# Opposition Brief — Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0767%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 980

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
= oct 18 1906
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

IN THE | CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 85-477

October Term, 1985

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Petitioner
v.
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
Respondent
and
GOULD, INC.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF OF HERCULES INCORPORATED
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

John Gerald Gleeson, Esquire Joseph G. Manta, Esquire
Hercules Incorporated John C. Sullivan, Esquire
Hercules Plaza FRUMKIN & MANTA
Wilmington, DE 19899 Suite 1818
(302) 594-7004 Three Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 988-0777
Attorneys for Respondent,
Hercules Incorporated

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................... 3
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This Case, In Which The Sole Basis For Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Was Diversity Of Citizenship
And In Which Only Pennsylvania Nuisance
Law Issues Were Involved, Does Not Present
cca wa bb om sees

The Issues Are Not Sufficiently Important To
Warrant This Court’s Review Since The Third
Circuit’s Decision Was Narrow In Scope And
Involved Issues Unlikely To Recur In The
I Sie 8 ine Bean « ara-s Cawwes as os

PECO’s Claims Were Properly Rejected By
The Third Circuit......... hateentieneaanss

A. PECO Did Not State Or Prove A Public
Nuisance Claim Since It Did Not Allege
That It Sustained Harm While Exercising

A Right Common To The General Public.

B. PECO’s Eleventh-Hour Attempt To Assert
A Cause Of Action For Indemnification
Was Properly Rejected By The Third Cir-
cuit Because PECO Failed To Prove That
It Was Legally Liable For The Cleanup Of
Its Property And Because There Can Be
No Common Law Indemnification As Be-
tween Parties Whose Liability Is Merely
I faa arg ek ws Id. at 239, 198 A. at 800 (citation omitted).
It is difficult to fathom how, if this Court is applying
Pennsylvania law, it can conclude that PECO did not

suffer the requisite injury io give it standing in light of

the Supereme Court's opinion in Heinl. For as recog-
nized by Dean Prossser: “When a public nusiance sub-
stantially interferes with the use or enjoyment of the
plaintiff's rights in land, it never has been disputed that
there is a particular kind of damage, for which the private
action will lie.” Prosser, Private Action for Public Nui-
sance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997, 1018 (1966) (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis added).

5. Although as of the time of the action, the incineration had
never been in operation.

A-11]

B. As a Matter of the Law of the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, PECO is Entitlea to Indemnification From
Hercules

Contrary to the Panel’s determination, the record
clearly supports the conclusion that PECO “could have
been compelled” through legal action taken by DER pur-
suant to the Clean Streams Law to incur the abatement
expenses for the nuisance created by Hercules. Section
691.316 of the Clean Streams Law specifically provides
in pertinent part:

Whenever the department finds that pollution or a
danger of pollution is resulting from a condition
which exists on land in the Commonwealth the de-
partment may order the landowner or occupier to
correct the condition in a manner satisfactory to the
department or it may order such owner or occupier
to allow a mine operator or other person or agency of
the Commonwealth access to the land to take such
action. For the purpose of this section, “landowner”
includes any person holding title to or having a pro-
prietary interest in either surface or subsurface
rights.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld this pro-
vision as constitutional in National Wood Preserves, Inc.
v. Commonwealth Department of Environmental Re-
sources, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980).

Under the Pennsylvania Clean Stream Law, “pollu-
tion” is defined as “contamination of any waters of the
Commonwealth such as will create or is likely to create
a nuisance .. .” §691.1. The jury specifically found that
Hercules had created a nuisance which was polluting or
contaminating the Delaware River and PECO’s ground-
water.® (J.A. 796-801) There was nothing further to sub-

6. Section 691.1 also defines “Waters of the Commonwealth”
as: “.. . any and all rivers, streams, creeks, rivulets, impoundments,
ditches, water courses, storm sewers. lakes, dammed water, ponds,

A-12

mit to the jury on the issue of indemnification. It is
simply a matter of applying Pennsylvania law to the find-
ings of the jury; the reasonableness and amount of the
clean-up costs were conceded by Hercules’ counsel. (J.A.
206).

Under federal practice it is not necessary to plead
“causes of action”, but merely to state a claim for relief.
That PECO clearly did throughout and there cannt be
any claim of “surprise” by Hercules’ as to the fact that
PECO was secking recovery of its clean-up costs.

The Panel then tries to justify not shifting the re-
sponsibility to Hercules where it properly lies on the ba-
sis that Hercules was not the culprit , rather it was

-PICCO. (Slip Op. at 30) But such an “equitable” analysis
contradicts the Panel’s holding that Hercules is PICCO
by virtue of the de facto merger doctrine and the Panel’s
holding that: “. . . Hercules has [expressly] assumed any
liability PICCO may have had due to the pollution of the
Chester site.” (Slip Op. at 11) Surely PICCO (ergo
Hercules) “was best suited to prevent the poilution”.
(Slip Op. at 30) Is there any question but that PICCO, if
it had not been merged into Hercules, would have had to

NOTES (Continued )

springs and all other bodies or channels of conveyance of surface
and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or artifi-
cial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth.”

7. Indeed Hercules’ entire defense of this case until the time of
appeal was that it was not liable to PECO because it was not
PICCO’s successor in interest and had not assumed this obligation.
Hercules took virtually no discovery, it filed no interrogatories or
requests for production of documents. It did not view the site al-
though PECO offered it the opportunity. Hercules’ counsel stated in
his opening; “. . . so that if you find the condition [PECO] alleges is
the fault of PICCO, then your verdict will be against Hercules.” (J.A.
205) During the course of the trial PECO submitted expert evidence
which virtually “fingerprinted” the pollutants as PICCO products
which were contaminating PECO’s groundwater and the Delaware
River. (J.A. 473-84; 645-48) Hercules offered no contrary expert
opinion evidence.

A-13

answer to PECO in both public nuisance and indemni-
fication? The Panel seemed to be swayed by the “fair-
ness” of making PECO bear the responsibility because
‘“... PECO had an opportunity to protect itself through
inspection and negotiation. . .” (Slip Op. at 30) But even
if that consideration had any bearing on the issues be-
fore this Court, it ignores the reality of the case and the
evidence. PECO asserted, and evidence so established,
that the buried contaminants were a latent condition un-
discovered until years later. (J.A. 10, 257) Indeed,
Hercules’ defense proffered through former PICCO em-
ployees was that PICCO had not deposited the pollutants
of which PECO and DER complained. (J.A. 520-22;
528-539) It is difficult to understand why the Panel be-
lieves it is fairer to shift the burden for this nuisance to
PECO, who certainly had nothing to do with its creation,
rather than to the party who created it yet to this day
denies it. How was PECO to negotiate a “fair price” for
land saddled with a latent condition which is a public
nuisance, when the perpetrator of the nuisance to this
day denies it and that party was not even PECO’s seller.®
Even if this Court somehow concludes that PECO and
Hercules are on ‘equal footing’ with regard to the
Chester site, shouldn’t the principles of contribution ap-
ply? See, e.g., State v. City of San Francisco, 94 Cal. App.
3d 522, 156 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1979).

But once the court determined that Hercules as-
sumed the liability for the Chester site, it acknowledged
that Hercules is primarily liable and it, not PECO, should
bear the burden of abatement. Despite disclaimers to the
contrary, the Panel’s self-contradictory opinion dos
stand for the proposition that “... a party that contam-
inates land, .. . can escape liability by the expedient of
selling the land”. (Slip Op. at 31)

8. Nor was there any evidence that Gould knew of the existence
of the pollutants which caused the public nuisance. The only evi-
dence was that the condition which was caused by the resinous pol-
lutants was a latent condition.

A-14
SUMMARY

The decision of the Panel in this case is contrary to
the law of public nuisance as established in Pennsylva-
nia, since PECO obviously has standing in that the pol-
lutants which cause the nuisance have damaged
PECO’s property, interfered with PECO’s use and en-
joyment of its property, and polluted the groundwater on
its property which then flows into the Delaware. PECO
was, and continues to be, specially harmed in the exer-
cise of its right to pure groundwater and uncontaminated
soil, a right common to the general public, but which the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law imposes an added ob-
ligation on a landowner to protect under Section
-691.316. The monies PECO expended in abating the
nuisance were in furtherance of these common rights
and that attendant obligation. Moreover, PECO submits
that the Supreme Court of Pennsyvlania would not apply
such a restrictive standard for standing given its decision
‘in Heinl v. Pecher, supra.

PECO further admits that the Panel’s decision is
self-contradictory in its analysis of PECO’s right to in-
demnification in light of its holding that Hercules has
expressly assumed the liability PICCO had for the pol-
lution of the Chester site. Thus, the Panel’s considera-
tion of when Hercules acquired PICCO was
inappropriate. PECO proved each and every element
necessary to entitle it to indemnification from Hercules.

A-15

If the Panel's decision is permitted to stand, it will
establish a precedent contrary to the law and public pol-
icy of Pennsylvania in requiring the one who caused the
nuisance to correct it, and will haunt for years to conie
the development of the law of public and private nui-
sance in the area of environmental protection and haz-
ardous waste disposal. Accordingly, PECO respectfully
requests that its Petition for Reargument be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN
& DONLEY

Joseph M. Donley
Robert Emmet Hernan
121 South Broad Street
8thFlocr

Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 732-2700

Attorneys for Petitioner
Philadelphia Electric Company

A-16

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

Appellee
v. Appeal No. 84: 1159
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
Appellant
and
GOULD, INC.,
Appellee

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL PURSUANT
TO RULE 22 OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied
professional judgment that the panel decision is contrary
to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and tc
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which law is controlling in this action, to wit, the panel’s
decision is contrary to the decision of Heinl v. Pecher,
330 Pa. 232, 198A. 797 (1938) and Article I, §27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and 35 Pa. C.S.A. §691.1 et
seq. And, that this appeal involves a question of excep-
tional importance, to wit, whether the panel decision es-
tablishes a precedent which encourages a party who
contaminates land to escape liability by divesting itself of
that land, while shifting the sole responsibility for abat-
ing the public nuisance to an innocent property owner
who’s land and groundwater is contaminated by the
nuiusance, which is a case of first impression that

A-17

presents critical issues of economic, environmental and
social circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN
& DONLEY

Joseph M. Donley

121 South Broad Street
8th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 732-2700

Attorneys for Petitioner
Philadelphia Electric Company

A-18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that I have caused to be served on
this 11th day of June, 1985, by hand, two copies of the
Petition of Appellee Philadelphia Electric Company for
Rehearing Before the Court In Banc on the below-listed

counsel:

John C. Sullivan, Esq.
FRUMKIN & MANTA

1818 Three Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorney for Appellant
Hercules Incorporated

Kean K. McDonald, Esq.
LABRUM AND DOAK

700 IVB Building

1700 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Appellee
Gould, Inc.

A copy of same was mailed, first class, this 11th day

of June, 1985, to:

John G. Gleeson, Esq.
HERCULES INCORPORATED
Hercules Plaza
Wilmington, DE 19899

JOSEPH M. DONELY

A-19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that three copies of this Brief of Hercules
Incorporated in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari were mailed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28.3
by United States mail, first class postage, prepaid this
18th day of October, 1985, to:

Joseph M. Donley, Esquire
KITTREDGE, KAUFMAN

& DONLEY
800 North American Building
121 South Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107

Kean K. McDonald, Esquire
700 I.V.B. Building

1700 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

JOHN C. SULLIVAN

Attorney for Respondent
Hercules Incorporated

——s

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0767%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
