# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Century Air Freight, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 1073

## Text

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

84 = 69 FILED

OCT 5 j004

N

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1984

CENTURY AIR FRE:iGHT, INC.,

Petitioner,
-VS.-

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

MILTON HOROWITZ
Counsel for Petitioner
15 Park Row
New York, N.Y. 10038
(212) 267-0606

MICHAEL E. VEVE
Of Counsel for Petitioner
O’CONNOR & HANNAN
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 887-1455

Di hk Bur ley Bunter -» 203 Richmond Avenue @ Staten Island, New York 10302
Tel.: (212) 447-5358 — (516) 222-2470 — (914) 682-0848

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was it proper for the Court of Appeals to affirm
the holding of the District Court herein that §404 of
the Civil Aviation Act; 49 U.S.C. §1374, mandating a
duty on airline operators to furnish air transportation
to those making reasonabie request therefor and pro-
hibiting undue preferencing and unjust discrimination
in air transportation, was not intended by Congress,
and therefore never did imply a right of action by
private parties to recover for executed acts of miscon-
duct violative of §404 of the Act?

That holding effectively overrules Fitzgerald v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F. 2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1956) which found that §404 implied such a right
since the Civil Aeronautics Board was powerless to
grant reparation in money for past misconduct, and
that to deny such right of suit to injured parties in
those instances would render §404 unenforceable. Un-
til the instant ruling, Fitzgeraid was followed without
dissent in scores of cases in all Circuits. And now the
shipping public, despite §1002(k) of the Act; 49 U.S.C.
§1482(k), enacted November 9, 1977 for the era of
deregulation and expressly prescribing common car-
riage and therefore public service as the regime for the
air transportation of goods, has been abruptly depriv-
ed of the right of enforcement which it had enjoyed for
close to 30 years.

2. Could the district court, before the filing of an
answer responsive to the complaint, validly dismiss,
as presenting no triable issue, a complaint charging
violation by an airline operator of section 404 of the
Civil Aviation Act of 1958; 49 U.S.C. §1374, and sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; 15 U.S.C.

ii

§§ 1 and 2, where a concededly total denial, sustained

tainerized goods aboard respondent's Flight 841—the
only daily, fully containerized all-freight, overnight
flight from metropolitan New York to Puerto

freight forwarder competitor of petitioner of an alloca-
tion of space aboard the flight of never less than two
thirds of the aircraft’s container capacity?

The dismissal disregards the conclusion of the in-
vestigatory and enforcing Bureau of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, in the course of its exercise of
primary jurisdiction of the case and after investiga-
tion, that respondent had v.olated section 404 of the
Aviation Act and section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.

The caption of the case in this Court contains the
names of all the parties to the proceedings in the
Court below.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Ee eNO eNO i
Parties ............. siilsahdelelclcehattinnteaneiniensnnnensteunnennnnnnannnnnnnnn ii
ST sions hacia anenntndninnnnenebnnennainnntia 1
SII sccictbisicinssintictancenbinnacnenncasannenecncneccecazeseseercesesass 2
Reasons for Granting the Writ .....................ccccceeeeeees 2
Statutes which the Case Involves ...........s:..ssssseesseeen 3
SII Or GENE GRIND ee secracescnreccceecsscccnscccenanscnnpeonceonens 9
Century’s Case Against American ......................00008 12
Be ne BND GID GIR cccesccecccssesecescecccencceccccenecenses 15

Argument:

1. Fitzgerald v. American World Airways, Inc.,
229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) is valid prevailing
authority for allowing private suit under Section
404(b) of the Aviation Act by qualified suitors il-
legally injured by carrier discrimination in air
TT CN ene eT TTT 22

2. The legal predicate of the undisputed exclusion
of Century’s goods from American’s freighter
flight sustained for six years is that it was a gross
violation of §404 of the Aviation Act and an il-
legal restraint of trade. In those circumstances,

iv
the mere presence of a beneficiary and preferencee

made the possibility of antitrust violation too
strong to allow summery dismissal on antitrust ......28

Conclusion ...........ssssssseseeseesessnsensennenrannenvensensnsansensensnes 30
APPENDICES

1. Order of Court of Appeals Denying Petition for
Rehearing in Banc, July 10, 1984 ........-v-+-ssererssssreeee la

2. Court of Appeals’ Summary Affirmance of
District Court Judgment on Opinion Below, May

31, 1984 ..cccccccsscscsssssescsesssnssenenenssnsnenonssensesensssananenenses 3a
3. District Court Judgment Dismissing Com-

plaint, January 10, 1984 ..........ssss»-svsenssnnsesisnsensennenneess 5a
4. District Court Opinion, January 5, LOBE ...ccccccccceee 7a

5. Letter of Civil Aeronautics Board Director of
Consumer Protection to Counsel for American
Airlines, Inc. Announcing Intention to Institute
Enforcement Proceeding, June 22, 1979 .........-+++++ 30a

CASES CITED
Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied 393 U.S. 846 (1968) ........crsserserrenrenennnenees 14,23

Caceres Agency, Inc. v. Trans World Airways,
Inc., 594 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1979) .......s-s-sereeeererenererenrers 27

Century Air Freight, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,

Vv

738 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 943

SPEED However,
combination service is timed to passenger schedules.

4. This fact, originally stated to the Bureau by Century, was
corroborated in our interviews with American’s personnel held in
June of 1978.

5. Usually, this calls for late evening departures, a fact attested
tc by the scheduling of American's freighter.

37a

In addition, although other carriers have periodically
offered freighter service in this market, no other car-
rier matches American's frequency, service, or depen-
dability.6 For these reasons, American’s long-
standing exclusion of Century and its restriction on
the amount of space ultimately provided were in-
jurious to Century’s development of a southbound
operation.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

Prior to the passage of P.L. 95-163 and the
development of new policies during deregulation,
there was no question that American’s standing
preference in favor of Profit-By-Air and the resulting
exclusion of Century constituted unlawful discrimina-
tion under Section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act.
Under prior law, the proscription against unjust
discrimination:

precludes different treatment of like traffic for like
and contemporaneous service under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions. (Citation omit-
ted.) Such discrimination may result from the charg-
ing of different rates to different shippers or
passengers afforded the same service . . . or from the
offering of specific services to only a select patron or
group of patrons (citation omitted). In either situa-
tion, the result is that the carrier is giving preferential
treatment to one person or group of persons to the pre-
judice of another and contrary to the requirement that
all those who seek the service of a carrier must be

6. The same is true of the other carriers now in the market.
Airlift’s service is often chartered to other destinations without
advance warning, and Flying Tiger's new operation is limited to
Saturday only.

38a

treated alike. Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 383 F.2d 466 at 481-82 (5 Cir.
1967); cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).

Guided by these principles, the Board explicitly found
that an agreement giving Emery Air Freight a stand-
ing priority over other forwarders in having its cargo
boarded on commuter carriers was unduly preferential
and refused to approve it under Section 412. Emery
Air Freight and Air Midwest, Inc., et al., Order 73-4-8.
pp. 1, 2, 6. Thus, prior to the enactment of the P.L.
95-163, American’s practice clearly violated the probi-
tions of Section 404(b).

After reviewing several Board decisions and
regulations issued since that time, the Bureau has
concluded that the requirements of equal treatment
enunciated in Transcontinental Bus System, Inc.,
supra, are largely unchanged with regard to boarding
preferences and that American’s practice remains
unlawful. In ER-1080 (November 9, 1978), the Board
began reviewing the obligations of freight carriers
with a view toward amending them to conform to the
new law. After a full rule-making proceeding, the
Board decided that it would be in the public interest to
utilize its power under Section 416(a) to exempt car-
riers from several statutory obligations, such as the
duty to carry upon reasonable request arising under
Section 404(a). However, the Board explicitly provid-
ed that this exemption did not alter obligations aris-
ing under Section 404(b), stating that:

This exemption, however, does not relieve the carriers
of their service obligations as common carriers, and
does not apply to a carrier’s duty to refrain from pro-
viding preferential treatment to particular companies

39a

or persons. Carriers having certificates under Section
401 or 418 remain, by definition, common carriers.
ER-1080, p. 12.

Accordingly, although the Board codified sweeping
changes in carriers’ duties in Part 291 of its regula-
tions, it has never exempted carriers from the re-
quirements of Section 404(b). See, eg. 14 C.F.R.
§§291.30-35.’

The Board has shown that it will continue to
adhere to the longstanding interpretation of Section
404(b) in cases involving standing service preferences.
In the matter of the application of Trans-
Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L., Docket 30255, the
Board specifically found a contract under which TMA
had agreed to give the freight of one particular ship-
per a standing delivery priority over other freight to
be unlawful. In its own words:

The Board has rejected similar priority arrangements
in interstate air transportation and we see no per-
suasive reason for adopting a different policy....
Order 78-5-67, p. 12.°

7. Nothing in the Board’s Proposed Policy Satement on Price
Discrimination, PSDR-58, which specifically concerns price
discrimination and not service preferences, excuses American's
discriminatory actions either. In fact, the proposed statement
provides further support for finding these practices to be
unlawful since American's discrimination caused Century severe
financial injury which the force of free entry did not dilute over a
substantial period of time. See, 14 C.F.R. §399.34(b) (proposed).

8. See also, the matter of the application for a foreign air carrier
permit submitted by P.7. Merpati Nusantara Airlines (Air Bali),
Docket 30826, in which the Board found that a proposal to offer one-
way charters on the basis of nationality was discriminatory and
violated Section 404(b), citing Transcontinental Bus System with
approval. Order 78-6-217, p. 3.

40a

On the basis of this precedent, the Bureau has con-
cluded that American’s treatment of Century which
resulted from a standing preference in favor of Profit-
By-Air is unjustly discriminatory and must be discon-
tinued.®

We have also concluded, on the basis of informa-
tion presently available, that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that American's practice con-
stituted a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Specifically, we find that it is inconsistent with the
“essential facility’ doctrine perhaps best enunciated
in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The relevant market at issue here is confirmed
air freight traveling from New York City to San Juan,
Puerto Rico on regularly scheduled cargo service.
American's service constituted a facility essential to
successful operations in this market. Since, as a prac-
tical matter, air freight forwarders are unlikely to be
able to duplicate these services, they should be
allocated on fair terms. Therefore, in foreclosing the
use of American’s services, both American and Profit-
By-Air may have violated the antitrust laws. Hecht,
supra, 570 F. 2d at 992; see also, Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1972). By implication,

9. As you know, the Bureau was of the opinion that the outcome
of PRAFRI might affect our interpretation of Section 404(b). In
PRAFRI, the questions of whether the rates charged for priority
freight were discriminatory and whether the Board had jurisdic-
tion to make such a determination were raised. In his initial deci-
sion, presiding Judge Yoder found that priority rates were
unlawfully discriminatory and that the Board still had jurisdic-
tion over such matters even in light of cargo deregulation. In
reaching his decision, Judge Yoder relied on the interpretation of
Section 404(b) advanced in Transcontinental Bus System, Inc.,
supra, showing that it is still current. I.D. at 57-58. Thus, based on
the long-awaited outcome of PRAFRI, this interpretation of car-
riers’ obligations is still valid.

4la

any such violations would also constitute unfair
methods of trade within the meaning of Section 411 of
the Federal Aviation Act. See, Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Bureau has con-
cluded that American violated Section 404(b) of the
Federal Aviation Act in excluding Century from its
New York City-San Juan freighter service and by con-
tinuing to restrict the availability of this service as a
result of preferences given other forwarders. These ac-
tions not only injured Century's business, but also
caused great harm to the general public. American
prevented a small forwarder from offering new, in-
novative service to the public in competition with the
incumbent. Such a result is directly contrary to the
aims of deregulation and current Board policies.

By July 20, 1979, the Bureau will determine what
further course of action should be taken here.'® On the
basis of the evidence presently available, we have con-
cluded that American must begin allocating space on
its freighter in a different manner. If you wish to
dispute this conclusion by drawing additional
evidence or legal precedent to our attention, please
contact Robert C. Seldon, the Bureau's attorney
responsible for the case's development, prior to the
20th.

10. We have already decided to take no action of our own in
response to Century's antitrust claim. Our reasons for doing so
are stated more fully in our letter to Century's counsel, a copy of
which is attached here.

42a

I must advise you that unless we are presented
with a contrary view of the facts or applicable prece-
dent, the Bureau is prepared to institute an ad-
ministrative proceeding to ensure that, in che future,
American will allocate space on its freighter in a non-
discriminatory manner. In addition, if American's
practices were found to be unlawful, American could
also be subject to civil penalty liability under Section
90 l(a) of the Act. We would prefer to resolve these and
other ancillary matters without resort to litigation. If
American is amenable to such a solution, I suggest
you discuss this matter as well with Mr. Seidon prior
to July 20th. In particular, I believe it would be fruit-
ful to discuss future practices in the market as well as
remedies for American's past activities.

Very truly yours,

s/ Reuben B. Robertson
Reuben B. Robertson

Director

Bureau of Consumer Protection

Attachment
cc: Milton Horowitz, Esq.

---

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