# Opposition Brief — Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0805%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 1086

## Text

ile Supreme Court, U.S,
fi? EBILED
NO. 85-528 |
OCT 25 1985
JOSEPH F. SPANIOW, JR.
IN THE x

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1985

RONALD L. GOLDFARB,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM G. BROADDUS
Attorney General of Virginia

JAMES T. MOORE, Ill
Deputy Attorney General

GREGORY E. LUCYK*
Assistant Attorney General
101 North 8th Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 786-3809

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

BEST AVAILABLE COPY at

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of
the United States Constitution prevent the Virginia Supreme
Court from attaching reasonable conditions promoting
attorney competence to the grant of a discretionary license
to practice law so long as any applicant may gain admission

_to the Virginia bar by taking and passing the bar examination.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ..........0.. sdéaiipedeeerbosesees evsencnnanenesedl i
TABLE OF CONTENTS SeSeeeeeeeeeeeeee Seeeseseseeseeoeeee eeeseeeeeeoeoeeeece ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ........scccccccccsees evcesananecosecs ecnswetias ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...... skeeeqnavenee sonesoncensqonss ee |
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .........ccccscseees secconcepcessevencannas 4
REASON FOR DENYING THE WRIT .........cccocccsecccesecsccccses 5
1. Petitioner's Due Process claim
has been previously considered
and rejected by this Court .........cccccccscccesees eoccces 5
2. The analysis by the court of
appeals of the commerce clause
issue is consistent with prior
decisions of this Court ........ccccccsccsecccesecccsccsecses 6
3. The case is unique, is limited
in scope and has no application
outside the discretionary bar
BAMISSION CONTEXT ..crcccrccccserccssccescessccscsecscccccores 9
CONCLUSION SSSSSSSSHSSSSSSESSSSSSSSSSSSESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSOSCESCES |

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Brown v. Sapreme Court of Virginia,

359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.),
aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973) ........ceesees ssicmamseacsdnanel

(ii)

Page

Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia,
414 U.S. 1034 (1973),
summarily aff'g 359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D. Va.) ........ stoveees smell

Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia, et al.,
766 F.26 BSH (4th Cir. 1965) .cccccccccccccccccccccscecces seanaein oni

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975) ......00 pocenessoovanseee ccecccocccssece LO

Hanover Fire Ins. v. Carr,
272 U.S. 494 (1926) ....cccroccrcerecssesescceees cocccccccccccccccccsoscece 8

Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 343-345 (1975) ........cccccsorecceee scenceessemesuene

Hoover v. Ronwin,
__ U.S. _, 80 L.Ed.2d 590, 600 n.18 (1984) ...........00. one

In re Jadd,
391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984) .....cccccccccccecccccccerseeed

Leis v. Flynt,
439 U.S. 438, 444 1.5 (1979) ....c.ccccccccccrccrccccrcccccsercsccccoeel

Looney v. Crane,
S45 U.S. 178 (1917) coccccccccccccccccescccccccccecccsoce ebeneenenie consensual

Matter of Brown,
Sk S&S ly, siinchstiiiiiiinialiaitas a pieuiiaaiidas eneundell

Norfolk and Western R. Co. v. Beatty,
423 U.S. 1009 (1975)
summarily aff'g 400 F.Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.) ...... cocwusessossuuse 11

Pike v. Bruce Church,
SOE Dade BET GAOT OD Srctscccevescccccssccncseceeccsesccocevccccovecocccceocel

(iii)

Souix Remedy Co. v. Code,
I i a cen cenonnonnnnnnnnanensenoonsnbense 8

South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunicke,
104 S.Ct. 2237 (1984) .........0.. pendenestecseues podaceesnosveocbocesodsed 6

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,
105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985) ......cececeees iia eatiahh pemanaennnansamencenqcsnntil 9

United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul,
and Pac. R. P. Co.,

‘$a: U.S. 311 (1931) .......... cocccccceceeceococees arccecccocccceccocoosoose 7
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State of Kansas,

216 U.S. 355 (1909) ..ccccccccrcocccscccccccccccccsoccoccecccsoccoscccocsoee 7
Statutes:
Va. Code § 54-67 ......ccccoccsoosereens eeccecceces cocccsecoesececcesseceseos 1

Constitutional Provisions:

Art. 1, § = eeeceeeeeesoeeeeeeeoeeeee eeeeeeeese eeeeeeone eeseeeeeeeeeoeee eeeeeeeeeoeeoe 1
Ast. 1, BB ecccces piienineemenanthnuctinnamatie seonpiiensones eepnepenquanests evenscedlll
Rules:

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(b)(6) SOOHOSOEESE OEE EEEESEEO HOE EEESEEEEEEEESEEESEEEOEEEES eoccccocoocecoes b

Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
Rule 1A81 cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccsccccescocvcccccoccccsocsocees passim

Other Authorities:
Hafter, Toward the Multistate Practice

of Law Through Admission by Reciprocity,
53 Miss. Lid. 1, 44 (1983) ..cccccccccccccccccccccccccoccscccserccceccccees 9

(iv)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner seeks this Court's review of an order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
affirming the action of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virg .a in dismissing petitioner's
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) for faiiure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The district court action was filed by petitioner
Ronald L. Goldfarb on May 18, 1984, against respondents the
Supreme Court of Virginia, its Clerk and Executive
Secretary. Petitioner challenged the validity of Supreme
Court Rule 1A:1 as violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8 of the United States
Constitution. Rule 1A:1 was adopted pursuant to the Court's
discretionary authority under Va. Code § 54-67 to admit
attorneys from other jurisdictions without examination.
Petitioner challenges subpart (d) of that rule, which requires

the Supreme Court to determine “whether the

applicant...[iJntends to practice full time as a member of the

Virginia Bar." Respondents moved for dismissal or

abstention, and after argument on the motions, the district
court granted the motion to dismiss.

The court of appeals thereafter affirmed, Goldfarb v.

Supreme Court of Virginia, et al., 766 F.2d 859 (4th Cir.

1985), holding that petitioner's due process challenge had

been raised and rejected in Brown v. Supreme Court of

Virginia, 359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034

(1973), a case which it described as "essentially identical to
the present action.” 766 F.2d at 861. The court endorsed the
prior court's findings and concluded that "the requirement

rationally served the interest of Virginia in insuring the

The purposes of the full time practice requirement were
explained by the Supreme Court in Matter of Brown, 213 Va.
282 (1972). The court defined its rule to mean "that an
applicant must show that he intends to open an office in
Virginia for the practice of law and to regularly engage in the
practice of law in this state.” Id. at 286, n.3. (Emphasis in
original.) Among the considerations which made necessary
the Virginia rule was the need to ensure that out of state
attorneys who sought admission without examination would
"familiarize themselves with the rules of local practice and
procedure.” Id. at 286. The court was concerned that the
demands of an out of state practice and "the infrequency of
{en attorney's] contacts with Virginia law would stand in the
way of his becoming a proficient Virginia practitioner.” Id. at
287.

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defining the extent of that assertion, the court concluded
that the examination alternative must be incorporated into
its Commerce Clause analysis. This being so, the court
properly found that because any attorney may gain admission
by taking and passing the bar examination, the Commerce
Clause is not offended by the admission without examination

alternative.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts of this case are not complicated. Petitioner
is an attorney licensed to practice law in several states. He
resides in Virginia but maintains his office in the District of
Columbia. Because he occasionally has clients in Virginia, he
wants to become a member of the Virginia State Bar (VSB).

In January, 1983, he applied to the Virginia Supreme
Court for admission to ‘the VSB without examination. In
response to an inquiry from the Supreme Court's Executive
Secretary, he stated that he planned to maintain offices in
both Virginia and the District of Columbia. His application
was denied because he did not intend to practice full time in
Virginia but rather would divide his practice between Virginia

and the District. Following that denial, petitioner filed this
lawsuit. It is undisputed that petitioner has not been denied
the right to sit and take the Virginia bar examination. If he
were admitted to the bar by examination, the full time
practice requirement would not apply. Further, petitioner is
not preciuded presently from representing clients in Virginia

courts pro hac vice, so long as he affiliates a local counsel.

REASON FOR DENYING THE WRIT

1, Petition: s Due Process’ claim has been
previous): sonsidered and rejected by this Court.

This Court has already found that the Virginia full
time practice requirement for reciprocity admission satisfies

due process. In Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359

F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973) a

three judge federal panel upheld this rule against an equal
protection and due process challenge, finding that the
requirement rationally served the interest of Virginia in
insuring the competence of attorneys practicing in the
Commonwealth. This Court summarily affirmed the panel's

decision. There is nothing unique or different about the case

at bar which suggests that this claim should be relitigated.

2. The analysis by the court of appeals of the commerce
clause issue is consistent with prior decisions of this
Court.

Petitioner argues that the court's decision below
cannot be reconciled with prior cases of this Court
considering the commerce clause. This contention has no
merit. The significant difference between this case and the
commerce clause cases relied upon by petitioner is that here,
petitione? is not absolutely foreclosed from maintaining his
practice in the District while at the same time practicing
freely in the courts of Virginia. He as an alternative
available to him which will permit him to achieve that result,
and that is simply taking and passing the bar exam. There
were no similar alternatives available to the complainants in
the commerce clause cases cited by petitioner. Thus, in

South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104

S.Ct. 2237 (1984), the "primary manufacture within Alaska" -
requirement was an absolute prerequisite to the purchase of
Alaskan timber. Absent compliance with the in-state
manufacture requirement, the complainant was absolutely

barred from purchasing the low priced Alaskan wood. There

is no such absolute bar in petitioner's case. Similary, in Pike

v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970), Arizona law required all

Arizona canteioupes to be packed at a plant in that state.
Absent compliance, the complainant was prohibited from
shipping them beyond state lines. There is no such absolute
prohibition in petitioner's case.

Petitioner's “unconstitutional conditions" argument
likewise merits no consideration by this court. His effort to
equate the "privilege" of admission without examination with
the "privilege" of doing business recognized in the commerce
clause cases is contrived and misrepresents those decisions.
Again, the "conditions" imposed on doing business in the
commerce clause cases represented an absolute bar to the

noncomplying business interest. See United States v.

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pac. R. P. Co., 282 U.S.

311 (1931) (ICC's grant of authority to reorganized
corporation to issue securities subject to condition not
authorized by statute; noncompliance with the illegal

condition would have voided the issue); Western Union

Telegraph Co. v. State of Kansas, 216 U.S. 355 (1909) (statute

required payment of charter fee based upon percentage of

corporation's entire authorized capital stock for payment into

state's permanent school fund as a condition of doing business

within state); Hanover Fire Ins. v. Carr, 272 U.S. 494 (1926)

(required payment of a 2% gross receipts tax in order to do

business within state); Looney v. Crane, 245 U.S. 178 (1917)

(imposition of tax upon out of state corporations according to
amount of authorized capital stock as a condition of doing

business within state); Souix Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S.

197 (1914) (denied foreign corporations right to sue in state
court; tantamount to a denial of right to do business).

In each of these cases cited by petitioner, the
"condition" struck down by this Court represented an absolute
bar to doing business within the state. Petitioner is not so
foreclosed from doing business in Virginia. As the district
court and the court of appeals concluded, he need only take
and pass the bar examination. It is the availability of this
alternative which sets this case apart from all those cited by
petitioner. The examination requirement may cause
petitioner some minor inconvenience, but it clearly does not
violate his ec» .utional rights, and does not justify granting

the writ in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0805%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.