# Reply Brief — American Mining Congress v. Thomas

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_1778%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 479 U.S. 814

## Text

& FILED

4) SEP 3 1986

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

___ aa
IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

| Supreme Court, U.S.

———

No. 85-1741

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
AMAX INC.,
ASARCO INCORPORATED,
ST. JOE MINERALS CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITICN

JAMES R. WALPOLE*
EDMUND E. HARVEY
JOANNE M. SALVATORE

CHADBOURNE & PARKE
1101 Vermont Ave., N.W.
Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20005
(292) 289-3000

ROBERT A. EMMETT
REED SMITH SHAW & McCLay

Of Counsel:

DoucLas E. MCALLISTER
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS
1920 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 861-2800

1150 Conn. Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-6100

Attorneys for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record

© lnc NNER EIN A NES AY IE LOO ATRIOS I EI RH
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

= a ee a aT sa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TO CO I a cccnuncnilsctiidideahbinwesebienies ii
1. The Revision Was Substantial ....................ec0eee 1

2. Petitioners Were Not On Notice That A Tech-
nology Other Than Those Specified In The Fed-
eral Register Was Under Consideration ........... 3
3. Petitioners Were Denied The Opportunity To
Challenge EPA’s Final Choice Of A
I iitatncacconacnendieninsitanchapasiicteieenbisiteviisiene 5
4. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Conflicts
With Those Of Other Circuits And Its Own Prior
IE -cecsisesnaindgesccnethlahiansecntunccaeadssncanisesimanclnenrs 6

5. The Petition Raises Significant Legal Issues ... 7

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page

American Federation of Labor and Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations v. Donovan, 757 F.2d

$30 (D.C. Gar. TRRR) niin 6
Chocolate Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Block, 755 F.2d

1008 (4h Cir. 19GB cntteinniimiceann 6
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980) 8

National Black Media Coalition, et al. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 791 F.2d 1016

(Bed Che, TDG): svseicsssssscsiatscnancmanneminnaees 3, 7
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d

$78 (D.C. Ge. ION) “cia 5
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239 (D.C.

Cte. TOBE sccisscssaacnistacteeaeeoee 4
Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA,

706 F.2d S06 (D.C. Cie THE ee 3
STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No.
89-554, 80 Stat. 383, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551,
Ob BU. ccisanccssenssgemnsteibbsbesessdtiotenteaneaneuamntaaaliiress 3

Clean Air Act, as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401

OE OU. ceacescseinessistssssheticceemameanal 8
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1567, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 e¢ seg.._.............. 1

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901

GE DOE, | ccnsecscsenevsvensshssasepesinjenesmaamaeieaminne omnia: 8
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 42
USC. Gea00 F Ol GE. . cisumcisaincaann 8
RULES AND REGULATIONS:
48 Fed. Rew. FOCT CIGR isccecdikcomene 3

ecren (a1 me «304 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 85-1741

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, AMAX INC., ASARCO
INCORPORATED, ST. JOE MINERALS CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent’s (‘‘EPA”’) brief in opposition (‘‘Opp.’’)
largely repeats and relies upon the errors of the
court’s decision below. It argues that EPA’s revision
of the proposed rules under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (‘‘Act’’) was insubstantial and
one on which Petitioners had adequate notice and the
opportunity to comment. It further contends that the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit does not conflict with those of
other circuits. Finally, EPA urges that the case is
simply a factual dispute about the adequacy of notice
and consequently raises no significant legal issues.

1. The Revision Was Substantial
EPA attempts to minimize the significance of the

revision to its proposed rules by claiming that
Petitioners’ complaint is not directed to any change

in the effluent limitation standards, but to the ‘‘ad-
dition of a supplemental control technology” which |
industrial dischargers, such as Petitioners, are not |
required to adopt (Opp. p. 6). Such an argument is |
utterly disingenuous, in light of the Act’s require-

ments that effluent limitations be ‘“‘technology-based.’”!

The statutory scheme contemplates the selection by

EPA of an appropriate technology which will permit

dischargers to attain the effluent standards being es-

tablished.

In the instant case EPA proposed certain effluent
standards, the achievability of which were to be based
on the “‘lime precipitation, settle and filter treatment
technology” (LS&F). Comments of Petitioners per-
suaded EPA that the standards being set were un-
achievable under the LS&F technology. It then
adopted a new and different technology - sulfide pre-
cipitation - to support its proposed standards.
Petitioners were denied the opportunity of addressing
whether the standards were achievable under the sul-
fide precipitation technology.’

Since it is the technology that determines the final
standards, any change in the technology obviously has
a material impact upon the standards being proposed
and constitutes a fundamental change in the proposed
rules. It is true that the Act does not expressly direct
a discharger to adopt a particular technology, but if
no technology exists to support the standards, such

1 EPA notes correctly in its Opposition that under the Act,
“Congress authorized EPA to establish technology-based effluent
limitations and standards for categories of industrial dischar-
gers’ (Emphasis added) (Opp. p. 2).

2 See Appendix pp. 40a-45a.

standards cannot be met;? and their adoption by the
EPA is unlawful.

2. Petitioners Were Not On Notice That A Technology
Other Than Those Specified In The Federal Register
Was Under Consideration

EPA does not dispute the fact that the sulfide pre-
cipitation technology was not one of those specifically
identified in the Federal Register as being relied upon
for the proposed rules and upon which public com-
ments were sought. Instead, it argues that since the
Federal Register alerted the public that chemical pre-
cipitation, which includes sulfide precipitation, was
under consideration and EPA sought comments on
other effective treatment technologies, adequate no-
tice had been given (Opp. p. 6). Chemical precipitation
is far too general a term, including as it does many
technologies,‘ to satisfy the ‘‘reasonable specificity”’
requirements of Section 4 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seg. (“‘APA’’). Small
Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705
F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Similarly, the general
invitation to submit other proposals or technologies
did not afford Petitioners the requisite notice that the
specifically identified technologies would be changed
to sulfide precipitation. National Black Media Coali-

’ This procedure, which violates the Clean Water Act, of se-
lecting the limits before determining the proper technology was
used by EPA in establishing all the 40 C.F.R. Part 421 Subpart
E, G, H and I regulations. The Fourth Circuit refused to con-
sider this issue which was raised by Petitioners in the court
below. See Petition, p. 7, n. 7.

* Chemical precipitation was not included in the Federal Reg-
ister list of six technologies being considered by EPA in this
rulemaking. See 48 Fed. Reg. 7047 (1983).

tion v. Federal Communications Commission, 791
F.2d 1016, 1022-1023 (2nd Cir. 1986). And the lack
of notice is emphasized by the absence in the volu-
minous comments of any suggestions that sulfide pre-
cipitation should be considered as an alternative
treatment technology. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Costle,
659 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

EPA relies heavily upon its discussion of sulfide
precipitation in the draft Development Document ac-
companying the proposed rules as satisfaction of the
notice requirements of the APA (Opp. pp. 6-7). If
sulfide precipitation were so important and reliable a
technology as EPA now attempts to portray, why was
it not identified as being one of the six technologies
specifically listed in the Federal Register as being
considered under the proposed rule? Its absence from
the proposed rule and the specifically identified list
of six technologies, like that of twenty other tech-
nologies discussed in the 2100 page Development Doc-
ument, clearly caused Petitioners to believe that it
was not regarded by EPA as one of the technologies
upon which effluent standards would be based.

EPA suggests that even if sulfide precipitation were
not specifically identified in the proposed rule pub-
lished in the Federal Register, Petitioners’ comments
on the draft Development Document reveal they were
on actual notice of sulfide precipitation as a possible
alternative technology (Opp. p. 7). Petitioners’ com-
ments, however, were limited to the draft Develop-
ment Document’s discussion of the six technologies
identified in the proposed rule. The limited nature of
Petitioners’ comments highlight their lack of actual
notice and why a Development Document is not a

Oat Ana ecmnend! semanas saey

substitute for notice in the Federal Register.

3. Petitioners Were Denied The Opportunity To Chal-
lenge EPA’s Final Choice Of A Technology

EPA contends that Petitioners were not denied an
opportunity to challenge EPA’s adoption of sulfide
precipitation as a technology since the court of appeals
considered their objections to that control method
(Opp. p. 8). EPA’s argument places the cart before
the horse. It is the agency with its expertise, and not
a reviewing court that must first consider and rule
upon objections to a proposed regulation. Indeed, ob-
jections must first be raised with the agency before
a court will even consider them. Portland Cement
Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir.
1973). The statutory rulemaking scheme is predicated
on the initial evaluation by the agency of public com-
ments and objections. Without such an administrative
record a reviewing court is not in a position to make
a reasoned and informed judgment on agency action.

Not only did EPA refuse to permit Petitioners to
comment upon the sulfide precipitation technology
during the rulemaking process,> but it successfully
opposed Petitioners’ attempt to supplement the re-
cord and address such control method in their briefs
to the court of appeals (App. pp. 52a; 55a-56a).° With-

5 When the final regulations were issued March 8, 1984,
Petitioners had not received a copy of crucial analytical data
from EPA. The information was not obtained until months after
the regulations were issued, and then after a Freedom of In-
formation Act request was filed (App. pp. 47a-49a).

§ Petitioners sought to place before the court of appeals data
from the same foreign plant relied upon by EPA which would
(footnote continued)

out the benefit of Petitioners’ comments on sulfide
precipitation before the EPA or the supplemental data
they sought to bring to the court’s attention, the
court below was in no position to determine the rea-
sonableness and legality of EPA’s prescribed effluent
standards.

4. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Conflicts With
These Of Other Circuits And Its Own Prior Decision

EPA attempts to distinguish the cases cited by
Petitioners which show that the decision below con-
flicts with decisions of other circuits and one of its
own decisions.” The Agency argues that, unlike those
decisions, the revision in issue here did not funda-
mentally alter the proposed rule. But as demonstrated
above, EPA did in fact make a basic and substantial
change in the rule by adopting a technology that was
never subject to notice and comment.

EPA also claims that notice of sulfide precipitation
was not supplied by a comment, but by notice in the
Federal Register and draft Development Document,
and thus its adoption as a technology was a “‘logical
outgrowth” of the original proposal. However, as
noted above sulfide precipitation was not identified
as one of the technologies under consideration in the
Federal Register; and reference to a large number of

demonstrate that sulfide precipitation could not achieve the pre-
scribed standards. They were also prepared to show that EPA
had been informed during the rulemaking that the samples at
the foreign plant were not representative of long-term perform-
ance.

7 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and
Chocolate Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir.
1985).

“ ee ey er eee oT ae ee

additional technologies in a draft Development Doc-
ument without any indication they were being con-
sidered as possible alternative control methods does
not meet the requirements of the APA.

Furthermore, while the comments did not mention
sulfide precipitation - a clear indication of lack of
notice to Petitioners - they clearly did trigger EPA’s
adoption of a seventh and new technology, as both
the court below found (App. p. 15a) and EPA con-
cedes (Opp. p. 9). If courts do not allow agencies to
escape the notice requirements of the APA by basing
a revised rule on the substantive contents of com-
ments, then a fortiori an agency cannot claim notice
where the comments do not even discuss the tech-
nology subsequently adopted, but cause the agency to
take different action than initially proposed.

In addition to the cases cited in the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, the decision be’ow is also in con-
flict with a more recent decision of the Second Circuit
- National Black Media Coalition et al. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 791 F.2d 1016 (2nd Cir.
1986). There, in circumstances very similar to those
here, the court held that an invitation to ‘‘submit
other proposals’ and “‘the comments of other inter-
ested parties’ did not provide adequate notice when
the final rule differed significantly from the proposed
rule, and was based on information not available to
the public (td. at 1022-1023).

5. The Petition Raises Significant Legal Issues

EPA attempts to dismiss this case as one involving
only a factual dispute on the adequacy of notice and
not any significant legal issues. The issues in this

case, however, transcend the particulars of the rule-
making proceeding under challenge, for they raise the
recurring question of what obligation an agency has
under Section 4 of the APA to give notice and op-
portunity for comment on a rule that substantially
differs from what was originally proposed. The ques-
tion ‘‘will ultimately require interpretation of impor-
tant statutory language by this Court” Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Costle, 444 U.S. 1096, 1098 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). And the question is an especially im-
portant one in the Environmental Law area where
the statutory schemes rely heavily upon meaningful

participation in rulemaking proceedings and usually —

provide little or no opportunity for adjudicatory hear-
ings, e.g. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 e¢ seq.,
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901 et seg., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et
seq., and Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300
F et seq.

For the foregoing reasons and those presented in
the petition, it is respectfully submitted that the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

ce eee

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES R. WALPOLE
EDMUND E. HARVEY
JOANNE M. SALVATORE
CHADBOURNE & PARKE
1101 Vermont Ave., N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005

Of Counsel: (202) 289-3000

DouGLAS E. MCALLISTER ROBERT A. EMMETT
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS REED SMITH SHAW & MCCLAY

1920 N Street, N.W. 1150 Conn. Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 861-2800 (202) 457-6100

Attorneys for Petitioners

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_1778%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
