# Amicus Curiae Brief — Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 971

## Text

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OCT 8 198
IN THE
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S

ee a Am om 8

OCTOBER TERM, 1985 ~

No. 85-388

JOSEPHINE A. DILLON, Committee of
HILDA NADINE AMIDON, a legally
incompetent person,

Petitioner,

Vv.

POTOMAC HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.

AMICUS CURIAE
MOTION AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Robert R. Hatten* Richard S. Glasser
Patten, Wornom & Watkins Glasser & Glasser
739 Thimble Shoals Boulevard 504 Plaza One
Newport News, VA 23606 Norfolk, VA 23510

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

BEST AVAILABLE COPY &

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No.

JOSEPHINE A. DILLON, Committee of
HILDA NADINE AMIDON, a legally
incompetent person,

Petitioner,

¥.

POTOMAC HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Now come 371 individuals (See Appendix), by
counsel, and pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States, would respect-
fully request leave of this Honorable Court to
file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Virginia in the above-styled matter. In support of
this motion, the amicus curiae petitioners would
respectfully show the following:

l. Your Petitioners are plaintiffs in asbestos
products liability litigation in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
wherein multiple asbestos products manufacturers are
alleged to be joint tortfeasors whose defective

2

products are alleged to have caused the plaintiffs to
contract permanently disabling and/or fatal diseases
of asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma.

y 3 Each Plaintiff has. partially settled his
claim against one or more of those asbestos manufac-
turers, pursuant to the presumed validity and consti-
tutionality of Virginia’s Partial Settlement Statute,
Sec. 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia Code.

3. Multiple non-settling Defendants remain in
each Plaintiff’s personal injury or wrongful death
case.

4. Virginia Code Sec. 8.01-35.1 was enacted by
the Virginia General Assembly in 1979 to permit
partial settlements in complex multi-party tort
litigation and to abolish the anachronistic common law
rule that settlement with one joint tortfeasor
released all non-settling joint tortfeasors.

5. The effect of a covenant not to sue pursuant
to the Virginia Statute is that it discharges the
tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution from any other tortfeasor.

6. In 1982 the statute was expressly amended by
the Virginia Generali Assembly to make it apply to all
pending causes of action, irrespective of when the
cause of action accrued. (Sec. 8.01-35.1D, VA. CODE
ANN.)

a: For five years after its enactment, numerous
State and Federal courts, law review commentators,
and the Virginia Attorney General opined that this
Statute was a legitimate and constitutional exercise
of legislative prerogative because it was "remedial"
and did not adversely affect any "vested rights."

8. In Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corporation,
229 Va. , 329 S.E. 41 (1985), the Virginia Supreme

3

Court found that “inchoate causes of action for
contribution" between joint tortfeasors arise at the
time that the joint tortfeasors committed their
negligent acts; that although this inchoate cause of
action for contribution is not a "vested right," it
is nevertheless a "substantive right" that could not
be retroactively impaired without violation of the
constitutional protection of "due _ process." The
Virginia Court then reversed a jury verdict against
the Potomac Hospital for medical malpractice that
occurred in 1977 because in 1983 the Plaintiff (in
reliance upon Sec. 8.01-35.1D) had partially settled
with several joint tortfeasors.

9. As in Dillon, supra, the negligent acts of
the Defendants in your Petitioners’ asbestos products
liability actions occurred prior to the enactment of
Sec. 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia Code. The non-settling
Defendants in these cases, therefore, contend that
your Petitioners’ cases should be dismissed pursuant
to the common law rule that release of one joint
tortfeasor releases all mnon-settling joint tort-
feasors.

10. Application of Dillon’s unique, unprece-
dented, and erroneous interpretation of “due process"
to your Petitioners, all of whose partial settlements
were also made after the enactment of Sec. 8.01-35.1D
of the Virginia Code, would have at least three far-
reaching and tragic effects:

First, it would result in the unjust and
unanticipated dismissal of hundreds of lawsuits
against non-settling Defendants who would receive a
windfall for their recaicitrance.

Secondly, it will effectively foreclose any
reasonable opportunity for hundreds of other asbestos
victims--all of whom have cases pending in the United
States District Court pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction--to settle their claims in the future,

4

thereby forcing unnecessary, expensive and_ time-
consuming litigation upon the Federal Courts as well
as the parties.

Thirdly, it will eliminate the ability of
the Virginia General Assembly, and possibly other
states, to pass remedial legislation on a variety of
social, economic, judicial, or environmental problems
in which affected parties have “inchoate” or "substan-
tive" but not "vested" rights.

Counsel for the Petitioner, Josephine A. Dillon,
consented to the filing of this Motion for Leave to
File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
but the attorneys for the Respondent, Potomac Hospital
Corporation, have refused to consent to the filing of
a brief by your amicus curiae Petitioners.

WHEREFORE, your Petitioners hereby request leave
to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the
Petitioner, Josephine A. Dillon, Committee of Hilda
Nadine Amidon, to the opinion of the Virginia Supreme
Court in Dillon v. Potomac Hospital, supra.

Respectfully submitted,

By Lite. —
Obert R. Hatten

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Petitioners

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Petitioners:

Robert R. Hatten, Esq.
Patten, Wornom & Watkins
739 Thimble Shoals Boulevard
Suite 105

Newport News, VA 23606
(804) 873-1881

Richard S. Glasser, Esq.
Glasser & Glasser

504 Plaza One

Norfolk, VA 23510
(804) 625-6787

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Virginia was mailed by first-class
mail, postage prepaid on the 9th day of October, 1985,
to the following persons: Frank J. Ceresi, Esq., 2300
South 9th Street, Suite 112, Arlington, VA 22204;
Robert Loftus, Esq., Miles & Stockbridge, 4069 Chain
Bridge Road, Fairfax, VA 22030; and The Hon.
William G. Broaddus, Acting Attorney General, 101
N. 8th Street, Richmond, VA 23219.

~Robert R. Hatten

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
PE Os ka eee ee 6 oe te ae 8s l

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........0.000. 3

ARGUMENT

i.

"Inchoate causes of action” are not
entitled to due process protection
from expressly retroactive state laws .. 4

If the Dillon opinion is correct, it

has established a new Constitutional

principle which was not in existence

at the time that the Petitioners relied

upon the presumed validity of Sec.

8.01-35.1D of the Virginia Code; conse-

quently, this new Constitutional

standard should be applied prospectively
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"The Covenant Not to Sue: Virginia’s Effort
to Bury the Common Law Rule Regarding
the Release of Joint Tortfeasors", Vol.
14 U. Rich. L.R. 809, 829-30 (1980) . .

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-388

JOSEPHINE A. DILLON, Committee of
HILDA NADINE AMIDON, a legally
incompetent person,

Petitioner,

Ve

POTOMAC HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.

‘MICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

Your amicus curiae Petitioners adopt the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Virginia filed by Josephine A. Dillon. This amicus
curiae brief is submitted in support of and in
addition to the reasons heretofore set forth by the
Petitioner for granting the writ.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE PETIT:ONERS

Your amicus curiae Petitioners are 371 individuals
who are plaintiffs in asbestos products liability
litigation in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia wherein multiple
asbestos products manufacturers are alleged to be
joint tortfeasors whose defective products. are
alleged to have caused the plaintiffs to contract

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permanently disabling and/or fatal diseases of
asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma.

Each amicus curiae Petitioner has _ partially
settled his claim against one or more of _ those
asbestos manufacturers, pursuant to the presumed
validity and OConstitutionality of Virginia’s Joint
Tortfeasor Release Act, Sec. 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia
Code.

This statute was enacted by the Virginia General
Assembly in 1979 to permit partial settlements in
complex multi-party tort litigation and to abolish
the anachronistic common law rule that settlement
with one joint tortfeasor released all non-settling
joint tortfeasors. In 1982 the statute was expressly
amended to make it apply to all ending causes of
action irrespective of when the cause of action
accrued. Sec. 8.01-35.1, VA. CODE ANN.

In Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corporation, 229
Va. , 329 S.E.2d 41 (1985), the Virginia Supreme
Court found that "inchoate causes of action for
contribution" between joint tortfeasors arise at the
time that the joint tortfeasors committed their
negligent acts; that although this inchoate cause of
action for contribution is not a “vested right," it
is nevertheless a "substantive right" that could not
be retroactively impaired without violation of the
Constitutional protection of “due _ process." The
Court therefore held that Sec. 8.01-35.1D was uncon-
stitutional.

As in Dillon, supra, the negligent acts of the
Defendants in your Petitioners’ asbestos products
liability actions occurred prior to the enactment of
Sec. 8.0i-35.1 of the Virginia Code. The non-settiing
Defendants in these cases, therefore, contend that
your Petitioners’ cases should be dismissed pursuant
to the common law rule that release of one joint

MN ED Nate Cael at

3

tortfeasor releases all non-settling joint tort-
feasors.

The interpretation of due process as set forth in
the Dillon case, supra, is unprecedented and erroneous
for the reasons that are hereinafter set forth.
Unless this opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court is
overruled, it will result in the unjust and unantici-
pated dismissal of hundreds of lawsuits against non-
settling Defendants who will receive a windfall for
their recalcitrance. Further, unless Dillon is
overruled, it will effectively foreclose any reason-
able opportunity for hundreds of other asbestos
victims, all of whom have cases pending in the United
States District Court to settle their claims in the
future, thereby forcing umnecessary expensive and
time-consuming litigation upon the Federal Courts as
well as the parties.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In Dillon yv. Potomac Hospital Corp., supra, the
Virginia Supreme Court has found that Sec. 8.01-35.1D
of the Virginia Code is unconstitutional as applied to
inchoate causes of action for contribution which pre-
existed the enactment of the statute. This opinion
erroneously fails to apply the “rational basis" test
as set forth in previous decisions of this Court for
evaluation of whether or not retroactive state laws
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Should
the Virginia Supreme Court be correct in finding Sec.
8.01-35.1D to be unconstitutional, its ruling should
be applied prospectively only so as to avoid severe
prejudice to those parties who relied upon the
presumed Constitutionality of the statute.

i tt lt

ARGUMENT

1. "Inchoate causes of action" are not
entitled to due process. protection

from expressly retroactive state
laws.

The limits of due process protection against
retroactive statutes has been clearly defined by this
Court in numerous recent decisions. See, Usery y.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Corp., 428 US. 1 (1976),
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gary & Co.,

US. 104 Sup. Ct. 2709 (1984); and United
States v. Locke, US. 105 Sup. Ct. 1785
(1985). These cases have estabiished a "rational
basis” test for determining whether retroactive
legislation is Constitutionally permissible. In

Usery, supra, Justice Marshall explained:

{[Ljegislative Acts . . . come to the Court
with a presumption of Constitutionality and .
. the burden is on one complaining of a due
process violation to establish that the
legislature has acted in an arbitrary and
irrational way.

[Ljegislation readjusting rights and burdens
is not unlawful solely because it upsets
otherwise settled expectations (citations
omitted). This is true even though the
effect of the legislation is to impose a new
duty or liability based on past acts.

428 US. at 15-16. This holding was reiterated in
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., supra, where this
court held that:

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5

Provided that the retroactive application of
a statute is supported by a_ legitimate
legislative purpose furthered by _ rational
means, judgments about the wisdom of such
legislation remains within the exclusive
province of the legislative and executive
branches.

The retroactive aspects of legislation

must meet the test of due process ... but
that burden is met simply by showing that the
retroactive application of the legislation is
itself justified by a _ rational legislative
purpose.

104 Sup. Ct. at 2718.

Determination of whether new legislation adversely
affects "vested rights", "substantive rights" or
"inchoate rights" is irrelevant, if the “rational
purpose" test is _ satisfied. See, United States y.
Locke, supra.

In 1979 the Virginia General Assembly abolished
the common law rile that release of one joint tort-
feasor released all other joint tortfeasors. Sec.
8.01-35.1 VA. CODE ANN. This statute provided that
the effect of a release or covenant not to sue is
that "it shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is
given from all liability for contribution to any
other tortfeasor." Sec. 8.01-35.1A.2 VA. CODE ANN.
The quid pro quo to the non-settling joint tortfeasor
is a reduction of the jury’s verdict in an amount
equal to the sum paid by the settling tortfeasor.
Sec. 8.01-35.1A.1. In 1982 the Virginia General
Assembly amended this statute to make it expressly
retroactive to all covenants not to sue executed
after July 1, 1979 "regardless of the date the causes
of action affected thereby accrued.” Sec. 8.01-35.1D
VA. CODE ANN.

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Po re

The legitimate and rational purpose of Sec. 8.01-
35.1D of the Virginia Code is obvious and compelling:
it encourages voluntary’ settlements in complex
litigation. This objective helps to preserve the time
and financial resources of both the litigants and
Courts. As the Virginia Supreme Court observed in
Hayman vy. Patio Products, Inc., 226 Va. 482 (1984),

We believe the General Assembly intended to
change a rule of law which tended to reward a
recalcitrant tortfeasor at the expense of a
joint tortfeasor who was willing to settle
out of Court. . . . The statute facilitates
prompt settlement, payment and discharge of
paying tortfeasors without releasing those
non-paying joint tortfeasors who prefer to
have their liability determined in litigation,
with its attendant delays.

226 Va. at 487.

The rational purpose accomplished by Sec. 8.01-
35.1D of the Virginia Code in the settlement of
complex tort litigation is also confirmed by the fact
that it is identical to the Federal rule that was
first announced by this Court in ARO Manufacturing
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement, 377 US. 476
(1964).1 There, Justice Brennan observed that the
common law rule which required release of non-settling
joint tortfeasors as a penalty for partial settlement,
"has been repudiated by statute or decision in many,
if not most, states and by the overwhelming weight of
scholarly authority." 388 U.S. at 501. The Court
then abolished the applicability of the anachronistic
common law rule in Federal tort litigation. In so
doing, the Court followed well-settled case law that

laccord, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401
U.S. 321, 348 (1971).

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[a] person has not property, no_ vested
interest, in any rule of the common law.
[The] Constitution does not forbid the
creation of new rights or the abolition of
old omnes recognized by the common law, to
attain a permissible legislative object,
despite the fact that “otherwise _ settled

expectations" may be upset thereby. (cita-
tions omitted)

Duke Power Co. vy. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978).

In Dillon v. Potomac Hospital, supra, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the retroactive application
of Sec. 8.01-35.1 to “inchoate causes of action for
contribution"? which existed prior to the enactment
of the statute violated due process and was, there-
fore, unconstitutional. This unprecedented decision
fails to mention or discuss the "rational basis" test
or any of the pertinent opinions of this Court which
have heretofore defined the limits of due _ process.
Instead, the Virginia Court relied upon a previous
state decision which held that the 1979 version of
Sec. 8.01-35.1 (which was not expressly retroactive)
could not be implicitly applied retroactively if it
affected pre-existing substantive _ rights. See, Sec.
8.01-35.1 VA. CODE ANN.; Shiflet v. Eller 228 Va.
115, 319 S.E.2d 750 (1984). Shiflet involved a
matter of statutory interpretation, not Constitutional
law, but the opinion had cited with approval a United
States District Court opinion that retroactive
application of Sec. 8.01-35.1 constitutes a "violation
of the non-settling Defendants’ guarantee of due

2The Virginia Court found that an inchoate cause of action
for contribution arises at the time of the jointly negligent
acts, not the time that a _ settlement oor verdict results’ in
payment of a disproportionate share of the liability.

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US. 97 (1971); United Siates v. Johnson, 102 Sup.
Ct. 2579, 2587 n.12 (1982); and Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 Sup.
Ct. 858 (1982)® Chevron pointed to three factors
that should control a decision about whether to apply
a new rule only to future cases.

First, "the decision to be applied nonretro-
actively must establish a new principle of law,
either by overruling clear past precedents on which

litigants may have relied, . .. or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed .. ." Id. at 355 (citation

omitted). Second, the Court must consider whether
retroactive application will "further retard" the
operation of the new rule. /d. Finally, the Court
must weigh any "inequity" that would be imposed by
retroactive application. Jd. Applying these factors,
a court may elect one of several options, ranging
from complete retroactivity, to application only to
cases still pending, to a rule of "pure" prospectivity
that "denies the benefits of the new rule even to the
parties before the court.” In re Twin Parks Limited
Partnership, 720 F.2d 1374, 1376 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 544 (1982).

All three of the criteria for prospective applica-
tion oof new Constitutional interpretations as
described in the Chevron case are applicable to the
Petitioners. First, the Constitutional protection
afforded to substantive rights from the _ retroactive
application of laws that has been announced in the

SSee generally, "Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique
and a Proposal,” by Francis X. Beytagh, Va. L. Rev. Vol. 61:1557-
1625 (1975).

15

Dillon decision is a new principle of law whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.’

Secondly, the prospective application of Dillon’s
Constitutional protection of substantive rights from
the retroactive interpretation of statutes will not
retard the operation of the new rule. By determining
that the General Assembly did not have the legislative
authority to retroactively affect substantive rights
of litigants by application of retroactive laws, the
Virginia Court set a legislative standard. It would
not retard the General Assembly from the passage of
unconstitutional legislation to punish litigants who
justifiably rely on the presumed _ Constitutional
validity of laws enacted by the General Assembly.
Indeed, prospectivity will provide practitioners and
litigants with notice of the new standard so that the
severe prejudice of unexpected dismissals can be
avoided.

Finally, the mnon-retroactivity of Dillon’s ruling
will eliminate the severe inequity that would be
created by the application of the new standard to
parties who have justifiably relied upon the presumed
validity of Sec. §8.01-35.1D and previous Virginia
case law. This inequity is obvious and severe, i.e.,
the umexpected dismissal non-settling tortfeasors
whose liability would otherwise have required payment
of compensation to the Petitioners. As between the
litigants, the unconstitutionality of Sec. 8.01-35.1D
is an unexpected ffortuity for the non-settling
Defendants that creates an unfair windfall for the
non-settling Defendants and rewards the non-settling

TSee, "Release of Joint Tortfeasors--Virginia Code Section
8.01-35.1 and its Retroactive Application,” U. Rich. L. Rev. Vol.
18:829-849 (1984); "The Covenant Not to Sue: Virginia’s Effort
to Bury the Common Law Rule Regarding the Release of Joint
Tortfeasors”, U. Rich. L. R. Vol. 14:809 at 830 (1980).

16

Defendants for recalcitrant attitudes toward settle-
ment.

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
submitted that the three-pronged criteria of Chevron
have been met and that the Virginia Court’s holding

in the Dillon case should be applied prospectively
only.

CONCLUSION

A Writ of Certiorari should be issued to review
the judgment and opinion of the Virginia Supreme
Court.

Respectfully submitted,

By gibicttt hss...

Robert R. Hatten
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Petitioners

4
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17

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Petitioners:

Robert R. Hatten, Esq.
Patten, Wornom & Watkins
739 Thimble Shoals Boulevard
Suite 105

Newport News, VA 23606
(804) 873-1881

Richard S. Glasser, Esq.
Glasser & Glasser

504 Plaza One

Norfolk, VA 23510
(804) 625-6787

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that = true copy of the foregoing
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Virginia was mailed by first-class
mail, postage prepaid on the 9th day of October, 1985,
to the following persons: Frank J. Ceresi, Esq., 2300
South 9th Street, Suite 112, Arlington, VA 22204;
Robert Loftus, Esq., Miles & Stockbridge, 4069 Chain
Bridge Road, Fairfax, VA 22030; and The Hon.
William G. Broaddus, Acting Attorney General, 101
N. 8th Street, Richmond, VA 23219.

Bit

~ Robert R. Hatten

APPENDIX

INDIVIDUAL AMICUS CURIAE PETITIONERS
REPRESENTED BY ROBERT R. HATTEN

Virginia Brown, Executrix of the Estate of Wilbur
Brown

Lydia Cole, Executrix of the Estate of William Cole

Carole Thomas, Executrix of the Estate of Bennie
Cunningham :

Thelma Day, Executrix of the Estate of Naaman Day

Elsie Ellis, Executrix of the Estate of Robert Ellis

Laura Farmer, Executrix of the Estate of Melvin
Farmer

Joyce Fleetwood, Executrix of the Estate of John
Fleetwood

Dixie Folds, Executrix of the Estate of Guy Folds

Virginia Gregory, Executrix of the Estate of Richard
Gregory

Bessie Holloway, Executrix of the Estate of Norman
Holloway

Hazel Jamerson, Executrix of the Estate of Berkley
Jamerson

Maydell Kilpatrick, Executrix of the Estate of Thomas
Kilpatrick

Esselle Lambert, Executrix of the Estate of Ben
Lambert

Rodney Llewellyn, Executrix of the Estate of Robert
Llewellyn

Eleanor Patrick, Executrix of the Estate of William
Patrick

Ruby Phillips, Executrix of the Estate of Valdoie
Phillips

Frances Rountree, Executrix of the Estate of Charles
Rountree

Emmet Steveson, Jr.. Executrix of the Estate of Emmet
Stevenson, Sr.

Robert Van Dyke, Jr. Executor of the Estate of
Robert Van Dyke, Sr.

Maude White, Executrix of the Estate of John White

2

Frances Williams, Executrix of the Estate of George
Williams

Jeanette Zoumplis, Executrix of the Estate of Chris
Zoumplis

Elizabeth Timberlake, Executrix of the Estate of
Waverly Timberlake

Dorothy King, Executrix of the Estate of Thomas King

Esmond Harding, Executrix of the Estate of John

Harding

Sylvia Boykin, Executrix of the Estate of Jeddy
Boykin

Willie Mae Crawley, Executrix of the Estate of Irby
Crawley

Dora Oman, Executrix of the Estate of Shirley Oman

Doris Folk, Executrix of the Estate of John Folk

Lucille Treblic, Executrix of the Estate of John
Treblic

Clara Long, Executrix of the Estate of James N. Long

Eleanor Adams, Executrix of the Estate of Edward

Adams

Areathea Burke, Executrix of the Estate of Johnnie
Burke

Louise Coiner, Executrix of the Estate of William
Coiner

Matilene Shank, Executrix of the Estate of Charles
Shank
Mary Alice Turner, Executrix of the Estate of Richard

Turner

Esther Washington, Executrix of the Estate of Ivory
Washington

Keziabelle Faircloth, Executrix of the Estate of John
Faircloth

Kathryn Furlough, Executrix of the Estate of Isaac
Furlough

Harvey Peck, Jr., Executor of the Estate of Harvey
Peck, Sr.

Mary Strayer, Executrix of the Estate of Harvey Peck,
Sr.

Vennie Davenport, Executrix of the Estate of Gregory
Davenport

3

Mary Nicholson, Executrix of the Estate of Jerrell
Nicholson

Mary Staton, Executrix of the Estate of Clyde Staton

Jacqueline Haskins, Executrix of the Estate of Verner

Truitt
Joanne Lewis, Executrix of the Estate of Harry Lewis
Lois Montgomery, Executrix of the Estate of James
Montgonery
Florence Estes, Executrix of the Estate of Walter
Estes ;
Mary K. Smith, Executrix of the Estate of Woodrow
Smith
Geraldine Thrower, Executrix of the Estate of Jesse
Thrower
4 Helen Sawyer, Executrix of the Estate of Hubert
Sawyer
joyce Bradley, Executrix of the Estate of John
Bradley

Katie Catron, Executrix of the Estate of Frank Catron

Beatrice Eley, Executrix of the Estate of Francis
Eley

Juanita Gilbert, Executrix of the Estate of Roy
Gilbert

June Cash, Executrix of the Estate of Ronald Cash

Evelyn Stacey, Executrix of the Estate of Milton

: Stacey

| Hazel Watson, Executrix of the Estate of Homer Watson

Nonie White, Executrix of the Estate of Walter J.
White

Joyce Tignor, Executrix of the Estate of Robert
Barlow

Mary Barnette, Executrix of the Estate of Alexander
Barnette

Elsie §. Barnes, Executrix of the Estate of Edwin ££.
Barnes

Jerry Michael Cale, Administratcr of the Estate of
William F. Caie

Irene Coggins, Executrix of the Estate of William H.
Coggins

Mary J. Dennis, Executrix of the Estate of Russell A.
Dennis

SE

4

Clara M. Deshields, Administratrix of the Estate of
Norman Willoughby Deshields

Yvonne P. Ellington, Administratrix of the Estate of
Wayland C. Ellington

Sarah M. Ferris, Administratrix of the Estate of
James H. Ferris

Guy Campbell, Administrator of the Estate of Joseph

| a Hart

7 Michael L. Hill, Sr., Administrator of the Estate of

1a George M. Hill, Sr.

ie Thelma P. Jones, Administratrix of the Estate of

Elbert W. Jones

Charles Wesley Menn, Administrator of the Estate of
Elizabeth Frances Mann

Lawrence J. Wiser, Administrator of the Estate of

George R. Passaro :

H Gertrude Rideout, Executrix of the Estate of John

Andrew Rideout

: Sarah L. Ross, Administratrix of the Estate of

Stanley Ernest Ross

: Nancy Stack, Administratrix of the Estate of Warren O.
Stack

Mildred W. Taylor, Administratrix of the Estate of
Richard C. Taylor

C. Belle Louthian, Executrix of the Estate of Fafael
Ware

J. James Basgier, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of
Milton M. White

Mary Louis T. Archer, Administratrix of the Estate of
Raymond B. Archer

Carolyn H. Burrow and William A. Bagley, Jr., Co-
Administrators for William A. Bagley, Sr.

Louise Greene Duke, Administrator of the Estate of
John Elton Duke, Jr.

William C. Feamster, III, Administrator of the Estate
of William C. Feamster, Jr.

Kathryn Ann Gravitt, Administratrix d. b. n. of the

Estate of Barksdale E. Gravitt

Pearlene T. Miles, Administratrix of the Estate of
Jesse Miles

jo hiiiaenehiniiee iene

poet woe

5

Alma Steber Reutlinger, Executrix of the Estate of
Clarence Reutlinger

Doris Coates, Executrix of the Estate of James P.
Coates

Cora Lee Hardy and Stephen C. Hardy, Co-Administrators
of the Estate of Carl C. Hardy, Jr.

Doris F. Isenhower, Administratrix of the Estate of
Max H. Isenhower

Rachel E. Knick, Administratrix of the Estate of
Eari B. Knick

Ida L. Miltier, Executrix of the Estate of Joseph
Miltier

Martha W. Morris, Executrix of the Estate of Rufus
Hamilton Morris III

James R. Revell, Administrator of the Estate of
Charles E. Ravell, Sr.

John C. Lumpkin, Administrator of the Estate of
George H. Riddick

Nancy Cook Robertson, Executrix of the Estate of
James H. Robertson

Ellen Ann Rooney, Executrix of the Estate of Henry
Francis Rooney

Thelma R. Harts, Executrix of the Estate of Cephus
Roscoe

Hattie S. Thornton, Administratrix of the Estate of
Cedric W. Thornton

Marylin C. Tolson, Administratrix of the Estate of
John T. Tolson, Jr.

Louella Vess, Administratrix of the Estate of James A.
Vess

Evelena Wells, Executrix of the Estate of Jessie
Wells

Edith D. White, Executrix of the Estate of Linwood
Erle White, Jr.

Peggy Lawrence, Administratrix of the Estate of
Edward Delaware Lawrence

Betty Hobbs, Executrix of the Estate of William
Staley Hobbs

Linda Ann Oliver, Administratrix of the Estate of
William Lewis

- wean codeine Mian

Esther Bailey, Executrix of

Bailey

Estate of Samuel

Dorothy Coday, Executrix of the Estate of Jack Coday

Sadie V. Cooke, Executrix of the

Cooke

Estate of Walter

Mae Kellis, Executrix of the Estate of Fred F 1s

Ruth Martin, Executrix of the Estate of Elme viartin
Lucille Mixon, Executrix of the Estate of Heniy Mixon
Bessie L. Ryan, Executrix of the Estate of William

Ryan

Louis Bagley
Clyde Baity
Perry Barclift
Robert Barnes
Edgar C. Barrett
Robert H. Bass
Chester Bellamy
Perceil Beverly
John H. Bobbitt
George G. Bosher
Bobby Brady
Horace Brinson
Jesse L. Britton
Clarence C. Brock
Otha B. Brodnax
Frederick Brown
Arthur C. Burris
Henry O. Byrd
James L. Canady
Reginald C. Cannon

William T. Carmines, Jr.

Robert Carter

John L. Charity
William Clark
Hillard Coffie
Ellis R. Colbert
Walter I. Cooper
William Cooper
Benjamin Craddock
Nelson U. Crosby

Alvin Davidson
Jesse O. Davis
Percy O. Davis
Robert Dudley

Wcodrow Duncan
Edward C. Dunn
Jesse C. Dunning
Anthony J. Dusseau

Thomas Elliott

Donahue Ellis

William J. Embler
Jerry Evans
William Evans
David J. Evers
Wallace Fairfield
James Favre
Joseph L. Firth
William Firman
Richard B. Fiora
Charles I. Floyd
Charles Forrester
Hobert L. Furr
Shirley A. Garris
Willie Gibbons
William F. Glazier
Gerald Gorde
John Gould
James Groome
David Guthrie
Lacy Hall

laine

Arthur Croxton
Dallas P. Cutler
Arthur M. Daniel
Elliott Gupton
Orian I. Leonard
Billy Ray Lockard
Woody London
Roscoe D. Loyd
John Luter

James A. Mahady
Major T. Manning
Edward A. Mason
Robert Massengill
Hugh McCain
Walter D. McCloud
Samuel Midyette
Joseph N. Moody
Irving T. Moore
Wilton Moore
James Morant
Jesse V. Myers
James R. Neeley
John F. Newton
Delbert Nicholas
James T. Oman
Hardy Osborne
Ray T. Outland
George C. Overman
Garland C. Parrish
David F. Peele
Bernis Pierce
Dorsey Pittman
Clyde Powell
Clarence Pruitt
Dallas Pruitt
Frank Randolph
James R. Raynor
Hugh V. Reynolds
Margie Thomas
Emory L. Thompson
Fred Thompson

Joseph Haymore
Ralph F. Henderson

Thomas E. Henderson

James H. Hershman
Garland R. Hess
John Gill

Jesse E. Hitt

M. J. Hobgood
James Hogge
Thomas J. Hogge
Maurice Holloway
Wilbur Holt, Sr.
George S. Hopkins
Alexander Howard
Floyd A. Hudgins
Jay P. Huneycutt
Colden Hyman
Linwood Illich
Roy E. Jackson
Jesse E. James
Gaston B. Jamison
Albert Johnson
Colonel D. Jones, Jr.
Herman F. Jones
Wilson W. Jones
Charlie Keatts
Raymond Kerr
Woodrow Kincaid
John O. Kirby
Claude E. Lane
Eugene Langley
Garnett LaPrade
Albert Lawrence
Ernest H. Lawson
Paul Lee, Sr.
Bruce T. Leggett
Cecil B. Leigh
Robert P. Riggs
William K. Roach
Robert Roane
Henderson Roberts

|

Robert Thompson
Walter Thon
William Thrasher
Jesse Topping
Clinton A. Townsend
Ted Treadway
Leon Treadwell
Compton Turner
John B. Tweedy
Arthur Volhein
Fred Walker
Claude R. Watts
Ethell C. West
James West

James White

Otis White
Conley C. Wilds
James H. Williams
James M. Williams
William Williams

Raymond D. Wilson, Jr.

Thomas Woodard
James Worsley
James R. Wright
Melvin Wright

B. C. Young, Jr.
Herbert Yow
Robert A. Burke, Jr.
Tommy Nelson Hare
George Harrison, Jr.
Joe Ned Moore
James F. White
Clyde D. Braswell
Columbus T. Butler
Herbert R. Dupree, Sr.
David C. Durham
Joseph J. Eardley
Willie J. Frame
Linwood L. Groves
George E. Harcum
Evangle Hendricks

Thaddeus M. Robins
Eldridge Robinson
Curtis F. Rogers
Roy L. Roper
Norman Rosson
Herbert Roughton
George Sanders
Charles Saunders
Edker Saunders
Melvin Saunders
Thomas R. Sawyer
William Sawyer
Henry Schaffer
Robert Schaffer
Edward Scott
John C. Scruggs
Rudolph Shearin
Carter Sibley
Jeremiah Silver
Cleveland Slade
Woodrow Slate
Forrest Smith

Roy Snead

Steve Sokol

John H. Speight
James M. Spruill
Albert J. Stancill
Joseph Sullivan
Edward S. Taylor
James Thomas
Frank J. Nagy, Sr.
John R. Winborne
Robert L. Aldridge, Jr.
Curtis R. Allison
Vincent Barresi
Thomas G. Bashara
William L. Bazemore
James Beacham
Carlton B. Bell
William E. Broaddus
James M. Bruce

Wallace L. Hobbs

Maurice H. Lane

Edward N. Lutz

Burrell M. Patillo

George R. Waymack, Jr.
James E. West

Hayes L. Whiddon

Leone Maxine Sheffer (deceased)
Arthur J. Golden (deceased)
Homer C. Crane (deceased)
Moses Lee Johnson

Albert Ray Long

Ray W. McClung

Horace F. Nichols

Esker Eddie Reed, Jr.

Irvin B. Slayton

Clyde K. Tysor

Rufus H. Buffaloe
Francis Marion Cave
Silver J. Ciccone
Earl Clow, Jr.
William E. Cross
James M. Doby
Grant Ensley

Bobby A. Felts
Robert A. Harrell
Willie M. Hudson
Robert P. Kucharski
Charles Wesley Mann
Lemuel Lee Newsom
James L. Pigg

Benny J. Sessions
Weeks Smith

Robert H. Weaver

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0694%3A7. Public record. Not legal advice.