# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Della Porta v. Department of Transportation

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 981

## Text

In The

Supreme Court of the United

October Term, 1985

DONALD DELLA PORTA,
Petitioner,
VS.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, F.A.A.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

JOEL A. MOTT, JR.
MOTT AND MOTT
Attorneys for Petitioner
Ten Hundred West Avenue
P.O. Box 385
Ocean City, New Jersey 08226-0385
(609) 399-7577

2818

tz —_ *NJ (201) 257-6850°NY (212) 840-9494ePA (215) 563-5587
mters,ime. MA (617) 542-1114*DC (202) 783-7288¢USA (800) 5 APPEAL

—

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether petitioner, an air traffic controller, has been deprived
of his procedural due process rights under the United States
Constitution when the Chief Controller failed to consider a timely
filed answer prior to rendering his decision.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CITATIONS
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Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90S. Ct.
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Jones v. TVA MSPF, Dkt. AT07528110307 (1982) ......

United States v. Hagerty, 528 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Colorado
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APPENDIX

Decision of the United Siates Court of Appeals for the
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Decision of Merit Systems Protection Board ............ Sa

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

+

October Term, 1985
DONALD DELLA PORTA,
Petitioner,
VS.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, F.A.A.,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

This action was commenced on September 10, 1981 by an
appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner, Donald Della Porta, to
the Merit Systems Protection Board from the decision of the Chief
Controller of the Atlantic City Tower FAA Facility Department
of Transportation, removing him from the position of Air Traffic
Controller Specialist G.S.-2152-12 for the reason that he had
violated 5 U.S.C. § 7311 ‘‘an individual may not accept or hold

a position in the Government of the United States if he participated
in a strike aqainst the L'nited States and 18 U.S.C. § 1918 which
makes participation ir 1 strike against the Government of the
United States a crime of which a sentence of imprisonment can
be imposed.’’ The second reason for his removal was on the basis
of an unauthorized absence alleging that on the 1548 p.m.-2348
p.m. shift of August 4, 1981, he failed to report for a scheduled
tour of duty and alleging that on August 3, 1981 a telegram was
sent stating that an illegal strike was in progress, that ‘‘you must
return to duty for your regular scheduled shift.’’ The petition
for appeal contained a statement by petitioner setting forth the
reason for his having been absent from the Atlantic City Tower
during the period of time from August 4, 1981 to August 7, 1981,
in that he was on annual leave. The petition contained a copy
of the Atlantic City Watch Tower Schedule which indicated that
D. Della Porta was scheduled for annual leave for this period
of time. The FAA failed to answer to the appeal under date of
November 12, 1981, denying any and all allegations made by the
petitioner in the appeal petition.

On March 29, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for summary
judgment relying upon answers to the agency’s interrogatories,
the petitioner’s request for admissions, Article 7 of the Provisions
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization and the Federal Aviation
Administration revision dated October 1979, the Watch Tower
Schedule and the affidavits of both Robert Testa and the petitioner.
Upon consideration, the hearing officer, Mitchell Kastner, entered
an order denying the motion.

The case came on for hearing and trial before the Honorable
Roger A. Schwartz, Presiding Official of the United States of
America, Merit Systems Protection Board, Philadelphia Regional
Office, without a jury, at the Federal Aviation Admissions Atlantic
City Tower following which the Board filed a written opinion

and decision. The Board found that the petitioner’s leave was
cancelled by his supervisor on August 1, 1981, relying on the
testimony of the Chief Controller. Since he had been advised that
if a strike occurred his leave would be cancelled, the agency had
established a prima facie case that the petitioner was striking
against the federal government on the dates of August 4, 5 and
6, 1981. The Board also found that prior to the strike, the
petitioner was scheduled for leave from August 3-August 7, 1981
and that this leave had been cancelled in the event of a strike.

The petitioner makes the argument that the agency did not
formally declare an operational emergency before cancelling the
petitioner’s leave as required by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and contract between PATCO and the FAA. It then
found as a fact that the agency did not declare an operational
emergency as required by the agreement and asserts that the proper
action would have been to terminate his vacation, appear for work,
and then grieve the agency action later. The Board then found
as follows: The deciding official did not consider a written reply
to the advanced notice of proposed removal which was filed by
the petitioner within the time permitted. Even though the Board
found that the failure to consider the bona fide reply is clearly
procedural error, it stated the evidence ir this case did not show
that a proper consideration of the reply would have changed Mr.
Testa’s mind on the removal action. Since these arguments have
been determined by the Board and would not be sufficient to
change the outcome of the removal action, the Board made a
determination.

This petition appeal followed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The case was heard and considered
and the judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board was
affirmed on June 24, 1985 (Appendix, infra at 2a). The judgment
was issued as a mandate on July 16, 1985 (4a).

JURISDICTION

Donald Della Porta, petitioner, seeks a writ of certiorari from
the final judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit dated June 24, 1985. The decision was issued as
a mandate on July 16, 1985 (1a). The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1)(A), 7512(1) aad 7513¢d)
which provides that an employee in the competitive serw:ce who
is not serving a probationary period may appeal an action rts "ing
him from the federal service; and the first section of the Fourteenti:
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Donald Della Porta, is a veteran with 14 years
of government service and for the past 11% years has been a
professional Air Traffic Controller. He has been a member of
PATCO since 1971 and the treasurer of Local Chapter #213 of
that organization since April of 1981.

On August 1, 1981, he was a GS12 Air Traffic Controller
Specialist with an annual salary of $35,033 per year assigned to
the Atlantic City New Jersey Tower. He had a good reputation
as a controller and had never previously received any disciplinary
action. His working ability was satisfactory. He had received no
criticism, only good comments. In April or May of 1981, his
supervisor, Edward Murzyn, granted him annual leave, a portion
of which was to commence on August 4, 1981.

On August 2 and 3 of 1981, petitioner was absent from his
place of employment on his regular days off, and on August 4,
1981, his annual leave commenced, which annual leave extended
up to and including midnight of August 8, 1981. The duty schedule
called for him to report for work for the shift commencing at
midnight following the evening of August 7, 1981, until 8 a.m.

of August 8, 1981. At approximately 7 p.m. EDT on August 3,
1981, a nationwide strike of Air Traffic Controllers occurred.

At 9:10 a.m. Friday morning, August 7, 1981, petitioner wen’
to the FAA Air Traffic Facility. Petitioner was told by Robert
Testa, Chief Controller of the Atlantic City Tower that he could
not return to work, that his proposal to remove letter had been
prepared and would be delivered to him and was specifically told
that he could not return to work for his regular shift as his
moratorium period had expired.

By communication dated August 7, 1981, petitioner was
advised that Robert C. Testa, the Chief Controller at the Atlantic
City Tower, intended to remove him from his position, in that
he had participated in a strike against the government of the United
States, which was a crime, in that he failed to report for duty
at 1548 p.m. on August 4, 1981, that he had an unauthorized
absence from the 1548 p.m. to 2348 p.m. shift of August 3, 1981,
and that he had seven days from receipt of said notice in which
to reply. This notice was received by him on August 12, 1981.

Under date of August 11, 1981, petitioner, denying that he
had committed a crime, requested a 20-day extension of time to
file a response and requested a review of all materials relied upon
by the FAA to support its proposed action. On the same date,
he requested the production of the documents suprorting any
adverse personal action under the Freedom of Information Act,
together with a response to the proposed removal action, indicating
that confusion and ambiguity existed with reference to the 24-hour
amnesty and reasserting that on August 4, 1981 from 1548 p.m.
to 2348 p.m. was not his next assigned shift to work. At 1:22
p.m. on August 14, 1981, Robert C. Testa sent a mailgram to
petitioner denying the request for extension of time and indicated
that if he wished to make a reply, he could review the materials
relied upon and would be given a reasonable amount of time to

submit a written response, as long as the response was submitted
prior to the expiration of the seven-day period. Thirteen minutes
later, at 1:35 p.m. on August 14, 1981, Mr. Testa forwarded
another mailgram, indicating that his original letter of intent of
removal was self-explanatory and that he would not elaborate
on the same, and reminded petitioner that any reply must be
presented or scheduled within the seven-day calendar limit. Under
date of August 16, 1981, Donald Della Porta submitted a written
reply to Mr. Testa, asking him to forward him a copy of the posted
two-week watch schedule, which included the week of August
2-8, indicating that he was on approved annual leave from August
4 to the 7th and was not scheduled to return to work until midnight
of August 7, 1981. This reply was received by Robert Testa on
August 19, 1981, but was ignored and not considered by him in
arriving at his decision of removal which was rendered on the
same day.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Under the provisiors of the Merit Systems Protection Board,
an employee who is intended to be removed from his position
by his employer must be given a reasonable time in which to file
an answer to the employer’s charges and complaints against him.
In no event can this time be less than 7 days from the receipt
by the employee of the Notice of the Intention to Remove, 5
U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2). On August 7, 1981 the Federal Aviation
Administration by Robert C. Testa, their Chief Controller at the
Atlantic City Tower forwarded a Notice of Incention to Remove
the petitioner from his position of employment. The letter
contained the following language: ‘‘Therefore, you may reply to
this Notice personally, in writing, or both, and furnish Affidavits
and other documentary evidence in support of your answer to
me, within 7 calendar days after you receive this letter.’’ This
letter was sent by certified mail on that date and was received
by petitioner on August 12, 1981.

a

By letter dated August 11, 1981, petitioner requested an
extension of time, requested the production of information that
would permit him to prepare a defense and denied the charges
against him. Then by separate typewritten letter dated August
16, 1981, which was received by Robert Testa on August 19, 1981, |
within the 7 days statutory limitation, petitioner made a further
request for the Watch Schedule and set forth with particularity
that there had been no communication to him that he was to report
for duty at any time prior to midnight of August 7, 1981.

At the hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board,
the presiding official found as a fact that the deciding official
did not consider the second written reply and that failure to
consider the reply was clearly procedural error. He then went on
to say that he did not think it was harmful error because, ‘‘The
evidence in this case does not show that proper consideration of
this reply would have changed Mr. Testa’s mind on the removal
action.”’

It is respectfully submitted that from the sworn testimony
and an actual inspection of t ¢ documentation in the iorm of
the duty schedule, the personal log, and the T and A Report,
it is clearly shown that a return to duty time prior to midnight
of August 7, 1981 had never been communicated to the employee
or could possibly have been made known to him. For the presiding
official to say that it is perfectly alright for the decision officer
to ignore the facts set forth in the employee’s answer on the
proposition that, ‘‘Do not confuse me with the facts, my mind
is already made up,”’ is untenable. Such a proposition is also
contrary to both the prior decision of the Board in the case of
Jones v. TVA, MSPF, Dkt. AT07528110307 (1982), and the
statutory mandate that the Merit Systems Protection Board affirm
an agency decision that shows harmful error. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(c)(2). One must ask the question, ‘‘Why the haste, if the
matter of the removal of Mr. Della Porta is not the sandbagging

of an individual on the pre-existing hit list?’’ Such a list was found
to exist in the case of United States v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp.
1286 (D. Colorado 1981). What is more harmful error than to
fail to carefully consider all of the facts and circumstances set
forth in an answer. The facts should be deliberated not eliminated.

The entire manner in which the decision-maker herein acted
is repugnant to Justice Brennan’s opinion in the case of Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970),
- which held that the decision must rest solely on the legal rules
and evidence adduced at the time of the hearing. An impartial
decision-maker is essential. Prior involvement in some aspects of
a case will not necessarily bar an official from acting as a decision-
maker. He should not, however, have participated in making the
determination under review. This is a fundamental problem in
the instant case. Chief Testa, the decision-maker, states that he
gave an unequivocal order to cancell Mr. Della Porta’s leave and
in his mind he believes that to be unequivocally true. The recipient
of the order, Superintendant Murzyn, says that he received a
conditional equivocal order cancelling the leave only when and
if there is a strike. As a decision-maker by reason of the prior
involvement, how can he possibly be objective? Under the Supreme
Court’s standard for procedural due process, Chief Testa should
have not participated in making the determination presently under
review.

In addressing the question of the 7-day notice as it applied
to the procedure followed by the City of New York, Justice
Brennan said:

*“We are not prepared to say that the seven-day
notice currently provided by New York City is
constituticnally insufficient per se, although there
may be cases where fairness would require that
a longer time be given.’’

Under what other circumstances would it be more important
to receive appropriate juridical demeanor than the termination
of an employee’s career after 14 years of faithful service.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should grant this writ of
certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,
JOEL A. MOTT, JR.

MOTT AND MOTT
Attorneys for Petitioner

la

DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Note: This opinion will not be published in a

printed volume because it does not add significantly

to the body of law and is not of widespread legal
interest. It is a public record. It is not citable as

precedent. The decision will appear in tables

published periodically.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT

Appeal No. 83-1297
DONALD DELLA PORTA,

Petitioner,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

DECIDED: June 24, 1985

Before FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge, Miller,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and NIES, Circuit Judge.

* Judge Miller assumed senior status on June 6, 1985.

2a

Decision
NIES, Circuit Judge.
DECISION

The decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in Case
No. NY075281F1326, sustaining the removal of petitioner by the
Department of Transportation, FAA (agency) for striking against
the United States Government and absence without leave from
August 4 to August 7, 1981, is affirmed.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that, under the union contract, his annual
leave was not legally cancelled since the agency never formally
declared the existence of an ‘‘operational emergency.’’ This
argument was specifically rejected in Letenyei v. Department of
Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 528, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1984), wherein
this court held that the threat of a national strike by air traffic
controllers constituted an operational emergency, justifying the
cancellation of annual leave.

Petitioner also raises, apparently for the first time on appeal,
an issue regarding the sufficiency of his leave cancellation. The
presiding official found that petitioner was advised by the agency
on at least three occasions that his annual leave would be cancelled
in the event of a strike. Petitioner argues, however, that the
agency’s cancellation of his leave was ineffective since the agency
never actually contacted him on the day of the strike to notify
him that his leave had been cancelled and that he was to report
for work at a certain time and hour. The argument ignores that
the strike was one of general knowledge. Schapansky v.
Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477, 482 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 432 (1984). Petitioner introduced

3a

Decision

no evidence indicating either that he was unaware that a strike
was in progress or that he had misunderstood the agency’s repeated
warnings that his leave would be cancelled if a strike occurred.
Accordingly, the agency’s prima facie case of strike participation
stands unrebutted.

Regarding the deciding official’s failure to consider
petitioner’s second written response, the presiding official
concluded that such error was harmless. The second response
merely argued the legal issue of the propriety of the agency’s
cancellation of leave under the union agreement. The deciding
official testified that the argument did not change his mind and,
indeed, the agency’s contrary position on this issue is basic to
the action taken against petitioner. Moreover, we have specifically
rejected the union contract argument, as discussed above.

Finally, petitioner argues that the agency improperly used
**selective enforcement’’ by rehiring certain air traffic controllers
but not petitioner. The FAA, however, had the authority to assess
its litigative risk in individual cases and is under no obligation
to rehire petitioner simply because other cases have been settled.

4a

Decision

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT

NO. 83-1297
NY075281F 1326
DONALD DELLA PORTA,
Petitioner,
Vv.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA,

Respondent.

JUDGMENT

ON APPEAL from the Merit Systems Protection Board

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is ORDERED
and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY OXDER OF THE
COURT
George E. Hutchinson, Clerk

/s/George E. Hutchinson

DATED June 24, 1985

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: JULY 16, 1985
COSTS: Against, Petitioner, Donald Della Porta
PRINTING $26.08

TOTAL $26.08

Sa

DECISION OF MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE

DONALD DELLA PORTA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Initial Decision Number: NY075281F1326
Date: 26 Oct. 1982

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Donald Della Porta appealed on September 10, 1982
_ from an action taken by the Department of Transportation,

Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City Airport Tower,
to remove him from the position of Air Traffic Controller, GS-12,
effective September 2, 1981. An evidentiary hearing was held on
this appeal on September 2, 1982.

JURISDICTION

Under 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(a) an employee may appeal to
the Merit Systems Protection. Board from any action which is
made appealable to the Board under any iaw, rule, or regulation.
Applicable law provides that an employee in the competitive
service, who is not serving a probationary period may appeal an
action removing him from the Federal service. 5 U.S.C. Section
7511(a)(1)(A), 7512(1) and 7513(d).

6a

Decision

The record shows that the appellant was an employee in the
competitive service, that he was not serving in a probationary
period, and that he was removed from his position with the Federal
Aviation Administration. Accordingly, I find that this appeal is
acceptable for adjudication.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The agency effected this action based on the charges that
appellant was striking against the Federal Government from
August 4 to August 7, 1981; and that he was absent without leave
for those dates. Since this agency action was taken in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. Section 7512 and Part 752, Subpart
C of the Office of Personnel Management Regulations, 5 C.F.R.
752.301, the burden of proof imposed upon the agency must
comply with that established by 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(c)(1)(B).
That is, the agency must support its case by a preponderance of
the evidence before the MSPB can affirm the agency action on
appeal. A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind, considering the record as a
whole, might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion that
the matter asserted is more likely to be true than not true, 5 C.F.R.
~ 1201.56(c)(2).

In addition to proving its case by a preponderance of the
evidence, the agency must also prove that its actions were taken
for such cause as promotes the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C.
Section 7513(a). See Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1010-11
(4th Cir. 1978); Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1257 (7th
Cir. 1977); Allen v. United States Postal Service, 2 MSPB 582
(1980); Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Norton
v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). As a separate element
of this analysis it is also necessary to detemine the reasonableness

7a
Decision

of the penalty chosen under the facts and circumstances of the
case; even if it is found that the action was taken for the efficiency
of the service, as required by statute. See Dougias v. Veterans
Administration, MSPB Dkt. No. AT075299006 (April 10, 1981);
Snipes v. United States Postal Service, MSPB Dkt. No.
AT075209206 (May 19, 1981); Wanner v. United States Postal

Service, MSPB Dkt. No. CH07528010032 (June 10, 1981). Thus,
my decision will first reflect an analysis of the evidence, whether
the acticn taken was for such cause as promotes the efficiency
of the service and finally whether the penalty chosen was
reasonable under the circumstances of the case factors cited in
Douglas, supra.

An employee is striking against his/her employer when he/she

refuses, in concert with others, to provide services to that employer.

United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879

(D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802, 92 S. Ct. 80 (1971). Such refusal,

as a matter of intent, is usually proven by circumstantial evidence.

See Tucker v. United States, 624 F.2d 1029 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Filson

v. Department of Transporation, MSPB Dkt. No. DC07528010253

(December 2, 1981). In proving that an employee struck against

the government, the agency has the initial burden of establishing

a prima facie case that appellant was, in fact, striking on the dates

| charged in the advance notice. A prima facie case is established
| by showing that a strike was called, that appellant was a member
of the striking union, that appellant did not appear for work as

scheduled; that he did not advise the agency why he was absent

or that his excuse for his absence was unreasonable. See Jones

v. TVA, MSPB Dkt. No. AT07528010300 (February 19, 1982);

Duckett and Yardley v. TVA, MSPB Dkt. No. AT07528010325

(February 19, 1982); TVA v. Bailey, 495 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Tenn.

1980). In analyzing the prima facie case, one can consider evidence

of an appellant's presence on a picket line, but such presence does

a

8a

Decision

not, by itself, establish that appellant refused, in concert with
others, to provide services to his employer. See Bailey, supra.
Once the prima facie showing is made, the appellant then has
the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut it, although,
of course, the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion always
remains with the agency. See Jones, supra.

5 C.F.R. 1201.56 provides that a Presiding Official may take
official notice of matters of common knowledge, or matters that
can be verified. The Board itself discussed at length the propriety
of taking official notice of the commencement and duration of
the strike action in question in this appeal, Ketchem v. FAA,
MSPB Dkt. No. DA075281F0713 (May 28, 1982). That case
concluded by taking official notice that an unlawful strike of air
traffic controllers occurred from August 3, 1981 through August
6, 1981. Jd. at 9. That decision also noted, however, that for
individual cases, wherein the issue of an appellant’s strike activity
after that date comes into question, it was inappropriate to take
official notice of the continuation of the strike beyond August
6; and that it was subject to proof by the agency. Jd. at 6. The
agency has produced no evidence that as to this appellant, the
strike went past August 6, 1981. In fact, the evidence establishes
that this appellant attempted to return to work on August 7, 1981,
H.T. pp. 16, 17, 36-38, but was denied entrance onto duty.

The agency produced evidence showing that appellant was
counseled by his supervisor on the illegality and probable
consequences of striking against the Federal Government, and
the meaning of PL 191 which prohibits that action, H.T. pp.
20, 21, 35. It was apparent that appellant understood his
supervisor’s remarks, H.T. p. 21. Appellant was advised on at
least three occasions that any leave he had would be canceled
should a strike occur, H.T. pp. 64-66, 74, 77-80. Appellant’s leave,

9a

Decision

during the period August 4-8, 1981, was canceled by his supervisor
on August 1, 1981, H.T. pp. 12-:1v. When a strike was called
by appellant’s union, neither the appellant, nor any other air traffic
controller showed up for work on August 3, 4, 5, 1981, H.T.
pp. 8, 9, 86. The appellant did not contact the agency during
this period to give an explanation for his absence, H.T. p. 17.
After his removal was proposed, appellant gave a standard
PATCO written response to the notice without giving any
explanation for his absence on the days in question, H.T. p. 19.
Appellant did not give any oral reply to the advance notice, H.T.
p. 19.

From this evidence, I conclude that the agency has established
a prima facie case that appellant was striking against the Federal
Government on August 4, 5, 6, 1981.

The appellant did not offer any rebuttal testimony to this
charge. An appellant’s failure to defend, taken alone, does not
satisfy the agency’s burden of proving its case; however, an
appellant’s silence in an administrative proceeding can be used
as one factor to help evaluate the weight of the evidence without
offending Fifth Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination.
This does not amount to compulsion prohibited by the amendment
because the silence, in and of itself, is insufficient to support an
adverse decision. Book v. United States Postal Service, MSPB
Dkt. No. SL07528010067 (May 26, 1981), affirmed 675 F.2d 158
(8th Cir. 1982).

Inasmuch as the agency has shown its prima facie case and
the appellant has not successfully rebutted it, I find that the charge

of striking is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, for
August 4, 5, 6, 1981.

10a

Decision

As to the second charge, in order to prove that an employee
is AWOL, the agency must show that the individual was absent
from duty on the dates specified in the advance notice; Conner
v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Dkt. No. DC07528101166 (March
16, 1981); that his/her absence was not authorized or that a request
for leave was not authorized or properly canceled, so as to deprive
the employee of proper notice of the agency cancellation. See
In Re Van Sciver, 1 MSPB 94 (1979) Chiriaco v. United States,
234 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Greene v. Department of
the Navy, MSPB Dkt. No. AT075209273 (April 28, 1981); and
circumstances beyond his/her control did not prevent the
individual’s appearance at work; Kramer v. Department of the
Navy, MSPB Dkt. No. SE07528010066 (May 14, 1981).

Prior to the strike, appellant had regularly scheduled leave
for August 3 to 7, 1981, and would have normally been expected
back on duty on August 8, H.T. p. 11. Nonetheless, the evidence
is clear that appellant was notified orally and by agency documents
that his leave would be canceled in the event of a strike, H.T.
pp. 28, 29; although he was never actually contacted on the day
of the strike to come in, H.T. pp. 81, 82, 84, 85. The appellant
shows no evidence that he was unaware that a strike had been
called on August 3. In addition, the wide publicity given this event,
as well as appellant’s subsequent efforts to return to work on
August 7, indicate that appellant had knowledge that a strike was
in progress. He also shows no evidence that circumstances beyond
his control prevented him from returning to work.

Notwithstanding the above, appellant makes the argument
that his leave was not properly canceled, in accordance with Article
28, Section 1 of PATCO’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. The
evidence does show that the agency did not formally declare an
operational emergency before canceling appellant’s leave, as

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Decision

required by the agreement, H.T. pp. 54-61, 96. However, the
proper action for appellant in this case would have been to appear
for work, even though he had annual leave and it appeared to
be improperly canceled; and then grieve the agency action later,
according to the established collective bargaining agreement, or
other regulatory grievance scheme that existed in the agency. ‘‘To
find otherwise would have the effect of undermining the statutorv
scheme established to preserve employee rights without
unreasonably preventing agencies from carrying out their
missions.’’ Gragg v. United States Air Force, MSPB Dkt. No.
DA07528101034 (September 16, 1982); see Walker v. Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307 (1967). The appellant’s allegation, therefore, presents
no viable defense to this matter. Regardless of the propriety of
the agency action he had an obligation to appear at work.
Consequently, I find he was absent without leave, as charged.

An agency may take an action against an employee under
5 U.S.C. Chapter 75 only for such cause as will promote
the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. Section 7513(a)
(1980). In prior decisions, the Board has held that unauthorized
absence from duty constitutes proper grounds for removal
since, by its very nature, it disrupts the efficiency of the
service. Bolling v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB
Dkt. No. NY07528090034 (December 28, 1981); Desiderio v.
Department of the Navy, 4 MSPB 171 (1980). In addition,
the appellant’s willful participation in a strike, an activity
which is defined as a concerted stoppage of work by employees,
likewise, by its very nature disrupted the efficiency of the
Federal Aviation Administration in completing its important
mission of controlling air traffic throughout the United

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Decision

—

States.‘ Therefore, I conclude that this agency action was taken
for such cause as promotes the efficiency of the service.

Notwithstanding the above, however, it is still necessary for
the agency to show that the particular penalty in the case at hand
was appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances of this
case. In this regard, the purpose of the Board’s review of the
penalty is to assure that the agency conscientiously considered
the relevant factors, and, in choosing the penalty struck a
responsible balance within the limits of reasonableness. See Snipes
v. United States Postal Service, MSPB Dkt. No. AT075209206
at 2-3 (May 19, 1981); Wanner v. United States Postal Service,
MSPB Dkt. No. CH07528010032 (June 10, 1981); Lancaster v.
Department of the Navy, MSPB Dkt. No. PH07528010056 (June
9, 1981).

The evidence is clear that the most relevant factor relied upon
by the agency and the deciding official in this case is the statutory
provision of 5 U.S.C. Section 7311(3) (1980) that: ‘‘An individual
may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United
States ...if he... (3) participates in a strike . . . against the
Government of the United States . . .”” See Advance Notice. Thus,
the plain language of the statute prohibits a person who participates
in a strike against the Federal Government from holding a position
in the Government. Although the statute does not specifically
provide for a removal action against such ar employee, removal

1. In United States v. Restor, et al., Crim. No. 81-187 Slip Op. at 8-9 (W.D.
Pa. January 13, 1981), Judge Diamond took judicial notice that the strike by
the air traffic controllers resulted in hardship and inconvenience to the public,
increased unemployment of innocent people and a loss of millions of dollars
in the airline industry. He stated that the controllers’ conduct was ‘‘uniquely
anti-social’’.

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Decision

is obviously the only penalty which can produce the result of having
the striking person not ‘‘hold a position’? in the Federal
Government. Since the language in the statute is plain, it controls,
unless there is a ‘‘clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary;’’ Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980), or unless it would lead to
absurd results. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965).
As Ketchem, supra, notes:

The Board finds, . . . that a long line of judicial
precedent mandates the conclusion that the strike
by air traffic controllers was indeed unlawful under
5 U.S.C. Section 7311 and 18 U.S.C. Section
1918 . . . These statutory prohibitions of strikes
against the Government of the United States were
carefully examined and held to be Constitutional
by a three-judge panel of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia and such
holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court...

[Ketchem cites the following cases for its
conclusions: U.S. v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp. at
1290; Air Transport Association v. PATCO, 516
F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. N.Y.), affirmed, 667 F.2d
316, 321 (2d Cir. 1981); TVA v. Bailey, 495 F.
Supp. 711, 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Air Transport
Association v. PATCO, 453 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.
N.Y. 1978); United Federation v. Blount, 325 F.
Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C.), affirmed, 404 U.S. 802
(1971)]

The most recent case yet on point in this regard is American
Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 80-4250 (9th

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Decision

Cir. June 8, 1982). In this case, the court addressed the question
of whether an arbitrator’s decision requiring the Postal Service
to reinstate an employee who had been removed for striking was
illegal. The court evaluated the facts of the case and concluded
that the removed employee had participated in the strike and that
his reinstatement would violate 5 U.S.C. 7311. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute to require
appellant’s removal.

In similar statutory penalty cases, the Board has observed
that agencies may not impose and the Board may not aporove
lesser penalties than those prescribed by statute. In reviewing a
case involving violation of 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) (misuse of a
government vehicle), the Board noted that the agency could not
properly impose a lesser penalty than that provided by the statute.
Woody v. General Services Administration, MSPB Docket No.
SF07528110028 (June 2, 1981). In a settled case, the Board refused
to approve an agreement reached by the parties because the
settlement contemplated a penalty less than that required by
statute. Special Counsel v. Dukes, MSPB Docket No. HQ12060020
(October 29, 1981).

The agency asserts that once it found the appellant to be
a striking employee it had no other choice but to effect his removal
by adverse action procedures. The law supports this argument.
Therefore, the penalty chosen for charge 1 was appropriate and
reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

Likewise, unauthorized absence from duty has been held to
be proper grounds for removal, Desiderio, supra, and this is
especially true when the absence is prolonged, with no foreseeable
end in sight. See McKenzie v. U.S. Postal Service, 1 MSPB 480,
481 (1980); Dornan v. Internal Revenue Service, MSPB Dkt. No.

ee

15a

Decision

NY07528110014 (September 1, 1981). Therefore, I find that
appellant’s removal on the combined charges of striking and
AWOL was not unreasonable in this case.

The appellant makes a procedural argument that the deciding
official, Mr. Testa, did not consider a second written reply by
the appellant, to the advance notice of proposed removal, dated
August 19, 1981. The final decision letter, dated August 19, 1981,
anc. Mr. Testa’s testimony bears this out, H.T. pp. 45-48. Failure
to consider a bona fide reply to the advance notice is clearly
procedural error, Jones v. TVA, MSPB Dkt. No. AT07528110307
(August 23, 1982).

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. Section 7701(c)(2), MSPB may
not affirm an agency decision that shows harmful error in the
application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at a decision.
This reason for reversal of an agency decision is considered to
be an affirmative defense afforded the appellant, and, in
accordance with MSPB Regulation, 5 C.F.R. 1201.56, the burden
of proof must be carried by a preponderance of the evidence.
Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 MSPB 489 (1980). Further,
any error so shown must be likely to have had a harmiu: effect
upon the outcome before the agency, thereby being prejudicial.
See Parker at 493.

In judging the harmfulness of the error, Parker states:

Application of the harmful error standard may be
relatively simple when subsequent events make
obvious the error’s actual effect ... But when
subsequent events do not reveal with clarity
whether the error was actually prejudicial, the
| probable effect of the error must be determined

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Decision

in light of all the evidence in the circumstances
of the particular case. Parker v. Defense Logistics
Agency, 1 MSPB 489 (1980) at 493.

The evidence in this case does not show that proper
consideration of this reply would have changed Mr. Testa’s mind
on the removal action. See H.T. pp. 45-48. Examination of the
letter merely shows that appellant made his argument that he had
advance annual leave and that it was not canceled properly. These
arguments have been already addressed and have been shown to
be insufficient to change the outcome of appellant’s removal
action. Therefore, this affirmative defense must fail.

Accordingly, having reviewed all the evidence of record, and
having found that the charges are sustained by the preponderance
of the evidence; further, noting the penalty as reasonable, in this
case, the agency removal action is affirmed.

DECISION
The agency removal action is affirmed.
NOTICE

This decision is an initial decision and will become a final
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board on 30 Nov. 1982
unless a petition for review is filed with the Board or the Board
reopens the case on its own motion.

Any party to this appeal, the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, or the Special Counsel may file a petition
for review of this decision with the Merit Systems Protection
Board. The petition for review must set forth specific objections

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Decision

to the initial decision, supported by references to applicable laws
or regulation, and with specific reference to the record. The
petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the Merit
Systems Pretection Board, Washington, D. C. 20419 no later than
the date set forth above.

After providing an opportunity for response by other parties,
the Board may grant a petition for review when it is established
that:

(1) New and material evidence is available that,
despite due diligence, was not available when the
record was closed; or

(2) The decision of the Presiding Official is based
on an erroneous interpretation of statute or
regulation. |

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 7703(b)(1)', the appellant has the
right to seek judicial review of the Board’s final decision on this
appeal. A petition requesting such review must be filed with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit no later
than thirty (30) days after appellant’s receipt of the Board’s final
decision or order.

For the Board:
/s/ Roger A. Schwartz
Roger A. Schwartz
Presiding Official

1. As modified by Section 127 of the Federal Court Improvement Act of
1982, to be codified at 28 U.S.C. Section 1295(a)(9).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0855%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
