# Opposition Brief — Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 1062

## Text

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED
OCT 26 1984
Case No. 84-503
*XANDER L. STEVAS
IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

BETTY ADAMS, et al,
Petitioner,
VS.

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENT
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION

Rosert C. MAYNARD

Counsel of Record

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
1800 Huntington Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
(216) 687-8500

MARLENE F. GIBBONS

SQUIRL, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Counsel for Respondent

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

BEST AVAILABLE COPY Siam

COUNTER-L ¢ATEMENT OF THE
QUESTION PRESENTED

Shovid this Court review a grant of summary judg-
mer. py a federal court in a diversity action dismissing a
state law claim against a chemical manufacturer for an
alleged failure to warn, when both the federal district
court and the federal circuit court of appeals, applying
the correct standard for summary judgment under Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, determined
that there was no genuine issue of material fact with
regard to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s
conduct and concluded that the manufacturer was not
negligent as a matter of law.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION Paibin 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS ... ... 54.42.55. il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................... ill
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THECASE ............. 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .............. 3

A. The Legal Standard Applicable to Union Car-
bide’s Duty To Warn A Third Party of Potential
Dangers of Its Products Is Determined By State
Law and Involves No Federal Question. ....... 3

B. The Decisions Below Are In Accordance With
the Law of This Court and Other Circuits With
Regard to the Standard For Summary Judg-
ment Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure .......15,.15.. 9 6

CONCLUSION ... 6.00 «hae . dil

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144(1970) ... 0 7
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234
EPG, BOND diay ek ee as ee ees 7
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King
Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962) ........... 7
Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337
IRE eS area a Mr at ay aay 7,8
Coleman v. Western Electric Co. Inc., 671 F.2d
a rosy gis a bya bao be 4
Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th
at Fa a ces Fe ace es 7
Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540. F.2d
I, BOWED, ons 5 wc os Seek as tke wa 8

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 4
Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d

i) ae Gack vk ek DR 8 6
Millhouse v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 9 Ohio

App. 3d 2038, 459 N.E.2d 623 (1983) ..........5, 11
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Ine.

RT) 8

Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591
P.2d 478, appeal dismissed, 93 Wash.2d 5, 604

a Ie a a 6
Sams v. Englewood Ready-Mix Corp., 22 Ohio

App.2d 168, 259 N.E.2d 507 (1969)........... 4
United States v. Diebold, Inc. 369 U.S. 654 (1962)....00 7
West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

aera rarer 4

Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37 Ohio
St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974) ............ ll

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
Younger v. Dow Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451
ee sg ws 6a awk ae ee ee es 6
RULES:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 . .3, 6, 8, 10, 11
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 ........... ll

OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Restatement (Second) of Torts, $388( 1965) ...... 4,5,8

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Qnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

BETTY ADAMS, et al.,
Petitioner,
VS.

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENT
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, Union Carbide Corporation (“Union
Carbide”)' is the manufacturer of a liquid chemical
known as toluene diisocyanate (“TDI”), which is used in
the manufacture of urethane foams. Union Carbide sells
TDI to the Genera! Motors Corporation (“GMC”) for use
at its Elyria, Ohio, Fisher Body Plant. GMC uses TDI in
making automobile polyurethane seat cushions. Petitioner,
Betty Adams, was employed at GMC’s Elyria plant

‘In accordance with Rule 28.1 of the Supreme Court Rules,
Respondent states that the United States subsidiaries, excluding
wholly owned subsidiaries, and affiliates of Union Carbide are:
ACM Services, Inc., Arizona Welding Equipment Co., Miami
Welding Supply, Inc., United States Welding, Inc., V. B. Ander-
son Co. and VBA Cryogenics Corp. (Foreign subsidiaries (except
wholly-owned) and affiliates ar listed at the end of this Brief.)

2

during the period 1967 through 1978, when she retired
due to disability. Petitioner claims that she was perma-
nently disabled from work due to TDI hypersensitivity
asthma caused by overexposure to TDI vapors at GMC’s
Elyria plant. TDI vapor is a respiratory irritant.

In 1980, Petitioner brought an action against Union
Carbide in the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio based upon a state law claim of negligence.”
Jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship.
Petitioner alleged that Union Carbide had a duty to warn
her directly o: the potential dangers of overexposure to
TDI, even though Union Carbide had warned GMC re-
garding the potential dangers of TDI and had provided
comprehensive information to GMC regarding the safety
of GMC personnel in the storage, handling and use of TDI.

Union Carbide’s defense to Petitioner’s claim was: (1)
Union Carbide’s duty to warn of the potential hazards of
TDI under state law extended only to GMC and not to
the employees of GMC, and (2) the information provided
by Union Carbide to GMC was adequate to warn GMC
concerning the potential dangers of TDI.

Summary judgment was granted to Union Carbide on
the basis of its defenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment. Both courts
below held that as a matter of Ohio law, Union Carbide
had satisfied its duty to warn of the potential dangers
of TDI by informing GMC of the potential dangers of
TDI and the methods tor its safe handling and use.
GMC had exclusive control over both TDI and the GMC

2 The action was brought by Betty Adams and her spouse,
Joseph Adams. The claim by Joseph Adams was based on a loss
of consortium caused by the alleged negligence of Union Carbide.

employees who came into contact with TDI. The courts
below further held that the information supplied to
GMC by Union Carbide about TDI was sufficient as a
matter of law to warn GMC of the potential dangers of
TDI.

We submit that this is not a case for this Court to
grant certiorari. The only issue raised by the Petitioner
is the appropriateness of summary judgment under the
circumstances of this case based upon the negligence law
of the State of Ohio. The applicable law relating to the
duty of Union Carbide to warn of the potential dangers
of TDI is entirely a matter of state law. Although the
legal standard for summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves federal law
the appropriate legal standard for summary judgment is
not at issue. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit
recognized and applied the legal standard for summary
judgment as enunciated by this Court. Accordingly,
there is no conflict between the decisions of the courts
delow and this Court. Petitioner claims only that sum-
mary judgment was not appropriate under the facts of
this case. Two federal courts already have held that
summary judgment was appropriate after a thorough
review of the record.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

A. The Legal Standard Applicable To Union Carbide’s
Duty To Warn A Third Party of Potential Dan-
gers of Its Product Is Determined By State Law
and Involves No Federal Question.

The jurisdiction of the federal courts below was
founded solely on diversity of citizenship. (Petition at
1-2) In a diversity action, it has long been established by

this Court that a federal court is to apply state law to a
negligence claim such as here, involving the duty of a
manufacturer to warn third parties of the potential
dangers of its product.’

Although the highest court in Ohio has not addressed
the specific issue involved in this case, a decision by a
state intermediate appellate court, which the district
court relied on, indicates that Ohio courts would have
applied the standard set forth in Section 388 of che
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) to determine Un-
ion Carbide’s liability.1 See Sams v. Engiewood Ready-
Mix Corp., 22 Ohio App.2d 168, 259 N.E.2d 507 (1969).
Petitioner does not dispute that § 388 of the Restatement
is applicable.’ Under that standard, specifically comment

‘See Eric Railroad Co. vv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);
see also Coleman vo Western Eleetrie Co. Ine.. 671 F.2d 980
(6th Cir. 1982)

‘If the highest court in the State has not ruled on the issue,
the federal court is bound to apply the law announced by a state
intermediate appellate court unless it is convinced that the
highest state court would decide differently. See West v. Amer?-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S, 223 (1940).

> The text of § 388 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, states:

§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use

One who —— directly or through a third person a
chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those
whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the
consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use,
for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is
supplied, if the supplier

a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is
id to be dangerous for the use fer which it is supplied,
an

(Footnote Continued on next page)

n to §388, a manufacturer is not required to warn
directly an ultimate end user of the dangers of its
product when the manufacturer has provided its vendee
all the information necessary to the safe use of its
product, provided that this method of disclosure gives a
reasonable assurance that the information will reach
those whose safety depends upon their having it.

The district court held that when Union Carbide
warned GMC, an industrial user, of the potential dangers
of TDI it was reasonable for Union Carbide under § 388
to rely on GMC to inform GMC’s employees of the poten-
tial dangers and to implement the appropriate safety
measures. An Ohio appellate case decided subsequent to
the district court’s opinion, which the Sixth Circuit duly
noted in its opinion, reaffirms the correctness of the
district court’s holding. The Ohio case, Millhouse v.
General Tire and Rubber Co., 9 Ohio App.3d 203, 459 N.E
2d 623 (1983), involved the same product, TDI, which is
involved here. The defendants in Millhouse were General
Tire and Rubber Co. and an independent contractor,
Mobile Wash, whom General Tire had hired to clean a
tank car which had contained TDI. The plaintiff was the
administratrix of the estate of a former employee of
Mobile Wash who had died from overexposure to TDI
while he was cleaning the tank car. The Chio trial court
granted summary judgment to General Tire, which was
affirmed on appeal, because General Tire had satisfied

(Footnote 5 Continued)

b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and

c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.

its duty to warn of the potential danger of TDI when
it warned Mobile Wash.*

Even if the propriety of the negligence law of Ohio as
it relates to the du.y of a manufacturer to warn third
parties regarding the potential danger of its product was
at issue, it is not an appropriate subject for this Court’s
review on certiorari. It involves no issue of federal law.

B. The Decisions Below are In Accordance With
The Law of This Court and Other Circuits With
Regard to the Standard For Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

There is no inconsistency in the standard for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which was applied by the district court and the Sixth
Circuit and the standard enunciated by this Court. The
Sixth Circuit stated in its opinion:

The standard to be applied in determining motions
for summary judgment was enunciated by this
Circuit over 20 years ago and is still in accord with
the overwhelming weight of authority:

“In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must construe the evidence in its most favora-
ble light in favor of the party opposing the motion ana
against the movant. Further, the papers supporting
the movant are closely scrutinized whereas the
opponent’s are indulgently treated.”

‘ Other jurisdictions have held to the same effect. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478, appeal
dismissed, 93 Wash.2d 5, 604 P.2d 164 (1979); Younger v. Dow
Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451 P.2d 177 (1969); see also,
Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.
1957) (applying the law of Oklahoma).

The Sixth Circuit adopted the holdings of its earlier
decision in Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King
Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962) and this Court’s
decision in United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654
(1962). The district court recognized that Union Carbide
had the burden of showing the absence of any genuine
issue of fact and that all reasonable inferences which
might be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the
manner most favorable to the non-moving party, in
accord with this Court’s decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).

As in any negligence case, the reasonableness of
defendant Union Carbide’s conduct was an issue. Under
Ohio state law Union Carbide had no duty to warn Peti-
tioner directly of the potential dangers of TDI if (1) the
information provided to GMC by Union Carbide was suf-
ficient to warn GMC of the potential dangers of TDI and
(2) Union Carbide was reasonable in relying on GMC to
warn GMC employees regarding the potential dangers of
TDI. The district court recognized that generally a de-
termination whether a warning was adequate under the
particular facts of a case is a jury question. The district
court, however, also correctly recognized that when the
legal standard for summary judgment is met, summary
judgment must be granted even in a negligence case.
This view is consistent with the decisions of this Court
and the law of the other Circuits.’ Petitioner has cited

7 Contrary to Fetitioner’s suggestion, the Sixth Circuit’s deci-
sion in this case is consistent with its earlier decision in Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234 F.24 342 (6th Cir. 1956) and
the view of the other Circuits in Bryant v. Technical Research
Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) and Croley v. Matson Naviga-
tion Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970). In fact, the Sixth Circuit in

(Footnote Continued on next page)

no case where summary judgment was prohibited per se,
regardless of the circumstances of the case, solely be-
cause the claim was predicated on a certain legal theory,
which is the position Petitioner is advocating before this
Court. Summary judgment under Rule 56 is a procedural
mechanism applicable to any and all actions, provided
the requisites of the rule have been met."

(Footnote 7 Continued)

this case cited as support for its decision, Aetna, Bryant and
Croley. These cases stand only for the proposition that summary
judgment is appropriate less frequently in negligence cases than
with regard to other types of claims. For example, in Bryant, the
Ninth Circuit determined that under the facts of that case
summary judgment was not appropriate because the non-moving
party had introduced sworn statements which created a dispute
whether the manufacturer had provided an adequate warning to
its vendee regarding the dangerous propensities of its product.
The Ninth Circuit expressly stated, however, that “we do not
foreclose the possibility that under some circumstances the
adequacy of warnings may be decided by summary judgment.
... Id. at 1346. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit
recognized that principle as a correct statement of the law.

*The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules state in
reference to Rule 56: “This rule is applicable to all actions, ....”
Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (8rd Cir.
1976), cited by Petitioner, does not stand for a contrary proposi-
tion in the context of determinations under § 388 of the
Restatement. The Third Circuit in Dougherty held only that a
directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer was not proper in
that case because it was apparent from review of all the evidence
that a jury cou'd reasonably find that the manufacturer’s warn-
ing to its vendee was not adequate.

Moreover, while this Court in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) held “that summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-

(Footnote Continued on next page)

After an exhaustive review of the record, both the
district court and the Sixth Circuit concluded that
Petitioner had introduced no evidence to support her
assertion under Ohio law of negligent breach of duty to
warn on the part of Union Carbide.

The undisputed facts show that GMC had exclusive
control over both the TDI chemical and the GMC employ-
ees who came into contact with it. GMC employees did
not manipulate open containers of TDI or transfer TDI
from one container to another. Union Carbide delivered
TDI to GMC in bulk shipments by tank trucks or rail
ear lots. Upon delivery, the TDI was pumped from the
common carrier into a GMC storage tank. From the
storage tank TDI was pumped by GMC into a closed
vessel system to mixers where TDI was automatically
combined by GMC with other chemicals to cause a chemi-
cal reaction known as “polymerization.” This process
completely altered the chemical properties of TDI by
reacting TD] with several other chemicals to form poly-
urethane foam. The chemical mixture was then injected
into molds the shape of cushions. The record below shows
that petitioner’s only alleged exposure to TDI vapors
was when the cushions were removed from the molds.

TDI vapor was known to be a respiratory irritant.”

(Footnote 8 Continued)

tion where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is
largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile
witnesses thicken the plot” it did not state that summary
judgment is never appropriate in antitrust cases.

“Standards for the maximum level of exposure to TDI vapor
(.02 parts per million (ppm) of ambient air) were established by
the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
These standards were applicable to GMC’s Fisher Body Division
throughout the entire period of Petitioner’s employment there.

10

Before shipping production quantities of TDI to GMC in
1969, Union Carbide supplied GMC comprehensive infor-
mation regarding the potential dangers of TDI and the
methods for its safe handling and use. The documentary
information was thorough, explicit and based upon the
information Union Carbide had at the time. Representa-
tives of Union Carbide, including the Associate Corporate
Medical Director, met with certain GMC personnel,
including the Medical Director and Industrial Hygenist
from GMC’s Fisher Body Division, to discuss how GMC
employees could be protected by GMC from the potential
dangers ot TDI. Union Carbide recommended in its
literature preplacement physician examinations for those
persons who could be exposed to TDI vapors at GMC and
periodic health examinations thereafter. The document-
ary information supplied to GMC identified the specific
respiratory problems allegedly suffered by Petitioner as
one of the potential dangers of repeated exposure to TDI
vapors by some individuals.

Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit concluded
that there was no evidence before the trial court to even
suggest that the warnings to GMC were not adequate or
that Union Carbide would have a reason not to rely on
GMC to inform GMC employees of the potential dangers
of overexposure to TDI. The Sixth Circuit correctly re-
jected the bootstrap-type analysis which Petitioner is
advancing before this Court that the alleged negligence
of GMC in failing to adequately warn Petitioner, GMC’s
employee, of the potential danger of TDI constituted
factual evidence of negligence by Union Carbide. As
stated by the Sixth Court, the alleged negligence of GMC
“cannot vicariously be imposed upon Union Carbide.”

The proper legal standard tor summary judgment
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 was applied by the district court

11

and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. There is no conflict
between the decisions of the courts below and those of
this Court or any other Circuit. The appropriateness of
summary judgment under the facts of this case is
underscored by the Ohio court decision in Millhouse v.
General Tire and Rubber Co., supra.”

CONCLUSION

The only question Petitioner raises in her Petition
turns on the particular facts of this case and, accordingly,
is of interest only to the parties to it. Petitioner asks this
Court to make a third review of the undisputed facts
of the rather lengthy record in this case to determine
whether there are any material facts in genuine dispute.
This task is without any legal significance outside the
limits of this case. Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. MAYNARD

Counsel of Record

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
1800 Huntington Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
(216) 687-8500

MARLENE F. GIBBONS

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Was. ington, D.C. 20004
Counsel for Respondent

” Rule 56 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure for summary
judgment is based upon Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37
Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924, 925 (1974).

(Continuation of footnote 1)

The following are Union Carbide's
foreign subsidiaries (except wholly-
owned subsidiaries) and affiliates: Union
Carbide Egypt S.A.E.; Union Carbide Ghana
Limited; Union Carbide Kenya Limited;
Union Carbide Nigeria Limited; Union
Carbide Sudan Limited; Union Carbide
Canada Limited; Chemos Industries Pty.
Limited (Australia); Union Carbide
Australia Limited; Union Carbide India
Limited; P.T. Agrocarb Indonesia; Nippon
Unicar Company Limited (Japan); Union
Showa K.K. (Japan); Sony Eveready, Inc.
(Japan); Union Gas Company Limited (Korea) ;
Union Carbide Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.; Union
Polymers Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia); Union
Carbide New Zealand Limited; Union Carbide
Ceylon Limited (Republic of Sri Lanka) ;
Indugas N.V. (Belgium); Calida Gas N.V.
(Belgium); La Littorale S.A. (France);
Argon, S.A. (Spain); Unifas Kemi A.B.
(Sweden); Electro Manganes Ltda (Brazil);
S.A. White Martins (Brazil); S.A. White
Martins Nordeste (Brazil); Union Carbide
Mexicana, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico) ;

Electrode Maatskappy Van Suid Afrika
(Eiendoms) Beperk (Republic of South
Africa); Tubatse Ferrochrome (Proprietary)
Limited (Republic of South Africa).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_2320%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
