# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — DuPage Bank & Trust Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 1004

## Text

S 7 al 2 R 9 | | Gey Court, U.S,

No. AUG

In THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OctToBeR TERM, 1987

DUPAGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
as Trustee of Trusts Nos. 2602 and 2439,

Petitioner,
vs.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY
COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, THE COUNTY OF
McHENRY, ILLINOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the
TOWN OF ALGONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Sanpra 8S. Kerrick *
WriuaM M. Franz

FRANZ & KERRICK

453 Coventry Green

Crystal Lake, Illinois 60014
(815) 459-8100

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

os &
19 198/

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The question is whether Illinois may impose taxes con-
trary to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Illinois is imposing a real estate tax on the sub-
ject property at a rate of 26 times that imposed on other
nearby property. The parties have admitted that both
properties are substantially similar in character and of
equal value, but differently classified. The Petitioner con-
tends the tax is unconstitutional. It is the de facto policy
of the State of Illinois that Equal Protection does not re-
quire a comparison of tax burdens between classes.

il

RULE 28.1 DISCLOSURE

The Petitioner, DuPage Bank and Trust Company of
Glen Ellyn, Illinois, is a mere title holding nominee of an
Illinois land trust. The taxpayers of the instant tax were
Illinois Institute of Technology, the contract seller; the
bankruptcy estate of Frank J. Kafka, successor to the con-
tract purchaser; and Sears Bank and Trust Company of
Chicago, the mortgage holder.

In 1981 DuPage Bank had no parents, affiliates or sub-
sidiaries. It is now owned by First Wisconsin National
Bank of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Illinois Institute of Technology is a private university
organized as a not-for-profit organization.

In 1981 Sears Bank was owned by a holding company,
Midland Bank Corp. Since that time Sears Bank has changed
its name to UnibancTrust Company of Chicago, and it is
now owned by a holding company, Unibanc, Corp.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ... i
BERPRMD GL RPREAPU RES oo. c cece ecceces il
py FN BW ivy 0) ayy | iv
RONEN APOE. ee cc ccc c cc ccccccccses 1
eee kk y dus scans sa diees ees 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
ES 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI:

EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIRES THAT ONCE
PROPERTIES HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED FOR
PURPOSES OF TAXATION, THAT THE TAX
TREATMENT, RELATIVE TO THE DIFFER-
ENCE IN CLASSIFICATION, BE NOT SO DIS-
PARATE AS TO BE WHOLLY ARBITRARY.
ILLINOIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
IGNORE THE CONSTITUTION AND DECI-
SIONS OF THIS COURT AND BE PERMIT-
TED TO TAX ADMITTEDLY SIMILAR PROP-
ERTIES WITH AN ARBITRARY DISPARITY
eG 6 ea ceed ines haseeees 7

ES 13

iV
APPENDIX APP.
PAGE

Opinion of Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Dis-
trict, 151 Ill. App. 3d 624, 502 N.E.2d 1250 .. la

Judgment Order of the Circuit Court of the Nine-
teenth Judicial District, McHenry County, IIli-
OPE Peer ner rye rr rt er rrr re lla

Order of Property Tax Appeal Board of Illinois
Department of Revenue ................... 15a

Notice of Decision of Illinois Supreme Court Deny-
Meer LOOVG (0 BOONE occ ccc cciccccnetnaes 18a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

—_—_———_

Cases PAGE
Department of Revenue v. Warren Petroleum Corp.,
2 ee eS | Brrr rer rr rrr ee 10
Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Carr, 272
io Re: A per re oe 11
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910. 9
Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Railway v.
Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940) ............ 8,9

People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia Fields Country
Ceeb. Bid TE. TOR COD onic vcccscvivas:

Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954). = 6, 7

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV ........... 2

In Tne

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Octoser Term, 1987

DUPAGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
as Trustee of Trusts Nos. 2602 and 2439,

Petitioner,
vs.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY
COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, THE COUNTY OF
McHENRY, ILLINOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the
TOWN OF ALGONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

The Petitioner, DuPage Bank and Trust Company, as
Trustee, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue
to review the decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois
issued on December 31, 1986.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second
District, is reported at 151 Ili. App. 3d 624, 502 N.E.2d
1250 (1986). (Appendix, page la). The Judgment Order of

ilies

the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
McHenry County, Illinois, is unpublished. (Appendix, page
lla). The order of the Property Tax Appeal Board of the
Illinois Department of Revenue is unpublished. (Appen-
dix, page 15a). The notice of the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court denying leave to appeal is unpublished.
(Appendix, page 18a). ;

JURISDICTION

_—_—_—_——

The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second
District, was filed December 31, 1986. A Petition for Re-
hearing was denied February 9, 1987. The Supreme Court
of Illinois denied Petitioner leave to appeal on June 4,
1987.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(3). The instant Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is
being filed within 90 days of the denial of the petition
for leave to appeal by the Illinois Supreme Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.

ee

~

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter involves the constitutionality of a real estate
tax. It is necessary to briefly review the assessment pro-
cedure.

Real estate in Illinois which is not used for public or
charitable purposes is subject to a real estate tax. Each
parcel is assessed by a local township assessor. Illinois
has several assessment classifications which essentially
classify real estate according to character so that the same
formula or method of assessment will be applied by the
assessor as he assesses all properties within the class. For
example, the same formula for assessments is applied to
all lands classified as farm lands. A different formula is
applied to lands classified as open space.

Once all the assessments for all parcels in all classes
within the township are completed, then the real estate
tax is imposed on the assessments so that a $10,000 assess-
ment will generally yield ten times as much tax as a $1,000
assessment.

If the taxpayer cannot settle his assessment with local
officials he may file a petition with the Property Tax Ap-
peal Board of the Illinois Department of Revenue. Hear-
ing on the petition is an administrative hearing de novo.

The taxpayer’s county and township are named respon-
dents. They must defend their proposed assessment.

In this case the taxpayer filed a petition to contest the
1981 assessment on a 107 acre parcel of land located ad-
jacent to a highway in the City of Crystal Lake. It was
not subdivided. It had some old, abandoned buildings on
a portion of the land, but for all purposes relevant to this
case, it was undeveloped land. No building permit could

a

be obtained without subdivision. The property generally
had commercial and mixed use zoning designations, but
subject to various contingencies and planned unit develop-
ment requirements. The zoning was neither final nor firm.

The taxpayer contended in its petition that its tax was
unconstitutional because the taxpayer’s undeveloped land
was being taxed 26 times higher per acre than other
similar undeveloped lands in the township. Without deny-
ing that the other undeveloped lands were similar to the
subject, the County answered that the taxpayer could not
compare its land to those other lands because the other
lands were properly in different assessment classifications.
Whether they were, in fact, similar properties was not
considered by the County in determining the tax.

To defend its proposed assessment, the County offered
proof of the recently recorded sale price of a nearby 66
acre parcel of undeveloped land on a major highway in
the township with superior firm industrial zoning and
which land qualified for a building permit without sub-
division. The County contended that the second parcel and
the subject were highly similar in character and that proof
of the sale price per acre of this second parcel should be
used to estimate the value of the subject, with an assess-
ment to be imposed on the subject on the basis of the
estimated value.

The taxpayer admitted that the two parcels were nearly
identical. The taxpayer submitted for the record the ac-
tual tax imposed on the County’s comparable to compare
it to the proposed tax on the subject. The subject’s pro-
posed tax burden was 26 times greater per acre than the
County’s comparable. The estimated tax of the subject
was $557.90 per acre, but the tax of the comparable was
only $21.00 per acre. Respondents offered no evidence of
assessments or tax burdens on any other properties to
compare to the subject.

a SS

The County objected to the taxpayer’s comparison of
taxes contending the Board could not consider the two
properties as “comparable” for imposing a tax unless they
were in the same class.

It is uncontested that the two parcels are properly in
different assessment classes, and that they are, in fact,
substantially similar in character and of the same value
per acre.

Because the two properties were so similar, the County
proposed to set the subject’s assessment based on an esti-
mated sale price derived from this comparable parcel.
However, it did not base the assessment of the com-
parable on its own sale price because a different formula
was being used in that class.

At the hearing the hearing officer ruled that the local
assessor could be cross-examined on whether he had at-
tempted to assess uniformly. Notwithstanding the ruling,
the State’s Attorney directed him not to answer the ques-
tion.

The taxpayer’s counsel argued orally that the tay was
unconstitutional as a-denial of Equal Protection and filed
a brief on the constitutional issue. The brief was part of
the record before the Board. The State’s Attorney de-
clined to argue the constitutional question at the hearing
and filed no brief for the County.

The Board issued a two page opinion ruling in favor
of the County’s proposed assessment. The opinion noted
the taxpayer had contended its tax was unconstitutional,
but overruled the objection without comment. (Appendix,
page 15a).

The taxpayer filed an appeal in administrative review
with the Circuit Court for McHenry County. The Circuit
Court reversed the Department of Revenue; declared the

oa

subject tax unconstitutional; and entered judgment for the
taxpayer for a ratable tax. (Appendix, pages 12a-13a). The
Circuit Court’s opinion relied on the decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the case of Walters
v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 98 L. Ed. 660,
665 (1954), as controlling. Walters addressed classification
vis-a-vis taxation, holding that Equal Protection requires
that “different [tax] treatments be not so disparate, rela-
tive to the difference in classification, as to be wholly ar-
bitrary.”’ The Illinois Attorney General, on behalf of the
Department of Revenue, then filed an appeal with the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois contending, inter alia, that Equal
Protection never requires a comparison of the tax burdens
between similar, but differently classified, properties.

In both written and oral arguments before the Appellate
Court, the taxpayer’s counsel argued that the Appellate
Court was obliged to follow the Supreme Court of the
United States in Walters, and to determine whether the
tax disparity between properties admitted to be substan-
tially similar, was so great as to be arbitrary.

Without mentioning Walters, the Appellate Court re-
versed the Circuit Court and ruled that Equal Protection
does not require Illinois to compare tax burdens between
classes. (Appendix, page 7a).

The taxpayer petitioned for a rehearing, specifically
directing the attention of the court to the fact that the
Appellate Court’s decision does not account for the Walters
decision and cannot be reconciled to the Walters decision.
The petition for rehearing was denied.

The Illinois Supreme Court has never decided an Equal
Protection classification case with the issue present here.
The taxpayer petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for
leave to appeal noting in the petition that the Appellate
Court had ignored the Walters decision. The Illinois Su-
preme Court denied leave to appeal.

a, ae

s

The present state of the law in Illinois is that a tax-
payer has no Equal Protection claim to contest a grossly
disparate tax burden for property substantially similar to
other property in the district but properly in a different
class. A tax 26 times higher per acre has been ruled con-
stitutional, literally as a matter of pure form over sub-
stance. The form of the classification wholly controls the
tax. The substance of similarities between the properties
has been ruled irrelevant.

Many other issues were litigated below which are not
appealed here.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIRES THAT ONCE PROP-
ERTIES HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED FOR PURPOSES OF
TAXATION, THAT THE TAX TREATMENT, RELATIVE
TO THE DIFFERENCE IN CLASSIFICATION, BE NOT
SO DISPARATE AS TO BE WHOLLY ARBITRARY. ILLI-
NOIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO IGNORE THE
CONSTITUTION AND DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND
BE PERMITTED TO TAX ADMITTEDLY SIMILAR PROP-
ERTIES WITH AN ARBITRARY DISPARITY OF 26
TIMES.

This case has been a six year test case by Illinois to
expand the State’s right to impose real estate taxes any
way it sees fit. It has patently ignored the Constitution
and failed to recognize a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Walters v. City of St.
Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 98 L. Ed. 660, 665 (1954). That
case is not recognized as law in Illinois.

In Walters the Supreme Court interpreted Equal Pro-
tection to require that if similar subjects have been prop-

sailien.

erly classified in different taxable classifications, then the
tax authorities must compare the extent of those similar-
ities to determine whether they justify the difference in
tax burden. If the disparity between the two tax burdens
for similar, but differently classified subjects, is so great
as to be arbitrary, then the higher tax is unconstitutional,
and the taxpayer will be entitled to a reasonably similar
tax burden. The Supreme Court declared that Equal Pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that:

“different [tax] treatments be not so disparate rela-
tive to the difference in classification, as to be wholly
arbitrary.” Ibid.

It is difficult to imagine a clearer directive to apply to
this case. The taxpayer has not found a single case in
any jurisdiction where the disparity in tax burdens for
similar properties was so vast as to charge one taxpayer
3.8% (1/26th) of the tax imposed on another taxpayer.
Since the subject and the County’s comparable are ad-
mitted by the parties to be similar, in fact, the Walters
case demands that the extent of the tax disparity be studied,
and if it is too great considering the similarities, then the
higher tax is constitutionally void.

It should be noted that the Walters test poses no threat
to any kind of classification. It does not require that sim-
ilar lands must have the same classification or even the
same system of classification. It does not require that the
tax burdens be identical or precisely uniform between
similar classes. The legislature does have broad author-
ity, unimpeded by Walters, to develop multiple classifica-
tions and systems. The legislature has authority to tax
certain classes at somewhat higher levels than others. The
Supreme Court has consistently endorsed the concept of
allowing the legislature wide latitude in these matters
both prior to and after its Walters decision. Nashville,
Chattanooga, and St. Louis Railway v. Browning, 310

U.S. 362, 368, 84 L. Ed. 1254, 1257 (1940), and Lehn-
hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359,
35 L. Ed. 2d 351, 355 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S.
910.

Walters goes beyond the underlying system of classifica-
tion and studies the tax, itself. It requires that once sim-
ilar subjects have been properly classified in different
classes, and once their assessments have been properly
determined per the mode for their respective classes, then
at that point, Equal Protection requires that their respec-
tive tax burdens, no matter how they are determined,
must be compared to determine whether the disparity is
so grossly disparate as to be arbitrary. If it is, then the
higher tax is unconstitutional, and the taxpayer will be
entitled to a reasonably similar lower tax burden.

The Illinois Supreme Court has indirectly addressed this
issue twice in obiter dicta, both favorably to this taxpayer.

In one case owners of a golf course complained of over-
assessment when their land was being assessed in a range
of $525 to $575 per acre while adjoining farm lands were
being assessed in a range of $150 to $363 per acre. The
Illinois Supreme Court studied the substance of the ac-
tual differences between the two classes to determine
whether the disparity between the classes was justified.
It found the golf course had significant improvements
(sprinkler system, etc.) installed at considerable expense
which had substantially enhanced the value of the golf
course beyond the value of the farm land. Then the court,
after considering the differences, determined that the
disparity in the tax burden was not arbitrary but was
based on real factors of substantial differences between
the properties. People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia Fields
Country Club, 374 Ill. 101, 103, 28 N.E.2d 109 (1940).

In the instant case the Appellate Court failed to apply
either the Walters or Olympia Fields analysis. The Court

=o

erroneously believed that Equal Protection never requires
an analysis between classes, but only within a class. This
interpretation of Equal Protection cannot, under any cir-
cumstances, be reconciled to the requirements of Walters
and Olympia Fields to determine whether the difference
in tax burden between classes is arbitrary.

Further, the Illinois Supreme Court spoke directly to
the issue of comparison between classes as a subject for
Equal Protection scrutiny in 1954, the year of Walters.
The Illinois Court was called upon to determine whether
a taxpayer had an unconstitutional tax burden because
it had to pay somewhat higher personal property taxes
for its similar, but differently classified, property. The
Court studied the difference in the tax burden and de-
clared that the difference was not disparate enough to
raise an Equal Protection claim, but went on to declare,
in dictum, that if the tax disparity would have been “‘sub-
stantial”, then the taxpayer would have an unconstitu-
tional tax under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is ap-
parent the Court did, in fact, apply the Walters type of
analysis, but the taxpayer did not have a “‘substantial”’
disparity as we do here. Department of Revenue v. Warren
Petroleum Corp., 2 Ill. 2d 483, 488, 489, 119 N.E.2d 215
(1954).

The Court went on in further dictum at 488, to declare
that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees ‘‘substantial equality in the resulting
[tax] burden” but not identity. A taxpayer would have
no Fourteenth Amendment claim to contest his tax until
the difference in tax burden became ‘“‘substantiai.’”’

The Illinois Department of Revenue and the Appellate
Court here mistakenly believed that Equal Protection never
requires such an analysis between classes.

The law is clear from the Supreme Court’s directive in
Walters that such an analysis must be applied where there

ee

is a gross disparity as is present here. Further, the tests
applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in Olympia Fields
and Warren Petroleum are substantially the same analysis
the Supreme Court of the United States applied in Walters.

In none of the three cases did the taxpayer prove a
gross disparity in the tax. However, the Supreme Court
of the United States has decided a case with a gross tax
disparity where it specifically adopted a substance over
form test for Equal Protection in an Illinois revenue dis-
pute, Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Carr, 272 U.S.
494, 509, 71 L. Ed. 372 (1926):

‘““*, . when the question is whether a tax imposed
by a state deprives a party of rights secured by the
Federal Constitution, the decision is not dependent
upon the form in which the taxing scheme is cast, nor
upon the characterization of that scheme as adopted
by the state court. We must regard the substance
rather than the form, and the controlling test is to
be found in the operation and effect of the law as
applied and enforced by the state.’ ”

In that case the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional an Illinois tax when foreign insurance companies
were being charged an occupation tax based on 100% of
net receipts, but domestic insurance companies were classi-
fied separately and only taxed on a basis of 30% of net
receipts. The Court was not concerned with the form of
the two classifications but looked directly to the substance
of what was being taxed and determined that Equal Pro-
tection would not allow such tax discrimination between
the two classes which were substantially similar. Jd. at
516.

Here, the Circuit Court declared the tax disparity of
26 times to be unconstitutional under both the Walters
test and the Hanover holding because the subject land
and the comparable land were so similar. That judgment

=

should have been affirmed by the Appellate Court and
should be reinstated by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court should grant certiorari and reverse
the Appellate Court on the constitutional issue to serve
notice on Illinois that it is not exempt from the mandate
of the Constitution or the directives of the Supreme Court
on the issues of Equal Protection and taxation. The Illi-
nois assessment officials from the local assessor to the
Department of Revenue have each demonstrated an atti-
tude that the best way to handle a constitutional objec-
tion by a taxpayer is to simply ignore the objection, to
refuse to address it at a hearing, and to decline to directly
rule on its merits. A constitutional system will not toler-
ate such arrogance in the use of their power by those
public officials charged with upholding the Constitution.
These officials are not immune from constitutional account-
ability. Their collective activities pose a dangerous cor-
ruption of the power to tax by the State of Illinois. They
- have refused to recognize the Constitution in determin-
ing the instant tax.

A tax at a level 26 times that charged for nearly iden-
tical property in the district is so excessive and oppressive
as to deny Equal Protection, all as prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. =

==

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner prays that this Court grant the Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari and, upon review, reverse the
decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois and reinstate
the judgment of the Circuit Court for the taxpayer on
the constitutional issue.

Respectfully submitted,

Sanpra S. KErRIckK *
WituiamM M. Franz
FRANZ & KERRICK

453 Coventry Green
Crystal Lake, Illinois 60014
(815) 459-8100

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

—ia—

(Filed December 31, 1986)
Nos. 2-85-509, 2-85-542 consolidated

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT

DuPAGE BANK & TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee
of Trusts No. 2602 and 2439,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VS.

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY COUNTY
BOARD OF REVIEW; THE COUNTY OF McHENRY, ILLI-
NOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the TOWN OF AL-
GONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County.
No. 84 MR 0056
Hon. Roland A. Herrmann, Judge Presiding.

Presiding Justice NASH delivered the opinion of the
court:

Defendant, the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) ap-
peals from a judgment of the circuit court which, on ad-
ministrative review, reversed a decision of the PTAB up-
holding the 1981 assessment of property held by the plain-
tiff, the DuPage Bank & Trust Company, as trustee. The
PTAB contends the trial court erred in finding: (1) the
assessment violated the constitutional requirement of uni-
formity of taxation; and (2) that the subject property was
entitled to a farmland classification.

—2a—

The subject property is a 107-acre parcel consisting of
two tracts, 36.75 acres and 71 acres, located in a com-
mercial/industrial area in the city of Crystal Lake. The
south one-quarter of the property is improved with build-
ings once used by the Illinois Institute of Technology and
McHenry County College, but abandoned since 1973. From
July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1982, the 36.75 acre tract was zoned
PUD Commercial and the 71 acre tract PUD for other
uses.

The property was assessed at $540,520 for 1981, and
plaintiff appealed to the McHenry County Board of Re-
view for a reduction of the assessment and for a farmland
classification as provided in section 20e of the Revenue
Act of 1939 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 120, par. 501le). The
board of review denied the requested relief, but adjusted
the assessment to $476,060 to correct an error in the
amount of acreage.

Plaintiff appealed the land assessment ($456,060 attrib-
utable to land and $20,000 attributable to improvements)
to the PTAB and a hearing de novo was held on Decem-
ber 3, 1982. Plaintiff argued that the assessed valuation
of the subject property was 26.5 times that of similar
properties and offered three parcels as comparables: a
70.44 acre farm assessed at $21,400 as farmland; a 134
acre golf course assessed at $52,280 as open space; and
a 66.28 acre farm assessed at $19,890 as farmland. Plain-
tiff also submitted a photograph of the subject property
taken in November 1982, showing a corn crop on it.

The Algonquin Township Assessor testified that the fair
market value of the subject property on January 1, 1981
was $2.7 million. The assessor based his valuation upon
sales of comparably zoned property with road frontage
and upon his estimation that it would take approximate-
ly 10 years to improve the property to its optimum mar-
ket value. The assessor also testified that he was familiar
with the subject property and had not observed any farm-
ing of it for 10 years prior to 1982, at which time the
property had been planted with corn.

—3a—

The PTAB found that the assessment was proper and
plaintiff sought administrative review of that decision in
the circuit court of McHenry County. The trial court found
that the U.S. Constitution requires uniformity of taxation
irrespective of the classification of property and that the
property had not been uniformly assessed as compared
with the other properties submitted. The circuit court also
determined that the PTAB’s finding that no farming had
taken place on the property until 1982 was contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence and that it was en-
titled to a farmland classification. The court reversed the
decision of the PTAB and reduced the assessment of plain-
tiff's property from $4,262 to $304 per acre. The PTAB
appeals.

We consider first the PTAB’s contention that the cir-
cuit court erred in reversing the PTAB’s finding that the
property was not entitled to a farmland assessment.

A determination by an administrative agency will not
be disturbed upon review unless contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue (1986), 111 Ill.2d 32, 47, 94 Ill.Dec. 737,
488 N.E.2d 984; Cherry Bowl, Inc. v. Property Tax Ap-
peal Board (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 326, 328, 55 Ill.Dec. 472,
426 N.E.2d 618; Robinson v. Property Tax Appeal Board
(1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 155, 156, 28 Ill.Dec. 583, 390 N.E.2d
942.) In order to qualify for assessment as farmland, real
property must have been used as a farm for the two years
preceding the tax year in question. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch.
120, par. 501e.) Section 1(25) of the Revenue Act of 1939
defines “farm” with reference to certain enumerated farm-
ing activities, such as the growning of crops and the rais-
ing of livestock. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 120, par. 482(25).)
In determining whether property is entitled to a farmland
classification for assessment purposes, the focus is on the
present use of the property. Santa Fe Land Improvement
Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (1983), 113 Il.
App.3d 872, 875, 69 Ill.Dec. 708, 448 N.E.2d 3, appeal
denied.

tien

—

At the hearing before the PTAB, the township assessor
testified that he was familiar with the subject property
and had not observed any farming activity on it for the
ten years prior to 1982. The only evidence of farming sub-
mitted by the plaintiff was a photograph taken in 1982
showing a corn crop on the property. No evidence was
presented to establish that the property had been farmed
in 1981, the tax year in question. Counsel for the plain-
tiff stated to the PTAB that farming had been “‘intermit-
tent” and that for some years, including 1981, the prop-
erty had been allowed to lie fallow. We conclude the trial
court erred in finding that the PTAB’s denial of a farm-
land classification was contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence.

Plaintiff also argues that fallow lands should be classified
at farmland, and represents that it is a practice in Mc-
Henry County to assess fallow lands as farmland. How-
ever, the Revenue Act does not contain an exception for
fallow lands and, in any event, no evidence was offered.
to support the conclusion that the subject property was
farmed prior to 1981 and then allowed to lie fallow as a
farming practice. Moreover, plaintiff's representations as
to local assessment practices are dehors the record, and
thus do not constitute support for his argument. We con-
clude that the circuit court erred in applying a farmland
classification to the property and in reducing the assessed
valuation on that basis.

The PTAB next contends that the trial court erred in
finding that the subject property was not assessed in ac-
cordance with the constitutional principle of uniformity of
taxation, which requires that like property be equally
taxed in proportion to value. (Apex Motor Fuel Co. v.
Barrett (1960), 20 Ill.2d 395, 401, 169 N.E.2d 769; People
ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1934), 357 Ill. 173,
180, 191 N.E. 296.) Plaintiff argues that classification is
irrelevant to the achievement of uniformity of taxation,
and states that the assessed valuation of the subject prop-
erty is 26.5 times that of similar parcels which are classi-
fied as farmland or open space.

—5a—

The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains a uniformity
clause which provides:

“Except as otherwise provided in this Section,
taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly
by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly
shall provide by law.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §4(a)).

The 1870 Illinois Constitution contained a similar provi-
sion (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IX, § 1). Our supreme court
has determined that the clause requires only that taxa-
tion be uniform as to the class upon which it operates.
(People ex rel. Bosworth v. Lowen (1984), 102 Ill.2d 242,
248, 80 Ill.Dec. 70, 464 N.E.2d 1053; Hoffmann v. Clark
(1977), 69 Ill.2d 402, 423, 14 Ill.Dec. 269, 372 N.E.2d 74.)
Since the subject property bore a different tax classifica-
tion than the parcels which plaintiff offered as comparable,
it has not been shown that the assessment offended the
Illinois constitution.

Plaintiff also contends that the disparity between the
assessed valuation of the subject property and the other
“comparables” offends the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., amend. XIV,
§ 1.) The threshold inquiry in equal protection analysis
is whether similarly situated persons are treated dissimi-
larly. (Hisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438, 446-47,
92 S.Ct. 1029, 1034-35, 31 L.Ed.2d 349; Jenkins v. Wu
(1984), 102 Ill.2d 468, 477, 82 Ill.Dec. 382, 468 N.E.2d 1162;
People v. Sampson (1985), 130 Ill.App.3d 438, 445, 86 IIl.
Dec. 403, 473 N.E.2d 1002.) The United States Supreme
Court has held that the States may classify property for
taxation purposes, provided equality is accorded to all
members of the same class. (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 359, 93 S.Ct. 1001,
1008, 35 L.Ed.2d 351; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Ry. v. Browning (1940), 310 U.S. 362, 368, 60 S.Ct. 968,
971, 84 L.Ed. 1254.) The Illinois Supreme Court has also
noted that, “It has long been settled that the power of
the legislature to make classifications, particularly in the
field of taxation, is very broad, and that the fourteenth

—fa—

amendment imposes no ‘iron rule’ of equal taxation.” De-
partment of Revenue v. Warren Petroleum Corp. (1954),
2 Ill.2d 483, 489-90, 119 N.E.2d 215.

Plaintiff does not contest the constitutionality of the
statutes establishing farmland and open space classifica-
tions and, as we have determined, the subject property
was not entitled to a farmland classification. Since plain-
tiff's property and the parcels offered as comparables bore
different tax classifications, they may properly be assessed
and taxed differently without offending the equal protec-
tion clause.

In support of his argument that equal protection re-
quires uniformity of taxation irrespective of classification,
plaintiff relies on the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois (1934),
292 U.S. 535, 54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed. 1411, and Hanover
Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr (1926), 272 U.S. 494, 47 S.Ct.
179, 71 L.Ed. 372. Plaintiff argues that these decisions
mandate uniformity of taxation for all kinds of property,
however classified. We do not agree.

In the Concordia case, the net receipts of foreign in-
surance companies were assessed at a different rate than
other personal property. The Supreme Court held that
this practice violated the equat-protection clause because
there was no reasonable basis to discriminate against this
species of personal property. (292 U.S. 535, 54 S.Ct. 830;
see National-Ben Franklin Fire Insurance Co. of Pitts-
burgh v. Brenza (1952), 411 Ill. 337, 342-43, 104 N.E.2d
218.) In the Hanover case, the Court also found that
dissimilar tax treatment of property of the same class of-
fended the equal protection clause. (272 U.S. 494, 516, 47
S.Ct. 179, 185.) Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, in neither
case did the United States Supreme Court state that the
equal protection clause mandates uniformity of taxation
irrespective of classification. The Illinois Supreme Court
has said that the fourteenth amendment requires no more
than uniformity among members of the same class (Peo-
ple ex rel. Miller v. Doe (1961), 22 Ill.2d 211, 219, 174

any [ae

N.E.2d 830), and that rule will be applied here. We con-
clude that the assessment of the subject property did not
offend the equal protection clause.

Plaintiff next contends that the assessment was im-
proper under the doctrine of constructive fraud. Fraud
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. (Jn
re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill.2d 311, 318, 88
Ill.Dec. 28, 478 N.E.2d 343; Clarendon Associates v. Kor-
zen (1973), 56 Ill.2d 101, 104, 306 N.E.2d 299; People ex
rel. Rosewell v. Dee El Garage, Inc. (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d
382, 385, 9 Ill.Dec. 328, 366 N.E.2d 585.) Deliberate mis-
conduct by the assessor need not be shown. (People ex
rel. Skidmore v Anderson (1974), 56 IIl.2d 334, 339, 307
N.E.2d 391.) In People v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp. (1982), 89 Ill.2d 287, 293, 59 I[ll.Dec. 923,
926-27, 432 N.E.2d 867, 870-71, constructive fraud in as-
sessments was described as follows:

“Some guidelines have been established for the proof
necessary to establish constructive fraud. Assess-
ments that are disproportionately higher than those
for similar property or assessments that are based
on the assessor’s own private opinion showing a lack
of knowledge or a lack of honest judgment are indica-
tive of constructive fraud. (Clarendon Associates v.
Korzen (1973), 56 Ill.2d 101, 104-05 [806 N.E.2d 299];
People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans (1934), 31 Ill.2d 477,
479 [202 N.E.2d 543); Aldrich v. Harding (1930), 340
Ill. 354, 358 [172 N.E. 772]; People ex rel. Carr v.
Stewart (1924), 316 Ill. 35, 30 [145 N.E. 6000].) Simi-
larly, overvaluation may be so excessive, under some
circumstances, as to justify the conclusion that it was
not honestly made and, therefore, is constructively
fraudulent. (Clarendon Associates v. Korzen (1973),
56 Ill.2d 101, 104-05 [806 N.E.2d 299]; People ex rel.
Paschen v. Hendrickson Pontiac, Inc. (1957), 12 Ill.2d
477, 480 [147 N.E.2d 29]; People ex rel. Callahan v.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1956), 8 Ill.2d 66, 69-70
[182 N.E.2d 544].)”

a:

Plaintiff states that there here exists a 2650% disparity
between the assessment levels of the subject property and
similar property and, in support of his argument, has com-
pared the 1981 assessed valuations and 1981 taxes for the
respective parcels to find the disparity.

In analyzing such a case, our courts have first required
that the property selected for comparison purposes be
similar in kind and character and be similarly situated.
(People ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson (1950), 406 Ill. 280,
285, 94 N.E.2d 151; People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia
Fields Country Club (1940), 374 Ill. 101, 108, 28 N.E.2d
109; People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1934),
357 Ill. 173, 181, 191 N.E. 296.) The “‘comparables”’ relied
upon by plaintiff did not meet this test because they bore
different tax classifications than the subject property. Two
of the parcels were assessed as farmland and one as open
space, in accordance with sections 20e and 20g-1 of the
Revenue Act of 1939, respectively, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch.
120, pars. 50le, 501g-1). These sections of the statute
designate that such lands may be valued on the basis of
their use as farmland and open space rather than by fair
cash value, which is the basis upon which real property
is normally assessed under section 20 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981,
ch. 120, par. 501), and was the basis upon which the sub-
ject property was assessed. Also, farmland is assessed in
part on the basis of its productivity. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981,
ch. 120, par. 501e.) The fact that farmland and open space
are assessed on a different basis than other real prop-

erty reflects a recognition by the General Assembly that _

such property is distinct from other real property and is
entitled to special treatment. (See Hoffmann v. Clark
(1977), 69 Ill.2d 402, 425-27, 14 Ill.Dec. 269, 372 N.E.2d
74.) It follows that specially classified property is not
“comparable” with other real property because the manner
in which its value is determined for tax purposes is dif-
ferent. The respective assessment levels, which are pro-
portionate to fair market value, cannot be compared. We
conclude plaintiff has not established fraud by comparing
the assessed valuation of its property with that of prop-
erty classified as farmland or open space.

vocal ll

a,

Plaintiff also argues that the valuation of his property
was so excessive that fraud must be inferred. Our supreme
court has stated that the taxpayer alleging excessive valu-
ation must show that the property has been assessed at
a valuation grossly in excess of its market value. (People
v. Wilson (1937), 367 Ill. 494, 498, 12 N.E.2d 5; People
ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1934), 357 Ill. 178,
179, 191 N.E. 296.) The only evidence offered in the pres-
ent case is that the fair market value of the subject prop-
erty on January 1, 1981 was $2.7 million dollars and its
assessed valuation was $476,060. Thus, the subject prop-
erty was assessed at approximately 17%, which the record
shows was the county wide assessment median. The record
fails to support plaintiff's assertion that the valuation of
its property was fraudulently excessive.

Last, plaintiff contends that the assessment of its prop-
erty was improper because the township assessor specu-
lated as to its value if it were improved in accordance
with its PUD designation. A valuation is speculative and
arbitrary if based upon the happening if an uncertain
event rather than upon what the property would fairly
and reasonably bring at a present fair sale. (People ex
rel. Rhodes v. Turk (1945), 391 Ill. 424, 428, 63 N.E.2d
513; People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferr,; Co. (1934),
357 Ill. 178, 181, 191 N.E. 296.) In Wiggins, waterfront
property was improperly valued as a possible industrial
site even though there had been no such development in
the area and no offers to buy the property.

In the present case, the record shows that when the
subject property was assessed as of January 1, 1981, it
bore a PUD designation, in part PUD Commercial. The
township assessor testified that he based his valuation on
sales of comparably zoned property also having road front-
age. Plaintiff did not offer any contrary eviderce of fair
market value. We conclude the assessor’s valuation was
not speculative, as it was based upon valid factors exist-
ing at the time of the assessment.

—10a—

Accordingly, as the decision of the PTAB was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, the judgment of the
circuit court will be reversed.

REVERSED.
REINHARD and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.

—lla—
(Dated June 6, 1985)

State of Illinois
County of McHenry—ss

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE 19TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
McHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS

No. 84 MR 0056

DuPAGE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee of
Trusts No. 2602 and 2439,

Plaintiff,

Vv

D

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS DE-
PARTMENT OF REVENUE; THE McHENRY COUNTY
BOARD OF REVIEW; THE COUNTY OF McHENRY, ILLI-
NOIS, a body corporate and politic; and the TOWN OF
ALGONQUIN, a body corporate and politic,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT ORDER

This cause came on to be heard pursuant to the Admin-
istrative Review Act (Jll. Rev. Stat., Chpt. 110, § 3-101
et seq.) for a judicial review of the 1981 assessments on
a 107 acre parcel of land in the City of Crystal Lake, Ili-
nois. The assessments are appealed by the taxpayer from
the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) which con-
ducted a hearing de novo on December 3, 1982, and ren-
dered its decision on May 17, 1984, under Consolidated
Dockets 81-3200-F-2 and 81-3201-F-2. The County’s tax

—12a—

index numbers for the parcels are 19-05-426-003-0030 and
19-05-476-008-0060.

This is an appeal of the “land’”’ assessments. There is
no appeal and no contest as to the “improvements’”’ assess-
ments.

The facts in this case are largely uncontested. The issues
involve questions of law and whether the PTAB correct-
ly applied the law to the facts of the case. In Adminis-
trative Review upon questions of law, the Court may
review the legal effect of those facts. For this reason, a
summary of the propositions of law and facts in the record
is necessary (as allowed by Jl. Rev. Stat., Chpt. 110,
§ 3-111{c)).

The taxpayer contended that as a matter of law the U.S.
Constitution requires uniformity of assessments and a
ratable tax burden for all properties in the district that
are comparable by the standard criteria used to appraise
real estate—such as zoning, location, topography, soils,
drainage, etc.

The taxpayer and the County suggested certain parcels
that were comparabie to the subject, one being directly
across the street from the subject. The taxpayer then sub-
mitted the assessments on those comparable properties.
The disparity in the tax burden is approximately 2609%.

It is uncontested that the PTAB assessed the subject
based solely on the township assessor’s estimate of the
subject’s projected sale price, yielding an overall assess-
ment of $4,262 per acre. The admitted comparable prop-
erties were assessed at a flat rate of approximately $300
per acre. The justification given by the State for this dis-
crepancy was that the subject was technically in a differ-
ent “class’’ from the comparables. The County did not
submit for the record a single assessment of any other
property for comparison.

The taxpayer contended that this method of assessment
constitutes an error of law in that the gross disparity in
the tax burden on admittedly comparable (but different-

—13a—

ly classified) properties denies the instant taxpayer of
Equal Protection as well as various other constitutional
guarantees. The PTAB rejected those legal objections.

This Court finds that those objections should have been
sustained as a matter of law. The U.S. Supreme Court
has addressed classification vis-a-vis taxation and ruled
that Equal Protection requires that “different treatments
be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classifica-
tion, as to be wholly arbitrary”. Walters v. City of St.
Louis, (1954), 74 S.Ct. 505, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 98 L.Ed.
660, 665. Further, Equal Protection requires that “Tax-
ing by a uniform rule requires uniformity not only in the
rate of taxation, but also uniformity in the mode of the
assessment on the taxable value”. Concordia Fire Insur-
ance v. Illinois, (1933) 292 U.S. 535, 54 S.Ct. 830, 78 L.Ed.
1411. Illinois revenue collections are also subject to provid-
ing the same reductions and debasements of assessment
levels so as to provide substantial equality in the tax
burden. Hanover Fire Insurance v. Carr (1926) 272 U.S.
494, 47 S.Ct. 179, 71 L.Ed. 372. For these reasons, this
Court finds that because the subject was essentially com-
parable to the other properties submitted, that the U.S.
Constitution requires that the subject bear a ratable tax
burden regardless of what technical classification it may
bear.

The taxpayer also argued in the alternative that it was
entitled, as a matter of law, to be classified as a “farm”
under Jil. Rev. Stat., Chpt. 120, § 482 (25).

At various places in the taxpayer’s Complaint and brief
to the PTAB and in the transcript of the hearing before
PTAB, the taxpayer demonstrated a history of farming.
The finding of fact by the PTAB that “no farming activ-
ity of any kind had taken place on the subject until 1982”,
is not supported by the record and is contrary to the mani-
fest weight of the evidence.

This Court finds that the subject should have been classi-
fied as a “farm” and assessed accordingly.

—l4a—

The Court further finds that under both of the~tax-
payer’s theories, as a matter of law, it is entitled to an
assessment in the range of $300 per acre.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that the decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal
Board of May 17, 1984, is reversed and vacated, and that
the taxpayer, DuPage Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee
of Trust No. 2602 and 2439, has judgment herein.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the 1981 land assessment for the
subject be entered on the agriculture assessment rolls as
follows:

Parcel 19-05-426-003-0030 at $304 per acre
Parcel 19-05-476-008-0060 at $304 per acre. ~

DaTED: June 6, 1985

ENTER: /s/ ROLAND A. HERRMANN
Judge

—l5a—

(Dated May 17, 1984)
PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD’S DECISION

APPELLANT DuPage Bank & Trust, et al
DOCKET NO. 81-3200-F-2 and 81-3201-F-2
PARCEL NO. See reverse side

The subject property consists of a 107 acre tract of land
located in Crystal Lake, McHenry County, Illinois. The
subject is improved with five buildings containing some
95,000 square feet. The appellant contends that the sub-
ject property, which is comprised of two parcels, should
be granted a farm assessment.

Appearing on behalf of the appellant were Mr. Wiiliam
Franz and Ms. Sandra Kerrick, attorneys at law. Mr. Franz
presented a memorandum of law in support of his con-
tention. He argued that the present assessments on the
subject property violates the constitutional requirement
of uniformity of taxation. He contended that a tax burden
on the subject at a level 26 times that of a comparable
property is unconstitutional. Mr. Franz next argued that
the subject parcel has been unreasonably and illegally
classified for assessment purposes. Thirdly, the appellant
maintained that the assessments on the subject property
are violative of the constitutional requirement that the
level of assessment rate cannot be more disparate than
2% times. Fourthly, Mr. Franz argued that the present
classification of the subject parcel was based on specula-
tion. He contended that the board of review assumes that
the subject will one day be used as an income producing
property. The appellant also argued that the assessments
violate due process and equal protection as guaranteed
under the United States Constitution. Finally, the tax-
payer maintained that the assessments are so disparate
as to constitute constructive fraud.

—1l6a—

The board of review was represented by its three members,
Mr. Robert Eickstadt, Mrs. Bernadine Darling, and Ms.
lola Desmond, Mr. Randall Woloski, Supervisor of Assess-
ments, Mr. David Stone, Assistant State’s Attorney and
Mr. Robert Kunz, Algonquin Township Assessor. Mr. Kunz
testified that in his opinion the subject parcels had a fair
market value of $2,700,000 on January 1, 1981. He also
stated that he has frequently observed the subject prop-
erty. He testified that the subject is located on a route
he often takes. With regard to both parcels, the witness
stated that he had never observed any farming activity
until 1982, at which time the subject was tilled and planted
with corn. On cross-examination of Mr. Kunz, the appellant
made a motion to strike all of the testimony with regard
to the valuation of the subject property.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the
Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

The Board further finds that the subject property’s pres-
ent assessments, as set forth in the appellee’s evidence,
are proper. The Board notes that land is accorded prefer-
ential treatment only if the definition of ‘“farm’”’ is met.
(Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, 482 (25)). Furthermore, under 501(e),
a tract of property must have been used as a farm for
the two preceding years. The assessor’s testimony clear-
ly revealed that no farming activity of any kind had taken
place on the subject parcel until 1982. It should be noted
that no rebuttal testimony was offered on this point.
Therefore, this Board finds that the subject property is
accurately assessed.

DOCKET NO. PIN LAND IMPR. TOTAL
81-3200-F-1 19-05-426-003-0030 $182,320 -0- $182,320
81-3201-F-1 19-05-476-008-0060 $273,740 $20,000 $293,740

The State Tax Appeal Board from the facts and exhibits
presented finds the decision of the McHenry County Board
of Review to be correct and that the correct assessed
valuation of the property is:

—17a—

LAND See reverse side IMPR See reverse side
TOTAL See reverse side

Subject only to the State Multiplier as applicable.

/s/ BENNETT BRADLEY
Chairman

/s/ W. J. INGELMAN

Member
DISSENTING /si JAKE J. RINGGER
Member
DATE 5-17-84 /s/ JOAN BUCK
Clerk

Final administrative decisions of the Property Tax Ap-
peal Board are subject to review in the Circuit Court
under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.
A complaint for such review must be filed within 35 days
of the date of this decision.

—18a—

(Letterhead of)

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
SPRINGFIELD, ILL. 62706
(217) 782-2035

June 4, 1987

Ms. Sandra Kerrick
Franz, Naughton & Leahy
453 Coventry Green
Crystal Lake, IL 60014

No. 64951—DuPage Bank and Trust Company, as Trustee,
etc., petitioner, v. Property Tax Appeal Board
of the Illinois Department of Revenue, et al.,
etc., respondents. Leave to appeal, Appellate
Court, Second District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for
leave to appeal in the above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate
Court on June 26, 1987.

~ 2 i ree bee le

Piast Tee ak A

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0770%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.