# Opposition Brief — General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 976

## Text

| ié BEiLE D
y | NOWAGaQa7

No. 87-260 JOSEPE:

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC., PETITIONER
v.

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA, AND ITS LOCAL 1200, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
GEORGE R. SALEM
Solicitor of Labor

ALLEN H. FELDMAN

Associate Solicitor
MARY-HELEN MAUTNER

Counsel for Appellate Litigation
EDWARD D. SIEGER

Attorney

Department of Labor
Washington ).C. 20210

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether compliance with a safety and health standard
setting an eight-hour time weighted exposure limit for a
particular toxic compound (freon) relieves an employer of
its general duty under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1), to maintain a workplace
“free from recognized hazards * * * likely to cause * * *
serious physical harm,” with regard to the short-term ex-
posure of employees to freon in confined spaces.

(1)

a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ee Sy ay olad-o waed aed baw one oo 8 l
A ne Lue Wein e kee sd.te see see ees |
Gc a aban bibs wea ea ee ease uae l
SEE ee HE a a ae 7
ee tA hs a wk wks be dO ke as awe a 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th
EE ea a ne a 3, 9
Brock v. L. R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d¢ 1377 (D.C.
ne a ee hae ada 8, 9
Con Agra, Inc., 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1141 (1983) ..... 4, 6,
9, 10
Donovan v. Adams Steel Erection, Inc. , 766 F.2d 804 (3d
as ee aie ssa cb aoe caesoauuneuus 9-10
Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg., 568 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.
ee ne sg a a ey a dea be eee OS 8
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) ......... 7
Statutes and regulations:
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, '29 U.S.C.
651 ef seq.:
ecko sceewsevsces 1-2
ee DRS ee” |) 2
Se A Oe we, EAD oo ce cece ses sseens 2
eS | 2
29 C.F.R.:
a 5
Ee 5,7, 8,9
ee 2,3,9
OE y
a F
Se ka Ad aoe eee os 2
NT BE 9, 10
(111)

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-260
GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC., PETITIONER
V.

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA, AND ITS LOCAL 1200, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court appeals (Pet. App. E1-E19) is
reported at 815 F.2d 1570. The opinion of the ad-
ministrative law judge (Pet. App. C1l-C22), and the final
order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (Pei. App. D1), are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered April
14, 1987. A timely petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en bane was denied on June 18, 1987 (Pet.
App. F1-F2). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
on August 17, !987. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT
1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSH Act) seeks “to assure so far as possible * * * safe

(1)

2

and healthful working conditions” (29 U.S.C. 651(b)), by
prohibiting two distinct categories of violations. The OSH
Act requires, under its so-called “general duty clause,” that
“[eJach employer * * * furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees” (29
U.S.C. 654(a)(1)). In addition, it requires employers to
comply with specific occupational safety and health stand-
ards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor (29 U.S.C.
654(a)(2), 655(b)).

The Secretary has promulgated an occupational safety
and health standard for certain toxic and hazardous air
contaminants, including freon vapors (1,1,2-Trichloro
1,2,2-trifluoroethane). See 29 C.F.R. 1910.1000. Under
this standard, employers must ensure that no employee’s
exposure to freon exceeds 1000 parts per million parts of
air on a time weighted average for any eight-hour work
period (29 C.F.R. 1910.1000(a)(2) and Table Z-1). The
standard does not set any limits for short-term exposure to
freon or for exposure to freon in confined spaces without
special entry procedures (see ibid.).

2. Petitioner, General Dynamics Land Systems Divi-
sion, manufactures M-1 Abrams battle tanks at a Depart-
ment « Defense facility (Pet. App. E3). For over a year,
petitioner had its employees use a freon solvent in cleaning
up the spills that resulted during the assembly process of
these tanks (/d. at E3-E4). The solvent, however, tended to
accumulate in confined spaces such as assembly line pits
and tank hulls and, because it displaced oxygen, created a
risk of asphyxiation, depression of the central nervous
system, irregular heart beat, and even cardiac arrest for
employees working in these areas (id. at E3). Thus, in
August 1982, one of petitioner’s employees was overcome
by freon vapors after entering a tank assembly-line pit (id.
at E4); in March 1983, another employee became dizzy

3

and weak after driving a fully assembled tank (/d. at E5);
in July 1983, yet another employee working inside a tank
lost consciousness after several gallons of freon were
poured onto the tank floor and the only exit from the tank
was blocked (ibid.); and, in September 1983, still another
employee was discovered inside the driver’s compartment
of a tank, unconscious and “shaking and foaming from
the mouth” (id. at C5-C6, E6).

Following the September 1983 incident, respondent
United Auto Workers filed a complaint with the Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) (Pet. App. E6). After conducting an
investigation,' the DOL cited petitioner for violating the
general duty clause of the OSH Act—by requiring
employees to enter (without a specific confined space entry
procedure) M-1 tank compartments after freon had been
sprayed or poured into them, thereby exposing those
employees to the hazard of asphyxiation and/or chemical
poisoning (id. at A2-A6, E6). The DOL also cited peti-
tioner for violating the Secretary’s specific freon stand-
ard —by exposing the employee injured in the September
1983 incident to levels of freon in excess of the eight-hour
time weighted average set forth in 29 C.F.R. 1910.1000
(Pet. App. A2-A7, E6).

3. An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)
vacated both aspects of the citation (Pet. App. C1-C22).
The ALJ refused to rule whether the Secretary’s evidence
supported the allegation that petitioner had violated the
general duty clause of the statute (/d. at C9). He reasoned
that, “under the Act, a citation alleging violation of sec-
tion 5(a)(1) [i.e., the general duty clause,] is inappropriate
if the hazard is addressed by a standard” (id. at C11) and

‘While the DOL was conducting its investigation, another
employee of petitioner died from exposure to solvent fumes (Pet.
App. E6).

4

that “the circumstances of this case are governed solely by
the regulations at 29 C.F.R. 1910.1000(a)-(d) which set
forth the limits of employee exposure to trichloro
trifluoroethane” (id. at C12). The ALJ recognized (id. at
C11) that, in Con Agra, Inc., 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1141,
1145 (1983), the OSHRC had held that “[t}he failure to test
in a confined atmosphere before possible exposure of
employees to toxic substances is a violation distinct from a
continued exposure to known quantities of substances
listed in section 1910.1000.” But the ALJ concluded that
“(t]he foregoing exception is not applicable,” stating that
the employee injured in the September 1983 incident had
ventilated the tank, and that “the air contaminants stan-
dard deals fully and completeiy with the hazard at issue,
which is employee use of trichioro trifluoroethane in pro-
duction of the M1 tank” (Pet. App. C11). Finally, he held
that the Secretary had failed to prove that the air con-
taminants standard had been violated (id. at C19-C20).
The ALJ’s decision was subsequently adopted as the
OSHRC’s final order, after no Commissioner called for a
further review of the decision (id. at D!).

4. The court of appeals vacated the OSHRC’s order
dismissing the general duty clause aspect of the citation
(Pet. App. E1-E19). The court identified the question for
decision as “whether, as a matter of law, [petitioner’s]
compliance with the freon standard relieved it of respon-
sibility for alleged violations of the statute’s general duty
clause” (id. at E8-E9). It emphasized (id. at E10) that the
case did not involve a challenge “to any [Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)] regulation,
but rather a challenge to the [OSHRC’s] interpretation of
particular OSHA regulations.” The court then held that
OSHRC had “erred in its construction of OSHA’s regula-
tions” and, in the alternative, that OSHRC had “acted ar-
bitrarily and capriciously in refusing to follow its own
precedent” (id. at E8).

The court began by noting that “Section 5(a)(1) [of the
OSH Act] clearly [and unambiguously] imposes on an
employer a general duty to provide for the safety of his
employees that is distinct and separate from the
employer’s duty, under section 5(a)(2), to comply with
{the] administrative safety standards promulgated under
section 6 of the Act” (Pet. App. E12). Thus, the court said
(id. at E13-E14) that “the Act does not empower the
Secretary, and hence OSHA, to absolve employers who
observe specific standards from duties otherwise imposed
on them by the general duty clause.” Construing the
language of 29 C.F.R. 1910.5(f) (Pet. App. E12), which
provides that an employer in compliance with a specific
OSHA standard “shali be deemed to be in compliance”
with the “general duty clause,” “but only to the extent of
the condition, practice, means, method, operation, or
process covered by the standard,” the court disagreed with
the ALJ’s conclusion that 29 C.F.R. 1910.5(f) relieved
petitioner of its duty to provide a workplace free from
recognized hazards.?

Rather, the court found that “[a]Jny apparent conflict
between section 5(a)(2) or the preemption regulations on
the one hand, and the general duty clause on the other, is
resolved when one focuses on the words ‘recognized
hazard’ in section 5(a)(1)” (Pet. App. E14). These words, it
said, indicate that, “if an employer knows that a specific
standard will not protect [its] workers against a particular
hazard, his duty under section 5(a)(1) will not be dis-
charged no matter how faithfully he observes that stand-
ard” (id. at E15).

? For the same reason, che court also rejected petitioner’s argument
(Pet. App. E13-E14) that it was relieved of its responsibilities under
the general duty clause by another of the Secretary’s regulations, 29
C.F.R. 1910.5(c)(1), which provides that a standard “specifically ap-
plicable to a condition, practice, means, method, operation, or proc-

6

The court then undertook te determine whether peti-
tioner had knowledge that its alleged observance of the
freon standard would not protect its workers against the
cited hazards (Pet. App. E14-E15). The court was unable
to do so, however, since the ALJ had held that the cited
hazards were addressed by the specific standard (id. at
E16). The court disagreed with the ALJ, noting that,
“Cw]hile the regulation places a limit on the permissible
level of time-weighted exposure to freon vapors over an
eight-hour work shift, the hazard described in the citation
* * * refers to the danger, in confined spaces requiring
special entry procedures, of short-term exposure to toxic
vapors in concentrations that may displace oxygen” (/d. at
E17). Accordingly, the court concluded that “the ALJ
should have determined whether the description of the
hazard was accurate; and, if so, whether [petitioner] had
knowledge of the hazard” (ibid.).

In the alternative, the court held (Pet. App. E17-E19)
that the ALJ had failed adequately to explain why it did
not follow the OSHRC’s holding in Con Agra. The court
could not “discern any material difference between the cir-
cumstances alleged in this case and those in Con Agra” (id.
at E18). Nor did it believe that Con Agra could be so easily
distinguished, noting that “its holding is not confined by a
focus on the particular facts about challenged employer
practices” (id. at E19). Rather, the court said, “Con Agra
correctly makes the larger point that[,] when an employer
is aware of a hazard that is not in fact addressed by a
specific standard, then of necessity that standard cannot
be deemed to have preempted his obligation under the
general duty clause” (/bid.).

ess, * * * shall prevail over any different general standard which
might otherwise be applicable to the same condition, practice, means,
method, operation, or process * * *.”

ARGUMENT

The court of appeals reached the correct result in this
case. Its decision does not conflict with any decision of
this Court or of any other court of appeals. Accordingly,
review by this Court is not warranted.

1. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 8-9, 11-20) that the
decision below invalidates and effectively replaces 29
C.F.R. 1910.5(f) with a preemption regulation of the
court’s own devising. This contention is meritless.

a. The court of appeals plainly did not invalidate the
Secretary’s preemption regulation. The court stated quite
explicitly (Pet. App. E10) that the case did not involve a
challenge “to any OSHA regulation, but rather a challenge
to the [OSHRC’s] interpretation of particular OSHA
regulations.” Moreover, the court construed 29 C.F.R.
1910.5(f) in a way that resolved “[a]ny apparent conflict
between section 5(a)(2) or the preemption regulations on
the one hand, and the general duty clause on the other
***” (Pet. App. E14). Thus, there is no basis for sug-
gesting that 29 C.F.R. 1910.5(f) has been invalidated.

b. Nor did the court of appeals replace 29 C.F.R.
1910.5(f) with a preemption regulation of the court’s own
devising.* The preemption regulation applies only where
compliance with a safety or health standard adequately
addresses a particular hazard attributable to a specific
substance. It does not alter the employer’s statutory
obligation to eliminate serious, recognized hazards from
the workplace, which is “mandatory [and] independent of
the specific health and safety standards to be promulgated
by the Secretary” (Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S.
1, 13 (1980)).

> Petitioner errs in suggesting (Pet. 9-10, 12 n.5, 13-14) that, in the
proceedings below, the Secretary took the position that 29 C.F.R.
1910.5(f) allowed an employer to rely on an inadequate safety or
health standard to defeat its obligations under the general duty clause.
The Secretary took no such position.

8

c. In any event, even if the preemption regulation ap-
plies whenever a specific standard fails to provide ade-
quate protection, the result below is still correct. 29
C.F.R. 1910.5(f) states that compliance with a specific
standard “shall be deemed to be in compliance” with the
general duty clause “only to the extent of the condition,
practice, means, method, operation, or process covered by
the standard.” The court of appeals correctly found (Pet.
App. E16) that “the hazard alleged in the statutury charge
is distinguishable from that addressed by the freon stand-
ard.” Specifically, it said (id. at E17) that, “[{wJhile the
regulation places a limit on the permissible level of time-
weighted exposure to freon vapors over an eight-hour
work shift, the hazard described in the citation is both
broader and more specific than that described in the
regulation.”* Thus, under the plain language of the
preemption regulation, it is clear that petitioner has not
been relieved of its obligations under the general duty
clause. >

4 The court’s conclusion is plainly correct. In setting only a max-
imum, eight-hour, time weighted exposure limit, the freon standard
addresses only the hazard of cumulative exposure to the substance
over a normal work shift. It sets no short-term limit to protect against
brief, sudden exposures to very high levels of freon, even though such
levels may result in severe toxic reactions or may displace oxygen,
creating a risk of asphyxiation or fatal cardiac arrest in confined
spaces. See Pet. App. C20, E3. Thus, it is “unsupported and
counterintuitive” (Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377,
1382 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) to conclude, as the ALJ concluded (Pet. App.
C11), that the freon standard deals “fully and completely” with the use
of freon in petitioner’s production of M1 tanks (id. at E16-E17).

5 Petitioner errs in suggesting (Pet. 9, 13) that the decision below
conflicts with the decisions of the Second Circuit in Usery v. Mar-
quette Cement Mfg., 568 F.2d 902 (1977), and the Seventh Circuit in
Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.9
(1975). In Marquette Cement Mfg., the court held that the OSHRC
erred when it refused to allow the Secretary to amend the complaint to
charge the employer with a violation of the general duty clause in

9

2. Petitioner next suggests (Pet. 9-10, 21-29) that the
court below erred in holding that OSHRC acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in failing to follow its Con Agra decision.
Of course, this holding was an alternate ground for the
decision below, and thus makes no difference to the out-
come of this case. In any event, the holding is correct.

In Con Agra, the Secretary issued a citation against a
grain elevator company whose employees regularly
entered grain-laden railroad cars containing pesticide
fumes. The employer responded that it was in compliance
with 29 C.F.R. 1910.1000’s limits on air contaminants.
The OSHRC held that the “failure to test ina confined at-
mosphere before possible exposure of employees to toxic
substances is a violation distinct from a continued ex-
posure to known quantities of substances listed in section
1910.1000” (Con Agra, 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1145).

Petitioner suggests (Pet. 22-26) that Con Agra is
distinguishable from the present case because petitioner
here was cited for violating 29 C.F.R. 1900.1000(e). But
that section merely prescribes protective measures for the
limits established in 29 C.F.R. 1900.1000(a), a section that
addresses only the hazards relating to weighted-average
exposure to freon over an eight-hour work shift. Since 29
C.F.R. 1900.1000(a) does not apply to the dangers of
entering confined spaces with potentially toxic at-
mospheres, neither can 29 C.F.R. 1900.1000(e). And 29
C.F.R. 1900.1000(a)’s silence with respect to such hazards
cannot be treated as an intent to leave them unregulated.
See, e.g., L.R. Willson, 773 F.2d at 1382; Donovan v.
Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 766 F.2d 804, 810 (3d Cir.

addition to a specific standard violation. In Butler Lime, the court set
aside an OSHRC decision vacating a citation that was based on an
alleged violation of a specific standard. Thus, neither of these deci-
sions finds preemption based on an interpretation of 29 C.F.R.
1910.5(f).

10

1985). Thus, the fact that petitioner has been cited for
violating 29 C.F.R. 1900.1000(e) is not a basis for
distinguishing Con Agra.

Nor can Con Agra be distinguished (Pet. 26-29) on the
ground that petitioner’s tanks, unlike the railroad cars in
Con Agra, are not confined spaces. The ALJ declined to
rule on this issue (Pet. App. CY), and thus, as the court of
appeals recognized (id. at E19), this is a factual question
that must be addressed on remand.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

GEORGE R. SALEM

Solicitor of Labor
ALLEN H. FELDMAN

Associate Solicitor
MARY-HELEN MAUTNER

Counsel for Appellate Litigation
EDWARD D. SIEGER

Attorney

NOVEMBER 1987

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1987-- 202-037/60104

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