# Opposition Brief — Ciampitti v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_1195%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 475 U.S. 1014

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED

No. 85-1002 JAN 30 see

JOSEPH F., SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

|

In the Supreme Court of the Rnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORA Ri TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

F. HENRY Hasicut II
Assistant Attorney General

Davipb C. SHILTON
ELLEN J. DURKEE
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washingion, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.
1251 et seq., federal jurisdiction to regulate discharges into
“adjacent wetlands” is limited to areas below the mean high
water mark.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,
bac deen head ewe be dees 7
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 729 F.2d 391, rev’d, No. 84-701
ea aa ere 7-8
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985) ........... 2, 5-6
Statutes and regulations:
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251
et seq. :
OS a eee 2
oS | 3
SE CED eb oe dees sk w decease nawees 3
eR |

Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401
et seq. :

IV

Page
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
33 C.F.R.:
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Pt. 323:
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In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-1002
ROBERT CIAMPITTI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 58a-59a) is
unreported. The district court’s opinion granting a prelimi-
nary injunction (Pet. App. la-35a) is reported at 583 F.
Supp. 483. The district court’s opinion granting a perman-
ent injunction (Pet. App. 36a-57a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
August 7, 1985. The petition fo; a writ of certiorari was filed
on November 5, 1985. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, the United States Army Corps of
Engineers administers a permit program for the discharge

(1)

2

of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United
States.” See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985). Without a Corps
permit, such discharges are prohibited (33 U.S.C. 131 1(a)).
Under the Corps’ regulations, “waters of the United
States”—and hence the scope of the Corps’ CWA regula-
tory jurisdiction—are defined to include, inter alia,
“wetlands” that are “adjacent” to water bodies that are
“subject to the ebb and flow of the tide” (33 C.F.R.
323.2(a)-(d)).!

Pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33
U.S.C. 403, the Corps also administers a permit program
for the building of structures and for excavating and filling
in “navigable waters.” See 33 C.F.R. Pt. 322. The scope of
the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction under the Rivers and
Harbors Act is more limited than under the Clean Water
Act. See 33 C.F.R. 323.2(b) and Pt. 329. In waters subject to
tidal action, federal regulatory jurisdiction under the Rivers
and Harbors Act is asserted over areas below the “mean
(average) high water” line (33 C.F.R. 329.12(a)(2)(b)).’

2. a. Petitioners own or sought to develop property
known as the Diamond Beach site located in Cape May
County, New Jersey. The Diamond Beach site is adjacent to

'The regulations define the term “wetlands” as follows (33 C.F.R.
323.2(c)):

The term “wetlands” means those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs and similar areas.

?Where possible, the mean high water line is determined by averaging
tidal datum over an 18.6-year period. 33 C.F.R. 329.12(a)(2). “Marsh-
lands and similar areas” are subject to Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdic-
tion, “but only so far as the area is subject to inundation by the mean
high waters.” 33 C.F.R. 329.12(b).

3

Jarvis Sound, a large tidal body of water that is connected
to the Atlantic Ocean. In late 1979 or 1980, petitioners
commenced filling portions of the Diamond Beach site with
sand (Pet. App. 10a). In 1983, petitioners had a 50-foot pipe
and a tide gate placed on a corner of the site in order “to
allow storm water to run off the site [and] to prevent tidal
water from coming onto the site” (id. at Sa (emphasis in
original)). Although the petitioner primarily responsible for
these development activities, Robert Ciampitti, had been
advised by his consultants by at least 1980 that areas on the
site were probably “wetlands” subject to federal jurisdic-
tion, petitioners did not apply te the Corps for a permit, nor
did they contact the Corps to inquire about federal
requirements (id. at 4a-Sa).

When the Corps discovered petitioners’ activities in 1983,
a Corps official informed Ciampitti that the site contained
wetlands subject to federal permitting jurisdiction and
directed Ciampitti to halt filling activities in specified areas
(Pet. App. 6a). Petitioners refused to comply with a cease
and desist order subsequently issued by the Corps (id. at
7a-9a), and the United States initiated this action in the
district court seeking to enjoin petitioners’ unauthorized
filling of wetlands and to require restoration of illegally-
filled areas. The government also sought civil penalties
against Robert Ciampitti. The statutory authorities relied
upon by the government were the Clean Water Act, the
Rivers and Harbors Act, and the Refuse Act (Pet. App.
3a).3

’The Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. 407, is a subsection of the Rivers and
Harbors Act that prohibits, inter alia, the depositing of refuse in
“navigable waters,” as that term is defined under the Rivers and Har-
bors Act. The Clean Water Act permit program effectively superseded
this provision of the Refuse Act, because a properly-issued Clean Water
Act permit is deemed to constitute compliance with the Refuse Act (33
U.S.C. 1342(a)(5) and (k)).

4

Following evidentiary hearings, the district court entered
a preliminary injunction and then a permanent injunction
prohibiting further filling activity on approximately 26
acres of the property (Pet. App. 34a-35a, 39a, 54a). The
district court also ordered some of the petitioners to apply
for a Corps permit to engage in fill activities (id. at 55a). In
the event that those petitioners failed to apply for a permit
or a permit were denied, those petitioners were required to
remove the illegally-placed fill and to prepare and imple-
ment a plan for restoration of the wetlands (id. at 5Sa-57a).*

b. The district court found that the area subject to the
injunction against filling was an “adjacent wetland” under
the Corps’ regulations implementing the CWA. Prior to
filling, the area was predominantly vegetated with plants
adapted for life in frequently flooded or saturated soil (Pet.
App. Ila). The soil in this 26-acre area was “saturated
throughout, in most cases directly to the surface” (ibid.).
The district court found (id. at 22a, 44a-45a) that both tidal
waters flowing on the surface and groundwaters saturated
the soil. Even with the illegally-deposited fill material, much
of the area was covered with surface water, and, “without
fill, tidal waters would normally flow onto the site” from
two directions (id. at 12a, 22a).

At trial, the government also attempted to prove that 1.45
acres—all within the area designated as “wetlands” by the
court—were below the mean high water line and, therefore,
subject to the prohibitions of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
Although there was no dispute that some of this 1.45-acre
area was below the mean high water line, the district court

‘The district court held in abeyance the question of civil penalties
against petitioner Robert Ciampitti (Pet. App. 53a, 57a). The court
indicated that Ciampitti’s efforts to prepare and implement a restora-
tion plan would be considered in the court's later determination of the
size or necessity for civil penalties (id. at 33a).

5

found the evidence too inconclusive to establish the precise
boundaries of the area below the mean high water line ( Pet.
App. 39a-41a, 47a). Accordingly, the district court did not
base any of the relief it ordered on violations of the Rivers
and Harbors Act or the Refuse Act (Pet. App. 47a). Instead,
the court premised the relief entirely on its conclusion that
the area in question was a wetland subject to Clean Water
Act jurisdiction.

On appeal by petitioners, the court of appeals affirmed
without an opinion for the reasons set forth in the district
court’s opinion (Pet. App. 58a-S9a).

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other
court of appeals. Accordingly, further review is not
warranted.

1. a. At bottom, petitioners contend that because the
district court found that somewhat less than 1.45 acres of
the property is below the mean high water line, the courts
below necessarily erred in holding that approximately 26
acres were “wetlands” subject to Clean Water Act jurisdic-
tion. This contention confuses the jurisdictional reach of
the Rivers and Harbors Act —which extends only up to the
mean high water line (33 C.F.R. 329.12)—with that of the
Clean Water Act (see page 2 & note |, supra). Because the
district court did not base the relief ordered on either the
Rivers and Harbors Act or the Refuse Act, the location of
the mean high water line is simply irrelevant to the disposi-
tion of this case.

This Court’s decision in United Siates v. Riverside Bay-
view Homes. Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985), unequivocally
repudiates the notion that Clean Water Act jurisdiction
over “adjacent wetlands” is bounded by the mean high
water line. The Court in Riverside approved the Corps’

eee

6

assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over “adjacent wet-
lands” and held that flooding from an adjacent water body
is not required by the Corps’ regulation defining “wet-
lands.” Slip op. 7-8, 12-13. Rather, “saturation by either
surface or ground water is sufficient to bring an area within
the category of wetlands, provided that the saturation is
sufficient to and does support wetland vegetation.” Slip op.
8. In other words, there is no requirement that a “wetland”
be located below the mean high water line nor that it be
regularly inundated by tidal flow.

Here, the district court found, as a matter of fact, “the
presence of both saturated soil and aquatic vegetation” in
the area in question and further found that “the soil satura-
tion ‘causes’ the growth of the vegetation” (Pet. App. 44a).
The district court’s findings plainly bring the property
within the category of “wetlands” as defined by the Corps’
regulation (33 C.F.R. 323.2(c)). Petitioners cannot plausi-
bly dispute that the property is adjacent to a tidal water-
body. These findings establish that petitioners’ property
falls within the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction under Section
404 of the Clean Water Act. See Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., slip op. 9.

b. Petitioners erroneously argue (Pet. 4-6, 11-12) that
there is a factual inconsistency between the district court’s
findings that somewhat less than 1.45 acres lie below the
mean high water line (Pet. App. 39a-41a) and that “{dJuring
normal high tide conditions, surface water covers a major-
ity of the site” (id. at 12a). Petitioners apparently fail to
recognize that the mean high water line is an average mark.
Thus, by definition, tides will often rise higher than the
mean. In addition, petitioners never acknowledge that the
district court found that the wetlands are saturated by tidal
surface waters and ground water (id. at 22a). Stated differ-
ently, the district court was clearly correct in observing (id.
at 45a (emphasis in original)) that “the fact that we cannot

7

quite conclude that much of the land is below mean high
water does not indicate, as [petitioners] argue, that it is not
saturated by surface or ground water.” Accordingly, the
district court’s factual findings as to tidal flow on the prop-
erty present no question warranting this Court’s review.

c. The case on which petitioners principally rely, Borax
Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), is
totally irrelevant to the delineation of Clean Water Act
jurisdiction. That case, which predates the relevant pro-
visions of the Clean Water Act by 37 years, involved a
boundary dispute between an upland and a tideland owner.
One contested issue was how the line of “ordinary high
water”—the boundary under the governing federal law—
was to be determined in view of the fact that the range of
tides varies according to the lunar phase (296 U.S. at 23).°
The rule of law governing such boundary disputes has
nothing to do with Clean Water Act jurisdiction, nor is it
even remotely relevant to the factual issue in this case—
whether the disputed area is saturated with water.®

2. Petitioners’ other contention (Pet. 12-16) is that the
decision below conflicts with the court of appeals’ decision
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729

‘Specifically, the upland owner argued that the boundary should be
established as the mean of high neap tides, which occur when the moon
is in its first and third quarters and which do not, on average, rise as high
as when the moon is in other phases. The Court instead adopted the rule
that a mean of all tides, not just neap tides, determined the boundary.
Borax, 296 U.S. at 26.

Petitioners’ argument (Pet. 12) that Borax requires, as a matter of
law, that the district court’s reference to “normal high tide conditions”
in its factual findings be treated as synonymous with the legal term,
“mean high water,” as used in Borax, is incorrect. The district court
clearly did not intend the reference to “normal high tide conditions” as a
legal benchmark, but instead merely meant that it is not unusual for
high tides to cover a substantial part of the property.

8

F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985).
That contention, which we believe was without merit in any
event (see Pet. App. 42a-45a), no longer warrants con-
sideration in light of this Court’s reversal of the Sixth

Circuit’s decision.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

F. Henry Hasicut Il
Assistant Attorney General

Davip C. SHILTON
ELLEN J. DURKEE
Attorneys

JANUARY 1986

DO}J-1986-01

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_1195%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
