# Appendix — Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft v. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill Gmbh.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 1063

## Text

IN THE SUPREME COURT * ~~

OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

SCHUBERT & SALZER
MASCHINENFABRIK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
and
SCHUBERT & SALZER MACHINE WORKS, INC.,
Petitioners,

Ve

SPINDELFABRIK SUESSEN-SCHURR,
STAHLECKER & GRILL GmbH,
HANS STAHLECKER AND FRITZ STAHLECKER,
Respondents

APPENDIX

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Allen Kirkpatrick, III
Counsel of Record

For Petitioners

William T. Bullinger
Cushman, Darby & Cushman
Eleventh Floor

1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone (202) 861-3000

Item

: eae

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Appeals Court Opinion, 829 F.2d
1025 (Fed. Cis. BT Vico ee seesees la

Trial Court Opinion (not reported)

incluGing Orders OF: ..ccoccccce - 46a
September 4, 1985.............. 194a
September 30, 1985............. 198a
GCECGBOE 237 L9ES.ccscccccccccce 2018
December 30, 1985...cccccccceee 2058

License Agreement, Schubert and
Murata, ‘0Oll Patent (A-2807 to
SOOT) oc ececresesessececssbeevoccce 213a

Sales Agreement Suessen and Murata,
‘O11 Patent (A-2803 to 2806)..... 220a

Assignment, Murata to Suessen, ‘011
Patent CRM ZEae ccc ccccecevcsceees 226a

Terminal Disclaimer, '946 Patent .
(A-2842 to BORD rece vcceceeseacee 228a

Terminal Disclaimer '01l Patent
(A-2236 to Bese ebennsecsesesneens 233a

NSS SIRES) EL eet ee 238a

indicates reference to lower court

appendix.

tintin: inact

APPENDIX

ITEM 1

Appeals Court Opinion, 829 F.2d 1025

(Fed. Cir. 1987)

yet ea

Spek MOO Mico Cea Pe

la

APPENDIX, ITEM 1

(Appeals Court Opinion)
[829 F.2d 1075]

SPINDELFABRIK SUESSEN-SCHURR
STAHLECKER & GRILL GmbH, et al.,
Appellees,

Vv.

SCHUBERT & SALZER
MASCHINENFABRIK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
and Schubert & Salzer Machine
Works, Inc., Appellants.
Appeal Nos. 86-561, 86-682.

United States Court of Appeals,
Federal Circuit

Sept. 9, 1987

{829 F.2d 1076]

Before BALDWIN and SKELTON, Senior
Circuit Judges, and ARCHER, Circuit Judge.

BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is a consolidation of appeals from
two judgments of the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina

(district court) (1) declaring U.S. Patent

2a

No. 4,059,946 (the '946 patent) and U.S.
Patent No. 4,175,370 (the '370 patent)
valid and infringed and awarding increased
damages and attorney fees based on a find-
ing of willful infringement of the '946
patent and (2) granting a motion to enjoin
subsequent infringement by a redesign of
the accused device. Appeal was taken on
four questions related to the district
court's infringement determinations. We
affirm the district court's decision with
respect to each of the four questions on

infringement.

Background

In 1983, the three appellees in this
appeal, Hans Stahlecker, Fritz Stahlecker,
and Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr,
Stahlecker and Grill GmbH (collectively

[829 F.2d 1077] and individually

3a

"Suessen"), brought an action in the
district court for infringement of two
patents+ relating to improvements in the
technology of open-end spinning devices,
the '946 patent and the '370 patent. It
was charged that an open-end spinning de-
vice, the Spincomat, produced and marketed
by appellants, Schubert and Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft and
Schubert and Salzer Machine Works, Inc.

(collectively and individually

1. Hans Stahlecker and Fritz Stahlecker
are individuals who jointly owned the
patents. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr,
Stahlecker and Grill, GmbH, a West
German corporation, is an exclusive
Licensee of Hans and Fritz Stahlecker.
([N. 1 at 829 F.2d 1076]

4a

"Schubert") , “ infringes claim 18 of the
'946 patent and infringes claims 1-7, 9-13,
and 17-20 of the '370 patent. The district
court rejected the Schubert defenses of
invalidity, unenforceability, non-infringe-
ment, and implied license, and on September
4, 1985, issued its "Order and Opinion In-
cluding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law" declaring the ‘946 and '370 patents
valid and infringed. The district court
awarded increased damages based on willful
and deliberate infringement and attorney
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) for in-
fringement attributable to the '946

patent.

2. Appellant Schubert and Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft is a
West German corporation. Appellant
Schubert and Salzer Machine Works,
Inc., is a United states subsidiary of
Schubert and Salzer Maschinenfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft.

(N. 2, 3, 4, at 829 F.2d 1077]

5a

Six weeks later, on October 28, 1985,
the district court issued an order declar-
ing that, despite Schubert's efforts to
produce a non-infringing modification, the
redesigned version of the Spincomat also

infringes the '946 patent.

A. Standard of Review

We review the four questions raised on
appeal, each related to the district
court's infringement determinations: (1)
whether the district court properly re-
jected an implied license defense to in-
fringement of the '946 patent; (2) whether
there is clear error in the finding of in-
fringement of the '946 patent by the re-
designed Spincomat; (3) whether there is
clear error in the finding of infringement
of the '370 patent by the Spincomat; and

(4) whether there is error or an abuse of

6a

discretion in the award of increased
damages and attorney fees.

In conducting our review, we have the
benefit of the district court's order. Its
factual findings are to be reversed only if
clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evi-
dence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been commit-

ted. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84

L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985); United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,

3. The district court's determinations on
validity, enforceability and certain
assertions of non-infringement are not
contested on appeal. .iccordingly, we
have not reviewed the district court's
findings with respect to those
issues.

[N. 3 & 4 at 829 F.2d 1077]

ee ee

7a

395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746
(1948).4 "This standard plainly does not
entitle a reviewing court to reverse the
finding of the trier of fact simply because
it is convinced that it would have decided

the case differently." Anderson, 470 U.S.

at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1512.

Where the issue before us is a question
of law, our review is based on whether the
district court erred as matter of law.

Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d

1578, 217 USPQ 977 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Deere

& Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d

1551, 218 USPQ 481 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

4. Notwithstanding Schubert's attack on
the district court for its verbatim
adoption of Suessen's findings, our
review of those findings is governed by
the clearly erroneous standard.

Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp.,
776 F.2d 309, 313, 227 USPQ 776, 768
(Fed. Cir. 1985).

8.0a

B. The Technology

The '946 and '370 patents are directed
to the automation of open-end spinning
(OES), a technology whereby uniformly
twisted yarn is produced from irregular

strands of fiber. The findings of the

district court regarding OES technology and

operation of an OES device are not

contested. [829 F.2d 1078]

ede hee

YARN WITHDRAWAL TUBE
SPINNING ROTOR ORIVE

te BE
\\__-w FIBER FEED TU
\ Fiber

Waist FEEDROLL —c: Sliver

‘) GE mut

OMB
ROLL

Zo

gr

Ni ee y COMBER ROLL DRIVE

TRASH TO WASTE

Above is a diagram of the principal
elements of an OES device. Open-end spin-
ning is performed on such a device in a se-
quence of steps. First, a mass of irreg-
ular strands of fiber is fed into the de-
vice on a feed roll. The feed roll, in
turn, feeds fiber into a high speed, rotat-
ing, toothed comber where the fibers are

separated into individual strands. The

9a

individual strands are then vacuum drawn
into a rotor which is cup-shaped with an
annular groove. A twist is imparted to the
strands while they are under the centrifu-
gal force of the high speed rotor. Once
twisted, the strands become the final pro-
duct, spun yarn. The yarn is pulled from
the rotor through a withdrawal sue and
wound onto a spool.

The '370 and '946 patents relate to a
portion of the OES operation denoted as the
"piecing point." As the yarn is withdrawn
from the rotor, pulled by a pair of "take
off" rolls and wound onto a spool, it is
subject to breakage. Breakage inherently
results in discontinuity in the operation,
requiring reconnection and restarting of
the operation. Automation of an OES device
involves the implementation of a sequence
of automatic steps to restart the device by

cleaning out broken fiber, feeding new

10a

fiber into the rotor and reconnecting the
newly spun yarn. The points of reconnec-
tion after breakage are denoted as "piecing
points." Both of the patents in issue dis-
close improvements which avoid time lapse
for reconnection and minimize nonuniformi-

ties in the yarn at the piecing points.

I. Infringement of the '946 Patent

The '946 patent, entitled "Method and
Apparatus for Start Spinning a Thread on
Open-End Spinning Units" issued on November
29, 1977 to Dieter Boettcher, Heinze Schulz
and Fritz Stahlecker. Hans and Fritz
Stahlecker were subsequently assigned the
patent, and they licensed Suessen as an
exclusive Licensee.

The '946 patent addresses the absence

in the prior art of a method and apparatus

lla

for providing precise control of fiber feed

during piecing. Claim 18° recites an apparat-

Claim 18 is dependent upon claim 17.
Claims 17 and 18 read as follows:

17. Apparatus for thread piecing in
an open-end spinning assembly
comprising:

opening means for opening sliver

being supplied to a spinning rotor

of said spinning assembly, feeding
means for feeding sliver to said
fiber opening means,

piecing means including means for

introducing a thread end back into

said spinning rotor to be pieced
together with a fiber ring formed in
said spinning rotor,

rotor control means for moving said

Spinning rotor from a stop condition

toward an operating spinning speed

to accommodate piecing by said
piecing means,

and fiber supply preparing means for

preparing said spinning assembly for

a piecing operation prior to

movement of said spinning rotor from-

its stopped position, said fiber
supply preparing means including
means for starting and operating

said feeding means for a period of

time and then stopping said feeding
means, said starting and stopping
being accompanied by a continuously
operating opening means, whereby
uniform fiber tufts are arranged at
[N.5 at 829 F.2d 1078-79]

NE BD NO at Mt DS

12a

[829 F.2d 1079]
us for performing a controlled sequence of
steps for automated restart of the spinning
operation, including preparation of the
rotor.

The district court found that claim 18
of the '946 patent reads directly on
Schubert's OES device, the Spincomat.® In

making this finding, the court identified

said sliver feeding means to
accommodate said piecing operation
to be subsequently performed.

18. Apparatus according to claim
17, further comprising means for
supplying a vacuum to said spinning
rotor to remove any fiber supplied
during said preparation of said
spinning assembly by said preparing
means.

6. In addition to rejecting the implied
license defense, the district court
rejected Schubert's argument that the
absence in their device of a "rotor
control means" and "piecing on the
rise" avoided infringement. Only the
implied license defense has been
appealed.

([N. 6 & 7 at 829 F.2d 1079]

13a

an aspect of the Spincomat which corre-
sponds to each of the elements recited in
claim 18. Literal reading of the '946

patent upon Schubert's Spincomat is not

contested in this appeal.

A. The Implied License Defense

Schubert argues that it has an implied
license under the '946 patent. Its argu-
ment involves two agreements.

The first was a license agreement
entered in 1982 between Schubert and Murata
Machinery, Ltd. (Murata). That agreement,
entered into before the filing of this suit
in 1988, in pertinent part reads:

Murata hereby grants to Licensee
[Schubert] a non-exclusive worldwide
license under the Patents to make, use
and sell the patented device only as
part of the open end spinning machines
of the License. The License hereby
granted is a limited license, and

Murata reserves all rights not
expressly granted.

14a

The "Patents" were defined by the agreement
as those listed in an Exhibit. They in-
clude U.S. Patent No. 4,022,011 (‘011
patent) and other patents belonging to
Murata in the name of Hironorai Hirai.
Schubert asserts that, notwithstanding any
infringement of '946, its accused infringe-
ment is merely a practicing of the '01l
invention, which it is licensed to do under
the 1982 agreement.

The second agreement, entered in 1984
after this lawsuit began, involved
Suessen's purchase of the '011l and other
Hirai patents from Murata. The agreement
reads, in pertinent part:

Suessen has been advised by Murata
that a non-exclusive license of the
patents and patent applications men-
tioned under 1. above had been granted
by Murata to Messrs. Schubert & Salzer
AG, Ingolstadt, F.R. Germany (herein-
after called the Licensee). Suessen
hereby agrees to purchase the patents
and patent applications mentioned under

1. above together with the License
Agreement as of 23rd/28th July, 1982,

LS a TT

15a

with the said Licensee and agrees that
you and your business/license concerns
will maintain the licensed rights of
the Licensee under the License Agree-
ment as stipulated during the life of
the patents and patent applications
mentioned under 1. above.

Schubert asserts that, per the 1984 agree-

ment, Suessen "stepped in the shoes of

Murata" and by so "stepping," Suessen

cannot--just as Murata cannot--sue under

the '946 or any other patent for infringe-

ment based on practicing the ‘'01l inven-

tion. To allow such a suit, Schubert

argues, would unfairly take away what it

[829 F.2d 1080] paid for in 1982.

Schubert labels its argument one of “legal

estoppel."

Another part of the agreement refers to
"the assignment of the [1982] License
Agreement." The 1982 license, however,
states that it is "nontransferable,
nonassignable." Our disposition of
this case assumes, arguendo, that there

was a transfer of the 1982 license
agreement which did not violate the
terms of that agreement.

16a
([N. 7 at 829 F.2d 1079]

The district court concluded that
Schubert in 1982 could not have acquired
from Murata any rights greater than those
which Murata had the right to grant and
that Murata had nothing more than a right
to exclude others from using the Hirai
patents. It then concluded, regarding the
1984 agreement:

There is nothing whatsoever in this
agreement about the '946 patent, any
patent corresponding to the '946
patent, or any technology specifically
covered by those patents. Nor is there
any language in the agreement that can
be construed as a grant by Suessen of
any right to practice any particular
technology which might be covered by
other Suessen patent rights. All this
agreement does is to convey to Suessen
the entire right, title and interest in
all of the Hirai patents, with the ex-
press reservation to the effect that a
nonexclusive license under these Hirai
patents had already been granted by
Murata to [Schubert], and with the ex-
press acknowledgments by Suessen that
it would continue to recognize the
existence of that license under the
Hirai patents. While this later ack-
nowledgment might seem redundant from
the viewpoint of the law in this
country (whereby a patent assignee
under normal circumstances would be

|

17a

bound as a matter of law by its
assignor's prior grant to a license to
a third party), it served a clear pur-
pose under German law since, as refer-
red to above [pp. 23-24, supra], the
German High Court had recently handed
down a ruling, the effect of which was
that an existing nonexclusive right
under a German patent could be defeated
by an assignment of the patent by the
owner to a third party.

The net effect of the 1984 agreement, said
the district court, was that Schubert is
"the beneficiary of a guarantee by Suessen
that the nonexclusive rights under the
Hirai patents granted to [Schubert] by
Murata in 1982 could not be taken away by
the new patent owner, Suessen" and that the
enforcement of the '946 patent against
Schubert in this litigation "in no way
affects that guarantee."
The district court then added:
Beyond these two agreements, defendants
offered no further evidence in support
of the existence of any implied
licensee--not even the testimony of de-
fendants to the effect that they ever
even thought they might have an implied

license or that they were led to take
Or ever took any action upon reliance

ioc nnenncimeaiainanieaeianaeiiia

18a

that they had rights under the '946
patents.

In the latter regard, the district court

cited Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire

Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925, 223 USPQ

982, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and Stickle v.

Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559, 219 -

USPQ 377, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1983), where this
court discussed implied license in the con-
text of equitable estoppel. The district
court concluded that equitable estoppel
could not be a basis for implied license in

this case.

Discussion

The doctrines of legal estoppel and
equitable estoppel have been applied by

courts to imply a license. See, e.g., AMP,

Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452,

182 Ct.Cl. 86, 156 USPQ 647, 649-50 (1968),

cert. denied, 391 U.S. 964, 88 S.Ct. 2033,

|

19a

20 L.Ed.2d 878 157 USPQ 720 (1968). Under
the facts of this case, there can be no
implied license under an equitable estoppel
theory. Indeed, that theory is not even
argued by Schubert. Instead, Schubert
asserts an implied license based on its
theory of legal estoppel. Though we -
nize that theory in appropriate circumstan-
ces, it does not work for Schubert here.
Legal estoppel "is merely shorthand for
Saying that a grantor of a property right
Or interest cannot derogate from the right
granted by his own subsequent act." AMP v.

United States, 389 F.2d at 453, 156 USPQ at

650-51. The rationale for that is to estop
the grantor from taking back that for which
he received consideration, 389 F.2d at 452,
156 USPQ at 649-50. Here, however, we have
a suit by a third party, Suessen, under a
patent owned by Suessen. The license by

the grantor, Murata, did not purport to,

20a

and indeed could not, protect [829 F.2d
1081] Schubert from a suit by Suessen under
'946. Hence, Suessen, by filing in 1983
and now maintaining its suit under '946,
does not derogate from the rieht given by
Murata in the 1982 license agreement.

Schubert nevertheless urges this three
prong argument: (1) “legal estoppel"
would prevent Murata from suing under the
'946 patent if it were to acquire it;
(2) Suessen "Stepped into" Murata's shoes
in 1984 when Sussen acquired the Hirai
patents and committed to maintain
Schubert's licensed rights; and hence,
(3) just as Murata could not, Suessen
Cannot sue under the '96 patent. We reject
that argument.

As a threshold matter, a patent license
agreement is in essence nothing more than a
promise by the licensor not to sue the

licensee. See, e.g., United States v.

2la

Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d

1122, 1127, 212 USPQ 889, 894 (D.C. Cir.
1981). Even if couched in terms of
"{ljicensee is given the right to make,
use,-or sell X," the agreement cannot con-
vey that absolute right because not even
the patentee of X is given that right. His
right is merely one to exclude others from
making, using or selling X, 35 U.S.C.
§ 154. * Indeed, the patentee of X and his
Licensee, when making, using, or selling X,
can be subject to suit under other
patents. In any event, patent license
agreements can be written to convey dif-
ferent scopes of promises not to sue, e.g.,
a promise not to sue under a specific
patent or, more broadly, a promise not to
sue under any patent the licensor now has
Or may acquire in the future.

As stated previously, the first prong

of Schubert's three part “stepping in the

> te Aina ig res cael

22a

shoes" argument is that legal estoppel
would prevent Murata from suing Schubert
under the '946 patent if Murata were to
acquire that patent. However, even

assuming, arguendo, that such estoppel

against Murata exists, the final two prongs
of Schubert's "stepping in the shoes" argu-
ment would fail. Given the assumption of
estoppel against Murata, the 1982 license
agreement would necessarily be a promise by
Murata not to sue under any patent, includ-
ing those acquired by Murata in the

future. In the 1984 agreement, Suessen

incurred what Murata promised in 1982.

8. Given such a promise, a subsequent suit
by Murata under a hypothetically-
acquired '946 patent would derogate
from what was granted by the license.
Conversely, if the agreement were
merely a promise not to sue under the
listed patents only, there could be no
estoppel against Murata asserting the
"946 patent.

[N. 8 & 9 at 829 F.2d 1081]

23a

Thus, Suessen would be committed to fore-

bear from suit under (1) the transferred

patents and (2) any of Murata's nontrans-

ferred patents and (2) any of Murata's

nontransferred patents (future and

present) .? That commitment does not

include a promise not to sue under

Suessen's own '946 patent.

Regarding the second promise, because
Suessen cannot normally sue under
patents remaining in Murata's hands, a
promise not to sue under such patents
has no realistic effect. Hence, the
second promise would have significance
only for Murata patents not transferred
in the 1982 agreement but acquired by
Suessen from Murata in the future.
Though the district court construed the
1984 agreement as containing only the
first promise, which pertains to the
patents transferred with the 1982
agreement, that construction makes
sense in light of its initial holding
that the 1982 agreement pertains only
to those patents. Our construction of
the 1984 agreement as containing a
second promise arises from our
assumption, arguendo, that the 1982
agreement pertains also to Murata
patents not transferred with the 1982
agreement.

24a

[N. 9 at 829 F.2d 1081]

Schubert's "standing in the shoes"
argument, however, would add to Suessen's
commitment a promise not to sue under
Suessen's separate patents that Murata
never owned. On the facts of this case, we
cannot interpret the 1984 agreement so
broadly, at least not with respect to the
'946 patent.

The district court correctly determined
that there is nothing in the 1984 agreement
about the '946 or other Suessen patent
rights. Schubert points to no extraneous
evidence tending to show any understanding
on the part of either contracting party
that Suessen was to forego rights under the
'946 or any other patent then owned by
Suessen. To the contrary, that a lawsuit
under '946 was ongoing but not mentioned in
the 1984 agreement indicates strongly that
there was not intent by the [829 F.2d 1082]

parties to have Suessen forfeit its rights

25a

under '946. Furthermore, an implied pro-
mise by Suessen to forego its '946 suit is
inconsistent not only with Suessen main-
taining its lawsuit after the 1984 agree-
ment but, also, with the course of events
leading up the 1984 contract./9® In sum, we
agree with the district court's conclusion
that the 1984 aereunese O60 not impose on
Suessen any obligation to stop its ongoing

Suit under the '946 patent.

10. For example, the invention of Suessen's
‘946 patent had a dynamic commercial
impact since its public unveiling in
1975. As early as 1974, Suessen
discussed its new technology with
Schubert. Schubert tried to develop a
comparable version of Suessen's
advancement but was unsuccessful.
Eventually, around June, 1982, Schubert
requested a license from Suessen but
was refused. Three weeks later,
Schubert obtained a license under the
‘011 and other Hirai patents.
Subsequently, this lawsuit was filed.
Those facts show a great value placed
by Suessen on its '946 patent and an
unwillingness to License it to
Schubert.

(N. 10 at 829 F.2d 1082]

26a

Schubert cites no case discussing its
"standing in the shoes" theory. It does,

however, rely on Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.

Giddings & Lewis Mach. Tool Co., 285

F.Supp. 483, 159 USPQ 433 (E.D. Wis.

1968). There, plaintiff sued defendant
under a "Brainard patent." Plaintiff also
owned a "Morgan patent," which was assigned
to it by a third party subject to a pre-
vious license to the defendant. In the
context of denying a summary judgment
motion, the district court discussed a need
at trial to focus on whether the claims of
the Brainard patent had “separate features"
from the Morgan claims. However, the court
did not specifically address the issue dis-
cussed herein, i.e., whether the assignment
to plaintiff of the patent subject to a
license to the defendant affected plain-

tiff's suit against defendant under its

27a

separately-owned patent.11

In any event,
Kearney is not binding precedent on this
court.

Schubert argues that not implying a
license in this case is unfair because
Schubert paid valuable consideration for
the right to practice the '011l invention
but is in danger of losing that right as a
result of doing no more than that for which
it paid. We disagree. The right Schubert
paid for in the 1982 agreement was freedom
from suit by Murata, not Suessen. Indeed,

when Schubert signed the 1982 agreement, it

was aware of possible suit by Suessen, who

ll. On that issue, we note that the
assignment of the Morgan patent in
Kearney seems to have occurred before
plaintiff filed suit under its Brainare
patent. In this case, as expressed
above, the assignment of the ‘'0ll
patent was tiade after Suessen filed
Suit under '946, a fact which cuts
against interpreting the assignment as
foreclosing the suit.

([N. ll & 12 at 829 F.2d 1082]

28a

had previously denied Schubert a license
under the '946 patent. Moreover, Schubert
has not shown us that it has lost any obli-
gation Murata may still owe it under the
1982 license agreement, e.g., not to sue
under any patents Murata still has or may
acquire. To rule that the Suessen acquisi-
tion of the '01l patent somehow bestows on
Schubert an absolute defense to a suit al-
ready filed by Suessen under '946, would
result in an unintended windfall to
Schubert that makes no sense under the

facts of this case.

B. Infringement Of The '946 Patent

By The Redesigned Spincomat

_ On October 16, 1985, Suessen filed an
Emergency Motion for an Order requesting
the district court to enjoin Schubert from
infringing claim 18 of the '946 patent by

exhibiting and demonstrating at the Textile

29a

Hall in Greenville, South Carolina, a modi-
fied, but allegedly still infringing,
Spincomat. The district court determined
that despite Schubert's attempts, this
modification does not avoid infringement of
the '946 patent./}2

Schubert had disengaged electrical re-
lays in order to interrupt control of the
prefeed in the piecing cycle. As modified,
the sliver is prefed for a short period of
time prior to commencing piecing. Schubert
contended that the disengagement of relays

altered control of advance piecing so that

12. The district court issued two orders
enjoining activity related to
infringement by the redesigned
Spincomat. One issued on October 23,
1985 enjoining the infringing
activity. A second order, with
findings, issued on December 24, 1985,
denying a motion to stay the first
order.

[N. 12 829 F.2d 1082]

30a

the device no longer performs the recited
function of a fiber preparation means.

[829 F.2d 1083]

Suessen countered with a video tape
showing that despite the reprogramming to
omit the sliver prefeed from the start of
the piecing sequence, if the piecer is un-
successful on the first try (without a
Sliver prefeed) it would call for a
"repeat," second try with a prefeed. The
district court compared the "repeat"
piecing sequence with claim 18 and deter-
mined that it functions in precisely the
Same sequence to accomplish piecing just as
had the original Spincomat and thus employ-
ed the same fiber supply preparation means
called for in the '946 patent.
The instant "fiber supply preparing

means" is the mechanism for prefeed of the
lead end of the sliver. It was determined

that the Spincomat continued to perform the

3la

function specified in the claim limitation.
Although modified, the device, in accord
with the recitation in claim 18, has a
means for preparing the spinning assembly
including a mechanism for starting and
operating the feeding means for a period of
time and then stopping the feeding imeans.
This, the court found, corresponds exactly
to the function of "fiber supply prepara-
tion means" recited in claim 18.

Schubert argues that the device is not
infringing because it would have to fail
each time in order to have an infringing
prefeed. Otherwise, it is argued, the
modified device merely operates under the
prior art.

We agree, however, with the district
court that claim 18 continues to read upon
the device. We find no error and affirm
the district court's order of January 2,

1986, directing that Schubert cease

32a

manufacture, sale or use of the redesigned

Spincomat.

C. The Direct Court's Award of In-
creased Damages And Attorneys'
Fees Based On A Finding Of Will-
ful And Deliberate Infringement

And Exceptional Circumstances

The district court found infringement
of the '946 patent by the original
Spincomat to be willful and deliberate
based upon two determinations: (1) that
Schubert fully appreciated the great com-
mercial significance of Suessen's apparatus
and Schubert spent six or more years trying
to engineer its own version, and (2) that
Schubert fully appreciated the significance
of the technological aspects of the im-
provement over the prior art represented by
the '946 patent and its key role in the

commercial success of the device. Based on

33a

the finding of willfulness the court im-
posed an award of increased damages under
35 U.S.C. § 284 as to '946 patent infringe-
ment portion of the case. Upon those same
determinations the court adjudged this as
an exceptional case of infringement and
awarded attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 for the portion of the case related
to infringement of the '946 patent.

The underlying facts are undisputed.
The question before us is whether the
ultimate finding of willful infringement is
clearly erroneous in light of those under-
lying facts and whether the award of in-
creased damages and attorneys' fees was an
abuse of discretion by the district

court. Kloster Speedsteel, AB v. Crucible,

Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580-81, 230 USPQ 81,

91 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 882, 93 L.Ed.2d 836

(1987); Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp. v.

34a

ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582-83, 226 USPQ

821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Schubert argues clear error in the
trial court's findings of willful infringe-
ment and exceptional circumstances, con-
tending that reasonable reliance upon the
advice of their German in-house counsel,
that bona fide attempts to design around
the patent and the seeking of a license
Support a conclusion of non-willful in-
fringement.

A district court's finding of willful
infringement is a finding of fact, review-
able under the clearly erroneous stan-

dard. CPG Products Corp. v. Pegasus

Luggage Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1015, 227 USPQ

497, 502 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As noted
earlier, the clearly erroneous standard is
satisfied if we are left with the firm con-
viction that mistake has been committed.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

at 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504. When increased

damages are awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 284,
the measure of those damages is committed
to the [829 F.2d 1084] district court's
discretion, the exercise of which will not
be overturned absent a clear showing of

abuse. CPG Products, 776 F.2d at 1015 n.

6, 227 USPQ at 502 n. 6.
It is well settled that a potential in-

fringer having actual notice of another's

patent rights has an affirmative duty of
due care. That affirmative duty will
normally entail the obtaining of competent
legal advice before engaging in any poten-
tially infringing activity or continuing

such activity. ~In Underwater Devices, Inc.

v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d

1380, 1389-90, 219 USPQ 569, 576 (emphasis

in original), this court stated:

Where, as here, a potential infringer
has actual notice of another's patent
rights, he has an affirmative duty to

36a

exercise due care to determine whether
Or not he is infringing. * * * Such an
affirmative duty includes, inter alia,
the duty to seek and obtain competent
legal advice from counsel before the
initiation of any possible infringing
activity.

Schubert did not obtain the advice of
the United States counsel regarding the
possibility of infringement of the ‘946
patent, but proceeded upon the opinion of
German in-house patent counsel that making,
using and selling in the United States the

Spincomat piecing mechanism would be legi-

timate under the '011 patent license.

37a

However, reliance on the advice of counsel
is not determinative in this case.

An appreciation of the technological
and commercial significance of Suessen's
rights, despite legitimate practice under
‘01l patent, put Schubert on notice to

exercise due care prior to initiating any

13. Furthermore in respect of willfulness,
there cannot be hard and fast per se
rules. Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron
Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109, 231 USPQ
185, 191 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Though it
is an important consideration, not
every failure to seek an opinion of
competent counsel will mandate an
ultimate finding of willfulness.

Kloster Speedsteel, AB v. Crucible,
Inc., 793 F.2d at 1579, 230 USPQ at
88. See also King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867, 226
USPQ 402, 412, (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, U.S.__, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89
L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). Conversely, that
an opinion of counsel was obtained does
not "always and alone" dictate a find-
ing that the infringement was not will-
ful. Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies
and Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656,

225 USPQ 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88
L.Ed.2d 229 (1985).

(N. 13 at 819 F.2d 1084]

38a

activity which had the possibility of
infringing. Before obtaining the license
under the '01l patent, Schubert attempted
unsuccessfully to obtain a license to the
‘946 patent from Suessen. Suessen's denial
of a license to Schubert supports a con-
clusion that Schubert was explicitly aware
of the possibility of infringement. Under
those circumstances, Schubert must be held
to a high degree of caution to avoid the
possibility of infringement of the '946

patent. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at

1389-90, 219 USPQ at 576.
We have noted a good faith effort to
"design around" as indicating support for a

non-willful finding. Rolls Royce Ltd. v.

GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d at 1109, 231

USPQ at 191. We have also indicated value
in encouraging such efforts. State

Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751

F.2d 1226, 1236, 224 USPQ 418, 424 (Fed.

39a

Cir. 1985). The district court did not,
however, find that Schubert had exerted
good faith efforts to design around the
'946 patent. Rather, it was found that
Schubert, unable to design its own auto-
matic piecing device, knowingly proceeded
to employ technology protected under the
'946 patent. e

The willful and deliberate nature of
Schubert's infringement is not diminished
by its asserted defense of implied
license. The facts related to that asser-
tion arose in the 1984 assignment of the
'01l1 patent to Suessen, long after Schubert
willfully initiated the acts of infringe-
ment. Accordingly, the district court
properly omitted license as negating a
finding of willfulness.

Having considered the Findings of the

district court and all of the arguments

presented on appeal, we find no clear error

40a

in the district court's determination that
infringement of the '946 patent was willful
and deliberate. Nor do we find the imposi-
tion of increased damages under 35 U.S.C.

§ 284 or the award of attorney fees under
35 U.S.C. § 285 abusive of the district
{829 F.2d 1085] court's discretion. Where
a finding of willful and deliberate
infringement and a collateral finding of
exceptional circumstances are premised on
the same basis, this court has found no
abuse of discretion in awarding both
increased damages and attorney fees. S.C.

Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,

Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201, 228 USPQ 367, 368

(Fed. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, we affirm

the district court's awards.

4la

II. Infringement Of The '370 Patent

The ‘370 patent, entitled "Piecing
Apparatus For An Open-End Spinning
Machine," issued on November 27, 1979 in
the name of Fritz Stahlecker and was
assigned to Hans and Fritz Stahlecker. It
was licensed to Suessen. The invention
disclosed in the '370 patent is directed to
the solution of a specific problem encoun-
tered during the automatic piecing cycle:
the maintenance of tension in the yarn
drawn off from the rotor during the piecing
operation. The '370 patent discloses an
apparatus with means of maintaining control
while winding the yarn so that loops or
Slippage do not occur. The apparatus pre-
vents slippage between the yarn winding
package and the drive roll used to accel-

erate the yarn through a means of path

control. A yarn path deflector is also

42a

employed to deflect any slack which may
occur in the yearn.

The claim recitation of an "auxiliary
driven feed means" element is the focus of
this appeal:

auxiliary yarn guide means for guiding

the yarn between the spool and a
yarn outlet of a spinning rotor of
the spinning assembly during piecing
operations, said auxiliary yarn
guide means including auxiliary
driven feed means for said yarn.

A finding of literal infringement of a
claim expressed in terms of a series of
means for performing particular functions
required involves interpreting the claim to
define the recited function. If, as a
threshold matter, the recited functions are
not performed by the accused device, there
can be no literal infringement. On the
other hand, if an accused device is found

to perform the recited functions, one must

determine under § 112 para. 6 whether the

means by which the accused device performs

43a

> A ee a

each function is the same as on equivalent
to the means disclosed in the specification

for performing each function. See Data

Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813

ee Oe ee ee

F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ 2d 2042, 2055 (Fed.

a ae

Cir. 1987). As held in D.M.I. v. Deere & /
/

Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 USPQ 236, 239
(Fed. Cir. 1985):

In applying the “means plus function"
paragraph of § 112, however, the sole
question is whether the single means in

the accused device which performs the
function stated in the claim is the

Same as Or an equivalent of the corres-
ponding structure described in the

patentee's specification as performing '
that function.

In holding that the Spincomat literally
infringes the claims?4 of the '370 patent
the district court found under § 112, para.

6, that it included an auxiliary driven

14. Schubert is accused of infringing
Claims 1-7, 9-13, and 17-20 of the '370
patent, each requiring an “auxiliary
driven feed means."

[N. 14 at 829 F.2d 1085]

44a

feed “means,” to perform the function of
guiding and drawing off the yarn. It was
determined that the Spincomat's fixed and
movable pressure rolls are the means which
perform the precise function of feeding
yarn by an auxiliary drive.

The Spincomat's rolls were determined
to be equivalent to the “auxiliary driven
feed means” disclosed in the specifica-
tion. In one sense the Spincomat rolls are
not auxiliary, they are located on the
spinning machine. During spinning, the
rolls guide yarn between the rotor and the
spool. But during a piecing operation,
those rolls are “borrowed" as auxiliary
rolls to perform exactly the recited
function of drawing the yarn out of the
withdrawal tube, feeding it into the yarn
package, and guiding the yarn between the

spool and the yarn outlet. It was

determined that the borrowed rolls in their

45a

auxiliary mode are a structural means
equivalent to that disclosed in the

{829 F.2d 1986] specification. See D.M.I.

v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d at 1575, 229 USPQ

at 239.

Having reviewed the arguments raised on
appeal, we find no clear error by the
district court and affirm the finding of

literal infringement of the '370 patent.

Conclusion

We affirm the decision of the district
court finding infringement by the original
Spincomat of the '946 and '370 patents and
finding infringement of the '946 patent by
the modified Spincomat. The awards of
increased damages and attorney fees based
on findings of willful infringement and

exceptional circumstances are sustained.

AFFIRMED.

uN

APPENDIX

Item 2

Trial Court Opinion {September 4,

1985, not reported), including

Orders of:
September 4,
September 30,
October 23,

December 30,

1985
1985
1985

1985

-

wat eee oe

46a

APPENDIX, ITEM 2.0
(sr. Court enon)
September 4, 1985 _ )
[The District Court's Opinion is
hereinafter called "D.S.C."]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

SPINDELFABRIK SUESSEN
-~SCHURR, STAHLECKER &
GRILL GmbH., HANS
STAHLECKER, and FRITZ
STAHLECKER,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action
No. 83-2421-3

Vv.

SCHUBERT & SALZER
MASCHINENFABRIK

AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, and
SCHUBERT & SALZER
MACHINE WORKS, INC.,

me ee ee eee ee ee eee
/

Defendants.
foes. 1)

ORDER AND OPINION, INCLUDING
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Nature of the Action

This is an action for patent infringe-

ment. Both subject matter and in personam

jurisdiction are admitted [Defendants'

amended Answer and Counterclaim]. Trial on

47a

all liability sues commenced on February
18, 1985, and was completed on February 23,
1985. All damage issues have been deferred
pending resolution of the liability

issues.

B. The Parties

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs, Hans Stahlecker and Fritz
Stahlecker, brothers, are citizens of West
Germany and joint owners of the two patents
in suit [PX 350, PX 351]. Plaintiff
Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker &
Grill GmbH. ("Suessen") is a West [D.S.C.
2] German corporation, located in Suessen,
West Germany. Suessen is a licensee of the
patents in suit.

Hans Stahlecker is the chief executive
officer of Suessen. Fritz Stahlecker is
the chief executive officer of another

closely related German company, Wilhelm

PO oe hse I

48a

Stahlecker GmbH ("WST") (not a party to
this litigation), which conducts research,
development and engineering in the field of
open-end spinning for Suessen under a con-
tractual arrangement.

Suessen is in the business of manufac-
turing textile machinery and components
therefor. One of its principal products is
spin boxes for open-end spinning
machines. Suessen's spin boxes are cur-
rently incorporated in the Schlafhorst
Autocoro open-end spinning machine. It is
manufactured by W. Schlafhorst & Co. of
Moenchengladbach, West Germany, a customer
of Suessen and a sublicensee of Suessen
under certain patent rights, including the
patents in suit [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:35-38,

43].

49a

Defendants

Defendant Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft
(sometimes referred to as "SSI" or
"Ingolstadt") is a West German corporation
located in Ingolstadt, West Germany. It is
in the business of manufacturing and sell-
ing throughout the world textile machinery,
including OES machinery.

Defendant Schubert & Salzer Machine
Works, Inc. is the United States Saies and
Service subsidiary of Schubert & Salzer
(Germany). [D.S.C. 3]

Schubert & Salzer (Germany)
manufactures a broad line of textile
machinery, and, like Suessen, became
involved in the OES field in the early
1960's. It has basically offered two
models of OES machines in the United
States--the RK 10, now obsolete, and the RU

11, which is now offered equipped with the

50a

accused infringing "Spincomat" automatic
piecing device.

The fact of such sales of accused
devices by the defendants in the United
States is admitted by defendants and
therefore not in issue. The quantity of ~
such sales in the United States is not now
relevant, since the issue of damages has
been deferred pending determination of the

liability issues.

C. The Patents in Suit

The '946 Patent

Plaintiffs' United States Letters
Patent No. 4,059,946 ('946) [PX 202] is
entitled "Method and Apparatus for Start-
Spinning a Thread on Open-End Spinning
Units." The patent issued on November 29,
1977, on an apolication, Serial No.
637,050, filed in the United States on

December 2, 1975, in the names of Dieter

5la

Boettcher, Heinz Schultz and plaintiff,
Fritz Stahlecker, all citizens of West
Germany.

On December 2, 1975, pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 119, the applicants for the '946
patent claimed in connection with their
application the right of priority of West
German patent application, Serial No.
2458042, filed in West Germany on December
7, 1974 [PX 203], and simultaneously there-
with, filed in the [D.S.C. 4] United States
Patent and Trademark Office a certified
copy of the original West German applica-
tion, specification and drawings showing
that the application was duly filed in the
West German Patent Office on December 7,
1974 [DX 2A].

The '946 patent application is a
literal English language translation of
West German Application No. 2458042, the

only difference being a rearrangement in

52a

the form in which the respective texts are
presented [Dauster Tr. 6:18-20]. Accord-
ingly, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 119, the
'946 application is properly considered as
having a U.S. filing date of December 7,
1974 [35 U.S.C. § 119; Witherspoon??-tr.

6:38-39].

The '370 Patent

Plaintiffs' United States Letters
Patent No. 4,175,370 ('370) [PX 213] is
entitled "Piecing Apparatus for an Open-End
Spinning Machine." The patent issued on
November 27, 1979, on an application,
Serial No. 912,418, filed in the United
States on June 5, 1978 in the name of

plaintiff, Fritz Stahlecker.

15. [See Curriculum vitae PX 341].
([N. 15 at D.S.C. 4]

53a

On June 5, 1978, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 119, the applicant for the '370 patent
claimed in connection with his application
the right of priority of West German patent
application No. 2728003, filed in West
Germany on June 22, 1977 [PX 214], and
Simultaneously therewith filed in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office a
copy of the original West German applica-
tion, specification and drawing with an
appropriate [D.S.C. 5] certification by the
West German Patent Office showing that West
German application No. 2728003 was filed on
June 22, 1977 [PX 213].

Whether the '370 patent is to be
accorded its U.S. filing date, June 5,
1978, or whether it is to be accorded the
benefit of the earlier filing date of
German application No. 2728003 is not in
issue and makes no difference for purposes

of these proceedings.

54a

II. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTIONS

OF THE PATENTS IN SUIT

A. Suessen's Involvement in Open-End
Spinning Machinery and its Role in

Automation thereof

Open-end spinning ("OES") is a rela-
tively new technology which has come into
increasing interest and subsequent use in
the textile industry since the early
1960's. Suessen, which for some time prior
to the 1960's was involved in manufacturing
components for ring spinning machinery,
followed the new trend on OES very early,
and in 1962 began (through WST) its own
development of OES components. Following
this, Suessen began making OES bearing
assemblies and rotors, and later the entire

OES spin box, for sale to manufacturers of

55a

OES machines?® [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:39-

41]. Since their entry into the OES field,

Suessen/WST have made many significant
developments in this technology resulting |
in the granting of hundreds of [D.S.C. 6]
patents worldwide, of which about 70 are
U.S. patents [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:43; F.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:97-99; PX 372]. The
ability to consistently achieve a quality
piecing point was among their most signi-
ficant achievements [F. Stahlecker Tr.
1:122].

As early as 1972, Fritz Stahlecker and
others at Suessen/WST foresaw the commer-
cial potential of automated OES. However,

these views were not necessarily shared by

16. Among the spin boxes which Suessen
developed is the spin box for
defendants’ RU 11l- machine [H.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:40].

17. [Omitted in original Opinion. ]
{(N. 16 at D.S.C. 5]

56a

the OES machine manufacturers?® at that
time. In 1975 Suessen introduced to the
trade at the Milan ITMA textile machinery
trade show its new WST designed
Spincat/Cleancat automation for OES
machines. This automation system basically
involved twin traveling units designed to
travel along an OES machine in tandem and
automatically clean rotors and piece up
broken yarn ends at the numerous spinning
stations, as required.

The reception given by the industry to
Suessen's introduction of its Spincat/
Cleancat OES automation was overwhelmingly
positive [PX 8, PX 10]. Thereafter, in the
late 1970's this technology and Suessen's

underlying patents were licensed to W.

18. Notably, defendant Schubert & Salzer
who expressed extreme skepticism [H.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:47].

[N. 18 at D.S.C. 6]

57a

Schlafhorst & Co. of Monchengladbach, West
Germany, who began incorporating the
Spincat/Cleancat technology in its
"Autocoro" OES machine [H. Stahlecker Tr.
1:44-47; F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:101-102].

[6.8.¢.. 7}

B. The Invention of the '946 Patent

and its Role in OES automation

Prior to the '946 patent, piecing?!?
made on OES machines by operators, or by
earlier unsuccessful automatic piecers,
suffered from a common problem--namely, the
resultant yarn piecing points were incon-
sistent in size and strength and, as such,
represented a yarn defect which typically

had to be subsequently cut out of the yarn

19. "Piecing" or "piecing point" is a term
used to refer to a location in a length
of yarn where the yarn has been
rejoined after a break.

[w. 19 & 20 at D.S.C. 7]

58a

and replaced with a knot [Lord?9 tr. 2:7-
8]. The invention of the '946 patent has
for its object the provision of a method
and apparatus for providing precise control
of the fiber feed during the restart of the
spinning operation so that the quantity of
fibers fed during the restarting (piecing)
operation can be controlled to thereby
obtain uniform, quality yarn piecing
points--that is, piecing points which
closely match the appearance and strength
of the yarn itself, and which can be re-
peated from piecing point to piecing point
on the same spinning unit and between dif-
ferent spinning units.

In order to better understand the con-
tribution to the art of the invention of

the '946 patent, it is necessary to have

20. [See Lord Curriculum vitae PX 342].
‘8. 20 at D.8.6C. Ti}

59a

basic knowledge of the principles of open-
end spinning. The OES process basically
involves the production of a twisted yarn
directly from sliver (a relatively large,
rope-like strand of fibers). [D.S.C. 8]
The principal elements of the spinning
system of an OES machine are shown schema-

tically in Figure 1:

nae:

CO RSNA LT BE ORCL Bae

60a

3IA1HG T10Y YIsWOI

31isvM OL HSVul

yndu| Zz ‘|
= “ -\
lI) AAS NN IS IAAL
jan. aaa4 uaaia * Wi pS”
{\ 14 30108
4 —<, J
miwmwaAwm ee: YOLOY ININNIdS

JapUIA 0} UIE)

FIGURE 1

6la

Referring to Figure l, sliver is drawn
into the system by means of a feed roll
which, in turn, feeds the sliver to a
comber roll. This comber roll, which is
provided with teeth and adapted to rotate
at high speeds, continuously combs indivi-
dual fibers from the continuously fed
sliver and directs these fibers through a
feed tube into a cup-shaped rotor provided
with an interior annular groove. The rotor
is adapted to rotate at very high speeds
with the result that individual fibers fed
through the feed tube to the interior of
the rotor are directed by centrifugal force
into the rotor [D.S.C. 9] groove where they
form a ring of fibers. During spinning,
twist is continuously inserted into this
ring of fibers which is pulled out of the
rotor groove in the form of twisted yarn,

while at the same time, the incomplete ring

™ eto) OOS OT,
tela

62a ~

is continuously replenished with new fibers
from the feed tube [PX 334, PX 334A].

In order to start this continuous spin-
ning operation, a length of twisted yarn is
inserted down into the yarn withdrawal tube
and into contact with the fiber ring where |
it attaches itself to a point on the fiber
ring and begins to insert twist into the
fiber ring at that point. Upon attachment
(piecing), the inserted twisted yarn end is
then pulled out of the yarn withdrawal
tube, bringing the newly formed twisted
yarn with it, and spinning is restarted.
The area where the yarn end is joined with
the fiber ring is known as the "piecing
point" [PX 334, PX 334A].

The quantity of fibers in the fiber

ring, and thus the size of the fiber ring,
will have a direct influence on the nature
of the "piecing point." If the ring of

fibers is oversized in comparison to its

63a

desired size (which should match the yarn
count) during spinning of the particular
yarn being produced, then the piecing point
will manifest itself as an undesirable
thick place in the yarn. On the other

hand, if the ring of fibers is undersized,

then the piecing point will manifest itself

as a weak, undesirable thin spot in the i

yarn [PX 334, PX 334A; Lord Tr. 2:16,

27). :
In the usual OES system, when a yarn

breaks, yarn break detection means are

provided to immediately stop the [D.S.C.

10] sliver feed roll at that spinning

station, and thus stop the sliver feed.

This is imperative, since otherwise, fibers

would continue to feed into the rotor with-

out being removed in the form of yarn, with

the result that the system would be choked

with fibers being fed into the rotor but

not being removed as yarn. Additionally,

64a

even though the sliver feed is stopped at a
yarn break, the combing roll (for engineer-
ing reasons) continues to rotate. As a re-
sult of these two conditions, the lead end
of the sliver fed into the system at the
moment the sliver feed stops continues to

be combed by the comber roll. This lead

end of the sliver is called the "fiber

beard" or “tuft." The longer the station-

ary fiber beard or tuft is subjected to the
combing action of the continuously rotating
combing roll, the thinner the beard or tuft
will become [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:110, 116-

117; Lord Tr. 2:30].

When a yarn breaks, there is neces-
Sarily a lapse of time between the moment
of the break and the moment at which an
operator or an automatic piecer learns of
the break and begins addressing the problem
of restarting spinning by piecing up. And

this lapse of time necessarily varies

65a

depending upon the whereabouts of the

operator or automatic piecer at the moment

of the break, how long it takes to
recognize the existence of the break,
etc. Thus, because of this unknown time
variable, when the piecing sequence is
begun, the nature of the fiber beard or
tuft is unknown vis-a-vis the amount of
fibers remaining therein versus the amount
i

of [D.S.C. 11] fibers which have been

already combed out by the continuously
operating combing roll after the sliver
feed was stopped. As a result, prior to
the invention of the '946 patent, the
piecing sequence was started each time with |
an unknown, but more importantly, in-
consistent quantity of fibers available to
be fed into the rotor and form the ring of
fibers to be incorporated into the piecing
point. Additionally, as OES machine speeds

have increased in the refinement of the OES

Bie sc. tectum

66a

technology, the coordination of all of the
steps necessary to carry out piecing has
become more and more critical [Lord Tr.
2:7-17; £. Stahlecker Tr. 1:110-112, 117-_
119; PX 300, PX 334, PX 334A, PX 360, PX
361, PX 362, PX 365A, PX 366A, PX 373, PX
375-1 through 375-5].

Recognizing the foregoing problems,
Fritz Stahlecker came to the realization
that in order to get consistency in piecing
points from piecing to piecing at the same
spinning station, and further, consistency
from spinning station to spinning station,
something should be done to gain control

over the quantity of fibers in the fiber

ring at the moment the piecing point is
formed. To this end, stated simply, he
conceived that this could be achieved in
the piecing sequence by first forming a
totally new fiber beard, while eliminating

the old, unknown fiber beard from the

67a

system, and thereafter in a set, known time
period, introducing the yarn end into con-
tact with the fiber ring, which ring would
now have the same quantity of fibers pro-
vided to it from the new, known fiber beard
(D.S.C. 12] every time the piecing sequence
was performed [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:104-110,
114-116; Lord Tr. 2:16,27].

Having realized that this uniformity of
the fiber beard was obtainable with proper
timing during the piecing sequence, it then
became apparent to Fritz Stahlecker and his
WST co~inventors of the '946 patent,
Boettcher and Schulz, that such a properly
timed piecing sequence was readily achiev-
able with an apparatus or automatic piecer
which could (1) always perform the sequence
in the same manner within a consistent,
known time period, and (2) perform the
necessary steps in the coordinated manner

required by higher spinning speeds. Thus,

68a

the Stahlecker et al. concept of achieving
uniform piecings became merged with the
concept of automation, with the result that
the inventors came up with the first tech-
nique of producing consistent piecing
points of acceptable quality in OES
machines, which technique at the same time
readily lent itself to being performed by
an apparatus for automatically accomplish-
ing the technique, even on high speed OES
machines [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:119-120, Lord
Tr. 2:30].

Stated otherwise, the real contribution
of the invention of the '946 patent is not
that it just provides highly successful
automation to the OES piecing process.
Rather, it provides previously unobtainable
consistently uniform, quality piecing
points, which just happened to be achiev-

able with automation of the piecing

69a

sequence [F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:104-126;
PX 363, 373, 375]. [D.S.C. 13]

Thus, with the advent of the '946
invention and its resultant uniform,
quality piecing points, the previously
required operation of replacing the random
size, unacceptable piecing point with a
knot was totally eliminated. Moreover, of

course, the knot itself was eliminated,

thereby upgrading the yarn quality
considerably. This was the breakthrough
which led to commercially successful
automation of OES spinning machines [Lord
Tr. 2:15-17; F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:122-125;
PX 363].

The '946 invention was unveiled to the

public in 1975 with the introduction by

ee ee ey ee

Suessen at the ITMA Show in Milan of its “a
"Spincat" and "Cleancat" automated piecing
and rotor cleaning device. From this point

forward, automation of OES machines was

70a

transformed from its pre-Spincat gadget
status to its post-Spincat status as a
commercial necessary for most modern state
of the art high speed OES machines [H.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:44-45; Lord Tr. 2:15-
19].

With this successful automation, OES
machine users no longer needed to be con-
cerned about the occurrence of uncontrolled
thick or thin spots in the yarn, with the
result that the necessity for running the
yarn through another process to eliminate
or clear such defects and replace them with
knots was totally eliminated. Moreover,
the occurrence of the knot itself was
eliminated [Lord Tr. 2:15-16].

The elimination of the additional step
of clearing piecing points from OES yarns,
while additionally providing knot-free
yarns, has had a substantial economic

impact in the [D.S.C. 14] U.S. in respect

7la

to the OES yarn market. With this
automation, users of OES machines are now
able to compete effectively in the spun
yarn marketplace with a broader range of
yarns. For example, whereas the user of
nonautomated OES machines is able to
compete effectively in he spun yarn market
in yarns ranging in size from English
cotton count 20s and largers, the user of
automated OES machines can now compete
effectively in yarns ranging in size from
English cotton count 30s and larger. This
represents an estimated additional U.S.
market available to OES machine users of
about $300,000,000 [Lord Tr. 2:17-19; PX
332].

The actual commercial impact to date of
the invention has been dynamic. All
Schalfhorst Autocoro machines are now auto-
mated to produce uniform, quality piecing

points made possible through the use (under

72a

license from plaintiffs) of the invention
of the '946 patent [Strunk Dep. Tr. 10, 13,
17-20; F. stanlesen Tr. 1:158-9; PX

379]. Since 1978, Schlafhorst has sold, or
has on order currently, in the United
States alone about 850 of these automated
machines, representing 163,200 spinning
positions, and is considered the leader,
worldwide, in the field of open-end spin-

ning machinery [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:43;

Jones Dep. Tr. 7-8].

C. The Invention of the '370 Patent

and its Role in OES Automation

The invention of the '370 patent is
directed to the solution of a specific
problem encountered during the automatic
iD.S.C. 15] piecing cycle. More specifi-
cally, the basic form of automatic piecing
apparatus invented and designed by WST for

Suessen takes the general form of a piecing

73a

carriage designed to travel along an OES
machine and automatically piece up broken

yarn ends as required. This traveling unit

is basically equipped with means separate

from the spinning machine itself for

temporarily driving the yarn package and

handling, guiding and feeding the yarn

during the piecing operation--that is,

handling, guiding and feeding the broken
yarn end on the package, which has to be
inserted back into the rotor to be pieced
up with the fiber ring, as well as handl-

ing, guiding and feeding the newly pieced

up yarn which has to be fed back to the
winding package immediately after piec-
ing. As soon as the yarn is connected by
piecing, the relatively small diameter
draw-off rollers begin pulling the yarn out
of the spin box at normal spinning speed,
while at the same time it is necessary to

start driving the yarn take-up package to

74a

wind up the yarn being fed by the draw-off
rollers from the spin box. Since the face
driven yarn package is of relatively larger
diameter than the draw-off rolls, it does
not accelerate as fast as the draw-off
rolls with the result that a large loop
tends to form in the yarn in its path of
travel between the draw-off rolls and the
take-up package. The loop can lead to pro-
blems in that the slack yarn loop, because
the yarn is highly twisted, is difficult to
control and will form into curls or kinks
which will be carried into the winding
[D.S.C. 16] package [F. Stahlecker Tr.
1:144-145; PX 377-1].

To solve the foregoing problem, Fritz
Stahlecker came up with the invention of
the '370 patent. In its broadest terms,
this solution involved adding to the piec-
ing unit some control means for controlling

the course of yarn during this acceleration

75a

phase in such a way as to reduce the ten-
dency of the yarn to form a loop while at
the same time applying a soft tension to
the yarn to prevent the undesirable kinks
from forming in whatever loop may never-
theless be formed. Stahlecker's control
means specifically took the form of yarn
path control at two points--first, a means
to prevent slippage between the yarn wind-
ing package and the face drive roll being
employed to drive (and accelerate) the
package. This aided in the acceleration of
the yarn winding package more quickly to
thereby reduce the tendency of the yarn to
form the uncontrolled slack loop in the
first instance. Second, a yarn path de-
flector in the form of a lever or suction
tube was provided to apply a soft tension
to the yarn in the area where any small un-
controlled slack loop might nevertheless

tend to form in cases where the first means

_. eeentaameal

76a

did not totally eliminate the problem [F.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:145-149; PX 377-2, PX 377-
oe

While the invention of the '370 patent
may not, relatively speaking, rise to the
same breakthrough, high level of contribu-
tion to the OES automation art attributable
to the invention of the '946 patent, it
does represent a significant contribution
to the art of automated OES machines in
that it [D.S.C. 17] eliminates a specific
problem which can cause defective yarn
packages.

The invention of the '370 patent is
currently in use by Suessen's licensee,
Schlafhorst, on its highly successful

"Autocoro" automated OES machines [F.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:150-153; PX 378].

III. THE DEFENDAN’S' RELEVANT ACTIVITIES

As early as 1974, Fritz Stahlecker
brought up in discussions with Schubert &
Salzer (Germany) (then one of Suessen's OES
spin box customers) the concept of automa-
tion of the piecing operation and demon-
strated the prototype Spincat and Cleancat
to them. At that time, Schubert & Salzer
expressed skepticism about the concept and
its likelihood of acceptance by the textile
industry [H. Stahlecker 1:40, 46-47; F.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:149].

Upon Suessen's introduction of its
Spincat/Cleancat automation at the 1975
Milan trade show, and its attendant wide-
spread demonstrated enthusiasm [PX 8, PX
10], Schubert & Salzer immediately recog-
nized that they were now "in a very dif-
ficult position" and had to resolve that
"precarious situation" as fast as possible

[PX 4]. Within one week of the

78a

Spincat/Cleancat introduction, a multi-
person "task force" was commissioned by
defendants on a "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL"
basis to try to develop a Schubert & Salzer
version of an automatic yarn piecing
apparatus [PX 4, PX 5; Canzler Tr.
5:241]. This "task force" operated under
the personal and direct control (D.S.C. 18]
of defendants' Director of Engineering [PX
4]. The "task force" was charged with pro-
viding an expedited solution in six months,
due to the immediate urgency of the situa-
tion, and because they (Schubert & Salzer
were "continuously behind Suessen" [PX 4,
PX 5]. This six-month period came and
passed with no positive results [PX 8, PX
10, PX 13).

Nevertheless, Schubert & Salzer con-
tinued to recognize the critical need for
automation as reflected in its management's

May 1976 memorandum:

I find it absolutely necessary to
use all necessary means for the solu-
tion of the problem [automation] even
though this calls for a delay of other
tasks. [PX 8].

Schubert & Salzer's efforts to provide
automated OES thereafter continued on into
1978 and 1979, during which time they
finally recognized and resigned themselves

to the necessity for (1) removing fibers

fed to the rotor after the sliver feed was

) stopped for a yarn break, (2) accurately
adjusting the sliver feed, and (3) con-
trolling the amount of fibers to be con-
tained in the rotor groove for piecing [PX
105]. Still, no Schubert & Salzer design
for automation was forthcoming.

Unable to solve the problem with its
own expertise, Schubert & Salzer next
turned to outside help and established a
joint venture with the ITR Research

Institute at Reutlingen, Germany, to aid in

developing a piecing apparatus that was

—

lll i re tan A ab as St 0 Me meas one

80a

competitive with the apparatus embodying
Suessen's patented [D.S.C. 19] inventions
[PX 60, PX 63; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 74-75].
Despite even further work, including
Studies of the timing of the sliver pre-
feed, the result of continued combing of
the fiber beard by the opener roll, the
relationship between the amount of fibers
in the rotor and the piecing point formed
therewith [PX 107, PX 108], as well as an
investigation of results being obtained by
Schlafhorst using Suessen's technology [PX
61], defendants were still unable to obtain
quality piecing points.

By April, 1982, Schubert & Salzer had
finally worked out a design for an auto-
matic piecer and had realized the necessity
of incorporating a prefeed of the sliver
(time controlled fiber beard) as taught by
Suessen's '946 patent [PX 33; PX 56A at p.

4]. However, they also realized that the

prefeed concept for making a uniform fiber

beard was a novel and patentable concept
and could cause patent infringement
problems for them [PX 33).

Thus, around June, 1982, in connection
with some discussions relating to the
settlement of other disputes with Suessen,
Schubert & Salzer requested a license under
Suessen's time controlled fiber beard
patent rights which are the subject of the
'946 patent. Suessen refused this request
for a license [H. Stahklecker Tr. 1:47-51;
Canzler Tr. 5:249-250; PX 14, PX 15].

Three weeks after they were denied a
license under Suessen's patent, Schubert &
Salzer obtained a nonexclusive license from
Murata Machinery Ltd., a Japanese company,
under [D.S.C. 20] a group of patents known
as the Hirai patents [Canzler Tr. 5:250].
These Hirai patents and defendants’ act of

taking a license thereunder are the focus

ee ae)

a

82a

of several defenses raised by defendants
which will be dealt with hereinafter.

Apparently, defendants’ act of taking a
license under the Hirai patents was in some
way calculated to justify defendants’
appropriation of plaintiffs' patented time
controlled fiber beard technology. How-
ever, the taking of this license was done
with defendants' full appreciation of the
distinct possibility of plaintiffs'
Superior rights in the '946 technology [Px
33], and was nothing more than a pretext to
a scheme of defendants' willful and delib-
erate infringement of the '946 patent

([Canzler Tr. 5:249-255].

IV. THE HIRAI/MURATA EPISODE

As previously mentioned, in 1971,
Suessen entered into the business of
manufacturing spin boxes based on its WST

developed technology and selling these spin

83a

boxes to manufacturers of OES machinery.
In connection with this effort, in March of
1972, Hans Stahlecker met in Tokyo, Japan,

with representatives of Murata Machinery,
Ltd., a Japanese textile machinery manu-

facturer, and Toymomenka, a Japanese trad-
ing company employed by Suessen to market

Suessen products in Japan. At that time,

Murata was involved in the manufacture of
textile winding machines and was interested
in expanding into the OES machinery market
in which it had no experience [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:51-53]. [D.S.C. 21]

As a result of this 1972 Tokyo meeting,
Suessen and Murata entered into an agree-

ment whereby Murata agreed to pay Suessen

350,000 Deutsche Marks (about $110,000
U.S.) for Suessen's agreement to furnish
Murata with Suessen/WST knowhow and
technical information relating to OES which

would hopefully lead to the ultimate

a

ens Aenea eecsb hitch i ee

84a

development of a commercial Murata OES
machine incorporating Suessen spin boxes
[PX 222]. Thereafter, extensive meetings
were held in Germany and Japan later in
1972 and early 1973 for the purpose of
educating Murata in respect to the
Suessen/WST OE technology. Nothing
commercial came out of this Murata effort,
and around 1975 the OES project was dropped
by Murata. This, of course, terminated the
Murata-Suessen collaboration, and contact
between the two companies essentially
ceased [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:52-55; F.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:127-134; Px 225].

In 1979, the previous Murata-Suessen
collaboration was brought into focus again
at Suessen, when it came to the Stahleckers
attention that, during the Suessen
collaboration period Murata had caused to
be filed certain patents throughout the

world in the name of one Hironori

85a

Hirai, a Mura employee. 7+ These patents t
dealt with technology derived ina major
way from Fritz Stahlecker during the 1
earlier Suessen collaboration period, and
thus caused Suessen a great deal of concern
[F. Stahlecker Tr. 1:126-134; 231193 PX
225]. ([D.S.C. 22] Although these patents
make no specific mention of a time con-
trolled fiber beard [Lauschke Tr. 5:4-6],
of concern to Suessen and of particular
relevance here, was Hirai's (Murata's)

claim of origination of the concept of

controlling the sliver feed elements to

create a new fiber beard of undamaged

Soe a pw a take lier ee Net Wa:

fibers during the piecing-up operation.
Apart from the surprisingly surreptitious 4

nature of the act, these Hirai (Murata)

21. Notably, Murata's interest in these
Hirai patents was not evidenced on the
face of the Hirai patents [e.g., PX
210, DX 11].

[N. 21 at D.S.C. 21]

i
3
a

86a

patents appeared to have claims of very
broad scope, and thus the potential of
creating, especially in Germany where
Suessen and its licensee Schlafhorst both
conducted their manufacturing, a cloud over
Suessen's ability to exploit and license
its own OES technology, particularly in
respect to OES Spincat automation [Lauschke
Tr. 5:6]. OES automation had been the
focus of substantial research and develop-
ment effort at WST since at least as early
as 1972, and formed the basis for Suessen's
Spincat/Cleancat product and widely
patented technology used by Suessen and
licensed to Suessen customers (H.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:55-56].

Actually, Hirai's patent application
activity had been routinely noted by WST's
patent department as early as August, 1975,
when the publication of the yet to be ex-

amined Hirai German patent application was

87a

recorded in that department's routine
system for monitoring the publication and
issuance of applications and patents by
others in fields of interest to WST. [DX
32; Lauschke Tr. 4:240-247, 263-265, 5:4-
5]. Thereafter, in 1977, this Hirai German
application was noted by the German [D.S.C.
23] Patent Office as a possible prior right
in connection with the prosecution of the
Stahlecker et al. German application, which
forms the basis for the '946 U.S. Patent in
suit, and the decision was made at that
time by the WST patent department to defer
examination of the German Stahlecker appli-
cation until examination of the German
Hirai application was completed and the
claims finally agreed upon by the German
Patent Office. [DX 114, 114A; Lauschke Tr.
4:250-256]. However, it was not until
1979, after changes had been made in the

Hirai German application during its

ti eee ee

a

88a

prosecution, and the claims were finally
formulated, did it become apparent to WST's
patent department that Hirai (Murata) was
going to obtain claims in Germany of a
scope possibly broad enough to cover cer-
tain aspects of Suessen's OES automation
technology. [Lauschke Tr. 5:20-24]. At
this point, the Stahlecker brothers were
informed for the first time of Hirari's
activities and the concern posed by Hirai's
now examined German patent application
which was soon to come into effect as a
German patent. Only at this point did it
then come to light that Hirai (Murata) was
about to obtain patent protection on sub-
ject matter derived from Fritz Stahlecker
during the earlier Suessen-Murata col-
laboration period. [H. Stahlecker Tr.
1:55-56; 68-77; F. Stahlecker Tr. 2:123;

Lauschke Tr. 4:244-259, 5:4-8, 20-24}.

89a

Thus, on August 6, 1979, this concern
led Hans Stahlecker to send a telex [ PX

226, p.- 1] to Mr. Junichi Murata, Murata's

president, (1) complaining of these Murata

acts, (2) reminding Mr. Murata that the
subject matter of Hirai's noted [D.S.C. 24]
patents was essentially derived from
Suessen, and (3) politely requesting (or
demanding) that Mr. Murata assure Suessen
that Murata would not instigate any claims
under these Hirai patents against Suessen
or any Suessen customer [H. Stahlecker Tr.
1:55-56].

On August 8, 1979, Mr. Murata responded
[PX 26, p. 2] (1) with an acknowledgment of
his appreciation of the situation, (2) with
the statement, “Basically your views are
respected," and (3) with the suggestion
that practical details leading to a solu-
tion to the problem be worked out at the

soon to be held 1979 ITMA textile machinery

_ :

90a

show in Hannover, Germany. Following this,
Messrs. Murata and Hans Stahlecker did meet
in Hannover. As a result of this meeting,
Hans Stahlecker became satisfied that
Murata would never assert the Hirai patent
against Suessen or its customers [H.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:55-61].

Suessen thereafter laid to rest the
matter of Mur..ta's Surreptitiously obtained
Hirai patents until late 1983 when the mat-
ter once again surfaced as a result of a
ruling handed down by the German High
Court. More specifically, in 1983, Hans
Stahlecker was advised that the German
Court handed down a ruling, the effect of
which was that an existing nonexclusive
right under a German patent could be de-
feated by an assignment of the patent by
the owner to a third party. Thus, the
Hirai patents cloud once again appeared.

Murata now had no interest in the OES

9la

field, and if it chose to sell the Hirai
patents to a third party, the new owner
might choose to assert the patents with
their broad claims against [D.S.C. 25]
Suessen or its customers [H. Stahlecker Tr.
1:61].

As a result of the foregoing, Hans
Stahlecker and Junichi Murata met once
again, this time in the fall of 1983 at the
Milan, Italy ITMA machinery show. At this
point, Hans Stahlecker put this matter
completely to rest, once and for all time,
by negotiating the outright purchase from

Murata of the complete portfolio of Hirai

92a

patents [H. Stahlecker Tr. 1:61-63].72 The
consideration for the purchase was the
return to Murata of the approximately
$100,000 which Murata had paid to Suessen
for its know-how back in 1972 [H.
Stahlecker Tr. 1:62]. The agreement [Px
227] was formalized in writing and executed
on February 17, 1984. The net effect of
Suessen's acquisition of these patents was
that the Hirai thorn in Suessen's side was
finally and completely removed [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:61; PX 227].

22. Japanese Patent No. 1 042 051, Swiss
Patent No. 601 512, German Patent
Application No. 25 05 943, French
Patent No. 75 04439, British Patent No.
1 486 161, Italian Patent No. 1 032 236
and U.S. Patent No. 4,022,011 [ PX
aa? fh
(N. 22 & 23 at D.S.C. 25]

93a

In late 1984, Suessen formally dis-
claimed the Hirai U.S. patent [PX 370).23
The reason for this disclaimer was quite
simply that Suessen had consistently taken
the position from the outset that Hirai
derived the invention which is the subject
of his patents from Fritz Stahlecker in the
Suessen/Murata contacts which took place in
late 1972 and 1973 [D.S.C. 26] (described
above), and Suessen was advised that a U.S.
patent based on an invention deried from
another is invalid as a matter of law.

(See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (102(£)74 [H.

Stahlecker Tr. 1:65].

23. Under 35 U.S.C. §253, a patent owner is
given the right to disclaim or dedicate
to the public the remaining term of a
patent owned by him.
(N. 23 at D.S.C. 25]

24. § 102. A person shall be entitled to a

patent unless-- *
* * *

(£) he did not himself invent the

subject matter sought to be
patented... .

(aadheet ad incite Bill

94a

([N. 24 at D.S.C. 26]

V. INFRINGEMENT

A patent may be infringed either
directly or under the judicially created
doctrine of equivalents. The test for
determining whether a patent is directly
infringed is set forth succinctly in Graver

Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products

Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950), reh'g.
denied, 340 U.S. 845 (1950).

In determining whether an accvsed
device or composition infringes a vaiid
patent, resort must be had in the first
instance to the words of the claim. If
accused matter falls clearly within the
claim, infringement is made out and
that is the end of it. [Emphasis
added].

The test is a simple one, and involves
merely "reading" the claim on an accused
device. It does not entail a comparison of
the drawings in a patent to the accused

device. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp.,

730 F.2d 1476, 1481-1482 (Fed. Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 306 (1984);

95a

Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil

Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709

(1984).

If the defendants escape direct or
literal infringement, the "Doctrine of
Equivalents" then becomes relevant.

([D.S.C. 27] The rationale behind the
doctrine of equivalents is set forth in the

Graver Tank opinion as follows:

But courts have also recognized
that to permit imitation of a patented
invention which does not copy every
literal detail would be to convert the
protection of the patent grant into a
hollow and useless thing. Such a limi-
tation would leave room for--indeed
encourage--the unscrupulous copyist to
make unimportant and insubstantial
changes and substitutions in the patent
which, though adding nothing, would be
enough to take the copied matter out-
side the claim, and hence outside the
reach of law. One who seeks to pirate
an invention, like one who seeks to
pirate a copyrighted book or play, may
be expected to introduce minor vari-
ations to conceal and shelter the
piracy. Outright and forthright dupli-
cation is a dull and very rare type of
infringement. To prohibit no other

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would place the inventor at the mercy

of verbalism and would be subordinating

substance to form. It would deprive
him-of the benefit of his invention and
would foster concealment rather than
disclosure of inventions, which is one
of the primary purposes of the patent
system.

339 U.S. at 607.

The test for determining infringement
under the doctrine involves a comparison of
the claims to the accused device, in view
of the apparatus as disclosed in the
patent. Thereafter, "if [the] two devices

do the same work in substantially the same

way, and accomplish substantially the same

result, they are the same, even though they

differ in name, form or shape." [Emphasis

added]. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v.

Linde Air Products Co., supra, 339 U.S. at

608; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,

717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Radio

Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 731

F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 105 S.Ct. 119 (1984). [D.S.C.

28] The doctrine of equivalents thus
avoids the conversion of the patent grant
into a “hollow and useless thing." 339
U.S. at 608.

The apparatus claims in both patents at
issue utilize "means plus function" lan-
guage. This type of claim is authorized by
paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 which
permits expressing an element as a "means"
for performing a specified function. The
statute further states that such a claim
"shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and

equivalents thereof." [35 U.S.C. § 112].

A. The ‘946 Patent

Plaintiffs charge defendants with

infringement of apparatus Claim 18 of the

98a

‘946 patent. This claim depends from Claim
17, and as such, reads as follows:
18. Apparatus according to claim 17,

(17. [a] Apparatus for thread piecing
in an open-end spinning assembly
comprising:

[b] opening means for opening sliver
being supplied to a spinning
rotor of said spinning assembly.

[c] feeding means for feeding sliver
to said fiber opening means,

[d] piecing means including means for
introducing a thread end back
into said spinning rotor to be
pieced together with a fiber
ring formed in said spinning
rotor,

[e] rotor control means for moving
said spinning rotor from a stop
condition toward an operating
Spinning speed to accommodate
piecing by said piecing means,

{D.S.C. 29]

(£] and fiber supply preparing means
for preparing said spinning
assembly for a piecing operation
prior to movement of said spin-
ning rotor from its stopped
position, said fiber supply
preparing means including means
for starting and operating said
feeding means for a period of
time and then stopping said

feeding means, said starting and
stopping being accompanied by a
continuously operating opening
means, whereby uniform fiber
tufts are arranged at said
sliver feeding means to accom-
modate said piecing operation to
be subsequently performed. ]

{g] further comprising means for
supplying a vacuum to said
spinning rotor to remove any
fiber supplied during said
preparation of said spinning
assembly by said preparing means
[PX 202].

The Court finds that Claim 18 reads
literally and directly on defendants’
Spincomat automatic piecer as employed on
defendants' RU 11 OES machine [PX 307,

PX 320, PX 321]. Considering each of the
claim elements [a]-[g]:
[a] The RU 11 is an open-end

spinning assembly, and together with

the Spincomat they piece thread

100a

[Bartlett?> Tr. 3:45; Px 27, PX 27A, PX
56, PX S6A).

(b] The RU 11 is equipped with an
opener roll at each spinning position
which functions to open the sliver
being supplied to the spinning rotor of
the spin box or spinning assembly
(PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56 , PX 56A, PX 301,
PX 302, PX 303; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 46;
Bartlett Tr. 3:45].

c| The RU 1l is equipped with a
S.iwer feed roll at each spinning
+ .om which functions to feed the
Siiver to the opener roll [PX 27,

PX 27A, PX [D.S.C. 30] 56 , PX 56A, PX

25. (See Bartlett Curriculum vitae Px 340].

'N. 25 at D.S.C. 29]

301, PX 302, PX 303; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr.

45; Bartlett Tr. 3:45].

(d] The Spincomat and the RU ll
are equipped with several elements
which function to introduce a thread
end back into the spinning rotor to be
pieced together with the fiber ring
formed in the rotor. These elements
include the feeding unit, package drive
roll, suction tube, centering worm,
thread guide or sickle, and dropping
worm on the Spincomat; and yarn outlet
tube and suction apparatus on the
RU ll. [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,
PX 308, PX 309, PX 310, PX 311; Request
For Admission 29 at Bartlett Tr. 3:41;
Bartlett Tr. 3:45-46].

(e] The RU 1l is equipped with a
rotor cleaning and braking lever
operable by the Spincomat during the

piecing operation to stop the rotor by

102a

disengaging it from a continuous drive
belt and to restart the rotor by re-
engaging it with the drive belt, which
moves it toward an operating spinning
speed to accommodate piecing [PX 27, PX
27A, PX 54, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 305, PX
306, PX 308 ; Request For Admission 31
at Bartlett Tr. 3:38; Parkhurst Tr.
59:128, Beuthien TGr. 4:179; Wulfhorst
Dep. Tr. 48-50; Bartlett Tr. 3:46].

(£] The RU 11 and Spincomat are
equipped with a "Program PC" electrical
control which, together with the sliver
feed roll and opener roll, prepare the
Spinning assembly for a piecing opera-
tion prior to [D.S.C. 31] movement of
the spinning rotor from its stopped
position [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,
PX 304, PX 306; Request for Admission
34 at Bartlett Tr. 3:22; Requests for

Admission 39 and 40 at Bartlett Tr.

103a

3:34; Request for Admission 42 at
Bartlett Tr. 3:35; Requests for Admis-
sion 46 and 47 at Bartlett Tr. 3:40;
Request for Admission 48 at Bartlett
Tr. 3:42; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 49-50;
Bartlett Tr. 3:46-47;|, The "Program
PC" starts and operates the sliver feed
roll for a period of time, and then
stops it, while the opener roll contin-
uously operates [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56,
PX 56A, PX 305, PX 306; Request for
Admission 25 at Bartlett Tr. 3:14;
Request for Admission 33 at Bartlett
Tr. 3:34; Request for Admission 34 at
Bartlett Tr. 3:22; Requests for
Admission 39, 40 and 41 at Bartlett Tr.
3:34; Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 46, 57;
Bartlett Tr. 3:46-48]. The timewise
coordination of these elements arranges

uniform fiber tufts at the sliver feed

roll to accommodate the piecing

SUN RARE Da =

104a

operation to be subsequently performed
[Bartlett Tr. 3:46-48; PX 56A at
Section 2.7 (p. 4)].

{g] The RU 1l is equipped with a
vacuum suction channel that is con-
nected to the rotor spin box and sup-
plies a vacuum to the spinning rotor to
remove any fiber supplied during the
preparation of the spinning assembly by
the fiber supply preparing means
[PX 27, {9.8.C. 32] PX Z7A, PX 53 , PX
56, PX 56A, PX 310, PX 311, PX 400;
Wulfhorst Dep. Tr. 48, 59; Bartlett Tr.
3:47-48; Request for Admission 42 at
Bartlett Tr. 3:35; Requests for
Admission 46 and 47 at Bartlett Tr.

3:40].

It is defendants' position that the
accused device does not infringe Claim 18

because it does not employ any “rotor

105a

control means" as called for by the
claim. More specifically, they contend
(Parkhurst Tr. 5:36-38] that in the '946

specification it is taught that piecing-up

occurs "on the rise"--that is, during
acceleration of the rotor from its stopped
condition, and before it reaches full
operating speed. Accordingly, they
contend, the "rotor control means" plus the
functional claim terminology must be
limited to a structure which is capable of
accomplishing piecing during acceleration
of the rotor, and which structure is not
present in the Spincomat device wherein
piecing occurs at a time after the rotor is
fully accelerated.

This position of noninfringement is not
sustainable for two independent reasons.
First, as already pointed out, the relevant
langauge of the claim, "rotor control

means, etc." requires only that the rotor

106a

drive stem move towards the operating
Spinning speed, not that it accelerate at a
reduced rate [Bartlett Tr. 3:49], and reads
directly on defendants' structure.
Specifically, the rotor brake controllable
by the Spincomat serves the function of
Stopping the rotor by [D.S.C. 33] moving it
out of engagement with a drive belt and
again starting the rotor by permitting it
to move back into engagement with the drive
belt whereby it accelerates to full operat-
ing speed in approximately 1.2 seconds [Px
305, PX 308; Request for Admission 31 at
Bartlett Tr. 3:38]. As such, defendants’
Structure is the full equivalent for pur-
poses of 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the "rotor con-
trol means" disclosed in the '946 specifi-

cation.

107a

It is well settled that "means plus
function" claim limitations are not to be
limited to particular means set forth ina
patent specification:

To interpret "means plus function"
limitations as limited to a particular
means set forth in the specification
would be to nullify the provision of
[35 U.S.C.] § 112 requiring that the
limitation shall be construed to cover
the structure described in the specifi-
cation and equivalents thereof.
Patentees are required to disclose in
the specification some enabling means
for accomplishing the function set
forth in the "means plus function"
limitation. At the same time, there is
and can be no requirement that appli-
cants describe or predict every pos-
sible means of accomplishing that
function. The statute, §-tit2-6, was
written precisely to avoid a holding
that a means-plus-function limitation
must be read as covering only the means
disclosed in the specification.
[Subject matter in brackets supplied].

D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570,

1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Accord: P.M.

Palumbo, et al v. Don-Joy Co., et al, 762

F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

108a

The fact that the "“rotor.control means" in
the '946 disclosure is more sophisticated
and may perform other functions, in addi-
tion to the function recited in Claim 18 ,
is of no consequence and cannot be used to

avoid infringement. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co.

v. MTD Products, Inc., 731 F.2d 840,

[D.S.C. 34] 848 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 105 S.Ct. 119 (1984); Amstar Corp.

v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1482

(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.

306 (1984).

Second, the "piecing on the rise" limi-
tation sought to be read into Claim 18 is
specifically recited in five other claims
of the '946 patent, 26 making its absence
From Claim 18 both conspicuous and

material. It is well settled that as a

26. Ciains 6, i2;, 13% 16, 19 and 23.
{[N. 26 at 5.8... 34]

109a

general rule limitations should not be read
into patent claims. Moreover, where such a
limitation is contained in other claims,
the rule is manifest.

Where, as here, the limitation
sought to be “read into" a claim
already appears in another claim, the
rule is far more than "general." It is
fixed. It is long and well estab-
lished. It enjoys an immutable and
universally applicable status compara~
tively rare among rules of law. With-
out it, the entire statutory and
regulatory structure governing the
drafting, submission, examination,
allowance, and enforceability of claims
would crumble. This court has con-
firmed the continuing life of the
rule. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech
Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 221 USPQ 649
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Raytheon Co. v. Roper
Corp., supra; Fromson v. Advance Offset
Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 , 219 USPQ
1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

D.M.I., inc. v. Deere & Co., Supra at

1574. See also: Palumbo v. Don-Joy,

Supra, at 977.

110a

B. The ‘370 Patent

Plaintiffs charge defendants with
infringement of Claims 1-7, 9-13 and 17-20
of the '370 patent. Claim 1 reads as
follows: [D.S.C. 35]

1. [a] A piecing device for an open-
end spinning machine of the type having a
plurality of spinning assemblies which
each include a rotatable storage spool
for storing yarn as it is spun at said
spinning assembly, spool drive means for
driving said spool during spinning
operations, and yarn guide means for
guiding the yarn between the rotor of the
spinning assembly and the spool during
spinning operations; said piecing device
comprising:

(b] auxiliary spool drive means for
driving the spool at a spinning
assembiy during piecing operations
at said spinning assembly;

(c] auxiliary yarn guide means for
guiding the yarn between the spool
and a yarn outlet of a spinning
rotor of the spinning assembly
during piecing operations, said
auxiliary yarn guide means
including auxiliary driven feed
means for said yarn.

(d] and control means for controlling
the course of the yarn between the
auxiliary driven feed means and
the spool so as to reduce forma-

lila

tion of a loop in the yarn during

acceleration of the drawing off of

the yarn during piecing [PX 213].
The Court finds that Claims 1-7, 9-13

and 17-20 read literally and directly on
defendants' Spincomat automatic piecer as
employed on defendants' RU ll OES machine
[PX 316, PX 320, PX 321]. Considering each
of the claim elements [a]-[d]:

[a] The RU ll has a plurality of
spinning assemblies and is equipped
with the Spincomat for piecing. Each
spinning assembly includes a spool that
stores yarn as it is spun [PX 27,

PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 301, PX 302;
Bartlett Tr. 3:76]; a spool drive for
driving or rotating the spool during

spinning [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 301, PX 302, PX 400 at Figure 1;

112a

Bartlett Tr. 3:76]; and yarn guides?’
for guiding the [D.S.C. 36] yarn
between the rotor of the spinning
assembly and the spool during spinning
operations [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX
S6A, PX 301, PX 302, PX 400 at Figure
1; Bartlett TR. 3:76].

[b] The Spincomat is equipped

with an auxiliary spool drive for
driving the spool during piecing
operations [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56,
PX 56A, PX 308, PX 309, PX 310, Px Sid,
PX 312, PX 313, PX 314, PX 315, PX 400;
Karl Tr. 4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:76].

[c] The Spincomat is equipped

with yarn guides that guide the yarn

27.

During spinning the yarn is guided by
the navel, yarn delivery tube, movable
and fixed pressure rolls, stationary
yarn guide, traversing yarn guide, and
main spool drive [PX 301].

(N. 27 at D.S.C. 35]

1l3a

between the spool and yarn outlet of
the spinning rotor during piecing,
including an auxiliary driven feed for
the yarn. Specifically, during piecing
this includes the fixed and movable

pressure rolls as moved by the pressure

roll separating lever, feeding unit and
its rollers, suction tube, dropping
worm, thread guide or sickle, and cen-
tering worm, which guide the yarn
between the spool and yarn outlet of
the rotor on the RU ll. The fixed and
movable pressure rolls are "borrowed"
by the Spincomat and operated by it via
the pressure roll separating lever
whereby they are under the control of
the piecing device and function as a
capstan drive for the yarn to provide
the auxiliary driven feed for the yarn

[PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 308,

PX 309, PX 310, PX 311, PX 312, PX 313,

114a

PX 315, PX 316, PX 400; Request for
Admission 50 at Bartlett Tr. [D.S.c.
37] 3:68; Canzler Tr. 5:237; Karl Tr.
4:223; Bartlett Tr. 3:76-78, 4:120].
(d) The Spincomat is equipped
with an auxiliary spool drive, center-
ing worm, dropping worm, vacuum
tensioning tube and package arm lifter
to control the course of the yarn
between the auxiliary driven feed means
and the spool so as to reduce formation
of a loop in the yarn during
acceleration of the drawing off of the
yarn during piecing. More
specifically, the auxiliary spool drive
presses the spool against the main
spool drive and the vacuum tensioner
tube imparts a soft tension to the yarn
(PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX S6A at p. 10;

PX 311, PX 312, PX 313, PX 314, Px 315,

PX 400; Requests for Admissions 5l, 52

115a

and 53 at Bartlett Tr. 3:68-69; Karl

Tr. 4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:78-79].

Claim 2 is literally infringed?®
because the Spincomat includes the fixed
and movable pressure rolls as moved by the
pressure roll separating lever and through
which the yarn passes. The drive for the
feed roll is synchronized with the
auxiliary spool drive by the “Program
pc." [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A;

PX 314, PX 315; Bartlett Tr. 3:84].

Claim 3 is literally infringed because
the auxiliary spool drive on the Spincomat
includes an auxiliary roll that is driven
and engages the spool [PX 27 at pp. 9, 133
PX 56 at [D.S.C. 38] pp. 8, 9, 10 and 16;

PX 308, PX 310, PX 311, PX 312, PX 313, PX

28. Except for Claim 1, all claims are
dependent and incorporate all of the
elements of the claim(s) from which
they depend.

[N. 28 at D.S.C. 37]

1l6a

314, PX 315, PX 320, PX 400; Karl Tr.
4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:84-85].

Claim 4 is literally infringed because
the Spincomat is mobile and is selectively
operable to perform piecing operations at
respective individual spinning assemblies
of the spinning machine [PX 27, Px 27A,

PX 56, PX S6A, PX 320; Bartlett Tr. 3:85].

Claims 5 and 17 are literally infringed
because the Spincomat includes a vacuum
tensioner tube which takes up yarn that is
delivered during the running-up phase and
not wound, in case of differences between
the feed velocity and winding speed. The
vacuum tensioner tube is disposed between
the pair of feed rolls and the auxiliary
roll or auxiliary spool drive (PX 27,

PX 27A at pp. 14, 17 and 43, PX 56, PX S6A
at drawing 22; PX 313, PX 314 ; Bartlett

Tr. 3:85-86, 92-93).

ll7a

Claims 6 and 19 are literally infringed
because the Spincomat includes a vacuum
tensioner tube which produces a deflection
of the course of the yarn by drawing the
yarn toward it or into it, and which guides
the yarn with maintenance of a given ten-
sion [PX 27, PX 27A at pp. 14, 17 and 43,
PX 56, PX 56A at drawing 22, PX 313,

PX 314; Bartlett Tr. 3:86-87, 93-94].

Claims 7 and 20 are literally infringed
because the Spincomat includes a vacuum

tensioner tube with an open nozzle end that

acts as a deflecting element [PX 27,

PX 27A, at pp. 14 , 17 [D.S.C. 39] and 43,
PX 56, PX 56A at drawing 22, PX 313, PX
314; Bartlett Tr. 3:87, 94].

Claim 9 is literally infringed because
the Spincomat control means includes
several elements that influence the running
path of the yarn in the zone between the

feed rolls and the spool. Specifically,

118a

this includes the auxiliary spool drive,
centering worm, dropping worm, vacuum
tensioning tube and package arm lifter.
[PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A at drawing
22, PX 313, PX 314; Bartlett Tr. 3:87].

Claim 10 is literally infringed because
the Spincomat elements that make up the
control means include an auxiliary spool
drive which influences the winding speed of
the spool [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,

PX 313, PX 314, PX 315 , PX 400; Karl Tr.
4:236; Bartlett Tr. 3:87-88].

Claim 11 is literally infringed because
the Spincomat elements that make up the
control means are connected to a "Program
PC" that controls the work sequence of the
piecing device and determines the time of
switching in and/or the duration of the
switching in. [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56,

PX 56A, PX 315, PX 400; Bartlett Tr.

3:88-90].

119a

Claim 12 is literally infringed because
the auxiliary spool drive, which is one of
the Spincomat elements that make up the
control means, is spring loaded to press
together the spool and the auxiliary spool
drive during the running-up phase. The
spool is held in position by the package
arm lifter [PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A,
PX 311, PX 313, PX 315, PX 400; Bartlett
Tr. 3:90-91]. [D.S.C. 40]

Claim 13 is literally infringed because
the Spincomat elements that make up the
control means are connected to a "Program
PC" that controls the duration of the
loading of the auxiliary spool drive
[PX 27, PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 315;
Bartlett Tr. 3:91-92].

Claim 18 is literally infringed because
the Spincomat elements that make up the
control means are connected to a "Program

PC" that controls the duration of the

120a

Switching in the yarn storage [PX 27,
PX 27A, PX 56, PX 56A, PX 315; Bartlett Tr.
3:93].

Defendants contend that the accused de-
vice does not infringe any of the claims of
the '370 patent because the piecing device
does not include "auxiliary driven feed
means" for the yarn [Parkhurst Tr. 5:86-87,
197]. This is based on the assertion that
the fixed and movable pressure rolls are on
the spinning machine and that they do not
feed the yarn.

Defendants' position is not sustainable
from a factual or legal standpoint.
Factually, defendants' expert admitted
(a) that the fixed pressure roll and mov-
able pressure roll are indeed borrowed by
the Spincomat piecing device from the spin-
ning machine, (b) that during the yarn
take-up after piecing these borrowed rolls

draw the yarn out of the tube and feed it

l2la

onto the package, *9 and (c) that the
borrowed rolls perform different functions
when they are borrowed than they do when
they [D.S.C. 41] are not [Parkhurst Tr.
5:198-199]. Furthermore, defendants' own
in-house patent agent conceded that the
fixed pressure roll and movable pressure
roll on the accused device perform the same
function during piecing (i.e., drawing off
of the yarn) as would a separate set of
rollers located on the piecing device
[Canzler Tr. 5:237; PX 25A, PX 25B]. In
other words, the movable and fixed pressure
rolls guide the yarn between the rotor of
the spinning assembly and the spool during

spinning operations, but during piecing

29. This is consistent with the testimony
of plaintiffs' expert regarding the
effectiveness of a capstan drive for
feeding yarn [Bartlett Tr. 3:65, 4:100-
101).

(N. 29 at D.S.C. 40]

122a

operations their operation is controlled by
the piecing device to guide the yarn
between the spool and a yarn outlet of a
Spinning rotor of the spinning assembly.
Legally, the case law is clear that a
Single element that performs two different
functions at different times can be
included twice in a means plus function

Claim. In re Hebberling, 357 F.2d 1001,

1007 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Phillips v. Lynch,

367 F.2d 601, 607, n. 5 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
Thus, the Court finds that defendants'
structure is the full equivalent for
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the
"auxiliary yarn guide means ... including
auxiliary driven feed means" disclosed in
the '370 specification, and that the
relevant claims of the '370 patent are
literally infringed.

Furthermore, even if the claims were

not literally infringed, the accused device

123a

does the same work in substantially the
same way and accomplishes the same result
as the apparatus of the '370 claims and is
therefore a full equivalent of the claimed
subject matter and an infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, as set forth

in Graver Tank, supra. [D.S.C. 42]

Defendants further contend that the
doctrine of file wrapper estoppel results
in a finding of noninfringement of the
claims of the '370 patent. The doctrine of
file wrapper estoppel is available only if
there is an absence of literal infringement
and only if the patentee narrowed the scope
of its claims during prosecution in the
Patent Office in response to a rejection

based on prior art that relates to the

patentable merit of the invention.
Specifically, defendants contend that the
doctrine of file wrapper estoppel requires

the presence of two elements in order for

124a

the claims to read on the accused device,
based upon the addition of the word
"auxiliary" during the prosecution of the
application in response to a rejection by
the Patent Office under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for
indefiniteness [Parkhurst Tr. 5:90-92].
This contention cannot be sustained for
two reasons. First, there is literal in-

fringement of the '370 claims, rendering

the doctrine inapplicable. Graver Tank &

Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co.,

supra, 339 U.S. at 607. Second, even if
there is not literal infringement, requir-
ing resort to the doctrine of equivalents,
the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel is
not applicable in this case under the con-
trolling legal precedents.

The application which matured into
United States Patent No. 4,175,379 was
rejected only once by an Official Action

dated December 6, 1978. The rejection was

125a

based solely on 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the
Examiner viewed the originally presented
claims as “indefinite-incomplete" and it
did not pertain [D.S.C. 43] to the
“auxiliary driven feed means." Indeed, in
this same action, the Examiner specifically
stated, "None of the claims appears to be
anticipated by the prior art." Thereafter,
amendments were made to claims to meet the
Examiner's indefiniteness rejection. 29

And, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has twice recently
addressed the issue of file wrapper
estoppel vis-a-vis claim amendments to cure

Section 112 indefiniteness rejections.

30. Defendants' patent law expert conceded
that the rejection defendants were
relying upon was purely a Section 112
rejection based on indefiniteness and
not based upon prior art, and that such
a rejection does not give rise to file
wrapper estoppel. [Parkhurst Tr.
5:203-206].

[m. 30 at D.S.C. 43]

126a

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A.,

714 F.2d 1110, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1983);

Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil

Co. Of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 709 (1984).

These cases make it quite clear that claim
amendments and remarks directed only to
cure a Section 112 rejection do not give
rise to file wrapper estoppel since, in
effect, they are being used to cure a
technical rejection rather than a rejection
directed to the patentable merit of the

invention.

VI. VALIDITY OF THE PATENTS IN SUIT

A. The '946 Patent

Defendants contend that Claim 18 of the
'946 patent is invalid on three separate
grounds: (1) invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102
for anticipation in view of Hirai U.S.

Patent No. 4,022,011; [D.S.C. 44]

127a

(2) invalid for double patenting in view of
Hirai U.S. Patent No. 4,022,011; and

(3) invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 for
anticipation in view of defendants' own
prior art RK 10 machine, or under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 in view of the latter when combined
with the teachings of plaintiffs' earlier
filed U.S. Patent No. 3,987,610.

The statutory presumption of patent
validity created by 35 U.S.C. § 282 places
on defendants the burden of proving in-
validity by clear and convincing evi-

dence. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v.

Sowa & Sons, Inc. , 725 F.2d 1350, 1358-60

(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.

95 (1984).

The Hirai Patent Defense

The threshold consideration underlying
the viability of any Section 102 (or

Section 103) invalidity defense involving

128a

the Hirai patent is whether that patent can
be considered as prior art to the '946
patent. The Court finds that the Hirai
patent cannot be otnnitecet as prior art
for the following reasons.

As indicated above (pp. 3-4, supra),
under 35 U.S.C. § 119, the '946 patent is
properly considered as having a U.S. filing
date of December 7, 1974. The application
for the Hirai U.S. patent, on the other
hand, was filed in the United States some
two months later on February 10, 1975.

Under ordinary circumstances, the fore-
going application filing sequences would
present a clear-cut case to the effect that

Hirai is to be totally ignored for purposes

of validity of the '946 patent. However,
there is one additional fact which can tend
to lead to confusion--this being that Hirai
also [D.S.C. 45] claims for himself the

priority under Section 119 of three earlier

12c°a

filed Japanese applications filed in Japan
in the period February-April, 1974,31 and
therefore before the '946 German priority
application_was filed in Germany. This
added fact, on its face, would seemingly
raise the anomalous question of whether
Hirai is therefore to be considered for

'946 reference purposes as carrying the

reference date of its U.S. filing date,

February 10, 1975 (which is subsequent to

the '946 priority date of December 7,
1974), or to be considered as prior art

because of its claimed Japanese priority

filing dates, February-April, 1974 (which

is prior to the '946 priority date).
This anomaly did in fact cause con-

siderable confusion in U.S. Patent Office _

31. The fact that Hirai bases his priority
on three Japanese applications simply
means that he combined three Japanese
applications into one U.S. application.
(R. 31 & 32 at D.S.C. 4S)

130a

practice in the 1960's and 1970's until the
U.S. Court of Customs and Appeals (the pre-
decessor of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) resolved the matter in a
trilogy of landmark decisions--In re
Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966)

(Hilmer I), In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108

(C.C.P.A. 1970) (Hilmer II), and In re

McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324 (C.C.P.A. 1976).?2

Hilmer I involved an appeal froma

Patent Ofice decision rejecting Hilmer's
application. The issue before the [D.S.C.

46] Hilmer I court was whether a U.S.

patent to Habicht (filed in the U.S. on
January 23, 1958, and entitled to priority
as of its Swiss filing date of January 24,

1957) was prior art as to the Hilmer appli-

32. Accord: Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315,
1337 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1014 (1980); In re Grasselli, 713
F.2d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

l3la

cation (filed in the U.S. on July 25, 1958,
and entitled to priority as of its German
filing date of July 31, 1957). As can be
seen, Hilmer's date of invention (i.e., his
German filing date under Section 119) was
prior to Habicht's U.S. filing date, but
after Habicht's foreign (Swiss) priority
date.

The pivotal holding of the court in

Hilmer I was that "section 119 does not

modify the express provision of section
102(e)33 that a reference patent is

effective as of the date the application

33. 35 U.S.C. §102(e) in effect bars the
issuance of a patent where "the
invention was described in a patent
granted on an application for patent
filed in the United States before the
invention thereof by the applicant for
patent or on an international applica-
tion by another who has fulfilled the
requirements of paragraphs (1), (2) and
(4) of Section 37l(c) of this title
before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent."

(N. 33 at D.S.C. 46]

132a

for it was 'filed in the United States'."
359 F.2d at 861. Therefore, for prior art
purposes, the Habicht patent was to be

considered as having a date subsequent to

Hilmer, and therefore not a part of the
prior art.
As can be seen, the factual relevant

filing sequences presented in Hilmer I are

identical to those presented here by Hirai

and '946, and accordingly, under Hilmer I,

Hirai is not prior art under Section

102(e). [D.S.C. 47]
In 1970, the Hilmer case came before

the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals

once again (Hilmer II). As background to .-

Hilmer I, an interference had been declared
between the Habicht and Hilmer applica-

tions, and Habicht had prevailed as to the
count (claim) which was the subject of the

interference. Hilmer I had then decided

that all of the disclosures of the Habicht

133a

interfering patent were not prior art as to

Hilmer under Section 102(e). Hilmer II

involved an appeal from a further rejection

on another ground by the Patent Ofice after

the Hilmer I remand. The issue in Hilmer
II was whether the subject matter of the
claim lost to Habicht in the interference
was prior art as to the Hilmer application
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).24

The Patent Office had reasoned that the
Claim lost in the interference was prior
art by virtue of being "prior invention"
under Section 102(g), and Section 119
altered the "in this country" limitation of
Section 102(g). The court disagreed. As

in the case of Hilmer I and Section 102(e),

34. Section 102(g) in effect bars the
issuance of a patent where “before the
applicant's invention thereof the
invention was made in this country by
another. .. ." [Emphasis added].

[N. 34 at D.S.C. 47]

134a

the Hilmer II court stated "§ 119 does not

remove the limitation of § 102(g) found in
the phrase ‘in this country'." 424 F.2d at
1112.

The last case in the trilogy, McKellin,

put the entire prior art issue to rest,
once and for all. McKellin had lost an in-

terference with a patent to Maltha under

facts similar to those in Hilmer I and

Hilmer II. Thereafter, [D.S.C. 48]

McKellin inserted into his application new
Claims which the Patent Office viewed as
"either fall[{ing] within the scope of the
invention defined by the [lost inter-
ference] counts or obvious variations
thereof." 529 F.2d at 1326. Thus, the
Patent Office was now taking the position
that even though a Habicht-type (Hirai-
type) patent was not prior art under

Section 102(e) (Hilmer I), or under Section

102(g) (Hilmer II), the lost interference

135a

count could be used under Section 103
(obviousness) to bar issuance of claims in
the loser's application directed to obvious
variants of the lost count. Once again,
the Patent Office's attempt to use a
Habicht-type (Hirai-type) reference as
prior art in respect to the patentability
of claims in a Hilmer-type ('946-type)
application was rejected by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and the

McKellin court made it clear that a

Habicht-type (Hirai-type) reference could
not be considered prior art for any pur-
pose. tus. the Court finally made it
absolutely clear that a Habicht~-type
(Hirai-type) reference must be considered

as a reference only as of its U.S. filing

date.

Applying this trilogy of cases to the
case at bar, this Court concludes that

Hirai is not prior art for purposes of

136a

Section 102(e) (Hilmer I); nor Section

102{g) (Hilmer II); nor Section 103; nor

for any other purpose under the facts

presented here (McKellin). Moreover,

Squarely in accordance with this trilogy,
even if there had been an interference
between Hirai and '94635 involving only
claims of Hirai as interference counts,
[D.S.C. 49] and even if priority based upon
effective dates had been awarded to Hirai,
such award of priority would not have
raised Hirai to the status of prior art in
respect to the '946 claims not involved in

such interference. McKellin, supra.

Conceding the applicability of the

Hilmer I and II, McKellin trilogy under

circumstances where the '946 patent is en-

35. Which there was not, but which
defendants argue that there should have
been.

[N. 35 at D.S.C. 48]

137a

titled to its December 7, 1974 German
priority date under Section 119 [Parkhurst
Tr. 5:131-132], defendants nevertheless
urge that Hirai is an invalidating prior
art reference against the '946 patent
because the two patents contain
“interfering” claims directed to the same
invention, and that by electing not to
invoke an interference, plaintiffs have
elected Hirai as the patent entitled to the
priority as between the two patents.

In support of their argument that
Claims of the patents “interfere,” defen-
dants point to method Claim 1 of Hirai and
urge that this claim claims the same inven-
tion as that claimed in apparatus Claim 18
of '946 (the only ‘946 claim in issue), as
well as method Claims 7 and 12 (not in
issue) [Parkhurst Tr. 5:40-53].

The evidence does not support this

proposition. In the first place, Hirai

138a

Claim 1 specifically calls for the step of
“removing the fiber thus supplied from

inside of the rotor together with the dust

and dirt collected in the rotor." [Dx

10). It is well known in the OES art that
dust and dirt tend to collect in the groove
of the rotor with such tenacity that it is
not necessarily removed by the normal
vacuum [D.S.C. 50] currents utilized for
the yarn forming operation [PX 334, PX 334A
at pp. 16-17]. To cope with this collected
dust and dirt, Hirai teaches that this
cleaning can be accomplished by "positively
cleaning the inside of the rotor,” [DX 10
at col. l, line 68-col. 2, line 2] by
injecting a jet of compressed air into the
rotor groove to clean the same during the
piecing sequence [F. Stahlecker Tr.

2:128]. This positive cleaning step to
remove the dust and dirt, which is explicit

in the above-quoted Hirai claim, is nowhere

139a

mentioned or taught in the '946 patent as.
an integral step in the piecing operation,
and is nowhere recited in Claim 18 of

‘946. Further, Claim 18 of '946 calls for
means for supplying a vacuum to the spin-
ning rotor prior to starting the rotor to
remove fiber supplied to the rotor up to
that time. Hirai Claim 1 is totally silent
on this score, and moreover, if Figure 3 of
Hirai is to be interpreted as a timing
sequence, as defendants urge it should be
[Parkhurst Tr. 5:167], then there is posi-
tive pressure (rather than vacuum) present
in Hirai's rotor until after his rotor
reaches a speed of about one-third (20,000
rpm) of its operating speed (60,000 rpm)
[DX 10 at col. 2, lines 3-7, and FIG. 3].
Under these conditions (i.e., the vacuum is
not effective until the rotor reaches a
speed of 20,000 rpm), such vacuum would not

remove the fiber supplied up to that time,

140a

as required in '946 Claims 7, 12 and 18,
because of the centrifugal forces exerted _
on the fibers by the rotating rotor which
would hold the fibers in the rotor with a
stronger force than that exerted by the
vacuum [Parkhurst Tr. 5:167-172; F.
Stahlecker Tr. 2:127-131; PX 380, PX 381,
PX 382]. [D.S.C. 51]
As to defendants' contention that Hirai
Claim 1 also “interferes” with '946 method
Claims 7 and 12, these claims differ from
Hirai Claim 1 for essentially the same
reasons as outlined above in respect to
apparatus Claim 18 [Parkhurst Tr. 5:161].
Further, the base claims (Claims 6 and 11)
from which these claims respectively depend
contain preambles which include the phrase,

"comprising the sequential steps of"

{underlining added; PX 202, col. 8, lines
19-20 and lines 59-60]. Such phraseology

imbues these claims with a limited scope

14la

not contemplated by Hirai Claim 1 in that
the method steps thereafter recited in the
claims must be carried out in the sequence
exactly as recited [Witherspoon Tr. 6:41l-
42). |

Secondly, a close analysis of the whole
of the Hirai and '946 patents shows a clear
difference in the inventions contemplated
by the respective patent disclosures. 26
More specifically, while both patents deal
with piecing up on OES machines, and both
disclose starting and stopping the sliver
feed during the piecing sequence, the
Similarity ends there. In Hirai, the pro-

blem posed, and purportedly solved, by the

36. While certainly not binding on this
Court, it is worth noting that the
German Patent Office has recognized the
difference also, by granting the German
version of the '946 patent over the
German version of Hirai [Dauster Tr.
6:14-17; PX 402A, PX 402B).

([N. 36 at D.S.C. 51]

142a

inventor is the elimination of shortened or

damag

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0573%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
