invalid and
should not be enforced, inter alia, because of its potential
(all emphasis added) for creating a conflict between
counsel for the class and the class itself.’

Petitioners, members of the nine member PMC, are
adversely affected by the holding of the Court of Appeals
since they are denied the benefit of its agreement among
the nine-member PMC which was not only agreed to
by Dean (“Respondent”) but was also promoted and
solicited by him. The agreement among the nine-member
PMC did not affect the class nor the settlement funds
allocated to the class (out of which all attorneys fees
and expenses for all attorneys representing the class and
individual members thereof were awarded by the District
Court).

As pertains to this appeal,” a consortium of New York
lawyers commenced this litigation in 1979 under the helm
of Victor Yannacone, known as Yannacone & Associates
(hereinafter “Y&A”). Respondent (“DEAN”) was a
member of that consortium at all times to September
1983 when “Y&A” withdrew as class attorneys for the
class.°

The class included all Vietnam war veterans and their
families who were exposed to the defoliant Agent Orange

1. Significantly the other three non-contributing inital, in-
cluding ‘““Dean” were to receive a 3-1 investment multiplier on their
usual litigation costs (up to $50,000 base each or K3=—$150,000
each) the six contributing members were not to receive such 3-1.

2. The procedural background and history of this litigation is set
forth at 818 F.2d 145 et seq.

3. Petitioner Schwartz was initially a member but withdrew in
1981 over conflicts and differences with ‘““Y&A” as to overall manage-
ment, direction and other details.

while in the armed forces, and their families, wives and
children, who were injured, harmed and damaged as a
consequence, including children not yet conceived or born.

The withdrawai of “Y&A” was based upon financial
hardships and the consequent management problems en-
suing. It simply was out of funds and could not proceed
with even the basic taking of further depositions because
of lack of funds and manpower. A reconstituted Agent
Orange Plaintiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”) was
initially appointed, consisting of Benton Musslewhite,
Stephen Schlegel and Thomas Henderson. Later that fall,
1983 six additional members were appointed by the Court,
including Petitioners and Respondent Dean. Jn Re Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation, 571 F.S. 481 (E.D.
N.Y. 1983).

Prior to the execution of the original “PMC” Agree-
ment in December, 1983 Newton B. Schwartz in Septem-
ber 1983 personally advised Special Master Sol Schreiber
(appointed by then Presiding Judge George C. Pratt then
a District Judge and thereafter appointed Judge, U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) that:

1. Dean was soliciting funds from prospective counsel
offering multipliers from 2-1 to 4-1 for funds contributed
to further the litigation and that a 3-1 return on the con-
tributions in addition to the usual “equitable fund” hourly
fees, and multiplier, if any, was finally agreed upon as
of September 1983.

2. That no services at all need to be performed by
contributors in the litigation in order to qualify for this
contribution of funds.‘

4. See e.g. affidavit executed by Newton Schwartz May 31, 1985
and filed in the Trial Court papers June 4, 1985. Document No.
6276 at pp. 8-10. Appendix, Exhibit “C” attached hereto.

6

3. But that contributing counsel could participate as
fully as they wished. —

Schreiber vetoed such suggested disclosure to Judge
Pratt and “Dean” concurred in this nondisclosure.

Petitioner and five of the other members of the “PMC”
(out of nine total) immediately began the infusion of
capital and their time, talent and energies into the active
litigation discovery and hearings in October, even before
the December 7, 1983 execution (as of October) Agree-
ment which Dean personally created, promoted, solicited
the final 3-1 return on contribution as well as the parti-
cipation of counsel.’ He did so as Court designated lead
counsel responsible for the preparation of the Plaintiffs
case.

The original formula unanimously agreed upon pro-
vided, inter alia:

1. Threefold reimbursement for each $200,000.00
contribution, from the pool of attorneys fees;

2. After such distribution, 50% of the remainder

would be distributed equally among the nine
PMC members;

3. Then a 30% distribution according to the num-
ber of hours each member expended;

4. The remaining 20% in accordance with certain
quality and risk factors.

The Court of Appeals opinion is premised on the totally
incorrect assumption that there was no disclosure of this
Agreement. While none was apparently made to Judge
Weinstein, who replaced Judge Pratt in October 1983,
it ignores the undisputed disclosure to Special Master

5. Id. at pp. 8-10.

a
i

Schreiber in September 1983 even before its execution.
On May 7, 1984, the day set for trial, after extensive,
exhaustive around the clock discovery, nationwide and
internationally, and the expenditure of more than $2 mil-
lion in fresh funds, a settlhement was obtained for the
class for $180,000,000.00. This despite substantial de-
fenses raised, including that of the “government contract-
ors” defense, which contended that if the Defendant chem-
ical companies produced Agent Orange, a dioxin, in ac-
cordance with U. S. Government specifications, it was
absolved from further liability even to the ultimate users,
and those who were exposed to it, i.e., the Plaintiffs here-
in.

On June 11, 1984 the District Court ordered that Pe-
titions for attorneys fees were to be submitted by August
31, 1984. A fee hearing was scheduled for September
1984 but no notice was given to the class because of the
“need for continued intensive work by the attorneys until
the close of the fairness hearings and . . . the complexity
of the fee application”. Although his predecessor, through
Special Master Schreiber at least constructively knew of
the “3-1” provision for return on contributions, Judge
Weinstein evidently was not so informed until the PMC
did so when it submitted its Joint Fee Petition. After
Judge Weinstein questioned the Agreement, the PMC
members modified the original agreement. The original
Dean-proposed 3-1 return on contributions was retained,
with the amount of five individual members’ contributions
increased to $250,000.00 each.*®

6. The Sixth member Thomas Henderson contributed $200,000.00;
each of the three non-contributing members, including Respondent
Dean, received a 3-1 multiplier up to $50,000.00 each on their general
litigation expenses; the contributing PMC members did not receive
any multiplier on their general litigation expenses. Agent Orange I,
611 F.Supp. at 1454.

8

The remaining fees were to be distributed pro rata to
each PMC member “in the proportion the individual’s
and/or firm’s fee award bears to the total fees awarded”.
Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1454.

As amended, the final fee award by the District Court
awarded:

1. Approximately $4.7 million to the nine PMC mem-
bers on an individually apportioned basis;

2. The amount awarded by the District Court to each
of the nine PMC members, the amount of fees awarded
under the amended Agreement and the net effect of the
agreement are correctly set forth below (see fn. 2, 818
F.2d 216 at 220-221.)

Amount of Fees Amount of Fees Net Effect
Awarded by Awarded Under Of The
District Court The Agreement Agreement

Dean (noninvestor) $1,424,283 $542,310 - $881,973
Schlegel (noninvestor ) 944,448 $393,312 - $549,136
Musslewhite (noninvestor ) 344,657 $206,991 - $137,666

Schwartz (investor)
O’Quinn (investor)
Brown (investor)
Locks (investor)
Chesley (investor )
Henderson (investor )

41,886 $513,026 +$471,140
132,576 $541,128 +$408,552
348,331 $608,162 +$259,831
487,208 $651,339 +$164,831
475,080 $647,534 +$172,456
515,163 $659,975 +$144,812

Ti LAL 9A LA AA

\ The total of all fees awarded by the District Court to
the members of the PMC remained unchanged.

In May of 1985 Dean moved to overturn the fee shar-
1g agreement, claiming that it violated professional ethics
and did not protect the rights of the class. After hearing
argument and testimony by expert witnesses including
Professor Arthur Miller, Petitioners’ expert in the matter,
the Court in Memorandum and Order issued June 27,

a

9

1985 denied Dean’s Motions and upheld the Agreement.
The District Court found, inter alia, that:

1. No conflict of interest had arisen in the litigation
from the fee sharing agreement; and

2. The interests of the class in obtaining a fair and
reasonable settlement had not been impinged. Agent
Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1461.

3. That the PMC was an ad hoc law firm “formed
for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multi-
district litigation” Agent Orange I, Id. at 611 F.Supp. at
1458; therefore, the business realities required the PMC
to perform all functions of a law firm including the allo-
cation of fees among its members. This satisfied DR 2-
107A;

4. As to DR 5-103 which prohibits an attorney from
acquiring a proprietary interest in an action in which he
is involved, the District Court held that the contributing
members acquired no independent interest in the action
because the financial return from any initial advance for
expenses was to be paid from the fees otherwise awarded
to the PMC members and thus would not affect the class
fund. While acknowledging that a conflict of interest was
possible, it held that complex class actions require more
sophisticated analysis of ethical codes than ordinary two
party cases in order not to “unnecessarily discourage
counsel from undertaking the expensive and protracted
complex multiparty litigation often needed to vindicate
the rights of a class.” Jd. at 1460.

Any theoretical incentive to settle early: (1) did not
occur here, because there was never any settlement offer
or meaningful discussion until the weekend of May 5-6,

10

1984 preceding the May 7, 1984 trial date; and (2) it
would be offset by the counter balancing theoretical in-
centive to extend such litigation created by the lodestar
formula; and (3) the 3-1 multiplier applied, “whether the
case is settled today or five years from now.” Id. at 1460.

Additionaily the Court set forth five additional reasons
for approving the Agreement at issue:

1. The returns on the contributions did not affect the
class fund, since they were paid from the fee awards of
PMC members;

2. The “business” of law will require creative, yet
ethical methods for economical and efficient operation;

3. Without the funds advanced by the PMC, the liti-
gation would have collapsed and neither the attorneys
nor the class would receive any payments.” Nor would
there be any return on past, present or future investments
if the case were lost, initially or after any appeals were
exhausted; such was the high risk of time and funds;

4. The same $250,000.00 contributions could have
been advanced by the contributing PMC members in safe
investments yielding substantial returns;

5. If the PMC members had received their requested
$30 million in fees, the extent of the mathematical dis-
tortion would have been insubstantial.

The District Court, evidently unaware of the earlier
disclosure to Special Master Schreiber, cautioned that in
all future cases, such agreements should be disclosed at
the time of its formation, which is precisely when it was
done in this case in September 1983.

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Agreement(s) here did not affect, one iota, the
class’ recovery. The original was proposed by Dean as a
necessary inducement to capable, resourceful, experienced’
counsel enter prolonged litigation which was highly risky
and speculative as later found by the Courts below. To
secure advancements for litigation costs in such a venture,
substantially more than the usual formulae, of hourly
rate, under traditional lodestar formulae even with po-
tential traditional multiplier for quality work and the
risk undertaken,* was essential to induce any contributing
attorneys willing to commit their time, talent, energies
and resources, whether cash or loan commitments by
them, to such difficult litigation. Here, unlike all other
known reported class actions, the ratio of litigation costs
expended and incurred to the date of trial ($2.3 million)
were nearly 12 of the fees awarded.

No case has as a matter of public policy more reason
to be prosecuted than this one. The political fallout from
our country’s involvement in the Vietnam war continues
even though that war ended in 1976. Yet, for the nearly
250,000 (% million) veteran claimants here involved,
and particularly those affected, actual or supposedly, by
the toxic chemical dioxin, Agent Orange, more than their
cherished monument in Washington and current best
sellers and hit movies about such war, they would have

7. The average number of years experience in the tort field of
the nine constituent members of “PMC” exceeded twenty years.
All were successful, active trial lawyers.

8. As encapsulated most recently in this Court’s decision in
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council, US. ,
106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986). Unlike that case, here there was no
“usual fee shifting statute” involved.

12 l

their vindication or “day in court” entitlement to a public
airing of the national policy involved. This is buttressed
by the fact that today, 11 years after the end of the war,
there are two movies depicting such war among the cur-
rent best attended and rated critically in the US.,
“Platoon” and “Full Metal Jacket”.

Dean knew the monumental risks in continuing such
litigation. He offered 3-1 because this is what he knew
it would take in the market place to arouse serious con-
sideration on such a risky commitment to a required
combination of capable, experienced and affluent trial
litigators.

Having so represented such agreement to induce his
fellow PMC members, is he not now estopped to deny
such agreement’s validity or to seek to set aside his own
Agreement, on both legal and ethical as well as moral
grounds?

The PMC was in fact an ad hoc law firm. It opened
its own law office in Brooklyn, New York and staffed it
with its repective members. Fee sharing agreements under
such circumstances are permissible just as they would
be among members of the same law firm.

Likewise, the members of the PMC who contributed
at the time, initially almost $1.5 million dollars and
incurred substantial additional debts for which they are
personally liable and more than that in their time and
substantial general litigation expenses without any multi-
plier, such as the 3-1 contracted to be awarded to the
three non-contributing members.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The opinion of the Court of Appeals below and
Grinnell I and II’ conflicts with that of the Third Circuit
in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973),
on remand, 382 F.Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal
after remand 540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976 en banc)
(hereinafter Lindy I and II respectively) and decisions of
the District Courts in the Second, Third and. District of
Columbia Circuits permitting and approving private fee
sharing agreements, even in lump sum awards, to class
counsel in an equitable fund action under the lodestar
approach;

2. The Court below under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) pro-
nounced the death knell for obtaining competent class
counsel in erroneously holding that the District Court’s
role was not properly satisfied as protector of the class
in holding hearings, and determining reasonableness in
the awarding of fees under the Agreement in this equit-
able fund case;

3. The Court of Appeals erroneously held that this
Agent Orange class action was not the type, which as a
matter of policy, was worthy of judicial encouragement
in view of the high risks involved in its prosecution and
defenses available thereto.

4. The Court of Appeals main premise, i.e., lack of
disclosure, fails factually because Petitioners here informed
the Special Master of the proposal to share attorneys fees
during the agreement’s formulative stages, including the

9. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974),
on remand, [1976-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) { 60,913 at 68,980 (S.D.
N.Y. 1976), appeal after remand, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).

14

3-1 return on contributions, and requested to inform the
then presiding Judge of such action, which was vetoed;
yet Petitioner and all other signatories except Dean* are
now penalized and have had their voluntary agreement
nullified by the Court of Appeals’ refusal to acknowledge
such uncontroverted disclosure. |

5. Erroneously, in the name of ethics, the Court of
Appeals has rewarded the very wrongdoer co-counsel,
Dean, who conceived, initiated, promoted and benefitted’®
most from their Agreement on tenuous theoretical ethical
grounds while rejecting out of hand (Dean’s) fraud in
the procurement of the agreement by promises of the very
3-1 return on investment now condemned by Dean and
the Court of Appeals; he is estopped from denying the
same on legal grounds and his procurement and participa-
tion in the same and on equitable grounds by reason of
his lack of clean hands and hence standing to challenge
his own procured agreement.

6. If the opinion below is allowed to stand, it will
preclude all future agreement between counsel respecting
mass toxic tort class actions and such have such a chilling
effect as to eliminate competent counsel from such cases
in the future, capable of prosecuting such litigation.

7. Ignoring such “clearly erroneous” standard, the
Court of Appeals here disregarded such detailed, pains-

* See page 2 footnote.

10. Dean had substantial time in the case which he most certainly
would lose unless he could induce Petitioners and others to enter
the case and assume the financial and a substantial part of the work
burden. A sizable portion of the fees he has been awarded is for
this time that would have been clearly lost but for the contributions
of Petitioners. There are no just reasons that he should get the
fruits of the agreement and Petitioners the pits.

15

taking findings of the District Court and erroneously sub-
stituted its judgment without regard to the facts extant,
de novo; hence its legal conclusions are incorrect.

DISCUSSION

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a similar
class action situation held that (on remand) in an anti-
trust case that the internal agreement of counsel was
“simply irrelevant” where the award otherwise conformed
with this Court’s criteria in “equitable fund” doctrine
cases first pronounced in Trustees v. Greenough, 105
U.S. 527 (1882) and Central Railroad & Banking v.
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885):

“Finding the basic facts not clearly erroneous, and
determining that there is no error in the Court's
reasoning or in its application of the proper legal
precept, we affirm the district court on this point
(whereby a law firm (“Berger”) was awarded $893,-
500 under a fee sharing agreement instead of the
$139,186.85 found under the District Court’s hear-
ing for reasonable value for contributing materially
to the creation of the settlement fund). Implicit in
this conclusion is the understanding that the agree-
ment between Kohn and Berger to split fees is simply
irrelevant to the considerations mandated by Lindy I
(emphasis supplied). Lindy II, supra, 540 F.2d
at 109.

Case law subsequent to Lindy IJ demonstrates that in
the class action context, District Courts wisely encourage
the court-awarded fee to be allocated by counsel. See,
¢.g., Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y.
Sept. 18, 1981) (available on Lexis, Genfed library);
In Re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, [1979-1980]

16

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) © 97,116 at 96,195 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) € 96,921 at 95,863 (D. Del. 1979), appeal dis-
missed, 614 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1980); Del Noce v.
Delyar Corp., 457 F.Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D. N.Y. 1978);
in Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 395,
400 (D.D.C. 1978).

As Judge Brieant noted in Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.:

“Counsel have, to an extent, simplified this Court’s
work in fixing fees here by agreeing together that
a single fee shall be awarded, based on the total of
the services rendered, which counsel will divide
among themselves by private arrangement as if they
were law partners, or joint venturers as to this par-
ticular piece of business. Accordingly, the Court is
concerned only with the fairness and propriety of a
single amount, to be fixed by the Court in accord-
ance with the traditional principles of quantum
meruit and in compliance with Grinnell I and II,
just as if all the services had been rendered by a
single law firm.” 457 F.Supp. at 1055.

The justification for allowing the attorneys who have
functioned as an ad hoc law firm representing a class
to allocate a fee among themselves is straightforward,
i.e., “it is virtually impossible for the Court to determine
as accurately as can the attorneys themselves the internal
distribution of work, responsibility and risk.” In Re Am-
picillin Aantitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at 400 (emphasis
supplied ).

This issue has not been decided by this Court as to
either the methodology for awarding attorneys fees in
common fund cases, nor under what circumstances private

17

agreements of such counsel will be respected and honored.
Nor has the Court decided the ethical considerations
here involved, nor the concomitant issue of whether the
very counsel who promoted such 3-1 inducements can
later renege on his very own agreement after capitalizing
upon the resources, time, talents and energies expended
by his own selected co-counsel, itself an important ques-
tion of ethics, as is that of the Court of Appeals reward-
ing a wrongdoer and one lacking clean hands. That is
whether or not “Dean” has standing to raise the issue
under the equitable doctrine of “common fund” situations.

In fact the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
itself has in the past properly discussed three factors to
be considered by the District Courts in increasing the
lodestar:

“1. Analysis of Plaintiff's burden. .. .

2. Risks assumed in developing the case. This
category subsumes consideration of: (a) the number
of hours of labor risked without guarantee of re-
muneration; (b) the amount of out-of-pocket ex-
penses advanced for processing motions, taking de-
positions, etc.; (c) the development of prior ex-
pertise ...

3. The delay in receipt of payment for services
rendered.” 540 F.2d at 117 (emphasis supplied).

The italicized language demonstrates that a District
Court may increase the lodestar, i.e., apply a multiplier,
based upon the advancement of costs of the litigation.
This is precisely the effect of the 3 for 1 multiple con-
tained in the fee-sharing agreement approved by Judge
Weinstein,

Dcciteeieeeeeneneeneienentienieieeanmiccmaiaaiteameuaiaiiilll

18

The District Court recognized that without the agree-
ment the very continuation of the litigation was in doubt
and the $180 million settlement would not have been
created. Implementation of the Agreement does not con-
flict with any common fund decision. Indeed, its result is
well-supported by existing case law.

PERFORMANCE OF THE FEE-SHARING
AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE
ETHICAL STANDARDS

A. There Has Been No Improper Sharing Of Fees.

The District Court, looking both to DR 2-107(A) of
the American Bar Association Code of Professional re-
sponsibility and Rule 1.5 of the more recently enacted
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, had little difficulty rejecting Dean’s argument
that the fee sharing agreement violated ethical standards
regarding the division of fees among attorneys. Judge
Weinstein found that ethical restrictions did not control
the present case because the PMC was “an ad hoc law
firm, a joint venture formed for the purpose of prosecut-
ing the Agent Orange multidistrict litigation.” 611 F.Supp.
at 1458. Such a factual finding is clearly supported by
the record.

A major portion of the sums advanced by the members
of the PMC paid the costs of operation of a separate law
office located in Brooklyn near the District Court which
was essential to the prosecution of the class action. Such
expenses included rent, furniture and office equipment,
payments to the office staff, telephone, photocopying ex-
penses and computer services. See Judge Weinstein’s main

19

opinion regarding fees and expenses, 611 F.Supp. 1296,
1330-31. Although the PMC was a joint venture for the
prosecution of a single case, these expenses represent the
normal capital expenditures of a law firm in operation.”
The District Court found that such an organization was
essential, stating:

“In short, the Brooklyn office served as the home
litigation office for the geographically scattered PMC
members and brought a levei of efficiency to the
litigation that was not present before and that was
badly needed.” 611 F.Supp. at 1331.

The funds contributed by the members were maintained
in separate PMC bank accounts and, in addition to pay-
ing office expenses, were used to pay deposition costs,
expert witness fees, class action notice expenses, computer
expenses and similar items, Dean Aff. at p. 8 (A 1285),
and, it is noteworthy, not to pay expenses of individual
PMC members. The costs were advanced for the capi-
talization of the joint venture and were not merely the
aggregate costs of individual attorneys who were par-
ticipating in the prosecution of the action.

The governing ethical rule does not prohibit the divi-
sion of fees in this case.

Model Rule 1.5 provides in pertinent part:

“(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if:

11. Even some of the attorneys working on the class action could
be deemed employees of the joint venture. See, e.g., Report of
Magistrate Scheindlin, which is an Appendix to Judge Weinstein’s
main opinion on attorneys fees, 611 F.Supp. 1347, 1363 (Alison
Pettiette, Esq., assigned to the PMC by Petitioner John M. O’Quinn,
was deemed in effect an associate of the “PMC’’).

speeiaeatemameiaan emma |

20

‘

(1) the division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or, by written agree-
ment with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation;

(2) the client is advised of and does not ob-

ject to the participation of all the lawyers involved;
and

(3) the total fee is reasonable.”

The Official Comment to Rule 1.5 indicates that the
rule contemplates the factual situation presented by this
case:

“A division of fee is a single billing to a client
covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are
not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates as-
sociation of more than one lawyer in a matter in
which neither alone could serve the client as well.

”
.

In the class, action context, the participation of the
Court, as Judge Weinstein recognized, must substitute
for that of the client, since as a practical matter the
class is only informed of what the Court approves from
material included in the notice of settlkement. Judge Wein-
stein found that the requirements of the Model Rules
were met. 611 F.Supp. at 1459. “First, each PMC mem-
ber assumed joint responsibility for prosecution of the class
action and that assumption of responsibility was approved
by the Court on behalf of the class. . . . Second, the total
fee allowed by the Court is reasonable by definition.” 611
F.Supp. at 1459.

The Agreement would not have been prohibited under
the old Code section. Under DR 2-107 (footnotes omit-
ted):

21

“(A) A lawyer shali not divide a fee for legal serv-
ices with another lawyer who is not a partner
in or associate of his law firm or law office,
unless:

(1) The client consents to employment of the
other lawyer after a full disclosure that a
division of fees will be made.

(2) The division is made in proportion to the
services performed and responsibility as-
sumed by each.

(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly
exceed reasonable compensation for all legal
services they rendered the client.”

In the ABA’s final draft of DR 2-107(A), a footnote’?
to subsection (A)(3) referred to ABA Formal Opinion
No. 204 (Nov. 24, 1940). Formal Opinion No. 204 pro-
hibited fee-splitting “[w]here an attorney merely brings
about the employment of another attorney but renders
no service and assumes no responsibility in the matter.”
ABA, Opinions on Professional Ethics at p. 490 (1967).
However, the division of either services or responsibility
may be a basis for division of fees. Formal Opinion No.
204, id. at p. 491. Thus, Dean’s complaint that one mem-
ber of the PMC did not contribute as many hours*® as
he did is of no consequence since all members of the

12. The footnotes to the final draft were carried over into the
Code as adopted in 1969 by the ABA House of Delegates to assist
in synthesizing with the earlier Canons of Professional Ethics and
Opinions of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics. Courts
have looked to the footnoted opinions in construing the Code. See,
e.g., Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 18, 1981)
(available on LEXIS).

i3. Petitioner Schwartz was awarded compensation by Judge
Weinstein for over 400 hours, hardly a token effort.

22

PMC were charged by the District Court with responsi-
bility for the class litigation and all shared that respon-
sibility. Indeed the members other than Dean as a group
contributed 70% of the time.

Moreover, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
also stated in Formal Opinion No. 204 that “[mJeasuring
the relative division of service and responsibility between
associate attorneys is not within the province of this ethics
committee unless the resulting fee to the client is flag-
rantly excessive.” Jd. at pp. 490-91 (emphasis supplied).
Neither the Code nor the Model Rules defines “responsi-
bility”, but Dean’s reliance on ABA Informal Opinion
No. 85-1514 (April 27, 1985) (Appellant’s Brief at p.
26) is misplaced and his quotation is selective. That
opinion states that “[t]he Committee is of the opinion
that assumption of responsibility does not require sub-
stantial services to be performed by the lawyer since
assumption of responsibility is the alternative to a divi-
sion of fees in proportion to services performed.” ABA
Informal Opinion No. 85-1514 (April 27, 1985), reprint-
ed in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Con-
duct at pp. 801:373, 374.

Like the Court decisions cited above at pp. 15-16, the ABA
Committees on Professional Ethics were not concerned
with the relative allocation of fees among attorneys jointly
responsible for a matter so long as the total fee to the
client was reasonable. The reason, as Judge Richey stated
in the Jn Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, is that such
allocation is best left to the attorneys themselves. See also
Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71 Civ. 3169 (S.D. N.Y. 1981)
(available in LExis).

23

B. Establishment Of The Fee-Sharing Agreement
Did Not Create Any Improper Conflict Of Interest
Between The Lawyers And The Clients.

Dean asserts that the Agreement had to create an im-
permissible conflict of interest between the PMC and the
class of Plaintiffs because it established in the PMC a
financial interest which would militate against the ability
of the attorneys to exercise their own independent profes-
sional judgment and cause a dilution of their loyalty to
the class in violation of DR 5-103(A) of the now super-
ceded ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.

The potential for conflict between attorneys and their
clients always exists where litigation is prosecuted under
an agreement where fees to be paid are contingent upon
the success of the suit. Nonetheless, a contingent fee
arrangement has long been authorized “because it may be
the only means by which a layman can obtain the services
of a lawyer of his choice.” ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, EC 5-7, EC 2-20. The advancement of the
costs of litigation were permitted under DR 5-103(B),
with the caveat that the clients had to remain ultimately
responsible for the disbursements. The advancement of
costs is “ofven . . . the only practical means by which one
having a claim against another can economically afford,
finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer
to prosecute his claim” ABA Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, EC 2-20. \

How else could major class actions proceed in the
absence of contingent fees and advancement of costs?
There will be very few representative Plaintiffs sufficiently
wealthy and charity minded to advance the fees and ex-
penses for the class as a whole.

24

It has long been obvious that, where an attorney has
contributed substantial effort pursuant to a contingency
fee agreement, there is a risk that the attorney might be
guided in his negotiations on behalf of a client by his
own self-interest in recovering a fee and that that self-
interest might be adverse to the client’s interest of obtain-
ing the largest possible recovery. That risk is minimized
in a federal class action since no settlement can be imple-
mented in the absence of notice to the class with an
opportunity to be heard, and an independent determina-
tion by a federal judge of the fairness and reasonableness
of the settlement after such a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(e). Indeed, pursuant to Rule 23, Judge Weinstein
considered the fairness and reasonableness of the settle-
ment prior to the determination of fees and expenses to
be awarded to counsel.

The Agreement did not conflict with old DR 5-103(A)
since there was no acquisition of a proprietary interest
in the cause of action. That is to say, the lawyers were
entitled to no particular share of the settlement amount
and were to be entitled only to that amount which the
District Court would ultimately determine to be fair and
reasonable. In terms of the relationship between the PMC
and the class, all that has been done was for the PMC
to agree that they would recover fees and disbursements
only as awarded by the District Court from the successful
prosecution of the litigation.

In addition, Rule 1.8(e) of the Model Rules has speci-
fically eliminated the requirement in DR 5-i03(B) that
the clients retain responsibility for the reimbursement of
disubrsements and now permits the reimbursement of
disbursements to be contingent upon the outcome. Rule
1.8(e) provides as follows:

25

“A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to
a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation, except that . . . a lawyer may advance
court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment
of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter.”

It should not be forgotten that the algebra of imple-
mentation of the Agreement could well have been very
different had settlement not been reached prior to triai.
Had the negotiations taken place months into the trial or
with the jury out, the value of the time contributed by
the members of the PMC likely would have grown much
larger in relation to the risk capital. This is, of course,
the routine situation in contingent fee litigation.

Dean does not suggest that the settlement was unfair
or unreasonable and the mere fact that it occurred at the
time that it did does not create the reality of any conflict
of interest. Judge Gagliardi in Ruskay, Judge Luongo in
In Re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, Judge Wright
in Valente, Judge Brieant in Del Noce and Judge Richey
in the Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, see p. 16 above, all
have approved the allocation among themselves by mem-
bers of a committee of counsel of compensation for work,
responsibility and risk. That is all that was done here.
No part of the settlement was allocated to the attorneys
other than amounts awarded by the Court under tradi-
tional notions of fairness and reasonableness.

Dean’s complaint is nothing more than the “sour
grapes” of a disgruntled contracting party, unhappy with
the result of an agreement he negotiated in a risky ven-
ture, entered into freely, and from which he derived some
but not all anticipated benefits. The amount awarded

26

Dean by the District Court, after adjustment pursuant to
the Agreement, left him with an effective hourly rate of
at least $86 after actual expenses. Had the District Court
awarded the members of the PMC even a modest risk
multiplier to time charges of 1.5, Dean’s effective hourly
rate would have increased to $196 and with a risk multi-
plier of 2.0, to $308.**

Surely Dean and all the other members of the PMC
expected the District Court to award a risk multiplier
were they to succeed in what was a most risky endeavor.
Indeed, the District Court’s extraordinary refusal to
award any risk multiplier was cited as error on appeal,
but the Court of Appeals denied such. Nonetheless, all
members of the PMC, including Dean, understood that
their Agreement would operate only if they were succesful
and only with respect to fees finally awarded. Dissatis-
faction with the award is no basis for avoidance of the
Agreement. Given the finding of the District Court that
the fee-sharing agreement did not affect the Plaintiff
class in any way, there is no basis in law, equity or ethics
to set it aside.

Professor Schuck, ante, in his definitive work on the
Agent Orange Litigation, “Agent Orange on Trial” has
correctly and pragmatically set forth the Fee Sharing

14. Hours Fees Fees Under Effective

Allowed Awarded Agmt. Hourly Rate
6,300.15 $1,424,284 $ 542,320 $ 86
1.5 risk

multiplier $2,136,426 $1,239,431 $196
2.0 risk

multiplier $2,848,567 $1,951,661 $308

A risk multiplier of 2.0 was approved in Lindy II. See 540 F.2d at
115-116.

ai

Agreement in issue as the only practical means to prose-
cute such litigation and Dean’s contentions as “more
hypocritical than ethical, more delusive than just.”

He candidly observed as material here:

“, . on December 13, 1984, the PMC executed an
amended agreement, which was to be retroactive to
October 1, 1983. The ‘off-the-top’ provision was
retained—indeed, the amount that each financier
might receive was increased to $750,000 (his $250,-
000 expenses contribution multiplied by three )—but
this advantage was extended to the others (Dean,
Schlegel and Musslewhite) albeit at a lower amount
($50,000 expenses each, multiplied by three). And
instead of the percentage allocation specified for the
remainder of the award, the new arrangement would
divide the fees remaining after the off-the-top deduc-
tions according to the proportion that each lawyer’s
fee award bore to the total fee award.

This last reason was obviated in May 1985 when
Dean moved to invalidate the new agreement. Con-
ceding that he had not signed it under duress or
ignorance, he pointed out that under its terms he
would receive $331,000 rather than the $1.34 million
that the court had awarded him, a diminution of
more than $1 million or 75 percent of his fee;
Schlegel’s reduction would be more than $530,000
and Musslewhite’s more than $150,000. In contrast,
Schwartz and O’Quinn would receive $475,000 and
$426,000 more, respectively, than the Court had
awarded them. Dean, the PMC’s chief counsel, would
receive an effective hourly rate of $55.62, while
Schwartz, essentially a passive investor, would re-
ceive more than $1,700 per hour. This arrangement,
Dean argued, constituted unethical fee splitting, dis-
proportionate to the services performed and respons-
ibility assumed, and champerty; it almost amounted
to a usurious loan.

28

Dean’s arguments have some force, yet the ethical
strictures they embody secm curiously anachronistic,
quaint reminders of bygone attitudes toward the
social functions of adjudication. The legal system
cannot have it both ways. If it desires the end, then
it must desire (or at least accept) the only practical
means to that end. If it wishes to encourage so-called
public interest tort litigation on behalf of diffuse,
poorly financed interests over extremely complex
issues of scientific or technical uncertainty, then it
must either transform the government into a tort
litigator on behalf of these interests (a solution
with enormous problems of its own), or it must
countenance, indeed welcome, private arrangements
for securing the resources necessary for effectively
prosecuting such cases. The truth is that in the fall
of 1983, if the Agent Orange litigation was to go
forward, the resources of the financiers were desper-
ately needed; it is no exaggeration to say that at that
critical moment and thereafter, they were needed far
more than the chief trial counsel, valuable as his
services were. The otherwise grotesque inbalance
revealed by Dean’s comparisons reflected the relative
value that their money and his services had for the
survival of the case at that point, a value Dean
obviously appreciated when he signed the agreement.
Although the opportunism of investors is not a pretty
or edifying sight, the prospect of meritorious cases
failing for want of resources is even less appealing.
Any set of principles that affirms the importance of
litigating very costly cases while denying the means
for doing so seems more /ypocritical than ethical,
more delusive than just.

On June 27, Weinstein rejected Dean’s challenge to
the agreement. After discussing the competing con-
siderations, the judge chose to address the ethical
problems case by case rather than announce any
general rule. In this case, he observed, any conflict
of interest and incentives to settle prematurely were

29

purely hypothetical, for he had found the settlement
to be fair and in the best interest of the class. In the
future, however, lawyers would be required to dis-
close to the court the existence and terms of such
a fee-sharing arrangement, so that the court could
protect the class—perhaps by requiring modifications,
reconsidering class certification, or notifying the
class—and the lawyers could proceed accordingly.*®

Of course, as to this latter caveat, Petitioners complied
with it by their disclosures to Special Master Schreiber
(Appendix Exhibit C, ante and infra).

This Court has long recognized the application in
equitable proceedings such as this (i.e., the equitable fund
doctrine under its Trustees v. Greenough, arie 105 U.S.
527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882) ). See e.g. International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68
(1918) (held inapplicable there, although recognized in
principal).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing valid and compelling reasons, this
Honorable Court should issue its Writ of Certiorari and
grant this Petition. To do otherwise will be to pronounce
the death knell on the next vital public policy litigation
which poses serious legal obstacles and requires extensive
effort and resources to combat adversaries with unlimited
resources.*°

15. “Agent Orange On Trial”, Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity, 1986 at p. 120, fn. 23.

16. It was estimated that as of the May 7, 1984 date of trial,
the seven chemical companies had expended some $74 million in fees
and costs. Firemans Funds, insurer for Dow Chemical, in addition to
counsel, employed up to ninety paralegals at the height of the litiga-
tion and had an annual budget exceeding $5 million, more than
the entire total award to the “PMC”.

Dated

30

Sep loon a / IIs 7

By:

Respectfully submitted,

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ, P.C.

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ
723 Main, Suite 325
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 224-4161

BARRY S. BERGER

723 Main, Suite 325
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 224-4161

JOHN M. O’Quinn, P.C.

JOHN M. O’QUINN

3200 Texas Commerce Tower
Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 223-1000

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail,
first class, postage prepaid, on this Sth day of August,
1987 as per the service list attached. Sop Gm be.

NEWTON B. SCHWARTZ

AGENT ORANGE SERVICE LIST

Honorable Jack B. Weinstein
United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201

Wendell B. Alcorn, Esq.

CADWALADER, WICKER-
SHAM & TAFT

One Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Thomas Besk, Esq.
UNIROYAL, INC.
World Headquarters
Middlebury, Connecticut 06749

Paul V. Esposito, Esq.

LEWIS, CVERBECK &
FURMAN

135 South LaSalle Street

Suite 1060

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Thomas Beck, Esq
HENDERSON & GOLDBERG
1612 Frick Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Morton G. Silberman, Esq.

CLARK, GAGLIARDI &
MILLER

The Inns of Court

99 Court Street

White Plains, New York 10601

Howard Lester, Esq.

LESTER, SCHWAB, KATZ
& DWYER

120 Broadway

New York, New York 10005

Benton Musslewhite, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF BENTON
MUSSLEWHITE, INC.

609 Fannin, Suite 517

Houston, Texas 77002

William C. Lucas, Esq.
TOWNLEY & UPDIKE
Chrylser Building

405 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York 10174

Leonard L. Rivkin, Esq.

RIVKIN, LEFF, SHERMAN
& RADLER

100 Garden City Plaza

Garden City, New York 11510

William Krohley, Esq.
KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN
101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

David J. Dean, Esq.
DEAN, FALANGA & ROSE
1 Old Country Road
Carle Place, New York 11514

Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., Esq.
YANNACONE & YANNACONE
Post Office Drawer 109

62 Rose Avenue

Patchogue, New York 11772

Richard Goldstein, Esq.
SHEA & GOULD

330 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

David R. Goss, Esq.

BUDD, LARNER, KENT,
GOSS, PICILLO &
ROSENBAUM

33 Washington Street

Newark, New Jersey 07101

Stephen J. Schlegel, Esq.

SCHLEGEL & TRAFELET,
LTD.

One North LaSalle Street

Suite 3900

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Irving Like, Esq.

REILLY, LIKE &
SCHNEIDER

200 West Main Street

Babylon, New York 11700

Neil Peterson, Esq.

Gene Locks, Esq.

GREITZER & LOCKS

1500 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Robert A. Taylor, Jr., Esq.
ASHCRAFT & GEREL

2000 L Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036

Arvin Maskin, Esq.
Department of Justice

Safeway Building - Room 904D
521 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Robert Conason, Esq.

GAIR, GAIR & CONASON, P.C.
80 Pine Street

New York, New York 10005

Hon. Raymond J. Dearie
United States Attorney
By: L. Kevin Sheridan
Executive Assistant
U.S. Attorney
U.S. District Court
Brooklyn, New York 11201

Hon. Shira Scheindlin
Magistrate

U.S. Courthouse

225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 1120!

Albert J. Fiorella, Esq.
1565 Franklin Avenue
Mineola, New York 11501

Stanley Chesley, Esq.
WAITE, SCHNEIDER,
BAYLESS & CHESLEY
1513 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Phillip E. Brown, Esq.
HOBERG, FINGER, BROWN,
COX & MOLLIGAN, P.C.

Central Tower
702 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94103

John O’Quinn, Esq.

O’QUINN, HAGANS &
WETTMAN

3200 Texas Commerce Tower

600 Travis

Houston, Texas 77002

Sol Schreiber, Esq.

MILBERG, WEISS, BERSHAD,
SPECTHRIE & LERACH

One Penn Plaza, Suite 4915

New York, New York 10119

Agent Orange Plaintiffs’
Management Committee
26 Court Street, Suite 304-8
Brooklyn, New York 11242

Clerk of Panel

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation

1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Suite 1002

Washington, D.C. 20005

Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq.

KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN,
HAYS & HANDLER

1575 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

Ms. Nancy Petrillo

Deputy Law Clerk

United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East

New York, New York 11201

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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT A

In re “AGENT ORANGE” PRODUCT
LIABILITY LITIGATION.

(Appeal of David DEAN).
No. 1118, Docket 85-6365.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1986.
Decided April 21, 1987.

One member of plaintiff's management committee in
Agent Orange class action appealed from order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, 611 F.Supp.
1452, which upheld fee sharing agreement between lead
counsel. The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge,
held that agreement under which certain members of
management committee would advance funds for litigation
expenses and receive threefold return on that investment
out of the fee settlement was invalid and would not be
enforced in view of its potential for creating conflict be-
tween counsel and the class.

Reversed.

2a
Leon Friedman, Hempstead, N.Y., for appellant Dean.

Elihu Inselbuch (Gilbert, Segall and Young, New York
City, Richard B. Schaeffer, New York City, of counsel)
for appellee Agent Orange Piaintiffs’ Management Com-
mittee.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MIN-
ER, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Our discussion of the background and procedural his-
tory of this litigation appears in Judge Winter’s lead opin-
ion, 818 F.2d 145. This portion of the Agent Orange
appeal concerns the district court’s approval of a fee
sharing agreement entered into by the nine-member Plain-
tiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”) in December of
1983. Under the agreement, each PMC member who had
advanced funds to the class for general litigation expenses
was to receive a threefold return on his investment prior
to the distribution of other fees awarded to individual
PMC members by the district court. In result, the agree-
ment dramatically increased the fees awarded to those
PMC members who had advanced funds to the class for
expenses, and concurrently decreased the fees awarded to
non-investing PMC members, who only performed legal
services for the class.

David Dean, lead trial counsel for the plaintiff class and
a non-investing member of the PMC, challenges the validity
of the agreement, to which he was a signatory, contending
that it violates DR 5-103 and DR 2-107(A) of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility (“ABA Code”). The
ABA Code provisions prohibit an attorney from acquiring
a proprietary interest in an action in which he is involved
and from dividing a fee with an attorney who is not a

3a

member of his firm, unless such division is made pursuant
to client consent and is based upon services performed
and responsibility assumed. In addition, Dean asserts that
such an agreement, which premises the size of a fee on
the amount advanced for expenses rather than on services
rendered, violates the standards and principles developed
in this circuit for the award of attorneys’ fees in equitable
fund class actions and inevitably places class counsel in
a position at odds with the interests of the class itself.

Although not informed of the existence of the fee shar-
ing agreement until September of 1984, four months after
the parties reached a settlement, the district court ap-
proved the agreement, holding that “there is no reason
to believe that the existence of the PMC’s fee-sharing
agreement had any appreciable untoward effect on the
decision to settle.” In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability
Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1452, 1461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(“Agent Orange I’). In essence, the court determined that
the substantial financial demands placed upon counsel
in complex multiparty litigation require flexibility in
reviewing internal fee sharing agreements so as not to
discourage future representation of large plaintiff classes.
At the same time, however, the district judge ruled that,
in all future cases, counsel must notify the court of any
fee sharing agreement at the time of its inception. In this
way, according to the district judge, “the court at the out-
set can determine whether to permit the fee allocation
agreement to stand before any attorney invests substantial
time and funds.” Jd. at 1463.

Because we find that the agreement before us violates
established principles governing awards of attorneys’ fees
in equitable fund class actions and creates a strong

4a

possibility of a conflict of interest between class counsel
and those they were charged to represent, we reverse the
district court’s approval of the agreement. Accordingly,
the fees originally allocated by the district court, based
on the reasonable value of service actually rendered, will
be distributed to the members of the PMC.

I. BACKGROUND

In September of 1983 Yannacone and Associates with-
drew as attorneys for the class, claiming financial and
management hardships. The district court then approved
appointment of the PMC as new class counsel. The
PMC was comprised of three members—attorneys Stephen
Schlegel, Benton Musslewhite and Thomas Henderson.
In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 571
F.Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In later months the dis-
trict court approved the expansion of the PMC to en-
compass six additional members, including appellant
David Dean. Dean, a member of the original panel of
class counsel had been closely involved with the Agent
Orange litigation since its inception in 1979. In October
of 1983 the district court appointed him to be the at-
torney responsible for leading the preparation and po-
tential trial of plaintiffs’ case.

In December of 1983, as a means of raising the capital
necessary for the maintenance and continuation of the
lawsuit, the nine PMC members entered into a written
fee sharing agreement whereby six of the members each
promised to advance the class $200,000 for general liti-
gation expenses. The agreement provided that the invest-
ing members would be reimbursed threefold from the
pool of attorneys’ fees awarded to PMC members upon
successful completion of the action. The fees remaining

5a

in the pool after the investment payouts would be dis-
tributed pursuant to a fifty-thirty-twenty percent formula:
fifty percent of the remainder would be distributed equal-
ly among the nine PMC members, thirty percent would
be distributed according to the number of hours each
member expended in the case, and twenty percent would
be distributed in accordance with certain quality and
risk factors relating to each PMC member’s work in the
action, as determined by a majority vote of the PMC.
All PMC members, including Dean, signed the agreement.
The district court, however, was not notified of its ex-
istence.

The action was settled in May of 1984 and the district
court, by order dated June 11, 1984, notified counsel
that petitions for attorneys’ fees were to be submitted to
the court no later than August 31, 1984. A hearing on
the issue of fees was scheduled for late Septei.oer. In
ordering the hearing, the district court waived applica-
tion of Rule 5 of the Local Rules of the Eastern District
of New York requiring notice to the class of all fee ap-
plications and fee sharing agreements prior to the hearing
on such fee petitions. The court gave as its reasons “the
need for continued intensive work by the attorneys until
the close of the fairness hearings and . . . the complexity
of the fee applications.” Notice of Proposed Settlement
of Class Action, reprinted in In re “Agent Orange’ Pro-
duct Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 867 (E.D.
N.Y. 1984). When the court waived application of the
local rule, it was unaware of the PMC fee sharing agree-
ment.

It was not until the PMC submitted its joint fee peti-
tion that the court finally learned of the agreement. At
the September hearing on the fee petitions, the district

6a

judge expressed doubts as to the agreement’s propriety
and requested further briefing on the issue. Faced with
the reservations expressed by the district judge, the PMC
members modified their agreement in December of 1984.
The revised agreement, and the one now before us, pro-
vided that five of the six investing members of the PMC
each would advance an additional $50,000 for general
litigation expenses, bringing their total investments to
$250,000 each. In return for these advances, as well as
for the $200,000 advanced by the sixth investing mem-
ber, the new agreement provided for the same threefold
return as did the original agreement. The fifty-thirty-twenty
percent formula for the distribution of the remaining por-
tion of the fees, however, was eliminated. In its place,
the revised agreement called for the remainder to be dis-
tributed pro rata to each PMC member “in the proportion
the individual’s and/or firm’s fee award bears to the total
fees awarded.”* Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1454.

1. The agreement, in pertinent part, provided as follows:
' When and if funds are received, either by the AOPMC or in-
dividual members thereof, the first priority distribution will be
to distribute to Messrs. Brown, Chesley, Henderson, Locks,
O’Quinn and Schwartz, an amount equivalent to the actual
monies expended for which these six signatories were responsible
toward the common advancement of the litigation up to
$250,000.00 with a multiplier of three (i.e., none of these six
individuals will receive more than $750,000.00 each), which
shall be paid to them for having secured the funds for the
AOPMC and to Messrs. Dean, Schlegel and Musslewhite an
amount equivalent to the actual monies expended by these three
signatories toward the common advancement of litigation up to
$50,000.00 with a multiplier of three (i.e., none of these three
signatories will receive more than $150,000.00 each). Any addi-
tional expenses will be reimbursed without a multiplier as ordered
by the Court. All of the expenses plus the appropriate multiplier
will be deducted from the total fees and expenses awarded by
the Court to all of the AOPMC firms. The remaining fees will
then be distributed pro rata to each signatory in the proportion

Ta

On January 7, 1985, the district court issued a Mem-
orandum and Order awarding over $10 million in fees
and expenses to the various counsel whose work had ben-
efitted the class, applying the principles of fee distribution
in equitable fund actions set forth in City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Grinnell
I’) and City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093
(2d Cir. 1977) (“Grinnell IT’). In re “Agent Orange”
Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (“Agent Orange IT’). As later amended and sup-
plemented, the district court’s decision awarded over $4.7
million in fees to the nine members of the PMC on an
individually apportioned basis. David Dean, due to his
lengthy involvement in the class action and the excep-
tional quality of his work, was awarded $1,424,283.75,
or over thirty percent of all fees awarded to the PMC.
Each of the six investing members of the PMC was award-
ed a much lower percentage of the entire PMC fee award,
with one investor being awarded only $41,886. The high-
est award to an investor was $515,163.

Once the fee sharing agreement was applied to these
awards, however, the amount of fees each PMC member
Wx. to receive changed dramatically. In Dean’s case, ap-
plication of the agreement reduced his award to $542,310,
a reduction of $881,973. In contrast, Newton Schwartz,
an investing member of the PMC to whom the district
court awarded $41,886, was now to receive $513,026,
equivalent to an hourly rate of $1,224.81. The awards
to all other investing members were similarly enhanced

the individual’s and/or firm’s fee award bears to the total fees
awarded.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1452,
1454 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Revised Fee-Sharing Agreement,
Dec. 13, 1984).

8a

and, in turn, the awards to the two other non-investing
members were diminished, resulting in a distortion of the
district court’s individual PMC member fee awards. The
total of all fees awarded by the court to the members of
the PMC, of course, remained unchanged.’

In May of 1985, Dean moved in the district court to
overturn the fee sharing agreement, claiming that it vio-
lated professional ethics and did not protect the rights of
the class. In a Memorandum and Order issued June 27,
1985, the court denied Dean’s motion and upheld the
agreement, albeit with some reluctance. The court found,
as a factual matter, that no conflict of interest had arisen
in the litigation from the fee sharing agreement and, con-
sequently, that the interests of the class in obtaining a
fair and reasonable settlement had not been impinged.
Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1461. Initially, the court
recognized its obligation to review the agreement in its
capacity as protector of the rights of the plaintiff class.
It then went on to examine the propriety of the agreement

2. The effect of the fee sharing agreement on the district court’s
fee awards to the individual PMC members is shown by the follow-
ing chart.

Amount of Fees Amount of Fees Net Effect
Awarded by Awarded Under of the
District Court the Agreement Agreement

Dean (noninvestor) $1,424,283 $542,310 - $881,973
Schlegel (noninvestor ) 944,448 393,312 - 549,136
Musslewhite (noninvestor ) 344,657 206,991 - 137,666
Schwartz (investor) 41,886 513,026 + 471,140
O’Quinn (investor) 132,576 541,128 + 408,552
Brown (investor) 348,331 608,162 + 259,831
Locks (investor) 487,208 651,339 + 164,171
Chesley (investor) 475,080 647,534 + 172,456
Henderson (investor) 515,163 659,975 + 144,812

Brief for Appellant at 8.

9a

under DR 2-107(A) and DR 5-103 of the ABA Code
and the practical effect of the agreement on the PMC’s
representation of the class.

As to DR 2-107(A), which prohibits an attorney from
splitting his fee with another attorney not of the same
firm unless he has the consent of his client and the “di-
vision is made in proportion to the service performed and
responsibility assumed by each,” the court determined that
the PMC should be viewed as an ad hoc law firm “formed
for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multi-
district litigation,” Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1458.
The court reasoned that the business realities of the liti-
gation required the PMC to be able to perform those
functions ordinarily performed by actual law firms, such
as splitting fees among its members. The district court
also noted that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Model Rules”) adopted by the ABA in 1983, although
not adopted in New York, reflect “an increased recogni-
tion” of these business realities by permitting fee sharing
agreements based upon services rendered or upon written
acceptance of joint responsibility by the attorneys if the
client is advised of the participation and does not object
and the total fee is reasonable. Model Rule 1.5(e). Rec-
ognizing the practical problem of client consent in class
actions, however, the district court concluded that its duty
to protect the rights of the class ordinarily could not be
performed unless the attorneys involved notified the court
of the existence of such an agreement “as soon as pos-
sible,” Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1459.

As to DR 5-103, which prohibits an attorney from
acquiring a proprietary interest in an action in which he
is involved, the court found that the investing members

10a

acquired no independent interest in the action because
the financial return from any initial advance for expenses
was to be paid from the fees otherwise awarded to the
PMC members, and thus would not affect the class fund.
While the court did recognize that a conflict of interest
could arise from such an agreement, it cautioned that
complex class actions require a more sophisticated analysis
of ethical codes than ordinary two-party cases in order
not to “unnecessarily discourage counsel from undertak-
ing the expensive and protracted complex multiparty lit-
igation often needed to vindicate the rights of a class.”
Id. at 1460. Accordingly, the district court held that a
case-by-case analysis of such fee sharing agreements to
identify potential conflicts of interest should be adopted.

The court conceded that an agreement of the sort
before it conceivably could create an interest on the part
of the investors to settle early, regardless of the benefit
to, or interest of, the class. This is because an attorney
whose fee is based upon the amount of funds advanced
for expenses in an action will receive the same fees
“whether the case is settled today or five years from now.”
Id. The court reasoned, however, that any possible in-
terest to settle early would have been offset by the theo-
retical incentive to extend such litigation created by the
lodestar formula and concluded that, as a factual matter,
no conflict had arisen here.

The court then set forth five additional, though non-
dispositive, reasons for approving the agreement. First,
the returns on the investments did not affect the class
fund, since they were paid from the fee awards of PMC
members. Second, the court r-cognized that the “business”
of law will at times require creative, yet ethical, methods

lla

for economical and efficient operation. Third, without
the funds advanced by the PMC members, it was possible
that the litigation would have collapsed and neither the
attorneys nor the class would receive any payments.
Fourth, the court noted that the PMC members could
have earned substantial returns, though not quite three-
fold, on these same funds if they had undertaken more
traditional investments. Fifth, if the PMC members had
received the amount of fees requested in their joint
petition, nearly thirty million dollars, the extent of the
distortion of the fees by the investment agreement would
have been insubstantial.

In sum, the district court determined that the practical
needs of this form of litigation required an inventive
method of fund raising in order to guarantee effective
representation of class rights. At the same time, however,
it labeled as “troubling” the PMC’s failure to inform the
court of the existence of the agreement until months
after a settlement had been reached. /d. at 1462. In light
of class counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the class and
the court’s role as guardian of class rights in relation to
settlement review, the district court found that both the
class and the court had a right to be notified of the exist-
ence of such an agreement. To this end, the court pro-
claimed that in all future cases, class counsel would be
obligated to make the existence of a fee sharing agree-
ment known to the court at the time of its formation.

II. DISCUSSION

Dean’s appeal presents an issue of first impression:
whether an undisclosed, consensual fee sharing agreement,
which adjusts the distribution of court awarded fees in
amounts which represent a multiple of the sums advanced

12a

by attorneys to a class for litigation expenses, satisfies the
principles governing fee awards and is consistent with
the interests of the class.

{[1, 2] At the outset, we note that the fees in this
case were awarded pursuant to the equitable fund doc-
trine, first set forth in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
(15 Otto) 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882), and Central
Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 5 S. Ct.
387, 28 L.Ed. 915 (1885). The underlying rationale
for the doctrine is the belief that an attorney who creates
a fund for the benefit of a class should receive reasonable
compensation from the fund for his efforts. Central Rail-
road, 113 U.S. at 125. Because the calculation of fees
necessarily will affect the funds available to the class,
this circuit has adopted a lodestar formula for fee com-
putation. Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099; Grinnell I,
495 F.2d at 471. The lodestar seeks to protect the
interests of the class by tying fees to the “actual effort
made by the attorney to benefit the class.” Grinnell II,
560 F.2d at 1099. Accordingly, fees are calculated by
taking the number of hours reasonably billed and multi-
plying that figure by an hourly rate “normally charged
for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area.”
Id. at 1098. Once calculated, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, increase or decrease this figure by examining
such factors as the quality of counsel’s work, the risk
of the litigation and the complexity of the issues. /d.
Discretion to adjust the lodestar figure upward because
of superior quality, however, is limited to exceptional
situations and must be supported by “specific evidence”
and “detailed findings” by the district court. Pennsylvania
v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clear Air,

U.S.— ., 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439

13a

(1986). Adherence to these principles is essential not
only to avoid awarding windfall fees to counsel, but also
to “avoid every appearance of having done so,” Grinnell
I, 495 F.2d at 469.

[3, 4] Of equal importance to our analysis is Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e), which requires court approval of any settle-
ment of a class action suit and squarely places the court
in the role of protector of the rights of the class when
such a settlement is reached and attorneys’ fees are
awarded. Grinnell IT, 560 F.2d at 1099. In fulfilling this
role, courts should look to the various codes of ethics
as guidelines for judging the conduct of counsel. Agent
Orange I, 611 F. Supp. at 1456. In addition, where only
retrospective review of counsel’s conduct is available,
courts should not be limited to an examination of the
actual effects of such conduct on the litigation, but rather
as the ABA Code and Grinnell I imply, the appearance
and potential effect of the conduct should be reviewed
as well. See Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469; ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility Canon 9 (1975).

[5] The ultimate inquiry, therefore, in examining fee
agreements and setting fee awards under the equitable
fund doctrine and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), is the effect an
agreement could have on the rights of a class. Because
we find that the agreement here conflicts substantially
with the principles of reasonable compensation in com-
mon fund actions set forth in Grinnell I and Grinnell II,
and that it places class counsel in a potentially conflicting
position in relation to the interests of the class, we
reverse.

Initially, it is beyond doubt that the agreement, by
tying the fee to be received by individual PMC members

l4a

to the amounts each advanced for expenses, completely
distorted the lodestar approach to fee awards. In setting
fees here, the district judge meticulously examined coun-
sel’s fee petitions in accordance with the Grinnell deci-
sions and arrived at individual awards for each PMC
member based upon the services that each had provided
for the class. By providing for threefold returns of ad-
vanced expenses, however, the agreement vitiated these
principles. The distortion was so substantial as to in-
crease the fees awarded to one investor by over twelve
times that which the district judge had determined to be
just and reasonable, and, in a second case, to decrease
the otherwise just and reasonable compensation of a non-
investor by nearly two-thirds.

There is authority for a court under certain circum-
stances, to award a lump sum fee to class counsel in an
equitable fund action under the lodestar approach and
then to permit counsel to divide this lodestar-based fee
among themselves under the terms of a private fee sharing
agreement. E.g., Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71-3169, slip op.
at 10-13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1981); In re Magic Marker
Securities Litigation, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) {€ 97,116, at 96,195 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16,
1979); Valente v. Pepsico, inc., [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) € 96,921, at 95,863 (D. Del.
June 4, 1979), appeal dismissed, 614 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.
1980); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D.
395, 400 (D.D.C. 1978); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.,
457 F.Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). We reject
this authority, however, to the extent it allows counsel
to divide the award among themselves in any manner
they deem satisfactory under a private fee sharing agree-
ment. Such a division overlooks the district court’s role

15a

as protector of class interests under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)
and its role of assuring reasonableness in the awarding
of fees in equitable fund cases. See Kamens v. Horizon
Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
§ 98,007, at 91,218 & n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1981);
Steiner v. BOC Financial Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 4 97,656, at 98,490 (S.D.
N.Y. Oct. 10, 1980); cf. Jones v. Amalgamated War-
basse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“if the court finds good reason to do so, it may reject
an agreement as to attorneys’ fees just as it may reject
an agreement as to the substantive claims”), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 944, 104 S. Ct. 1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474 (1984).
In addition, this approach overlooks the class attorneys’
“duty . . . to be sure that the court, in passing on [the]
fee application, has all the facts” as well as their “fiduci-
ary duty to the . . . class not to overreach.” Lewis vy.
Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

A careful examination of those decisions permitting
internal fee sharing agreements to govern the distribution
of fees reveals no case where return on investment was
a factor. More important, in a number of those cases
the courts apparently assumed that the internal fee shar-
ing agreement would be based substantially on services
rendered by individual counsel. E.g., Ruskay, slip op.
at 14 n. 4 (“Since the court has satisfied itself that the
proposed distribution will not result in compensation
beyond services performed, it declines to overrule the
agreement.”); Jn re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81
F.R.D. at 400 (“Since the fee application purports to be
based upon the rates and time spent by the several at-
torneys, it is presumed that these factors also weigh
heavily in this internal agreement.”).

16a

[6] Accordingly, while the practice of allowing class
counsel to distribute a general fee award in an equitable
fund case among themselves pursuant to a fee sharing
agreement is unexceptional, we find that any such agree-
ment must comport essentially with those principles of
fee distribution set forth in Grinnell I and Grinnell II.
This does not mean that a fee sharing agreement must
replicate the individual awards made to PMC members
under the district court’s lodestar analysis. Even after
the court makes the allocation, the attorneys may be
in a better position to judge the relative input of their
brethren and the value of their services to the class.
See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at
400. Nor does this mean that class counsel need follow,
line by line, the lodestar formula in arriving at an agree-
ment as to fee distribution. Obviously, the needs of large
class litigation may at times require class counsel, in
assessing the relative value of an individual attorney’s
contribution, to turn to factors more subjective than a
mere hourly fee analysis. It does mean that the distribu-
tion of fees must bear some relationship to the services
rendered.

In our view, fees that include a return on investment
present the clear potential for a conflict of interest be-
tween class counsel and those whom they have under-
taken to represent. “[W]henever an attorney is confronted
with a potential for choosing between actions which may
benefit himself financially and an action which may bene-
fit the class which he represents there is a reasonable
possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety
will occur.” Zy/stra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d
102, 104 (Sth Cir. 1978). The concern is not necessarily
in isolating instances of major abuse, but rather is “for

17a

those situations, short of actual abuse, in which the client’s
interests are somewhat encroached upon by the attorney’s
interests.” Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 266 (Oct. 8,
1985). Such conflicts are not only difficult to discern
from the terms of a particular settlement, but “even the
parties may not be aware that [they exist] at the time
of their [settlement] discussions,” id. This risk is magnified
in the class action context, where full disclosure and con-
sent are many times difficult and frequently impractical
to obtain. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,
93 F.R.D. 485, 490-91 (D. Md. 1982); Gould v. Lumon-
ics Research Ltd., 495 F.Supp. 294, 297 n. 6 (N.D. II.
1980).

[7] The district court recognized that the agreement
provided an incentive for the PMC to accept an early
settlement offer not in the best interests of the class, be-
cause “[a]n attorney who is promised a multiple of funds
advanced will receive the same return whether the case
is settled today or five years from now.” Agent Orange
I, 611 F.Supp. at 1460. Given the size and complexity
of the litigation, it seems apparent that the potential for
abuse was real and should have been discouraged. Unlike
the district court, however, we conclude that the risk of
such an adverse effect on the settlement process provides
adequate grounds for invalidating the agreement as being
inconsistent with the interests of the class. The conflict
obviously lies in the incentive provided to an investor-
attorney to settle early and thereby avoid work for which
full payment may not be authorized by the district court.
Moreover, as soon as an offer of settlement to cover the
promised return on investment is made, the investor-
attorney will be disinclined to undertake the risks asso-

18a

ciated with continuing the litigation. The conflict was
especially egregious here, since six of the nine PMC
members were investing parties to the agreement.

[8] The district court’s factual finding, that the ade-
quacy of the settlement demonstrated that the agreement
had no effect on the PMC’s conduct, is not dispositive.
The district court’s retrospective appraisal of the adequacy
of the settlement cannot be the standard for review. The
test to be applied is whether, at the time a fee sharing
agreement is reached, class counsel are placed in a posi-
tion that might endanger the fair representation of their
clients and whether they will be compensated on some
basis other than for legal services performed. Review
based on a fairness of settlement test would not ensure
the protection of the class against potential conflicts of
interest, and, more important, would simply reward
counsel for failing to inform the court of the existence
of such an agreement until after a settlement.

We also reject the district court’s finding that its author-
ity to approve settlement offers under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e) acts to limit the threat to the class from a potential
conflict of interest. At this late stage of the litigation,
both class counsel and defendants seek approval of the
settlement. The court’s attention properly is directed to-
ward the overall reasonableness of the offer. and not
necessarily to whether class counsel have placed them-
selves in a potentially conflicting position with the class.
It would be difficult indeed for a court at this stage to
hold that, regardless of the terms of the settlement, class
counsel had not fulfilled its obligation to the class. Given
this focus and other administrative concerns that may
come to bear, we find the approval authority, in this con-

19a

text, to be insufficient to assure that the ongoing interests
of the class are protected. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby,
333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dis-
senting) (at this stage of litigation, “[a]ll the dynamics
conduce to judicial approval of such settlements”), cert.
dismissed, 384 U.S. 28, 86 S. Ct. 1250, 16 L.Ed.2d 335
(1966); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,
93 F.R.D. at 491 (court authority to review settlement
offers not adequate to safeguard against dangers of con-
flict of interest); Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff As Monitor In Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 5, 26-27 (Summer 1985) (judicial
review not a significant barrier to collusive settlements).

Equally unpersuasive is the district court’s determin-
ation that the potential incentive to settle early is offset
by an incentive, fostered by the lodestar formula, to pro-
long the litigation. While a number of commentators have
asserted that use of the lodestar formula encourages
counsel to prolong litigation for the purpose of billing
more hours, e.g., Wolfram, The Second Set of Players:
Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limit of Proportional Dis-
cipline, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293, 302 (Winter
1984), the formula’s effect in this regard is far from clear,
See Coffee, supra, at 34-35 (“the claim that the lodestar
formula results in excessive fees is nonetheless a red
herring”); Mowrey, Attorneys Fees In Securities Class
Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J.Corp.Law. 267, 343-48
(1978) (attorneys’ fees awards by district courts have
not risen since adoption of lodestar analysis); see also 7B
C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Pratice and
Procedure § 1803, at 508 (1986) (no empirical data
show any incidence of district courts awarding excessive
fees). Moreover, the court’s authority in reviewing fee

20a

petitions and approving or disapproving hours billed in
an equitable fund action works as a substantial and direct
check on counsel’s alleged incentive to procrastinate. In
re Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities
Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1977);
7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 1803, at
511. Consequently, we do not view the lodestar system as
countervailing the clear interest in early settlement created
by the private agreement.

[9] Additionally, potential conflicts of interest in class
contexts are not examined solely for the actual abuse they
may cause, but also for potential public misunderstand-
ings they may cultivate in regard to tthe interests of class
counsel. Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d
86, 95 (7th Cir. 1977); Prandini v. National Tea Co.,
557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977). While today we
hold that the settlement reached here falls within that
range of reasonableness permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e), we are not insensitive to the perception of many
class members and the public in general that it does not
adequately compensate the individual veterans and their
families for whatever harm Agent Orange may have
caused. To be sure, the settlkement does not provide the
individual veteran or his family substantial compensation.
Given the facts of this settlement, the potentially negative
public perception of an agieement that awards an invest-
ing PMC member over twelve times the amount the
district court has determined to be the value of his services
to the class provides additional justification for invalidat-
ing the agreement and applying the lodestar formula.

[10,11] We find the various additional rationales for
approving the fee sharing agreement set out in the district

2la

court’s decision equally unpersuasive. First, the fact that
the returns on the advanced expenses did not directly
affect the class fund is of little consequence, since we have
already determined that the district court’s responsibility
under Grinnell I and Grinnell I, as well as under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e), goes beyond concern for only the over-
all amount of fees awarded and requires attention to the
fees allocated to individual class counsel. Second, while
we sympathize with counsel regarding the business deci-
sions they must make in operating an efficient and man-
ageable practice and agree that a certain flexibility on the
court’s part is essential, we are not inclined to extend this
flexibility to encompass situations in which the bases for
awarding fees in an equitable fund action are so clearly
distorted. Third, whether this class action would have
collapsed without an agreement calling for a threefold
return is a matter of speculation. Any such collapse, how-
ever, would have been due to the pervasive weaknesses in
the plaintiffs’ case. Fourth, we find wholly unconvincing
the district court’s suggestion that the investors could
have made a sizeable return on their funds if they had
invested them in other ventures. We take notice of the fact
that a threefold return on one’s money is a rather gen-
erous return in any market over a short period of time.
Fifth, while the effect of this fee sharing agreement might
have been dwarfed to the point of insignificance if the fees
awarded to counsel had been much greater, this simply
is too speculative to defend the agreement as not affecting
the interests of the class. Finally, we do not find class
counsel to have formed an ad hoc partnership. They
merely are a group of individual lawyers and law firms
associated in the prosecution of a single lawsuit, and they
lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential element
of attorneys practicing as partners.

22a

[12] We do not agree with the district court’s ruling
that in all future class actions counsel must inform the
court of the existence of a fee sharing agreement at the
time it is formulated. This holding may well diminish
many of the dangers posed to the rights of the class. Only
by reviewing the agreement prospectively will the district
courts be able to prevent potential confiicts from arising,
either by disapproving improper agreements or by reshap-
ing them with the assistance of counsel to conform more
closely with the principles of Grinnell I and Grinnell II.
In the present case, however, where the district court was
not made aware of the agreement, and the potential for a
conflict of interest arising was substantial, the adoption
of a rule for future cases in no way alleviates the fatal
flaws of this agreement and does not offset the need for
its invalidation.

Although appellant Dean is successful on this appeal,
his conduct has been far from praiseworthy. He freely
consented to the formation of the agreement in December
of 1983 and later to its revision in 1984. He did not even
inform the district court of the existence of the agreement
or of his objections to it until long after the settlement
was reached. If he had called the agreement into question
immediately, a great deal of time and expense could have
been saved.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Having determined that the fee sharing agreement
violates the principles for awarding fees in an equitable
fund action and places class counsel in a position poten-
tially in conflict with the interests of the class which they
represent, we reverse. We award all the PMC members
the fees to which the district court determined they were
entitled.

ee Se a

Cre ees

23a
EXHIBIT B

In re “AGENT ORANGE” PRODUCT
LIABILITY LITIGATION.

(Appeal of ATTORNEYS’ FEE AWARDS).

No. 1097, Dockets 85-6305, 85-6325, 85-6343,

85-6345, 85-6347, 85-6351, 85-6353, 85-6355,

85-6357, 85-6359, 85-6361, 85-6363, 85-6383,
85-6389 and 85-6397.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1986.
Decided April 21, 1987.

Appeal was taken from order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, 611 F.Supp. 1296, which
awarded attorney fees from fund resulting from settle-
ment of Agent Orange class action against manufacturers.
The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) Court’s across-the-board reduction in certain expenses
and billable hours was proper; (2) use of national hourly
rates was proper; (3) awards based on $150 per hour
for partners, $100 per hour for associates, and $125 per
hour for law professors were adequate; (4) Court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding multipliers for quality
to six members of plaintiffs’ management committee;
(5) Court properly declined to award risk multiplier;
but (6) Court should not have abrogated award to one

24a

firm because of that firm’s use of discovery materials
obtained in class litigation to represent clients who had
opted out of the class.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Paul M. Bernstein, New York City (Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann, New York City, Edward A. Gross-
mann and Penny P. Domow, New York City, of counsei),
for appellant Agent Orange Plaintiffs’ Management Com-
mittee.

Edward F. Hayes, III, Huntington, N.Y. for appellants
McMillan, Bigg, Lonnie, Davison and MacLaren.

Benton Musslewhite, Houston, Tex., pro se.

Robert A. Taylor, Jr., Washington, D.C. (Ashcraft &
Gerel, Wayne M. Mansulla, Washington, D.C., of coun-
sel) for appellant Ashcraft & Gerel.

Leon Friedman, Hempstead, N.Y., for appellants Dean,
Falanga & Rose.

Henderson & Goldberg, Pittsburgh, Pa., Thomas W.
Henderson and Antonio D. Pyle, Pittsburgh, Pa., of
counsel, for appellant Henderson & Goldberg, P.C.

Greitzer and Locks, Philadelphia, Pa., Neil R. Peterson,
Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel, for appellants Greitzer and
Locks, Schlegel & Trafelet, Henderson & Goldberg,
O’Quinn, Hagan & Whitman, Newton B. Schwartz, P.C.,
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley and Hoberg, Finger,
Brown, Cox & Milligan.

Edward J. Nowakoski, West Caldwell, N.J., of counsel,
for appellant Kraft & Hughes.

= at. eg oe eee Dee, ~ *,

aoe

4
;
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‘
;

25a

Sullivan & Associates, Daniel C. Sullivan and Gregory

A. Stayart, Chicago, IIl., of counsel, for appellant Sullivan
& Associates, Ltd.

Stephen J. Schlegel, Chicago, IIl., pro se.

Richard D. Heideman, A. Thomas Johnson, Heideman
Law Offices, Louisville, Ky., of counsel, for appellant
Estate of Lowell M. Coffey.

Townley & Updike, New York City, Richard J. Barnes
and John E. Sabetta, New York City, of counsel, for
appellee Monsanto Co.

Kelley Drye & Warren, New York City, William M.
Crowley and Patricia C. Tui, New York City, of counsel,
for appellee Hercules Inc.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MIN-
ER, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Our discussion of the background and procedural his-
tory of this litigation appears in Judge Winter’s lead
opinion, 818 F.2d 145. The nine members of the Plain-
tiffs’ Management Committee (“PMC”) and various out-
side counsel appeal, on a number of grounds, the district
court’s decision setting attorneys’ fees. On June 18, 1985,
the district court issued an amended order, awarding over
seven million dollars in fees and three million dollars in
expenses to eighty-eight attorneys and law firms involved
in the action. In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability
Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Agent
Orange’). The nine members of the PMC, individually
and as a group, challenge the district court’s use of a
national hourly rate in calculating the fee awards under

26a

the lodestar formula set forth in City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (“Grinnell I’), and
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d
Cir. 1977) (“Grinnell II’), the level of the quality multi-
pliers it set, and its failure to apply a risk multiplier to
the fee awards and to credit certain hours and expenses.
Four outside counsel challenge the district court’s findings
as to the value of their work to the class and the decision
to abrogate various contingency fee arrangements be-
tween counsel and certain class members. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In May of 1984, on the eve of trial, a settlement was
reached with the chemical company defendants, calling
for the establishment of a $180 million dollar fund for
the benefit of the class. By order dated June 11, 1984,
the district court required fee petitions to be filed no later
than August 31, 1984, and scheduled hearings on the
petitions for the early fall. Notice of Proposed Settlement
of Class Action, reprinted in In re “Agent Orange”
Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 867 (E.D.
N.Y. 1984). Pursuant to this procedure, well over 100
attorneys and law firms filed petitions, claiming tens of
thousands of hours of work performed for the benefit
of the class. The fee petitions fell into three categories:
those filed by the nine members of the PMC; those filed
by members of Yannacone and Associates, the original
consortium of attorneys in charge of the action; and those
filed by attorneys not connected with any court-appointed
entity representing the class.

In reviewing fee petitions, the district court developed
guidelines falling into two categories—one covering the

27a

hours to be credited for work performed and the other
covering the expenses to be reimbursed. The hourly guide-
lines were as follows:

1. Court Time: One half of the time requested for
review of court orders was permitted on the ground
that the majority of court orders were made in open
court or after extensive briefing. Telephone confer-
ence time with court personnel was awarded in full,
except that no time was awarded for conferences
relating to internal management difficulties of the
PMC. Attendance at, and preparation for, court
hearings was awarded in full. Review of hearing
transcripts was awarded in full for those attorneys
attending the hearing. Nonattending attorneys were
awarded for only half such time. Travel to and from
hearings and court appearances also was awarded
on a fifty percent basis.

2. Management Committee Meetings: All time for
PMC meetings on substantive issues was permitted.
Travel to and from such meetings was awarded on
a fifty percent basis. No time was awarded for
meetings on nonsubstantive topics. The same division
was made for telephone conferences among PMC
members.

3. Educational Reading: Time for review of scien-
tific materials relating to the causation issue and
other issues in the case was awarded on a fifty
percent basis on the ground that such knowledge
could be used by counsel in future cases.

4. Depositions: Half of the time was awarded for
travel to and from depositions, for attendance by
nonparticipating attorneys, and for review and read-
ing. All time for preparing and summarizing depo-
sitions was granted. No limit on the length of depo-
sitions was enforced.

28a

5. Document Preparation: All time for review and
preparation of legal documents was awarded, except
that those hours used to prepare documents con-
cerning internal PMC organizational issues were not
credited.

6. Mail: If a short period of time for review of a
substantial amount of mail was requested, no time
was awarded under the assumption that counsel
simply was opening the mail. If a lengthy period of
time was claimed for review of only a few letters, all
time was credited under the assumption that counsel
was reviewing a letter brief.

7. Intra-Firm Conferences: This time was credited
on a fifty percent basis when related to substantive
issues.

Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1320-21, 1350-51. The
expense guidelines were as follows:

1. Travel: Documented expenses for hotels were
reimbursed at ninety dollars per day. Meals were
reimbursed at fifty dollars per day and twenty dollars
per day if the attorney was in his home city.

2. Paralegal Time: Paralegals were treated as an
expense and reimbursed at a rate of twenty dollars
per hour.

3. Out-of-Pocket Expenses: Telephone, mailing, du-
plication and similar expenses were reimbursed in
full if adequately documented.

4. Percentage Approval: When counsel submitted
adequate documentation to prove expenses but were
unable to establish that those expenses were all
related to compensable activity, expenses were reim-
bursed on a percentage basis.

5. “ees for Non-Causation Experts: A cap of
$5,000 per expert was set on the ground that their

7 Sms
tee Cink

29a

input was not substantial and not reasonably related
to class interests.

Id. at 1321-22, 1351.

Following these guidelines and applying the lodestar
formula for calculating attorneys’ fees in an equitable
fund action, see Grinnell 1, 495 F.2d at 471, the district
court awarded $10,767,443.63 in individual fees and ex-
penses to various counsel who, in the ceurt’s view had
performed work beneficial to the class. In arriving at the
lodestar figure, the court employed national hourly rates
of $150 for the work of a partner, $100 for the work of
an associate, and $125 for the work of a law professor.
Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1326. The court, in its
discretion, further applied quality multipliers, ranging
from 1.50 to 1.75, to the fees allowed various members
of the PMC and other counsel who had exhibited excep-
tional skill in the litigation and settlement negotiations.
Id. at 1328. The district judge, however, declined to apply
a risk multiplier to the lodestar figure. /d.

Not satisfied with these awards, two groups of attorneys,
including the PMC, now raise numerous objections on
appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. PMC Members

The district court awarded the individual members of
the PMC an aggregate of $4,713,635.50 in fees and
$650,356.97 in individual expenses. In addition, the court
awarded the PMC, as a whole, expenses in the sum of
$1,711,155.87. These attorneys now raise four specific
challenges to their individual awards.

30a

1. National Hourly Rates

Faced with a flood of fee petitions from counsel located
in all regions of the country, the district court utilized
national! hourly rates for calculating the fee awards for
each attorney. While it recognized that the general rule
for fee calculation in this circuit requires the use of “the
hourly rate normally charged for similar work by attor-
neys of like skill in the area,” Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at
1098, the district court noted that special problems arise
“in applying this general standard in a complex multi-
district litigatior that is national in scope, involves coun-
sel from all over the country and extends over many years
during which the rates for particular lawyers and classes
of lawyers are changing,” Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at
1308.

Specifically, the court pointed out that if the general
rule were interpreted to require imposition of the rates
normally imposed within the district, the rule would make
little sense in the context of this action, given that the
vast majority of counsel involved were non-local. Alterna-
tively, if the rule were interpreted to require imposition
of varying rates depending upon the location of each
counsel’s practice, the district judge perceived that such
a rule would minimize the court’s familiarity with the
rates to be awarded, require an almost unworkable case-
by-case review of such rates, and consistently benefit non-
local counsel at the expense of the class fund. The district
judge concluded that in large multiparty litigation, where
substantial numbers of specialized non-local attorneys are
involved, utilization of a national hourly rate is appro-
priate because it “recognizes the national character of the
lawsuit and of class counsel while retaining a vitally im-

SaaS ee Ee DSP ER win’

aR REZ esc a ESD ul

iat tas

3la

portant administrative simplicity together with an essential
neutrality of result as between fee applicants and fund
beneficiaries.” Id. at 1309.

Relying on five separate sources, the district court
developed the national rates to be applied in this action.
First, the court considered data compiled in the National
Law: Journal Directory of the Legal Profession (B. Ger-
son, M. Liss & P. Cunningham eds. 1984), a periodical
that provided rate information concerning law firms of
fifty or more attorneys throughout the country as of March
1983. Second, the court reviewed the submissions of coun-
sel, in particular the defendants’ Memorandum Concern-
ing Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Applications for Attorneys’ Fees
and for Reimbursement of Expenses, which provided
further information on national rates. Third, the court
reviewed various surveys of law firm economics, dated
1980 through 1984, and other periodicals relating to the
manner in which firms bill their clients. Fourth, the court
took notice of its own experience in setting fee awards
in class actions. Finally, the district judge reviewed recent
fee awards by other courts to understand more fully the
manner in which other jurisdictions set appropriate rates.
Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1325-28 (citing, inter alia,
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 590
n. 22 (3d Cir. 1984); Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749
F.2d 945, 955-56 (1st Cir. 1984)). From an analysis of
this data, the district court arrived at national hourly
rates of $150 for partners, $100 for associates and $125
for law professors.

The members of the PMC challenge the use of national
rates on the ground that they do not comport with the
principles governing attorneys’ fee awards in equitable

32a

fund actions. They assert that the practice in this and
other circuits required the court to review independently
the hourly rate for each attorney in order to ensure that
he was compensated at a level commensurate with that
of other counsel of like skill in the area in which he prac-
tices. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 590-91
(classifying application of national hourly rates as legal
error on the grounds that the district court presented no
evidentiary basis for their establishment and such rates
ignored the market rates that the attorneys would com-
mand in their respective communities). Relying on large
class action cases in other circuits where courts have
awarded varying rates to counsel from different localities,
e.g., In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities
Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977), they
argue that, while the task may be a difficult one, other
jurisdictions routinely undertake it.

[1] In passing on the efficacy of national hourly rates,
we note that fees in this action were awarded under the
equitable fund doctrine, which seeks to ensure that coun-
sel who have performed services beneficial to the class
receive fair and just compensation for their respective
efforts. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 527,
536, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882). In order to provide counsel
with such compensation and, at the same time, temper
these awards to prevent windfalls, we have adopted a lode-
star formula for calculating fees in equitable fund and
statutory fee contexts. Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099;
Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469-71. Under the formula, the
district court initially multiples the number of hours rea-
sonably billed by the hourly rate normally charged for
equivalent work by similarly-skilled attorneys in the area.
Grinnell I1, 560 F.2d at 1098. Once calculated, the dis-

9
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3
=
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e
s
Ef

33a

trict court then may, in its discretion, upwardly or down-
wardly adjust this figure by considering such factors as
the quality of counsel’s work, the probability of success
of the litigation and the complexity of the issues. Id.

While at least one circuit looks to the rates employed
in the area in which the attorney practices, Cunningham
v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1985),
we traditionally have interpreted Grinnell I and Grinnell
II as requiring use of the hourly rates employed in the
district in which the reviewing court sits. Polk v. New
York State Department of Correctional Services, 722 F.
2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). We generally have adhered
to this rule whether the attorney involved was local or
non-local. Id.; accord Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d
240, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1204, 103 S.Ct. 1190, 75 L.Ed.2d 436 (1983); Chrapli-
wy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 768-69 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77
L.Ed.2d 1315 (1983); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thomp-
son, 689 F.2d 137, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
We and other circuits have strayed from this rule only
in the rare case where the “special expertise” of non-local
counsv. was essential to the case, it was clearly shown
that local counsel was unwilling to take the case, or other
special circumstances existed. Polk, 722 F.2d at 25; Ava-
lon Cinema, 689 F.2d at 140-41.

[2] Accordingly, the issue for review here is’ whether
the district court erred in deviating from this established
precedent. While we concede that such conduct in the
ordinary case would constitute legal error and require
recalculation of the lodestar, we conclude that, in an ex-
ceptional multi-party case such ds this, where dozens of

34a

non-local counsel from all parts of the country are in-
volved, public policy and administrative concerns call for
the district court to be given the necessary flexibility to
impose a national hourly rate when an adequate factual
basis for calculating the rate exists.

An examination of the alternatives to the use of na-
tional rates in large multiparty class actions of this sort
readily establishes the necessity for affording district courts
this discretion. Use of our forum rule would distort dra-
matically the purposes of the lodestar calculation itself—
to ensure fair and just compensation to counsel and to
prevent the award of windfall fees. This distortion would
occur because, in cases in which the vast majority of
attorneys involved are non-local, the forum rule neces-
sarily will either overcompensate or undercompensate a
substantial number of non-local attorneys. Undercompen-
sation could deny counsel their right to fair and just fees;
Overcompensation would not be consistent with the need
to prevent windfalls. Adherence to the forum rule in cases
in which the inherent limitations of the rule are magni-
fied, i.e., where few local counsel and vast numbers of
non-local counsel are involved, therefore, makes little
sense.

Resort to a varying approach, depending upon the area
in which the individual practices, fares no better. In an
action of the magnitude of Agent Orange, in which well
over one hundred fee petitions were filed by counsel
throughout the country, such an approach would pose
an administrative nightmare for the district court. As the
district judge here noted, “[slimplicity becomes an espec-
ially important goal in a complex case involving a hund-
red or more fee applications and tens of thousands of

Dlr Rien, sek white D HG EES wale eae Re A AbD.

35a

pages of supporting documentation and requiring a num-
ber of years for prosecution during which rates for par-
ticular attorneys and geographic locations change in differ-
ent ways.” Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1308. While ad-
ministrative interests normally should not be the primary
concern of a court in formulating substantive rules of re-
view, we observe that the attorney-by-attorney approact
recommended by the PMC simply would over-tax the
capacity of a district court to review fee petitions ade-
quately. Cf. New York Association for Retarded Children
v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983) (burden-
saving measures may be taken by district court in light
of voluminous fee petitions).

Although not a panacea, the use of national hourly
rates in exceptional multiparty cases of national scope,
where dozens of non-local counsel are involved, appears
to be the best available method of ensuring adherence to
the principles of the lodestar analysis. The risk of over-
compensation or undercompensation on a large scale,
apparent under the forum rule, is somewhat neutralized,
while, at the same time, the administrative burden on the
district court, apparent under the varying rate rule, is
reduced to a manageable level. In granting the district
court this discretion, however, we caution that such rates
should be employed only in the exceptional case present-
ing problems similar to those presented here. We further
caution that, even in similar cases, national hourly rates
should be employed only when the district court is pre-
sented with an adequate evidentiary basis on which to
fix such rates. Once the court is satisfied with the evidence,
it should make clear, factual findings that support its
determination.

36a

We are aware that at least one circuit has rejected the
imposition of national hourly rates on the ground that
they do not comport with the lodestar principle. In re
Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 591. To the extent, however, that
the Third Circuit’s decision was based upon the fact that
the national rates employed did not comport with that
circuit’s rule requiring the hourly rate to reflect the rate
normally charged in the locale in which counsel practices,
we already have rejected its analysis by following a forum
rate rule. See Polk, 722 F.2d at 25. In addition, Jn re
Fine Paper, though not entirely clear on this point, may
be read to condemn only national hourly rates not based
on an adequate evidentiary record. The Third Circuit,
in reversing the district court’s adoption of such rates,
indicated that the district court there had not referred to
any evidence supporting the existence of such rates, 751
F.2d at 590, and noted that “the subject is not one on
which judicial notice is appropriate,” id. If read in that
context, our decision is in accord with that of the Third
Circuit, since we limit the utilization of national rates to
those instances in which an adequate evidentiary basis
exists. Finally, even assuming that Jn re Fine Paper stands
for an absolute prohibition on the imposition of national
hourly rates, we note that, subsequent to that decision,
the Third Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney
Fees, organized at the behest of the Chief Judge of that
Circuit, recommended that the court permit the utilization
of such rates in exceptional cases. Court Awarded Attor-
ney Fees, Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237,
260-62 (Oct. 8, 1985).’

1. The Task For

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0865%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
