# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_1037%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 1059

## Text

: NOV 12 1985

JOSEPH F. SPANION,

BO Ary" S

Michael B. Roche
(Counsel of Record)
Jeffrey B. Lieberman
SCHUYLER, ROCHE & ZWIRNER
3100 Prudential Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 565-2400
Attorneys for Petitioners

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. After reversing the district
court's decision that certain terms of its
own class action settlement agreement were
clear and unambiguous, did the court of
appeals vi »dlate this Court's ruling in

Anderson v. City of Bessemer by reviewing

incomplete extrinsic evidence in the record
de novo and then deciding previously unde-
cided issues of fact with finality?

2. After the district court had re-
viewed and approved a class action settle-

ment agreement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(e) and ordered specific performance based
upon its interpretation of that agreement,
did the court of appeals err by ignoring the
district court's interpretation and substi-
tuting its own interpretation based upon
extrinsic evidence not considered by the
district court?

3. After reversing the district

court's grant of specific performance, did

the court of appeals err by not remanding
but rather proceeding to adjudicate the
pet.tioners' alternative motion on the mer-
its -- even though the district court had
never considered this motion and even though
the court of appeals' decision required a
determination of numerous disputed issues of
fact on an incomplete evidentiary record?

THE PARTIES

The petitioners represent those members
of a certified class of stewardesses who had
been terminated from their employment with
the respondent because they had become preg-
mant and given birth to a child. Petition-
ers were subsequently rehired by the respon-
dent pursuant to a written settlement agree-
ment previously entered in this cause and
approved by the district court pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). The certified class

representative is Darlene Burmeister (for-
merly Darlene Preston). The respondent is

American Airlines, Inc.

ead
—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED... ..cceeeeees eee
THE ft aes ee ee ee see 8 @
TABLE OF CONTENTS.......e08. ee eseccs

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES......
OPINIONS BELOW... cccccccccccccccces
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT...... ecceces
STATUTE INVOLVED... cc. ceccccscncccecs
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... ..cwceccceen

Genesis of the Litigation......

The Entry of Summary Judgment
Against AMETican....cecceeeeees

The 1977 Settlement Agreement..

The Returning Mothers Were

Denied Benefits Under American's

Retirement Pac 606860068666 8b6

The Returning Mothers' Motion
In The District Court..........

The District Court's Order
of May Dt tttecthotebannes ch eeoe

The Decision Of The Court
OF Appeals... ccs eeeseesvessees

15

16

18

19

p\ es, JP Se ee *eeeeeees

I.

II.

IIt.

This Court Should Review The

Decision Of The Court Of Appeais

Because It Improperly Decided
Issues Of Fact De Novo And On

The Basis Of An Incomplete
Evidentiary Record...... TEETTTTTTT

A.

The Court Of Appeals'

Decision Is In Direct

Conflict With The Recent
Decision Of This Court

In Anderson v. City Of
0 ere see

This Court Should Exercise

Its Supervisory Power Here
Because The Court Of Appeals
Has Dramatically Departed
From The Accepted And

Usual Course Of Judicial
PFOCCeGINGS.... cee reeeeseveees

In Order To Insure The Finality

Of Class Action Settlements, This
Court Should Review This Case And
Establish The Appropriate Standard
Of Review Which Courts Of Appeal
Should Apply In Reviewing A
District Court's Interpretation

Of Its Own Class Action

SQCCLOMONE. ccccccccccecccessccccces

This Court Should Review The
Decision Of The Court Of Appeals
Because It Improperly Adjudicated
The Returning Mothers' Alternative
Motion TO Vacate... ccecereceeeeeeces

22

26

33

36

A. The Court Of Appeais'
Adjudication Of Petitioners’
Alternative Motion To
Vacate On Its Merits
Conflicts With Several
Decisions Of This Court...... =

B. The Court Of Appeais'
Adjudication Of Petitioners'
Alternative Motion To Vacate
On Its Merits Directly
Conflicts With A Decision
Of The Court Of Appeals For
The Second Circuit On The
Very Same [SSUC... cee eeeeeeeee 38

c. This Court Should Exercise
Its Supervisory Power Here
Because The Court Of Appeals
Has Significantly Departed
From The Accepted And
Usual Course Of Judicial
ProceedingS....ceseeeeeseeseeese 40

COPPER s COCO SEE OESESEEOOE ELE OEESSE 42
APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit dated

JUNE 7, LHBS.ccccccccccccescsseccsee La

Memorandum Opinion and Order

of the United States District

Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division

dated May 20, 1983... cceeeessseeee 248

Order of the United States

Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit denying re-

nearing dated August 15, 1985...... 29a

| cian aia ia

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Flowers, 330 U.S. 4164 (1947)......... 37,39

Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses
Association, Local 550 v. American
Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th

Cir. 1973) cert. denied sub nom,

Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses
Association, Local 550 v. Zipes,

SiG Uses GES TAP TE) ccccrccesscsccceces o> A

Anderson v. City of Bessemer,
eas U.S. ONS 105 ScGee 1504 (APES) ccsccvce 22-26

Barnes v. St. Catherine's
Hospital, 563 F.2d 324
(7th Cat .

The court of appeais aiso conceded that
while the parties must have “intended for
that credit [for length of service] to have
beneficial consequences of some sort for the
re-employed class members," the term
“appears to be an idle wheel" (Id.). None-
theless, despite its admitted perplexity
over what the parties intended by the use of
this term, the court of appeals proceeded to
conclude definitively and with finality that
the term did not include "credited service"
within the meaning of American's Retirement
Plan.

The court of appeals' analysis of the
limited evidence of record brings into sharp
focus the impropriety of its de novo review
of the incomplete record before it. The Re-
turning Mothers never had an opportunity to

conduct discovery or to present evidence at

a hearing. Plainly, if discovery were per-

mitted and an evidentiary hearing conducted,

-3l1-

these crucial issues could be ‘fully and
fairly explored and a logical and well-
reasoned interpretation of them could be
made. As it stands now, in its rush to
finality, the court of appeals improperly
construed any doubt as to the meaning and
significance of the disputed language in the
1977 Agreement against the Returning
Mothers.

To summarize, the court of appeals not
only made factual findings de novo in direct
contravention of the mandate of this Court,
but it also made these findings on the basis
of an incomplete and entirely undeveloped
evidentiary record. This is simply too
Slender a reed to support a conclusion that
deprives many women of significant employ-

ment benefits.* Under these circumstances,

* american estimated that it would presently
cost approximately $850,000 to fund the retirement
benerits actuarially attributable to the credits for
length of service sought dy the Returning Mothers
(Apo., p. 18). Thus, although it cannot de stated
with exact certainty, at issue nere are millions of
dollars in future pension benefits.

-32-

as
aie

i,
=F
Tie

iat

t
-f

:
J
.

it is imperative that this Court grant re-
view of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

II. In Order To Insure The Finality Of
Class Action Settlements, This
Court Should Review This Case And
Establish The Appropriate Standard
Of Review Which Courts Of Appeal
Should Apply In Reviewing A Dis-
trict Court's Interpretation Of Its
Own Class Action Settlement.

Judge McGarr had initially approved the

1977 Agreement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(e). In reversing Judge McGarr's May 20
Order, the court of appeals applied a de
novo standard of review (App., p. 4a) and
rejected outright Judge McGarr's interpreta-
tion of the 1977 Agreement. In the process,
the court of appeals accorded no weight
whatsoever to Judge McGarr's interpretation
-- even though he had reviewed the 1977
Agreement and had supervised its approval
and implementation.

Given the fact that federal dockets are

crowded with numerous class actions and

-33-

at GREE TEN SEY bn M

BS Nebel ot

;
i
fs
j
4
a
4
:
3
:
4
tad
i
4
{

given the strong pubdlic and judicial policy
of encouraging settlements of such suits, it
is crucial that the finality of class action
settlements be established by this Court
through its definition of the proper stan-
dard governing courts of appeal in their
review of a district court's interpretation
of its own class action settlement.

Lest it be forgotten, it was Judge
McGarr who, as he was required to do under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), reviewed, assessed and

approved the terms of the 1977 Agreement.
Accordingly, who, other than Judge McGarr,
was and is better qualified to ascertain the
true meaning of the 1977 Agreement? We sug-
gest no one. Now that an interpretation of
certain of the terms in the 1977 Agreement
are at issue, the court of appeals should,
at the bare minimum, have given substantial
deference to Judge McGarr's interpretation

of those disputed terms. To hold otherwise,

~34-

| oy
res
4

cr’

|
Sl |
al
a!
pal
~
|
ie = 2; 14.4ee .
. ray
nar | oy ae
ES

a “a
,
;
: : . >.
sae . soak
wa
:

No. 84-1073

retroactive retirement credit to re-employed class mem-
bers, American would be obligated to fund the retirement
benefits actuarially attributable to those credits—an ex-
penditure that American estimates at $850,000, or $86,500
a year for thirty years, almost a third of American’s
express monetary obligation under the Settlement Agree-
ment.” Such an expenditure would be a retroactive ben-
efit—American would have to pay what it would have paid
if the re-employed class members had not been termi-
nated and had all been members of the Retirement Plan.
We think it unlikely that a uniquely retroactive benefit of
such magnitude would have been buried so unobtrusively
in the chosen language of section V A amidst other
implied benefits that were wholly current, if the parties
had really intended to create it.

In addition, we think that section III D of the
Settlement Agreement was intended in part to prevent
just such massive monetary obligations from being teased
out of the language of the Settlement Agreement after it
was signed and approved. In section IIJ A, American
agreed to pay $2,700,000 to the class, the only monetary
obligation to the class members expressly set forth. Sec-
tion III D reads as follows:

American Airlines will have no monetary or other
obligation to any member of the class or to any
representative or attorney for the class unless ex-
pressly provided in this Agreement.

No obligation to fund retroactive retirement benefits is
expressly provided in the Settlement Agreement, and
section III D bars implied monetary obligations. Indeed,
section III D provides a strong reason in itself to think
that the parties did not intend to include retroactive

* This is what it would have cost American in .381, taking into
account the 1981 amendment to the Retirement Plan. See supra
note 11. The record does not show what it would have cost
American in 1977, but the figure would clearly have been
substantial, although less.

18a

No. 84-1073

retirement credit in the settlement. The parties knew the
content of section III D and so would have realized that if
the Settlement Agreement was to grant retroactive re-
tirement credits, American’s obligation to fund those
credits would have to be set forth expressly in the agree-
ment.

In an affidavit attached to her memorandum in sup-
port of her motion for specific performance below, Bur-
meister said the following:

6. In 1977, one of the counsel for plaintiffs
informed me that a tentative settlement agreement
(“the 1977 Agreement”) had been reached with
American. I had previously explained that retroactive
credited service under the Retirement Plan must be
included in the 1977 Agreement in order for it to be
acceptable to me. I signed the 1977 Agreement
having been assured and led to believe that it included
these benefits.

In the same affidavit she also says:

10. Had I believed at the time I signed the 1977
Agreement that it did not provide for retroactive
credited service under the Retirement Plan, I would
not have signed it on behalf of myself or as a class
representative.

If Burmeister had made her understanding clear to
American before signing the Settlement Agreement, and
if American assured her and led her to believe that it
included retroactive Credited Service, then American
might very well be bound by her understanding. But
Burmeister conspicuously does not say that she explained
to American how she understood section V A, or that
American assured her and led her to believe that her
understanding was correct. If she could have truthfully
made such assertions, we presume that she would have.
Any particular interpretation that only one of the parties
may have envisioned at the time the contract was exe-
cuted is immaterial. Smith v. Vernon, 6 Ill. App. 3d 434,
436, 286 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1972).

19a

No. 84-1073

Finally, we consider the effect of section 120-8 of
American’s Regulations, dated November 24, 1982, which
states:

The Company Seniority Date determines the length
of “accredited service” with the Company. It is the
basis for determining an employee's eligibility for-

Retirement Benefits (REG 160-1).

Since this section bears a date of 1982, the quoted passage
may have been revised to reflect the 1981 changes to the
Retirement Plan. See supra note 11. Thus we hesitate to
treat it as straightforwardly applicable in 1977. It is
insignificant that the passage speaks of “Company Se-
niority Date” rather than “Company Seniority”; length of
accredited service is Company Seniority, and, as the
passage says, length of accredited service is determined by
Company Seniority Date. “Company Seniority” and
“Company Seniority Date,” though differently defined,
appear to us to be functionally interchangeable. The
passage refers us to another regulation, REG 160-1, which
evidently contains more information. But the parties
have not supplied us with REG 160-1, and we do not know
what it says. The statement that Company Seniority Date
is the basis for determining an employee's eligibility for
retirement benefits conflicts with te clear provisions of
the Retirement Plan as in effect in 1977, and we doubt
that it is true. Article VI of the Retirement Plan, entitled
“Eligibility for Benefits,” does not make use of the terms
“Company Seniority Date” or “Comp ay Seniority,” nor
does it in any other way indicate that Company Seniority,
as defined in the Regulations, plays any part in the
determination of an employee's eligibility for benefits.
Because of this discrepancy and the uncertain effective-
ness of the quoted passage in 1977, we do not find the
passage to be trustworthy evidence supporting Bur-
meister’s position.

All of these considerations lead us to conclude, and we
hold, that the Settlement Agreement does not provide

20a

No. 84-1073

retroactive retirement credit to re-employed class mem-

Ill

In her motion to the district court seeking specific
performance of the Settlement Agreement, Burmeister
moved in the alternative to vacate the order of October 4,
1977, approving the Settlement Agreement and dis-
missing the action, “to allow plaintiff to adjudicate fully
her cause of action against defendant.” Because the dis-
trict court granted the motion for specific performance, it
did not rule on the alternative motion. Thus it may
appear that we must remand the case for such a ruling.
After reviewing her motion and supporting memo-
randum, we have come to the conclusion that such a
remand is unnecessary. '

Burmeister’s reason for seeking the vacation of the
order is that the Notice to Class Members, supra note 18,
misled them into believing that they would receive full
retroactive credited service under the Retirement Plan.
We assume without holding that inadequate notice of a
proposed settlement in a class action may be sufficient
grounds for vacating the order approving the settlement.
See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982). But Burmeister submitted no
evidence that the notice misled any class member into
believing that the Settlement Agreement provided retro-
active retirement credit to those re-employed, and no
evidence that any class member (besides herself) would
have objected to the settlement if the notice had stated
rere ry that retroactive retirement credit was not in-

2

" Burmeister’s affidavit of March 18, 1983, states that after she
was told in 1979 that she would not receive retroactive retire-
ment credit, she contacted a re-employed class member, Peggy
Allen, who engaged counsel to pursue the matter adminis-
tratively. But the record contains no affidavit from Allen
asserting that she was misled by the notice.

2la

_—

No. 84-1073

The language in the notice that Burmeister finds
especially misleading is the statement: “The seniority thus
computed will apply for all purposes....” As we noted
supra, the subject of this statement is seniority, which, at
least in 1977, had nothing to do with the Retirement Plan.
It is not seniority but credit for lenyth of service that
Burmeister consistently portrays as suggesting retro-
active retirement credit, yet the statement says nothing
about credit for length of service, even though the pre-
ceding sentence does.”

Furthermore, it appears that the vast majority of re-
employed class members were not members of the Retire-
ment Plan when they were terminated.” In order to
believe on the basis of the notice that they were to receive
retroactive retirement credits, such persons would have to
infer that the Settlement Agreement retroactively in-
ducted them into the Retirement Plan. It is clear to us
that such an inference could not reasonably be based on
the language of the notice, without further inquiry.

For these reasons, we hold that the notice to class
members was not so misleading as to require the vacation
of the order approving the settlement and dismissing the
action.”

= We noted this anomaly supra, p. 16. A prudent class member
might have inquired whether the omission of “credit for length
of service” was deliberate, and if so, what it meant, but as far as
we know, no one did.

= See supra note 17.

“ Ordinarily we would not decide a motion addressed to but
not acted on by the district court. In this case, however, we have
before us all the briefs and evidence presented to the district
court, and since we are in as good a position as the district court
to decide the motion, we depart from our usual practice in the
interest of judicial economy and put the question of retroactive
retirement credits under the Settlement Agreement finally to
rest.

22a

No. 84-1073

IV
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the
case is remanded with directions to deny the plaintiff's
motion for specific performance of the Settlement Agree-
ment and her motion to vacate the order approving the
Settlement Agreement.

SO ORDERED.

Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA 50234—Pandick Midwest, Inc., Chicago—6-7-85—450

23a

IN THE UNtreD States District Court
For the Northern District of [linois
Eastern Division
70 Cc 2069

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
(Entered May 20, 1983)

On August 3, 1977, a settlement agreement was entered
into between plaintiff and class representative Darlene Preston
(now “Darlene Burmeister”) and defendant American Airlines
(“American”). Plaintiff contends that American has not
fulfilled its obligations under the terms of the agreement
because American has refused to allow plainuff and the other
class members who were re-employed under the terms of the
settlement agreement (“returning class members”) to fully
participate in its Retirement Benefit Plan (“Plan”). Specific-
ally, plaintiff avers that the returning class members should be
allowed, in accordance with the provisions of the settlement
agreement, to participate in the Plan on a retroactive basis,
encompassing both the period of employment each returning
class member worked for American prior to her termination,
and the compensation period."

The sequence of events which led to the parties’ decisions
to enter into the settlement agreement is briefly as follows. In
1970, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association,
Local 550 (“ALSSA”), filed a complaint against American. In
its complaint, ALSSA alleged that American had violated Tide
Vil, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, by terminating stewardesses who
became pregnant and had children. In 1972, plaintiff filed a

'“Compensation period” is defined in the settlement
agreement as “the period of time which commenced upon the
termination of a class member’s employment and ends on the
date on which 2n order is entered approving this settlement.”
Settlement Agreement at 2. ‘

24a

class action on behalf of the stewardesses who became preg-
nant, had children, and were terminated by American. Once
again, the cause of action was that American had violated Title
VII. In 1974, the class was certified? and plaintiff became the
class representative. Finally, in 1974, plaintiff filed a class
action against ALSSA contending that it had actively partici-
pated in American’s discrimination and had thereby violated
Title VII. These three cases were eventually consolidated and
on April 28, 1976, summary judgment was entered against
American.

Pending American’s appeal of that decision, the parties
entered into the 1977 settlement agreement. The agreement, in
essence, provides that: (1) a pro rata share of the remainder of
$2,700,000, after court awards for litigation expenses, costs and
attorneys’ fees are deducted, will be paid to each certified class
member, (2) American will re-employ all members of the
certified class who apply and meet various requirements; and
(3) all returning class members will receive the amount of
company seniority and credit for length of service that should
have been received had their employment not been terminated
by American. In 1977, the settlement agreement was approved
by court order and the consolidated case was dismissed.

Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the court to order
specific performance of the settlement agreement, which woula
allow plaintiff and the returning class members to fully partici-
pate in the Retirement Benefit Plan or, in the alternative, to
vacate the order dismissing the case. For the following reasons,
plaintiff's motion seeking specific performance is granted.

The construction of a settlement agreement is to be
governed in accordance with the principles of law which govern
a contract. Okonko v. Union Oil Co. of California, 519 F. Supp.
372 (C. D. Cal. 1981); see also United States v. Orr Construc-

2 The certified class was composed of stewardesses whose
employment had been terminated between 1965 and 1970
because they had become pregnant and had children.

25a

tion Co., 560 F. 2d 765 ‘7th Cir. 1977). The interpretation,
construction, or legal effect of a contract are issues to be
resolved by the court as questions of law. Mazanek v. Rockford
Drop Forge Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 956, 424 N. E. 2d 1271 (1981).
Further, when the terms of a contract are clear and unam-
biguous, no parol or extrinsic evidence can be considered to
change the meaning of the terms. Susmano v. Associated
Internists of Chicago, Lid., 97 Ill. App. 3d 215, 422 N. E. 2d
879 (1981). To determine whether ambiguity exists in the
language of a contract, the instrument must be considered as a
whole. Courts cannot consider some clauses and ignore other
clauses. Valerio v. R & R Construction Co., 20 Ill. App. 3d 48,
312 N. E. 2d 713 (1974).

In applying these rules to the 1977 settlement agreement, it
is evident that the terms of the agreement are clear and
unambiguous. The language is not “reasonably susceptible to
more than one meaning.” Susmano, at 219, 422 N. E. 2d at
882. According to the clear terms of the agreement, plainuff
and the returning class members are entitled to receive any and
all of the benefits they would have received had they not been
discharged by Amencan.

Paragraph V of the settlement agreement is entitled “‘Sen-
iority and Credit for Length of Service.” The first sentence of
this paragraph explicitly provides that “[e]ach re-employed
class member shall be credited with the amount of company
seniority and length of service to which she was entitled at the
date on which her employment was terminated plus company
seniority and such length of service for the entire compensation
period....”

The Retirement Benefit Plan is one of the benefits Amen-
can employees enjoy. In addition, the retirement benefits of the
Plan are determined by the number of years an employee has
worked for American. Clearly, the phrase “credited with ...
company seniority and length of service to which she was

26a

SW Tee ee BE aun ‘ oe Seka Sager “ jaa: ae
’ ttt neste ae ies Fie Dae mae ; CiBET 2 a
® CA a Sys ara - Aevae? Li
ay. \ ' 2
: : Bod
te ee As Vik ee voor =
,
oy ' 5 a ¥y y Fi
f ; names ae 7 ”
i 4
‘ ‘ een Pee
a
: ra - -
4 f * y ,
4 f
a f “4 bs
a We te ate FA 2RD
. <>} a oa *
oa . pe - oX.6 d =
P a oe may ahh — -
a a — GBs Wks
1 : ;
14 . 7 ‘ ‘ rs en ie ine oe
ae Rs Wik Yori.
; : Fe
( A “Ets Lae 5 ve nb Sa ;
‘ vi et ©
a , , thin & pata aoe
‘ . ius on, tA ee
|
p , Baa
at
4 # =% - ¢ a Wde ea. A pe eT —
q z } d P bs ADR Paes ° rai a Ss

, oy
; nae Oy: Setews bah Sl ORES
: 28 oe

rc ; a se. 2 e ene we G tt! 'y Pate
oe ee ae aa Wacken POR Daeeite iy

; RM et Sab a mm eee co) ry 3
ee iad aes eae ae

fier

Tea ete

entitled” means that plaintiff and the returning class members
are entitled to the benefits of the Plan consistent with their
credit for length of service.

At one time, in order to be eligible to receive the benefits of
the Plan, employees were required to make yearly contributions
to the Plan. If an employee’s contribution were still a require-
ment, American would have to allow plainuff and other
returning class members the opportunity to make retroactive
contributions to the Plan and thus participate in the Plan’s
benefits.

However, since 1980, a new version of the Plan has been in
effect. This new Plan does not require employee contributions
in order for an employee to be eligible to receive its benefits. In
addition, in 1981, American agreed? to pay back to its employ-
ees all of the contributions previously paid into the Plan. As a
result of these facts, plaintiff and the returning class members
are no longer required to make contributions to the Plan in
order to receive benefits based on credit for length of service.

Finally, the mandate found within paragraph VI of the
settlement agreement that “American ... will not discriminate
in any way against any class member by virtue of the fact that
she is a class member or adopt or enforce any employment
practice, condition or qualification which operates to dis-
criminate against any class member” buttresses the clear mean-
ing of the terms of the agreement. In order to avoid dis-
crimination, plaintiff and the returning class members must be
awarded all of the benefits they would huve received had they
not been discharged. Clearly, the Plan is a part of those
benefits.

In conclusion, plaintiff's motion for specific performance is
granted. According to the terms of the settlement agreement,
plaintiff and the returning class members who desire to partici-

3 The agreement was between the Association of Profes-
sional Flight Attendants and American. Plaintff and the
returning class members are members of the Association.

27a

pate in the Plan must be credited with their length of service
during the compensation period and their time of employment
with American prior to the compensation period, for purposes
of qualifying, vesting and calculating benefits under the Plan.
In addition, American must inform plaintiff and the returning
class members of their rights to participate retroactively in the
Plan.

ENTER:

/s/ Frank J. McGarr
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: May 20, 1983

28a

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

——_—__Ausust15 , 19.85.

Before
Hon. WALTER J. CUMMINGS, Chief Judge
Hon. HARLINGTON Wooo, JR... Circuit Judge

Hon. wJESSE £. ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge

AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ) Appeal from the Unit
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO, States District Cour
et al., for the Northern

ala District of Illinois
Plaintiffs-Apvellees, Eastern Division.

No. 84-1073 vs. No. 70 ¢ 2069
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., * Frank J. McGarr,
Defendant-Appvellant. Chief Judge.
ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and sug-
sestion for rehearing en banc filed in the above entitled
cause by plaintiffs-appellees, no judge in active service
has requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the
original panel have voted to deny a rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing
be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

29a

STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS.
COUNTY OF COOK )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael B. Roche, being first duly
sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows:

l. I am a member of the Bar of this
Court in good standing.

2. I caused to be deposited in the
United States mailbox at 3100 Prudential
Plaza, Chicago, Illinois, 60601, with first
class postage prepaid, a sufficient number
of copies of the “Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit” in the

lawsuit styled Air Line Stewards _ and

Stewardesses Association, Local 550, MTWU,

AFL-CIO, et al. v. American Airlines, Inc.

This mailing occurred on Tuesday, November

12, 1985 at approximately 5:00 p.m. within

the permitted time under 28 U.S.C. §2101(c).

3. At the same time and place, with
first class postage prepaid, I caused to be
served by mail three copies of said Petition
on Gordon 8B. Nash, Jr., Esq., Counsel of
Record for Respondent, American Airlines,
Inc., at Gardner, Carton & Douglas, One
First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois,

60603.

Michael B. Roche

Subscribed and sworn to
before me this 12th day
of November, 1985.

Notary Public

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_1037%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.