# Opposition Brief — Jones v. Walker

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 1036

## Text

Office - Supreme Court. US.

: FILED
ty wm § VQ NOV 2 1994
ALEXAN'DE iu. STEVAS.,
CLERK
IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

HONORABLE ED JONES, CHAIRMAN OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ COMMITTEE ON HOUSE

ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,
V

ANNE W. WALKER,
Respondent.

Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR ANNE W. WALKER

JOHN J. GILECE, JR.
4801 St. Elmo Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Tel. No. (801) 986-1777

WILLIAM HARRY GARBER
Courthouse Plaza II
10345 Democracy Lane, Suite A
Fairfax, Virginia 22020
Tel. No. (703) 352-3436
Attorneys for Respondent
Anne W. Walker

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Chairman, who is a member of Congress,
and the Staff Director, of the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Services of the Committee on House Ad-
ministration are immune from civil liability under the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution for their al-
leged discriminatory (gender-based) and wrongful! dis-
charge of the General Manager of the House of Represen-
tatives Restaurant System.

PARTIES INVOLVED

The parties to this Petition are the Honorable Ed Jones,
Congressman and Chairman of the Subcommittee of Serv-
ices, Committee on House Administration of the House of
Representatives, and Thomas Marshall, the Subcommit-
tee’s former Staff Director, petitioners; and Anne W.
Walker, former General Manager of the House of Represen-
tatives Restaurant System, respondent.

ii

CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ........... ce eeeeeeeeeeeenes i
PARTIES INVOLVED .ocas 0snnacae swale eeeeneeeea nee i
CONTENTS ...cccccacnnvess0ancnmn eee eeeeee eee ii
CASES AND AUTHORITIES ....cccsscussesesssssssse ili
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED .........-.- 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...ccccscvenntssccsunncss 2
ARGUMENT ......00ccu0080000b5 eee 7

A. This Case Does Not Present Any Important Ques-
tion Involving The Relationship Between The Leg-
islative And Judicial Branches of Government ...

B. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals, Denying
Speech Or Debate Protection To Personnel Deci-
sions, Does Not Dec de The Question In Any Way
Which Conflicts With The Decisions Of This Court 9

C. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Decide Any Impor-,
tant Question Regarding Official Immunity Which
Should Be Decided By This Court ............. 10

CONCLUSION ....c000000e85he55eu Ok Sen eee 12

~)

ili

CASES AND AUTHORITIES
_ CASES: Page
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ..............005. 9

Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Periodical
Correspondents Association, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C.

Cir. 1975), cert. den., 423 U.S. 1501 (1976) ....... 4,5
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) ........... passim
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) ........ 9, 10
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 U.S. 800 (1982) ....... 6, 10, 11
Page v. District of Columbia, 20 App. D.C. 469 1902 .. 8
Parker v. Allen, No. 74-1846, slip op. (D.D.C June 6,

Ce Pane AW bie oie RMON Ak's ¥ OX 5, 6
United States v. Brewster 408 U.S. 501 (1972) ....... 9, 11
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) ............ 12
Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ..... passim

Walker v. Jones, 557 F. Supp. 366 (D.D.C. 1983) ... passim
Constitution:

Artecte f, Section 6, Clause [ ..... 2.6... cas. passim
Fifth Amendment 2

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1984

ee

HONORABLE ED JONES, CHAIRMAN OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ COMMITTEE ON HOUSE

ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
ANNE W. WALKER,
Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Respondent Anne W. Walker, former Manager of the
House of Representatives Restaurant System, through her
attorneys, pray for the denial of the issuance of a writ of
certiorari sought by petitioners, the Chairman and a former
Staff Director of the House of Representatives’ Subcommit-
tee on Services, Committee on House Administration, for
review of the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered on May 1,

to

1984, in favor of respondent and against petitioners in this
proceeding.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the
United States of America provides in pertinent part: “. . .
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [the
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in
any other place.”

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America provides in pertinent part: “No person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law... .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves an action for damages, reinstatement,
and declaratory and injunctive relief, arising out of the
allegedly discriminatory (gender-based) and wrongful dis-
charge of respondent Anne W. Walker as General Manager
of the House of Representatives’ Restaurant System (here-
inafter, the “House Restaurant System”), in violation of her
liberty and property interests and of the Equal Protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment (Complaint, Paras. 20-40; Pet. App. D at 8d-11d).
Facts alleged in the complaint on September 23, 1982 are
summarized below.

In December 1970, Anne W. Walker was hired by the
Subcommittee to manage the House Restaurant System
(Complaint, Para. 7; Pet. App. D at 4d). At the time of her
employment, and throughout her employment, she was led
to believe that so long as her duties were performed in a
proper and efficient manner, her employment would be
perinanent and would continue. This belief was based on
well-known personnel policies of the Subcommittee, and on

Anne W. Walker's conversations and communications with
the Subcommittee Chairman and with other Subcommittee
members and staff of the Subcommittee to the effect that
employees not involved in the legislative process are dis-
charged only for valid cause and reason relating to improper
or inadequate job performance. (Complaint, Para. 9; Pet.
App. D at 4d.

Anne W. Walker was employed in various positions in the
House Restaurant System for a period of approximately ten
years (Complaint, Para. 11; Pet. App. at 5d). During this
period she changed the financial position of the House Res-
taurant System from a loss to a net profit in excess of three
million dollars (Complaint, Para. 11; Pet. App. at 5d); man-
aged, controlled, and operated the House Restaurant Sys-
tem without intervention or criticism (Complaint, Para. 14,
Pet. App. D. at 6d); and was led to believe and understand
that her performance was at all times satisfactory (Com-
plaint, Paras. 9, 14, and 15; Pet. App. D at 4d—6d). Indeed,
during 1980, Chairman Jones increased the salary of Anne
W. Walker by eight thousand dollars per annum to forty-five
thousand dollars per annum because of the efficient manner
in which she operated the House Restaurant System (Com-
plaint, Para. 14; Pet. App. D at 6d).

In May 1982, at her request, Anne W. Walker met with
Congressman Jones and Thomas Marshall, the Staff Direc-
tor of the Subcommittee, at which time she detailed the
operations and profit structure of the House Restaurant
System. They made no comment and expressed no dissatis-
faction with her performance; and, concluded the meeting
without criticism. (Complaint, Para 15; Pet. App. at 6d.)

Early in 1982, Congressman Jones indicated to others
that because of Anne W. Walker's sex she was overpaid and
that her salary was “ridiculous for a woman” (Complaint,

4

Para. 13; Pet. App. D. at 5d—6d). On June 22, 1982, Con-
gressman Jones notified Anne Walker of her discharge
(Complaint, Para. 16; Pet. App. D at 6d-7d):

It is with regrets that I must terminate your employ-
ment as general manager of the House Restaurant
System effective June 30, 1982,” . . . as “best for the
future of the Restaurant System”. . . “Sincerely yours,
Ed Jones, Chairman.”

In July 1982, Congressman Jones and Staff Director Mar-
shall hired a male persor as General Manager (Complaint,
Para. 18; Pet. App. D at /©.

After Anne W. Walker's discharge, Congressman Jones
made Knowingly false public statements and representa-
tions that she was discharged because she (1) operated the
House Restaurant System inefficiently and at a loss, (2)
engaged in improper and/or illegal bookkeeping practices,
and (3) engaged in misappropriation and “skimming” of
funds from the House Restaurant System (Complaint,
Para. 19; Pet. App. D at 7d-8d).

On February 15, 1988, the District Court dismissed the
complaint in its entirety on the sole ground that “the dis-
charge of a House Restaurant employee, pursuant. to au-
thority granted by a congressional subcommittee, is an
action within the ‘legislative sphere.” (Memorandum deci-
sion; Pet. App. B at 3b.) The District Court reasoned:

Actions related to the internal administration of Con-
gress have been found to be protected legislative acts.
For example, the seating of the press in the House and
Senate galleries, Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents Association,
515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975) cert. den. 423 U.S. 1501
(1976) . . . have been found to be legislative action

protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In addition,
this District Court has previously held that the admin-
istration of a congressional restaurant “while it may not
attain the magnitude of some congressional duties, is
clearly an activity which is within the ‘leyislative
sphere’. ” Parker v. Al/en, et al., No. 74-1846, slip op. at
9 (D.D.C. June 6, 1975).

The cases indicate that actions of Congress in making
“internal arrangements for its own necessities” are
within the “legislative sphere.”

On May 1, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
missal of the complaint as to Congressman Jones and Staff
Director Marshall on the ground that “personnel actions of
the kind Jones and Marshall are alleged to have taken, if
effected for unlawful reasons, do not fall within the legis-
lative functions to which the absolute immunity of the
Speech or Debate Clause attaches.” (733 F.2d 934, Pet. App.
A at 19a).' The Court of Appeals reasoned that food service
work is not legislative in nature (733 F.2d 934; Pet. App. A.
at 14a); and, that it would “demean the high purpose of the
speech or debate privilege to extend it to official activities of
Congress members and their aides in ‘mundane fields’ out-
side ‘the legislative core.” Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865,
880 (5 Cir. 1977); rev'd on other grounds, 571 F.2d 793 (5 Cir.
1978) (en banc), rev'd 442 U.S. 228 (1979),” (733 F.2d 929;
Pet. App. A at 10a.) That Court also distinguished Conswm-
ers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Periodical Corre-
spondents Association, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), on
the ground that the press seating arrangements in were

‘The District Court dismissed to complaint as to Congressmen
Mollohan and Coyne because the “complaint attributed no actual
participation in the termination of Walker's employment . . .” to them
(733 F.2d 925 n.1; Pet. App. A. at 2a—3a.)

6

intended to shield members of Congress from press mem-
ber’s use of their House access to lobby iegislators (733 F.2d
930; Pet. App. A at 12a}—which unquestionably relates to
the legislative business of the Congress. The Court of Ap-
peals also noted that, in Parker v. Al/en, No. 74-1846, slip
op. (D.D.C. June 6, 1975; unpublished) the District Court
concluded that the Capitol Architect who actually fired the
head waiter of the Senate Restaurant System was not im-
mune from suit under the Speech or Debate Clause, and
awarded the head waiter substantial relief. The Court of
Appeals also held that petitioners are not immune from suit
under the doctrine of absolute immunity because the scope
of that doctrine “does not extend beyond the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
235 n.11, 246 (1979).” (733 F.2d 932; Pet. App. A. at 17a.)

The Court of Appeals further held that they had ad-
dressed the wrong issue with respect to qualified immunity:
the question of the uncertainty of the law pertaining to the
Speech or Debate Clause, rather than whether their con-
duct violated any “‘clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional right [of Anne W. Walker] of which a reasonable
person would have known.’ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
at 818; see also id. at 807.” (733 F.2d 932, 933; Pet. App. A. at
17a—18a).

The Court of Appeals also held that the allegations of
Anne W. Walker's complaint are sufficient enough so as not
to be subject to be dismissed for failure to state any claim
upon which relief can be granted (733 F.2d 933; Pet. App. A
at 18a—19a).°

*Petitioners do not challenge this holding.

~]

ARGUMENT

A. This Case Does Not Present Any Important Question
Involving The Relationship Between The Legislative
and Judicial Branches of Government.

Petitioners assert that this case presents the question of
“whether Congressional decisions’ to dismiss senior aides
are shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause.” (Petition at
7.) Petitioners contend that the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari to review this issue because it involves an
important issue concerning the relationship between the
legislative and judicial branches of government, the signifi-
cance of which was recognized in Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 235 n.11 (1979) (Petition at 7-8).

For the first time, in this Court, Petitioners contend, in
substance, that the subject matter of Anne C. Walker's
complaint is nonjusticable because the Court of Appeals
“judgment fails to accord to the House the respect that any
court owes a coordinate branch of government. (Judge
MacKinnon dissenting, 733 F.2d 938; Petition at 11, see also
Petition at 7-8). Petitioners rely on that part of the cissent-
ing opinior of Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at

*There is no allegation by Anne W. Walker in the complaint or
elsewhere, and no evidence of record, to support petitioners’ asser-
tion that any “Congressional decision” was made to discharge her.
The complaint merely alleges that in discharging her the petitioners
engaged in acts in violation of her Constitutional rights. (733 F.2d
931; Pet. App. A. 14a—15a.) Likewise, there is no evidence of record to
support petitioners’ claims that (1) “[a]fter consideration of the mat-
ter in executive session, the subcommittee dismissed the [so-called]
committee aide who served as General Manager of the Restaurant
System.” (Questions Presented, Petition at (i); and (2) “[t]he specific
meeting of the Subcommittee which is the subject of the complaint
was conducted in executive session.” (Petition at 11 n.12).

250, which states that “long-accepted concepts of separation
of powers dictate . . . that until Congress legislates other-
wise as to employment standards for its own staffs, judicial
power in this area is circumscribed.” (Petition at 8.)
However, this dissent refers only to the staffs of Members of
Congress who are considered to be “intimately a part of the
policymaking and political process” where there is an “im-

perative need for loyalty, confidentiality, and political com--

patibility—not simply to a political party, an institution or
an administration, but to the individual Member.” Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. at 250.

Anne W. Walker was neither such a Congressional staff
member, nor an aide, or alter ego to the Subcommittee.’ As
the chief food service facility manager, she was completely
removed from the legislative arena. She did not work for any
Member of Congress; but rather, was an employee of the
Subcommittee and worked directly for the Staff Director of
that Subcommittee. The Staff Director was neither a mem-
ber of Congress nor an aide to any Member of Congress.

Anne W. Walker's duties and responsibilities did not in-
volve or influence any legislative functions or activities. Her
discharge as General Manager of the House Restaurant

‘Petitioners suggest that Anne W. Walker, as General Manager of
the House Restaurant System, was an agent or officer of the House of
Representatives based on the holding in Page v. District of Columbia,
20 U.S. App. D.C. 469, 474 (1902), that persons conducting the
restaurants of the Houses of Congress are not required to take out
local liquor licenses because they are quasi agents or officers of the
Houses. (Petition at 13 n.14.) It is apparent that this type of agency
does not suggest, without more, that there was a close intimate
relationship between the manager of the restaurants and their em-
ployers in the matters of legislative functions and activities—one of
the factual predicates needed to establish that Anne W. Walker was
an aide to the Subcommittee.

. fore ge A ren rr re me ce >

9

System could not. therefore, materially impact on the sepa-
ration of power concerns which the Petitioners seek to raise.
Absent this genuine issue concerning “lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government,” Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962), “judicial review of [this] Congressional
employment decision[] is constitutionally limited only by
the reach of the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitu-
tion, Art. I, §6, el. 1.” Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 235
n.11. Thus, the merits of the Speech or Debate issue are
properly before this Court. Anne W. Walker submits that
the decision of the Court of Appeals on that issue is in all
respects correct for the reasons set forth in its opinion (Pet.
App. A).

B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, Denying Speech
or Protection To Personnel Decisions, Does Not De-
cide The Question In Any Way Which Conflicts With
The Decisions Of This Court.

Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals “jettisoned”
the traditional test for the invocation of the Speech or De-
bate Clause and “invented and applied a novel and unprece-
dented criterion: whether the subject of the legislative ac-
tion is in a ‘mundane field’ . . . as opposed to a matter ‘of
state.’ 733 F.2d at 926; App. A at 4a.” (Petition at 9.)
However, this allegedly “blatant distortion of the classic
test” (Petition at 9) articulated in Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606 (1972) is nowhere to be found in the opinion of
the Court of Appeals.

That Court understood, and correctly applied, the Gravel
test when it stated that “[alctivities ‘casually or incidently
related to legislative affairs,’ id. at 558 [United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)], but not ‘part and parcel of
the legislative process,’ Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at

10

626, are outside the realm of Speech or Debate protec-
tion’”(733 F.2d 929; Pet. App. A at 10a.)

In applying the Gravel test to the alleged violative con-
duct of the petitioner, the Court ef Appeals drew the logical
and common sense conclusions that (1) restaurant manage-
ment does not involve any “functions relating to the process
of lawmaking . . . “or” “‘other matters’ of state ‘which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972);” and (2)
“Selecting, supervising, and discharging a food facilities
manager ... is not reasonably described as work that
significantly informs or influences the shaping of our nation’s
laws.” (733 F.2d 926, 931; Pet. App. A. at 4a and 1da.)
Accordingly, neither the decision nor the rationale of the
Court of Appeals in any way conflicts with the decisions of
this Court.

C. The Court of Appeals Did Not Decide Any Important
Question Regarding Official Immunity Which Should
Be Decided By This Court.

Petitioners assert that “this Court has not resolved the
degree of official immunity—absolute’ or qualified—con-
cerning the dismissal of a Congressional aide.” (Petition at
13.) This question was not considered by the Court of Ap-
peals because that Court found as “far-fetched” the notion
that Anne W. Walker was a Congressional aide, ranking
aide, or alter ego of the Subcommittee. (733 F.2d 931; Pet.
App. A at 13a—l4a.) Accordingly, further consideration of
this question is not warranted.

‘This Court has held that the doctrine of “absolute immunity” is
coextensive with the Speech or Debate Clause as it applies to Mem-
bers of Congress and their aides. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
810-811; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 228.

11

Petitioners contend that he Court of Appeals erred in
focusing its analysis of the qualified immunity criteria set
forth in ‘Har’ow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), on
‘heir aller<d violative acts, rather than on Speech or Debate
Clause bar to remedies for these acts; and, that so long as
there is uncertainty as to whether the courts have jurisdic-
tion governing Congressional personnel decisions, mem-
bers of Congress and their aides must act at their peril
(Petition at 14-15).

This Court has already held that “judicial review of con-
gressional employment decisions is constitutionally limited
only by the reach of the Speech or Debate Clause... ”
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 235 n.11. It is clear from its
opinion (733 F.2d 932, 933; Pet. App. A at 17a-18a) that the
Court of Appeals properly applied the qualified immunity
criteria of Harlow v. Fitzgerald.

As Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissent in United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507: “The immunities of the
Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Consti-
tution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members
of Congress, but to protect the beac of the legislative
process.”

The integrity of the legislative process was not impinged
by Anne W. Walker's operation and management of the
House Restaurant System, or by her hiring, supervision, or
firing.

The recurrent theme of petitioners’ case is that, in dis-
charging Anne W. Walker as General Manager of the House
Restaurant System, they can violate her Constitutional
rights with impunity because they are protected by the
Speech or Debate Clause. But, “[nJo man [person] in
this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.”

12

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 200 (1882), quoted
with approval in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 246. Yet,
the petitioners would have the Supreme Court condone
their allegedly flagrant, unlawful firing of Anne W.
Walker. “All officers of the government, from the high-
est to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound
to obey it.” Jd., 442 U.S. at 246. But the petitioners
would have the Supreme Court place them above Anne
W. Walker’s Constitutional rights.

There is no moral, ethical, legal, or other good and
sufficient reason why the petitioners should not be held
responsible for violating Anne W. Walkers’ clearly es-
tablished Constitutional rights of which they knew or
should have known.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. GILECE, JR.

4801 St. Elmo Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Tel. No. (301) 986-1777

WILLIAM HARRY GARBER
Courthouse Plaza II

10345 Democracy Lane, Suite A
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Tel. No. (703) 352-3436
Counsel for Respondent

Anne W. Walker
November 1, 1984

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_2343%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
