# Appendix — Funnell v. Jones

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 853

## Text

y Supreme Court, U.S,
. a oe ee:
QZ -1 92 | JUL 1 1987
" JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
a ) CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Individually and
as Administratrix of the Estate of
DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased, and

DONALD FUNNELL, Petitioners,

Vv.

STEPHEN JONES, ET AL., Respondents.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL
3115 Harvey Parkway
Oklahoma City, OK 73118
(405) 524-4636

Pro se
July 1, 1987

iisadesaall

EDITOR'S NOTE:

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A
BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE
WILL BE ISSUED.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORRECTED ORDER, May 26, 1987.......... la

ORDER DENYING REHEARING, March 3,1987..2a

OPINION, September 17, 1985....cccecces 3a
AMENDED PETITION FOR REHEARING........ 19a
APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME..... 32a
GROER, CHCOD]F FS, TP9SS wc cs cracsssesves 38a

MOTION TO SEVER CAUSE, October 4,1985.39a
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEVER CAUSE...41la
MOTION FOR***NINE MEMBER APPEAL COURT.42a
ASSIGNMENT ORDER, April 16,1985 cboosee 49a
ORDER RECALLING OPINION,April 16,1985.5la
RECALL OF VOTE AND DISQUALIFICATION...53a
PETITION FOR REHEARING, March 7,1985..55a
ORDER, Re: OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION'S

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY QUESTIONNAIRE.100a
OPINION, Januaty 15,1985. .sccseseceses 102a

CASE INFORMATION SHEET. ...cccessccces 118a

(continued)

i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page
ORDER, May 27, 1980 (Case 54,943)...... 122a
DISSENTING OPINION, May 27, 1980....... 123a

MOTION TO SUSPEND APPLICATION OF RULE..127a
PETITION FOR REHEARING (Case 54, 493)..131a
ORDER March 31, 1980 (Case 54,493)..... 135a
APPLICATION AND PETITION (Case 54, 493)136a
ORDER, November 5, 1979 (Case 54,217)..146a
ORDER, October 19, 1979 (Case 54,217)..147a
ORDER, October 10, 1979 (Case 54,217)..148a

Seanor v. Browne, Annotators Headnotes

and Syllabus by the COuS€.seunc eee 149a

RULE 13, OKLAHOMA COURT RULES.......... 153a

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Tuesday, May 26, 1987

THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOW-
ING ORDERS:

59,204 (consolidated with 59,205,
59,212) Roberta Ann Funnell et Mee Ve
Stephen Jones et al.

CORRECTED ORDER: Motions to Sever
denied; Petitions for
Rehearing denied.

CONCUR: Doolin, C.J., Hargrave,
¥.Cide> Sag Wilson,
Summers, JJ., Powers, Means,
Brightmire, S.JJ.

NOT PARTICIPATING: Hodges, J.,
Powers, Means, Brightmire,
S.JJ., appointed in place of
Lavender, Opala, Kauger, JJ.,

who disqualified.

(John B. Doolin)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

May 26, 1987, James W. Patterson, Clerk)

la

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Tuesday, March 3, 1987

THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOW-
ING ORDERS:

59,204 (consolidated with 59,205 and
59,212) Roberta Ann Funnell etc. v.
Stephen Jones et al. Rehearing denied.
CONCUR: Doolin, C.J., Hargrave,

V.C.J., Simms, Wilson,
Summers, JJ., Means, Powers,
Brightmire, S.JJ.
NOT PARTICIPATING: Hodges, J.,
Means, Powers, Brightmire, S.JJ.,
appointed in place of Lavender,
Opala, Kauger, JJ., who disqualified.
(John B. Doolin)
CHIEF JUSTICE
(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

March 3, 1987, James W. Patterson, Clerk)

2a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
ADMINISTRATIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DAVID ALLEN
FUNNELL, DECEASED, AND
DONALD FUNNELL,

Appellants,
vs.

STEPHEN JONES AND WILLIAM
R. THOMPSON,

Appellees.
and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,

Appellant,
vs.

JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP,
RICK CHEW, ROBERT D. LOONEY,
SR., WENDELL WIGHTMAN, and
THOMAS WILLIAMS,

Appellees.
and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ADMIN-
ISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF
DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL,
DECEASED,

Appellant,
vs.

3a

FILED
SUPREME
COURT
STATE OF
OKLAHOMA
SEPT. 17,
1985

JAMES W.
PATTERSON,
CLERK

No. 59,204
(consoli-
dated w/
59,205 and
59,212)
FOR OFFI-

CIAL PUB-

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) LICATION
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JAMES D. FUNNELL and HARRIET )
FUNNELL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS )
CO-TRUSTEES FOR DAVID ALLEN )
FUNNELL; JONATHAN BURCH, )
EDWIN WHITNEY BURCH and )
JERRY DICK, )
)
Appellees. )

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF

OKLAHOMA COUNTY

Honorable Ray Lee Wall, Judge.

Appeal from order of the trial court
granting summary judgment and holding
that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
statute of limitations and by previously

executed settlement agreement.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL

DONALD K. FUNNELL,

Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma Appellants Pro se,

La

RONALD R. HUDSON
Holloway, Dobson,
Hudson & Bachman
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

WILLIAM R. THOMPSON
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

GEORGE D.
RONALD R.
McKinney,
& Webster
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

DAVIS &
WALKER
Stringer

GOMER SMITH, JR.
Smith & Murdock
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

EDWARD L. RAY,
Fenton, Fenton,
Smith, Reneau & Moon
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

ROBERT J. EMERY
Emery, McCandless,
Gaitis & Bruehl
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

JONATHAN W. BURCH
Burch & Burch
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

5a

For Appellees,
Edwin W. Burch,
Jonathan Burch,
George Camp,

Stephen Jones,

Appellee, Pro se,

For Appellee,
Robert D. Looney,
Sr.

For Appellee,
Wendell Wightman

For Appellee,
Thomas A.
Williams,

For Appellee,
James E. Work,

For Appellees,
James D. Funnell,
Harriet Funnell.

DOOLIN, J.

This is a consolidation of three
appeals brought by Appellants pro se in
the District Court of Oklahoma County.
The three causes consolidated and ruled
on below, include:

1) CJ-79-991, an action by Appel-

lants, Roberta Ann Funnell, individual-

ly and as administratrix of the estate
of David Allen Funnell, deceased, and

Donald Funnell, against Appellees,

Steven Jones and William R. Thompson,

for legal malpractice.

2) CJ-80-2351, an action by Appel-

lant, Roberta Ann Funnell against

Appellees James E. Work, George Camp,

Rick Chew, Robert D. Looney, Sr.,

Wendell Wightman and Thomas A.

Williams, also for legal malpractice.

6a

3) CJ-80-4300, an action by Appellant
Roberta Ann Funnell as personal repre-
sentative of David Allen Funnell,
deceased against Appellees James D.
Funnell, Harriet Funnell, Jonathan
Burch, Edwin Whitney Burch and Jerry
Dick for fraud.

On September 13, 1982, the Honorable
Ray Lee Wall, sitting by special appoint-
ment, found and ordered that Appellants’
claims in 1) and 2) had been barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations,
and that Appellants’ claim in 3) had been
barred by a settlement agreement. There-
upon, the court sustained motions for
summary judgment in each of the three
actions in favor of the respective defen-
dants, and Appellants commenced this

appeal.

7a

We find the trial covrt's findings and
orders to be correct in each instance.

We are unusually impressed with the
organizational ability, grasp and under-
standing of the appellant pro se, but the
fact that these lawsuits and their subse-
quent appeals were conducted pro se does
not, in any way relieve Plaintiffs/Appel-
lants of the responsibility to conform
their actions to the rules of pleadings,
evidence or appellate practice. We adopt
the rule stated by the Court of Criminal

Appeals in Bowen v. State, 606 P.2d 589

(Okl.Cr. 1980), and hold that a party
proceeding pro se in a civil action or a
civil appeal is to be held to the same
standards as an attorney.

The arguments in cases 1) and 2), are
founded on the Appellants’ belief that

the statute of limitations was tolled as

8a

’

to her causes of action for legal malprac-
tice due to the fraudulent concealment of
wrongdoing by the attorney who allegedly
committed the wrongful acts; concealed by
an alleged conspiracy among the attorneys
subsequently consulted by Appellants to
prosecute the first attorney. Inasmuch
as Appellants' Petitions below allege no
acts constituting legal malpractice which
occurred during the two-year period
immediately prior to the filing of Plain-
tiffs’ initial Petition, some tolling of
the statutes must be proved to avoid the
finding that the actions were barred. To
this end, Appellants allege the theory of
tolling of limitation by concealment.

In Oklahoma, an action for malprac-
tice, whether medical or legal, though
based on a contract of employment, is an

action in tort and is governed by the

ga

two-year statute of limitations at 12

O.S.A. 1981, §95 Third. (Seanor v.

Browne, 154 Okl. 222, 7 P.2d 627
(1932)). This limitation period begins
to run from the date the negligent act
occurred or from the date the plaintiff
should have known of the act complained

of. (McCarroll v. Doctors General

Hospital, 664 P.2d 382 (Okl. 1983)). The

period may be tolled, however, by conceal-
ment by the attorney of the negligent
acts which have injured the client. This

Court has previously held, in Kansas City

Life Insurance Co. v. Nipper, 174 Okl.

634, 51 P.2d 741 (1935) that:

"One relying on fraudulent
concealment to toll the statute of
limitation must not only show that
he did not know facts constituting
a cause of action, but that he
exercised reasonable diligence to
ascertain such facts."

10a

To specifically address the rule
stated in Nipper, we note that the record
reveals Appellant, Roberta Ann Funnell
was complaining of her first attorney,
James E. Work's alleged malpractice as
early as June, 1971. Even though she was
aware no action had ever been instituted
against him, for she waited almost ten
years to do anything about it. The pain-
ful conclusion to be drawn is her actual
knowledge in 1971 of the acts she alleges
constitute malpractice, shows there was
no concealment on the part of anyone
which would toll the statute of limita-
tions as to her cause of action against
Work.

Appellant, Roberta Ann Funnell, com-
plains each subsequent attorney was negli-
gent for not suing each preceding attor-

ney for not suing Work for negligence

lla

which allegedly occurred on or about
August 8, 1969. While this Rtindily be
"tacking" the negligence of one party
onto the negligence of another to create
a single, continuous tort, is original,
such argument is not persuasive to neces-
sitate the creation of a new doctrine of
limitations, for there is no allegation
that subsequent attorneys were acting as
joint tort-feasors.

If the action against Work was barred
by the statute of limitations, which we
find to be the case, then the succeeding
lawyers cannot be guilty of malpractice
for not filing an invalid lawsuit. The
liability of each successive lawyer must
be bottomed on his own, negligent act,
not on the original complaint.

Even assuming there are other allega-

tions against any of the attorney-Appel-

ids

lees which might be grounds for a cause
of action for malpractice, the petitions
filed by Appellants below do not allege
any such negligent acts occurring within
a two-year period immediately preceding
the filing, and such petitions are,
therefore, fatally defective on their
face and summary judgment lies.

In summary then, as to causes 1) and
2), supra, we find the two-year statute
of limitations is applicable to each; the
original petitions allege no act of mal-
practice occurring within the two-year
period immediately preceding its filing,
and the allegation that the statute of
limitation was tolled by concealment
fails because of Appellant, Roberta Ann
Funnell’s knowledge of the acts she com-
plains of as negligent. The trial court
committed no error in granting summary

judgment as to these causes.

13a

Appellants allege errors regarding
acts by attorneys employed subsequent to
the original lawyers. These allegations
on the merits however, may not be reached
when the trial court grants summary judg-
ment on the question of statute of limita-
tions. In order for the allegation of
malpractice to be considered such acts of
necessity must be committed within two
years of the acts complained of, or
within two years of discovery of such
acts.

The trial court's granting of summary
judgment in case 3) supra, was on other
grounds. This action alleges that on
June 28, 1978, Appellant, Roberta Ann
Funnell's sons, Donald Funnell and David
Funnell were induced by fraud and coer-
cion to execute a settlement agreement

and thus to terminate certain litigation

1, a

between themselves as plaintiffs and
Appellees James Funnell and Harriet
Funnell. David Funnell subsequently died
and Roberta Ann Funnell was appointed his
personal representative. Appellant seeks
to vacate the settlement agreement on
behalf of David Funnell's estate and
alleges he was coerced and defrauded into
signing by all the named defendants.

It is a settled rule in Oklahoma that
fraud is never presumed and where a writ-
ten agreement is attacked on the ground
of fraud, that agreement will be upheld
unless the allegations of fraud are estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.

(Steiger v. Commerce Acceptance Co., 455

P.2d 81 (Okl. 1969)).
It may be true that appellant has
rightfully set forth the elements of

fraud for the inducement of execution of

15a

settlement. What such allegations lack
is specificity, clarity and convincing-
ness for there seems little doubt the
adult sons of the appellant accepted the
proceeds of settlement under its terms.
The plain wording of the agreement
Says appellant's sons had full and com-
plete access to all the books and records
of the defendants and had satisfied them-
selves as to the truth and accuracy of
everything contained therein. On its
face, this document appears to be a fair
agreement, knowingly executed by the
parties to it and supported by adequate
consideration. Appellant's allegations
that it was procured by unlawful means
is, of course, within the realm of possi-
bility, but is not supported by properly
pled facts which rise to the standard

required to vitiate such an agreement.

16a

Also applicable here is the rule

stated in Tyler v. Hartford Insurance

Co., 195 Okl. 523, 159 P.2d 722 (1945),
which states:
"When a transaction is fairly
susceptible of two constructions,

the one which will free it from

the imputation of fraud will be

adopted.”

Appellant correctly points out that in
some limited instances involving fiduciar-
ies, the party in the fiduciary position
may be required to offer affirmative

proof that no fraud existed. (Looney v.

Chastain, 395 P.2d 571 (Okl. 1964).

While the relationship between David
Funnell and Donald Funnell and the named
defendants may have at one time been a
relationship of trust and confidence, at
the time the settlement agreement was
entered into, such relationship had been

severed as evidence by the fact that

17a

David Funnell and Donald Funnell had
instituted several lawsuits against the
other defendants. It is illogical to
suppose they would have sued the defen-
dants and yet have maintained a relation-
ship of trust as to the contentions which
were the subjects of the suits.

We hold that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in cause 3).

The judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

SIMMS, C.J., and HARGRAVE and WILSON,
JJ., and POWERS AND MEANS, S.JJ., concur.
SUMMERS, J., and BRIGHTMIRE, S.J., concur
in judgment.

HODGES, J., not participating.

POWERS, MEANS and BRIGHTMIRE, S.JJ.
appointed in place of LAVENDER, OPALA and

KAUGER, JJ., who disqualified.

18a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAIONA

Filed Supreme Court of Oklahoma October
28, 1985.

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indivi- )
dually and as ADMINISTRATRIX )

of the Estate of DAVID ALLEN) No.
FUNNELL, Deceased, and DONALD) 59205

FUNELL, )Conso-
Appellants, Jlidated
Ve )Under
STEPHEN JONES and WILLIAM R. )
THOMPSON, )
Appellees. )
and ;
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ) No.
Appellant, ) 59204
v. ) Conso-
JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP, ) lidated
RICK CHEW, ROBERT D. LOONEY, ) With
SR., WENDELL WIGHTMAN and )
THOMAS A. WILLIAMS. )
Appellees. )
and )
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ADMINIS-)
TRATRIX of the Estate of )
DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased)
Appellant, )
Vv. ) No.
JANES D. FUNNELL and HARRIET ) 59212
FUNNELL, Individually and as )
Co-Trustees for DAVID ALLEN )
FUNNELL, JONATHAN BURCH, EDWIN)
WIITNEY BURCH and JERRY DICK,)
Appellees. )

19a

AMENDED PETITION FOR REINEARING

COMES NOW Appellant, Roberta Ann
Funnell (Ann), individually and as the
Administratrix of the Estate of David
Allen Funnell, Deceased (David) and
requests a rehearing and reconsideration
of this Court's opinion dated September
17, 1985, in the above styled and number-
ed causes. Said opinion is identical to
the Court's opinion dated January 15,
1985, except as to the participants.

Ann and David have filed a Motion
to Sever cause number 59,205 from the
consolidated appeals of which this Court
took notice in its Order of October 9,
1985. Said order treated Appellant's ap-
plication for extension of time to seek
rehearing as a timely petition for re-
hearing and allowed only until October
28, 1985 to amend and file a supporting

brief. Such brief with appendix is
20a

filed herein.

Appellants Ann and David do hereby
amend and adopt Appellant Donald Fun-
nell's Motion to Sever Cause (number 59,
205) from Consolidated Appeals and his
Petition for Rehearing filed October 7,
1985, along with the Brief of Appellant
Donald K. Funnell in Support of Petition
for Rehearing filed March 7, 1985.

This Court recalled its January 15,
1985 opinion by its Order of April 16,
1985 thus these are not second petitions
for rehearing. Ann and David further
adopt the aisle and authorities in
their Petition for Rehearing with its
attached affidavit and exhibits as set
forth in their brief in support thereof
filed Narch 7, 1985.

A copy of the application for exten-

sion of time described in paragraph two _

21a

Supra is attached hereto and amended in
the same order of its numbered para-
graphs to respectfullly and additionally
state as follows:

1. This Court disregarded its own
rulings holding that on a motion for sum-
mary judgment the appellate court must
consider all of the pleadings, affida-
vits and discovery materials filed in
the case in the light most favorable to
those opposing said motion. This fact
is evidenced by the pencilled margin
notes on a small part of the record as
set forth in the exhibits and affidavit
of Ann which are attached to the Peti-
tion for Rehearing filed larch 7, 1985.
Said notes made conclusions in disregard
of even the facts and allegations immedi-
ately following or adjacent to said

erroneous and unlawful conclusions.

22a

Thus this Court's members and appointed
Justices did not have the benefit of
knowing the true complete facts as they
relied on the mere conclusions of the
Court personnel,

This Court further disregarded the
holdings in the numerous federal case
citations interpreting Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after
which this Oeste te Rule 13 of the Rules
for District Courts was patterned (al-
though not as clearly stated-parti-
cularly at the time appellants were
required to prematurely respond in the
fall of 1981). January 1982 Rule 13 was
expanded and changed.

2. This Court's erroneous conclu-
sions of fact, supra, were applied to
both the appeals (numbers 59, 205 and
59, 204) in total disregard of the clear
fact that David and Donald's cases of

action weie ietaee a factually dis-
a

tinct from Ann's. Said conclusions of
fact were contrary to the record as evi-
denced in part by documents in-the ap-
pendix of the brief in support of this
petition for rehearing and were made
without jurisdiction under the Oklahoma
Constitution.

3. This Court failed to address
the constitutional and civil rights
issues averred in the Petition in Error
and the Petition for Rehearing filed
March 7, 1985, and discussed in all
briefs of Ann and David.

4. This Court egregiously failed
to respond to Appellant's Notion for
Clarification of Non-Participation and
Disqualification and Request for :
Appointments So As To Comprise A Nine
Member Appeal Court filed April 22,
1985. This Court particularly dis-
regarded paragraph 10 of said Notion as

to Court members — famiiy members
a

who are or may be shareholders in the
Oklahoma Bar's own Professional
Liability Insurance Company and/or
insured thereby and affected by matters
relating to costs of any professional
liability insurance. Appellant called
on the conscience of the Court without
pointing fingers. However, it is now
known that, at least, the author of the
opinions herein, Mr. Justice Doolin, and
participating Madam Justice Wilson have
immediate family members who now prac-
tice law in this state. Appellant does
not know of all affected relatives of
other Court members (but they know).
Appellant had raised the issue of family
members of the Court members being af-
fected by the matters of legal malprac-
tice insurance costs in the Petition for
Rehearing filed March 7, 1985. There-

after only Mr. Justice Lavender disquali-
25a

fied and withdrew his concurring
Opinion.

This Court's opinion in these
cases, which revolves around a 50 year-
old medical malpractice case, demon-
Strates that this Court is unwilling to
apply the same principles of law and
logic of that and its later medical
malpractice decisions to its own sons,
daughters, husband, and brethern of the
Oklahoma Bar while usurping Legislative
power to give undue, and unlawful, favor
in matters directly affecting them finan-
cially. This Court was not impartial.

5. The opinion disregards the
averments of other abuses of civil
rights by the second trial court, Judge
Ray Lee Wall, particularly as to his
disregard of the fact there were many
missing material documents and his re-
questing only copies of briefs filed

after August 3l, — Instead of re-
a

viewing the entire record as is required
under motion for summary judgment. This
Court should take judicial notice of
said trial judge's eregious abuse of
legal procedures and law in the related
appeal number 62,658, which has provoked
a federal lawsuit that includes action
relating to the secreting of the docu-
ments, supra, and involves alterations
of the Court records.

This Court should take note that
the documents submitted by Ann at her
deposition in number 59, 204, which in-
cluded much of the Stephen Jones mate-
rials for 59, 205, were improperly re-
moved from the custody of the former
County Court Clerk by appellees Camp's
and Jones‘ counsel. There is incon-
Sistency in the document marking as some
of have the original numbered stickers
but many others have xerox copies of

exhibit numbers or _ at all. Appel-
5

lant remarked of this when she inventor-
ied the record in the office of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, but as
Stated in her affidavit she did not have
time nor was she equipped to fully inven-
tory all the contents of what had been
three boxes of records. The full signi-
ficance of the inconsistency, supra, did
not become apparent until Ann learned of
the alteration of a court document re-
lating to Stephen Jones in the record of
appeal number 62, 658 as set forth in
her reply brief. Again it was Jones"
counsel who was improperly given access
to record.

Paragraphs 6 through 10 of the
Court designated Petition for Rehearing
referred to Ann's physical condition
needing additional time that undoubtedly
would be granted to any lawyer in simi-
lar circumstances. The Court disregard-

ed the orders of Ann's orthopedist in
28a

al

the continuing bias against pro se liti-
gants, particularly one suing brethern
lawyers. Ann's doctors, physiothera-
pists, fellow patients and associates
are outraged by this entire matter
particularly in light of the second
paragraph of number 4, supra. Ann at
this writing with red blurred infected
eyes and a dozen acupuncture needles in
her, which is all that even partially
alleviates pain, reiterates her belief
that Mr. Justice Doolin and this Court,
including all those appointed, should
review the entire record and opinion and
with an awareness of their own oaths and
conflicts of interest in view of all the
foregoing and/or any plan to resign and
enter private practice.

Appellant specifically submits the
Court egregiously abused the facts, law
and its discretion in equity in appeal

b : .
number 59, 212 29a

WHEREFORE, Appellant Roberta Ann
Funnell individually and as Administra-
trix for the Estate of David Allen
Funnell, Deceased, prays this Court
grant full rehearing, withdraw its
Opinion dated September 17, 1985, and
reverse the summary judgments granted by

the trial court.

(Roberta Ann Funnel] )

Roberta Ann Funnell, pro se
2306 S.E. 49th Street
Oklahoma City, OK 73129
(405) 670-1943

30a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Filed Supreme Court of Oklahoma October
O,, 1985.

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indivi- )
dually and as ADMINISTRATRIX )

of the Estate of DAVID ALLEN) No.
FUNNELL, Deceased, and DONALD) 59205

FUNELL, yConso-
Appellants, Jlidated
Vv. Under
STEPHEN JONES and WILLIAM R. )
THOMPSON, )
Appellees. )
and )
)
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ) No.
Appellant, ) 59204
Ve )} Conso-
JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP, ) lidated
RICK CHEW, ROBERT D. LOONEY, ) With
SR., WENDELL WIGHTMAN and )
THOMAS A. WILLIAMS. )
Appellees. )
and )
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ADNINIS-)
TRATRIX of the Estate of )
DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased)
Appellant, )
Vv. ) No.
JAMES D. FUNNELL and HARRIET ) 59212
FUNNELL, Individually and as )
Co-Trustees for DAVID ALLEN )
FUNNELL, JONATHAN BURCH,EDWIN)
WHITNEY BURCH and JERRY DICEK,)
Appellees. )

31a

APPLICATION OF APPELLANT ROBERTA
ANN FUNNELL FOR EXTENSION OF TINE TO

FILE FOR RENEARING

Comes now Appellant Roberta Ann
Funnell, Individually and as the
Administratrix of the Estate of DAVID
ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased, and respect-
fully requests this Court for an exten-
Sion of time to file her application and
brief for rehearing of the above three
conseiidated woctedé in which an Opinion
was filed on September 17, 1985, and
shows the Court that:

1. These three consolidated
matters are appeals of granting motions
for summary judgment in favor of appel-
leas and the above Opinion does indicate
that not all of the record convering
over ten years of events, concealments
and misrepresentations was ever consi-
dered by this Court, although required

by law to do so.

32a

2. This Appellant is in two
different roles which according to said
Opinion has not been recognized with
particularity as to Appeal Bobbibe 59,
205. Thus this Appellant must address
to the very fullest this Court's mis-
Statements of facts, misquotations of
common law cases and disregard of
statutes.

3. Additionally there are serious
questions and issues of state and
federal constitutional and civil rights
which require considerable time and
research.

4. Appellant is having to appear
pro se as Oklahoma lawyers have a
conflict of interest or will not act
against their and their fellow lawyers’
interests as they are part of the lawyer
owned and operated legal malpractice
insurance group which was instigated by

this Court. 33a

i

5. Appellant is further
handicapped by an order of the first
trial judge, Honorable Merle Lansden,
that she could not consult with any
Oklahoma attorneys unless (s)he will
appear in court, and would consult with
said judge before doing so. This Court
refused to remove said judge although he
had been involved in other abuses of
civil rights of litigants and action was
pending against him when he was
assigned.

6. Appellant was in an automobile
accident and has: been under medical care
requiring that she restrict her activi-
ties as to use of her hands, arms and
neck. It has been determined that
Appellant will have a permanent disabi-
lity of the use of those elements if she
proceeds with pulling books off shelves,

page turning, typing and other activi-

ties which eae, anata and loss of
a

function. She cannot hire others to do
her legal research as law students will
not help pro se litigants and any others
would be considered breaking the law.

7. Appellant also is being treated
for a resistant infection in both eyes.
This is quite disabling.

8. - Attached are orders of appel-
lant's orthopedist to restrict her
activities for “another 60 days" or
until December 1, 1985, and continue

' physiotherapy which requires many hours
each day.

9. Appeliant respectfully submits
that the interests of justice would be
more fairly served if this Court grant
an extension of time until December 1,
1985, for this appellant to file her
petition for rehearing and brief.
During that time this Court thru Hr.
Justice Doolin could review the immense

consolidated records and ascertain the

35a

error of their factfinding. These cases
have great public interest and concern,
This Court should be given and take
every opportunity to rectify errors
which apparently came about due to
change of personnel and illness of the
Opinion writer, Hr. Justice Doolin.

10. To not grant the extension of
time would deny appellant the oppor-
tunity and right to present her consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights. Under

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86S.

Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 694, there can be no
rulemaking which abrogate rights secured

by the Constitution,

(Roberta Ann Funnell)

Roberta Ann Funnell, pro se
2306 S.E. 49th Street
Oklahoma City, OK 73129
(405) 670-1943

36a

October 2, 1985
IN RE: Roberta Ann Funnell

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Patient is to restrict activities

with hands, arms and neck for another 60
days from this date.

(H.d. Freede, M.D.)

H.J. Freede, M.D.

October 2, 1985
IN RE: Roberta Ann Roberts

Please extend physical therapy
treatment for another 60 days.

(H.J. Freede, M.D.)

Hi.J. Freede, N.D.

37a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Wednesday, October 9, 1985

THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOW-
ING ORDERS:

59,205 - ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, et al. v
STEPHEN JONES and

59,204 - WILLIAM R. THOMPSON.
Appellant's application for extention
of time to seek rehearing is treated as
a timely petition for rehearing under
Supreme Court Rule 28. Appellant
allowed until October 28, 1985 in which
to amend the same, and file a brief in
support thereof. Extention of this
time limit not contemplated. Applica-
tion of appellants to sever these

consolidated appeals is noted.

(Robert D. Simms)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Oct. 9, 1985 James W. Patterson, Clerk)

38a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indi-
vidually, and as ADMINISTRA-
TRIX of the Estate of DAVID
ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased, and
DONALD FUNNELL,

Appellants,
No. 59,205
Vv. Consolida-
ted Under
STEPHEN JONES and WILLIAM R. No. 59,204

THOMPSON,

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

Appellees.

MOTION TO SEVER CAUSE
FROM CONSOLIDATED APPEALS

Appellant, Roberta Ann Funnell, moves
the Court to sever the claims of Roberta
Ann Funnell individually and her claims
as Administratrix of the Estate of David
Allen Funnell, Deceased, against Appel-
lees Stephen Jones and William R.
Thompson in case No. CJ-79-991, Appeal
umber 59,205 from these consolidated
ippeals for the reason that her claims as

\dministratrix have been disregarded in

39a

case No. 59,205 and her individual claims
have been confused and overlooked in this
Court's Opinion filed September 17,
1985. Appellant is in two different and
conflicting positions and roles so that
such severance is required to allow the
Court to fully separate the factually and
legally distinct causes of actions and
give each separate consideration.
WHEREFORE, Appellant Roberta Ann
Funnell, individually and as Administra-
trix for David Allen Funnell, prays that
case No. 59,205 be severed from the con-
sclidated appeals.
(Roberta Ann Funnell)
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, pro se
2306 S.E. 49th Street

Oklahoma City, OK 73129
(405) 670-1943

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Oct. 4, 1985, James W. Patterson, Clerk)

r
©O
o

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indi-
vidually, and as Administra-
trix of the Estate of DAVID
ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased, and
DONALD K. FUNNELL,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Appellants, )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
STEPHEN JONES and WILLIAM R.
THOMPSON,
Appellees.
ORDER

Appellant's motion to sever

consolidated appeals is denied.

No. 59,205
Consolida-
ted Under
No. 59,204

cause from

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN

CONFERENCE THIS 13th DAY OF MAY, 1985.

(Robert D. Simms)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

May 13, 1985, James W. Patterson, Clerk)

1a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, etc. )
et al., )
Appellants, )
v. ) (No.59,205)
)
STEPHEN JONES and WILLIAM R. )
THOMPSON, )
Appellees. )
and
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, )
Appellant, )
Vv. ) No. 59,204

) (consolida-
JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP, ) ted with

et al., ) numbers
Appellees, ) 59,205 &
59,212)
and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, etc.,
Appellant,

Vv. (No.59,212)

JAMES D. FUNNELL, et al.,
Appellees.

ee ee eee ee ee ee

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF NON-
PARTICIPATION AND DISQUALIFICATION AND
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS SO AS
TO COMPRISE A NINE MEMBER APPEAL COURT

Comes now Appellant Roberta Ann

Funnell and respectfully moves the Honor-

L2a

able Court for clarification of its mem-
bers who are disqualified and/or intend
to not participate in the decision on the
Petitions for Rehearing of Appellant
Donald K. Funnell and this Appellant, as
an individual and as Administratrix,
filed in the above styled consolidated
causes. This Appellant further respect-
fully requests that appointments be made
to the Honorable Appeal Court so that a
full nine member Court will hear this
matter for which Appellant Donald K.
Funnell has requested oral argument.
Appellant shows the Court as follows in
support of the above:

1. This Appellant in her role as Admin-
istratrix has adopted the Petitions, argu-
ments and briefs of Donald K. Funnell.

2. The opinion promulgated herein on

January 15, 1985 prejudiced this Appel-

43a

lant in her position as Administratrix as
set forth in her Petition for Rehearing
and Brief in Support thereof and in Appel-
lant Donald K. Funnell's Petition for
Rehearing and supporting Brief which are
adopted by this Appellant.

3. This Appellant believes it is neces-
sary for a full court to hear the argu-
ments of Appellant Donald K. Funnell to
clarify the issues of these consolidated
matters in which this Appellant is in
_q@ifferent and even possibly conflicting
roles.

4. The Honorable Mr. Justice Robert E.
Lavender referred only to this Appel-
lant's Petition for Rehearing in his
Recall of Vote and Disqualification filed
April 10, 1985.

5. The opinion referred to in para-

graph two (2) supra noted that the Honor-

LL a

able Justices Barnes, Opala and Kauger
disqualified and described the Honorable
Mr. Justice Hodges as "not
participating.”

6. The Assignment Order filed herein
on April 16, 1985, assigned replacements
for only Justices Lavender, Opala and
Kauger.

7. The Order Recalling Opinion filed
April 16, 1985, gave as reason “the
opinion now has but four concurrances."

8. This Appellant respectfully sug-
gests that the foregoing gives the appear-
ance that it could be the intention of
this Honorable Court to find a fifth con-
curring opinion and not present the
matters to a full nine member Court.

9. That as demonstrated in this Appel-
lant's Petition for Rehearing, Mr.

Justice Hodges did participate in these

45a

matters by requesting and receiving a
transcript from the record and said tran-
script later noted underlinings of oral
argument made by counsel for
attorney/appellees Stephen Jones, George
Camp, Jonathan Burch and Edwin Whitney
Burch. Appellant noted it is improper to
consider oral arguments of counsel as
these cases are appeals from granting of
motions for summary judgment and only
sworn testimony should be considered.
Appellants had submitted sworn affidavits
contradictory to the unsworn statements
of said counsel. The foregoing gives the
appearance of bias in favor of attorney
litigants and their counsel.

10. As noted in this Appellant's Peti-
tion for Rehearing, members of this Court
are involved in the instigation of an

Oklahoma Bar Professional Liability Insur-

Léa

. =o

ance Company. Court members have family
members who are or may be shareholders in
said Company and at any rate are or could
be affected by matters relating to costs
of any professional liability insurance.
Appellant has called on the conscience of
this Court and reiterates same, particu-
larly as to any bias against pro se
litigants.

11. These consolidated cases have rami-
fications to all the people of Oklahoma
who have subsequent dealings with members
of the Oklahoma Bar Association and who
are or may be beneficiaries of trusts.
There are constitutional questions
involved which deserve the fullest
consideration.

12. This Appellant respectfully sub-
mits that the Court members who are dis-

qualified, should be disqualified or have

47a

indicated “not participating" should cer-
tify their disqualification so that a
full nine member Court can be appointed,
hear oral argument and decide these
matters in the interest of justice and
appearance thereof.
(Roberta Ann Funnell)
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, pro se
2306 S.E. 49th Street

Oklahoma City, OK 73129
(405) 670-1943

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Apr. 22, 1985, James W. Patterson, Clerk)

48a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

STEPHEN JONES, et al.,
Appellees.

and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,
Appellant,

v.

JAMES E. WORK, et al.,
Appellees,

and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, et al.,

Appellant,
Vv.
JAMES D. FUNNELL, et al.,

Appellees.

ASSIGNMENT ORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

i

No. 59,204
[Cons. w/
59,205
& 59,212)

Pursuant to the authority vested in me

by Art. VII, § 6, Okla. Const., the fol-
lowing are hereby assigned to the Supreme
Court to sit in and decide the above
styled and numbered cause:

HONORABLE DONALD POWERS (For

Lavender, J.)

HONORABLE WILLIAM M. MEANS (For

Opala, J.)

HONORABLE PAUL BRIGHTMIRE (For

Kauger, J.)

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

THIS 16th day of April, 1985.

(Robert D. Simms)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

April 16, 1985 James W. Patterson, Clerk)

90a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, et al.,
Appellants,

Vv.

STEPHEN JONES, et al.,
Appellees.

and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,
Appellant,

Vv.

JAMES E. WORK, et al.,
Appellees,

and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, et al.,
Appellant,

Vv.

JAMES D. FUNNELL, et al.,

Appellees.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

er ee ee ee eee ee ee ee

No. 59,204
{[Cons. w/
59,205
& 59,212)

ORDER RECALLING OPINION

5

The opinion promulgated herein on

January 15, 1985, and appearing at 56 OBJ
136, is Ordered Recalled for the reason
the opinion now has but four
concurrances.

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

THIS 16th day of April, 1985.

(Robert D. Simms)
CHIEF JUSTICE

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,
April 16, 1985, James W. Patterson,

Clerk)

52a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
ADMINISTRATIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DAVID ALLEN
FUNNELL, DECEASED, AND
DONALD FUNNELL,

Appellants,
Vv.

STEPHEN JONES AND WILLIAM
R. THOMPSON,

Appellees.
and
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,
Appellant,

Ve

JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP,
RICK CHEW, ROBERT D. LONNEY,
SR., WENDELL WRIGHTMAN, and

THOMAS WILLIAMS,
. Appellees.

and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ADMIN-

ISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF
DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL,
DECEASED,

53 a

— er ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee eee ee eee ee ee ee ee Se ee ee ee ee te

FILED
SUPREME
COURT
STATE OF
OKLAHOMA
APRIL 10,
1985
JAMES W.
PATTERSON,

CLERK

No. 59,204
(Cons. w/
59,205 &
59,212)

Appellant,
Vv.

JAMES D. FUNNELL and HARRIET
FUNNELL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
CO-TRUSTEES FOR DAVID ALLEN
FUNNELL; JONATHAN BURCH,
EDWIN WHITNEY BURCH and
JERRY DICK,

weet ee ee ee ee ee ee ee eee ee”

Appellees.

RECALL OF VOTE AND DISQUALIFICATION

I, the undersigned Justice of this
Court, do hereby recall my concurring
vote for the Court's opinion of January
15, 1985, 56 OBJ 136, which opinion is
now pending before the Court on Appellant
Roberta Ann Funnell's petition for rehear-
ing. I do hereby further certify my dis-
qualification from any further participa-
tion in the above styled causes.

DATED THIS 10th DAY OF APRIL 1985.

(Robert E. Lavender)

ROBERT E. LAVENDER
JUSTICE

Sha

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Filed Supreme Court of Oklahoma March 7,
1985 .

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indivi- )
dually and as ADMINISTRATRIX )

of the Estate of DAVID ALLEN) No.
FUNNELL, Deceased, and DONALD) 59205

FUNELL, )Conso-
Appellants, Jlidated

Vv. Under

STEPHEN JONES and WILLIAM R. )

THOMPSON, )
Appellees. )

and )
: )

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ) No.
Appellant, ) 59204

v. ) Conso-

JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP, ) lidated

RICK CHEW, ROBERT D. LOONEY, ) With

SR., WENDELL WIGHTMAN and )

THOMAS A. WILLIAMS. )
Appellees. )

and )

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ADMINIS-)

TRATRIX of the Estate of )

DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL, Deceased)
Appellant, )

Vv. ) No.

JAMES D. FUNNELL and HARRIET ) 59212

FUNNELL, Individuaily and as )
Co-Trustees for DAVID ALLEN )
FUNNELL, JONATHAN BURCH,EDWIN)
WHITNEY BURCH and JERRY DICK,)

Appellees. )

55a

PETITION FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW Appellant, Roberta Ann
Funnell (Ann), Iniividually and as the
Administratrix of the Estate of David
Allen Funnell, Deceased (Administra-
trix), in the above entitled causes and
very respectfully represents to the
Court that on the 15th day of January,
1985, a decision was rendered by this
Court in the above entitled causes,
setting forth, among other things, that
this Appellant was not entitled to
relief in said causes, based on the
general rules that: 1.) the running of
the "statutes of limitations" against
her cause of action against Appellee
James E. Work nullified actions based on
the acts of all subsequent attorneys
employed by Roberta Ann Funnell, David
Allen Funnell and Donald Funnell; 2.)

that the eects: filed by Appellants
56a :

below do not allege any (other) negli-
gent acts occuring within a two-year pe-
riod immediately preceding the filing"
3.) the allegation failed that the statu-
te of limitations was tolled by conceal-
ment because of Appellant Roberta Ann Fu-
nnell's knowledge, presumed, of the acts
of Work; 4.) Appellant as Administratrix
had not properly pled facts to vitiate
the settlement agreement obtained by the
Trustee and their lawyers; 5.) and that
parties appearing pro se were held to
the same standards as an attorney.
Appellant Roberta Ann Funnell, Indi-
vidually and as Administratrix respect-
fully requests the Court for and is enti-
tled to a rehearing and reconsideration
of the Court's opinion and that this
Court grant this appellant the relief
prayed for in her original Petitions-in-

error filed herein, which is that this
57a.

Court find as a matter of law that Ap-
pellant's claims are not barred or that
in the alternative there are facts relat-
ing to the statute of limitations and fr-
audulent concealments which only a jury
can decide, and for an order remanding
with directions to allow full discovery,
followed by a jury trial of these cases
involving attorney malfeasance, fraud
and breach of contract.

It is respectfully submitted by
this Appellant in both of her capacities
that the decision described supra is con-
trary to the law and evidence in the ca-
ses and that the Court further failed to
consider numerous points of law and fact
urged by Appellant which points are set
forth in more particularity as follows:

I,

58a

THE SUPKEME COURT OF OKLAIIONA DE-

NIED APPELLANT ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS WIIIC! COULD NOT BE ANTICI-
PATED PRIOR TO THE DECISION RENDER-
ED ON THE 15th DAY OF JANUARY,1985.

A. Appellant appearing pro se was
improperly held to the same standards as
an attorney;

1.) Despite United States Supreme
Court unanimous rulings and Federal
Court rulings that courts are obligated
to apply less stringent standards to pro
se complaints, to be sensitive to
problems of pro se litigants and to
protect pro se litigants.

2.) Despite Oklahoma Statute, Title
12, section 78, and the numerous prior
rulings that the Supreme Court is requ-
ired to disregard any error or defect
which does not affect the substantial

rights of the adverse party.

59a

3.) Despite the facts that these
cases were actions against attorneys and
Appellant could not find an attorney
willing to prosecute other attorneys
with only one short-lived exception who
discovered he had a "conflict of
interest". And that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court along with the Oklahoma
Bar Association has instigated an
inquiry into matters relating to
lawyer's professional liability insur-
ance premiums resulting in subscriptions
having been obtained from the Oklahoma
lawyers to fund a holding company for
their own Professional Liability Insur-
ance Company. Thus Oklahoma lawyers
have a vested interest to either not
handle attorney malpractice cases or to
mishandle them so that the client has no

chance to recover damages. A copy of an

60a

Order of June 21, 1978, by then-Chief
Justice Ralph B. Hodges is attached here-
to and incorporated herewith as Exhibit
l. <A copy of a letter from then-Presi-
dent of the Oklahoma Bar Association,
Leslie L. Conner, Jr., as printed in the
Oklahoma Bar Journal, Vol 51, No. 9, of
March 1, 1980, is attached hereto and
incorporated herewith as Exhibit 2.

4.) Despite the fact that the pro se
litigant in Bowen v. State, 606 P.2d
589, the cases cited by this Court,
could have "standby counsel” burt
this Appellant was denied the right to
even talk to an attorney at a very cri-
tical point in the litigation. It is in
the record that the Honorable Merle Lans-
den, the trial judge first appointed by
then-Chief Justice Robert Lavendar who
is a friend and former campaigner with

Appellee Stephen Jones, ordered that
61a

-

Appellant could not discuss her cases

with any Oklahoma attorney UNLESS SAID

ATTORNEY TALKED WITH THE JUDGE and came

into the court so that said judge could
“look him in the eye". Judge Lansden
stated he "just wanted to get rid of
this thing" in reference to the Appel-
lants' suit against Jones and Williaa R.
Thompson, and this Appellant's intended
actions against the other attorney/ ap-
pellees. This Court twice denied ap-
plications to disqualify Judge Lansden.
5.) And that due to the foregoing,
Appelllant was denied her right to me-
aningful access to the courts guaranteed
under the United States Constitution
Amendments Five and Fourteen, which also
assure the right to consult privately
with counsel at one's own expense even

if the proceeding is wholly civil.

62a

6.) And that under Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 491, S. Ct.

1602, L. Ed2d 694, this Court could not
make rules whch abrogate Appellant's
constitutional rights nor make rules
contrary to the modern practice to liber-
alize the rules of pleading and when the
Oklahoma Legislature has acted in a de-
finitive manner. Further this Court's
rules are not always clear and defini-
tive as required under due process.

7.) And that by this Court's
foregoing acts and inter alia involving
itself with the legal malpractice insur-
ance matters of the Oklahoma lawyers,
yet failing to upgrade the ethics code
for lawyers to the national standards,
then arbitrarily and capriciously making
a rule to hold pro se litigants to the
standards of attorneys as to pleadings
and other rules, the result would be in-

vidious discrimination against this pro

63a

se litigant unless said rule is set
aside and the rules under the foregoing
items one (1), two (2) and six (6) are
applied by a disinterested and impartial
tribunal.

The discrimination would also be
against an entire class of persons who
are former, present or potential clients
of Oklahoma lawyers and who have or have
good cause to bring legal malpractice
actions against Oklahoma lawyers, parti-
cularly whree they have exhausted their
funds due to the negligence and/or
misconduct of the lawyers they hired.

B. By not equally applying the
laws regarding written or oral contracts
Appellant's property right of enforce-
ment of a written contract was arbitrar-
ily and capriciously taken away.

1.) This Court has previously en-
forced contracts between lawyers and

their clients. Yet this Court by fiat
64a

nullified the Appellants' written con-
tracts made by and with attorney Stephen
Jones in 1972 thenremade in 1973 to
inter alia bring a suit in behalf of
David and Donald Funnell involving
trusts and life insurance policies.
Jones also contracted to challenge the
probate of Joseph W. Funnell's estate to
recover all amounts that were depleted
to defeat all the Appellants' claims as
creditors and to prosecute a suite by
Ann against Harriet and James D. Fun-
nell. Jones did not file to timely
recover the estate depletions and did
not sue and serve the Trustees of the
trusts, but he concealed from Appellants

the fact that he let the statutes run,

as set forth in Appellants' original and

65a

amended petitions with numerous exhi-
bits and affidavits filed in their
action against Jones and William R.
Thompson, who was hired by David and
Donald on April 2, 1977, to inter alia
investigate Jones’ handling of their
suit.

Appellants were notified of Jones'
breachs of contracts when they received
Jones' letter dated March 25, 1977,
stating he no longer considered himself
Ann's attorney. The contracts required
that Jones had to withdraw from all
cases if he withdrew from one. The

Appellants' lawsuit was filed on March

12, 1979, and was within even the two

year statute of limitations declared by

this Court which is contrary to the laws

of Oklahoma regarding contracts. Jones
failed to appear at pretrial on April Fe
1977 regarding David and Donald's case

causing it to be dismissed. Jones speci-

66a

fically contracted to keep all the cases
in good standing but did not do SO, as
alleged.

Jones also specifically contracted
to keep Appellants "fully advised", to
furnish copies of "all memorandums,
letters, reports and pleadings", and to
advise in writing of any omissions or
misconduct of Appellants’ prior
attorneys. It was alleged and demon-
Strated that Jones received documents
vital to Appellants" cases but con-
cealed them. Particularly Jones conceal-
ed an assignment of a life insurance
policy to Ann from Joseph Funnell, which
had been separated from the policy re-
ferred to as "attached" in the assign-
ment. It had been written by Appellee
James E. Work but did not identify the
"attached" policy. Work did not notify

Ann of the assignment and did not keep

67a

custody of the “attached" life insurance
policy.

From the circumstantial evidence
Work apparently had relied on Ann's
second attorney, Appellee George Camp,
to advise her regarding the policy and
assignment but Camp did not do so. Camp
admitted going through Ann's files in
Works's office and Work later conm-
plained about an attorney removing
"things" but never responded to ques-
tions about it. Camp became very hos-
tile to Ann when she obtained her tax
records, which had been ordered returned
to her by the court, as Camp had been
holding them as a lien to obtain fees
above an agreement. Camp later sued Ann
which Jones "defended". The assignment

was discovered in August 1979 after some-

one in Jones’ office had sent it to Ann
amidst the Camp file and after Ann had

made complaint veal vg Oklahoma Bar Asso-
8a -

ciation to recover her files from

Jones. Work, Camp and Jones failed and/
or refused to answer Ann's Interro-
gatories and filed their premature
motions for summary judgment but no
affidavits in support and contrary to
the rule and law.

2.) Contrary to Oklahoma Statutes,
Title 12, section 95 Third, this Court
declared that "In Oklahoma, an action
for malpractice, whether medical or
legal, through based on a contract of
employment, is an action in tort and is
governed by the two-year statute of
limitations at 12 0.S.A. 1981, section
95 Third." Said statute reads, "Civil
actions other than for the recovery of
real property can only be brought within
the following periods. After the cause
of action shall have accrued, and not
afterwards: Third: Within two (2) years;

An action for trespass upon real

69a -

property; an action for taking, detain-
ing or injuring personal property,
including actions for the specific

recovery of personal property; an action

for injury to the rights of another, not

arising on contract, and not hereinafter

enumerated; an action for relief on the
ground of fraud-the cause of action in
such case shall not be deemed to have
accrued until the discovery of the
fraud." (emphasis added). The said
statute reads at First. “Within five (5)
years: An action upon any contract,
agreement or promise in writing." The
said statute reads at Second. "Within
three (3) years: An action upon a
contract express or implied not in

"

writing...

This Court cited Seanor v. Browne,

154 Okl. 222, 7 P.2d 627 (1932). Seanor
did not apply a two year limitation but

instead it applied oer" year statute
a

of limitations where a physician had

orally contracted and agreed to "care-
fully and skillfully attend er
and cure” an injury. This Court appears
to have read only a misleading headnote,
which mentioned only the word
"malpractice". No less an authority than

the Federal Court in Royal Crown Cola

Bottling Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co., 438 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Okl. 1977)
said that neither the Oklahoma Supreme
Court nor any other Oklahoma Court has
addressed the specific issue of which
Statute of limitations is applicable to
legal malpractice.

Jones' contract dated June 8, 1973
specifically agreed to “perform to the
best of our professional ability..." in
addition to specifically contracting as
Stated supra. The five-year statute must

apply as designated by the Oklahoma
71a

Legislature, particularly in light of
Seanor.

3.) This Court's opinion reduced
the record to a few conclusory state-
ments and failed to state the facts on
which the decision was based. The Court
admitted drawing a conclusion as to
Appellant Ann's knowledge in June 1971,
which is a fact regarding her state of
mind and which only a jury should deter-
mine based on the full tacts. Under this
Court's own rulings on motions for sun-
mary judgment no fact determinations can
be made. The imputed knowledge had no
bearing on the actions against Jones and
Thompson nor much against Thomas
Williams.

That the opinion involved conjec-
ture is demonstrated by pencilled notes
mades on the documents in the record by
whoever abstracitd the record. Said

notes indicate leaping on words without
72a

due consideration of all facts presented
in the record on motions for Summary
judgment and imputing legal knowledge to
Ann, particularly on the original peti-
tion in the action against Stephen Jones
and William R. Thompson. Ann's affidavit
with its attached Exhibits "A" through
"H" is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
Said affidavit and its exhibits are
hereby adopted and incorporated herein
by reference as though set out word for
word. The Exhibits "A" through "H" are
copies of certified copies of notations
found on documents in the record which
Ann examined in the office of the Clerk
of the Supreme Court by Order of this
Court. The affidavit sets forth the
content of the pencilled notes which did
not clearly copy in the Clerk's office.
A close examination of the docu-
ments supra discloses that this Court

concluded wrongly on paragraph 2 of R-2
73a

that "client had knowledge of S of L as
to action on ex-husband's Trust on Life
Insurance policies 1-15-72" Logically
assuming that "S of L" refers to statute
of limitations, it is wrongfully imput-
ing legal knowledge to Ann who had mere-
ly said she "expressed her concern that
the statutes of limitations were run-
ning", which the abstractor underlined.
Ann's concern was logical in view
of the facts that the Trust had been in
force nearly a year, that she was the
legal guardian for David and Donald
appointed on October 27, 1971, nearly
three months prior and had been led to
believe that the trust was to be broken
through an action in court which may
have required filing within the three
months. This state of her mind is sup-
ported by Appellee Wendell Wightman's

letter/contract R1073 dated June 28,

1971, at item #3 which states, "Enter
7ha

probate as creditor and challenge the
will and trust." Further, Wightman's
letter of January 14, 1972, in Exhibit
#91 of Ann's deposition, stated she had
to take some action soon regarding David
and Donald's interests. It is in the
record that Wightman was writing the
insurance companies and gave no speci-
fics as to how he would break the trust,
whether by suing them or however.

Also by R1073 supra next to last
paragraph, Ann was advised that item #3
Supra included her own action as well as
David and Donald's (the boys), as to
challenging the Life Insurance Trust.
Ann's belief that she, David and Donald
were to challenge said Trust carried
over to her first contract with Jones on
January 24, 1972, as can be inferred
from paragraph 10 of R-3, as well as the
contract, R18-20 and Exhibit A to R159-

165. Jones advised that he had "checked
75a

with an 0.U. law professor and there was

still time to act on the insurance poli-
cies." Ann relied on Jones as her legal
advisor.

The abstractor's next wrongful

conclusion was that Ann “had knowledge
of Work's actions 6-28-71", which is
written in the margin at paragraph 3 of
R-2 of the original petition against
Jones. She was stating that at the
times she consulted with Jones she had
said she had owned certain policies
scheduled in the Life Insurance Trust

but Work had required her to sign over

the ownership and she had done so in the
belief that a diminishing term policy
"was being turned to her", and the other
policies were going to benefit her sons
(David and Donald). Ann further told
Jones that Work had failed to advise the

judge in the divorce case that she owned

the named policies ane that Wightman had
a

Stated before he was hired June 28, 1971
(date of his contract/letter supra),
"that the judge could not have properly
interferred with a third-party contract
and required Plaintiff (Ann) to sign
these policies over to Joseph W. Fun-
nell, but Wightman took no action and
quit January 14, 1972." The abstractor
and Court disregarded the rest of the
record contrary to rules and law.
Wightman had induced Ann to pay
him several thousand dollars to initiate
the attack on the life insurance trust
(which he did not do) by steering her
away from any wrongdoing by Work and
Saying that the judge had taken a false
Statement to conceal his own wrongful
conduct. The proper solution, per Wight-
man was to attack the trust. Wightmank
further advices as to the misconduct of
the judge and breaking the trust are in

the transcription of a taped telephone

77a

conversation between Ann and Wightman
which is part of her affidavit R420-
443. At R1064 Wightman had positively
advised Ann there was no wrongdoing by
Work. At that time Ann relied on
Wightman's statements.

Jones then eventually advised Ann
there might be a conflict of interest if
she, David and Donald all attacked the
Trust and that she could not have owned
the life insurance policies (R461). The
record shows the latter was the same ad-
vice given by Ann's prior attorneys,
Work, Camp, Rick Chew and Robert D.
Looney, Sr. Ann had particulalry relied
on Looney who was older and a longtime
church friend. She had a right to rely
on all these attorneys. Wightman and
Looney's misadvice had assured Ann she

would collect from the estate.

78a

Thus this Court's conclusion that
Ann had "actual knowledge in 1971 of the
acts she alleges constitute malpractice,
shows there was no concealanns 0 the
part of anyone which would toll the
Statute of limitations as to her cause
of action against Work" (opinion page

4,) simply is illogical. Obviously the

Court's conclusion is that her actual
knowledge arose when Wightman made the

remark at P3,R2 then all the other

lawyers had to have done something to

conceal as there is considerable evi-

dence that Ann was asking every one of

them about the life insurance policies

before and after the said remark.

4.) The Court was picking and choo-
Sing the allegations as the opinion
states Ann "complains each subsequent
attorney was negligent for not suing
Work for negligence which allegedly

occurred on or about August 8, 1969."

79a

That date was never mentioned in the

original or first amended petition which
causes of action revolved around Work's
failure to advise the Court about the
insurance policy ownerships and had
failed to allege the insurance in the
Motion for New Trial then he and the
subsequent attorneys had concealed that
he was requried by law to set forth the
insurance matters for them to be consi-
dered. It was in the Second and Third
Amended Petitions that August 8, 1969
was stated in relation to the conceal-
ment of the assignment as set forth
supra, and when Work wrongfully advised
Ann could not own the Crown and Phoenix
policies. Ann's first allegations of
fraud were incomplete.

The abstractor had made one nota-
tion on the original petition regarding
the action against Chew stating, "if

Work's action were poeeetat until Dec.
a

iii it

"79 how can (Plaintiff) allege that Chew
should ahve known of them in 1970?" That
was answered in the Third Amended Peti-
tion as Chew had worked for Work's firm
during the time Ann was their client.
Ann never alleged Work's action was con-
cealed from the attorneys but their neg-
ligence was concealed from Ann. The in-
adequacy of Work's handling of matters
should have been apparent.

And the picking and choosing al-
legations could not be more apparent
than in the handling of David and
Donald's causes of action against Jones
and Thompson. The Court's opinion that
"the petitions filed by Appellants below
do not allege any such negligent acts oc-
curing within a two-year period immedi-
ately preceding the filing” is simply

not true. By the abstractor'’s own hand

it was noted at R3 that the pretrial was

on "4-7-77" where it was alleged "that
8la .

because of Jones negligence and failure
to appear at pretrial, case CJ-73-2024
was dismissed. " (The numerous questions
of "When?" made on the petition were
answered in the amended petitions and in

affidavits). The abstractor even noted

"“oncealment?" several times. The

allegation of failure to appear at
pretrial was made again at R14 with the
date April 7, 1977. The allegations of
the breachs of contracts by the letter
of March 25, 1977, were arbitrarily
disregarded by the abstractor in his
notes at R139 that "Letter/withdrawal
does not constitute act of malprac-

" It was however a breach of

tice...
contracts.

Further that the opinion is not
true as to no negligent acts alleged
within two years is the action against

Thomas A. Williams, who was added as a

Defendant by the Amended Petition filed

March 4, 1981. At R392 Ann alleged that

"on the advice of Defendant, Plaintiff
wrote an action against Stephen. Jones
and Defendant read Plaintiff's Petition
before it was filed as case CJ-79-991.
Defendant advised that the Petition

would be timely if filed by March 12,

1979." Also at R392 Annalleged that

Williams had advised her on March 5,

1979 that a Fifth Amended Petition in CJ-
71-2464 would be timely if filed on

March 5, 1979 to add new defendants, and

that contrary to law Williams advised

her that once the Amended Petition was
filed it did not matter when the summons
was served. Obviously all that was with-
in the two year time and according to
this Court's requirement on the negli-
gent act and not when damages occur,
which is contrary to common law. Ann

asked leave to amend the Petition and
83a

should be allowed to do so to show her
damages.

The abstractor's picking at allega-
tions is apparent at R181 where in an
amended petition Ann alleged she discov-
ered in August of 1979 there was a cause
of action against Jones himself for
fraudulent concealment of a cause of
action. The abstractor noted "but she
sued him in March 1979." Prior allega-
tions had been that Jones had concealed
a cause of action against Work. The new
allegation was against Jones himself for
fraudulent concealment of a cause of
action because Jones concealed his own
misconduct, referring to the insurance
assignment Supra.

This Court's opinion failed to
state the allegations by describing the
actions 1) CJ-79-991 and 2) CJ-80-2351
as only for legal malpractice when they

were for fraud and CJ-79-991 for breachs
8La

of contract. Action 3) CJ-80-4300 was

described as for fraud only when the
coercion was the major issue as to how
the settlement agreement was obtained.
In the opinion at page 3, para-
graph 4 the wrongful conclusion was
drawn that "The arguments in cases 1)
and 2) are founded on the Appellants’
belief that the statute of limitations
was tolled as to her causes of action
for legal malpractice due to the fraudu-
lent concealment of wrongdoing by the

attorney who allegedly committed the

wrongful acts; concealed by an alleged
conspiracy among the attorneys subse-
quently consulted by Appellants to pro-
secute the first attorney." (emphasis
added) Thus clearly this Court chose to
ignore the allegations against Jones and
Thompson made by the Administratrix and

Donald, although Causes of action Six

through Nine of the original Petition,
85a

copy attached hereto in the affidavit,
are clearly their actions, as they are
described inparagraph 2 at the beginning
of the Petition and realleged starting
at the Sixth Cause and through the Ninth
cause. All the amendments thereafter
clearly set forth David and Donald's
causes. The original petition was
abandoned.

Ann never alleged "conspiracy
among the attorneys subsequently con-
sulted by Appellants to prosecute the
first attorney". It was alleged that the
attorneys subsequent te Work had their
own conflicts of interest not disclosed
and each did their own damages by con-
cealing Ann's legal position from her.
They were not alleged to be "joint tort-
feasors™ because Ann never considered
them as such and it would be contrary to
Oklahoma law to have so alleged. Obvi-

ously David and —— never consulted
a

anybody to prosecute Work. If the Court
was trying to refer to the Jones, Thomp-
son, and Williams conflicts of interest
then there was collusion, apparently .
as to concealing Jones own wrongdoing in
claiming he had filed to recover all the
trusts benefitting David and Donald but
concealed the he had failed to name, sue
and serve the trustees and concealed
that he could not have added them in a
timely manner when he assured he would

sue the First National Bank after he got
all the papers and when he claimed the
petition could be amended up to trial,
all of which is in the record.

The Court's summary is seriously
flawed as to causes 1) and 2) as the two-
year statute should not have applied to
each, the original petitions did allege
acts within the two year period preced-
ing "its" filing or fraudulent conceal-

ment was alleged, the statute was tolled

87a

iii aacaacaela aa ll

because Ann had no knowledge that any of
the acts were negligent because of the
misadvice of all the attorneys. The
petitions were amended and the facts,
law and justice support those
amendments.

5.) The Court disregarded that
Appellees James E. Work and Stephen
Jones had made special oral contracts

which under Seanor, supra requires a

three-year statute of limitations. Work
had promised to obtain insurance to
cover Ann's judgments in the divorce
policy in the assignment, allowed the
policy to leave his custody, and impro-
perly relied on Ann's second attorney to
notify her. Under Seanor the statute of
limitations ran seven months after Jones
became the legal advisor for Ann. Jones
had requested all the divorce case docu-

ments. He was told by Ann that she had

believed she was getting the diminishing
88a

term policy which had no cash value.
Jones concealed there had been an
assignment.

Jones made a special agreement in
December 1976 when in return for obtain-
ing signatures of David and Donald that
he had done nothing to harm their cases
he assured them he would be ready for
trial in the spring. That he had no
intention of so doing is in the record
as he had the same date advised the
Court Clerk to not set his discovery
motions for hearing and never scheduled
them. It was alleged in the original
petition that he had failed to prepare
for the trial, as well as failing to
appear at the pretrial.

This Court failed to apply the
allegations and facts in the record on
motions for summary judgment to its own

cited laws, or to the laws cited in Ap-

pellant's briefs. Appellant is entitled
89a

to reconsideration and rehearing as weil
as the right to amend pleadings.

6.) This Court's misstatements,
wrongful conclusions and sissapplicetion
of the duties of a fiduciary deprived
the Administratrix of David's property
in various trusts. The Court over-
reached its authority by imputing words
into the settlement agreement that
simply were not there. The Court mis-
stated that “The plain wording of the
agreement says appellant's sons had full
and complete access to the books and
records of the defendants and had satis-
fied themselves as to the truth and
accuracy of everything contained there-
in." The “plain wording” of the agree-
ment is that David and Donald each ac-
knowledged and agreed that they had
initialed a copy of the said accounting

which they acknowledged had been rend-

ered to them. If Oe acknowledged and
a.

initialed the accounting rendered then
clearly they did not have access to "all
books and records." By affidavit Donald
States the conditions under which they
were coerced, oppressed, intimidated and
threatened. Further their legal repre-
sentative, Thompson, was not even in the
room at the time the accountings were
presented and assured them he would get
copies for them. Over one year later
through the Oklahoma Bar Association the
"accountings" were obtained and same
Showed no initials and are part of the
record. And clearly they never acknow-
ledged any accounting or records regard-
ing the July 1961 Trust because there is
no language regarding access to any
"books and records" despite this Court's
imputing the language, nor were any ac-
countings rendered or claimed to have

been rendered.

9la

The cases cited by the Court,

Steiger v. Commerce Acceptance Co., 455

P 2d 81 (Okl. 1969) and Tyler v.

Hartford, 195 Co. v. Nipper, 174 Okl.

634, 51 P.2d 741 (1935) had no bearing
as they did not involve parties that had
ever had any fiduciary duty. The Court
misapplied those cases supra. The Court
failed to apply the principles of Looney

v. Chastain, 395 P. 2d 571 (Ok1l. 1964)

by its shocking, arbitrary and capri-
cious conclusion that because David and
Donald had instituted lawsuits against
"the named intendente" <khes had never
sued the attorneys named) the fiduciary
relationship was severed. It is irrele-
vant whether David and Donald trusted
the fiduciaries. It was the fiduciaries
and their attorneys duties to David and
Donald that are at issue. The Court's

opinion flys in the face of all the

standards of fiduciary duties when one
92a

is a Trustee or attorney for a Trustee,
particularly where said attorneys had
represented the grantor of the trusts
involved and had a duty to the benefi-
ciaries.

The Court disregarded the facts
that the agreement had covered the time
only to June 28, 1978 and most of the
acts sued for related to those later.
They involved accountings related to a
type trust supervised by the federal
government, known as ERISA. It was
alleged the trustees had not complied
with the federal laws as to the account-
ings for the Pension and Profit Sharing
Trust at the time the settlement agree-
ment was coerced and later.

There can be no misunderstanding
about the stock warrant action. That
trust clearly was not named in the

settlement agreement which is a form of

a contract. The trustees repudiation of
93a

the trust came after the agreement and
their concealments.

The Court complained that this pro
se appellant had not "properly pled
facts which rise to the standard requir-
ed to vitiate such an agreement.” The
facts were presented and this Court sit-
ting in equity should have considered
and applied them instead of overreach-
ing. Appellant should be allowed to
amend and the Court consider it amended
by the facts before it, instead of apply-
ing rules of ancient writs as to plead-
ing that are contrary to modern con-
cepts, requirements and the intent of
the Oklahoma Legislature, as well as the
United States Supreme Court. Appel-
lant's rights under U.S.C.A. 5 and 14
were denied.

This Court failed to apply the
allegations and facts to its own cited

laws and those cited in Appellant's
94a

briefs. Appellant is entitled to recon-
Sideration and rehearing.

7.) The opinion was rendered by a
five person Court which was dae duly nor
Constitutionally constituted. Further,
in light of the foregoing the require-
ments of the appearance of justice are
not met. Although Mr. Justice Ralph B.
Hodges authored the Appellant's Exhibit
1 hereto, the entire Court that was sit-
ting in 1978 is considered to have parti-
cipated. Present Court members have
family members who were or are affected
by the matters of legal malpractice in-
Surance cost. Although it is claimed in
the opinion that Mr. Justice Hodges did
not participate, the record indicates
that he did as the sheet which was sub-
stituted for the transcript at R1641
shows that the said transcript Original
was “delivered to HODGES, J 12-7-84",

It is apparent that certain argument by

95a

Counsel for Stephen Jones, George Camp,
Jonathan Burch and Edwin Whitney Burch
was underlined thus apparently consider-
ed by the Court. Oral argument consider-
ation was improper and particularly in
view of the fact that juries are specifi-
cally told to disregard the opinions of
Counsel. Further the argument was self-
serving and contrary to sworn affidavits
in evidence.

Further, Mr. Justice Robert
Lavendar participated in the decision
although this Appellant's affidavit
attached to her Motion to Retain filed
December 12, 1983 said that she and then-
Chief Justice Lavendar had exchanged
some correspondence regarding attorney
discipline problems and that Justice
Lavendar and Stephen Jones were friends.

Thus the due process requirements
under Amendment Five of the United

States alaaibdabias hie not met. Appel-
a

lants are entitled to a fair and impar-
tial tribunal. Appellant's rights under
the United States Constitution Amend-

ments 5 and 14 were denied.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA
DENIED APPELLANT ROBERT ANN
FUNNELL DUE PROCESS, EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
OKLAHOMA

A. The Trial Court and the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma invaded the province
of the jury by deciding questions of
fact.

1.) Appellant repleads all of: the
foregoing, particularly the stated in-
Stances where the Court decided ques-
tions of fact and submits that the ques-
tion of fraud and fraudulent concealment
or due diligence to discover a cause of
action are questions of fact to be sub-
mitted to a jury. Under Oklahoma Sta-

Wa

tute, Title 15, section 60, the law is
that the existence of fraud is a fact
question. Appellant submitted numerous
facts and pleadings regarding fraudulent
concealment which were not controverted
by the Appellees responses in the Trial
Court and which they were given ample
opportunity to controvert. Those facts
by themselves present jury questions.

This Court's holding that Ap-
pellant's claims are barred by the
statute of limitations constitutes a
determination of a fact. Under Rule 13
of the District Court Rules this Court
has held that there can be no determi-
nation of a fact question on Rule 13
motions for summary judgment. Thus
Appellant has been denied the due pro-
cess and equal protection requirements
under the Oklahoma State Constitution.
The Appellants had rights to a jury

trial under Article 2, section 19 of the

98a

Oklahoma State Constitution. Appellant
was denied her rights to a jury trial,

as the fact questions were to be deter-
mined by a jury by this Court's own defi-
nition.

Wherefore, premises considered,
Appellant prays that a rehearing and re-
consideration of her said causes be had,
and that upon that rehearing and reconsi-
deration, this Court grant the Appellant
_ the relief prayed for in her original
petitions-in-error set forth above and

filed herein.

(Roberta Ann Funnell)

Roberta Ann Funnell, pro se
2306 S.E. 49th Street

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73129
(405) 670-1943

proof of service attached hereto

99a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAIIOMA

In Re: OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIA- ).
TION'S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY) S.C.B.D.
INSURANCE QUESIONNAIRE ) No. 2616

ORDER

The Board of Governors cf the
Oklahoma Bar Association has advised
this Court that the Association is faced
with a severe problem of diminishing
markets for professional liabilty
insurance and a correspondingly sharp
increase in premiums for coverage that
is still available. A primary cause
thereof is the lack of valid statistics
on the acts or omissions most frequently
giving rise to claims. Because reli-
ability claims experience data is essen-
tial to any effort to solve the problem.

IT IS ORDERED:

100a

The Court respectfully requests and
directs each member of the Oklahoma Bar
Association to respond by July 31, 1978,
to a questionnaire to be distributed by
the Association in a cooperative effort
to solve said problem. Responses to the
questionnaire shall be handled in such
manner that the anonymity of the respon-
dents is preserved.

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN CONFERENCE ON THIS 16TH DAY OF JUNE,
1978.

(Ralph B. Hodges)

CHIEF JUDGE

101la

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
ADMINISTRATIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DAVID ALLEN
FUNNELL, DECEASED, AND
DONALD FUNNELL,

Appellants,
vs.

STEPHEN JONES AND WILLIAM
R. THOMPSON,

Appellees.
and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,

Appellant,
vs.

JAMES E. WORK, GEORGE CAMP,
RICK CHEW, ROBERT D. LONNEY,
SR., WENDELL WIGHTMAN, and
THOMAS WILLIAMS,

Appellees.
and

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, ADMIN-
ISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF
DAVID ALLEN FUNNELL,
DECEASED,

Appellant,
vs.

1028

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee et ee ee ee ee ee et et et eet et et Se et Se et Se ee”

FILED
SUPREME
COURT
STATE OF
OKLAHOMA
JAN. 15,
1985
JAMES W.
PATTERSON,

CLERK

No. 59,204

(consoli-

dated w/
59,205 and
59,212)

FOR OFFI-
CIAL PUB-
LICATION

JAMES D. FUNNELL and HARRIET
FUNNELL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
CO-TRUSTEES FOR DAVID ALLEN
FUNNELL; JONATHAN BURCH,
EDWIN WHITNEY BURCH and
JERRY DICK,

tlie ie i nd

Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
OKLAHOMA COUNTY

Honorable Ray Lee Wall, Judge.

Appeal from order of the trial court
granting summary judgment and holding
that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by
statute of limitations and by previously

executed settlement agreement.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL

DONALD K. FUNNELL,

Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma Appellants Pro se,

1034

RONALD R. HUDSON
Holloway, Dobson,
Hudson & Bachman
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

WILLIAM R. THOMPSON
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

GEORGE D. DAVIS &
RONALD R. WALKER
McKinney, Stringer
& Webster
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

GOMER SMITH, JR.
Smith & Murdock
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

EDWARD L. RAY,
Fenton, Fenton,
Smith, Reneau & Moon
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

ROBERT J. EMERY
Emery, McCandless,
Gaitis & Bruehl
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

JONATHAN W. BURCH
Burch & Burch
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

104a

For Appellees,
Edwin W. Burch,
Jonathan Burch,
George Camp,

Stephen Jones,

Appellee, Pro se,

For Appellee,
Robert D. Looney,
Sr.

For Appellee,
Wendell Wightman

For Appellee,
Thomas A.
Williams,

For Appellee,
James E. Work,

For Appellees,
James D. Funnell,
Harriet Funnell.

DOOLIN, J.

This is a consolidation of three
appeals brought by Appellants pro se in
the District Court of Oklahoma County.
The three causes consolidated and ruled
on below, include:

1) CJ=-79-991, an action by Appel-

lants, Roberta Ann Funnell, individual-

ly and as administratrix of the estate
of David Allen Funnell, deceased, and

Donald Funnell, against Appellees,

Steven Jones and William R. Thompson,

for legal malpractice.

2) CJ-80-2351, an action by Appel-

lant, Roberta Ann Funnell against

Appellees James E. Work, George Camp,

Rick Chew, Robert D. Looney, Sr.,

Wendell Wightman and Thomas A.

Williams, also for legal malpractice.

105a

3) CJ-80-4300, an action by Appellant

Roberta Ann Funnell as personal repre-
sentative of David Allen Funnell,
deceased against Appellees James D.
Funnell, Harriet Funnell, Jonathan
Burch, Edwin Whitney Burch and Jerry
Dick for fraud.

On September 13, 1982, the Honorable
Ray Lee Wall, sitting by special appoint-
ment, found and ordered that Appellants’
claims in 1) and 2) had been barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations,
and that Appellants‘ claim in 3) had been
barred by a settlement agreement. There-
upon, the court sustained motions for
summary judgment in each of the three
actions in favor of the respective defen-
dants, and Appellants commenced this

appeal.

106a

We find the trial court's findings and
Orders to be correct in each instance.

We are unusually impressed with the
Organizational ability, grasp and under-
standing of the appellant pro se, but the
fact that these lawsuits and their subse-
quent appeals were conducted pro se does
not, in any way relieve Plaintiffs/Appel-
lants of the responsibility to conform
their actions to the rules of pleadings,
evidence or appellate practice. We adopt
the rule stated by the Court of Criminal

Appeals in Bowen v. State, 606 P.2d 589

(Okl.Cr. 1980), and hold that a party
proceeding pro se in a civil action or a
civil appeal is to be held to the same
standards as an attorney.

The arguments in cases 1) and 2), are
founded on the Appellants' belief that

the statute of limitations was tolled as

107a

to her causes of action for legal malprac-
tice due to the fraudulent concealment of
wrongdoing by the attorney who allegedly
committed the wrongful acts; concealed by
an alleged conspiracy among the attorneys
subsequently consulted by Appellants to
prosecute the first attorney. Inasmuch
as Appellants’ Petitions below allege no
acts constituting legal malpractice which
occurred during the two-year period
immediately prior to the filing of Plain-
tiffs' initial Petition, some tolling of
the statutes must be proved to avoid the
finding that the actions were barred. To
this end, Appellants allege the theory of
tolling of limitation by concealment.

In Oklahoma, an action for malprac-
tice, whether medical or legal, though
based on a contract of employment, is an

action in tort and is governed by the

1084

two-year statute of limitations at 12
O.S.A. 1981, §95 Third. (Seanor v.

Browne, 154 Okl. 222, 7 P.2d 627 ?
(1932)). This limitation period begins
to run from the date the negligent act
occurred or from the date the plaintiff
should have known of the act complained

of. (McCarroll v. Doctors General

Hospital, 664 P.2d 382 (Okl. 1983)). The

period may be tolled, however, by conceal-
ment by the attorney of the negligent
acts which have injured the client. This

Court has previously held, in Kansas City

Life Insurance Co. v. Nipper, 174 Okl.

634, 51 P.2d 741 (1935) that:

"One relying on fraudulent
concealment to toll the statute of
limitation must not only show that
he did not know facts constituting
a cause of action, but that he
exercised reasonable diligence to
ascertain such facts."

109a

To specifically address the rule
stated in Nipper, we note that the record
reveals Appellant, Roberta Ann Funnell
was complaining of her first attorney,
James E. Work's alleged malpractice as
early as June, 1971. Even though she was
aware no action had ever been instituted
against him, for she waited almost ten
years to do anything about it. The pain-
ful conclusion to be drawn is her actual
knowledge in 1971 of the acts she alleges
constitute malpractice, shows there was
no concealment on the part of anyone
which would toll the statute of limita-
tions as to her cause of action against
Work.

Appellant, Roberta Ann Funnell, com-
plains each subsequent attorney was negli-
gent for not suing each preceding attor-

ney for not suing Work for negligence

110a

which allegedly occurred on or about
August 8, 1969. While this theory of
"tacking" the negligence of one party
onto the negligence of another to create
a single, continuous tort, is original,
such argument is not persuasive to neces-
sitate the creation of a new doctrine of
limitations, for there is no allegation
that subsequent attorneys were acting as
joint tort-feasors.

If the action against Work was barred
by the statute of limitations, which we
find to be the case, then the succeeding
lawyers cannot be guilty of malpractice
for not filing an invalid lawsuit. The
liability of each successive lawyer must
be bottomed on his own, negligent act,
not on the original complaint.

Even assuming there are other allega-

tions against any of the attorney-Appel-

1114

lees which might be grounds for a cause
of action for malpractice, the petitions
filed by Appellants below do not allege
any such negligent acts occurring within
a two-year period immediately preceding
the filing, and such petitions are,
therefore, fatally defective on their
face and summary judgment lies.

In summary then, as to causes 1) and
2), supra, we find the two-year statute
of limitations is applicable to each; the
Original petitions allege no act of mal-
practice occurring within the two-year
period immediately preceding its filing,
and the allegation that the statute of
limitation was tolled by concealment
fails because of Appellant, Roberta Ann
Funnell's knowledge of the acts she com-
plains of as negligent. The trial court
committed no error in granting summary
judgment as to these causes.

112a

Appellants allege errors regarding
acts by attorneys employed subsequent to
the original lawyers. These allegations
on the merits however, may not be reached
when the trial court grants summary judg-
ment on the question of statute of limita-
tions. In order for the allegation of
malpractice to be considered such acts of
necessity must be committed within two
years of the acts complained of, or
within two years of discovery of such
acts.

The trial court's granting of summary
judgment in case 3) supra, was on other
grounds. This action alleges that on
June 28, 1978, Appellant, Roberta Ann
Funnell's sons, Donald Funnell and David
Funnell were induced by fraud and coer-
cion to execute a settlement agreement

and thus to terminate certain litigation

113a

between themselves as plaintiffs and
Appellees James Funnell and Harriet
Funnell. David Funnell subsequently died
and Roberta Ann Funnell was appointed his
personal representative. Appellant seeks
to vacate the settlement agreement on
behalf of David Funnell's estate and
alleges he was coerced and defrauded into
signing by all the named defendants.

It is a settled rule in Oklahoma that
fraud is never presumed and where a writ-
ten agreement is attacked on the ground
of fraud, that agreement will be upheld
unless the allegations of fraud are estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.

(Steiger v. Commerce Acceptance Co., 455

P.2d 81 (Okl. 1969)).
It may be true that appellant has
rightfully set forth the elements of

fraud for the inducement of execution of

114,a

settlement. What such allegations lack
is specificity, clarity and convincing-
ness for there seems little doubt the
adult sons of the appellant accepted the
proceeds of settlement under its terms.
The plain wording of the agreement
says appellant's sons had full and com-
plete access to all the books and records
of the defendants and had satisfied them-
selves as to the truth and accuracy of
everything contained therein. On its
face, this document appears to be a fair
agreement, knowingly executed by the
parties to it and supported by adequate
consideration. Appellant's allegations
that it was procured by unlawful means
is, of course, within the realm of possi-
bility, but is not supported by properly
pled facts which rise to the standard

required to vitiate such an agreement.

115a

Also applicable here is the rule

stated in Tyler v. Hartford Insurance

Co., 195 Okl. 523, 159 P.2d 722 (1945),
which states:
"When a transaction is fairly

susceptible of two constructions,

the one which will free it from

the imputation of fraud will be

adopted."

Appellant correctly points out that in
some limited instances involving fiduciar-
ies, the party in the fiduciary position

may be required to offer affirmative

proof that no fraud existed. (Looney v.

Chastain, 395 P.2d 571 (Okl. 1964).

While the relationship between David
Funnell and Donald Funnell and the named
defendants may have at one time been a
relationship of trust and confidence, at
the time the settlement agreement was
entered into, such relationship had been

severed as evidence by the fact that

1164

David Funnell and Donald Funnell had
instituted several lawsuits against the
other defendants. It is illogical to
Suppose they would have sued the defen-
dants and yet have maintained a relation-
ship of trust as to the contentions which
were the subjects of the suits.

We hold that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in cause 3).

The judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Simms, C.J., Lavender, Hargrave, Wilson,
JJ. = concur

Hodges, J. - not participating

Barnes, Opala, Kauger, JJ. -

disqualified.

117 4

CASE INFORMATION SHEET
Case Number 59204 Date: 1/23/84
Consolidated with 59205 & 59212
1 Box of Records in Intern's Workroom

Appellant: Roberta Ann Funnell

Attorney: pro se

Appellee: James E. Work et al.

Attorney: Ronald Hudson, Ed Ray, et

al.
County: Oklahoma
Judge: Wall

Type of Action: Attorney malpractice

and breach of fiduciary duty by trustee.
Adverse Decision Appealed
(1) Nature (verdict for P, summary
judgment for D, etc.).
Summary judgment for all D's, all
cases. |
(2) Is there a final, appealable

order? Yes

1184

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Date judgment was rendered:
9/13/82

Is journal entry, decree, order

or signed court minute of decision
appealed included in the record?
Yes

If yes, on what page is it

found? P. 545 (letter) P. 566
(memorialization)

If any post-judgment motions were
filed, list them, the date of fil-
ing and the date and type of
dispostion. None which effect
finality.

Was petition in error filed
within 30 days of the date judg-
ment was rendered or overruling of
motion for new trial or judgment

NOV?

11%

Summary of Facts: Appellant

challenges Settlement Agreement made by
trustees of estate of Joseph Funnell
through which Joseph's sons received lump
sum in lieu of attempting to achieve a
better result through litigation.
Appellant claims that settlement was
obtained by fraud, and undue influence
upon her sons who it seems excluded her
from the agreement. Ms. Funnell has sued
all the lawyers involved (both sides),
and the trustees, and failed in each
action.

Issue(s) to be Decided: (1) Legal

malpractice barred by stat. limitations.
(2) Will allegation of fraud, etc., toll
statute when settlement agreement was
already finalized in open court?

Is there a Motion to Retain or Motion for

Oral Argument? No

1204

Does the case appear to be appropriate
for affirmance by summary Opinion as
allowed by Rule 1.202? No
State the appropriate reason, citing
section of Rule 1.202.
Comments: AARGH!I!1!
Fast track:
(1) Did appellant agree to accelerate
procedures in appeal? (See peti-
tion in error, subsection F).
No
(2) Did appellee agree to the same?

No

1214

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Roberta Ann Funnell, Indivi-
dually and as Administratrix
of the Estate of David Allen
Funnell, Deceased, and

)
)
)
)
Donald Funnell, )
)
Petitioners, )
)
Vv. ) No. 54,943
)
Honorable Merle Lansden, )
)
)

Respondent.
Rehearing DENIED.
DONE this 27th day of May, 1980.

(Robert E. Lavender)
Chief Justice

LAVENDER, C.J., IRWIN, V.C.J. and
WILLIAMS, HODGES, BARNES, DOOLIN,
HARGRAVE, JJ., concurring.

SIMMS, J., not voting.

OPALA, J. dissenting by attached opinion.
(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

May 27, 1980 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)

122a

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Roberta Ann Funnell, Indivi-
dually and as Administratrix
of the Estate of David Allen

Funnell, Deceased, and
Donald Funnell,

)

)

)

)

)

)

Petitioners, )

)

Vv. ) No. 54,943

)

Honorable Merle Lansden, )

)

Respondent. )

OPALA, J., dissenting:

The fundamental law of the Federal
Republic has, for some five decades now,
- enjoined upon the legal system of this
Nation, as one of its cherished values,
the principle of impartiality of the

tribunal.?

If there be the slightest
doubt about a judge's state of mind, it

must be resolved in favor of the litigant

1. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct.
437, 71 L.Ed. 749 [1927]; Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,

1234

who questions the tribunal's fitness’.

The record before us affords ample
basis for at least some doubt as to the
respondent's neutral and detached posture
in the litigation. His recusal is hence
mandated by the command of the Constitu-

3

tion, state and federal. We should

have so ruled in the beginning.

93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 [1972];
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
577-579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697-1698, 36
L.Ed.2d 488, 499-500 [1973]; In re
Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30
L.Ed.2d 708 [1972].

2. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S.
455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532
[1971]; Johnson v. Mississippi, 403
U.S. 212, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2da
423 [1971]; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897
[1974].

3. Art. 2 § 6, Okl. Con. provides in
pertinent part:

". . . and right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial,
delay, or prejudice." [Emphasis added]

12,4

Rule 404 -- which bars rehearing after
our refusal to assume original jurisdic-
tion -- is no barrier to the petitioners'
plea before us. Rules do not rise to the
dignity of a jurisdictional impediment.
Courts are not infallible. They cannot
allow their mistakes to lie concealed
beneath a self-generated cloud of proce-
dural complexities. We are and must
forever remain free to correct an error
by promptly withdrawing the flawed deci-

sion and substituting in its place one

State ex rel. Harden v. Edwards, 176
Okl1. 187, 56 P.2d 402 [1936]; State ex
rel. Larecy v. Sullivan, 207 Okl. 128,
248 £.2a 239 [1952]; Tumey v. Ohio,
supra note l.

4. Rule 40, Supreme Court Rules, as
amended November 13, 1979, 12 0.S.
Ch. 35, App. i.

125a

which will accord with the law's highest
5

command.

My unswerving commitment to these
values leaves me with no alternative but
to dissent from today's denial of

rehearing.

5. Health Systems Agency of Oklahoma,
Inc. v. Norman, 589 F.2d 486, 491
[10th Cir. 1978].

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

May 27, 1980 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)

126a

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF OKLAHOMA
(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,
May 5, 1980, Ross N. Lillard, Jr., Clerk)
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indivi-
dually and as Administratrix
of the Estate of DAVID ALLEN

FUNNELL, deceased, and
DONALD FUNNELL,

vs. No. 54,943

)

)

)

)

)

)
Petitioners, )
)

)

)
HONORABLE MERLE LANSDEN, )
)

Respondent. }

MOTION TO SUSPEND APPLICATION OF RULE 40

INSOFAR AS IT PERTAINS TO
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

Petitioner Roberta Ann Funnell respect-
fully moves this Honorable Court to sus-
pend application of that portion of its
rule 40 which states this Court will not
consider a petition for rehearing from an
order refusing original jurisdiction and

for reasons shows this Court as follows:

127a

1. This Court has jurisdiction over
lower courts under Oklahoma Constitution
Article 7 section 4. This Court appoint-
ed the Respondent after Oklahoma County
Judges disqualified.

2. Under the United States Constitu-
tion Amendment 14 this Petitioner has the
right to due process and equal protection
of law.

3. Petitioner's Petition and Brief for
Rehearing submits convincing authority
that in disqualification cases this Court

has a mandatory duty to assume jurisdic-

tion where a Petitioner has reasonable
fear she will not obtain a fair and impar-
tial trial under the Respondent Judge.
Petitioner's affidavits have so stated.
4. Petitioner's Affidavit attached
hereto gives new information as to her

fear of unfair hearing before Respondent

128a

and her rights under the Constitution
were denied.

5. Respondent, in violation of stat-
ute, has issued an order prohibiting Peti-
tioners from amending their pro se peti-
tion before an answer has been filed and
further ordered that recently acquired
counsel cannot amend their petition.

When Respondent sustains demurrers to
Petitioners’ inartfully drawn pro se peti-
tion defense counsel will have a strong
argument that allegations of a subsequent
amended petition having been previously
ruled on is res judicata.

6. This Court has a duty to uphold the
laws of this state and not apply restric-
tive Federal Code in matters of disquali-
fication of Respondent as was done in
Petitioners prior attempt to remove

Respondent.

129

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully
requests this Court suspend its rule 40,
assume jurisdiction and grant the relief
requested in the Application and Petition
which relief includes an Order which will
allow amending the petition in court
below and Writ disqualifying Respondent.

(Roberta Ann Funnell)
Roberta Ann Funnell, pro se

1304

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,
Apr. 21, 1980 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indivi- )
dually and as Administratrix )
of the Estate of DAVID ALLEN )
FUNNELL, Deceased, and )
DONALD FUNNELL, )
)
Petitioners, )
)
vs. ) No. 54,943
)
HONORABLE MERLE LANSDEN, )
)
Respondent. )

PETITION FOR REHEARING

On March 31, 1980, this Court declined
to assume Original Jurisdiction in the
captioned cause even though 20 0.S. 1403
lends itself to the interpretation that
the Legislature intended for the Supreme
Court to review all Applications to Dis-
qualify Trial Judge upon a proper

showing.

1314

This case involves no "nice" distinc-
tions upon which reasonable men can dif-
fer. The Respondent herein willfully and
flagrantly violated the statute of this
state which permits a Plaintiff to amend
his or her petition anytime before an
answer is filed. The Petitioners (Plain-
tiffs below) originally filed this peti-
tion pro se, (because they could not find
an attorney who would institute litiga-
tion against the Defendant attorneys).
Now the Respondent has made a mockery of
state law by not allowing them to amend
after having obtained the assistance of
counsel. Petitioners have been denied
effective assistance of counsel in viola-
tion of the U.S. Comstitution and have
been denied justice in violation of the

Oklahoma Constitution.

132a

This writer has advised his client
that the state's highest Court will not
tolerate open and flagrant lawlessness
from a lower bench. Surely his: advice
was not in error.

Further, an egregious ruling by the
trial Judge is consistent with Petition-
ers' position that the Respondent is
biased in favor of the Defendant attor-
neys with regard to whom Respondent has
made a pre-trial finding of fact that
they are "honorable people".

Respondent's pre-trial finding of fact
that attorney defendants being lawyers
are "honorable people” and his prior
biased comment with regard to petition-
er's pro se efforts and attempts to
secure counsel constitute additional
layers of icing on the cake of judicial

oppression. Petitioners are in great

133a

fear that they will not receive a fair
trial at the hands of Respondent.

WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully
request this Honorable Court to Assume
Original Jurisdiction and grant the
relief requested in their Application and
Petition which relief includes an Order
which will allow them to amend their Peti-
tion and a Writ disqualifying the
Respondent.

(Mike Millstead)

ee |
MIKE MILLSTEAD, Attorney
for Petitioners

___ (Roberta Ann Funnell)
Roberta Ann Funneil, pro se

1344

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Monday, March 31, 1980

THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOW-
ING ORDERS:

54,943

Roberta Ann Funnell, Individual-
ly and as Administratix of the
Estate of David Allen Funnell,
Dec. and Donald Funnell v. Hon.
Merle Lansden. Application to
Assume Original Jurisdiction and
Petition for Writs of Mandamus or
Prohibition denied. CONCUR:
Lavender, C.J., Irwin, V.C.J.,
Hodges, Williams, Barnes, Doolin,
Hargrave, JJ.

DISSENT: Simms, Opala, JJ.

(Robert E. Lavender)
Chief Justice

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Mar. 3l,

1980 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)

135a

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF OKLAHOMA
(FILED Supreme Court, State of
Mar. 17, 1980 Ross N. Lillard,
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, Indivi- )
dually and as Administratrix )
of the Estate of DAVID ALLEN )
FUNNELL, Deceased, and
DONALD FUNNELL,

Petitioners,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
HONORABLE MERLE LANSDEN, )
)
)

Respondent.

Oklahoma,

Jr. Clerk)

No. 54,943

(BASED ON
NEWLY DIS-
COVERED
EVIDENCE)

APPLICATION AND PETITION TO ASSUME
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ORDER TO ISSUE
A WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

1. Petitioners respectfully request

the Court to assume original jurisdiction

for reasons which are hereinafter set

forth.

2. Petitioners are Plaintiffs in Okla-

homa County Case No. CJ-79-991

which is a

legal malpractice action against Defen-

dants Stephen Jones and William

136a

Thompson. Petitioners allege Respondent
Judge Merle Lansden should be disquali-
fied by a Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus
issued from this Court for reasons which
will be hereinafter shown.

3. On March 5, 1980, Respondent Judge
overruled Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify
himself.

4. Said Respondent Judge is biased
against Petitioners and in favor of the
Defendants below and said bias is shown
by his statement at a hearing on the 9th
day of November, 1979, wherein the Judge
made the following unusual statement:

". »« « I have no hesitancy of
talking to lawyers on the tele-

phone without the other attorneys

being there because I've found all
the iawyers to be honorable people

T. SL 9-13 (emphasis supplied)
Exhibit A hereto

137a

Counsel Mike Millstead did not enter the
case until the 2nd day of January, 1980,
and did not receive a copy of the tran-
script and actual knowledge of the con-
tents therein until January 12, 1980.

The significance of the Judge's statement
is overwhelming when you consider that
the Defendants in the legal malpractice
case are all lawyers and Defendant
William Thompson has been appearing on
his own behalf pre se. The Court's find-
ing that ". . . all the lawyers to be
honorable people . . .” is susceptible to
one of two interpretations, to wit: All
lawyers connected with the above cases
are honorable people or all lawyers in
general are honorable people. Either
interpretation leads to the unacceptable
situation that the Court on November 9,

1979, made a finding of fact that Defen-

138a

dants Stephen Jones and William Thompson,
both lawyers connected with the case as
Defendants and lawyers in general, are
both honorable people. Since the nature
of this legal malpractice case which
alleges inter alia fraud, a pre-trial
finding of fact that the Defendants are
"honorable" clearly indicates the bias of
Judge in favor of attorneys and Defen-
dants and a prejudice against
Petitioners.

5. Not only has the Respondent Judge
shown his prejudice by comments with ref-
erence to attorneys, but he has made rul-
ings which are not only adverse to Peti-
tioners, but more importantly are in

clear violation of the law. For example,

in a hearing on the 12th day of
September, 1979, on page 55 of the tran-

script, Exhibit B hereto, the Court

139a

issued an order to the effect that the
Petitioners were prohibited from amending
their petition even though no answer had
been filed in the case. The Court fur-
ther indicated that he intended to rule
on demurrers to the original petition
before he would allow an amended petition
to be filed. Respondent reiterated this
ruling on January 2, 1980. T. 6L 13-16,
Exhibit C hereto. These rulings clearly
disregard statutory law to the effect
that a Plaintiff has the absolute right
to amend her petition any time before an
answer is filed and it ignores case law
which makes it clear that where a second
amended petition is filed but does not
adopt or incorporate by reference the
former pleadings only the second amended

petition will be considered on demurrer.

1408

6. Plaintiff, Roberta Ann Funnell, is
still appearing pro se for herself in the
legal malpractice action below. Counsel,
Mike Millstead, represents only Plain-
tiffs David Allen Funnell, Deceased, and
Donald Funnell, for the reason that there
might be a conflict of interest between
the boys and their mother. The Respon-
dent has expressed a prejudice against a
person appearing pro se and a bias in
favor of persons represented by Counsel.
On page 7 Line 19 of the transcript of
the proceedings had on January 2, 1980,
Exhibit C hereto, the Court confessed
that it was "almost impossible" for him
to handle a pro se matter. At the August
8, 1979 CJ-79-991 hearing the Respondent
at T. 4L 9-11, Exhibit D hereto, issued a
bizarre order to the effect that Plain-

tiffs were prohibited from consulting

l4la

with any attorneys outside of the Court
who do not make an Entry of Appearance.
At T. 4L 5-7, the Court ordered that the
Plaintiffs could not consult with an Okla-
homa attorney unless the Court was first
furnished with the name of the attorney.
The Court then made the unusual statement
that he wanted to talk with whatever
attorney Plaintiffs wanted to consult
with. Apparently, this meant that the
Judge intended to screen ali prospective
attorneys before allowing them to repre-
sent Plaintiffs. Thus, the Respondent
effectively deprived Plaintiffs of their
right to Counsel and the free choice
thereof, in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.

7. Previously on September 24, 1979,
Petitioners, appearing pro se, filed in

Supreme Court Case No. 54,217 a Petition

12a

for a Writ of Mandamus with supporting
affidavits for the purpose of disqualify-
ing Respondent. Original Jurisdiction
was assumed by this Honorable Court and
the Writ was denied with Justices Simms,
Opala, and Hodges dissenting. The pri-
mary contention by Petitioners in that
application was that the Respondent was
biased and confused as to the facts, giv-
ing "the appearance of an elderly befud-

died man not competent to handle cases

involving many documents, details, and
defendants." While present Counsel was
not involved in the case when allegations
of incompetence were made, he does allege
that the fact that said allegations were
made would tend, in accordance with funda-
mentals of human nature, to aggravate any
pre-existing prejudice and create new

bias if in fact none before existed.

1434

8. Respondent, on March 5, 1980, stat-
ed, "The Motion for Disqualification will
be denied, and I might say that I am

not-- I would be glad to get out of it,

but I just can't do it under the

circumstances." T. 14L 9-11, Exhibit E

hereto. Respondent's stated wish to get
out of the case should be given serious

consideration. What circumstances could
possibly preclude this Trial Judge from

recusing himself?

9. All transcripts referred to have
been filed either with this Court or the
Trial Court and applicable page copies
are attached hereto.

10. As consequence of the above said
bias and prejudice exhibited by said
Judge against Plaintiffs and in favor of
Defendants, Petitioners have no plain

adequate or speedy remedy of law.

lita

WHEREFORE, Petitioners being otherwise
remediless, pray that this Court assume
Original jurisdiction and cause this Writ
of Prohibition or Mandamus to issue which
prohibits and orders the Respondent Judge
from proceeding further in the case and
orders his disqualification. Further,
the Respondent Judge should be ordered to
withdraw his prior illegal order which
prohibits the Petitioners from amending
their original peition which petition was
filed pro se.

(Mike Millstead)

MIKE MILLSTEAD, Attorney
for Petitioners

(Roberta Ann Funnell)
Roberta Ann Funnell, pro se

1454

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Monday, November 5, 1979

THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOW-
ING ORDERS:

54,217 Donald Funnell and Roberta Ann
Funnell v. The Hon. Merle
Lansden, Judge for the Dist.
Court of Oklahoma County, State
of Oklahoma. Rehearing denied.

(Ben T. Williams)
Acting Chief Justice

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Nov. 5, 1979 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

DONALD FUNNELL and _
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL,

)

)

)
Petitioners, )

vs. ) No. 54,217
)
THE HONORABLE MERLE LANSDEN, )
Judge for the District )
Court, Oklahoma County, )
State of Oklahoma, )
)
)

Respondent.

16a

The order of this Court issued October
10, 1979, is hereby corrected to show the
proper citation of authority as follows:
Andrews, Mosburg, Davis, Elam, Legg &
Bixler, Inc., v. General Insurance
Company of America, W.D. Okl., 418 Supp.
304 (1976).

Petitioners are granted until October
26, 1979, within which to file a brief in

support of the Petition for Rehearing

. filed herein.

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

this 19th day of October, 1979.

(Pat Irwin)
Acting Chief Justice

(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Oct. 19, 1979 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

DONALD FUNNELL and )
ROBERTA ANN FUNNELL, )
)
)

Petitioners,

147a

No. 54,217

vs.

THE HONORABLE MERLE LANSDEN,
Judge for the District
Court, Oklahoma County,
State of Oklahoma,

wet ee ee ee eee ee ee

Respondent.

Jurisdiction assumed and writ of manda-
mus denied upon reading and consideration
of the petition and return, along with
brief, affidavits and transcripts in sup-

port thereof. Andrews, Mosburg, Davis,

Elam, Legg & Bixler, Inc. v. General

Insurance Company of America, U.S. W.D.

Okl. 148 F. Supp. 304 (1976).
DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

THIS 10th DAY OF OCTOBER, 1979.

(Robert E. Lavender)
Chief Justice

Dissent: Simms, J., Opala, J., Hodges, J.

All others concurring.
(FILED Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma,

Oct. 10, 1979 Ross N. Lillard, Jr. Clerk)

18a

SEANOR v. BROWNE.
Ro. 20678.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Jan. 26, 1932.

1. Lixitation of actions (Key) 31.
Action for malpractice, though based
on contract of employment, is action in
tort, and governed by two-year statute of
limitations (Comp. St. 1921, § 185, subd.
3).
2. Limitations of actions (Key) 27.
Special oral contract pleaded whereby
physician agreed to cure injury for
reasonable fee, but failed to cure, held
governed by three-year statute (Comp. St.
1921, §$ 165, subds. 2, 3).
3. Pleading (Key) 205 (1).
General demurrer, addressed to whole

of pleading, should be overruled, if

149a

pleading states facts entitling party

pleading to any of relief claimed.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. An action for malpractice, negli-
gence, carelessness, and unskillfullness
of a physician in treating a patient,
though based upon a contract of employ-
ment, is an action in tort, and governed
by the two-year statute of limitations,
as the contract of employment is merely
the inducement and right of the physician
to treat the patient.

2. While the gravamen of the action as
pleaded in the petition is in tort, and
the petition shows on its face that the
tort action is barred by the statute of
limitations of two years, yet, where
plaintiff pleads a special oral contract

that defendant agreed to cure an injury

150a

of plaintiff for a reasonable fee and
compensation, and pleads a failure of
defendant to perfect said cure, and
pleads the amount paid defendant for such
service, held, the special contract thus
pleaded is governed by the three-year
statute of limitations, and a general
demurrer to the petition on the grounds
that the action is barred by the statute
of limitations should be overruled, where
the special oral contract action is not
barred.

3. A general demurrer addressed to the
whole of a pleading should be overruled,
if the pleading states facts entitling
the party pleading to any of the relief

claimed.

REPORTED AT 7 P. (2d)

15la

DESK COPY

Wi31's

OKLAHOMA |
COURT RULES
AND
PROCEDURE
1980-1981

(This Pamphlet supersedes the 1979-1980 Pamphlet]

. Page
Oklahoma Statutes .......... eee ee eee eee e eres \
Oklahoma Court Rules ..........--. eee ee cree eres 873
Federal Rules .........ccccscccccccncccccscessese 1099
A detailed listing of Oklahoma Statutes and Court
Rules and Federal Court Rules contained in this
pamphlet appears on the inside page of the cover.
WEST PUBLISHING CO. ST. PAUL, MINN.

152a

4)

Rule 13. g udgment where facts not controverted

A party may move for judgment in his favor on the ground
that the depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and
affidavits on file, filed with his motion or subsequently filed
with leave of court show that there is no substantial controversy
as to any material fact. The adverse party may file affidavits
and other materials in opposition to the motion. The affidavits
which are filed by either party shall be made on personal know]l-
edge, shall show that the affiant is competent to testify as to the
matters stated therein, and shall set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence. The court shall render judgment if it
appears that there is no substantial controversy as to any ma-
terial fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. If the court finds that there is no substantial con-
troversy as to certain facts or issues, it shall make an order
specifying the facts or issues which are not in controversy and
direct that the action proceed for a determination of the facts or
issues.

Notice shall be given to the adverse parties of the filing of a
motion for judgment under this rule. The filing of such a mo-
tion shall not delay or extend the time to answer, reply or file
other proceedings or papers in the case, and it shall not delay
the pretrial conference, the trial or other proceedings in the
case. If such a motion is made after the case is at issue, the
hearing on the motion and the pretrial conference may, in the
discretion of the court, be held at one time.

Rule 14. Discovery

a. Discovery rules and statutes shall be liberally construed,
provided, however, that all matters that are privileged against
disclosure at the trial, including, but not limited to, privileged
communications between a party or his agent and the attorney _
for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any dis-

153a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0712%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
