# Opposition Brief — Wainwright v. DeAngelo

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 479 U.S. 953

## Text

=

ORIGINAL = _

CT 14 1855
CASE NO: 85-1922 Og i

yee sFL. Je

IN THE LER

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,

Secretary, Department of
Corrections,

Petitioner,
vs.

RICHARD RAYMOND DeANGELO

Vy

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

i BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael D. Gelety

1700 E. Las Olas Blvd.
Suite 300

Ft. Lauderdaie, Fla. 33301
(305) 462-4600

Counsel for Respondent

TABLE OF CITATIONS ..ccccccccscsece weer ere ae eer ee Te
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .wsccccsccccvncccsecs a
REASONS FOR DENYING JURISDICTION .....cccccccsvcvceoce
CONCLUSION ..cccccccescccccceseveces coc e reece esseces
PROOF OF SERVICE ..... err ee ee ee eeccccces a
APPENDIX wccsccvpecesvccsccnccsccesscceseseeeceseese
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

16

i

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page
Case Authorities:
Edwards v.Arizona
74 Vise €77, 101 S.Ct. 1860,
OS. Tete Ce Ie. COCA) “owen ban dew os kb'e ae ite pes ot
Escobedo v. Illinois
210 Usb, SIO, C8 S.Ct... 1758,
£2 Less 20s O77 CL9GR) ici xt A ee ee oe Se Be LO
Hoffa v. United States
Seo. Uees 293; 87. SvCt. 408,
Ae (roe eee SIO RUS OG) bss vy seatas vos eo ee 4
Maine v. Moulton
474 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 477
Be hie eee SOD PLOOS) cacy cde veces cls oaks I}
Michigan v. Jackson
Sees or be ea ARN) PAM cis pn oi 6. 6 'ash. wk site das 10
Miller v. Fenton
u<UsSs ~~, 400 S.Ct. 445,
ewes aes eo FISBR) as Sok ee oOo ea wee ee |
Miranda v. Arizona
364 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602
A eeu, Sele WES PLUGS sais boas kb ewe as Pe
Stone v. Powell
428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037
a? Dames cee 2007 C2666) ios bie ees ck es 5
United Staes v. Gouveia
S67 Uxes too; 108 S.Ct. 2292 (1984) 2 ouK ce 10
United States v. Henry
a77 Uses. 2es, 100 8,Cr. 2183
Oe Agnes ses cao LLO80) Sava aweds evs See re ll
Other Authorities:
United States Constitution:
20 UL Sule S2eoets) svecss SAT Lea le ie a waa tae te eee
Fifth Amendment ..... ke i eee ee ee eee | eae
tage te
PEC Pe sa cd ce ek bo aK oe oe oe eS x o, 30; "3
3 28

a4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Respondent herein supplements Petitioner's
Statement of the Case with the following pertinent factual
information:

1. Regarding eke Respondent's voluntary hospitali-
zation in the matter, it must be emphasized that the Respon-
dent had been shot in the abdomen numerous times with a .357
caliber handgun, the Respondent was also inforined that his
death was imminent, and he was given the last rites by a
priest while at the hospital;

2. It was while in this weakened end extreme
physical condition (with its accompanying psychological
weakening) that the statements in question were elicited
from the Respondent by the use of Gary Leon, the brother
of one of the persons killed and an acquaintance of the
Respondent. Gary Leon was specifically enlisted by the
Oakland Park Police Department to not only learn infor-
mation, but to ask specific questions and touch upon
specific areas in a series of two conversations with the
Respondent. It was, ih fact, admitted at the trial of
the matter that Leon was acting as an agent of the police
during these interrogation sessions;

3. Even before the first interrogation session

by Leon, the Respondent DEANGELO was already a primary

suspect in the case, and as further conceded by the State.

a police officer would have had to advise Respondent DEANGELO

of his rignts pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d. 694 (1966);

4. Although the tape recording of the first
interrogation by Leon was inaudible, the officers involved
did, in fact, monitor the conversation (while it was being
Simultaneously recorded) and the officers were able to hear
the statements elicited from Respondent DEANGELO and were
privy to the inculpatory nature of those statements. The
monitoring of the first interrogation session led to further
specific questions being given to Gary Leon for a repeat

visit to Respondent DEANGELO.

REASONS FOR DENYING JURISDICTION

The initial and most practical reason for denying
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is the fact that this
Court, as well as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
and the District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
have all denied Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Mandate
and/or Extension of Time in regard to this matter. See
Appendix, pages 1, 2 and 3.

After rehearing was denied in the instant matter,
an extension of time was initially granted by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, and with the expiration of that
extension, the Mandate in the instant case was issued and

the further motions were denied.

More importantly, in the Order Denying Extension
of time in the Southern District of Florida, it will also
be noted that the transcript of the Respondent DENGELO's
trial was ordered to be supplied to the Southern District

f Florida. Appendix, page 4.

Finally, in this regard, it should be noted that
the instant matter is on the docket for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and
an evidentiary hearing is set for Tuesday, October 28, 1986
in Fort Lauderdale, in compliance with the Eleventh Circuit
Opinion in the matter. Appendix, page 5.

It is the Respondent's position in this initial
regard that all of the Courts in question, including this
Court, have seen fit to deny additional time for the State
Petitioner to seek review, and more importantly, the case
has progressed, in panei with the Eleventh Circuit's
Opinion, to the point of having the record supplied and
the case set for an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary
hearing should proceed, and the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari should be denied, consistent with this Court's
denial of an extension of time for such Writ.

Similarly, it is the Respondent's position that
the Writ of Certiorari should be denied as being prematurely

brought before this Court. A perusal of the subject of this

appeal, that being the Review and Recommendation of the

Magistrate (page A-19 of Petitioner's Appendix), reveals
that the Recommendation and later Order by the District
Judge (page A-35 of Petitioner's Appendix) dealt with the
presumption of correctness of 28 U.S.C. §2254 as it

related to the need for an independent evidentiary hearing.
Of course, the upshot of the Review and Recommendation,
leading to the appeal in the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, was that the presumption of correctness did apply
to the instant matter and that, therefore, an independent
evidentiary hearing was not necessary and that the Petition
for Habeas Corpus was therefore denied. (Pages A-32 and
A-33 of Petitioner's Appendix).

Further, the Magistrate in the Review and Recom-
mendation specifically did not address the merits of
Respondent DEANGELO's Motion to Suppress, choosing in fact
to rely upon the presumption of correctness to dispose of
the question of constitutionality and admissibility of the
statements involved. (Page A-32 of Petitioner's Appendix).
In the Opinion in question from the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Court noted that:

Although it is not clear
whether the District Court
accorded the §2254(d)
presumption to the trial
court's decision that
DEANGELO's statements

were volunary under

Hoffa v. United States,

300 U.S. 293, B87 S.Ct. 408;
i? L.E@. 2a. 374 (1966),

it appears that such was
the case. To the extent
that the District Court
deferred to this pre-
sumption, we reverse."
Pg. A-6 of Petitioner's
Appendix.

The Court Opinion then discusses Stone v. Powel]

428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037 49 L.Ed. 2d. 1067 (1976), which
was relied upon by the Magistrate in the Review and Recom-
mendation, specifically dealing with whether or not a claim
is fully and fairly litigated in the state court, and in

light of Miller v. Fenton, _ U.S. , 406 &.Ct. 445,

88 L.Ed. 2nd 405 (1985), the Eleventh Circuit Opinion
Simply acknowledged the need for an evidentiary hearing
regarding the admissiblity of the statements of Respondent
DEANGELO:

Neither the state trial
court nor the District
Court made any findings
as to whether DEANGELO
was in custody within
the meaning of Esco-
bedo when visited

by Gary Leon ....a
remand is necessary to
determine several
crucial facts. Pq.
A-13 of Petitioner's
Appendix.

Further, the Opinion went on to state that:

The testimony of Gary
Leon is not in the
record before us, so
it is impossible to
determine at this
point whether the
investigation had
focused on DEANGELO
at the time of the
first or second
visit or both

on remand, these
matters should be
considered by the
District Court on.
the full record

of DEANGELO's

trial, followed by
written findings of
fact and conclusions
of law. Pgs. A-16
and A-17 of Petit-
ioner's Appendix.

Peal
esl

It is clear from the Opinion of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals that the District Court's
Opinion and ruling was reversed for the purpose of
affording an evidentiary hearing with a complete finding of
fact and conclusion of law which would make further review
of the constitutional issues possible - as it is currently
impossible under the state of the record at present.

Therefore, the Petitioner's attempt to frame
important constitutional issues in the instant Petition
are premature, as those issues were not addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the Respondent's

position at this point that a factual determination through

an evidentiary hearing in the District Court would be the
next logical and practical step in the history of the
instant matter, finally setting a factual groundwork upon
which to make findings of law. The supposed constitutional
issues raised by the Petitioner are simply not ripe for
review by this Court until a factual groundwork is laid
and the merits of the Respondent DEANGELO's Motion to
Suppress are addressed and decided based upon such factual
findings. A review of the matter by certiorari at this
point would be based upon speculation as to the outcome

of such factual and legal conclusions. It is interesting
to note that the Petitioner does not question the fact
that the District Court erroneously considered the pre-
Sumption of correctness in §2254(d) (although in fairness
to the Court, was without this Court's holding and clari-

fication in Miller v. Fenton), but the Petitioner

chooses instead to ignore the real basis for the Eleventh
Circuit Opinion and to instead choose to distract this

Court with constitutional issues which have yet to be
decided by either the Dis .rict Court or the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, those issues being merely pinpointed and

suggested on remand by the Eleventh Circuit Opinion.

id

Therefore, it is the Respondent's position that
the Petition for Certiorari should be denied at this point
és being premature and as having an inadequate basis of
fact upon which to be grounded.

Turning to the merits of the case and that aspect
of the Petition which requests certiorari review based upon
the application of the law to the case at bar, it is the
Respondent's position that, notwithstanding the earlier
objections, certiorari would be inappropriate in this case
as there is no conflict shown between the Opinion in question
and existing case law, nor are there substantial novel ques-
tions which must be answered by this court. Quite the con-
trary, the Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit merely reversed
the summary dismissal of the Habeas Corpus Petition and
remanded the case for further proceedings for necessary
factual determinations regarding the statements admitted
before the jury. In so remanding, the Eleventh Circuit
suggested various points of emphasis to the lower court,
to guide the lower court in its further proceedinas and
to, presumably, eliminate the need for further remand.

It is primarily from these guidelines that the Petitioner
attempts to formulate a conflict as a basis for certiorari
jurisdiction.

It is very clear from a reading of the Eleventh

Circuit's Opinion that “whether DEANGELO was in custody,

as was the case in Escobedo, thereby triggering the need
for Miranda warnings, obviously is a pivotal question.”
(Page A-12, Petitioner's Appendix). See Escobedo v.

Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed. 2d. 977

(1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.

1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d. 694 (1966).

Similarly, the Opinion went on to note that
“neither the State trial court nor the District Court made
any findings as to whether DEANGELO was in custody within
the meaning of Escobedo when visited by Gary Leon”.
(Page 813, Petitioner's Appendix).

Finally the court's Opinion again stated that
"..-- It is impossible to determine at this point whether
the investigation had focused on DEANGELO at the time of
the first or second visit or both ... this information is
pertinent to whether the conversations were custodial in-
terrogations of DEANGELO with a view toward gathering in-
criminating evidence against him...” (Pages A-16, A-17 of
Petitioner's Appendix). DEANGELO's Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent and its parallel right to counsel to
ensure such Fifth Amendment right is and always has been
the issue in the case. In their Petition, the State con-
fuses the right to counsel, which accompanies the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, with the attachment of

the mandatory right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

See pages 19 and 20 of the Petition. The right to counsel
guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment is separate and distinct
from the Sixth Amendment guarantee. The Fifth Amendment
protection against compeiled self incrimination provides the
right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed. 2d. 378

(1981), page 482; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, page 470;

Michigan v. Jackson, U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 1404 (1986),

page 1407. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the Assistance
of Counsel also provides the right to counsel at post-

arraignment interrogations. Michigan v. Jackson, supra,

page 1407. In their effort to create a conflict, the State
has unfortunately confused these two distinct rights to the
assistance of counsel, unfortunately intertwining the Sixth

Amendment as was again clarified in United States v. Gouveia,

467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (1984), with the right to
counsel supplement to the Fifth Amendment right as is noted

in Miranda, Edwards, and Escobedo.

There is absolutely no question that the right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment attaches at the
initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings, more speci-
fically, the filing of a formal indictment or information
or the appearance at an arraignment, Gouveia, supra,

page 187; Jackson, supra, page 1407. It follows that

10

the Respondent's position is not that the interrogation in
question could be carried out only in the presence of an
attorney, as it was a critical stage in a post-arraignment

Situation, see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. _, 106 S.Ct.

477, 8&8 L.Ed. 2d. 481, (1985), but the position of the
Respondent has consistently been that the Respondent was
entitled to a Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself with the accompanying assistance of counsel.

The Petitioner cites the Eleventh Circuit's

Opinion and the Opinions mentioned in the United States

v. Henry, 477 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed. 2d.
115 (1980), and then the Petitioner concludes that Henry
was a case dealing with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
again misunderstanding the fact that the Eleventh Circuit
Opinion was addressing the Fifth Amendment right and the
possible circumventing of that Fifth Amendment right and
its accompanying right to counsel through the use of a
government agent (in Henry's case a cellmate).

If the investigation in question focused upon
DEANGELO, and went from investigatory to accusatory,
particularly in light of the information learned in the
first interview by Gary Leon, DEANGELO had the right to
remain silent and had the accompanying right to counsel
to help him secure the Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda,

Supra, Edwards, supra, Escobedo, supra.

il

This fact is made all the more clear by the
admission of the State that Miranda rights would have
been necessary had the police officers spoken directly to
DEANGELO. (Page A-11, Appendix of Petitioner). The mere
fact that the police officers chose to attempt to circum-
vent that Fifth Amendment privilege by sending Leon, an
agent, instead of a uniformed officer, does not diminish
DANGELO's Fifth Amendment privileges at the point when
the investigation focused upon him and he was, for all
practical purposes, in custody. The dire physical and
mental condition of the Respondent at the time of the
questioning by Leon cannot be ignored, although this con-
dition was ignored in the Petition for Certiorari. The
physical and mental condition of the Respondent at the
time of the first and second questionings are very impor-
tant facts which must be developed at a hearing, as a person
facing death (and continuously being told of his condition),
lying in a hospital bed with tubes and life supporting
mechanisms is clearly not in the same position as a healthy
person who walks into the police station voluntarily and
gives a statement. Where the police will necessarily feel
that they must either arrest the healthy suspect or risk
his leaving the jurisdiction, no such formal compulsion

faces the officer who has a suspect lying near death ina

12

hospital room. Just as handcuffing a dying man to his
hospital bed will not change his physical condition or
his ability to leave at his whim, the mere fact that he
may not have been placed formally under arrest after his
first or second confession does not change the fact that
the police have their man in their control, secure in the
knowledge that he cannot physically move.

The questions of custody and interrogation have
yet to be adequately determined. However, it is beyond
dispute, after a careful reading of the cases cited by the
Petitioner, that the legal precedent involved is consistent,

the cases and their propositions remain vital, and that there

is no conflict between the cases involved and the application
of those cases in the Eleventh Circuit Opinion. The mere
fact that the Petitioner happens to misread the Eleventh
Circuit's Opinion and then misapplies Sixth Amendment cases
to a Fifth Amendment situation does not in any way create a
conflict and does not somehow provide a jurisdictional
foundation for the granting of certiorari review.

Therefore, it is the position of the Respondent
that, on the merits of the case involved, there is no conflict
which arises from the Eleventh Circuit's Opinion, nor is there
even a misapplication of the pertinent legal theories to the
case at bar, and therefore certiorari review should be denied

in the matter.

13

CONCLUSION

It is the Respondent's position that certiorari
review should be denied in the instant case, as the
Mandate has been issued and stays have been denied by the
United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals and the District Court of Appeals for the
Southern District of Florida, and the case has been
remanded and is actually set upon the District Court's
docket for an evidentiary hearing.

Further, Respondent feels that the Petition
should be denied as the issues are not ripe for a decision
on the merits without first holding an evidentiary hearing
and determining the necessary factual basis upon which to
apply the legal theories.

Finally, the merits of the case do not lend
themselves to certiorari review, as there are no conflicts
which arise from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Opinion as it is applied to the cases cited therein, and,
as a matter of fact, Petitioner misconstrues some of the
cases cited in the Petition, and in so doing, confuses
the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and its accompany-
ing right to counsel as opposed to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel which attaches after formal charging docu-

ments have been filed.

14

denied.

Therefore,

the Petition for Certiorari should be

25

Respectfully submitted,

; | |
Wail... f |Z,

MICHAEL D. GELETY

Attorney for Respondent

1700 East Las Olas Boulevard
Suite 300

Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 33301
(305) 462-4600

CASE NO: 85-1922
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,
Secretary, Department of
Corrections,

Petitioner,
VS.
RICHARD RAYMOND DEANGELO,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PROOF OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies of the opposition
of the Respondent to the Writ for Certiorari were furnished
by United States Mail to the Attorney General's Office for
the state of Florida at 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 204, West

Palm Beach, Florida, 33401 on this ioe day of October,

\

\

1986.

MICHAEL D. GELETY

16

REEEKTKKKKKKKKEKKKEKKKEKEEK
‘

APPENDIX

RETAKE KKKKKEKKEEE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

JOSEPH F SPANIOL, JR

LERK OF THE COURT

Penny H. Brill, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
11l Georgia Avenue, Suite 204
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Re: Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections v. Richard Raymond DeAngelo, A-242

Dear Ms. Brill:

Your application to continue a stay pending appeal in
the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice Powell,
who has endorsed thereon the following:

"Denied
5/7/86
L.F.P., Jr."
Very truly yours,
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR., Cler
By
ard L. Turner, Jr

cc: Michael D. Gelety, Esa.
1700 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 300
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

i7

FILED

N THE UNITE S COURT 0 <
I FE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPHALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT LEVENTH CIRCUIT

, 85-514 MAY - 1986

SPENCER 0. MERCER
CLERK

RICHARD RAYMOND DeANGELO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

ORDER:
The motion of respondent-appellee made by and through his counsel
for enlargement of time staying the mandate beyond May 5, 1986, is

DENIED. See Fed. R. App. P. 4l,

Lato Aah CIRCUIT TTpet

~~ eee

-_—

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 82-6652-Civ-ROETTGER

RICHARD DE ANGELO, :
Petitioner,
vs. 2
LOUIE WAINWRIGHT, 2

Respondent.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion of
Respondent to stay prscobbinns pending disposition by the
United States Supreme Court of the respondent's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.

Owing to the respondent's delayed filing of his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals issued its mandate on May 8, 1986 remanding the
case to this Court. This Court is directed to consider the
full record of the petitioner's trial, followed by written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. DeAngelo v. Wain-
wright, 781 F.2d 1516, 1520 (llth Cir. 1986).

The United States Supreme Court did not dispose of
respondent's petition before the end of its term. To avoid
further delay in these proceedings, it is hereby

ORDERED that the respondent's Motion to Stay is

APP. - Page 3

denied and it is further

ORDERED that the respondent shall provide to this

Court a copy of the transcript of the petitioner's trial on

or before August 27, 1986, so that the Court can comply with

the mandate of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale,

on
AYA aay of July, 1986.

\

Copies to:

Michael D. Gelety, Esq.
1700 East Las Olas Boulevard
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General

lll Georgia Avenue - Suite 204
West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Florida, this
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
LURANA S.
APP. _ Page 4

NOTICE OF _EVIDENTI. —HEARING D. C. Form No. 18 (Rev. Sept. 1953)

United States District Cort

TUR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

RICHARD DE ANGELO,

Petitioner,
v.

LOUIE WAINWRIGHT, ; No. §2-6652-Civ_ROETTGER

Reepondent.

TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been set for hearing at

10:00 a.m. » ON Tuesday, October 28, »19g6 =» AE Courtroom 203B,

299 East Broward Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301.

Date October 6, 1986 | 49 LURANA S. SNOW

U.S. MAGISTRATE N
By wa A... tla 1...
Deputy Clerk,

Tv

Richard DeAngelo, #068779

Avon Park Correctional Institution
P.O, Box 1100

Avon Park, FL 33825

Michael D. Gelety, Esq.

1700 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 300

Fe. Lauderdale, FL 33301

Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Actorney General

lil Georgia Ave. = Room 204
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

ort
Sa
NaS

FP) Mines 2a Tt im PROS TERE

APP. _ Page 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLOR’ A

CASE NO. 82-6652-Civ-ROETTGER

RICHARD DE ANGELO, :
Petitioner, :
vs. :

LOULE WAINWRIGHT, :
Respondent. :

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM

TO: SUPERINTENDENT of Avon Park Correctional Institution
Avon Park, Florida

IT APPEARING that the above named Richard
DeAngelo is confined in Avon Park Correctional Institu-
tion, and a hearing is set in this cause at Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, on October 28, 1986, and that it is necessary for
the above named Richard DeAngelo to be before this Court
for the purpose of giving testimony,

NOW, THEREFORE, this is to command you, the Warden
of Avon Park Correctional Institution, that you have the
body of the said Richard DeAngelo now in custody as
aforesaid, under safe and secure conduct, before this Court
at Fort Lauderdale, Flor‘sa by or before 10:00 a.m., on
October 28, 1986.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this

TEs STATES MAGISTRATE

LURANA S. SNOW

3 day of October, 1986.

APP. - Page

6

Copies to:

Michael D. Gelety, Esq.
1700 East Las Olas Boulevard
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General

111 Georgia Avenue - Suite 204
West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Warden, Avon Park Correctional
Institution (2 certified copies)

APP.

- Page 7

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