# Opposition Brief — City of St. Louis v. Jamison > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0520%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1988 - **Citation:** 485 U.S. 987 ## Text No. 87-943 In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1987 ty _— CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Petitioner, vs. JESSE WOODSON JAMISON, Respondent. Ly Vw BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT .f'> ae Scuwartz, Herman & Davimson *Rospert Herman Mutton L. Scowarrz 1221 Locust, Suite 750 St. Louis, MO 63103 (314) 231-0600 Attorney for Respondent Jamison *Counsel of Record COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 or call collect (402) 342-2831 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Authorities ii Reasons for Denying the Writ 1 I. The Solicitation Rule Adopted By The City of II. Ill. ) | RBar cet ae eae St. Louis Recognizes the Public Forum Status of Unrestricted Areas of the Airport. ..... Airport Director Griggs Exercised Complete and Unguided Discretion In Denying Plaintiff-Re- spondent’s Application to Exercise His First Amendment Rights at the-Airport. 20 Airport Director Griggs’ Attempt to Bar All Per- sons Who Have A History of Mental Illness From the Airport Is Not A Reasonable Time, Place or Manner Regulation Because It Is Not Content Neutral, Is Overbroad and Overinclusive and Violates Equal Protection of the Laws. ........ 4 5 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CasEs Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2668 (1987) re 3, 4 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) 0. = 2 Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Edu- cators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 4 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 5 REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT This Court should deny this Petition for Writ of Cer- tiorari because this case does not present any questions of general importance which should be considered by this Court. The issues presented to the District Court and to the Eighth Circuit in this case are whether the unrestricted . areas in the Lambert-St. Louis International Airport are a public forum available for the expression of first amend- ment rights and whether Plaintiff-Respondent Jamison’s request to silently protest was unconstitutionally denied. This issue was effectively decided in Plaintiff-Respon- dent’s favor by the City’s adoption of an airport ‘‘Solici- tation Rule’’ which designated unrestricted areas of the airport as being held oper for first amendment expression. In ruling for the Plaintiff-Respondent, the Eighth Circuit followed precedents established by this Court and held that the unrestricted areas of the airport had been established by the City as a public forum and that the denial of Jami- son’s request was unconstitutional. I. The Solicitation Rule Adopted By The City of St. Louis Recognizes the Public Forum Status of Un- restricted Areas of the Airport. In determining that unrestricted areas of the Lam- bert-St. Louis International Airport constitute a public forum, the Eighth Circuit cited the Airport’s Solicitation Rule, Section 1.05, which states that ‘‘any person or or- ganization desiring to engage in activities at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport which involves the exercise of constitutional freedoms . . . shall be protected in such ac- tivities... .’’ Appendix, A-25. The rule’s stated intent is to ‘‘insure that persons seeking to exercise constitutional 1 a sl 2 freedoms of expression can communicate effectively with users of the Airport.’’ Appendix, A-25. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the ‘‘City’s regu- lations thus implicitly acknowledge that the first amend- ment activities that take place in more traditional public forums are not incompatible with the purposes of an air- port’s public concourses.’’ Cf. Grayned v. City of Rock- ford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Appendix, A-6. (‘‘crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place . 2°?) The Eighth Circuit followed a long line of cases both from the state and federal levels which have unanimously held that an airport is a public forum in which first amend- ment activities are protected. Appendix, A-6. However, rather than blindly following precedent, the Court relied heavily upon the City’s ‘‘implicit acknowledgment that the concourse of a large airport facility like the one in St. Louis has the character, pattern of activity, and nature of purpose that makes it an appropriate place for the com- munication of views.’’ Appendix, A-7. II. Airport Director Griggs Exercised Complete and Unguided Discretion In Denying Plaintiff-Respon- dent’s Application to Exercise His First Amend- ment Rights at the Airport. “ In light of the publie character of the concourses of Lambert-St. Louis International Airport and Solicitation Rule 1.05, which acknowledges the Airport’s public forum status, the complete and unguided discretion exercised by the Airport Director in denying Plaintiff-Respondent’s application to protest is inconsistent with the preservation ~2 } 3 of first amendment rights. Defendants have asserted that Airport Director Griggs’ previous refusals to obey the procedures established under Rule 1.05 somehow caused the Rule to be ‘‘moribund”’ at the time of Jamison’s re- quest to exercise his first amendment rights. Upon the asserted nullification of the Rule, Defendants argue that Director Griggs acquired general discretion to disallow any activities that, in his opinion, would not be in the best interests of the airport or persons using it. This practice resulted in the denial of all requests for permission to protest or solicit except those mandated by court order. The Eighth Cireuit rejected such practice which: makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedom which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncon- trolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the dis- cretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censor- ship of prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. Appendix, A-8. In Board of Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S.Ct. 2568 (1987), decided last term, this Court rejected an airport regulation which purported to prohibit all ‘‘non- airport related’’ speech on the grounds that such regula-_ tion would give airport officials the unconstitutional power ‘*to decide in the first instance whether a given act is airport related.’’ Jews for Jesus, supra, 107 S.Ct. 2568 at 2573. The exercise of broad discretion by Airport Di- rector Griggs in this case would likewise cause ‘‘immeas- urable injury’’ towards Plaintiff-Respondent and all per- sons who wished to exercise their first amendment free- doms at the airport. 4 Finally, the Ei¢ehth Cirenit held that the City’s prac- tices were not narrowly tailored to serve compelling gov- ernmental purposes. Director Griggs testified that he routinely refused all requests to protest or solicit except those mandated by court order. A rule banning all first amendment activity is clearly overbroad and unconstitu- tional. Jews for Jesus, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 2571. III. Airport Director Griggs’ Attempt to Bar All Per- sons Who Have A History of Mental Illness From the Airport Is Not A Reasonable Time, Place or Manner Regulation Because It Is Not Content Neu- tral, Is Overbroad and Overinclusive and Violates Equal Protection of the Laws. The Eighth Cireuit held that the City of St. Lonis and its Airport Director failed to demonstrate that a broad exciusion of all persons suffering from some form of mental illness would further the City’s interest in seeur- ity and operational efficiency. Appendix, A-10. In de- termining that the government may regulate the time, place and manner of expression in public forums, the Eighth Circuit turned to the well-established maxim that such regulations must be ‘‘content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.’ Perri y Education Ass’x ‘supra, 460 U.S. at 45. Appendix, A-9. The Eighth Cireuit rejected the City’s argument that persons, including Jamison, who have mental illnesses ‘‘which increase their propensity for violent or disruptive conduct,’’ can be uniformly deprived of their first amend- ment rights as being an ‘‘overbroad and constitutionally offensive prohibition.’’ Appendix, A-10. After deter- mining that the evidence did not demonstrate that Jamison, himself, would in fact pose a danger to the public, the Eighth Cireuit found support in this Court’s language from Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969): ‘‘[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.’’ Appendix, A-10. Ly w CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this case does not present any question of general importance which should be con- sidered by this Court, nor does the Eighth Circuit opinion in Jamison v. City of St. Louis conflict with holdings among other circuits, and the Petition for a Writ of Cer- tiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the Eighth Circuit should be denied. Respectfully submitted, Scuwartz, Herman & Davipson Rosert Herman 1221 Locust, Suite 750 St. Louis, MO 63103 (314) 231-0600 This brief was prepared with the assistance of William J. Balmer. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0520%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.