# Appendix — Allen v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0816%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 1004

## Text

87 - -3 16 Supreme Court, U.S.
86 01g FILED

JUL 20 1987
No.

eos 2.4

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

IRENE H. ALLEN, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO PETITION

D. DALE HARALSON RALPH HUNSAKER
Counsel of Record DAVID M. BELL
DENNEEN L. PETERSON SCOTT E. BOEHM
HARALSON. KINERK & MOREY, P.C. O'CONNOR, CAVANAGH. ANDERSON
82 South Stone Avenue WESTOVER, KILLINGSWORTH &
Tucson, Arizona 85701 BESHEARS
(602) 792-4330 One East Camelback, Suite 1100
Phoenix, Arizona 85012
(602) 263-2604
STEWART K. UDALL J. MacARTHUR WRIGHT
Attorney At Law WRIGHT & MILES
70 East Mitchell 60 North 300 East
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 P.O. Box 339
(602) 230-1254 St. George, Utah 84770

(801) 623-2612

ee

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A
BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE

WILL BE ISSUED.

TABLE OF CONTENTS: APPENDIX”

Opinion of Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, filed April 20, 1987

Opinion of the Federal District
Court, filed May 10, 1984. ...

Opinion of the Federal District
Court, filed August 21, 1981...

Judgment of Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, filed June 9, 1987 .

Excerpts from the Atomic Energy
Bee OF 26ees. 6 6 x es ee ee

Excerpts from the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954. e 7 e e e 7” e e e e

*Appendices separated by blue
pages bearing title of appendix
subsection.

APPENDIX A

Opinion of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

filed April 20, 1987

PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

IRENE H. ALLEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
No. 84-2126

¥

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. C 79-0515)

Marc Johnston, Appellate Staff Attomey. Civil Division, Department
of Justice (Richard K. Willard. Acting Assistant Attorney General:
Robert S. Greenspan. Appellate Staff Attorney, Civil Division,
Department of Justi: Brent D. Ward, United States Attorney: Henry
A. Gill, Acting Assistant General Counsel, and Edward Jiran.
Attorney, Department of Energy: Ralph H. Johnson, Pamela L.
Wood, and Patrick O. Cavanaugh, Trial Attorneys, Torts Branch. Civil
Division, Department of Justice, with him on the brief), Washington
D.C. for Defendants-Appellants.

Dale Haralson of Haralson. Kinerk & Morey, Tucson, Arizona. and
Ralph E. Hunsaker of O'Connor, Cavanagh. Anderson, Westover.
Killingsworth & Beshears, Phoenix, Arizona (Denneen L. Peterson
of Haralson, Kinerk & Morey: David M. Bell and Scott E. Boehm of
O'Connor, Cavanagh. Anderson, Westover. Killingsworth &
Beshears; Stewart L. Udall of Beer and Toone, Phoenix, Anzona:
J. MacArthur Wright of Wright & Miles, St. George, Utah, with them
on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Before McKAY, SETH, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

In this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80, nearly 1200 named plaintiffs have sued
the United States, alleging some 500 deaths and injuries as a result of
radioactive fallout from open-air atomic bomb tests held in Nevada in
the 1950s and 1960s. The district court selected and tried twenty-four
“bellwether” claims, in order to find a common framework for the
rest.' See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 258 (D. Utah
1984). The court entered final judgment in favor of the government
on fourteen of these claims and against the government on nine,
leaving one claim outstanding. Id. at 446-47. It then granted a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) motion permitting the government to appeal those
claims resolved against it. On appeal the government contends that
(1) the “discretionary function” exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
precludes government liability; (2) the government did not breach
any duty owed to the public; (3) the government did not cause
plaintiffs’ injuries; and (4) the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the
two-year statute of limitations in U.S.C. § 2401(b). We do not discuss
the last three issues, because we agree that the discretionary function
exception precludes government liability.

The district court opinion states the facts fully. See Allen, 588 F.
Supp. at 337-38, 348-50, 358-404. The authority for federal atomic
bomb tests came from the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Pub. L. No.
585, 60 Stat. 755 (“the 1946 Act”). See Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (present version of atomic energy statutes).
Under the 1946 Act, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) received
broad discretionary power to “conduct experiments . . . in the mili-
tary application of atomic energy.” 1946 Act. § 6(a): see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2121(a) (same authority in present statutes).> The AEC was
authonzed to carry on such experiments “only to the extent that the
express consent and direction of the President of the United States

' The trial lasted thirteen weeks. The tnal transcript runs more than 7.000 pages: the
exhibit evidence more than 54,000 pages. The district court deliberated for seven-
teen months, then issued an opinion which occupies 225 pages of the Federal
Supplement.

2In 1974, the AEC was abolished and its functions transferred to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438. 88 Stat. 1233.

has been obtained, which consent and direction shall be obtained at
least once each year.” Id. Additionally, the AEC was “authorized and
directed to make arrangements . . . for . . . the protection of health
during research and production activities.” 1946 Act, § 3(a). These
arrangements were to “contain such provisions to protect health. to
minimize danger from explosion and other hazards to life or prop-
erty .. . as [the AEC] may determine.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2012(d)-(e), 2013(d), 2051(d) (similar provisions in present
Statutes). ee

In 1950 the AEC chose an area in Nevada as a testing site. The
President approved this choice. Thereafter, between 195] and 1962.
eight series of open-air tests were conducted, with the President
approving each series of tests. Over one hundred atomic bombs were
detonated.

Each test explosion was executed according to detailed plans which
the AEC officially reviewed and adopted. Separate plans for protect-
ing the public, and for providing the pubiic with appropriate informa-
tion, were also adopted by the AEC. To actually execute the plans.
however, the AEC delegated some of its authority. The AEC selected
a “Test Manager” for each test series. who had some day-to-day
discretion. The Test Manager could, for example. postpone a given
test because of adverse weather conditions. The Test Manager in turn
delegated authority to a Radiological Safety Officer (a “Radsafe
Officer”) who was in charge of implementing plans to avoid radiation
dangers, and a Test Information Officer who was in charge of impie-
menting plans to provide public information on the tests. Both the
Radsafe Officer and the Test Information Officer also had some day-
to-day discretion in performing their duties.

At tral, as a basis for governmental liability. plaintiffs singled out
the alleged failure of the government. especially of the Radsafe Of-
ficers and the Test Information Officers, to fully monitor offsite fall-
out exposure and to fully provide needed public information on
radioactive fallout. The district court focused on these two failures in
finding government liability. Allen. 588 F. Supp. at 372-404.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes suits for damages
against the United States

“for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.”

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). In such suits, the United States is liable “in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Suit is not allowed, however, for
any claim

“based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid.
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.”

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added). The key term. “discretionary
function,” is not defined. For over thirty-five years the federal courts
have been attempting to define it.

Plaintiffs in the present case attempted to distinguish between the
discretionary initiation of government programs, at the highest levels
of administration, and the decisions involved in carrying out pro-
grams, at lower levels. Plaintiffs argued that while low-level decisions
may involve some “judgment,” they do not fall within the discretion-
ary function exception cf § 2680(a). See. e.g.. Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955) (reference to “operational

level” of activity: no immunity found for government failure to oper-
ate lighthouse). The district court agreed. basing its finding of gov-
emment liability squarely on a distinction between high-level and
low-level government activity. Allen. 588 F. Supp. at 335-40.

After the district court judgment in the present case. the Supreme
Court decided United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio

Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984), in which it ex-
plicitly rejected distinctions based on the administrative level at
which the challenged activity occurred. In Varig, various plaintiffs
brought an FTCA suit against the United States, claiming that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had negligently imple-
mented plane inspection and design certification programs. allowing
improper flammable materials and a defective heater system to be
used to construct a specific Boeing 707 and a specific DeHavilland
Dove. The planes in question caught fire and burned, killing most of
those on board. The Supreme Court held. however, that the United
States was immune from suit. The court found that the contested
FAA actions constituted the performance of a “discretionary func-
tion,’ exempt under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) from potential FTCA lia-
bility. 467 U.S. at 819-21.

The plaintiffs in Varig focused on “low-level” decisions in their
suit. They challenged the actual issuance by the FAA of design
approval certificates for two plane types, the decision to enforce FAA
standards with a particular “spot-check”™ system, and the actual plane
inspections that were and were not carried out under that sytem. 467
U.S. at 799-803, 816-20. The Supreme Court found that each of these
actions constituted a discretionary function, immune from suit under
§ 2680(a):

“ ‘{T]he “discretionary function or duty” that cannot form a
basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the
initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It
necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.’ *

Id. at 811 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15. 35-36
(1953)). The Court emphasized that it is “the nature of the conduct.
rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the dis-

cretionary function exception applies in a given case.” Varig, 467
U.S. at 813.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the AEC, in planning and con-
ducting its monitoring and information programs, was not making
the kind of policy judgments protected by § 2680(a). They point to
the general statutory provisions instructing the AEC to consider pub-
lic health and safety, and claim that these broad congressional direc-
tives leave no further room for discretion. We disagree.

In the case before us, as in Varig, the government actors had a
general statutory duty to promote safety: this duty was broad and
discretionary. In the case before us it was left to the AEC. as in Vang
it was left to the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA, to decide
exactly how to protect public safety. If anything, the obligation
imposed on the FAA to protect public safety was greater and the
discretion granted to the FAA by Congress was less, in the circum-
stances reviewed by Varig, than the comparable obligation imposed
and discretion available to the AEC in the present case. Compare 49
U.S.C. § 1421 (FAA safety duty) with 42 U.S.C. § 205K(d) (AEC
safety duty). We cannot say that what was protected by the Supreme
Court in Varig is now subject to liability.

Plaintiffs further contend that, even if the initial discretion granted
the AEC by statute was broad, test site personnel violated the AEC’s
own policy directives by failing to implement adequate protective
measures. We cannot accept this argument either. Neither the plain-
tiffs nor the district court have been able to point to a single instance
in which test site personnel ignored or failed to implement specific
procedures mandated by the AEC for monitoring and informing the
public. Indeed, the district court’s conclusions appeaf to be based, at
least in part, on perceived inadequacies in the AEC’s radiological
safety and information plans themselves.* The court relied heavily on

* The district court stated that its review of “the various radiation safety plans. public
information plans, and related documents” disclosed the “astounding fact” that no
concerted effort was made “to directly monitor and record internal contamination
or dosage in off-site residents on a comprehensive person-specific basis.” Allen.
588 F. Supp. at 373-74. aa

a 1954 report to the AEC by the Committee to Study Nevada Proving
Grounds which was moderately critical of the measures taken up to
that point to inform and warm the public. See Allen, 588 F. Supp. at
386-90, 392-93. The stated objective of this report, however. was
“(tlo be a basis for Commission decisions on future policy.” Pl. Ex
at 4. The operational plans the district court considered deficient
embody those AEC policy decisions. As such, these plans clearly fall
within the discretionary function exception.*

Government liability cannot logically be predicated on the failure
of test-site personnel to go beyond what the operational plans specifi-
cally required them to do. If, as the plaintiffs maintain, the AEC
delegated “unfettered authority” to a Test Manager and his subordi-
nates to implement public safety programs, this simply compels the
conclusion that those officers exercised considerable discretion. Their
actions, accordingly. also fall within the discretionary function
exception.

It is irrelevant to the—diseretion issue whether the AEC or its
employees were negligent in failing to adequately protect the public.
See Cisco v. United States, 768 F.2d 788, 789 (7th Cir. 1985):
General Public Utilities Corp.. 745 F.2d 239, 243, 245 (3d Cir. 1984).
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985).* When the conduct at issue
involves the exercise of discretion by a government agency or
employee, § 2680(a) preserves governmental immunity “whether or

+ In the one instance which suggested that a subordinate contradicted an official
direction by a superior, the district court quoted at length from a document which
it characterized as a modification or redetermination of AEC policy regarding oft-
site exposure levels by personnel at the “NTS operational level.” Allen. 588 F.
Supp. at 385-86. But the district court was actually quoting from the official
Operations Plan for the RANGER test series which had been annexed as an
appendix to the Rad-Safe Group’s after-series report. Def. Ex 88 at 66, 69.

* It is also irrelevant whether the alleged failure to warn was a maiter of “deliberate
choice.” or a mere oversight. See Allen. 588 F. Supp. at 337-38. We agree with the
treatment of this distinction in Myslakowski v. United States. 806 F.2d 94 (6th Cir
1986). cert. denied. US. (1987):

“The. cntical error in the tnal court’s analysis is in its conclusion that
because the evidence does not show that the departmental policymakers
evaluated the pros and cons of requiring that a warning be given conceming

not the discretion involved be abused.” For better or worse, plaintiffs
here “obtain their ‘right to sue from Congress [and] necessarily must
take it subject to such restrictions as have been imposed. ” Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953) (quoting Federal Housing
Administration v. Burr. 309 U.S. 242, 251 (1940)).°

To be sure, the circumstances in Varig are not identical to those
now before us. Most notably, Varig involved the actions of a regula-
tory agency supervising private individuals. The Court observed in
Varig that the discretionary actions of government regulators were
at the core of what § 2680(a) was intended to protect. But Varig
expressly reaffirmed the earlier Supreme Court decision of Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). which found very broad govern-
mental immunity outside a regulatory setting. See Vang. 467 U.S.
at 810-14.

the rollover propensity of the jeep and then made a discretionary decision

not to give such warnings. it therefore follows that no discretionary decision.

of the kind contemplated by § 2680(a). was made... .
Stated otherwise. even the negligent failure of a discretionary government
policymaker to consider al] relevant aspects of a subject matter under conpid-
eration does not vitiate the discretionary character of the decision that
is made.
Indeed. it is, in part. toe provide immunity against liability for the con-
sequences of negligent failure to consider the relevant. even critical. matters in
discretionary decisionmaking that the statutory exception exists. If it were
otherwise, a judgment-based policy determination made at the highest
levels. to which all would concede that the statutory exception applies (the
decision to sell] surplus jeeps). would resv’) in no immunity if the decision
could be shown to have been made without consideration of important.
relevant factors. or was a decision negligently reached. If that reasoning were
sound, the discretionary function exception would be inapplicable in every
case in which a negligent ‘failure to consider a reievant risk could be
proved.”
~ Id. at 97-98. Accord in re Consolidated United States Atmosphenc Testing Litigation.
616 F. Supp. 759, 776-77 (N.D. Cal.). appeal docketed. No. 85-2842 (9th Cir. 1985).

© Plaintiffs rely heavily upon an AEC policy report accepting responsibilit. for
reimbursing radiation-caused losses. We cannot treat such an agency statement as
waiving the “discretionary function” exclusion Congress placed in the FTCA. The
existence of an adminstrative claims system does not constitute a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. See United States v. Shearer. 473 U.S. 52. . 105 S. Ct.
3039. 3043 n 4 (1985): Feres v. United States. 340 U.S. 135. 144-45 (1950).

In Dalehite, private plaintiffs sued the government over deaths.
injuries, and property damage resulting from a disastrous explosion
of two shiploads of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. 346 U.S. at 22-23.
As with the AEC bomb-testing program before us here, Congress and
the President, in response to international tensions following World
War Il, had decided on a crash government program—in Daichite. a
program to feed the populations of Korea, Japan, and Germany. Id.
at 19-20. Broad general authority was given to the War Department.
and the War Department created a plan for massive fertilizer ship-
ments. The Army's Chief of Ordnance was delegated discretionary
responsibilities for carrying out the War Department plan, and he in
turn appointed a “Field Director of Ammunition Plants” to adminis-
ter the program. id. Other lower-level plant managers and supply
officers were also appointed.

As with the AEC bomb tests, the production of fertilizer in
Dalehite involved a mix of private and public facilities and
employees. Id. at 20-21. As with the AEC bomb tests. all plans for
manufacture, packing, and shipping of the fertilizer in Dalehite were
officially approved. Id. at 38-40. The Dalehite plaintiffs, like the
present plaintiffs, were unable to point to any instances in which
government employees acted negligently in performing specific, man-
datory duties. The Dalehite plaintiffs instead argued primarily. just as
the present plaintiffs argue here. that at various points the govern-
ment could have made better plans, and that the government failed to
fully investigate the hazards of the dangerous material involved and to
fully inform and warn the nearby populace. Id. at 23.

The Supreme Court in Dalehite found every contested government
decision, action, and omission to be the performance of a discretion-
ary function, exempt from suit under § 2680(a): the cabinet-level
decision to export the fertilizer, the lower-level failure to fully test for
explosive properties, the Field Director's fertilizer production plan,
the actual production of the fertilizer in accordance with the govern-
ment specifications, and the specific decisions to bag the fertilizer at
a certain temperature and to label the fertilizer in a certain way. Id. at
24, 36-42. The various actions and omissions of the Coast Guard.
supervising the actual loading of the ships, were also exempted. as

-10-

ee ee

was the general failure to warm the nearby populace of potential
dangers. Id. at 23-24, 43.’

In Varig. The Supreme Court approved the view of § 2680(a)
expressed in Dalehite, strongly rejecting any suggestion that later
cases had narrowed the broad immunity found there. Varig. 467 U.S.
at 810-14. Given the Court's holding in Dalehite, reaffirmed in Varig.
we must conclude that the government is immune from liability for
the failure of the AEC administrators and employees to monitor
radioactivity more extensively or to warn the public more fully than
they did.*

? The Court in Dalehite approved-a series of earlier lower court interpretations of
§ 2680(a). which the Court stated were generally “in conformity with our holding.”
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 n. 32. The cited cases demonstrate the Court's intent in
Dalehite to include extremely low-level and mundane decisions and implementa-
tions of decisions within the discretionary function exception of § 26801a). See.
e.g.. Toledo v. United States. 95 F. Supp. 838. 839, 841 (D.P.R. 1951) (suit over car
damage caused by tree at government facility falling on car: court holds that
§ 2680(a) bars recovery for failure to remove diseased experimental tree. but notes
that negligent removal of tree might not be exempt): Olson v. United States. 93 F.
Supp. 150. 152-53 (D.N.D. 1950) (suit for property damage caused by questionable
discretionary decision of government employees to release flood waters from dam:
court holds that § 2630(a) bars recovery).

o

We have previously followed the command of the Supreme Court in Vang. See
Russel! v. United States . 763 F.2d 786, 787 (i0th Cir. 1985) (no government FTCA
liability possible. for failure of federal mine inspectors to more fully inspect Utah
coal mine). Most of the post- Varig decisions of the other circuits are in accord with
our holding today. See e.g.. Myslakowski v. United States. 806 F.2d 94. 97-99
(6th Cir. 1986) (no liability for Postal Service decision to sell used jeeps. without
warning buyers of jeep propensity to tip over). cert.denied. US.

(1987); Ford v. American Motors Corp. . 770 F.2d 465. 466-68 § Sth Cir.
1985) (same); Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp. . 795 F.2d 301. 306-09 (3d Cir. 1986)
(no liability for GSA decision to sell asbestos without warming of hazards): Merklin
v. United States, 788 F.2d 172. 174-75 (3d Cir. 1986) (no liability for AEC inspec-
tors’ failure to wam uranium proccssing plant employees of health hazards dis-
covered during AEC inspections); Ostera v. United States. 769 F.2d 716. 718 (1lth
Cir. 1985) (no liability for FBI decision to obtain release of particular person from
prison to use as informant): Begay v. United States. 768 F.2d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.
1985) (no liability for U.S. Public Health Service failure to warn uranium miners of
radiation hazards); Cisco v. United States. 768 F.2d 788. 789-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (no
liability for EPA failure to warn residents of landfill dirt contaminated with dioxin):

In the instant case, no evidence was presented of any act or omis-
sion of the AEC or its employees that clearly contravened a specific
Statutory or regulatory duty. or that exceeded statutory or regulatory
authority. There was no evidence, for example, that the Test Informa-
tion Officer failed to release information he was required to give out.
or that the Radsafe Officer failed to take a specific radiation measure-
ment that had been decided upon. Plaintiffs’ entire case rests on the
fact that the government could have made better plans. This is proba-
bly correct, but it is insufficient for FTCA liability.

Our decision here adheres to the principle enunciated by the
Supreme Court of broad sovereign immunity. An, inevitable conse-
quence of that sovereign immunity is that the United States may
escape legal responsibility for injuries that would be compensible if
caused by a private party. There remain administrative and legislative
remedies; we note the express authorization-under 42 U.S.C. § 2012()
for the government to make funds available for damages suffered by
the public from nuclear incidents. Nonetheless, judicial reluctance to

Baxley v. United States, 767 F.2d 1095. 1097-98 (4th Cir. 1985) (no liability for
FAA failure to regulate “ultralight” aircraft); Shuman v. United States. 765 F.2d
283, 291 (Ist Cir. 1985) (no liability for Navy failure to warm shipyard workers of
asbestos hazards): Hylin v. United States, 755 F.2d 551. 554 (7th Cir. 1985) (no
liability for federal mine inspectors’ failure to fully inspect clay mine): Feyers \v.
United States . 749 F.2d 1222, 1227 (6th Cir. 1984) (no liability for Army’s failure to
inspect Chrysler's operation of government-owned railyard). cert. denied. 47! U.S.
1125 (1985):General Public Utilities Corp. v. United States. 745 F.2d 239. 247 (3d
Cir. 1984) (no liability for Nuclear Regulatory Commission's faiiure to warm of
possible equipment defects at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility). cert. denied.
469 U.S. 1228 (1985): Flammia v. United States. 739 F.2d 202. 204 (Sth Cir. 1984)
(no liability for INS'’s “specific operational decision” to permit a Cuban refugee
known to be a convicted felon to enter the United States). But see Aslakson vy.
United States. 790 F.2d 688. 691-94 (8th Cir. 1986) (FTCA liability possible tor
government agency's failure to comply with its own already established safety
policy); Henderson v. United States. 784 F.2d 942. 943 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (FTCA
liability possible, for government missile facility safety decision not made “at the
pianning stage.” but “operational in nature”), Collins v. United States. 783 F.2d
1225, 1228-31 (Sth Cir. 1986) (FTCA liability possible. for failure of Mine Safety
and Health Administration to close mine, when challenged decisions of subordi-
nates did not involve “policy” decisions. or involved only explicit mandatory
duties); Alabama Electric Cooperative v. United States. 769 F.2d 1523. 1526-29
(1th Cir. 1985) (FTCA liability possible. for “operational” decisions of Army
Corps of Engineers in constructing river dikes).

-]2-

a

Ce

Ne weticousalh

recognize the sometimes harsh principle of sovereign immunity
explains much of the tangle of the prior FTCA cases.

The Court stated in Varig that the purpose of § 2680(a) was to
avoid any judicial intervention that “would require the courts to
‘second-guess’ the political, social, and economic judgments of an
agency.” 467 U.S. at 814. The bomb-testing decisions made by the
President, the AEC, and all those to whom they were authorized to
delegate authority in the 1950s and 1960s, were among the most
significant and controversial choices made during that period. The
government deliberations prior to these decisions expressly balanced
public safety against what was felt to be a national necessity, in light
of national and international security. However erroneous or mis-
guided these deliberations may seem today. it is not the place of the
judicial branch to now question them.

For the above reasons, we find all challenged actions surrounding
the government atomic bomb tests in the 1950s and 1960s to be
immune from suit, as the performance by a federal agency of a
“discretionary function,” protected by § 2680(a).

We REVERSE the district court’s decision with regard to those
nine claims in which the government was found to have liability and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY)

No. 84-2126 — IRENE H. ALLEN. et al. v. UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA. McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:

It undoubtedly will come as a surprise to many that two hundred
years after we threw out King George III, the rule that “the king can
do no wrong” still prevails at the federal level in all but the most
trivial of matters. After the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982) (FTCA), many people, as well as the
lower federal courts, assumed that the old governmental immunity
from responsibility for negligent conduct that injures individual
citizens was gone. Many endorsed what appeared to be the FTCA’s
policy that if the citizens at large benefited from a government pro-
gram, that coliective citizenry, not the isolated individual injured by
the negligent conduct of the program, would bear the economic
burden of that injury. This case dramatically illustrates that, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in United States v. S.A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
the FTCA (and for that matter Congress's injunction that a program
be carried out safely) is largely a false promise in all but “fender
benders” and perhaps some cases involving medical malpractice by
government doctors.

When Congress decided to employ above-ground testing. it repeat-
edly evinced the general intent that the tests should be conducted so
as not to jeopardize the health and safety of the population down-
wind.' However, it did not delineate the health and safety measures
to be taken. No mention is made of how fallout from open-air
testings should be monitored or how the public should be educated
regarding the effects of fallout—the two issues litigated in this case.
The responsibility for developing defined health and safety plans and
for disseminating information was instead delegated to the AEC.

Based on ample evidence, the trial court found that the people who
designed the downwind safety program deviated from optimum prac-
tices based on the best available scientific knowledge. On a fully

' See The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 and The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1982 & Supp. III 1985}). For detailed discussion of the two act's safety provisions.
see Allen v. United States. 588 F. Supp. 247, 348-50 (D. Utah 1984).

Diente — _ , —

supported record, the trial court found the following deviations in the
plans which would clearly support liability for injury under standard
tort analysis as applied by the trial court: the decision to monitor
randomly rather than on a “comprehensive, person-specific basis,”
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 374 (D. Utah 1984): deci-
sions not to use thyroid or whole body counters, id. at 375; decisions
regarding the limited extent of urine, fecal. and blood sampling. id. at
374; the decision not to test milk samples “in order to avoid arousing
public concern,” id. at 375; the decisions to forego internal fallout
assessment from inhalation of fallout particles, id. at 376: decisions
regarding the extent of follow-up monitoring in downwind com-
munities, id. at 379; the decision to distribute film badges and pocket
dosimeters to a select number of residents rather than to every resi-
dent, id. at 379-81, 384-85; the decisions regarding duration of
monitoring, id. at 381; the decisions with respect to the quantum of
personnel and equipment committed to the monitoring program. id.
at 381-82; and the decisions concerning the content and appropriate
tone of the information given the public as well as the decisions to
use pamphlets and films as the education media, id. at 385-404.

Again, on a fully supported record, the trial court found that these
departures from accepted safety standards were the proximate cause
of suffering and death from cancer in many of the plaintiffs. Under
the then-available legal precedents, the tnal court reasonably con-
cluded that the FTCA showed Congress’s intent that the Government.
which benefited from the testing. should bear these particular costs.
The critical analysis dealt with Congress’ decision in the FTCA to
exempt from liability those government acts broadly and vaguely
described as “discretionary functions.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

At the time of the tnal court's decision, the leading construction of
that provision by the Supreme Court was Dalehite v. United States.
346 JS. 15 (1953). Language in Dalehite invited some courts to
focus on the bureaucratic level of the decision maker in determining
whether the ensuing decision or action was clothed with immunity
under the discretionary function exception. Cabinet-level actions
were considered clearly of a “planning” nature and thus immune.
A vehicular collision resulting from driver negligence involved “oper-
ational” action and was not immune. See Dalehite. 346 U.S. at 28.

r,

37. Struggling to give meaning to the elusive terms “discretionary
function.” and noting particularly the subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court in Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957), and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955),
some courts thought the Supreme Court intended to narrow the
sweep of its Dalehite interpretation of that exception. See. e.g.. Relf
v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 423, 427 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd. 593 F.2d
1371 (D.C. Cir: 1979). Following that pattern. the trial court in this
case focused on the decisions made at the operational level. It con-
cluded they were not immune.

Since the appeal was lodged in this case, the Supreme Court
decided Varig Airlines. That opinion removed all doubt as to whether
the discretionary function exception is to be construed broadly or
narrowly. In Varig the Court explicitly denounced both the
increasingly narrow construction given the exception since Dalehite
and the interpretation of Dalehite that focused on the bureaucratic
level of the decision maker. The Court stated, “[I]t is the nature of
the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether
the discretionary function applies in a given case.” Varig Airlines.
467 U.S. at 813. it breathed vitality into Dalehite by selectively quot-
ing language other than the planning/operational language most often
cited previously: “Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion.” Id. at 81! (quoting Dalehite, 346 U.S. at
36). The Court thus shifted the discretionary function inquiry back
toward examining the nature and character of the governmental
action to determine whether it is of the type intended to be protected
from tort liability by Congress. Those decisions “grounded in social.
economic, and political policy.” id. at 814, are insulated from our
review, regardless of who the decision maker happens to be or how
negligent the decision or action may be.

The majority opinion fully deals with the Supreme Court's focus in
Varig Airlines. It is sufficient here to note that the focus is on the
nature of the planning or decision making rather than on the level at
which that planning or its implementation takes place. While that
may create analytical problems even in automobile accident cases
where the driver is left to “plan” how to drive and carry out his
mission in the most economic fashion. both the facts and language of

ote

Varig easily cover the facts of this case. Vang involved an allegedly
faulty safety inspection program for aircraft. The factual paralle!
to the safety programs at issue here cannot be distinguished on a
principled basis. Varig Airlines gives little help to lower courts apply-
ing the new standard to specific facts—if the FTCA waiver of immu-
nity indeed applies to anything but trivial government failures. such
as automobile accidents. Nonetheless, it removes all doubt that
the discretionary function exception swallows the negligent decisions
before us.

The AEC devised safety and information plans pnor to every
open-air detonation, tailoring the plans to the demands of each spe-
cific project. None of the tnal court’s documented list of failures
represents an instance of deviation from, or negligent implementation
of, the safety and information plans adopted.? Rather. the court's
extensive criticisms and ultimate conclusions of negligence were
directed at the substance and failures of the plans themselves.

On appeal, plaintiffs do assert that “the evidence clearly demon-
Strates negligent and wrongful failure to execute and deviation from
. . . the plans approved by the Commission.” Brief for the Appellee
at 22 (emphasis in original). However, the evidence does not support
this allegation. Not one example is given of a failure to monitor or
distribute information as prescribed in the plans.* Rather. plaintiffs

2 If the evidence had demonstrated such deviation or negligent implementation.
neither Varig Airlines nor Dalehite would bar our review. Both those cases confirm
that conformity to a discretionary plan insulates the governmental action from
review. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 (“It necessarily follows that acts of subordi-
nates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable.” ): Varig Airlines. 467 U.S. ai 820 (acts of FAA
employees immune from review because dictated by immune policy-based pro-
gram). Deviation from an immune plan or negligent implementation of an immune
plan. however. can strip the action of the discretionary function exception. for such
governmental action does not involve the type of social. economic. or political
policy considerations ai the core of the exception

> At one point in their bref, plaintiffs state that the test manager “authonzed [the
radsafety} officers to go beyond the information radsafety plans.” Bnef for the
Appellee at 57. In other words. the test manager authorized the officers to deviate
from the plan. Plaintiff argues that because the officers were so authonzed. their
failure to deviate froni the plan subjects the Government to liability. This reasoning

-4-

challenge. mirroring the trial court's concerns, goes toward the failure
of the plans to specifically prescribe greater monitoring or more
diffuse and in-depth information distribution. Plaintiffs’ statement
that “test site personnel negligently and wrongfully failed to imple-
ment basic radiological protection measures which were common at
the time,” id. at 24 (emphasis added), demonstrates the true charac-
ter of their allegations. Plaintiffs concede as much by stating that the
trial court “determined that the fallout monitoring program and infor-
mation program which coincided with the 1951-1962 open-air testing
at the Nevada test site did not comport with the ‘best available
scientific knowledge.” ” Id. at 42-43 (emphasis added).

In arguing that the safety and information plans themselves are not
immune from our review under the discretionary function exception,
plaintiffs contend:

Where Congress has placed a mandatory duty upon the govern-
ment to protect public health and safety, such as it did upon the
Commission, it left no room for further policy-making
regarding public safety. Where there is not policy-making there
is no “discretion” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
and no immunity.

Id. at 13. Essentially, they assert that because the two Atomic Energy
Acts demonstrate a concern for public health and safety. even though
no specific health and safety measures are mandated therein, the
safety plans devised to address that concern involved no social.
economic, or political policy making.

On the contrary, the broad safety language of the Atomic Energy
Acts had to be translated into concrete plans. and that translation
involved the very essence of social, economic, and political decision
making—the precise policy choices protected by the discretionary
function exception. See General Pub. Util. Corp. v. United States,
745 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1984) (means chosen by Nuclear Regula-

is at direct odds with Varig Airlines and Dalehite. See supra note 2. It is just such
deviation from a discretionary plan that can deprive the action of the protection of
the discretionary function exception

tory Commission to fulfill its broad statutory duty to review safety of
nuclear facilities protected by discretionary function exception), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985). These decisions concerned choices

involving the social psychology of how best to inform without alarm-
ing residents, the most cost-effective way of using public funds to
monitor fallout levels, and how best to use a finite number of person-
nel. In short, they required the AEC “to establish priorities for the
accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives
sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing
and funding.” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820. While those choices
deviated from the standards against which liability is measured where
liability is available, Congress’ determination to retain government
immunity for “discretionary functions.” as understood post-Varig
Airlines, puts those choices beyond our ability to review and puts
compensation for injury to individuals stemming from those choices
beyond our power to order.

While we have great sympathy for the individual cancer victims
who have borne alone the costs of the AEC’s choices, their plight is a
matter for Congress. Only Congress has the constitutional power to
decide whether all costs of government activity will be bore by all
the beneficiaries or will continue to be unfairly apportioned, as in this
case. Until Congress amends the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA or passes a specific relief bill for individual victims. we
have no choice but to leave them uncompensated. I must therefore
concur in the majority opinion which has carefully reviewed and
applied the controlling law to the facts of this case.

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the Federal District Court

District of Utah, filed May 10, 1984

4
ss
LP
‘
Aa
4
M
+
‘4
|
*
B
= 1.6315789 x 10

-10- No. C 79-0515-J

(2) 3.2 x 10 + 4.5 x 10"' = ?
(3.2 + 4.5) x 10°8- ') = .71111 x 10’ or
7.111 X 10%—a short way of saying 7,111,000.
(3) 1.62 x 10°? + 6.04 x 10° = ?
(1.62 + 6.04) x 10"-?)-® = 2682 x 10-* or
2.682 - or 1/106
milli m 10> * or 11.000
micro rv 10-° or 1/1.000.000
nano n i:

pico Pp 10- '-

femto f 10>!

atto a it)" +

Simply by referring to Table 1, one can determine what multiple
or fraction of a standard unit is being discussed in the text. Quick
reference to Table | prefixes will aid the reader in identifying the
units used and in making a meaningful comparison of quantities.

B. The Atom: Protons, Neutrons and Electrons

After centuries of careful observation, our best answer to
Thales’ 2,500-year-old question ‘What is the world made of?”
seems to be that all matter is composed of atoms. See G. Amaldi,
The Nature of Matter (1966). Atoms are very tiny packages of
mass which have specific physical qualities.'* In the natural world
around us, science has identified 92 species of atoms commonly
referred to as elements. Each element has unique physical and
chemical properties. Each element's atoms differ slightly in struc-
ture and composition from the atoms of any other element. Some
elements are familiar: copper, iron, oxygen. gold, carbon. calcium
and two dozen others are well known as part of our own chemical

$3.

No. C 79-0515-J

makeup, or as part of the everyday world around us. Others. such
as praseodymium, rubidium, and polonium, are far more obscure.
Each, however, represents a different type of atom.

In addition to the 92 “natural” elements, scientists have pro-
duced a dozen more “synthetic” elements, such as plutonium.
which are heavier, and often more unstable and short-lived than
their “natural” brethren.'> A complete list of the known chemical
elements is found in Table 2.

Table 2 THE ELEMENTS*
Atomic Element's Chemical Atomic Element’s Chemical
Number Hame Symbol Number Name Symbol
] Hydrogen H 33 Arsenic As
2 Helium He 34 Selenium Se
3 Lithium Li 35 Bromine Br
4 Beryllium Be % Krypton Kr
5 Boron B 37 Rubidium Rb
& Carbon 38 Strontium Sr
7 Nitrogen N 39 Yttnum Y
8 Oxygen oO 40 Zirconium Zr
9 Fluorine F 4} Niobium Nb
10 Neon Ne 42 Molybdenum Mo
1] Sodium Na 43 Technetium Te
12 Magnesium Mg at Ruthemium Ru
13 Aluminum Al 45 Rhodium Rh
14 Silicon Si 46 Palladium Pd
15 Phosphorus P 47 Silver Ag
16 Sultur S 48 Cadmium Cd
17 Chlorine Ci 49 Indium In
18 Argon Ar SO Tin Sn
19 Potassium K 5] Antimony Sb
20 Calcium Ca 52 Tellunum Te
21 Scandium Sc 53 lodine l
22 Titanium Ti Ss Xenon Xe
23 Vanadium Vv 55 Cesium Cs
24 Chromium Cr So Barium Bu
25 Manganese Mn 37 Lanthanum La
26 Iron Fe 58 Cenum Ce
27 Cobalt Co 59 Praseodymium Pr
28 Nickel Ni 60 Neodymium Nd
29 Copper Cu 6] Promethium Pm
30 Zinc Zn 62 Samanum Sm
3] Gallium Ga 63 Europium Eu
32 Germanium Ge 64 Gadolinium Gd

en

-}3- No. C 79-05i5-J

Table 2 (continued)

Atomic Elements Chemical Atomic Elements Chemical
Number Hame Symbo! Number Name Symbol
65 Terbium Tb 86 Radon Rn
66 Dysprosium Dy 87 Francium Fr
67 Holmium Ho 88 Radium Ra
68 Erbium Er 89 Actinium Ac
69 Thulium Tm 90 Thorium Th
70 Ytterbium Yb 9] Protactinium Pis
7I Lutetium Lu 9 Uranium U
72 Hafnium Ht 93 Neptunium Np
73 Tantalum Ta O4 Plutonium Pu
74 Tungsten W 95 Americium Am
75 Rhenium Re 96 Cunum Cm
76 Osmium Os 97 Berkelium Bk
Pf Indium ir 9% Califomium Ct
78 Platinum Pr 99 Einsteinium Es
799 Gold Au 100 Fermium Fm
80 Mercury He 10] Mendelevium Md
8] Thatiium TI 102 Nobelium No
82 Lead Pb 103 Lawrencium Lw
83 Bismuth Bi 104 (Kurchatovium) Ku
84 Polonium Po 105 (Hahnium) Ha
85 Astatine Al

*See also Appendix D. infra.

The differences between atoms of different elements are ac-
counted for by variations in their composition and structure. All
atoms are thought to be composed of three types of smaller parti-
cles: protons, neutrons and electrons. A proton is a tiny particle
with a mass of approximately 1.672 x 10°°4 gm. or 1.007 atomic
mass units.'© Each proton carries a positive electric charge.'? An
electron is a particle with a negative electric charge equivalent to
that of a proton but with 1/1837 the mass of a proton, or 5.5 x 104
amu. An electron has a diameter of approximately | x 10°'* cm. A
neutron is a subatomic particle having no electric charge (hence
the name) yet having a mass of 1.0087 amu—-slightly heavier than
a proton. An atom of a particular element represents a specific
combination of protons, neutrons and electrons.

Far from being randomly distributed within an atom, these parti-
cles are ordered according to specific principles of structure:

-]4- No. C 79-0515-J

(1) Each atom contains a nucleus at its center;
(2) Protons and neutrons are located within the nucleus:

(3) The nucleus is tiny in relation to the atom itself. comprising
about 1/100,000th of the volume of the atom, yet containing al-
most all of its mass; :

(4) Electrons orbit the nucleus in constant motion. and in pat-
terns better described using the physics of standing waves;!*

(5) An electrostatically neutral atom is one with an equal num-
ber of electrons and protons; an atom with an imbalance of pro-
tons and electrons will itself act as a charged particle. called an
ion. lons—electrically charged atoms—are often far more reactive
with other atoms than are neutral, un-ionized atoms:

(6) Electrons are distributed in the space around the nucleus in
stable orbitals, which correspond to a discrete amount of energy.
often called an energy state:

(7) Only certain energy states. or orbitals. are allowed in atoms
of a given element:

(8) An electron may move from one energy level to a higher
energy level, by absorbing energy from an outside source in an
amount equal to the difference between the two energy levels: an
electron may fall to a lower energy level by emitting energy in the
amount of the difference between the two levels. The energy is
emitted in the form of a photon.!?

An electron may absorb energy (i.e.. become “excited™) to a
degree sufficient to allow it to leave the atom altogether. This
phenomenon is called ionization, and is the key to innumerable
chemical reactions.

The simplest element is hydrogen, whose atoms consist of a
single proton in the nucleus and a single electron in the surround-
ing orbitals. The number of protons in the nucleus determines the
number of electrons in the atom’s orbital shells. which has a

i:

-15- No. C 79-0515-J

significant effect on the atom’s chemical characteristics. The num-
ber of protons is often referred to as the atomic number and is
identified in the literature by the symbol Z. An element's atomic
number determines its place in an important scheme of classifica-
tion known as the Periodic Table. See Table 3. The elements in
each column grouping, or period, share similar electron structures,
physical and chemical properties. See I. Asimov, Understanding
Physics: The Electron, Proton, and Neutron 13-18 (1966); C. Ham-
mond, “The Elements.” in Handbook of Chemistry and Physics.
pp. B-2 to B-40 (64th ed. Weast 1983).

In addition to the atomic number, atoms are described according
to atornic weight, symbolized by the letter A, which quantifies the
total mass of an atom as expressed in atomic mass units (amu).
The atomic weight of hydrogen is approximately 1.00797 amu. the
single proton being the source of almost all of its mass. Heavier
elements have nuclei containing neutrons as well as more protons.
Helium, for example, has two protons and (usually) two neutrons
in its nucleus, giving it an atomic number (Z) of 2 and atomic
weight (A) of approximately 4.0026. While varying the number of
protons will change the atom from one element to another. varying
the number of neutrons changes the atomic weight of the atom
without radically affecting its physical or chemical properties.
Atoms of the same element which have different numbers of neu-
trons in the nucleus are referred to as isotopes of the element.
Hydrogen, for example. has three isotopes: the most common
form. protium, has no neutrons; deuterium, or heavy hydrogen.
has one proton and one neutron; tritium, the heaviest. has two
neutrons for each proton. Isotopes are often referred to by an
abbreviation of their atomic weights called a mass number. Radi-
um (Z = 88, A = 226.054) becomes simply radium 226 or 7?Ra.
Radium 224 (A = 224.0202) is another isotope of the same ele-
ment having two less neutrons. In lighter elements the number of
neutrons and protons in the nucleus tends to be equal. or nearly so.
In the heavier elements toward the bottom of the Periodic Table,
neutrons outnumber protons. Lead, for example, has 82 protons (Z
= 82) and an average of 115 neutrons (A = 207.19) in its nuclei.
compared to Calcium (Z = 20, A = 40.08) or Neon (Z = 10. A
= 20.183).

tht cs,

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ac at ant sz rz té iti 10°'? cm) which are of particular interest to this lawsuit.

-18- No. C 79-0515-]

Differences in photon energy are crucial. We are constantly
awash in an invisible ocean of radio waves which pass by—and
through—our bodies with no perceivable harmful effect. However.
exposure tO gamma rays, which easily may be one-hundred trillion
(10'*) times more powerful than broadcast radio waves. raises
serious human health concerns. See Part 1V, infra.

At the end of the last century, scientists in Europe led by
Wilhelm Roentgen discovered basic techniques for producing high
energy photons—*x-rays.” Roentgen called them—in the labora-
tory. By bombarding a metal plate within a sealed glass vacuum
tube with high-voltage electrons. invisible radiation was produced
which would cause certain chemicals to fluoresce brilliantly. and
which could fog-er-darken photographic plates wrapped in paper.
or even concealed within a box. See S. Glasstone. Sourcebook on
Atomic Energy 48-5] (2d ed. 1958); I. Asimov, Understanding
Physics: The Electron, Proton and Neutron 33-35 (1966). In 1896.
the French physicist Henri Becquerel discovered that the same
kind of penetrating radiation emanated from uranium salts.°? In
1898, Marie Curie gave this phenomenon of constant emission of
penetrating. ionizing radiation the name radioactivity. S. Glass-
tone. Sourcebook on Atomic Energy. at 53: see Mme.
Sklodowska-Curie, 126 Comptes Rendus 110] (1898). One of the
first properties observed in both x-rays and radioactive substances
was the induction of an electrical charge in the air surrounding an
x-ray tube or immediately in contact with a sample of radioactive
material. This ionizing effect enabled early researchers to detect
such radiation using very simple devices. “[T]o detect nuclear
particles we detect ionization.” E. Pollard & W. Davidson.
Applied Nuclear Physics 43 (1942) (emphasis in original). Radia-
tion detection and measurement techniques are still very heavily
dependent upon this particular quality. See_e.g.. N. Tsoulfanidis.
Measurement and Detection of Radiation (1983).°* As we shall
see, the adverse health effects of exposure to radiation are also a
product of ionization. See Pari 1V infra.

D. lonizing Radiation: Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Rays.

Early research work done by Ernest Rutherford and others using
heavy radioactive elements such as radium. polonium. thorium

-19- No. C 79-0515-J

and uranium, disclosed that ionizing radiation emanating from
radioactive materials could be resolved into three different types:
alpha rays (a), beta rays (B) and gamma rays (y). Application of a
strong magnetic field to a stream of ionizing radiation emitted by a
sample of radium salts readily deflected beta rays in a fashion
indicating that beta radiation carries a negative charge. See Fig. 1.
Less easily deflected in the opposite direction were alpha rays.
which were deduced to have a positive electrostatic charge and
greater momentum than beta rays. Gamma rays passed undeflected
by the strongest magnetic fields: their highly penetrating qualities
led researchers to conclude that gamma rays and x-rays were very
similar (which they are). See e.g., J. Cork, Radioactivity and
Nuclear Physics 11 (1947). Soon it was determined that beta rays
exhibited all the properties of high-energy electrons. while alpha
rays were identified as consisting of the nuclei of helium atoms
stripped of both outer electrons. Both gamma rays and x-rays were
found to consist of very short wavelength high-energy photons.°+

Of crucial importance was the discovery that radioactivity is the
product of internal processes within the nucleus of the atom rather
than the result of excitation by some undetected outside source of
energy. Radioactivity properties are unaffected by external forces.
such as heat. light or pressure. or by any chemical reaction.-*
Instead. they operate according to specific principles of nuclear
physics.

The basic principle finds simple expression in the work of
Pollard and Davidson: “This process, the passage from one nearly
stable nucleus to one which is stable, is the underlying process of
radioactivity.” Applied Nuclear Physics 102 (1942). Recalling that
the nuclei of atoms are made up of various combinations of pro-
tons and neutrons, and that within atoms of a given element, the
ratio of neutrons to protons may vary from isotope to isotope.
careful observation of radioactive properties reveals that some pro-
ton/neutron ratios tend to be far more stable than others. Radio-
activity represents the mechanism of internal adjustment by which
less stable nuciei transform their composition into a proton
neutron ratio having greater stability. Emission of an alpha parti-
cle, for example, lightens the nucleus in evenhanded fashion: the
numbers of neutrons and protons are each reduced by 2. Radio-

-20- No. C 79-0515-J

Ro

i
l'IG. 4.

1. The a-rays are very slightly penetrating, and appear to constitute the principal
part of the radiation. These rays are characterised by the laws by which they are
absorbed by matter. The magnetic field acts very slightly upon them. and they were
formerly thought to be quite unaffected by the action of this field. However. in a
strong magnetic field, the a-rays are slightly deflected: the deflection is caused in the
same manner as with cathode rays, but the direction of the deflection is reversed: it
is the same as for the canal rays of the Crookes tubes.

Il. The B-rays are less absorbable as a whole than the preceding ones. They are
deflected by a magnetic field in the same manner and direction as cathode rays.

Ill. The y-rays are penetrating rays, unaffected by the magnetic field. and com-
parable to ROntgen rays.

Consider the following imzzinary experiment:—Some radium. R. is placed at the
bottom of a small deep cavity. hollowed in a block of lead. p (Fig.4). A sheaf of rays.
rectilinear and slightly expanded, streams from the receptacle. Let us suppose that a
strong uniform magnetic field is established in the neighbourhood of the receptacle.
normal to the plane of the figure and directed towards the back. The three groups of
rays. a, B. ‘y, will now be separated. Then rather faint y-rays continue in their
Straight path without a trace of deviation. The B-rays are deflected in the manner of
cathode rays, and describe circular paths in the plane of the figure. If the receptacle
is placed on a photographic plate, a C, the portion, B C, of the plate which receives
the B-rays is acted upon. Lastly, the a-rays form a very intense shaft which is slightly
deflected, and which is soon absorbed by the air. These rays describe in the plane of
the figure a path of great curvature, the direction of the deflection being the reverse
of that with the B-rays.

If the receptacle is covered with a thin sheet of aluminium (0.1 m.m. thick). the
a-rays are suppressed alrnost entirely, the B-rays are lessened. and the y-rays do not
appear to be absorbed to any great extent.

AL

Fig. 1. Mme. Mane Sklodowska Curie, Radioactive Substances. thesis presented to
the Faculty of Sciences. Paris. 1903 (pap. reprint ed. 1961), at 33-34.

84),.°° such as uranium
(Z = 92, A = 238), which ultimately “decay” to the very stable
nuclear structure found in lead 206 (Z = 82. A = 206):

SP “Pb + tHe (a-particle)

A nucleus which has a greater ratio of neutrons to protons than
is found in more stable forms may emit a beta particle (B-)—a
high energy negative electron—as one of the neutrons is trans-
formed into a proton. Strontium-90, with 38 protons and 52 neu-
trons, is radioactive. It decays by B-emission into Yttrium-90, with
39 protons and 5] neutrons. Yttrium-90 in turn decays into
Zirconium-90 by B-emission. Zirconium-90 with 40 protons to 50
neutrons, is the stable, naturally predominate isotope of that ele-
ment. Radioactivity ceases.

8S —L—e wy —£_. 07 r (stable)

Atoms with an overabundance of protons may decay by emitting
a positively charged electron, or positron (B + ), or by capturing an
electron from a nearby orbital. Either process reduces the number
of protons and increases the number of neutrons by |. For
example,

'30

'$N (stable) + B+ (positron)

When the radioactivity properties of the nuclides?’ are plotted on
a graph of numbers of neutrons (N) and protons (Z), a pattern
emerges. See Fig. 2.

Radioactive decay enhances nuclear stability not only by adjust-
ing the total number of particles, but also by carrying away dis-
crete bundles, or quanta, of energy from the nucleus. Alpha parti-
cles don't quietly drift away from the nucleus of Plutonium-239;
they are propelled away at high speed with an energy of more than
5 MeV—five million electron volts. While 5 MeV is a trifling
amount of energy in the sphere of human endeavors, at the atomic
level it is enormous. In 1919, Rutherford bombarded nitrogen
atoms with a particles of lesser energy. The a particles slammed
into the nitrogen nuclei, yielding oxygen nuclei—a different ele-
ment—and a free proton:

$He (a particle) + '3N

'XO + {H (proton)

130

110

100

Neutron number, NV

-22- No. C 79-0515-J

> &
& % HE
CRRIRRAIN ER
= NSS PNB aN!
; : ge

\ ie *i2Rn + 3He + Q (energy)

After another 1,600 years, only half of that remainder is still
226Ra (0.25 gm). Passage of 1,600 more years witnesses decay of
one-half of that fraction, leaving 1/8 gram (0.125 gm) of 77°Ra.

i
G

-24- No. C 79-0515-J

The process of decay continues at this rate until no more °°°Ra
remains. To say, therefore, that a radionuclide such as stron-
tium-90 has a half-life of 28.1 years means that half of the quan-
tity existing at the beginning of the 28.1 years remains %Sr at the
end of that time.

Half-life varies dramatically from radionuclide to radionuclide.
Some isotopes last for half-lives of only a few seconds; others last
far longer. Uranium (*38U), although radioactive, has a half-life of
4.51 x 10° years—nearly the age of the earth itself. See R. Heath.
“Table of the Isotopes,” in Handbook of Chemistry and Physics
B-232 to B-316 (64th ed. Weast 1983).°° Half-life is indicative not
only of the persistence of a radionuclide in the laboratory or the
environment, but also of the intensity of its radioactive decay.
Radiation yielded by one gram of iodine-!36, an isotope found in
the fireball of a nuclear explosion, is intense: emitting B particles
and y rays in the MeV range, '*] decays rapidly. reflecting a half-
life of 83 seconds.

11 -----= '3Xe (stable) + B — +y + Q (energy)

Consequently its radioactivity fades rapidly. After 15 minutes. less
than 1/2000 of the original amount is identifiable as '*¢]. After an
hour more, the fraction remaining is nearly 2.28 x 10°'* of the
original amount. In contrast, Plutonium-239, a radionuclide pres-
ent in every nuclear fallout cloud to date.*! persists with a half-life
of 24.400 years. Consequently, all but a fraction of the estimated 3
tons of 749Pu deposited on the earth by fallout can still be found
somewhere. See ‘‘Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation.”
Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation (1977). PX-706/DX-605 [hereinafter cited as
the UNSCEAR Report (1977)], at 148.

Half-life is not an average lifetime for a radionuclide:*? it is an
expression of rate, of the statistical probability of decay over a
specific time period

The half-life of a radionuclide gives some immediate insight
into its behavior and the nature of the hazard that might be
associated with it. A small quantity of radionuclide with a
half-life in the order of minutes will not persist long enough

-25- No. C 79-0515-J

to present a significant hazard a few days later and it is not
likely to become dispersed very far by natural forces. In
contrast, a radionuclide with a half-life on the order of sev-
eral years may represent a long-term hazard and become
widely dispersed if not held in containment... .

F. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and the
Environment 44 (1982). The quantity of radioactive material that
persists in relation to the number of half-lives is illustrated in
Fig. 3.

PERCENT OF ORIGINAL
NUMBER OF RADIOACTIVE ATOMS

30
20 F
Or
4 4 1 4
' 2 3 4 3 6

NUMBER OF HALF LIVES

Fig. 3. Relationship of time, expressed as number of half-lives. to the quantity of a
radioactive subsiance.

Quantity of radioactive material may be expressed in either of
two ways: (1) the mass of the material: or (2) its radioactivity. To

3

-26- No. C 79-05]5-J

say, however, that a sample of Strontium-90 has a mass of x. grams
does not by itself offer any perspective on the amount of ionizing
radiation being emitted by the sample at any given moment. The
activity of a known mass of radioactive material may be computed
as follows:

A* ~_ 0.693mN,
T,oAF,

Where A* is the activity of the sample:

m is the mass of the sample:

A is the atomic weight of the radionuclide:

T,,> is the half-life in years (or whatever):

F, is the conversion factor from years (or whatever) to a desired
time period, e.g. minutes; seconds, etc.

N, 1S a constant, known as Avogadro's number, expressing the
number of atoms in a mole (a mass in grams equal to the nuclide’s
atomic weight) of material. See F. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radio-
ecology: Nuclear Energy and the Environment, supra at 45. For
example, a 1.2 gram sample of sodium-24, an important radio-
active by-product of nuclear weapons testing having a half-life of
15.0 hours, would have an initial activity of

A* (0.693)(1.2 grams)(6.022 x 10°* atoms/moles)
(15.0 hours)(24 grams/mole)(3600 seconds/hr. )

= 3,864 x 10!’ disintegrations per second.

This activity represents a rate of emission paralleling that of a
sample of pure radium-226 having a mass of 1.0557 x 10’ grams.
or 10.5 metric tons. Of course, 74Na activity would fade quickly in
comparison to the 77®Ra; the mean life of *4Na atoms would be
21.64 hours, while atoms in our 10.5 metric tons would persist for
a mean life of 2,308.8 years, making it a far more serious hazard
overall. 34

Expression of radioactivity in terms of rate of decay (e.g.. disin-
tegrations per second) is a common measurement. The most fre-
quently used unit of activity is the curie (Ci), which represents a
mass undergoing 3.7 x 10'° disintegrations per second. Practical
quantities of radioactive materials are more easily expressed in
fractional units, such as millicuries (mCi), microcuries (wCi). or
picocuries (pCi), representing 10°*, 10°° and 10°! curies. respec-

-27- No. C 79-0515-J

tively.*4 A tiny new unit, the Becquerel (Bq). represents an ac-
tivity of one disintegration per second, or the equivalent of 27 pCi.
Yet the radioactive fallout yield of even a “nominal” nuclear de-
vice is more easily expressed in megacuries—millions of curies of
activity.

Measurement in curies does not. however. define the type or
energy of the radiation being emitted. That information is specific
to each radionuclide and is important to the evaluation of the risk
created by exposure to curie, millicurie, or microcurie amounts of
material.

F. Interactions of Radiation with Matter

Each type of radiation emitted by radioactive materials interacts
with other matter in important yet distinct ways. Alpha particles
carry an electrostatic charge of +2 units. When an a particle
passes near another atom, the electrons in its orbital shells are as
attracted to the a particle by virtue of their own negative (-)
charge. Some electrons are merely excited by the event, 1.e., they
move from a lower to a higher energy state while remaining in
orbit around the nucleus. For many others. however, the coulombic
attractions of the a particles are too strong: these electrons are
stripped away from their original atoms and travel freely for a
time, leaving the mother atom in an ionized state. Balance of
electric charges is soon restored, but #n reaching neutrality, some
atoms form new combinations with other atoms—new molecules
are born. In many ways, an a particle can be visualized as a tiny.
speedy electromagnet. sweeping free electrons into its path.

The electrostatic attraction is a mutual one; the electrons in
nearby atoms are attracted by — and attract — the speeding a
particles. The coulombic forces energize the electrons, pulling
them away from atoms by giving them sufficient energy to escape.
At the same time the electrons act as a drag on the a@ particle. Its
energy is reduced by the amount that the electrons’ energy is
increased. According to fundamental physical law.*> the energy is
conserved, neither created or destroyed. The ionization that occurs
in the path of an a particle represents a transfer of energy. The
amount of energy transferred per unit of distance traveled by the a
particle is known as a linear energy transfer (LET). See e.g..

-28- No. C 79-0515-J

Committee on the Biological Effects of lonizing Radiations, The
Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation: 1980, at 13 (1980), DX-1025 (hereinafter cited as the
“BEIR-Iil Report”). Alpha radiation is “high-LET™ radiation: so
many electrons are excited or ionized by a particles that a great
deal of energy is transferred in a short distance. The range of an a
particle traveling through matter thus tends to be fairly short.
As soon as the @ particle has transferred the bulk of its energy.
it slows down sufficiently to capture two electrons of its own.
becoming a neutral, inert helium atom.*°

The range of an a particle depends largely upon the energy of
the particles and the density of the medium through which it
passes. Radioactive a-emitters shower their surroundings with par-
ticles having an energy between 0.1 MeV and 10 MeV. Such
energies give the alpha radiation a range in air of less than 10 cm.
The range in more dense material, for example paper. aluminum
foil, or human cell tissue is far less, on the order of a few um. The
range of a particles, or conversely. the stopping power of material
bombarded by them, is computed with good accuracy through a
system of mathematical formulae not directly relevant here.*7 For
the purposes of this case, the general range of a particle radiation.
i.e., a few centimeters in air, a few microns (ym) in living tissue**
is important information to use in assessing the risks presented by
potential and actual exposure to a-emitting radionuclides. *°

Beta particles (B-) interact with matter somewhat differently
than a radiation. As a consequence of B- particles having far less
mass than an a particle (M, = 1/7360 M,,) and a negative rather
than positive electric charge.*° relatively low linear energy transfer
(LET) takes place per unit of distance traveled. Beta particies are
far more easily deflected by collisions with other electrons or
nuclei, and cause ionization of atoms by colliding with other elec-
trons or by passing near enough to repel electrons (having the
same negative charge). Having a low LET factor, however, means
that B- particles in the 100 Kv-2 MeV energy spectrum have
significantly greater range and penetrating power than do a parti-
cles carrying even twice as much energy. They may traverse several
meters in air at speeds approaching that of light. J. Cork. Radioac-
tivity and Nuclear Physics 118 (1947). In cell tissue, B- particles
may leave a trail of ionization several millimeters in length.

-29- No. C 79-0515-J

Beta particles, like other ionized electrons, also radiate energy
in the form of gamma rays as they are deflected by nuclei and slow
down, eventually returning to orbitals of other atoms. This “brak-
ing” radiation, called Bremsstrahlung. may in turn strike other
electrons, exciting them into further ionizations.

Gamma radiation interacts with matter in several different ways:
(1) photoelectric absorption; (2) Compton scattering: (3) pair pro-
duction; (4) Rayleigh scattering: or, it may not interact at all.
passing through the exposed material completely unimpeded.
Since gamma rays have no electric charge. ionization by gamma
radiation occurs only when a gamma ray strikes an orbital elec-
tron. If a gamma ray striking an electron is totally absorbed, the
electron is stripped away from the atom, and possessed of the full
energy of the gamma ray, careens through surrounding matter in a
fashion very much akin to a B particle. Thousands of ionizations
result. This “photoelectric” effect is the dominant form of inter-
action for gamma rays whose energy is less than 1.0 MeV.?!

For gamma rays of greater energy (0.3-3 MeV), the phe-
nomenon known as Compton scattering is predominant: a gamma
ray Striking an electron may only impart a portion of its energy to
the particle. The ionized electron is driven in one direction, the
gamma ray photon, now of lesser energy, is defiected on a new
path. In Compton scattering, a gamma ray may thus 1onize several
electrons before its energy is wholly transferred.

For gamma rays of an energy of 1.02 MeV or greater another
interaction may occur if the photon strikes a nucleus: the gamma
ray can disappear, leaving a positron (8 + ) and an electron (B-) in
its place. This phenomenon, known as pair production, ultimately
generates further gamma radiation: when the positron comes in
contact with another electron both particles are annihilated, yield-
ing two gamma photons of an energy approximating 0.51 MeV
each. These go on to ionize other electrons, or pass out of the
irradiated material entirely. At energies above 10 MeV, pair pro-
duction is the predominant interaction. See I F. Whicker & V.
Shultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and the Environment
51 (1982). Finally, gamma rays of low energy (°8U in
the shell, bombarded with neutrons from the chain reaction and
vaporized by its heat, is converted in significant part to 7°’Pu by
this reaction:

SU + dn *3Pu

Some unreacted **8U would remain as well. If the neutrons
emitted by the bomb’s initial processes are of sufficient energy.
238 will itself undergo fission, adding to the energy of the explo-
sion and to the quantity of highly radioactive fission products in its
fallout.

C33U*)——=28Np

The greater time-scale permitted by use of efficient tamper
reflector material as well as improved design technique is indis-
pensable to another process: the nuclear fusion reaction of a
hydrogen bomb.

-37- No. C 79-0515-J

1. The Hydrogen Bomb

The reality of the fission bomb in turn opened the door to the
possibility of a device utilizing the nuclear processes of the sun
and stars. nuclear fusion, to achieve energy yields in the megaton
range.** Rather than splitting heavy atoms to produce energy.
fusion binds the lightest elements together into new atoms. At the
core of the sun, temperatures range into the millions of degrees.
Celsius. In that heat, the nuclei of hydrogen atoms develop ener-
gies greater than 100 kev, permitting a number of reactions to
occur:

(1) 1H + {[H--~-> 7H + ,. + 1.4MeV

(2) 7H + 7H--—-— jH + |H + 4.03 MeV
(3) 7H + 7H --——= 3He + jn + 3.27 MeV
(4) jH + {|}H~-~-—> 3He + , + 5 MeV

(5) 7H + {H---— $He + jn + 17.06 MeV
(6) 7H + 3He -—--—= He + {H + 18.4 MeV
(7) 3He + 3He —--—= $He + 2/H + 13 MeV
(8) {H + }H---—= He + 2)n + 11.3 MeV

The end result is the conversion of hydrogen to helium with the
release of significant energy:

4iH ———— 3He + 2,, + , + 26.7 MeV

_§. Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 442-443 (2d ed.
1958).5° The reactions proceed at widely varying rates: fusion of
two 'H nuclei at the core of the sun, for example, takes between
10° and 10!' years.

Fusion reactions of the heavy isotopes of hydrogen, in contrast.
take between | and 30 microseconds at a temperature of 20 million
degrees Celsius. These reactions were of interest to those who
sought to develop the hydrogen bomb. The temperatures in the
core of a fission explosion approach those found in the sun and
other stars, even if only for a time period of about | microsecond.
Development of a hydrogen bomb, therefore, required develop-
ment of a nuclear fission “trigger” that could create temperatures
in the 20 million to 200 million degree range and maintain them
long enough to initiate nuclear fusion reactions using tritium (*H
and deuterium (7H). This in turn would ignite additional deu-

-38- No. C 79-0515-J

terium-deuterium reactions, or might utilize the a lithium reaction
SLi + dn $He + 7H + 4.8 MeV

to generate more tritium-deuterium fusion. At 200 million de-
grees Celsius a deuterium-tritium mixture will “ignite: in as little
as 0.28 microseconds (compared to a reaction time of roughly 4.8
microseconds to ignite deuterium fusion by itself). see e.g.. W.
Lawrence, The Hell Bomb 41, 46 (1950), with an energy yield per
reaction of 17.6 MeV, compared to 3.2 or 4.0 MeV. See S.
Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons € 1.69 at
21 (3d ed. 1977) DX-i242. Pound for pound, heavy hydrogen will
yield 1.5 to 4 times as much energy through fusion than does
uranium or plutonium in a fission device. Using a large amount of
deuterium fuel. a thermonuclear explosion can produce energy in
the range approaching 100 megatons of TNT.°!

A number of the tests in the 1950's at the Nevada Test Site were
directly related to development of a suitable fission bomb “trig-
ger” device for producing a hydrogen fusion explosion. Actual
tests of fusion-based, or thermonuclear, bombs took place in the
United States Pacific Test Range in the Marshall Islands. but pre-
liminary work was done on an expedited basis at NTS in reaction
to fears concerning rapid weapons development by the U.S.S.R.°-
See e.g., “AEC Test Program.” AEC 388/1 (Dec. 24. 1950.
DX-82; *““AEC Pre-Greenhouse Test Program.’ AEC 388/3
[Ranger Series] (Jan. 5, 1951) DX-83.°*

Development of the “super”, as the hydrogen bomb was then
called, was one goal behind establishment of the NTS: improve-
ment of fission weapons in an atmosphere of national emer
gency caused by events in Korea was another. See 2 R. Hewlett
& F. Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the United States
Energy Commission 535 (1969), DX-1002; Nevada Test Org..
“Background information on Nevada Nuclear Tests (May |.
1957), PX- 245.° ;

II]. NUCLEAR FALLOUT

A. Nature of Fallout Radioactivity

The processes of nuclear fission and nuclear fusion release tre-

-39- No. C 79-0515-J

mendous amounts of energy as predicted by Einstein's postulate
E = mc?. Both processes directly produce reaction products.
gamma radiation and free neutrons of significant energy. Mary of
the gamma rays are absorbed by air surrounding the bomb which
along with the reactants themselves, generate tremendous amounts
of heat. A luminous “fireball” forms around the exploding device
within the first second following detonation, glowing at many
times the apparent brightness of the sun.®* The fireball quickly
expands outward as a toroidal (i.e.. doughnut-shaped) cloud of
superheated material, drawing great amounts of cooler air up into
the familiar “mushroom” cloud associated with atomic explo-
sions. See Fig. 5.

UPDRAFT THROUGH
CENTER OF TOROID

TOROIDAL CIRCULATION
OF HOT GASES

COOL AIR BEING DRAWN
UP INTO HOT CLOUD

Fig. 5. Cutaway showing artist's conception of toroidal circulation within the radi-
oactive cloud from a nuclear explosion.

For those who are exposed directly to the explosion of a fission
or thermonuclear device, the heat, the blast, the gamma and neu-
tron radiation pose serious and often lethal risks of injury. See

-40- No. C 79-0515-J

Comm. for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by
the Atomic Bombs. . . . , Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physi-
cal, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings 105-334
(pap. ed. 1981) (hereinafter cited as “Hiroshima and Nagasaki}.
The plaintiffs in this action, however, do not allege direct exposure
to atomic blast effects. Instead they are concerned with exposure
to the residual radiation present in the smoky ashes of the fireball.

The residual radioactivity of an atomic explosion—the material
which becomes “fallout—is derived from three sources: (1) fis-
sion products, i.e., the nuclear fragments resulting from the split-
ting of uranium or plutonium nuclei; (2) unused nuclear fuel (esp.
plutonium), and (3) induced activity. i.e., radionuclides generated
by bombarding stable elements in the bomb materials, air, tower
metal, soil, seawater, etc. with neutrons. Any detonation of a
nuclear device produces residual radioactivity in these three ways.
The amount of materiai contributed by each process, however.
varies with the specific qualities of each explosion.

(1) Fission Products

The direct products of the nuclear fission process are the most
important source of fallout radioactivity.

Neither uranium nor plutonium split into standardized frag-
ments: fission results in the formation of more than 200 difierent
isotopes of 36 elements, ranging from zinc (Z = 30) to dys-
prosium (Z = 66). The most common fission products have mass
numbers of 95 and 139; those with mass numbers approximating
117, representing fission into nearly equal halves. comprise 1% or
less of the total. Yield of other products grouped in relation to
mass number is generally illustrated in Fig. 6.

Both uranium and piutonium have a significantly greater number
of neutrons than protons, See Table 4.

This imbalance is carried on into the fission products, which usu-
ally have more neutrons than do the naturally occurring isotopes of
the same elements.®’ Consequently, all but a few of the fission

4 } ~ | ) | i |
3 |
: e | |
bs 49 | ;
aA |
ry eee oe
3 | |
‘ ! | {
| |
|
107! r | 2
d
- r j
& .
£
2 10775 ;
2 ; j
§ " *
e bh
107?
r
r @ certain mass assignment
Rey AE
r | @ uncertain mass assignment
i j
1074 3 )
an
-
? :
1074
8) 80 100 120 140 160 180

Mass number

Figure 6. Graph showing yields of fission product chains of **SU as a function of
mass number. [After “Plutonium Project Report on Nuclei Formed in
Fission.” Revs Modern Phys.. 18, 539, (1946). |

TABLE 4
isotope protons neutrons _np_
2331) 92 14] £532
235) 9? 143 1.554
238U) 9? 146 1.5869

orm) 94 145 1.542

-42- No. C 79-0515-J

product radionuclides are extremely unstable—and highly radio-
active. They seek stability through emission of beta particles.
which shifts the nuclear ratio in favor of protons. Many also re-
lease excess energy in the form of gamma radiation. Most products
must undergo a series of B-decay transitions before reaching a
stable, or nearly stable ratio of particles. The characteristics of
each product’s series, called a decay chain, is important to a
determination of the total yield of fission products.

Consider, for example, the fission product krypton-95: it experi-
ences six B-decay transitions before reaching a stable nuclide
(half-lives are given in parentheses):

SKr——e $Rb——= 2S —P-e 5 a
(very short) (
So
& 80
3 a “
3
= 60
vs
s |
>
: \
> 40
-
1S)
*?Pu and roughly 10 kg. for °45U, depend-
ing upon shape. See J. C. Giddings, Chemistry. Man and Environ-
mental Change 432 (1973). Most of the fissionable “fuel” of an
atomic bomb thus remains unused by the fission process. Vapor-
ized by the intense heat of the fireball, the remaining **5U or
239Pu becomes a part of the radioactive fallout cloud. Similar
residues may likely be present as a result of the use of 7**U as a
component material of the bomb. Free neutrons produced by the
fission process can produce plutonium from uranium-238 by the
following processes:

6 249

usNp
T,, = 2.35 min. 2.45 d. 24400 yr.

24

4K] 1 — 44
23 + jn 233 je 94

Further, the abundance of high-energy neutrons present in the
fireball of a thermonuclear explosion may interact with uranium-
235 and uranium-238 to produce a variety of isotopes of plutonium
(e.g.. 738Pu, *4°Pu, °4'Pu) and heavier nuclides such as Amer-
icium (-4!'Am) and Curium (-4*Cm).”” In fact. the heavy element

-4)- No. C 79-0515-J

einsteinium (753Es) was first identified in the debris from the
explosion of the first H-bomb in the Pacific in 1952. C. R. Ham-
mond, “The Elements,” in Handbook of Chemistry and Physics.
at B-12 (64th ed. Weast 1983).

Plutonium will always be present in fallout from nuclear detona-
tions. According to the UNSCEAR Report, 90% of the plutonium
now dispersed in the environment came from tests carried out
prior to 1963; by 1973 an estimated 320 kCi of 749Pu and °4°Pu and
another 26 kCi of 75*Pu had been so dispersed. UNSCEAR Report
(1977), Px-706/DX-605, at 148.7! Converting from kilocuries of
239Pu activity to actual mass of the heavy metal we can estimate
that nearly 5 metric tons’? of plutonium have been dispersed by
fallout. 7*

While a “nominal” fission detonation may produce many fis-
sion products in gram (or milligram) amounts, plutonium is dis-
persed in kilogram quantities. Yet plutonium contributes less to
fallout activity because it is less radioactive than most fission
products: its half-life of 24.400 years (*39Pu is far longer than
most fallout components. The 0.06 curies of radioactivity pro-
duced by | gram of plutoniuin-239 is far less than that of
cesium-137, or iodine-131, or other important fission products:

Specific Activity

nuclide half-life (Ci/gm)
at 5 24,400 yrs 0.06
IMCs 30.28 yrs 86.1
"Sr 28.1 yrs 141.0
~_ 8 days 1.24 x 10°

Plutonium, of course, persists for a much longer period: 99% of
the iodine-13]1 produced in open air testing has long since decayed,
while 99+ % of the plutonium ever dispersed in the environment
still remains.’* Plutonium, uranium and other heavy element resi-
dues represent a significant long-term component of nuclear fall-
out. In fact, “in the period from 20 hours to 2 weeks after the
burst, depending to some extent upon the weapon materials, those
isotopes can contribute up to 40% of the total activity of the
weapon debris.” S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons § 9.32 at 405 (3d ed. 1977).

-48- No. C 79-0515-J

(3) Induced Activity

The tremendous flux of free neutrons present in the firebal! of a
nuclear detonation themselves create radioactive residues of sig-
nificance to radioactive fallout.

It was discovered early that free neutrons colliding with the
nuclei of atoms could react, perhaps merely by joining the nucleus
and forming a new isotope of the element, or perhaps by joining
the nucleus and ejecting other particles in the process, transform-
ing the nuclide’s identity. For example. nitrogen reacts with free
neutrons to form Carbon-i4, an important radionuclide:

4C+iH+Q

Carbon-14 is a B-emitter with a half-life of 5730 years. As noted
above, neutrons can react with light nuclides such as lithium-6,
breaking thern apart:

'SN + in

SLi + jn———— _ (1Li*) ——— iH + He
Or, neutrons may add to the mass of sodium nuclei, rendering
them unstable and radioactive:

jiNa —_ iiNa
Sodium-24 is a B-emitter with a half-life of 15.0 hours:
iiNa i3Mg (stable) + g- + ,

This type of transformation, or activation, of nuclei by free neu-
trons occurs with many elements in the atmosphere, soil or sea
which are directly exposed to the nuclear fireball. Sodium-24.

silicon-31, manganese-56 and other nuclides may be produced in
significant quantities.

The non-explosive components of the device itself, or the steel
tower on which it may have rested before detonation, may also be
an important source of induced radioactivity; neutron-capture re-
actions generate radioactive isotopes of iron, copper, zinc, man-
ganese and cobalt, as well as aluminum, although the radioactive
form of the latter, aluminum-28, has a very short half-life, about
2.3 minutes. S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, supra, at 405-407.

A number of factors influence the role which induced radio-
activity plays in determining the nature of fallout radiation. Fire-

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-74- No. C 79-0515-J

exceedingly complex task. for it is apparent that “no radionuclide
that is produced should be ignored until a critical analysis demon-
Strates that it is insignificant.” Y. Ng. et al., Prediction of the
Maximum Dosage to Man From the Fallout Nuclear Devices:—IV.
Handbook for Estimating the Maximum Interna! Dose from
Radionuclides Released to the Biosphere. Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory, UCRL-50163 Part IV (1968), PX-720, at v. [herein-
after cited as ““LLRL Handbook for Estimating Maximum Internal
Dose™}]. While many fission products decay and nearly vanish
before making their way into the food chain, others persist with
tremendously variable effect upon the degree of internal radiation
exposure received.

Even where metabolic or ecological variables can be ignored. as
in estimation of external alpha, beta, and gamma dose from ex-
posure to fallout debris, the calculations are not simple. See e.g..
Broido & Teresi, “Analysis of the Hazards Associated With
Radioactive Fallout Material (1)}—Estimation of a- and B- Doses.”
5 Health Physics 63-69 (1961), PX-563.

Clearly, where exposure to radioactive fallout is concerned. the
complexity and the variability of the multitude of factors makes
careful and comprehensive monitoring and measurement a gen-
uine necessity, if external and internal doses are to be accurately
evaluated. Assessment of the risks posed by the infiltration of
nuclear debris into the daily life of off-site residents in commu-
nities in Utah, Nevada and Arizona is a demanding task at best.
Where the available data generated from actual measurements of
fallout activity and contamination is grossly inadequate and in-
complete, the difficulty of the task is compounded a thousand-
fold. See Parts VIII, IX, infra.

IV. BACKGROUND:
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH PHYSICS

A. Units Used in Radiation Dosimetry

The testimony and exhibits in the record as well as the scientific
literature concerning radiation and health make use of a variety of
units to express or describe the amounts of radiation people are
exposed to or have absorbed into their tissues. In evaluating infor-

-75- No. C 79-0515-J

mation and analysis of radiation hazards. it is useful to identify the
specific units being used and the concept and quantity that each
unit expresses.

Radiation-induced damage to biological tissue results from
the absorption of energy in or around the tissue. The amount
of energy absorbed in a given volume of tissue is related to
the type, energy, and number of radiations traversing the
tissue volume, and the interactions which occur between the
radiations and the atoms and molecules of the tissue.

1 F. W. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and
the Environment 63 (1982).

(1.) Rad

The most commonly used unit to describe radiation dose, that
is, the actual amount of ionizing radiation absorbed by living
tissue, is the rad. Measurement of radiation dose in rads is accom-
plished by dividing the total radiation energy delivered by the
mass (in grams) of the tissue which absorbs it. A rad expresses an
energy/mass ratio:

Historically, the erg has been used to describe energy deliv-
ered by ionizing radiation. If 100 ergs of energy are depos-
ited in 1 gram of tissue, the tissue is said to have received
1 rad of radiation. .. .

The definition of the rad says nothing about the time it
takes to deliver 100 ergs per gram of tissue. In some cases
good reason exists to be concerned about the rate of delivery
of radiation, and in these cases we would express radiation
doses in terms of rads per minute, rads per hour, or rads per
year. For many purposes we shall be concerned with totai
rads delivered, and not with their rate of delivery.

J. Gofman, Radiation and Human Health 46 (1981). PX-1046
(emphasis in original).

Like other units discussed so far, the rad may be more conven-
iently expressed in fractional form:

-76- No. C 79-0515-J

1 millirad (mr) = 0.001 rads (or 10-* rads)
1 microrad (ur) = 0.000001 rads (or 10°¢ rads)

Larger multiple units, such as kilorad (1,000 rads) have little
application to measurement of doses to specific individuals:
absorbed in a short time, such a dose would likely be fatal. See
S. Glasstone & P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 577
(3d ed. 1977), DX-1242. Recently, however, more use has been
made of a unit from the international system of units, the Gray.
A Gray (Gy) represents the absorption of | joule (107 ergs) of
energy in | kilogram (1,000 grams) of tissue. Simple calculation
disclosed that 1 Gray represents 10° ergs per gram of tissue. or a
dose equalling 100 rads. J. Gofman. Radiation & Human Health.
supra, at 46. A dose of one rad would equal 0.01 Gray. 50 milli-
~ rads would equate to 0.0005 Gray. ’9

Except for a few recent scientific publications, the testimony and
exhibits in this case speak in terms of rads rather than Grays, as
will the text of this opinion.

Radiation dose expressed in rads can be related to radioactivity
expressed in curies through simple mathematical calculation.
Assuming that all of the energy released by the beta decay of
1 pico- curie (PCI) of radioactive material evenly dispersed in |
kilogram of tissue is actually absorbed in the tissue, the dose rate.
to that tissue, expressed in rads per hour, would equal:

Dose rate (rads/hr) = (2.134 x 10°) X (average decay energy
[MeV]})

See id. PX-1046, at 418-19. The total dose received to the kilogram
of tissue (e.g., the lungs of an adult person), may be calculated
using an equation previously discussed:

Total Dose (rads) = (dose rate/0.693) x (T..) x (k)

where T, is the effective half-life of a specific radionuclide. see
e.g. Table 8, supra, and k is a mathematical term which converts
T, into hours. See N. Tsoulfanidis, Measurement and Detection of

PNT ol ae ee, ee
Spee ela

-77- No. C 79-0515-J

- Radiation 499 (1983).8° For example, 1 pCi of iodine-131, with an

average decay energy approximating 0.6 MeV, would deliver
ionizing radiation in the form of beta particles at the rate of 1.28 x
10-9 rads per hour, for a total dose of nearly 3.37 x 10~7 rads, or
0.33 microrads, based upon an effective half-life of 7.6 days. This
is a very small dose of beta radiation. The picocuries can add up.
however, as illustrated by an example:

By drinking milk contaminated with radioactive fallout
debris, a child absorbs 20,000 PCi of iodine-131 into the
tissue of her thyroid gland. The thyroid gland of a child is far
smaller than a kilogram, weighing in the neighborhood of
2—4 grams. Rather than being distributed throughout a full
1,000 grams of living tissue, the energy is concentrated in far
fewer radiosensitive cells. Correcting our calculation for the
differences in contamination and tissue mass, we find:

— 1.68 rads to the child's thyroid gland from 131,.
From a quart or so of contaminated milk, our
example child could receive a radiation dose
to a sensitive organ significantly higher than
**background” levels due to the presence of
a single fission product.

Besides iodine-131, nuclear fission produces various quantities of
11 other radioactive iodine isotopes, with half-lives ranging from a
few seconds (e.g.. 5.9 sec. '*81) to 16 million years ('791). National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Protection
of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Releases of Radioiodine,
NCRP Rep. No. 55 (1977), DX-1179, at 13-14, 15 (table); see
Appendix A.

The example calculation is far from totally abstract. One study
of milk sampled from Utah dairies shortly after the 100-kiloton
SEDAN test at the Nevada Test Site in 1962 estimated the con-
centration of '*'I to vary between 0 and 800,000 pCi per litre
(1.05 quarts). Pendleton, et al., “Differential Accumulation of '*']
From Local Fallout in People and Milk,” 9 Health Physics 1253,
1255 (1963), PX-32. Further, it was estimated as a result of an

-78- No. C 79-0515-J

accident involving the Windscale nuclear reactor in the United
Kingdom in Ociober 1957, 20,000 curies of !3'I was released into
the atmosphere:

Sufficient pasture contamination occurred to require the
confiscation of milk for several days in a 200-square-mile
area downwind of the reactor. . . . The milk produced in a
much smaller area remained contaminated above the con-
fiscation level chosen by the British for more than a month.
As a result of this confiscation and other precautionary pro-
cedures, the mean absorbed dose to the thyroid glands of
children downwind of the Windscale reactor was estimated to
be 16 rad, and the mean adult absorbed dose was estimated
to be 4.0 rad.

NCRP Report No. 55 (1977), supra, DX-1179, at 14 (citations omit-
ted). While radioactive fallout debris from Nevada was dispersed
over a much wider area than was contamination at Windscale, a
“nominal” 20-kiloton fission device yields 250,000 curies of !*'I,
representing between 2.9 and 3.1 percent of the total fission products.
Id. DX-1179, at 14 (table): 1 F. W. Whicker & V. Schultz.
Radioecology: Nuclear Energy and the Environment 92. 107
(tables) (1982).

The calculation performed above demonstrates that rads of radi-
ation dose to internal organs may arise from picocuries of con-
tamination. 250,000 curies (Ci) of '*'I is equivalent to 2.5 x 10!’,
or 250,000,000,000,000.000 picocuries (pCi) of '3'I—still barely
3% of the total fission produce yield.*! At the very least, one can
say that where fallout is concerned, a lot can go a very long way.

Estimation of radiation dose from external sources, particularly
multiple sources of gamma radiation, requires far more complex
calculations. See e.g., H. Cember, Introduction to Health Physics
ch. 6 (1969); AEC Symposium, “The Shorter-Term Biological
Hazards of a Fallout Field,” at 23-84 (1956), PX-699/DX-641:
Broido & Teresi, “Analysis of the Hazards Associated with Radio-
active Fallout Material (1)—Estimation of y- and B- Doses.”
5 Health Physics 63-69 (1961), PX-563.

Radiations of external origin that may be absorbed in liv-

4
-

-79- No. C 79-0515-J

ing tissues include natural or man-generated rays from the
atmosphere, earth, water, and other tissues or organisms. The
type of external exposure that is probably the simplest to
evaluate is that resulting from a “point source” of photons.
Photon emitters have a gamma ray exposure constant. termed
Iy, which has the units of roentgen per hour per curie at an
air distance of 1 m. The value of Iy, may be calculated for
any gamma-emitting radionuclide and it is dependent upon
the number of photons emitted per disintegration and the
energies of the photons. Values of Iy are, for example, 0.33
and 1.32 R/hr/Ci for '*’Cs and ©°Co, respectively. . . . The
exposure rate (E) in roentgen per hour at any distance (d) in
meters can be calculated for a point source containing A*
curies by

Nonpoint sources and causes in which several gamma emit-
ters are more difficult to evaluate. The case in which the
radionuclide is distributed within a mass of substance is even
more difficult to evaluate because of absorption and scatter-
ing of photons prior to their exit from the substance. If such
complexities are great enough, direct measurement of ex-
posure rate may be necessary.

1 F. W. Whicker & V. Schultz. Radioecology. . . . supra. 66-7 (em-
phasis added and footnotes omitted). See also Radiological
Health Handbook, PHS Publ. 2016 (1970): K. Morgan & J. Turner.
eds., Principles of Radiation Protection(1967). The tremendous
variability of potential gamma and beta radiation exposures from
nuclear fallout renders accurate and thorough measurement of
radiation intensity an unavoidable necessity. See H. Knapp.
“Gamma Ray Exposure Dose to Non-Urban Population from the
Surface Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout,’ T10-16457 (July

1962), PX-717.

(2.) Roentgen

The complexity of dose calculation involving gamma exposure
often makes actual measurement of radiation in rad units
impractical.

-80- No. C 79-0515-J

Frequently, it is not convenient to measure dose in rads. In
the particular case of irradiation of organisms or tissues from
an external X- or gamma ray source, it is more convenient to
measure the radiation exposure at the surface of the tissue of
interest using an appropriate instrument or device. The dose
to the tissues can be estimated from the measured exposure
from theoretical considerations. The fundamental unit of ra-
diation exposure which is applicable only to X- or gamma
radiation, is the roentgen (R), which is defined as

1R = 2.58 X 10-4 coul/kg air

This definition of the roentgen is equivalent to the production
by X- or gamma rays of | electrostatic unit of charge of either
sign per cubic centimeter of dry air at 0° C and 760 mm
mercury. The roentgen quantity is defined on the basis of
production of ionization in air because it is normally mea-
sured with an air-filled ionization chamber.
1 F. W. Whicker & V. Schultz, Radioecology. . . , supra, at 63
(emphasis added and footnote omitted). Simply expressed, the
roentgen unit describes a certain degree of ionization caused in air
by gamma rays. In the process of ionization, of course, some
gamma energy is absorbed by the air, approximately 88 ergs per
gram, or 0.88 rad. N. Tsoulfanidis, Measurement and Detection of
Radiation 485 (1983). The greater density of living tissue results in
greater absorption of the same amount of gamma radiation: a
roentgen of gamma radiation in air equates with approximately 94
ergs absorbed per gram of tissue, i.e., 0.94 rads at the surface.
Gamma rays with energies ranging from 0.3 MeV to 3.0 MeV
permit a rough equivalence between | roentgen (R) of exposure
and | rad (r) of absorbed dose in soft tissues. See S. Glasstone &
P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons § 8.18 at 329-30 & n.
4, 638 (3d ed. 1977), DX-1242.

(3.) rem

In strict terms, a rem of ionizing radiation, or roenigen equiv-
alent man, describes “(t}hat amount of ionizing radiation of any
type which produces the same damage to man as | roentgen of

-81- No. C 79-0515-J

about 200-=kv X radiation. . . *° Handbook of Chemistry &
Physics, at F-103 (64th ed. Weast 1983). The rem describes a
quality of ionizing radiation not encompassed by either of the first
two units: neither rad nor roentgen say anything about the pen-
etrating qualities of particular radiation or differentiate between
high-LET and low-LET radiation. -

We know that the linear energy transfer (LET) is much
higher for some radiations than for others. For those biolog-
ical effects where LET matters, the rad unit must be modi-
fied to a unit that shows the greater effectiveness of one kind
of radiation over another. A term has been introduced, the
relative biological effectiveness, or RBE, to express this dif-
ference is effectiveness.

J. Gofman, Radiation and Human Health, supra, PX-1046, at 47.
Defined in terms of a dose of gamma radiation producing a certain
biological effect, e.g., chromosome lesions, cell-killing, etc. a
rem represents the proportionate amount of other ionizing radia-
tion that will produce the same biological effect, 1.e., the same
number of chromosome lesions, dead cells, etc. The specific pro-
portion of one to the other, the RBE, varies according to type and
energy of radiation, the type of cell exposed, the biological effect
being studied, the total radiation dose, the dose rate, and other
factors. N. Tsoulfanidis, supra, at 486. The same kind of radiation
may have many RBE ratios.

As as general rule, biological damage increases as the amount of
energy deposited per unit of distance traveled, the linear energy
_ transfer (LET), increases. High-LET radiation, such as alpha par-
ticles, neutrons and fission fragments are often significantly more
damaging than low-LET radiation, such as gamma ray photons,
beta particles, and positrons, which have far less mass, and travel
far greater distances, leaving less ionization in their wake. Id. J.
Gofman, supra, at 26-29. In modern health physics, the concept of
quality factor, or Q, is used to describe distinctions between radia-
tions based upon linear energy transfer values. N. Tsoulfanidis,
supra, at 486-87. While low-LET radiations may have a “Q” of 1,
5-MeV alpha particles may have a “Q” of 10 or even 20. Id.*?

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Whether expressed in terms of Q or RBE, the relative effects of
different radiations is critical to accurate calculation of biological
risk associated with radiation exposure. Once more, an example is
instructive:

A cattle rancher inhales a particle of fallout debris con-
taining | pCi of radioactivity due to plutonium-239, an alpha
emitter with a decay energy approximating 5 MeV. The par-
ticle becomes trapped in lung tissue.

The alpha particles having a range in tissue of approx. 40 x
um, the amount of energy delivered to the surrounding lung 4
cells per hour may be calculated as follows: z

(3.7 x 10 */s/p Cin 54 MeV) 1.602 x 10 'J/MeV)(3.6 = 10°) 4
(4/3)(4.0 * 19 ‘) 3(10'kg/m') a"

an amount equal to 39.7 rads/hour of a radiation to the 2
surrounding tissue, probably less than a microgram of epi- 4
thelial cells in the bronchial tubes. See N. Tsoulfanidis, su- 3
pra, at 490-91; J. Gofman, supra, at 484. 4

For many biological injuries. however, alpha particles of
MeV range energy are assigned an RBE. or Q, of 10. Multi-
plying the absorbed dose by this factor yields a dose rate in
rems per hour:

(39.7 rads/hour) X RBE (10) = 397 rems/hour

Thus the 3,970 ergs/gram of alpha energy bombarding the
few cells nearest to the fallout particle has the biological!
effectiveness of 39,700 ergs/gram of low-LET beta or gamma
radiation delivered to the same tissue. lonizing radiation de- 2
livered at the rate to those cells likely would kill or seriously 3
damage almost al] of them. Fortunately, they represent an 3
extremely tiny fraction of total Jung tissue. Inhalation and ¥
retention of many more particles, however. could do far more -
damage to the bronchiai linings. 3

Once the task of evaluating a particular exposure to radiation in
terms of its relative biological effectiveness has been accom-

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plished, the expression of dose in rem units is easily transferred or
compared with other dose estimates expressed in rems. The risk
arising from exposure to various radiations—alpha, beta, gamma
or neutrons, among others, may be standardized and directly com-
pared. A dose expressed in rems identifies a certain quantum of
biological effect, regardless of source.**

In much of the literature. testimony and documentary evidence
now before this court, however, doses of low-LET radiation ex-
pressed in rads are treated as equivalent to doses expressed in
rems. Only as to alpha radiation is a distinction usually made. See
Table 11.

TABLE 1].

Relation of Linear Energy Transfer (LET)
and Type of Radiation to Quality Factor (QF)

Average LET in Quality
. e-§ ¢: ft
tkeV ym) Type of radiation factor
3.5 or less X-rays. gamma rays. beta particles |
7 2
Neutrons (10 keV) 10
Protons 1-10
Alpha particles 1-20
175 Fission fragments. recoii nuclei 20

1 F. W. Whicker & V. Shultz, supra at 66.

To be fully effective. analysis of data and measurements con-
cerning exposure of human beings to ionizing radiation must be
made with particular reference to the units in which the informa-
tion is expressed. Whatever unit is used, be it rad, roentgen, rem.
or some fractional or multiple variant of these units, it describes
the exposure to ionizing radiation or absorption of its tremendous
energies by living tissue. See also Radiation Quantities and Units.
ICRU Rep. No. 19 (July 1971), DX-1105.

B. Radiation Energy: Quantity vs. Quality

So far this discussion has dealt with the units of radiation mea-
surement in terms of each other. and-other measurements of radio-

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activity, such as the curie, or the concept of half-life. It is impor-
tant, however, to make at least a general comparison between the
kinds and quantities of energy infused into biological systems by
ionizing radiation and those imparted by more common, more
familiar physical processes. It is one thing to define a unit called
“rad” in terms of 100 other units of energy called “ergs.” or an
international unit known as the Joule.*+ How much energy does an
erg represent, or a rad?

Perhaps the best comparison of amounts—and qualities—of en-
ergy can be drawn between ionizing radiation and heat. To do so.
though, requires definition of one more unit describing energy:

The calorie is the familiar unit in chemistry that describes
energy transfers involving heat. One calorie is that amount of
energy which will raise the temperature of one gram of water
by one degree centigrade [or Celsius]. (This definition does
change some at different temperatures of water, but for our
purposes here we can neglect those smal! changes. )

The best estimates are that approximately 400 rads of
whole-body radiation, if delivered rapidly, are sufficient to
cause 50% of the exposed humans to die within a period of
days to weeks. This is the so-called acute radiation sickness.
Is this a great deal of energy in heat terms? Some simple
calculations show that it is not.

Since I rad represents the absorption of 100 ergs per gram
of tissue, it follows that 400 rads represents the absorption of
40,000 ergs per gram. The conversion factor from ergs to
calories is 2.39 x 10-8. Therefore,

40.000 £1 x 2.39 x 10-8 calories _ 9 56 x 10-4 calories
gram erg gram
We can round this off to approximately 10-7 calories/gram (or
0.001 calories/gram).

Biological tissue is quite comparable with water in the
amount of heat required to raise its temperature by one de-
gree centigrade [or Celsius]. So we shall say that the required

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amount is one calorie per gram for biological tissue too.
Therefore, our 10-* calories/gram from the absorption of 400
rads of ionizing radiation energy would be enough to raise
the temperature of biological tissue by 0.0001 centigrade. Not
much of a fever! We tolerate fevers of several degrees centi-
grade (not thousandths of a degree) in a variety of infectious
diseases. Yet the amount of ionizing radiation that can kill
half of the humans exposed to it, would—-if converted first
into heat—raise temperatures only by 0.001° centigrade.

This points up the biologically deadly difference between
energy in the form of heat versus the same amount of energy
in the form of ionizing radiation. . . .

The difference resides in the fact that the energy of ioniz-
ing radiation is not distributed the way the thermal energy of
a fever is, the latter being distributed among all the mole-
cules of a gram of tissue. Instead, the energy of ionizing
radiation is transferred from photons to single electrons [or
from charged alpha or beta particles], which in turn transfer
all their energy to relatively few electrons in relatively few
molecules. The transfer occurs in extremely concentrated
fashion compared with the even diffusion of heat energy.
Therefore, the energy delivered by ionizing radiation is ener-
getic enough to break any chemical bond, even the strongest
ones in living tissue. .

J. Gofman, Radiation and Human Health 52-53 (1981). PX-1046
(emphasis in original). It is not the quantity of energy penetrating
the cells of the human body, but rather the quality of the energy.
the nature of its interaction with cellular chemistry, which makes
exposure to ionizing radiation an extraordinary hazard. As de-
scribed in Part II, supra, alpha, beta and gamma radiations streak
through matter at high energy and high speed. stripping electrons
away from any chemical compound or individual molecule with
which they come in close proximity or direct contact. The ionized
molecules may reunite as before, with no detectable damage. They
may also react with each other or with other molecules nearby,
forming new and not necessarily useful compounds, reflecting a

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temporary, or perhaps a permanent injury to the chemical struc-
tures onginally present.

From the standpoint of biological injury. energy absorbed in the
ionization of air, or a multitude of inanimate objects. is essentially
meaningless. A glass of water which has been irradiated by alpha.
beta or gamma rays poses no risk to health greater than any other
water—unless, of course, it has become contaminated with radio-
active material that would bombard internal organs with additional
radiation if ingested. Far more important is the interaction of
ionizing radiation with the tightly ordered, extremely complex and
relatively fragile molecules of life.

Of particular concern is the effect of ionization on the lengthy
and critically important strands of genetic material found in each

living cell.

C. Ionizing Radiation and Chromosomes

At the interior of each living cell is found a nucleus of special-
ized proteins, enzymes, and other chemicals. The nucleus appears
for most purposes to be the control center of the cell. It contains
the long, spiralling molecules of DNA (deoxyribonuclecic acid).
which carry encoded within their delicate patterns the entire ge-
netic ‘“‘blueprint’ controlling the structure, composition and
numberless chemical activities of the individual cell, the tissue in
which it is found, and—somewhere within its strands—the re-
mainder of the instructions followed by all of the other specialized
cells that make up an incredibly detailed living organism. The
DNA molecules are joined together in discrete units called genes.
which in turn a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0816%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
