# Appendix — DeSeyn v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 471 U.S. 1101

## Text

84-1468 WAR 1 1985

KLE ANDER SEV AR,
CERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984
No.

ROBERT L. DESEYN,
Petitioner,

vs.

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED CONSERVANCY

DISTRICT,
Respondent.

SUBSTITUTE APPENDIX FOR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
Por the Sixth Circuit

MACK D. COOK, II

900 First National Tower
Akron, Ohio 44308

(216) 376-1005

Attorney for Petitioner

SA-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT L. DESEYN ) JUDGE
( ALVIN I. KRENZLER
Plaintiff )
~ve- ) CASE NO. C82-3018A
MUSKINGUM WATERSHED )

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ) MEMORANDUM OF
) OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant )

Plaintiff filed this action on November 3, 1983
[Sic]. In his complaint, plaintiff is asserting causes of
action alleged to arise under 42 U.S.C $1983, the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C $407, in addi-
tion to various pendent state claims.

The defendant in this action, the Muskingum
Watershed Conservancy District, was organized as a
conservancy district under the authority of Capter /Sic/
61 of the Ohio Revised Code. Pursuant to O.R.C
§6101.03, the defendant is a political subdivision and a
public corporation of the state of Ohio.

Generally, the plaintiff alleges in his complaint
that he owns a residential dwelling located on land leas-
ed from the defendant in an area referred to as the
‘North Shore area adjacent to Atwood Lake’ (North
Shore area). Plaintiff alleges that the defendant is
about to commence oil and gas drilling in the North
Shore area, and plaintiff is seeking to enjoin that activi-
ty.

On November 23, 1983 /Sic],the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which is

SA-2

presently pending before the Court. In its motion, the
defendant asserts that any oil and gas drilling in the
North Shore area will not be conducted by the defen-
dant but will be conducted by a third party under an oil
and gas lease entered into prior to when plaintiff ob-
tained his lease from the defendant. Further, plaintiff's
lease expressly states that it is subject to any existing
oil and gas leases. Defendant also asserts in its motion
to dismiss that it is not a person within the meaning of
42 U.S.C.§1983, and that plaintiff does not have stan-
ding to sue under 33 U.S.C. §407.

The defendant has attached exhibits and af-
fidavits to its motion to dismiss. Therefore, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), the defendant’s motion will be
treated as a motion for summary judgement under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56.

Fed R. Civ. P. 56 provides in pertinent
part:

The judgement sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and ad-
missions on file, together with the af-
fidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgement as a matter of law.

The undisputed facts in this case, established by
the pleadings, exhibits and affidavits of the parties are
as follows. The defendant owns the real estate in the
North Shore area at issue in this case. On June 1, 1967,
defendant entered into a oil and gas lease with the Ox-
ford Oil Company, granting the company the right to
drill for oil and gas on lands which encompass that
presenti» occupied by the plaintiff.

SA-3

On August 1, 1969, a Dr. Frank Schirack entered
into a cottage site lease with the defendant with respect
to the lot presently occupied by the plaintiff. The lease
was for a term of one year with the right to renew it each
year, subject to certain conditions, for a total period of
fourteen years. The lease expressly provided that it was
* gubject to ‘[a]ll existing oil and gas leases.’ On March 1,
1970, Dr. Schirack assigned the lease to the plaintiff,
Robert L. Deseyn. Plaintiff, at the same time, purchas-
ed the cottage Dr. Schirack had constructed on the site.
The plaintiff continues to occupy the site at the present
time. Plaintiff brought this action in November, 1982
when he personally observed three gas drilling sites on
real estate owned by the defendant in the North Shore
area.

Plaintiff's first claim is alleged to arise under 42
U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff alleges, in this claim, that the
defendant’s actions regarding oil and gas drilling ac-
tivities in the North Shore area have been arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable and thus a violation of due
process of law.

In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the requirements
of due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protec-
tion of liberty and property. The Court went on to hold:

Property interests, of course, are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understan-
dings that stem from an independent
source such as state law--rules or un-
derstandings that secure certain benefits
anc that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.

SA-4

In the present case, the plaintiff's property rights
are defined by the lease agreement covering the proper-
ty at issue here. The plaintiff has a property interest in
the land only to the extent such an interest is granted
by the lease. The lease agreement specifically provides
that plaintiff's interest in the property is subject to any
prior oil and gas leases. The oil and gas lease at issue
here was entered into on June 1, 1967. The lease plain-
tiff took by assignment was entered into on August 1,
1969. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not have a property
interest in this land which would give rise to a right to
due process concerning oil and gas drilling activities in
the North Shore area, and, therefore, the plaintiff could
not violate such a right. Thus, plaintiff's claim under 42
U.S.C. §1983, alleging a violation of due process is
hereby dismissed.

Plaintiff's second claim, that oil and gas drilling
in the North Shore area will diminish the value of plain-
tiffs property and will, thus, constitute an uncompen-
sated taking of plaintiffs property in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is similarly defeated by the
lease at issue here. The source of any property interest
the plaintiff might have in the land at issue here is the
lease. The lease, by providing that plaintiff's property
interest is subject to any preexisting oil and gas leases,
never gave the plaintiff the property interest he now
claims will be taken by the drilling activity. Board of
Regents v. Roth, supra.

Accordingly, because the property interest plain-
tiff claims will be taken was never given to him in the

first place, the plaintiff's claim which is based on an un- -

compensated taking in violation of the Fourteenth

anil

ole

Amendment is hereby dismissed. This is not to say,
however, that the plaintiff will not have a state tort ac-
tion against the driller if the drilling should damage
those property interests that plaintiff does have in the
land.

Plaintiffs third claim is brought under the
Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §407. Plaintiff alleges
that the drilling activity will produce refuse matter
which will flow in to the water reservoir of Atwood Lake.

The Refuse Act provides in pertinent part:

It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge,
or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to
be thrown, discharged, or deposited either
from or out of any ship, barge, or other
floating craft of any kind, or from the
shore, wharf, manufacturing establish-
ment, or mill of any kind, any refuse
matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom
in a liquid state, into any navigable water
of the United States, or into any tributary
of any navigable water from which the
same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and it shall not be lawful
to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to
be deposited material of any kind in any
place on the bank of navigable water, or
on the bank of any tributary of any
navigable water, where the same shall be
liable to be washed into such navigable
water, either by ordinary or high tides, or
by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby
navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed.

OO

SA-6

In his complaint, the plaintiff does not specify
what types of refuse matter the drilling will produce
which might impede or obstruct navigation. However,
even assuming that such matter may be produced, 33
U.S.C. §407 does not create a private right of action to
enforce the statute. City of Evansville, Ind. v Ken-
tucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F. 2nd 1008 (7th Cir.
1979). Accordingly, the plaintiff does not have a stan-
ding to assert a cause of action under 33 U.S.C. §407
and this claim must, therefore, be dismissed.

The remainder of plaintiff's claims arise under
state law and are only before the Court under the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction. The Court having dismiss-
ed the plaintiff’s federal claims prior to trial, plaintiff's
pendent state claims are better resolved in a state court
and are therefore dismissed. United Mine Workers v.
Gibb, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

_ Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss
is hereby granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(s)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT L. DESEYN ) JUDGE
ALVIN I. KRENZLER

Plaintiff )
-vs- ) CASE NO. C82-3018A

MUSKINGUM WATERSHED )
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ;
) JUDGEMENT ENTRY
Defendant )

On May 18, 1983 this Court entered its Memoran-
dum of Opinion and Order granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss this action. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that this action is hereby dis-
missed. Plaintiff is to pay all costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
(s)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NO. 83-3400

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBL
ROBERT L. DESEYN ) Sixth Circuit Rule 24 limits citation to specific situation:

Rule 24 bolore citing in a proceeding in a court in the Su
cilcd, @ copy must be served on other periies and the Cour

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) This notice is to be prominenitiy Cispiuyed it this decision is
-vs- ) APPEAL FROM
) THE UNITED STATES
) DISTRICT COURT
) FORTHE
MUSKINGUM WATERSHED ) NORTHERN DISTRICT
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ) OFOHIO
)
Defendant-Appellee. )

BEFORE: EDWARDS and WELLFORD, Circuit
Judges, and CHURCHILL, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Deseyn owls a house
and water well located in a Conservancy District in
Tuscarawas County, Ohio. The property upon which
his house and water well are located is leased from |
defendant Conservancy District. Plaintiff acquired the
lease by assignment from a Dr. Frank Schirack and
subsequently purchased the residence from him and
continued to lease the real estate from the Conservancy
District.

Defendant is an Ohio Conservancy District
authorized under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 6101 to
operate and maintain the lake and surrounding proper-
ty on which many cottages have been built. Defendant
Conservancy District is a political subdivision of the
State of Ohio.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

aaa

SA-9

Sometime in 1982 plaintiff Deseyn noticed three oil
and gas well drilling sites in an area around his home
(none closer than 600 feet to his property). Deseyn then
filed this action for an injunction, declaratory judg -
ment, damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, alleging
irreparable damage and injury to himself and to the
market value and peaceable enjoyment of his home and
water well. Among other things, he alleges violation of
42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) for arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable actions taken without due process of law,
and under the Fourteenth Amendment for a“taking”of
his home and water well without compensation and due ©
process.

Plaintiff also asserted a cause of action under 33
U.S.C. § 407.! Dismissal by the district court of this
asserted private cause of action was proper. See City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F. 2nd
1008 (7th Cir. 1978). As stated by another court:

The rivers and Harbors Act is limited by
its terms to enforcement by the United
States Attorneys. The majority of courts,
and the courts of this circuit that have ad-
dressed this issue, have held that the Act
precludes private suits and have thus
refused to find an implied private cause of
action. Red Star Towing and Transp.
Co. v. Department of Transportation,
423 F.2nd 104, 105 (3rd Cir. 1970);
Township of Long Beach v. City of New
York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1211-12 (D.N.J.
1978); see Connecticut Action Now, Inc.
v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2nd 81,85-
87 (2nd Cir. 1972); Parcell v. Shell Oil
Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1279-80 (D.Conn.
1976). affirmed, 573 F.2nd 1289 (2nd Cir.
1977).

National Sea Clammers Ass’n. v. City of New York,
616 F.2nd 1222, 1232 (2nd Cir. /Sic] 1980).

1. This Act is known as the Rivers and Harbors Act
(Refuse Act).

SA-10 :

It appears that the ‘cottage site lease’ (attached
to the complaint) which was assigned to Deseyn was
entered into by his predecessor on August 1, 1969, and
contains a clause which expressly provides that the
lease is subject to ‘all existing oil and gas leases and
utility rights-of-way thereunto pertaining.’ The district
court, on review of defendant’s motion for summary
judgement, found that the oil and gas drilling lease un-
der attack by Deseyn was entered into June 1, 1967,
over two years prior to Deseyn’s predecessor’s acquisi-
tion of his property rights in the lease and cottage.

We AFFIRM the district court’s decision for
defendants since it sets vut, as a matter of law, the
rights of the parties based on the uncontested facts that
were before it, recognizing, at the same time, that
plaintiff may at some later time have a cause of action if
future drilling demonstrably damages his property in-
terests.

SA-11

NO. 83-3400

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT L. DESEYN ) F l L E cD
DEC 7 1984
Plaintiff-Appellant, JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk
-ve- )
)
) ORDER
)
MUSKINGUM WATERSHED )
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT )
)
)

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: EDWARDS and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges;
and CHURCHILL, District Judge.*

The district court, on review of defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judge-
ment, found that the oil and gas drilling lease under at-
tack by Deseyn was entered into June 1, 1967, over two
years prior to Deseyn’s predecessor’s acquisition of his
property rights in the lease and cottage. Even if con-
sidered as a sua sponte summary judgement action
without the requisite notice, plaintiff has not
demonstrated prejudice in this procedure. Plaintiff has
never demonstrated any basis to challenge the validity
of the 1967 lease. See Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler
Board of Education, 649 F.2nd 434, 436.

Upon consideration of plaintiff's petition for
rehearing, we again affirm the district court's decision

* The Honorable James P. Churchill, U.S. District
Court for the Fastern District of Michigan, sitting by
designation.

SA-12

for the reasons heretofore stated in the court’s per
curiam opinion.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
(s)

Clerk

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND PROCEDURAL RULES INVOLVED

The Due process Clawse of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides:
- « « nor shall any State deprive any
person of .. . property, without due
process of law; nor Geny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law.
The Bill of Rights, Article V, pro-
vides:
» + « nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just
compensation.
28 U.S.C. §1254(1) provides:

Cases in the courts of appeals may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by the
following methods: (1) By writ of
certiorari granted upon the petition

of any party to any civil... case.

28 U.S.C. §1331 provides:

The district courts shall have ori-
ginal jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. §1343 provides:

The district courts shall have ori-
ginal jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by
any person: .. . (3) To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State
law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privi-
lege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States; (4) To recover damages

Or to secure equitable or other relief

SA-15

under any Act of Congress providing
for the protection of civil rights,
28 U.S.C. §2201 provides:

In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, . . . any
court of the United States, upon the
filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be
sought. Any such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be re-
viewable as such.

33 U.S.C. §407 provides:

It shall not be lawful to throw,
discharge, or deposit, or cause, suf-
fer, Or procure to be thrown, dis-

charged, or deposited either from or

SA-16

out of any ship, barge, or other
floating craft of any kind, or from
the shore, wharf, manufacturing es-
tablishment, or mill of any kind, any
refuse matter of any kind or descrip-
tion whatever other than that flowing
from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state, into any
navigable water of the United States,
Or into any tributary of any navigable
water from which the same shall float
or be washed into such navigable wa-
ter; and it shall not be lawful to
deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure
to be deposited material of any kind
in’ any place on the bank of any navi-
gable water, or on the bank of any
tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be
washed into such navigable water,

either by ordinary or high tides, or

by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be

impeded or obstructed:

33 U.S.C. §413 provides:

The Department of Justice shall
conduct the legal proceedings neces-
sary to enforce the provisions of sec-
tions 401, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408,
409, 411, 549, 686, and 687 of this
title; and it shall be the duty of
Unite. States attorneys to vigorously
prosecute all offenders against the
same whenever requested to do so by
the Secretary of the Army or by any of
the officials hereinafter designated,
and it shall furthermore be the duty
of said United States attorneys to
report to the Attorney General of the
United States the action taken by him

against offenders so reported, and a

transcript of such reports shal’ be

transmitted to the Secretary of the
Army by the Attorney General; and for
the better enforcement of the said
provisions and to facilitate the de-
tection and bringing to punishment of
such offenders, the officers and
agents of the United States in charge
of river and harbor improvements, and
the assistant engineers and inspec-
tors employed under them by authority
of the Secretary of the Army, and the
United States collectors of customs
and other revenue officers shall have
power and authority to swear out pro-
cess, and to arrest and take into
custody, with or without process, and
person or persons who may commit any
of the acts or offenses prohibited by

the said sections, or who may violate

any of the provisions of the same.

SA-19

42 U.S.C. §1983, enacted as §1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
provides:

Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Terri-
tory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen ‘of the United
States or other person within the jur-
isdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

Rule 12(b), FRCP, provides:

Every defense, in law or fact, toa
claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-

Claim, or third-party claim, shall be

asserted in the responsive pleading

SA~20

thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by mo-
tion: (1) lack of ‘jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) lack of juris-
diction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process,
(5) insufficiency of service of pro-
cess, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join a party under Rule 19.
A motion making any of these dGefenses
shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by be-
ing joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion. If a pleading
sets forth a claim for relief to which

the adverse party is not required to

serve a responsive pleading, he may

SA-21

assert at the trial any defense in law
or fact to that claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense num-
bered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 15(a), FRCP, provides:

A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served

Rule 20(a), FRCP, provides:

Permissive Joinder. All persons

SA-22

Ru le

may join in one action as plaintiffs
if they assert any right to relief

jointly, severally, or in the alter-

native in respect of or arising out of |
the same transaction, occurrence, or
series cf transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact
common to all these persons will arise
in the action.
23, FRCP, provides:
(b) An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition: ...
(2) the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corres-
ponding declaratory relief with re-

spect to the class as a whole;....

SA-23

Rule 56(c), FRCP, provides:
The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to
the day of hearing may serve opposing

affidavits. The judgment sought shall

be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_2546%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
