# Opposition Brief — Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0148%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1985 - **Citation:** 472 U.S. 1032 ## Text fice Supreme Court. US.) FILED MAY 29 1985 IN THE SUPREME COURT CF THE UNITED fone « oreven October Term, 1984 CLERK No. 84-1698 RANSOM THEODORE SPURLOCK, et al., Petitioners, Vv. SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION, Respondents. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA PHILIP E. von AMMON* DONALD R. GILBERT TIMOTHY BERG FENNEMORE, CRAIG, von AMMON, UDALL & POWERS 100 W. Washington, Suite 1700 Phoenix, AZ 85003 (602) 257-8700 ANDREW D. HURWITZ* ROBERT L. PALMER RON KILGARD MARTORI, MEYER, HENDRICKS & VICTOR 2700 N. Third Street Suite 4000 Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 263-8700 Counsel for Respondents * Counsel of Record BEST AVAILABLE COPY ‘ May 28, 1985 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1984 No. 84-1698 RANSOM THEODORE SPURLOCK, et al., Petitioners, Vv. SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION, Respondents. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA PHILIP E. von AMMON* DONALD R. GILBERT TIMOTHY BERG FENNEMORE, CRAIG, ven AMMON, UDALL & POWERS 100 W. Washington, Suite 1700 Phoenix, AZ 85003 (602) 257-8700 ANDREW D. HURWITZ* ROBERT L. PALMER RON KILGARD MARTORI, MEYER, HENDRICKS & VICTOR 2700 N. Third Street Suite 4000 Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 263-8700 Counsel for Respondents * Counsel of Record May 28, 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . INTRODUCTION .. . Reasons for Denying the Petition. 1. The Spurlocks' COMES. «© » 2. The Spurlocks' claim that the mineral reservation is ambiguous under the decisions of this Court was not raised below and is without merit. 3. The Spurlocks' without merit. CONCLUSION... . Lists of Affiliates -i- claim that title to the land grant lands was in AT&SF rather than Santa Fe Pacific does not warrant review by this Claim that their due process rights have been violated was not timely raised below and is ii 16 19 24 > - i == a . eb eee YR ae Of le ae 7 ae) ae ; an Pa Pal ML Shee bese eS Oi ua a) ; ve i M os ne Ai aif 1 ry =i a : “7 - ii z PutgAT Sie oe 2 edie ce a8: ete: oy é ; eek. ee bases S.- pie a 2 iter ent Ve eee eae kee vere 7 XG a a tine - a : ni i =t o Se-Ly Veh PST ey ae ¥ es “ad, ; . ‘ : : = eae! nul F 7 wi s £4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES ican y Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1932). . Boise Cascade Corp. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 630 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981). . Burke v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co,, 234 U.S. 669 (1913) . ll, Dick v. Darden, 204 Ala. 400, Se Ges wee theeer + « 8 ee Field v. Seabury, 60 U.S. 323 (19 How.) (1856) . Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199, 179 S.W.2d 690 (1944) oe a e e H.A. & L.D. Holland Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry., 214 F. Sao teem Gass Beeele.-s « * 4% @ Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957) ° * ° ° . e e e 7 e * ° Hazelwood Brewing Co. v. Siebert, 256 Pa. 9, 100 A. 493 (1917) Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) e + © e e e * * . e * © Holmes v. Johnson, 324 Mass. 450, S35 W.8.20 924 (1969) 2. « 0 =jje- Pages 20 12 14 20 10 20 Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Cent.:al 1. -Llinois Public Service Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 79, 222 N.£.2d 520 (1975)... 10 Kerfoot . Farmers §& Merchants Bank, 218 U.S. 281 (1910). * . 10 McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462 SEE cs 6 cs tlw 7 New Mexico v. Baker, 196 U.S. 432 (1905) a = eo ” e J e e * - l@ New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 17 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903) * ° . « ° . ” * & . 5 > 18 Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, See Usils GOO Chee bs «+ we 17 Platt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., oo Weems Se taeres « «th oe oe + Se 24 Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d mk Pee ee ee 7 Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, Jae Gelbe bam CASES) s uc 0 te lt 20 Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d S30 (ER Cite LPR?) « « « BB, Abe 16 Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co. v. Cord, 14 Ariz. App. 254, 482 P.2d 503, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (3971) . « « « « 14 “Li i= mey_v io, ey Ss est: ee United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317 (1940) . Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981) W v. W rn l ’ 462 mo 36 (1983) * . we = * . Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981) AUTHORITIES 1 American Law of Mining § 3.13 (1983) e * * * e e . Hearings Before the House Committer on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. § 33 at 2 (1922)... 22 18 18 18 17 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Petition for a Writ of Certio- rari presents no issue warranting review by this Court. First, the Spurlocks' Claim that title to the land grant lands was in an affiliate of Santa Fe Pacific, ratuer than Santa Fe Pacific, is irrele- vant to their claim to the reserved minerals. Further, the Spurlocks lack standing to make this claim, and their claim has no-~ merit. Second, the Spurlocks' argument that federal law, not state law, controls the interpretation of the mineral reservation was not presented to the state courts and cannot be reviewed by this Court. In any event, the issue is one of state law which this Court need not review. Third, the Spurlocks' claim that their due process rights were violated was not timely raised in the Arizona courts and has no legal basis. INTRODUCTION In their effort to cast this litigation in a form that will engage the attention of this Court, Petitioners have characterized a private dispute over title to minerals as a cause of grave public Significance. The contrary is true. As litigated in the state courts, this case consisted of a series of claims and counterclaims seeking to quiet title under Arizona law to certain minerals located upon or under land owned by the Spurlocks subject to a mineral reservation in favor of Santa Fe Pacific. The Spurlocks also asserted state law claims seeking to recover damages for the removal of helium-bearing gas from lands subject to the mineral reservation. The case involves claims based on Arizona property and tort law. In tke Petition, the Spurlocks argue that Santa Fe Pacific's mineral reservation is void under federal law. This claim is peripheral to the real dispute litigated below. Indeed, the Spurlocks have characterized their claims in the consolidated cases as follows: Simply stated, the Spurlock v. Santa Fe lawsuit involves the ownership of the helium which lies beneath the plaintiffs' land and whether Or not the defendants should respond in damages to the plaintiffs for their past and continuing wrongs. The fact that defendant Santa Fe ‘Pacific Railroad Company is federally chartered and, along with other defendants, has violated its federal charter in many regards, is_ only collateral and incidental to the main controversy. Spurlocks' Motion f£ Reman nd Respons in Opposition to Petition for Removal, Appendix A at 9 (emphasis added). The Spurlocks are dissatisfied with the decision reached by the Arizona Court of Appeals. However, the Supreme Court of the United States is not merely a haven for dissatisfied litigants. Rather, as stated by Chief Justice Taft, "(t]he Supreme Court's function is for. the purpose of expounding and stabilizing principles of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon constitutional questions and other impor- tant questions of law for the public benefit." Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. § 33 at 2 (1922). The case below raises no significant constitutional issues and no federal law questions of any public importance. R Denyin h ition. In the Petition, the Spurlocks advance three reasons why this Court should grant a writ of certiorari and review this case. First, they argue that at the time of the conveyances from Santa Fe Pacific to the Spurlocks' predecessors in interest, the title to the lands involved in this lawsuit was in Santa Fe Pacific's parent company, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company ("ATESE"), and not Santa Fe Pacific. They do not suggest any reason why such a con- clusion would entitle them to relief from this Court. Second, they argue that the holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals, that under Arizona law a reservation of “all oil, gas, coal and minerals whatso- ever" is unambiguous and reserves the entire mineral estate, must be overturned as contrary to the decisions of this Court. Third, they argue that the failure of one Arizona Court of Appeals judge to recuse himself violated the Spurlocks' rights under the due process clause. None of the arguments raised by the Spurlocks presents any issue that justifies review by this Court. The arguments are without merit and, in some instances, untimely. For these reasons, the Petition should be denied. Based upon a tortuous analysis of 1866, 1871, 1897 ana 1902 Acts of Con- gress, the Spurlocks argue that after 1903 the land grant lands, including the lands involved in this lawsuit, were owned by ATSSF rather than Santa Fe Pacific. The point of the argument is unclear. Even if ATSSF rather than Santa Fe Pacific owned the land grant lands in 1903, the Spurlocks would not own the minerals in dispute. Rather, either AT&SF would own the land and underlying minerals, having conveyed to no one, or the conveyances by Santa Fe Pacific to the Spurlocks' predecessors subject to a mineral reserva- tion would be in effect conveyances by ATsSF.+ In either case, the judgment 1 If AT&SF rather’ than Santa Fe Pacific was the owner of the lands after 1903, the Spurlocks are not entitled to judgment because they have not joined AT&SF as a party to this litigation. See McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1960). Further, the Spurlocks cannot claim full fee title against AT&SF by adverse possession because their predecessors entered into possession of the lawsuit lands pursuant to the deeds containing mineral reservations. The Spurlocks entered the lands under the same chain of title. An occupant cannot acquire title by adverse possession greater than that which he intended to claim when entering the property. Holmes _v. Johnson, 324 Mass. 450, 86 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1949). Thus, when a party enters property under a deed, the deed limits the scope of his possession and he cannot acquire any greater title than the deed purports to convey. See Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199, 179 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1944); Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650, 657-58 (Tex. 1965). This is true even when the occu- pant enters under a void or invalid deed. See v , 204 Ala. 400, 85 So. 369' (1920). Therefore, because the Spurlocks and their predecessors entered under a deed that contained a mineral reservation, the title they could acquire (footnote continued) -7- ¥ 3 a : 7 S £ i ios a Baba Re oA PA CN TL St BOL AS eel IN Sy entered by the Arizona Court of Appeals would be correct. Recognizing the necessity of pre- senting an issue of public importance, Petitioners argue that the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals will affect title to some 4,000,000 acres of land in Arizona and New Mexico, a part of which is within the boundaries of Grand Canyon National Park and Lake Mead National Recreation Area. Petition at 10 n.14. The argument does not withstand the most superficial scrutiny. If, as Petitioners insist, title to these lands passed to AT&SF in 1903, the occupants, both public and private, may be mere squatters whose rights can only be confirmed by a multitude of (footnote continued from previous page) by adverse possession would be subject to that mineral reservation. oe ocnss Peat, 3 Wien aay individual quiet-title actions. No over- riding national purpose could be served by such a result. It is less than clear how the Interior Department's effort to eliminate pockets of private ownership in the national parks will be facilitated by an adjudication that AT&SF, rather than Santa Fe Pacific, is the owner. The Spurlocks are, in effect, seeking an advisory opinion from this Court as to whether title to the land grant lands from 1903 onward rested in Santa Fe Pacific or AT&SF. Since the answer to that question is irrelevant to any dispute between the Spurlocks and Santa Fe Pacific or Kerr-McGee, there is no basis for this Court to decide the issue. Further, the Spurlocks lack stand- ing to argue that AT&SF rather than Santa Fe Pacific owns the land grant lands or \ PAIS ET REA RR Meh Eo ole PEDERSON ES A that the Santa Fe Pacific mineral reserva- tion is void. Only the United States or the parties to the 1902 and 1903 transac- tions would have standing to enforce an obligation of Santa Fe Pacific to convey to AT&SF or to challenge the retention of the land grant lands by Santa Fe Pacific. See Kerfoot v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 218 U.S. 281 (1910); Illinois Commerce Comm'n _v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 79, 322 N.E.2d 520 (1975); Hazelwood Brewing Co. v. Siebert, 256 Pa. 9, 100 A. 493 (1917). Similarly, the Spurlocks are not entitled to attack the Santa Fe Pacific mineral reservation as contrary to the 1866, 1871, 1897 or 1902 Acts of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals rejected aie similar argument in Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1957), observing: Even assuming arguendo that appellant's theory is’ sound -10- % ih I ket and that Congress did in 1870 impose a mandatory duty on the Northern Pacific to convey a full fee title to the land here involved, with no reser- vations, appellant has indicated no authority by which he is enabled to enforce that mandate. Nor has he attempted, if indeed it were possible, to classify himself as a third party beneficiary Or a cestui que trust with respect to this land. To overlook such a distinction is to vault the appellant into a status which he has~ not acquired. In such legal gym- nastics we will not indulge. 238 F.2d at 640. The Spurlocks' claim that title to the lands involved in this lawsuit was in AT&SF is also a collateral attack on the patents issued by the United States to Santa Fe Pacific. A determination of the Secretary of the Interior that a patent should be granted to an applicant cannot be attacked by a third party in a collat- eral proceeding. Burke _v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669 (1913); see -ll- = on ae) oll - of ' ‘ : oe ? : f dba) _> Cee nh ae Pei lands to the Spurlocks' predecessors subject to a reservation of "all oil, gas, coal and minerals whatsoever." See Russell _v. Texas Co., supra at 641. The Spurlocks have no claim under federal law to the minerals in dispute in this litiga- tion based on an assertion that title to the land grant lands was in ATESF. The Spurlocks have never before argued that the term "minerals" must be found to be ambiguous under the decisions of this Court. The interpretation of the reservation clause was treated by the parties, and decided by the Arizona courts, as a question of state law. Having failed to argue the existence of a federal question before the Arizona courts, the Spurlocks may not -~l16~ oe ide Ae Me ot if eee Sahin Sri eriainicinlinespis io oe: peean assert i: as a basis for certiorari. "It is a long-settled rule that the jurisdic- tion of this Court to re-examine the final judgment “ state court can arise only if the record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1981) (emphasis added). See also New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928); Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U.S. 648, 655 (1897). Whether timely raised or not, there is, in reality, no federal question inherent in this case. The question of whether the language in a private deed is ambiguous is a question of state law. It is not the burden of this Court to rectify perceived inequities in the application of state law by state courts. The Spurlocks cite four cases in -17- which, it is claimed, this Court found the term “minerals” to be per se ambiguous. In each case this Court performed its familiar role of interpreting an act of Congress which unquestionably governed the conveyance in issue, a different role altogether from serving as a final arbiter of state law issues.3 There is no case in which this Court has undertaken to establish a "federal rule” of construction of private 3 Thus, in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983), this Court con- strued the federal government's mineral reservation expressly mandated by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916. In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903), this Court construed an 1864 act of Congress chartering the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. In Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981), this Court construed the language of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act of 1935 and the hie gata Leasing Act of 1920. In United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317 (1940), this Court con- Strued language from the same _ act construed in Soderberg. -18- conveyances not governed by an act of Congress. 3. ane Spurlocks— claim that hei h been vi - ted was =e ven raised or and _is without merit. The Spurlocks argue that one of the members of the Arizona Court of Appeals was required to recuse himself and that his failure to do so violated their right to due process of law. The Spurlocks did not raise that issue in the court of appeals or in their petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court.4 Only in their motions filed after their petition for review was denied and mandate issued did the Spurlocks attempt to raise any issue that their right to due 4 It is undisputed that the Spurlocks were aware of the asserted grounds for recusal prior to the consideration of this case by the court of appeals. Petition at 28. -19- process of law was abridged by Judge Haire's decision not to recuse himself. The Spurlocks did not raise their due process claim in a timely fashion. In H nv ia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935), the petitioners asked this Court to decide a federal question that was first raised in a motion for rehearing to the state Supreme court. This Court stated that "(t]he long-established general rule is that the attempt to raise a federal ques- tion after judgment, upon a petition for rehearing, comes too late, unless the court actually entertains the question and decides it." Id. at 443. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 243-44 (1957); Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 128 (1945); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1932). In the instant case, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the Spurlocks leave -20- tote fcr ay. , > be wens ar ih Bethe ar tie | fot iets to file motions for reconsideration. In no way can the Arizona Supreme Court be said to have considered and decided the Spurlocks' claim of due process viola- tions. Even if the Spurlocks had timely raised their due process claim, granting certiorari would be inappropriate. Their argument is utterly devoid of merit. The question posed by the Petition is whether the due process clause is vio- lated when one member of a three-judge state appellate panel participates in a decision twenty-five years after he served as counsel for the receiver of a company that had done business with one of the parties to the litigation.> The answer is 5 Judge Haire concluded that he had no knowledge of significant evidentiary facts. Before making his decision not to recuse himself, he consulted with other court of appeals judges, including the chief judge. Appendix B at 35. (footnote continued) -2l- Sm fi yen eS be / a Bey Clearly no. As this Court has observed: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would generally be matters merely of legislative discretion. Tumey_v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). Not one of the cases cited by the Spurlocks suggests that due process is violated when a judge who arguably knows facts that may be of minimal evidentiary value sits as one of three judges on an (footnote continued from previous page) Indeed, the Spurlocks in their letters to Judge Haire disavowed any concern that Judge Haire would be biased and expressly stated that the Spurlocks were not requesting recusal. "By writing this letter and calling certain matters to your attention, I am not suggesting that you would be biased for or against either party. « « s" Appendix C at 36. "The purpose of discussing the foregoing is not to encourage you to recuse yourself." Appendix D at 45. -22- ape Ta: ae: i appellate panel in a civil case. Recusal was fully considered by Judge Haire prior to oral argument in the court of appeals. He concluded correctly that there was no basis for recusal. -23- CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Respectfully submitted, easy, Erm Komnen - von Ammon* Donald R. Gilbert Timothy Berg FENNEMORE, CRAIG, von AMMON, UDALL & POWERS A Professional Corporation 100 W. Washington, Suite 1700 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-1888 Attorneys for Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company bch, H— Andrew D. Hurwitz* Robert L. Palmer Ron Kilgard MARTORI, MEYER, HENDRICKS & VICTOR 2700 N. 3rd Street, Suite 4000 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Attorneys for Kerr-McGee Corporation *Counsel of Record -24- SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY Parent Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation Affiliate Santa Fe Industries, Inc. Advertising Direction, Inc. Alameda Belt Line The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company Central California Traction Company The Clinton and Oklahoma Western Railroad Company The Dodge City and Cimarron Valley Railway Company Fresno Interurban Railway Company The Garden City, Gulf and Northern Railroad Company The Gulf and Inter-State Railway Company of Texas Haystack Mountain Development Company The Kansas Southwestern Railway Company Los Angeles Junction Railway Company The Oakland Terminal Railway Oklahoma City Junction Railway Company Rio Grande, El Paso and Santa Fe Railway Company St. Joseph Terminal Railroad Company Santa Fe Forwarding Company Santa Fe Industrial Realty Company Santa Fe Rail Equipment Company Sante Fe Terminal Services, Inc. Santa Fe Transportation Company Star Lake Railroad Company Sunset Railway Company Transit Ice Company Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. Walker-Kurth Lumber Company Limited Partnership Management, Inc. -i- iets. ‘bi Sa eae as a a aan) | oe = Robert E. McKee, Inc. B & C General Agency, Inc. McKee Building Services, Inc. McKee Products, Inc. Sun Country Construction Company SF Minerals Corporation Cerrillos Land Company SF Coal Corporation Santa Fe Mining, Inc. Gallo Wash Coal Company Hospah Coal Company Pintada Coal Company Santa Fe Capital, Inc. Santa Fe Land Improvement Company Chula Vista Bayfront Investment Company Santa Fe Towers Land Company Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc. Santa Fe Energy Company SF Energy Company of Colombia SF Energy Company of Indonesia SF Energy Company of Indonesia (Banyu Block) SF Energy Company of Indonesia (Java Basin A) Santa Fe Energy Company of Indonesia (Java Basin B) Santa Fe Energy Company of Tunisia Santa Fe Energy Products Company Santa Fe Oil Company Santa Fe Pacific Fuels Company Santa Fe Pipelines, Inc. Gulf Central Pipeline Company Gulf Central Storage and Terminal Company Gulf Central Storage and Terminal Company of Nebraska San Diego Pipeline Company Santa Fe Marketing Company Santa Fe Pipeline Company Southwest Pipe Line Company Standard Office Building Corporation The Zia Company Los Alamos Constructors, Inc. atte pegtctbtiy Women S haciaks Mactoaed SGSI Corporation Southern Pacific Company Bankers Leasing and Financial Corporation Bankers Leasing Corporation Asociados Internacionales del Pacifico BLC Corporation Commetro Leasing, Inc. Commonwealth Control, Inc. The Commonwealth Plan, Inc. The Commonwealth Plan of Puerto Rico, Inc. The Commonwealth System, Inc. Financial Leasing Corporation Lease Capital, Inc. The Midwest Commonwealth Plan, Inc. The Pacific Plan, Inc. The Worcester Plan, Inc. BLFC Securities Corporation ComPian, Inc. Bravo Oil Company Constellation 130, Inc. Constellation Reinsurance Company Constellation Reinsco, Inc. CRM Associates, Inc. Galaxy Reinsurance Company One Market Street Properties, Inc. Pacific Petroleum Pipe Lines, Inc. San Diego Pipeline Company Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation Santa Fe Pacific Timber Company So Pac Finance N.V. Southern Pacific Development Company Canton Street Properties, Inc. Golden Empire Investment Corporation Southern Pacific Industrial Development Company Southern Pacific Land Company Geoproducts Corporation Southern Pacific Pipe Lines, Inc. Black Mesa Pipeline, Inc. Mescalero Pipeline, Inc. SPPLITT, Ltd. Southern Pacific Transportation Company -iii- Central California Traction Company Evergreen Leasing Corporation Holton Inter-Urban Railway Company Los Angeles Union Terminal, Inc. Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company Petaluma and Santa Rosa Railroad Company The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company Pacific Fruit Express Company Pacific Motor Transport Company Pacific Motor Trucking Company Louis Heller, Incorporated Portland Terminal Railroad Company Portland Traction Company Southern Pacific Air Freight, Inc. Southern Pacific Equipment Company Southern Pacific International, Inc. Southern Pacific Marine Transport, Inc. Southern Pacific Warehouse Company St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company The Alton & Southern Railway Company Arkansas & Memphis Railway Bridge and Terminal Company Dallas Terminal Railway and Union Depot Company Glascar, Inc. . Kansas City Terminal Railway Company Southern Illinois and Missouri Bridge Company The Southwestern Town Lot Corporation Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis Sunset Railway Company Visalia Electric Railroad Company Sunset Communications Company Sunset Insurance Company TOPS On-Line Services, Inc. KERR MCGEE CORPORATION Subsidiaries Basic Management, Inc. Bikita Minerals Private Limited Crescent Petroleum Company Downtown Airpark, Inc. Kerr-McGee Oil (U.K.) Limited Little Medicine Development Company San-Ann Service, Inc. Sunningdale Oil (Ireland) Limited Texoma Pipe Line Company Transocean Drilling Company Limited Transocean Drilling Company (U.K.) Limited Transocean Drilling (Curacao) N.V. Transshore Drilling (Curacao) N.V. Transshore Drilling Company Limited Transworld Drilling Company (Nigiria) Limited White Shoal Pipeline Corporation Partnership Brewster Phosphates @-Yy= --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385018_0148%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.