# Appendix — Harris v. Attorney Grievance Commission > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0524%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1988 - **Citation:** 484 U.S. 1062 ## Text i. oo H | : Supreme Court, U.S, 87-948 _— “ao OCT 28 887 SPANIOL, JR. CLESK. In The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1987 ALAN EDGAR HARRIS, Petitioner, ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND, Respondent. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Benjamin Lipsitz, 6699 Reisterstown Road, Suite 182 Baltimore, Maryland 21215, (301) 358-0717, oe Attorney for Petitioner i TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland Memorandum of Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City Letter from the clerk of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, dated July 38, 1987, advising date of filing of that court's Opinion and Order Letter from the clerk of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, dated September 9, 1987, advising that court's disposition of motion for reconsdieration Page App. App. App. App. 1 32 61 62 App. l IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 5l September Term, 1985 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND Ve ALAN EDGAR HARRIS Murphy, C.J. Eldridge Cole Rodowsky Couch McAuliffe Adkins, - JJ. Opinion by Couch, J. Filed: July 30, 1987 * Couch, J., now retired, partici- pated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Art- icle IV, Section 3A, he also parti- cipated in the decision and adop- tion of this opinion. TT App. 2 The Attorney Grievance Commission ("Commission"), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition seeking disciplinary action against the respondent, Alan Edgar Harris. The petition alleged that Harris violated certain disciplinary rules in his representation of three unrelated clients, Delores Green, Grady Jacks, Sr., and Anthony Jeter. Pursuant to Maryland Rule BV 9, we referred the matter to Judge Arrie W. Davis of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In his memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Davis reject- ed some of the Commission's charges, but nevertheless concluded that Harris had violated the following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 1-192(A) (1), DR 6-101 (A) (3), DR 7-1@1(A) (1) in his representation of Delores Green; and DR 1-102(A) (1), DR 5-103(B), DR 9-102(B) (3) in his representation of Grady Jacks, App. 3 Sr. /l Harris has filed seventeen exceptions and Bar Counsel has filed one exception to Judge Davis's memorandum. Exceptions 16 and 17 involve two motions to dismiss the disciplinary petition. We shall first address the motions to dismiss. Harris's Motions to Dismiss Exception 16 In the first motion, argued initially before Judge Davis and now before this Court, Harris attacks in several respects proceedings of the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board. Like the trial court, we fl The text of the applicable Disci- plinary Rules is set forth in this opinion. With respect to the Jeter complaint, Judge Davis found that there was no clear and convincing evidence regarding the charged violations. The Commission has not excepted to this finding and thus we Shall not consider the Jeter complaint. App. 4 reject his arguments. /2 Harris argues initially that Bar Counsel improperly informed the Inquiry Panel of prior hearings and warnings issued to respondent in three other cases, and also advised the Panel that there was a "pattern of misconduct" involved. Bar Counsel's action, however, is specifically sanctioned by the Attorney Grievance Commission's Administrative and Procedural Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Section 4-203 states in part: /2 Harris argued below that the trial court had the power to grant his motion to dismiss and to, in effect, remand the case to the Review Board for reconsideration of the charges. Judge Davis rejected this contention: "This Court ... believes that it has jurisdiction to consider the bases set forth in the Motion to Dismiss and make findings of fact as to the factual bases set forth in the Motion to Dismiss; however, within the context of the unique nature of an Attorney Grievance proceeding, it is the Court of Appeals which must determine whether or not the matters alluded to constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the Petition." We agree with this Statement. App. 5 "Transmittal of File by Bar Counsel. Upon the appointment of a Panel, Bar Counsel shall promptly forward the file and record to the Panel Chairman and other Panel members. If Bar Coun- sel determines that the present com- plaint or complaints establish a pat- tern of misconduct similar to past mis- conduct for which sanctions or warn- ings have been issued to the Respon- dent, the file and record shall in- clude a statement of prior sanctions imposed on the Respondent and aiso a Statement of prior warnings issued to the Respondent. Prior sanctions in- clude disbarments, suspensio®s and pub- lic and private reprimands." We find this contention to be without merit. /3 We next consider Harris's due process contentions /4, which we summarize as /3 To the extent the respondent attacks section 4-293 of the Guidelines as violative of due process, our discussion infra of Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 538, 325 A.2d 718, 723- 24 (1974) and Bar Association of Baltimore v. Posner, 275 Md. 250, 255, 339 A.2d 657, 659-60, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975), will suffice to reject tnis contention. /4 Harris also claims he was denied equal protection, but he has not explained his reasons for doing so. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brown, 308 Md. 219, 223, 517 A.2d 111l, 1112 (1986); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Cockrell, 304 Md. 3’9, 393, 499 A.2d 928, 935 (1985). App. 6 follows: 1) respondent was denied the Opportunity to participate in the selection of the Inquiry Panel hearing the complaints against him; 2) a single Inquiry Panel improperly considered four entirely unrelated complaints against respondent, depriving him of a “fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased body, unaffected by notice or knowledge of any complaint other than the one it was initially charged to hear ..."; 3) respondent was precluded from taking part in Review Board proceed- ings, including the selection of partici- pating members; and 4) the Attorney Griev- ance Commission improperly performed as an investigative agency, a prosecuting agency, and a "selecting agency with respect to the persons who (were) to constitute the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board...." /5 /5 Respondent does not argue that those contentions also constitute a violation of the Attorney Grievance Commission's Adminis- trative and Procedural Guidelines. App. 7 Harris's arguments are clearly without merit. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stewart, 285 Md. 25l, 259, 401 A.2d 1926, 1930, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979), we said that proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board are Similar to the proceedings conducted by a grand jury in criminal cases. They are investigatory in nature - designed to aid in determining whether disciplinary action 1s warranted - and informal to the extent that the rules of evidence need not apply. Id., 401 A.2d at 1930. See, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brown, 388 Md. 219, 223, 517 A.2d 11ll, 1113 (1986). Moreover, any irregularity in the proceedings before the Inguiry Panel and the Review Board Ordinarily will not amount to a denial of due process, as long as the lawyer is given notice and an opportunity to defend in a full and fair hearing following the institution of disciplinary proceedings in this Court. Maryland State Bar Association App. 8 v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 538, 325 A.2d 718, 723-24 (1974); Bar Association of Baltimore v. Posner, 275 Md.250, 255, 33p A.2d 657, 659-60, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 19016 (1975). See Stewart, 285 Md. at 259, 481 A.2d at 10830; Brown, 308 Md. at 223, 517 A.2d at lll. In the instant case, Harris was afforded notice and an opportunity to defend ina full and fair hearing following the institution of disciplinary proceedings in cada Court. Accordingly, his various contentions asserting a denial of due process in the Inquiry Panel and Review Board proceedings are without merit. The reasoning of Stewart also disposes Ot Harris's contention that he did not ieee notice before a member of the Inquiry Panel recused himself. Likewise, we reject his assertion that he should have been notified that a new Panel member would be replacing another member at the upcoming App. 9 Inquiry Panel proceedings. If Harris believed any member serving on the Panel should have been disqualified because of conflicting interests, he could have given written notice to the Panel Chairman explaining the basis of the allegation, with copies to the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee “a Bar Counsel. Guidelines, [ ]} [Sec.] 5-181 (b). There is nothing in the record to indicate that he took that action. Moreover, the trial court concluded, and we agree, that Harris has failed to demonstrate a conflict of interest on the part of any Panel member, Or any prejudice to himself as a result of the substitution. Finally, Harris claims the disciplinary petition charged him "with violations as to which he was not charged before the Inquiry Panel and as to which that Panel made no findings...." We reject this contention. Formal charges of misconduct do not exist App. 198 against an attorney until a petition is docketed in this Court. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bailey, 285 Md. 63l, 637, 403 A.2d 1261, 1265 (1979). As long as these charges are “sufficiently clear and specific™ so as to reasonably inform the respondent what he is com7melled to answer for and detend against, Md. Rule BV 9c; Attorney Grievance Commission v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974), and there are no substantive transgressions cf the Commission's own Guidelines or the BV Rules, the respondent is generally precluded from contesting what occurred in the preliminary stages before the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board leading to the - filing of charges in this Court. See Stewart, 285 Md. at 259, 491 A.2d at 1930. See generally Attorney Grievance Commission v. McBurney, 282 Md. 116, 122-24 & n.l, 382 A.2d 58, 62-3 & n.1 (1978). Accordingly, the respondent's first App. ll motion to dismiss is denied. /6 Exception 17 In his second motion to dismiss, Harris alleges that Bar Counsel had an improper ex parte communication with a member of the Inquiry Panel that was considering the complaints against respondent. He argues: "Bar Counsel, in a ex parte manner and without informing Respondent or --- his counsel, improperly, impermis- sibly and unethically attempted to affect and/or did affect the proceed- ings, decision and/or recommendation of said panel and/or its disposition of the matters entrusted to it herein by seeking to change and/or by persuad- ing the panel to change its recommenda- tion herein with respect to the respec- tive complaints of said Delores Green and Anthony Jeter." After a hearing, the trial court rejected Harris's contention, Harris has renewed /6 Although we do not decide whether Md. Rule BV 10 b is an additional basis on which to reject any of Harris's objections, we believe it iS appropriate to draw attention to that rule: "The hearing of charges shall not be stayed or challeneged by reason of any procedural defects alleged to have occurred prior to the filing of charges." ——— — App. 12 his motion before this Court. In support of his contention, Harris submitted an internal memorandum from Bar Counsel's files describing the communica- tion between Bar Counsel and the Inquiry Panel member. It reads as follows: TO BC Docket No. 84-247-4-2 ~ Green/Harris BC Docket No. 84-96-4-2 Jeter/Harris FROM Melvin Hirshman Bar Counsel On July 23, 1985, I read the report of four (4) cases against this Respondent from the Inquiry Panel. The two (2) cases referred to above were reported as recommending that the Respondent be reprimanded. The transcript of their findings of May 6, 1985, indicated that they found the conduct such that he should not re- ceive discipline but should receive a reprimand. I called Katherine Bishop, Chairman of the Panel, and went over the BV Rules to her and explained the difference to her between a warning and a reprimand. She said that she would conter with the other members of her Panel and advise me in a day or so what it was that they intended in these two (2) cases. The two (2) cases in which they recommended Charges and a dismissal are not involv- ed with the problem. Mr. Grossman App. 13 advises me that if the Panel indicates that warnings rather than reprimands were meant, then we will appeal this matter to the Commission at its next meeting.” It is clear from this memorandum, which was written by Bar Counsel to his own files, that Harris's contention must fail. According to the memorandum, the Inquiry Panel in the Green and Jeter cases apparently recommended a disposition which was not recognized in the BV Rules. Upon reading this recommendation, Bar Counsel, by telephone, contacted the chairperson of the Panel to explain the permissible dispositions available under the Rules. The memorandum also reveals that Glenn Grossman, Assistant Ber Counsel, recommended to Bar Counsel that an appeal be filed if the Inquiry Panel sussequently indicated tnat “warnings rather than reprimands were meant." The record is devoid of any evidence that Bar Counsel attempted to influence the Inquiry Panel in App. 14 any way to come forward with a particular outcome. Accordingly, the respondent's second motion to dismiss is denied. re Complaint of Delores Green Exceptions Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14 According to Judge Davis's findings, the Green complaint relates to Harris's representation of Delores Green ina civil action against Action T.V. Rental, Inc. ("Action T.V."), and one of Action TV's employees, James Alexander, for Alexander's allegedly wrongful repossession of a television set which Green was renting (with an option to purchase) from Action TV. The crux of Green's complaint, lodged with the Attorney Grievance Commission sometime in 1984, was that her case against the defendants was dismissed for lack of prosecution. A settlement between Harris, On behalf of Green, and the attorney for Action TV, John H. Doud, III, was App. 15 eventually reached in 1985. As part of the settlement, Green received $758 and a new television set from the defendants. [In addition, Harris gave Green $690. Based on the foregoing, the Commission charged Harris with violating the following ~ disciplinary rules: Disciplinary Rule 1-182 "Misconduct. (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra- tion of justice. Enage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." - re)) Disciplinary Rule 6-191 "Falling to Act Competently. (A) A lawyer shall not: .2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances. (3) Neglect a legal matter en- trusted to him." Disciplinary Rule 7-191 "Representing a Client Zealously App. 16 (A) A lawyer shall not intentional- ly: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objec- tives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Dis- ciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable re- quests of opposing counsel which did not prejudice the rights of nis client, by be- ing punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tac- tics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process. Judge Davis found that the case had been dismissed prior to settlement and conclud- ed: "While it is true that Delores Green agreed to the settlement and may have received all to which she was entitled in her case against Action TV Rental, it is difficult to kmoOw with any certainty whether Green's position was compromised by virtue of the dismissal of her case. It should be noted that the Respond- ent did make a $600.88 contribution to the settlement of Green's case which shows that he desires to make reparations; however, the contribu- tion may also be indicative of Res- pondent's belief that he was less App. 17 7 than diligent in his representation of Green. As a result of the fore- going, I find that Respondent failed to represent his client zealously through reasonably available means permitted by law in violation of Dis- Ciplinary Rule 7-1901(A) (1) and that Respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A) (3)." Judge Davis further concluded that Harris did not violate DR 1-1902(A) (4), (5) and (6), DR 6-101(A) (2), and DR 7-101(A) (2) and (3). Exception No. l Harris contends that Judge Davis's factual finding that “[t]he case was auto- matically dismissed pursuant to Judge Green- feld' “rder of March 24th, 1982" is not Supported by clear and convincing evidence. In a disciplinary action, factual findings are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed on appeal unless determined to oe clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gilbert, 307 Md. 48l, 4902, 515 A.2d 454, 458 (1986); Attorney Griev- ance Commission v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 674, Nee rrr App. 18 496 A.2d 672, 677 (1985) and cases cited therein. Based on our review of the record, we are unable to say that Judge Davis's finding is clearly erroneous. Judge Greenfeld's Order of March 24, 1982, the second of two orders suspending Operation of Md. Rule 538 (now Md. Rule 2- 587), provides: "Plaintiff's Motion to Suspend Opera- tion of Md. Rule 538 GRANTED. Plaintiffs should not be penalized for the Court's failure to rule on Defendant's Demurrer, which was pre- viously filed. Md. Rule 530 shall be suspended for 12 months from today's hearing. If the case is not disposed of with said 12 month period, it shall be automatically dismissed for lack of prosecution." (Emphasis added). t A docket entry on the Green file jacket, dated March 25, 1983, provides: "DISMISSED under Rule 530 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure for lack of prosecution. Judgment absolute in favor of the Defend- ant(s) for costs of suit." Harris argues that Ms. Green's case was "still alive on the docket" when the settlement was reached petween Green and (RE A * ja ee re meee oe) .. > aoe =<, yi it} ced Age a mr SKS Di - _ ; . & a : 2 el 2 —— a a i? eee) n 7 704 or . a i , Oar ca & Saas ' a Pee ; Jap ALE ke ae 4 7 ; ae Se? ee an r ce ie” Sey oe ano ix, » ie =n Ate a Reece eee aa 4 a] eb a F 7 7 DV rn Pee a eee an hf a4 - i ge on aati aT _.e a 7 a ~ a ~ J <7 ! . te a . - a > ieee ee Lee, ee ica E Se es Z paw ei ‘ ne 7 =) ns te ¢ ied a ” ee - a — - = y i i) = 7] ne u _ q iy a ui) : a a a 7, = yay @ YA : ‘7 a . it Ov f ¥ : ae ij _ ‘y ; - L <3 ja et Pe on ne ee . E x 7 pth Ie EL) oie ae ,. es eh.) ae _ = 9 >) ) 3 ae YY & = & - a poet is a ee Se t= —s82) (eta vid i + ee Jae - H ia 1 yaa a nan > oe : ay 7 7 NY Sarees 10 nd A ain ~~ ‘ aro ' 7} vos %, = wk ee ee oy re ee 7 ae aa “so, * " * . 1. oe = rea n ‘yee f 4 : 7 . © 9 4-3 - yy : ao s : : a i an ie 7 en) 7 : 7 > i i. _ 7 7 , 4 ; - : , 1 ih. > s 7 a cy gee - = te co a we ~ we 2 nee * : - _~ aa : | ioc eee a oe eee a - — . a may ery uy “er ey ee oe) a 7 “a App. 19 Action T.V. In support of this argument, Harris contends that the: "court clerk's office had erroneous- ly issued an untimely notice of con- templated dismissal of the case un- der former Maryland Rule 530 before the requisite one year's time, which triggered operation of that cule, had expired. Respondent had filed a motion raising this defect. That occasioned the filing of a motion ne recipiatur by the defend- ant in the case. Those motions still were pending, and thus the case had not been finally dismiss- ed, when it was settled by the res- pondent, Ms. Green having consented to the proposed settlement with full knowledge of all pertinent circumstances," Judge Greenfeld's Order of March 24, 1982, suspending operation of Md. Rule 5320 for one year, unequivocally provides that the case would be dismissed for lack of prosecution if the case was not disposed of Within the twelve month period. Evidence of several post-dismissal pleadings and a post-dismissal settlement between the parties in the circumstances of this case does not overcome the prima facie correctness of Judge Davis's factual find- App. 20 ings. Accordingly, we find no merit to this exception. Exception No. 6 Along the same lines, Harris contends that Judge Davis erred in reaching the following conclusion of law: "I find as a fact that the settle- ment that was reached occurred at a time when the case against Action T.V. Rental had been dismissed." Judge Davis correctly characterized the finding as an issue of fact. For the reasons previously set forth, we find this exception to be without merit. Exception No. 7 Exception 7 relates to Harris's conten- tion below that the case against Action TV never reached disposition due to Harris's inability to secure a trial date. Harris argues that the trial judge erred in reaching the following conclusion of law: "I further find that there is no credible evidence before this Court App. 21 to indicate that [Harris's law clerk] contacted the office of John Doud in regard to scheduling a trial date particularly in light of Doud's assertion that no contact was made with his office prior to the receipt of the May, 1983 letter sent by Respondent." The factfinder determines the weight of the evidence, including whether to believe any witness. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Winters, Md. ’ A.2d (Misc. No. 30, September Term, 1984, slip Oop. at ll (filed June 2, 1987)] and cases cited therein. Under the clearly erroneous Standard, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge. This contention is without merit. Exception No. 8 Harris next excepts to Judge Davis's conclusion that the: "Respondent failed to represent nis client zealously through reasonably available mans permitted by law in violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A) (1) and that Respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to nim in violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-1901(A) (3)." App. 22 The docket entry of March 25, 1983, re- flecting the dismissal of Green's case, pro- vides that judgment absolute was entered in favor of the defendants. [It is our view that Harris violated DR 7-1901(A) (1) and 6-191(A) (3) when his client's case was dis- missed. Hence, we deny this exception. Exception No. 13 Harris contends that Judge Davis erred in finding that: "([Rlespondent's representation of Delores Green ... waS characterized by a cavalier informality, impati- ence with his clients, and a lack = of professionalism." This finding relates to Judge Davis's con- clusion that Harris did not violate subsec- tions (3) and (4) of Disciplinary Rule l- 102. Inasmuch as Bar Counsel has not excepted to this finding and because this finding plays no part in our disposition of the other exceptions, we decline to address this contention, App. 23 Exception No. 14 Finally Harris objects to Judge Davis's conclusion that Harris violated DR 1-102(A) (1), DR 6-101(A) (3), and DR 7-101(A) (1). As we have affirmed the violations of DR 6- 101(A) (3) (Exception 8, supra), and DR 7- 191(A) (1) (Exception 8, supra), it follows that Harris violated DR 1-1@2(A) (1). Accordingly, we reject this exception. Complaint of Grady Jacks, Sr. Exceptions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 Do 1B, Bis Aas Loe 3 According to Judge Davis's findings, Harris began representing Grady Jacks, Sr., in June of 1982. Over the next few years, Harris handled some 19 personal injury Claims for Jacks and nis family. On numerous occasions during this period, Harris gave Mr. and Mrs. Jacks certain monies: some of the sums were personal loans, some were advances against anticipated settlement of the tort claims, App. 24 and others were actual settlement monies. On September 7, 1984, Harris informed Jacks that Jacks owed him some $3,580. Jacks, who disputed the debt, requested an accounting from Harris and filed a complaint against Harris with the Attorney Srievance Commission. As a result of the complaint, Harris froze all settlement funds which he held on behalf of the Jacks family pending resolution of these proceedings. Based on this history, the Commission Charged Harris with violating the following disciplinary rules: Disciplinary Rule 1-192 "Misconduct (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. (2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another. (3) Engage in illegal conduct in- volving moral turpitude. (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra- tion of justice. ee App. 25 (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Disciplinary Rule 5-133 "Avoiding Acquisition of Interest In Litigation. (B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, includ- ing court costs, expenses of in- vestigation, expenses of medic- al examination, and costs of ob- taining and presenting evid- ence, provided the client re- mains ultimately liable for such expenses." Disciplinary Rule 9-192 "Preserving the Identity of Funds and Property of a Client (B) A lawyer shall: (3-) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and Other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render ap- propriate accounts to his client regarding them. (4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by the client the funds, securi- ties, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.” App. 26 Judge Davis concluded that Harris violat- ed DR 1-102(A) (1), DR 5-103(B), and DR 9- 102(B) (3), but did not violate DR 1-102(A) (2), (3) (4)- (5), (6), and DR 9-102(B) (4). Exception No. 2 In this exception, Harris contends that the trial judge erred in making the following findings of fact: "He filed a Demurrer on October 15, 1979 to the Civil Action brought by the Respondent." We agree with Harris that this finding relates to the Green complaint and not the Jacks complaint. Exception 2 is sustained. Exception 3 ‘Harris next challenges Judge Davis's finding that Harris advanced $608.24 to Vincent Stark of Stark Realty Company for a delinquent mortgage payment. We have searched the record and find no clear and convincing evidence to support this finding. Accordingly, Exception 3 is Sustained, App. 27 Exception 4 Harris argues that the trial judge erred in making the following italicized finding: "With respect to the failure of Respondent to give an accounting to Grady Jacks or his family for the 19 cases he handled for them, he offered a letter of Feoruary 14, 1984 as a settlement sheet for the cases referred to therein." As we read Judge Davis's memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions of law, the challenged language is merely a recital of the claims against Harris and not a finding of fact. This exception is denied. Exception 5 In the same vein, Harris claims that the trial judge erred in making the following "finding or conclusion:" "Petitioner asserts that DR 9-192(A) (2) is inapplicable to the present case, since, according to the Peti- tioner, Grady Jacks was not disput- ing the fee due Respondent; hence there was no reason to freeze the funds in Respondent's escrow account." We perceive the quoted passage to be a Summary of one of Bar Counsel's arguments App. 28 rather than a finding of fact or conclusion of law. Accordingly, this exception is without merit. Exception 9 Exception 9 challenges the following con- clusion of law: "The advances, as set forth herein- above, included ... an advance of $608.24 paid to Vincent Stark for delinquent Mortgage payments." We agree with Harris for the reasons set forth in Exception 3. Exception 9 is Sustained, Exception 104 Harris next claims that Judge Davis erred in concluding that Harris violated DR 5-193(B). As previously set forth, DR 5- 193(B) prohibits a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client while representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, except that under some circumstances a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation. App. 29 Judge Davis found that the monies advanced to the Jacks family from Harris included "a $3,509.80 deposit to the seller for the purchase of a house, $2400.90 for settlement on the Allendale Road property, a $332.75 advance for the purchase of a 1977 Cadillac automobile, $1500.90 for the tax and title on tne automobile, ... and $750.80 for the purchase of a video machine." He further found that these sums were in no way advances for the "expenses of litigation." /7 In response to Harris's argument that the monies were not advanced in connection with contemplated or pending litigation lnasmuch as it was Harris's intention to settle the cases out-of-court, Judge Davis concluded: /7 Upon our review of the record, it appears that the $1500.08 was actually for the car and the $332.75 was for the taxes and title. App. 39 "Respondent was authorized to enter Suit at any time under the provi- sions of the retainer agreement ex- ecuted in each case. Each agree- ment further contained a provision regarding the contingent fee wheth- er recovery was effectuated by a law suit or by settlement. [In fact, Respondent did file suit in 1984. Finally, an attorney would be remiss if he undertook represent- ation of his client without being prepared, if the eventuality arose, to pursue the course to whatever end the pre-litigation negotiations required. To do less would not be to properly represent his client." We agree with Judge Davis and deny Excep- tion 10. Exception ll In this exception, Harris challenges Judge Davis's conclusion that: "fHarris] failed to maintain com- plete records of all funds, secur- ities, and other properties of his client coming into the possession of the lawyer and to render approp- riate accounts to his clients re- garding them in violation of Disci- plinary Rule 9-1902(B) (3)." Based on our review of the record, we Cannot say that Judge Davis's conclusion was in error. Accordingly, we deny this exception, App. 3l Exception 12 Harris also challenges the trial judge's conclusion that Harris violated a disciplinary rule contrary to DR 1-102(A) (1). As we have affirmed violations of DR 5-1093(B) (Exception 10, supra) and DR 9-132 (B) (3) (Exception 11, Supra) with respect to Harris's representation of Jacks, this exception is without merit. Exception 13 Exception 13 is set forth in our discussion of the Green complaint, supra. For the same reasons, it is denied with regard to the Jacks complaint. Exception 15 Finally, Harris challenges Judge Davis's conclusion that Harris violated DR 1-1%32(A) (1), DR 5-103(B), and DR 9-192(B) (3). We have addressed these contentions in previous exceptions and have found them to be without merit. Exception 15 is denied. App. 32 IV Petitioner's Exception Bar Counsel excepts to Judge Davis's failure to find a violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B) (4). Judge Davis found there was no clear and convincing evidence to Support the conclusion that Harris violated DR 9-192(B) (4). Based on our review of the record, we are unable to say that Judge Davis's finding is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this exception is denied. V Sanction The severity of the sanction to be imposed depends upon the facts and circum- Stances of each case. Attorney Grievance “ommission v. Brown, 308 Md. 219, 236, 517 A.2d llll, 1119 (1986). With respect to the charges in connection with Harris's representation of Delores Green, we have upheld Judge Davis's conclusion that Harris neglected a legal matter in violation of DR App. 33 6-181(A) (3), failed to represent his client zealously in violation of DR 7- 101(A) (1), and violated a disciplinary rule in contravention of DR 1-102(A) (1). With respect to the charges in connection with Harris's representation of the Jacks family, we have upheld Judge Davis's conclusion that Harris advanced financial assistance to his client in violation of DR 5-183(B), failed to maintain complete records and render appropriate accounts in violation of DR 9-102(B) (3), and violated a disciplinary rule in contravention of DR 1-102(A) (1). The Commission seeks a nine month suspension. It cites Bar Association of Baltimore City v. Cockrell, 274 Md. 279, 334 A.2d 85 (1975). Considering all the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the appropriate sanction to be imposed is suspension from the practice of law in this State for six months. We recognize that Harris has had App. 34 no disciplinary action taken against him Since his admission to the bar in 1968. Nevertheless, the violations here are sufficiently serious to warrant suspension for this length of time. The suspension Shall begin thirty days after the filing of the opinion in this case and shall continue thereafter until Harris has paid his portion of costs in this case. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT TO PAY TWO-THIRDS AND THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION TO PAY ONE-THIRD OF THE COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE BV15 c. FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST ALAN EDGAR HARRIS. App. 35 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE >: .IN THE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Petitioner MISC. DOCKET (BV) 51 Vv. : SEPTEMBER TERM 1985 IN THE : CERCOLT COURT FOR ALAN EDGAR HARRIS BALTIMORE CITY Respondent DP-38 NO. 51 MEMORANDUM OF FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Petition of the Attorney Grievance Commission ("The Commission") in requesting disciplinary action against the Respondent and its answer filed thereto came on before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on September 1l, 1986 and October 14 and 16, November 20, 1986 and January 19, 1987. The testimony offered at that hearing together with the Exhibits received established a clear and convincing evidence of the following facts relevant to this controversy. On September 11, 1986, App. 36 The Commission proceeded with the complaint of Delores Green against the Respondent which grew out of the case of Green v. Action TV-Rental in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. Called to testify for The Commission were John Doud, Esquire, an attorney with the firm of Fedder and Garten (who represented Action TV Rental) and the Complainant, Delores Green. Ms. Green had retained the Respondent to file Suit against Action TV Rental on the basis that an employee of Action TV Rental had broken into her home to repossess a television set on behalf of the Company. The employee, Jim Alexander, allegedly pushed Ms. Green out of the way, throwing her against the door and then pushed her daughter, Veronica Wilkerson, while at the house. Ms. Green claimed her shoulder and/or back were injured when she became involved in the altercation with Mr. Alexander. Ms. Green called the police and App. 37 Alexander was apprehended. Delores Green thereafter retained the Respondent to ° defend her against charges of assault and battery by the employee of Action TV Rental and to assist her in her cross-complaint against Alexander. The Respondent was also retained to institute a civil case against Action TV Rental. Delores Green asserted that she discussed her case against Action TV Rental with Respondent sometime in 1984: "I asked nim how the case was and at the time he told me the case had been dismissed and he had to leave, he didn't have time to talk to me and he would send me papers on what happened with the case." It was at that point that she telephoned the Attorney Grievance Commission to file her complaint. Within two weeks after advising Green that the case had been . dismissed, Respondent forwarded a letter that “recorded step by step everything he had done." Ultimately, Green received a new color television set in settlement oft App. 38 the case against Action TV Rental, the Complainant having made all of the payments on the original contract with the exception . of the last payment. The employee of Action TV Rental had broken the original television set with a cinder block when told by police that he could not take the television set away. John Doud testified that he filed a Demurrer on October 15, 1979 to the civil action brought by the Respondent. According to Doud, the Plaintiff's Motion to Suspend Maryland Rule 5398 was granted for a period of a year in March of 1982. Doud claimed that he had no discussion with his client between the time of filing of the Demurrer and March of 1982. The case ° was automatically dismissed pursuant to Judge Greenfeld's Order of March 24th, 1982. When asked the reason given by Respondent as to why tne dismissal of the Green matter should have been vacated, Doud App. 39 responded that Respondent had sent him a letter asserting that Respondent's law . clerk had contacted Doud's office to attempt to arrange a scheduling of the trial date and that Respondent was unable to get cooperation from Doud's office or to agree upon a trial date. According to Doud, he had no recollection of any contact from Respondent's oftice and that he further indicated tht the file did not reflect any communication or correspondence from Respondent at any time prior to requesting cooperation in setting a trial date. Doud further testified that the case was settled for $750.@00 in cash and a console television set. Respondent avers that Green "did not suffer any detriment from Respondent's activities” by reason of her receipt of "an adequate settlement", according to Respondent's evaluation of the claim. He points to the fact that, notwithstanding ii ¥ 7 - » ae 3 B i] - F “er , ee. J — A a “nd st a - i ay le st - ae . fr a Coen = I oa a 7 7 4 Rail | y —_ t on _ - } — — - ~ . a * e a : ‘ * A 1 > ¢ 2 ‘ a e ae - « e - — ‘ " _ = Ly = ond . App. 4@ that former Rule 530 had been invoked, settlement was nevertheless accomplished. Respondent further alludes to the fact that he made a $680.80 contribution to the settlement: "I paid $680.90 because I have a law practice. If I try the case I still will probably wind up losing. A lawyer's time and advice are his stock and trade and Mr. Grossman I don't know whether you are aware of the cost of trying a case. If you try a case, it's going to cost you anywhere from $12,000.99 to put a jury in the box and to -=- and the Court system -- I, aS an attorney try to settle a case if I can. I settle a case for economic reasons." oT ~ Respondent explained that prior to March, 1982, he never contacted the Court to attempt to have a hearing on the Demurrer because the Court was "so back- logged that you could write, you could stand on your head and you could talk yourself plue in the face." When asked whether a Motion filed by Respondent for Suspension of Maryland Rule 530 had precipitated a Motion Ne — App. 41 Recipiatur, Respondent replied: "That's correct. After I receive a Motion Ne Re then I went over and I sometime after that when I got a chance to read the Motion Ne Re I found out the case had an entry that was posted, obviously, was posted after April 25th. The case had not actually been dismissed in March. It had been written in as actual entry as having been dismiss- ed after April 25 so it may have been sometime in May that it was Gismissed. The Clerk's office ob- vioulsy [sic] had destroyed the notice of contemplated dismissal, which I sent to them, the March 25 entry was made. * * * * On the fifth day of May, 1983 I Filed a Motion for Suspension of Maryland Rule 538, that was filed by May 16. What happened was I mailed Mr. Doud his copy and then it took me awhile to get over to Court and I filed, I actually filed his response to the Motion, his oe- ing dated May 13, 1983 having been filed and mine having been dated-- May 16, 1983. And this file has been taken away from the Clerk's office, and the papers are not in order, there are notations on it, this one said filed late. I don't recall that ever being in the file of the Clerk's office. I think there may have been--it's been out of the custody of the Court and not in the Clerk's Office where it be- longs and in possession of Mr.Gross- man and it's not in proper order." App. 42 Considering the complaint of Grady Jacks, Respondent began representing the Jacks family around June 23, 1982. He filed a Demurrer on October 15, 1979 to the Civil Action brought by the Respondent. Over a period of time, Respondent handled some 19 accident cases involving the Jacks family. In each case, a retainer agreement was executed which contained a Power of At- torney authorizing Respondent to make pay- ments from proceeds received. At various times after June 23rd, 1982, the Respondent advanced monies to William Jacks and to Grady and Mrs. Jacks. Advances had been made to the Jacks family including a $3,500.00 deposit to the seller, $2,490.89 for settlement on the Allendale Road Proper- ty, a $332.75 advance for the purchase of a 1977 Cadillac automobile, $1,500.99 for the tax and title on the automobile and an advance of $608.24 paid to Vincent Stark of Stark Realty Company for delinquent App. 43 Mortgage payments for the months of April and May, 1984. Jacks also obtained $758.90 from Respondent to purchase a video machine. Jacks estimated that the loans received from Respondent totalled approxi- mately $8,000.80 to $9,020.90. When asked when he first demanded an accounting, Jacks respondent [sic] "shortly after Mr. Harris was with my first case in 1982 with The Mayor and City Council v. Diamond Cab Company." At a later point in the proceedings, Jacks asserted that he could not say how much Respondent owed him currently because he "would need to know (myself) what each case was wegen, * He estimated that the total of all of the cases would have come to $35,000.90. Jacks, on cross-examination, acknowledged that he "may have" told the panel that $16,090.08 was the amount owed him by the Respondent. Jacks later conceded that a letter dated February 14 from the Respon- App. 44 dent referring to a check in the amount of $3792.62 represented the difference between the $14,158.08 proceeds and "total amount of indebtedness to my office and me, personally." Respondent takes the position that monies paid to Mr. Jacks and members of his family were paid against P.I.P. sums re- ceived. Respondent principally argues, how- ever, that the loans made to the Jacks fam- ily were not made while he represented the Jacks family in connection with "contemplat- ed or pending litigation." With respect to the failure of Respond- ent to give an accounting to Grady Jacks or his family for the 19 cases that he handled for them, he offered a letter otf February 14, 1984 as the settlement sheet for the cases referenced therein. Additionally, Respondent asserted that he reviewed with Jacks and his family certain ledger cards App. 45 containing information regarding the cases he was handling. . Petitioner asserts that DR9-192(A)(2) is inapplicable to the present case, since, according to Petitioner, Grady Jacks was not disputing the fee due Respondent; hence there was no reason to freeze the funds in Respondent's escrow account. Finally, regarding the claim of Grady Jacks, Respon- dent asserts that his client authorized a payment of a fee of $1252.57 notwithstand- ing that the initial retainer agreement with Mr. Jacks called for the payment of a fee of $1,066.67, representing one third of the $3,200.00 recovery. With respect to the claim of Anthony Jeter growing out of his action against Chong Nim Lee, the Petitioner asserts that Respondent has violated tne Disciplinary Rules by reason of an alleged failure to file answers to interrogatories for a period in excess of one year and a further App. 46 failure to have the case placed on the trial docket until October 19, 1984. Ser- vice of process had been effectuated on Lee December 3, 1980. Respondent received the answers to interrogatories from Anthony Jeter on August lst and 2nd, 1982. The time to respond to the interrogatories had been extended pursuant to Respondent's re- guest. Respondent had written to Counsel for the Defendant advising of certain diffi- culties in representing Jeter because the latter was at the time incarcerated. On July 13, 1983, Respondent forwarded unex- ecuted answers to the interrogatories to counsel for the Defendant. In September of 1983, the answers were filed. In support of its allegations, The Commission alludes to Respondent's representation to counsel for the Defendant that he would have to meet with Jeter's Counselor, but Respondent failed to follow through and visit his cli- ent's Counselor. Penultimately, Petitioner App. 47 asserts Respondent's failure to place the case on the trial docket was the result of neglect rther than a tactical decision. Respondent had submitted that the decision to defer proceeding in the case was bottom- ed on the consideration that Jeter's abil- ity to recover would be hampered by know- ledge of nis status aS a prisoner during a trial. The Commission cites the fact that Respondent failed to make mention of his Strategy of not going forward in his answer wherein he indicated that the Plaintiff would be present pursuant to a Writ of Habeas Corpus "if there is a trial date assigned to this case... ." Petitioner further alludes to a letter from Respondent to Jeter in which Respondent suggested there would be a break in his case load and he would be able to "give some attention to [your] case." App. 48 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent relies primarily on the fact that Delores Green agreed to and received a settlement in her case against Action TV Rental in conjunction with his assertion that Green herself had brandished a pair of scissors giving rise to the criminal action against her which had to be defended. I find as a fact that the settlement that was reached occurred at a time when the case against Action TV Rental had been dismiss- ed. I further find that there is no cred- ible evidence before this Court to indicate that Jonathan Resnick contacted the office of John Doud in regard to scheduling a trial date particularly in light of Doud's assertion that no contact was made with nis office prior to the receipt of the May, 1983 letter sent by Respondent. While it is true that Delores Green agreed to the settlement and may have re- ceived all to which she was entitled in her App. 49 case against Action TV Rental, it is diffi- cult to know with any certainty whether Green's position was compromised by virtue of the dismissal of her case. [It should be noted that the Respondent did make a $680.98 contribution to the settlement of Green's case which shows that he desired to make reparations; however, the contribution may also be indicative of Respondent's be- lief that he was less than diligent in his representation of Green. As a result of the aforegoing [sic], I find that Respond- ent failed to represent his client zealous- ly through reasonably available means per- mitted by law in violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-181 (A) (1) and that Respondent neg- lected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-191 (A) (3). In answer to the allegation that Respon- ‘dent improperly advanced monies or guaran- teed financial assistance to Grady Jacks, App. 5@ he contends: (1) that the monies paid to Grady Jacks and his family were advances against P.I.P. proceeds; and (2) that the loans made to the Jacks family were not made in connection with cases where there was “contemplated or pending litigation." Considering the last contention first, there is without question clear and convincing evidence that the monies advanced were for sums far in excess and wholly unrelated to the Personal Injury Protection proceeds received. DR 5-193 (B) provides: "While representing a client in con- nection with contemplated or pend- ing litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guaran- tee the expenses of litigation, in- cluding Court costs, expenses of in- vestigation, expenses of medical ex- amination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses." There had been testimony that monies were paid for transportation for the Jacks App. 51 family to and from Respondent's office and to other places in connection with the cases in which Respondent represented them. The advances, as set forth hereinbe- fore, included a $3,588.00 deposit to the seller for the purchase of a house, $2488.90 for settlement on the Allendale Road property, a $332.75 advance for the purchase of a 1977 Cadillac automobile, $1500.00 for the tax and title on the automobile, an advance of $608.24 paid to Vincent Stark for delinquent Mortgage payments, and $758.90 for the purchase of a video machine. It is clear that those sums were in-no way advanced for the "expenses of litigation" as the purposes are clearly set forth. Additionally, Respondent was authorized to enter suit at any time under the provisions of the retainer agreement executed in each case. Each agreement further contained a provision regarding the contingent fee whether recovery was App. 52 effectuated by a law suit or by settle- ment. In fact, Respondent did file suit in 1984. Finally, an attorney would be remiss if he undertook representation of his client without being prepared, if the eventuality arose, to pursue the cause to whatever end the pre-litigation negotia- tions required. To do less would be not to properly represent his client. Concerning the allegation that Respond- ent failed to make a proper accounting to Grady Jacks, he asserts that (1) a letter dated February 14, 1984 served as a settlement sheet for the cases referenced therein (2) a ledger sheet prepared by Melville Harris, Respondent's fatner, was reviewed with tne client; (3) and that many of nis records had been submitted to the Circuit Court No. 2 in connection with his divorce suit, Frances Harris v. Alan Edgar Harris. At the outset, it is axiomatic that it = .a = App. 53 is preferable for a private practioner to use a settlement sheet in which the amount of the proceeds received as well as all itemized expenses are set forth thereon. Such a settlement sheet would have avoided the dispute as to whether or not Grady Jacks and his family had receivéd all to which they were entitled. More specitfrical- ly, however, the disbursement contained on Respondent's ledger sheet was incomplete. The $332.75 “personal loan” paid to Grady Jacks for Johnnies' auto sales was not contained thereon. Additionally, certain sums of money were retained in Respondent's ‘escrow account on behalf of the Jacks family, notwithstanding that Respondent averred that he did not owe Jacks any additional funds. The letter of Feodruary 14, 1984 was limited in scope and did not detail disboursements for medical care and other expenses in connection with the cases App. 54 involved. From the aforegoing [sic], there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent, while representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, advanced or guaranteed finan- cial assistance to his client in violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-183 (B) and that Said advances were not to cover the ex- penses of litigation, Court costs, expenses of investigation or medical examination for presentation of evidence. There is further clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has failed to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and prop- erties of his client coming into the posses- sion of the lawyer and to render appropri- ate accounts to his clients regarding them — in violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-132 (B) (3). See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Engerman, 289 Md. 330, 424 A.2d 362 (1981) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Cockrell, 274 Md. 279, 334 A.2d 85 (1975) App. 55 for discussion of advancing financial assistance beyond the expenses of litigation. See also Attorney Grievance Commission v.Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 496 A.2d 672 (1985) for discussion of failure to maintain complete records of client's property. Considering the allegation that Respond- ent failed to promptly pay over funds belonging to his client, Respondent contends that he failed to do so because there was a dispute as to the amount owed and Respondent was further consumed by the divorce proceedings initiated against him by his wife. While the asserted dispute was primarily the result of Respondent's practices, this Court cannot say that the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent failed to promptly pay or deliver to his client as requested by the client funds, securities or other properties in the possession of the lawyer App. 56 as required by Disciplinary Rule 9-192 (B) (4). Neither is this Court satisfied that the evidence is clear and convincing that, with respect to the case of Grady Jacks, Respondent's practices constitute illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, that Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre- sentation, or that the conduct complained of is prejudicial to the administration of justice as proscribed by Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (3), (4), and (5). There is, however, clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did violate a Disciplinary Rule in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (1). Anthony Jeter appeared and was gquestion- ed briefly at a hearing before this Court on September 1l, 1986, but complained of a severe headache and asked to be excused. On succeeding occasions, various excuses were presented by Mr. Jeter as to why he was App. 57 unable to appear before this Court to present testimony regarding his case. This Court therefore has before it principally the record of the civil case, Jeter v. Chong Nim Lee, et al., Case #29397 in the Baltimore City Court of Common Pleas, exhibd- its submitted by Petitioner and the testimony of Respondent. In response to the allegations contained in the Petition for Disciplinary Action, Respondent con- tends that he advised Jeter that appearing before a jury while incarcerated (requiring that he be accompanied at trial by a prison guard) could affect the outcome of his case. This Court having reviewed the record of the proceedings in Jeter v. Chong Nim Lee as well as the records submitted boy The Commission regarding Jeter's complaint, I conclude that the evidence is not clear and convincing regarding Respondent's violation of DR 1-162 (A) (1) (6), DR 6-161 (A) (3) or DR 7-101 (A) (1), (2) and (3). App. 58 While this Court does not believe that Res- pondent did all that he could in pursuing the claim on behalf of Mr. Jeter, particu- larly regarding the Interrogatories that were to be answered, the void created by Anthony Jeter's reluctance to testify or his physical incapacity as well as the reasonableness of Counsel's advice not to proceed at a time when Jeter would have to appear in front of a jury when he was obdvi- ously incarcerated precludes this Court from finding that Respondent acted contrary to the best interest of his client. In conclusion, although this Court does not find that there has been presented clear and convincing evidence of disnones- ty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or moral turpitude, Respondent's representa- tion of Delores Green and Grady Jacks was characterized by a cavalier informality, impatience witn his clients, and a lack of professionalism. Respondent was, no Coubt, App. 59 distracted from his professional responsib- ilities oy his divorce case, but used this as an excuse in his dealings with his clients. The same lack of zeal and dili- gence extant in the Green and Jacks cases is indicated in the Jeter case notwitnstand- ing that the evidence presented does not, in the Court's view, rise to the level requisite in Disciplinary proceedings. From the aforegoing [sic], I find as follows: as to the complaint of Delores Green, Respondent violated DR 1-102 (A) (1), DR 6-101 (A) (3), DR 7-101 (A) (1). I find that Respondent did not violate DR l- 102 (4) (5) and (6), DR 6-202 (A) (2), DR 7- 101 (A) (2) (3). As to tne complaint of Grady Jacks, Respondent violated DR 1-192 (A) (1),- DR 5-183 (B), DR9-102 (B) (3). I find that Respondent did not violate DR l- 102 (A) (2)-4 (3)6 (4) (S)e (6) DR 9-192 (B) (4). As to the claim of Anthony Jeter, while the evidence presented indicates a App. 60 lack of diligence by Respondent, I do not find that the evidence is clear and “s,s convincing that the Respondent violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102 (A) (1) and (6), 6-101 (A) (3) and 7-101 (A) (1) (2) and (3). ARRIE W. DAVIS, JUDGE February ll, 1987 cc: Benjamin Lipsitz Counsel for Respondent Glenn M. Grossman Assistant Bar Counsel Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland w ee App. 61 COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND * * * * * July 30, 1987 Glenn Grossman, Esquire Attorney Grievance Commission Fourth Floor, District Court Building Annapolis, Maryland 21441 Re: Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Alan Edgar Harris Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 5l September Term, 1985 7 Dear Mr. Grossman: Please find enclosed a copy of the Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals filed today in the above entitled matter. Very truly yours, /s/ Alexander L. Cummings /t/ Alexander L. Cummings, Clerk ALC/fmw Enclosure cc: The Honorable Arrie E. Davis Benjamin Lipsitz, Esquire Alan Edgar Harris, Esquire \s 4 App. 62 COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND * * * * * September 9, 1987 Benjamin Lipsitz, Esquire Suite 182 Baltimore Federal South Building 6689 Reisterstown Road = Baltimore, Maryland 21215 Re: Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Alan Edgar Harris Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 51 September Term, 1985 Dear Mr. Lipsitz: In reference to the Motion for Recon- Sideration which you filed on behalf of the respondent in the above-captioned case, please be advised that on September 8, 1987, the Court denied the Motion for Recon- Sideration,. Very truly yours, /s/ Alexander L. Cummings /t/ Alexander L. Cummings, Clerk ALC: Emw Glenn Grossman, Esquire --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0524%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.