# Appendix — Medina v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 948

## Text

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a Supreme Court, U.S.
FIL E D

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86-479 JUL 24 1985
No.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1985 TERM

ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA
PETITIONER
VS.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE NAVAL STATION,
ROOSEVELT ROADS, PUERTO RICO

ANTILLES CONSOLIDATES SCHOOL SYSTEM
RESPONDENTS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

ROBERT J. WALSER. EQ).
GPO Box AL

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936
(809) 722-0111

Attorney for petitioner

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Order and Opinion US

Case 82-1702, 10 May

Memorandum and Order

Case 82-1702, 13 Jun

Order and Opinion US

Case 84-1644, 27 Mar

Court of Appeals
1983

1983

Court of Appeals

1985

page

34

36

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

82-1702

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA,
Plaintiff, Appellant
Ve
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

{[Hon. Carmen Cosuelo Cererezo, U.S.District Judge]

Before

Coffin, Circuit Judge,

Campbell and RBownes, Circuit Judges.

Robert J. Walser, for appellant.

OLA Skt MAEM! oes BOO 9 eB OTL he Bg A 0d

Alex H. Adkins Trial Attorney,

Department of the Navy, with whom-Daniel

Lopez Romo, United States Attorney,

and Osvaldo Carlo Linares, Assistant

United States Attorney, were on brief, for

appellees.

May 10, 1983

oO EN Riera CEO OO At Ol we te

Re Ae tt I AME TL, Om

OL OE OGetpa: ee a,

CAMPBELL, Chief Judge. Appellant Andres

Serrano Medina ("Serrano") is a taxi
driver and former cook for the Antilles
Consolidated School System at the United
States Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads,
Puerto Rico. Because of the revocation
of his permit to enter the Naval Station,
he lost his job as a cook and his right
to operate his taxi on the base. He
brought this suit against the base comman-
der, the United States, and the _ school
system seeking reinstatement, back pay,
reissue of his identification cards,
and relief from the debarment' order.
The district court granted summary judge-
ment for the defendants.

On January 8, 1978, Serrano was
driving a United States marine onto
the base in his taxi. mis half brother,
Jose Medina, was also in the car. Acting

on a tip, Naval security agents stopped

them. They found three small bags of
marijuana on the marine, and several
more under the taxi where Jose had apparen-
tly thrown them. A search of Serrano
and, on his written consent, the car
turned up nothing. The agents’ asked

for Serrano's Navy identification card;

when he produced it they noticed a second
card in his wallet, which he also handed
them. One card for the cook's job, the
other for the taxi job. Although they

had been issued only three days apart,

*one was a reissue of two-year old card.

On one, Serrano was’ pictured with a

beard, while on the other he was clean
Shaven; the height and weight figures

given on the cards were

Page 3
Slightly inconsistent; and on one his

name was given as Andres Serrano, on

the other as Andres Serrano Medina.
The agents confiscated the identification
cards, which were destroyed five days
later, and turned Serrano and his half-
brother over to the Puerto Rico police.
A week later, Serrano and his

attorney met briefly with the executive,
officer of the Naval Station, lward
Serig, in an effort to obtain return
of the cards, without which Serrano
could not enter the base. Serig refused
to discuss the matter until the criminal
action was resolved. On March 30, while
the Puerto Rico criminal charges were
still pending, he issued a letter perma-

nently barring Serrano from the baee,*

l. The executive officer is the second
in command at the Station, For present

purposes, we shall consider his authority

coextensive with that of the commanding
officer, from whom seposibility for
this matter was delegated.

2. The letter read, in part,

On January 1978 you were appre-
hended by the Naval Station Security
Department when a substantial amount
of marijuana was discovered in the Naval
Station. You were also in possession
of two civilian worker's identification
cards issued to you on 19 and 22 August
1977. Both identification cards were
found to bear your photograph aithough
they were filed under different names
and contained dissimilar descriptions
of your physical characteristics. This
is in violation of Naval Station Regula-
tions and constitutes an act of fraud
against the United States Government.

As a result of your involvement

Page 4
in the aforementioned incident, you are
hereby barred from entering the Naval

Station, Roosevelt Roads.

The complaint alleges that the debarment
"is the direct cause that Serrano lost
his job as a cook in the school and
his business as a taxi driver."

Criminal charges arising out
of the January incident were brought
in Puerto Rico court. In April, the Navy
also brought charges against Serrano
in federal court when statements’ by
high school students on the base implica-
ted him in further drug transactions.

In may, after several continuances,
the Puerto Rico action was dismissed.
The United States Attorney later reques-
ted dismissal of the federal charges,

which was granted in July.

8

On November 7, and again on Novem-
ber af Serrano's attorney requested
in writing the return of the identification

cards; this was refused by a letter

from the commanding officer dated Decem-
eer 1, 1976. The letter acknowledged
that Serrano had “been absolved of any
guilt in the [criminal] charges," but

asserted that he "remained guilty" of

fraud against the government in posse-
ssing inconsistent identification cards.
It reiterated as a trespasser if he
were observed thereon. A week later
Serrano's attorney sent a letter reques-
ting a meeting with tie commanding officer;
this was refused. Fina.ly,
Page 5

on December 15, Serrano and his attorney
went to the base in an effort to speak
with the commanding officer. They were

denied admission. This followed in

January 1979,
I.

Several of appellant's arguments
may be quickly rejected. First, Serrano
claims he should have been allowed to
amend his complaint. The district court
did allow the vbhbiadie to be amended
once, in October 1979, More than two
years after the original complaint had
been filed, in March 1981, Serrano moved

to amend again by adding a number of

new defendants in support of a conspi-
racy theory. The motion was’ denied.
Serrano now appeals from that ruling, des-
cribing it as a denial of due process.

We fiad no error in the court's
denial of leave to amend, Plaintiff's
motion was unduly delayed. He claims
that he was not aware of the extent

of or participants in the alleged cons-

10

piracy until mid-1980. Yet the alleged
conspirators were the commander of the
base and the agents who stopped Serrano's
car. As early as February 1979 they
had been summoned as witnesses in the
Puerto Rico criminal action. Serrano
states that after he discovered the
conspiracy he was still obliged to put

off any amendment because of "an intolera-

ble personal situation," viz., fear
that amendment of the complaint = and
subsequent discovery would implicate
his half-brother and subject him to

criminal prosecution, Only once’ the

Page 6
Statute of limitations had run on the
criminal offense did Serrano seek leave
to amend the complaint. We do not think

his desire to hide the criminal behavior

of his half brother provided any proper

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justification for the further period

of delay. See Hayes v. New England

Millwork Distributors, Inc., 602 F.2d

15, 19=+20 (lst Cir. 1979). The district
court was entitled to believe that
allowance of the eleventh hour amendment
would result in undue prejudice to the
defendants as it added new parties
(at least some of whom were no longer even
in Puerto Rico), and by raising new
and separate claims would require addi-
tional research and discovery. We find

no abuse of discretion. See Johnston

he

v. Holiday Inns., 595 F2d 890, 896 (lst

Cir. 1979) (denial of leave to § amend

shall be reversed only for abuse of

discretion).

The district court alsc properly
found that it lacked jurisdiction over
the claims, all for money damages, against

the United States. No contractual claim

can ‘be made out under the Tucker Act,

28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(2), as the United

States is not a party to the collective
bargaining agreement, the only contract

invlolved, and Serrano was paid out

of nonappropriated funds. See generally

Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S.

481, 485 (1942); H.R. Rep. No. 933,
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News 3477, 3478-79,

Nor can Serrano recover in tort under

section

Page 7
1346(b). Debarment from a military
installation falls within the discretio-
mary function exceptionto the Federal
Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a)

Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d

626, 628 (7th Cir. 1972).
It is also clear that the district
court properly dismissed Serrano's claim

under 42 U.S.C. S 1985, The complaint

9lst

does not mention a conspiracy or state

facts from which the existance of a

conspiracy might be inferred. See Griffin

v. Breckenridge, 405 U.S. 88, 102-103

(1971).
ifs

This bring us to Serrano's prin-
cipal allegations: that the debarment
involved a denial of due process and
was so arbitrary that it cannot stand.
The district court found that no liberty
Or property interest existed to trigger
due process protections, and that the

debarment was not patently arbitrary.

Because these conclutions were necessarily
based in part on submissions outside
the pleadings, we treat the decision
below as a grant of summary judgement.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c); id. 56. We

may affirm only if, looking at the record

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in the light most favorable to appellant,
there is no genuine issue of material
fact and appellee is entitled to judge-

ment as a matter of law. E.e@., ahs

v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461,464 (lst Cir.

1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 904 (1976) .

Page 8

A. Military Discretion

Our law has accorded significant
autonomy to the military with respect
to civilian and judicial interference.
The military “constitutes a specialized
community governed. by a separate discipli-
ne from ,that of the civilian," Orloff

v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 8394 (1953).

The "overriding demands of discipline
and duty" render it "a specialized society
separate from civilian society." Parker

v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974).

See also Department of the Air Force

¥.° Rene, 425 U.S. 733, 743-66 (1974).

15

Of necessity, the military constitutes
a system that stands apart from and
outside of many of the rules that govern
civilian life in our country." Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell,
J., Concurring).

This status creates’ particular
tensions when the military and civilian
realms conjoin. Frequently, itis the
civilian that must yield to the hichee
for "the special character of the military
requires civilian authorities to accord
military commanders some flexibility
in dealing with matters that affect
internal discipline and morale." Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980) (up-
holding Air Force regulations requiring

commanding officer's approval before

petitions may be circulated on the base);

see _ also Secretary of the Navy v. Huff,

444 U.S. 453 (1980) (upholding equivalent

Navy regulations): Greer v. Spock,

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Page 9
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding exclusion
of politically oriented speakers’ from
Army base). In particular, the commanding
officer of a military basg has broad
authority and discretion to exclude

civilians from the base. Cafeteria

Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893

(1961); United States v. May, 622 F.2d

1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

984 (1980); 32 C.F.R. SS 700.702(a),

700.715; H. Moyer, Justice and the milita

ry S 4-520 at 521 (1970).

In Cafeteria Workers Rachel

Brawner, a cook at the Naval Gun Factory,
was relieved of her identification badge
and denied access to the base, without
notice or hearing, because of an unspeci-
fied failure to meet security require-
ments. Noting "the historically unques-

tioned power of a commanding officer

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summarily to exclude civilians from
the area of his command, "267 U.S. at
893, and the regulatory provision, still
in existence, that civilians employees
were to be admitted only as authorized

by the commanding officer, the Court

found that the commanding officer clearly
had the authority to exclude Mrs. Brawner.
Nor was the summary procedure a denial
of due process. The Court balanced
the government's traditionally unres-

trained control of its own internal
affairs against Mrs. Brawner's pcsivate
interest in pursuing her job at that
location -- “a mere privilege subject
to the Executive's plenary power," id.

at 895 -- and concluded that no process
was due.

Page 10

The only glimmer of encouragement

in Cafeteria Workers to persons situated

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appellant contends that
he has a fifth amendment right to notice
and a hearing before being disbarred.
It is quite clear that he received neither.
However, we agree with the district
court that he hed no right there to.
This case is squarely within the explicit

holding of Cafeteria

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367 U.S. at 898 (emphasis added). Thus,

Cafeteria Workers would seem, at most, to

allow us only to “question whether the al-
legations, assumed to be true, are such
as would constitutionally permit an
exclusion order to stand; that is, whether
the assumed facts may constitutionally
be the basis for the judgement that"Serra-

no merits exclusion. Lieberman, Cafeteric

Workers Revisited; Does the Commander

Page 15

Have Plenary Power to Control Access

to his Base, 25 JAG J. 53,56 (1970).

To delve into the truth or falsity
of the facts behind the exclusion would
be to require the very hearing that
appellant has been found not entitled to.

It is true that circuit court

decisions subsequent to Cafeteria Workers

have often seemed willing to question,

within limits, not only whether the

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asserted reason for exclusion is sufficient
but also whether that reason has a basis
in fact. They phrase the issue as whether
the exclusion itself, not just the proffer
ed reason, is patently arbitrary or discri-

minatory. See, e.qg., United States v.

May, 622 F.2d at 1006; Bridges v. Davis

443 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1971) (scope
of review in challenge to debarment
"extremely limited," but commander's
wide discretion does not extend to patent
ly arbitrary or discriminatory exclu-

sions), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972);

Committee to Free the Fort Dix 38 v.

Collins 429 F.2d 807, 811 (3d Cir.

1970); Weissman Ve United States,

387 F.2d ark: 273 (20th Cir. 1967)
("The question...is whether the order

was rational."); Lloyd, Unlawful Entry

and Re-entry into Military Reservations

in Violation of 18 U.S.C, S$ 1382, 53

28

Mil. L. Rev. 136, 142 (1971) (bar can

not be “arbitrary or capricious," citing

Digs. Ops. JAG 1912, p. 267). Indeed, in

the most recent of these cases the plain-
tiff received a full bench trial on
the merits. The district court concluded

the bar crder was reasonable, and
Page 16

the circuit cour. agreed that "there
was ample evidence to support [the comman-
der's] actions." Tokar v. Hearne, 699
9 F.2d at 757.

We need not now decide whether
this willingness to look at the under-
lying factual support for a bar order
is proper. The district court’ here
determined that the commanding officer
"had valid grounds for suspecting plain-
btiff and for deciding that it was best
for his command area that he be excluded

therefrom." Though the question is

29

fairly close, the record revealing more
than a little confusion on the part
of the Navy, we would agree with the
district court. The charge of identifica-
tion card fraud seems insubstantial,
but the concern as to appellant's invol-
vement in drug sales is adequately suppor-
ted. The circumstances were ‘plainly

suspicious; Serrano was accompanied

In his taxi not only by a passenger
who possessed marijuana bvt by a half-
brother widely identified as _ dealing

in drugs who apparently tried

to get rid of some marijuana when the
Stop occurred. While a taxi driver
might not always be expected to vouch
for every passenger, the presence of
his half-brother in the taxi put matters
in a different light. The record also
contains three sworn statements by separ-

te individuals identifying appellant

as a drug supplier. A base commander

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has wide discretion as to whom he may
exclude from the base, and there is
evidence in the form of the current

regulationsthat the

Page 17
military was deeply troubled by the
trafficking in drugs on bases. We cannot
say the exclusion of plaintiff in these
circumstances was patently arbittses

or discriminatory. See Bridges v. Davis,

433 F.2d at 974 (Koelsch, J., concurring)
("substantial proof of actual misconduct"
not required; bar orders’ should stand

"even though the result of gossip and

unconfirmed rumor").

31

Saks

The complaint named not- only
the United States and the base commander
as defendants, but also the school system
in whose cafeteria Serrano had _ been
employed. Appellant states that regard-
less of the outcome of his action against
the United States, he has an independent
and viable action against the_~ school
System for back pay and reemployment,
if only at another facility. The district
court did not address this claim in
its opinion. It did, however, dismiss
the action "as to all defendants."

It is not easy to discern the
legal theory or factual basis on which
appellant seeks to proceed against the
school system. hi .0oes allege a breach
of the collective bargaining agreement
between the school system and his union.

Yet the provision of the agreement to

~~

‘32

which he cites does not seem ‘to exist.

Moreover, in his brief he asserts that

the agreement "expired on 25 August

1977, had not been renewed or otherwise
kept in force, and was not in effect

during any of the time
Page 18

period of this case." Adding to. the
confusion is the fact that the school
system itself denies that Serrano was
even discharged.

Notwithstanding the above, and
without meaning to intimate that the
claim has any merit, we do not at this
time sustainthe dismissal as_ to. the
claim against the school system arising
out of the employment relationship.

The district court did not discuss
the matter in its opinion, and we think
Serrano should have an opportunity to
justify the claim, if he can, upon a

proper motion for summary judgement

33

focusing on that issue. Accordingly
while affirming the district court's
judgement in ail other’ respects, we
vacate and remand as to so much of it
as dismisses Serrano's claim for. back
pay from and reemployment in the school
system,

So ordered.

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34

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 82-1702
ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA
Plaintiff, Appellant,
Ve
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees,

Before

Campbell, Chief Judge

Coffin and Bowes, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Entered June 13, 1983
The petition for the rehearing
is denied. The opinion is amended as
follows:
1) The sentence beginning - on

line 13 of page 2 is changed to "His

brother, Jose Serrano Medina, was also
in the car."

2) On page 16, line 8, 9, and
10 from the bottom are changed to "passen-
ger who possessed marijuana but by his
brother, who apparently tried to get
rid of some marijuana when the stop
occurred. While a taxi...."

3) In line 6 from the bottom
on page 16, “half-brother is’ changed
to "brother."

By the Court,

Francis P. Scigliano

Clerk.

[cc: Messrs. Walser and Adkins

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the First Circuit

No. 84-1644
ANDRES SERRANO MEDINA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon.Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. DistrictJudge |]

Before

Coffin, Circuit Judged

Wisdom, *Senior Circuit Judge.

and Bownes, Circuit Judge.

Robert J. Walser for appellant.

Osvaldo Carlo Linares, assistant United

36

i 7) i a4 ee af
: a a ee :

37

States Attorney, with whom Daniel F. Lo-

pez Romo, United States Attorny, was no

brief for appellees.

March 27, 1985

38

Per curiam, Appellant, Andres Serrano

Medina, challenges a grant of summary
judgement, dismissing his claim that
appelee, the Antilles Consolidated School
System, had terminated his employment
as a cook without cause and thereby
violated his due process rights. For
the reasons outlined below, we affirm
district court's decision,

The district court entertained
cross-motions for summary judgement
in response to our earlier decision

in this case, Serrano Medina v. United

States, 709 F.2d 104 (ist Cir. 1983).
There we upheld the district court's
dismissal of appellant's primary claim,
which was that the commanding officer
of the United States Naval Station at
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, had violated
appellant's due process and equal protec-

tionrights by permanently barring him

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39

from the naval station. Id. at 108-
110, For a number of years’ preceding

the issuance of the bar order, appellant
had worked at the naval station in two
Capacities, as an independent taxi driver
and as a cook for the school system,
Although not unsympathetic to appellant's
plight, we held that the commanding
officer's exclusion of appellant from
the naval station had neither violated
his constitutional rights nor been "arbi -
trary or discriminatory."! Id.

At the same time, we remanded

for further consideration what

I. Having rejected the claim against

the commanding officer in our earlier
decision, we find that part of appellant's

brief which concerns the facts under
lying the bar order largely, if not

entirely, irrelevant at this juncture.

So Ronee gee: PERNA aae here NR RL

For a complete summary of these facts,

40

see Serrano Medina »s. United States,

709 F.2d 104, 105-106 (lst Cir.

Page 3

appeared to be a- possible’ secondary

; ; 2
claim against the school system, which

operates as a somewhat autonomous entity
at this and two other military bases.

"

While we noted that it was not easy
to discern the legal theory or factual
basis on which appellant seeks to proceed
against the school system" for _ back
pay and re-employment, we thought it
best that the district court give appel-
lant an opportunity to justify what
ever claim he might have. Id. at 110.
After considering the cross-
motions for summary judgement that were

subsequently filed, the district court

dismissed appellant's claim against

the school system for a number of reasons,

'
>
,
y

-

41

including: (1) the fact that appellant
was unable to point to any collective
bargaining agreement, contract, or statute
that required the school to prove that
it had cause to terminate someone in
appellant's position; (2) the fact
that the school system had ample cause
to terminate him in that it was impossible
for him to report to work as a result
of the bar order; and (3) the fact that

there was no evidence that the school
System had injured his’ reputation by

publishing any defamatory statements

about him.

In reviewing the district court's
decision, we focus solely upon the second
and third grounds, which, by tnemselves,
are sufficient to dispose of this appeal.
The evidence unmistakably shows” that
appellant was dismissed in large part

because he was unable to report to work.

Appellant concedes both in his amended

2. As the district court has subsequent-
ly noted, none of the specific charges
set forth in the amended complaint spe-
cifically identifies tthe school system

as the wrongdoer.

Page 4
complaint and in the "Stipulated Statement
of Facts" signed by counsel for both
parties that his "employment as_ cook
in the school cafeteria [was] terminated

' Moreover,

because of the debarment order.'
the termination letter itself states
in pertinent part:' "Due to the barment
from entering Roosevelt Roads Naval
Station, you became ineligible to perform
the duties of your position. This may

not be controverted since employees

must be ready, willing and able to work."

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These facts fully support the district
court's conclusion that even if appellant
was correct in his contention that he
could only be terminated ‘for cause,

the school system had more than sufficent

cause to terminate him.

Similarly, the evidence on record
fully supports the district court's deter-
mination that any damage to appellant's
reputation was caused not by the school
system but by the commanding officer.
Appellant makes no allegation, and points
to no evidence which would support an
allegation, that the schol system disclosa
to the public any defamatory comment, eva-
luation, or letter.

Accordingly, the decision of

the district court is affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0769%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
