# Opposition Brief — Neal v. Midwestern Distribution, Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0214%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 934

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S. |
FILED *

MAR 4 W6T

IOL, JR,
CLERK

No. 86-1269 %

IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1986

HENRY NEAL,
Administrator of the Estate of
ROGER F. STROH
Petitioner,

V.

MIDWESTERN DISTRIBUTION, INC.
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James H. Anderson

(Counsel of Record)

Alex L. Holtsford, Jr.

Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco,
Cole & Black

Post Office Box 116

Montgomery, Alabama 36195

(205) 834-7600

Attorneys for Respondent

i

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW

(1) Does a conflict exist between the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal involving interpretation of 49 U.S.C. §§
10927 (a) (1) and 11107 (a)?

(2) Should this Honorable Court review a conflict among
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals involving state sub-
stantive law questions?

ii
LIST OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS

In accordance with Rule 28.1 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the following is a list of corporate
affiliates of Midwestern Distribution, Inc.:

Midwestern Distribution, Inc.
Leaseway Transportation, Inc.
Allstate Insurance Company
Northbrook Insurance Company
Sears, Roebuck & Company

Mission Insurance Company
National Union Insurance Company
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW i
LIST OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS -_.....--_- il
UE I iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE l
Aen We Bete AMOUR 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT . 3

CONCLUSION _... 7

Iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Alford v. Major, 470 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1972)

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206 (11th cir. | RF tei, Se

Bryant v. Refrigerated Transport Co., 418 So.2d 281
(te: Det UL Age. Tyee)

Garrett v. Superior Trucking Co., 162 Ga. App.

558, 290 S.E.2d 528 (1982) Siesta Lt

Price v. Westmoreland, 727 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1984)

Proctor v. Colonial Refrigerated Transportation,

Inc., 494 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1974)

Riddle v. Trans-Cold peer: Inc., 530 F. staal
186 (S.D. Ill. 1982) - ;

Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202,

58 S.Ct. 860, 82 L.Ed. 1290 (1938) -

Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller
Freight Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 96 S.Ct. 229,
46 L.Ed.2d 169 (1975)

White v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 50
(5th Cir.) , cert. denied 444 U.S. 965,
100 S.Ct. 452, 62 L.Ed.2d 377 (1979)

No. 86-1269

IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1986

HENRY NEAL,
Administrator of the Estate of
ROGER F. STROH

Petitioner,
v.
MIDWESTERN DISTRIBUTION, INC.
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a wrongful death case brought by the administrator
of a deceased truck driver's estate against Midwestern Distribu-
tion, Inc. (““Midwestern”) , the company which was the lessee
of the truck in which the deceased (“‘Stroh’’) was killed. Mid-
western leased the truck from a corporation, Tractor 6540, Inc.,
and Stroh was one of two truck drivers who were alternating
the driving duties for Tractor 6540. Petitioner’s theory of lia-

2

bility against Midwestern is that 49 U.S.C. §§ 10927 (a) (1) and
11107(4) and the implementing regulation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission place the responsibility for Stroh’s
death on the lessee carrier, Midwestern.

The district court held, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
that the statutory scheme in question is intended to protect
only “members of the public,” and Stroh, as an employee of
the lessor and a “statutory employee” of Midwestern, does not
fall within the protected class of “members of the public.”
Consequently, summary judgment was entered and later af-
firmed in favor of Midwestern because the aforesaid federal
statutes did not create a cause of action for Stroh and state
worker’s compensation law barred any other possible cause of
action in tort.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Petitioner brought this tort action based on a theory of lia-
bility grounded in Interstate Commerce Commission regula-
tions. Undoubtedly, those federal statutes and regulations
create a cause of action only for “members of the public.”
These statutory laws were intended to destroy independent
contractor status for lessors of trucks engaged in interstate com-
merce so that an injured member of the public could recover
for his injuries from the more financially stable lessee carriers.
Petitioner argues that these regulations also apply to drivers
employed by the lessor so as to allow those drivers to recover
for their injuries against the lessee carriers. This argument is
made even though there is no dispute that the driver is also a
“statutory employee” of the lessee carrier.

It is the respondent’s position that such broadening of the
statutory regulations was not intended by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission or by Congress. As federal law does not
create a cause of action for Petitioner, any available cause of
action is controlled by state law and does not justify review by
this Honorable Court.

3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. No Conflict Exists Between The United States Courts
of Appeal Involving Interpretation of 49 U.S.C. §§
10927 (a) (1) and 11107(4).

Petitioner asserts that a “conflict’’ exists between the United
States Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits involving the interpretation of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10927 (a) (1)
and 11107 (4) and the statutes’ implementing regulation. The
asserted ‘‘conflict’”’ is artificially created by Petitioner’s misin-
terpretation of the cases and misguided reliance on dictum
within those cases. The alleged ‘‘conflict’’ does not constitute
a genuine conflict among circuits so as to justify this Court’s
granting of certiorari.

The Eleventh Circuit’s underlying holding in this case is that
the aforecited federal statutes do not create a cause of action
for Stroh because he was a statutory employee of Midwestern,
and therefore was not within the protected “member of the
public” class. This is the key issue for the resolution of the
merits of this case; i.e., whether a ‘statutory employee’’ of a
lessee carrier is a “member of the public’’ entitled to protec-
tion under the federal statutes.

The Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the federal statutes in
question do not supply Stroh with a cause of action echoes the
precise holding of White v. Excalibur Insurance Co., 599 F.2d
50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 965, 100 S.Ct. 452, 62
L.Ed.2d 377 (1979). Pursuant to the case of Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (llth Cir. 1981), White is binding
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit for the case at hand. The
Eleventh Circuit correctly analyzed, followed, and applied
White to the present case.

Petitioner argues that three cases conflict with White and
with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in the present case. As the
following discussion shows, none of these cases create a genuine
conflict worthy of this Court’s review.

First, Petitioner argues that Riddle v. Trans-Cold Export,
Inc., 530 F.Supp. 186 (S.D. Ill. 1982), conflicts with the pres-

4

ent holding and therefore, that conflict exists between the
Eleventh and Seventh Circuits (although this issue has never
been heard by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals). The
Illinois district court in Riddle noted that the I.C.C. statutes
in question require a plaintiff to be a ‘““member of the general
public” before such an action can be brought against the lessee
for the lessor’s negligence. 530 F.Supp. at 189. The court,
citing and following the Fifth Circuit in White v. Excalibur
Ins. Co., supra, found that the plaintiff, a co-driver of a truck,
was not a member of the general public and granted the lessee
carrier's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plainly, the Illinois district court — which Petitioner con-
tends represents the whole Seventh Circuit — followed White
and is in complete accord with the precise holding below. A
single footnote in Riddle shows a disagreement with White
concerning available state law remedies, but that point of dis-
agreement is not on the merits of the federal issue involved
herein. The true holding of Riddle completely supports the
present holding of the Eleventh Circuit and presents no con-
flict among the circuits.

Second, Petitioner argues ihat Bryant v. Refrigerated Trans-
port Co., 418 So.2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) conflicts
with the present holding. Therefore, the Petitioner argues
there is a conflict among the courts within the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. This argument is completely meritless. In Bryant, a Flor-
ida state intermediate appellate court allowed an action by the
estate of a deceased truck driver to proceed against the lessee
carrier based on several unique factors. There was no employ-
ment contract, express or implied, between Bryant and the
lessee, and, most importantly, there existed an express contrac-
tual agreement between the lessor and the lessee that Bryant
was not an employee of the lessee. Based on these facts, the
Florida court found that Bryant was not an employee — statu-
tory or otherwise — of the lessee and was in effect a complete
stranger to the lessee. The fact situation in Bryant is clearly
distinguishable from the present case in which Midwestern had
exclusive control over the actions of Stroh and his co-driver.

5

Therefore, there is no merit to Petitioner’s argument that there
is a conflict among the courts in the Eleventh Circuit concern-
ing this issue. See, e.g., Garrett v. Superior Trucking Co., 162
Ga. App. 558, 290 S.E.2d 528 (1982).

Petitioner next argues that Proctor v. Colonial Refrigerated
Transportation, Inc., 494 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1974), conflicts
with the present holding by the Eleventh Circuit. At first
glance, it appears that a conflict does exist. However, a closer
study of Proctor and more recent cases reveals that there is no
conflict worthy of this Court’s review.

Proctor was decided in 1974, several years before the other
cases discussed herein which support the present holding.
Proctor held that a co-driver of a leased truck was a stranger to
the lessee carrier just as a member of the public and, conse-
quently, the lessee was responsible for the co-driver’s injuries.

However, in November of 1975, this Honorable Court in
effect altered that part of the Procior decision by holding that
a driver for the lessor was not a member of the public within
the protection of the Interstate Commerce Commission regula-
tory statutes. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada
Miller Freight Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 39, 96 S.Ct. 229, 46
L.Ed.2d 169, 178 (1974) (‘‘[T]he lease did not affect this basic
responsibility of the lessee to the public; it affected only the
relationship between the lessee and the lessor.”’). While not
expressly overruling Proctor, it certainly altered the holding so
as to change its effect on the present case. Furthermore, Trans-
american did overrule Alford v. Major, 470 F.2d 132 (7th Cir.
1972) , which was a primary case relied on in the Proctor deci-
sion. See, Proctor, 494 F.2d at 92.

The effect of the Proctor decision was so altered by Trans-
american as to dissipate any conflict which may have existed.
The Fifth Circuit specifically rejected Proctor after Trans-
american and no Circuit Court of Appeals has ever followed
the Proctor rationale (See White, 599 F.2d at 55-56). On the
other hand, the White decision was completely followed by the
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Price v. Westmoreland, 727
F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1984). This Honorable Court has denied

6

certiorari once on this issue, White, supra, and should do so
again in the present case.

II. Any Conflict Among the Circuits Concerns State
Substantive Law Questions and Does Not Justify
This Court’s Review.

Pursuant to the above argument, no right of action was cre-
ated for Stroh by the Interstate Commerce Commission regula-
tory statutes. Consequently, any remedy available to Stroh is
governed by state law schemes governing employees and their
right to worker’s compensation benefits. Each state may have
its own rule relating to whether a person classified as a ‘‘statu-
tory employee”’ is covered by that state’s worker’s compensation
laws without invoking this Court’s review. Most states have an
“exclusivity” provision in their worker’s compensation statutes
barring other tort actions and it is up to each of those states to
interpret their state statutes. The Proctor court interpreted
South Carolina’s worker’s compensation scheme to not bar a
common law negligence action by a statutory employee, while
the White court and the Eleventh Circuit court in the present
case interpreted different state statutes to bar a common law
negligence action for a statutory employee.

If a “conflict” indeed exists between the cases asserted by
Petitioner, it is a conflict among the applications of state sub-
stantive law worker’s compensation remedies. Such a conflict
does not justify this Court’s granting of certiorari. Ruhlin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 206, 58 S.Ct. 860, 862,
82 L.Ed. 1290, 1292 (1983) (A difference in opinion as to state
law questions is not a reason for granting certiorari.) .

7

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should

be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

A
L , ie A

|

¢

Address of Counsel:

HILL, HILL, CARTER,

FRANCO, COLE & BLACK
Post Office Box 116
Montgomery, Alabama 36195-2401
205/834-7600

unsel of Record

[cfs H. ANDERSON

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James H. Anderson, a member of the Bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Attorney for Midwestern
Distribution, Inc., do hereby certify that I have served a copy
of the foregoing upon all counsel of record in this cause by
placing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this
the 2nd day of March, 1987, addressed as follows:

Allen W. Howell

P. O. Box 7367
Montgomery, Alabama 36107

oe

— -
ES H. ANDERSON

,

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385019_0214%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
