# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Levin v. Registration & Disciplinary Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 933

## Text

1) Office - Supreme Court. US.

84-375 FILED

No. SEP 4 1994

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK

In Tue

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OctosErR TERM, 1984

JACK M. LEVIN,

Attorney-Petitioner.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIAM J. HARTE
Wuuum J. Harts, Lr.
111 West Washington Street
Suite 2025
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 726-5015

Attorney for Petitioner

Photex — 444 North Wabagh Avenue — Chicago 60611 — 321-0223

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the petitioner is denied
due process and equal protection of the
laws upon the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction which is:

a) inconsistent with the
sanctions imposed upon attorneys
Similarly situated and,

b) in complete disregard of the
findings of fact and recommendations
of the Hearing and Review Boards
without clear and convincing evidence
of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation in violation of
D.R. 1-102(a) (4) of the Illinois Code
of Professional Responsibility.

2. Whether the petitioner is denied
due process upon the rigid application of
a mathematically based sanction without
consideration for the compelling

mitigating circumstances presented by the

petitioner.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented For Review .....i
Table of Authorities . ...«+«-+«s«+e=vs iv
Course of Proceedings Below... ...1
JucisGiction « « 6+ s+ 6 6 *& 2:8 6 et we 8
Constitutional Provisions Involved... 4
State Rules Involved . . ...-+..«-.«- S§
Statement of the Case . .....-. « « 6

BO@CGRGEGUNRG »« «© © #© wee 2h eos oe oe sn 2 ©

The Suspension Order ......e. .- 13
APGUMORE «0 2 4-4. 68. * 6 oS ee eee

I. THE PETITIONER IS DENIED DUE
PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS AS A RESULT OF THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S
ARBITRARY IMPOSITION OF A
SANCTION INCONSISTENT WITH
DISCIPLINE IMPOSED ON ATTORNEYS
CHARGED WTH SIMILAR MISCONDUCT
AND IN DISREGARD OF THE HEARING
AND REVIEW BOARDS' FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS WITHOUT CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF
DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT OR
MISREPRESENTATION IN VIOLATION
OF D.R. 1°102(a) (4)... « « «© «© « - 36

iii

A. The Illinois Supreme Court's
Sanction Is An Arbitrary And
Discriminatory Deviation From
The Sanctions Imposed Upon
Those Attorneys Charged With
Similar Misconduct.. . .... 37

B. The Illinois Supreme Court
Ignored The Findings And
Recommendations Of The Hearing
and Review Boards Without
Clear and Convincing Evidence
of Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit
Or Misrepresentation In
Violation of D.R. 1-102(a) (4). 47

II. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S
MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF A
MATHEMATICALLY DETERMINED
SANCTION IGNORED THE COMPELLING
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE PETITIONER'S
MEGGwewcss we we eee eee ese 393

a ae ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S.

442 (1953) = * 2 o e . 7 om e . . o . 33
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
eee (advan «6 6+ 6.6 6 He eA ee

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co.
v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) ... 26,27

Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529 (1884) .. . 30
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883) .. 29

Great Northern v. Sunburst Oil &
Refinery Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) 25,26

In re Ahern, 23 I1l.2d 69, 177
N.E.2d 197 (1961) . 7 . 7 = . 7 19,40,45,
47,57

In re Chapman, 95 I11.2d 484, 448
N.E.2d 852 (1983) . . « «© « « « 197,45,46,
47

In re Clayter, 78 Ill.2d 276, 399
N.E.2d 1318 (1980) . .... .- «16,39,40
44,53

In re Cohen, 83 I11.2d 521, 416
N.E.2d 256 (1981) e . . © e . . * + e 48

In re Damisch, 38 I11.2d 195, 230
N.E.2d 254 (1967) . . * + + © . . 7 . 44

In re Donaghy, 402 I11.2d 120, 83
N.B.2d S60 (1949) . « «© © © © © © @ «© BL

Vv

In re Feldman, 89 Il11.2d 7, 431
Bee. see tape? «6 « « « © « « « « #&

In re Fisher, 15 I11.2d 139, 153
B.B.ae O32 (i998) « « 2 2 «6 0 ts BOe34e32

In re Hopper, 85 Il1.2d 318, 423
N.E.2d 900 (1981) . «. «© « « « « «© 49,54

In re Johnson, 93 I1ll.2d 441, 444
B.B.28 BSS (A982) «1 3 3 el 6 ee ABS Se
25,55,56

In re Kink, 92 I11.2d 293, 442
W.8.20 206 (i9G2) ss «© « «© « « £9948,63
44,49,50,57

In re Levinson, 71 I11.2d 486, 376
8.8.20 996 (i978) « «§ «6 © « 8 18,19,20
25,55,56

In re March, 71 I11.2d 382, 376
NW.B.2€ 213 (1978) . ~. « «© «© « © © 16,52

In re McLennon, 93 I11.2d 215, 443
N.E. 2a 553 (1982) J * + a _ — - es ” - 54

In re Neff, 83 I11.2d 20, 413 N.E.2d
1282 (1980) e ~ e e . * * ° e * * - o 30

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) .. .37

In re Saladino, 71 I11.2d 263, 375
N.E.2d 102 (1978) . 2. «© « «© «© © © 039453

In re Taylor, 66 I11.2d 567, 363
N.E.2d 845 (1977) .~. « « « © « « 49,40,42

vi

In re Wigoda, 77 I11.2d 155, 395
N.E.2d 571 (1979) .« 2. «© © © © © © © © 49

Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
353 U.S. 252 (1957) .~. . «© « « «28,34,37
51

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) ° . . o . . . a . . . 7. . . . 33

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1922) 7 - . . e - . 7 ” - * . ” . . 39

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) . 2. 2. 2 «© «© «© «© © 226

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) ° o 7. . . a ° . . . . . . . - 29

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232 (1957) . . . . io . . . . . . 32

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) . 37

Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278
(1957) . . . 7 o — . . . . - - + . . 28

United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d
826 (7th Cir. 1974) . .« « « « «© « « « 54

Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576
(1959) - - . - - - - . - . 7 a os o 7 54

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433 (1971) - o - a . 7 — ” . - . a . 29

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1984

No.

IN RE
JACK M. LEVIN,

= Attorney~Petitioner.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

Attorney-petitioner, JACK M. LEVIN
("petitioner"), respectfully requests that
a writ of certiorari issue to :2view the
judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court
of {fllinois entered April 4, 1984, by
which that Court suspended petitioner from
the practice of law in the State of
Illinois for three years and until further

order of the Court.

ele

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This cause arises from a six-count
complaint filed on August 5, 1981, by the
Administrator of the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission against
petitioner.

Fach of the six counts of the
complaint charged petitioner with neglect
of legal matters entrusted to him in
violation of D.R. 6-10l1(a) (3) of the
Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as with conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation in violation of D.R.
1-102(a) (4). A hearing was conducted on
January 14 and 15, 1982, at which time the
Hearing Board, finding that the six counts
of neglect, but not the misrepresentation,
were proven, unanimously recommended that

the petitioner be suspended from the

=2-
practice of law for a period of two

years. (Appendix C, Report and
Recommendation of Hearing Panel.)

Counsel for the Administrator fied
exceptions with the Review Board, alleging
that the Hearing Board had erred in
finding that petitioner was not guilty of
conduct involving misrepresentation in
violation of D.R. 1-102(a) (4) of the
Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility, and that disbarment was
warranted. Petitioner filed exceptions to
the Report of the Hearing Board with
respect to the quantum of discipline
recommended.

On March 17, 1983, the Review Board
summarily affirmed the Hearing Board's
recommendation of a two-year suspension.
(Appendix D). The matter came before the

Illinois Supreme Court on exceptions filed

-3-

by the Administrator to the finding that
the misrepresentations alleged in Counts
I, III and V were not proved and to the
amount of discipline recommended upon
exceptions filed by petitioner to the
sanctions ordered by both Boards.

The Illinois Supreme Court, while
accepting the Hearing and Review Boards'
finding that the petitioner was not guilty
of misrepresentation, fraud or deceit,
nevertheless increased the recommended
sanction from a two-year suspension to a
suspension for three years and until
further order of the Court, on the grounds
that petitioner's conduct "went beyond
mere neglect." (Appendix A, 101 I11.2d

535, 463 N.E.2d 715 (1984.)*

*The Illinois Supreme Court's order
will be referred to herein as the
"Suspension Order."

-4-

JURISDICTION

The Suspension Order of the Illinois
Supreme Court was entered on April 4,
1984. A timely Petition for Rehearing
was denied on June 4, 1984. This
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed
within ninety days after the denial of
rehearing. Jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

AMENDMENT XIV TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES:

Section l.

--- No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the
Privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due
process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

-5-

STATE RULES INVOLVED

ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY:

A lawyer shall not... neglect a
matter entrusted to him. D.R.
6-101 (a) (3)

A lawyer shall not... engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation. D.R.
1-102 (a) (4)

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 771 FOR THE

ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE OF
ATTORNEYS, PART B:

Conduct of attorneys which
violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility contained in article
VIII of these rules which tends to
defeat the administration of justice
Or to bring the courts or the legal
profession into disrepute shall be
grounds for discipline by the
court. Discipline of attorneys may
be by:

(a) disbarment;

(b) disbarment on consent;

(c) suspension for a specified
period and until further order of

court;
(d) suspension for a specified

-6-

period of time ;
(e) censure.

STATEMENT OI THE CASE

Background

Petitioner graduated from John
Marshall School of Law in 1959. (Tr.,
169) From the time he obtained his
license in May of 1960 until he became a
sole practitioner in 1973, petitioner
practiced law in a number of reputable
Chicago firms. During the period covered
by the complaint, the petitioner was
engaged in high-volume plaintiff's
personal injury practice. (Tr., 171) As
a sole practitioner, he was known to be
an intense and highly motivated
individual, to the point of being a
vorkaholic. (Tr., 87) Handling hundreds

of files annually, petitioner felt

-7-
compelled to work extremel: long hours,
often seven days a week. (Tr., 172-173)
In fact, it was quite common for
petitioner to try 25 to 30 cases per year
to a verdict before a jury. (Tr., 171)
Many of the cases that he handled were
not only for relatively small amounts of
money, but were also very difficult cases
of contested, even questionable
liability. (Tr., 84, 889) As one
witness put it:
"Jack takes the hardest kinds

of cases with the most difficult

liability problems in the personal

injury field and tries to make

something out of them....

His reputation is of trying to
turn the garbage into gold.

Where most lawyers would just
give up on them, he takes them and
tries to do the best he can." (Tr.,
at 85)

There is no doubt then that petitioner's

-8-

practice involved the representation of
persons who probably would not have had
anybody to try their cases if petitioner
had not.

Eventually, petitioner's excessive
work habits began to have an adverse
impact on both his children and his
wife. (Tr., 174) Unhappy with her
husband's workaholic tendencies and his
inability to devote more time to personal
matters, petitioner's wife filed for
divorce in 1973 or 1974. (Tr., 173,

175) It was around this same time that
petitioner's oldest daughter began to
experience serious emotional problems,
ultimately suffering a nervous breakdown
on two different occasions. (Tr., 175,
199) The situation progressively
deteriorated, culminating in petitioner's

wife and daughters having to undergo

-9G-

psychiatric treatment. (Tr., 174, 206)
Unfortunately, the difficulties
encountered by petitioner in his personal
life, coupled with the enormous demands
of a high volume practice ultimately led
him to neglect a number of legal matters.

Realizing that he had over-extendea
himself, and admittedly impelled to a
great extent by the threatened
disintegration of his family, as well as
by the incidents which precipitated a
prior suspension from the practice of
law, petitioner began to change his
Practice drastically sometime between
1973 and 1976. (Tr., 175-177, 192, 204,
206) Whereas, originally, his law
practice was comprised of cases taken
directly by the petitioner from the
client at the outset of the claim, cases

reterred to him at some point during

-l10-
pendency by other attorneys, and cases
referred to him specifically for trial,
respondent now began to make good faith
attempts to accept only cases, on
referral from other lawyers, that were
getting close on the trial call. (Tr.,
175-176) Today, ninety percent of
petitioner's practice is made up of files
that are within three or four months of
trial. (Tr., 176)

Petitioner has also taken
considerable measures to review his
practice so that nothing like that which
has been alleged in the complaint can
happen again. (Tr., 177) First, he has
taken steps to have a much better
indexing of the cases. (Tr., 177)
Second, he has advised all of his
referring attorneys to handle all

depositions except those of substantial

-ll-
cases. (Tr., 177) Third, petitioner has
drastically reduced the number of cases
requiring clients to come to him
initially. (Tr., 177) He opens no more
than fifteen new files a year now,
preferring instead to leave the client
contact to his referring sctexeure.

(Tr., 177) Furthermore, in addition to
making a special effort to return all
phone calls, petitioner has reduced the
number of hours he customarily worked on
a weekly basis, making a special point to
avoid the office on Saturdays altogether.
William Maddux, a trial attorney from
the Chicago legal community, who has
practiced law for 23 years and has known
petitioner continuously on a professional
basis for that same period of time,
testified as to petitioner's honesty,

integrity, good moral character, and

-12-
fitness to practice law. (Tr., 160) Mr.
Maddux stated:

"In my opinion and from my
personal observations, Jack Levin is
an able, competent trial lawyer.,

Not only able and competent, but a
person you can believe.

I never found him to make a
Statement that was deemed or found
to be untrue. I can assure you his
work is good.” (Tr., at 161)
Furthermore, according to Mr. Maddux,

who related he has had ample opportunity
to observe petitioner's professional work
over the years, petitioner served his
clients well and loyally and to the best
of his ability. (Tr., 161) This is
significant in light of the fact that
petitioner had a reputation in the
Chicago legal community for handling very
difficult cases. (Tr., 84) Yet, as Mr.

Maddux noted, "I never saw anything other

than able handling." (Tr., 161-162)

-13-

Notwithstanding the incidents of
neglect in the instant case, Mr. Maddux
testified he is still of the opinion that
petitioner is competent to practice law.

(Tr., 166)

The Suspension Order

The Illinois Supreme Court, after
reviewing the findings of fact and the
recommendations of the Hearing and Review
Boards considered two issues: 1) whether
the Hearing and Review Boards erred in
not finding dishonesty or
misrepresentation in petitioner's
conduct, and 2) whether the two year
suspension recommended by both the
Hearing and Review Boards was appropriate.

In its opinion, the Court acknowledged
the findings of the Hearing and Review

Boards inasmuch as they found no evidence

-14-
of misrepresentation, fraud or deceit in
violation of D.R. 1-102(a) (4). However,
despite the concession that there was no
violation of D.R. 1-102(a) (4) and the
recognition that “we gave considerable
deference to findings of fact by the
Hearing Board," the Court chose to ignore
the Boards‘ recommendations of a two-year
suspension on the grounds that: (1) the
petitioner's “blatant misstatements” went
“beyond mere neglect" and (2) the
petitioner had engaged in six instances
of misconduct subsequent to a previous
sanction. Specifically, the court stated
that while the findings of the Hearing
Board “are entitled to the same weight as
any other fact finder" and are accorded
“considerable deference" by the Supreme

Court, the Court was “not required to

-15-

accept them when the Board's conclusion
is not established by clear and
convincing evidence." 101 I11.2d at 539,
540.

Significantly, the Supreme Court
rejected as against “clear and convincing
evidence" only those findings of the
Board relating to the petitioner's
quantum of neglect. However, in imposina
the increased sanction of a three-year
suspension and “until further order™ on
the finding that petitioner's conduct
involved “blatant misstatements," the
Court sought to impose a sanction
tantamount to disbarment and appropriate
only in those circumstances where
dishonesty, actual misrepresentation,
fraud or deceit in violation of D.R.
1-102(a) (4) has been demonstrated by

Clear and convincing evidence. In re

-16-
March, 71 I11.2d 382, 376 N.E.2d 213
(1978). Thus, the Illinois Supreme
Court, on the same set of facts and with
no additional finding of a D.R. 102(a) (4)
violation as requested by the
Administrator, deemed it proper to not
only augment the period of suspension,
but to considerably aggravate the
harshness of the sanct.ion by prohibiting
reinstatement "until further order of the
Court." 101 I11.2d at 542.

In this context, it is important to
note that the court expressly recognized
that in order to safeguard the public and
Maintain the integrity of the legal
profession, "it is important that there
be uniformity in the sanctions afforded
to different attorneys.” 101 I11.2d at

541, citing In re Clayter, 78 I11.2d 276,

399 N.E.2d 1318 (1980). Nevertheless, in

-17-

distinguishing or ignoring those
disciplinary cases in which it had
ordered significantly lighter sanctions
on facts substantially congruent with
those material to the instant case, the
Illinois Supreme Court inexplicably chose
to disregard this standard. Distinguish-

ing In re Chapman, 95 I111.2d 484, 448

N.E.2d 852 (1983), solely on the basis of
that respondent's alcoholism, the Court
unfairly trivialized the compelling
circumstances surrounding the
petitioner's misconduct in this case and
ignored the fact that the respondent in

Chapman had a history of previous

disciplinary sanctions and made repeated
"prejudicial misstatements" to his client.

The Court maintained that its
decision in the instant case was

consistent with the discipline imposed in

-18-

In re Johnson, 93 I11.2d 441, 444 N.E.2d

153 (1982) and In re Levinson, 71 I11.2d

486, 376 N.E.2d 998 (1978), on the
grounds that "the neglect found here
includes a greater number of instances
and for that reason alone, even without
regard to the respondent's previous
misconduct, calls for a longer
suspension." 101 I11.2d at 543.
However, as petitioner in his Petition
for Rehearing pointed out, while the

sanctions in Johnson and Levinson

apparently present mathematical
consistency in terms of the period of
supervision, i.e., six months suspension
for each instance of neglect, in neither
case did the court impose upon the
respondent the added burden of his
proving he is qualified to return to

practice at the end of the suspension

-19-
period.

Clearly, in misconstruing Johnson and

Levinson and failing to address or

consider those cases cited in
petitioner's brief in which repeated acts
of neglect were accompanied by "blatant
misstatements" and/or actual

misrepresentation, In re Kink, 92 I11.2d

293, 442 N.E.2d 206 (1982); In re Taylor,

66 I1l1.2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977); I

re Ahern, 23 I1l.2d 69, 177 N.E.2d 197

(1961), the Court sought to evade the
plain impact of those decisions which
impose substantially lighter sancticns
then those dictated in the instant case.
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision to rigidly apply a
mathematically determined sanction based

upon its interpretation of In re Johnson,

supra, 444 N.E.2d at 153, and In re

-20-

Levinson, supra, 376 N.E.2d at 998,

ignores the unique mitigating factors
present in the instant case. As the

Hearing Board noted:

"No doubt exists in the minds of the
Panel that during the heart of the
period involved the Respondent was
embroiled in serious, substantial
marital and family problems...

fand}) It is undoubted that the
personal problems of the Respondent
may be part of the reason for his
inaction on the cases" (Appendix C)

Similarly, the Hearing Board stated:

“The Panel implies no criticism of
the Respondent for accepting cases
of such adverse liability or
apparently limited recovery. In
fact, respondent is to be commended
for accepting such difficult cases
for clients who would not ordinarily
have had a day in court." (Appendix
C)

Evidence of petitioner's honesty and
good reputation in the community, his

lack of corrupt or dishonest motives and

his willingness to cooperate with the

-2]-
Commission was not addressed or
considered by the Illinois Supreme Court
in its opinion. While noting that the
petitioner had taken on "a high volume,
personal injury trial practice" involving
many difficult cases “of dubious
liability and small sums of money," the
Illinois Supreme Court failed to take
into account the Hearing Board's finding
that the petitioner's deviation from
required professional standards was
mitigated in part by the high pressure
nature of his practice and the serious
professional problems resulting
therefrom. 101 I11.2d at 537. The Court
further chose to discount the evidence
that petitioner's continuous good faith
efforts to substantially change the
nature of his practice presented a

mitigating factor dictating a lighter

-22-
sanction, regardless of the point in time
when the major change occurred. The
Court's justification for the increased
sanction clearly ignored the compelling
circumstances surrounding the
petitioner's misconduct and rested solely
on evidence of the petitioner's earlier
discipline, the number of instances of
neglect and the “irreparable prejudice to
petitioner's clients - factors previously
weighed and taken into consideration by
the Hearing and Review Boards in their
recommendation to the Illinois Supreme
Court of a two-year suspension.

The unwarranted and harsh sanction
imposed by the Court without
consideration for sanctions imposed in
cases substantially similar to the case

at bar or the mitigating factors

-23-

present in the instant case, thereby
resulted in an abrogation of petitioner's
rights under the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

PETITIONER TIMELY RAISED HIS CLAIM THAT

THE COURT'S HARSH AND UNPREDICTABLE
SANCTION VIOLATED EQUAL PROTECTION.

Petitioner first raised his
constitutional objection to the sanctions
imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court in
his Petition for Rehearing in which he
asserted that the sanction was the
effective equivalent to disbarment and
was constitutionally inconsistent with
sanctions imposed on other attorneys in
Similar cases. The Petitioner concluded
that:

These inconsistencies... raise grave

constitutional issues of deprivation

of due process and equal protection

under the law. (Petition for
Rehearing, pg. 3)

=-24-

Petitioner's objection to the Court's
Sanction in his Petition for Rehearing
was timely in that the court's increased
sanction was both unexpected and
unpredictable in light of the pattern of
precedent set by that Court and the
recommendations of imposed by the Hearing
and Review Boards. Both the Hearing
Board and the Review Board recommended a
two-year suspension on the grounds that
petitioner's conduct did not rise to the
level of dishonesty, misrepresentation,
fraud or deceit necessary for violation
of D.R. 1-102(a) (4). Even upon a finding
by the Illinois Supreme Court that
petitioner's conduct went “beyond mere
neglect," the sanctions previously
imposed in cases involving either neglect

Or misrepresentation have not imposed the

-25-
added burden on the respondent to prove
after a period of suspension that he is

qualified to resume his practice. In re

Johnson, 93 I111.2d 441, 444 N.E.2d 153

(1982); In re Levinson, 71 I1l1.2d 486,

376 N.E.2d 998 (1978).

Petitioner concedes that the general
rule is that a “constitutional question
is urged too late, if put forward for the
first time upon petition for rehearing."

Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst

Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 366

(1932). It is clear, however, that the
instant case falls into the class of
decisions in which this Court will review
a state supreme court's unpredictable
foreclosure of a party's constitutional
right. Specifically, Justice Cardozo in

Great Northern spoke of the exception

into which the petitioner falls:

-26-

The rule, general as it is, does not

extend to cases where the ’
constitutional question, however |
tardily raised, is considered or \
decided (citations omitted), nor

does it apply where the grounds of

the decision supply a new and

unexpected basis for a Claim b the

defeated party of the denial o

Federal right. 287 U.S. at 367.

(emphasis added)

Thus, where "the objections of the
petitioner could not [have been] made in
advance of the event," the United States
Supreme Court will assert jurisdiction
over the matter in order to prevent an
unjustifiable foreclosure of a
constitutional claim arising only upon
the rendition of a decision by a state

supreme court. Great Northern, supra,

287 U.S. at 367; Pruneyard Shopping

Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 n. 9

(1980); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings |

Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930). |

-27-

In the instant case, petitioner was
confronted with an unexpected and
unwarranted sanction which departed not
only from the recommendations of the
Hearing and Review Boards, but from the
precedent set by previous Illinois
Supreme Court decisions. Petitioner
cannot reasonably be bound to anticipate
the unconstitutional departure from
precedent in order to invoke federal
protection in advance. The federal issue
in this case arose from the unanticipated
ruling of the state court, and
petitioner's presentation of this issue
in his Petition for Rehearing “was timely
since it was raised at the first

opportunity." Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &

Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678

(1930).

-28-

ARGUMENT

Introduction

This Court has held that it will
review a state court order denying an
attorney's right to practice law where
the attorney makes a substantial
allegation that the order violates the
due process or equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Schware v.

Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232

(1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of

California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Theard

v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).

Implicit in this holding is this Court's
recognition that “without doubt, [the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment} denotes... the right of an
individual... to engage in any of the

common occupations of life..." Board of

-29-

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572

(1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

U.S. 390, 399 (1922).

More specifically, upon earning the
privilege to practice law "an attorney's
calling or profession is his property
within the literal sense and meaning of

the Constitution." Ex parte Wall, 107

U.S. 265, 289 (1883). In repeatedly
acknowledging that after an attorney has
earned his license he has gained--in
terms of “liberty"--the right to practice
law, this Court has held that the state's
exercise of its disciplinary powers may
threaten an attorney with a "significant
deprivation of liberty" as well as
subject him to a risk of “grave stigma.”

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);

Wisconsin v. Contantineau, 400 U.S. 433

(1971). As Chief Justice Marshall in

-30-

Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529 (1884), stated:

»«ethe profession of an attorney is
of great importance to an
individual, and the prosperity of
his whole life may depend on its
exercise. The right to exercise it
ought not to be lightly or
Capriciously taken from him. 22 U.S.
at 529.

In accord with this Court's

holdings, the Illinois Supreme Court has
held that although the dual purpose of
the disciplinary system is to safeguard
the public and maintain the integrity of

the legal profession, In re Neff, 83

I11.2d 20, 413 N.E.2d 1282 (1980), the
duty of the courts to protect the public
from the impositions and improper
practices of attorneys must not be
exercised in a despotic manner and

without legal discretion. In re Fisher,

15 I111.2d 139, 153 N.E.2d 832 (1958).

-3l-

In Fisher, the Illinois Supreme Court

citing In re Donaghy, 402 I11l. 120, 123,

83 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1949), noted:

The legal calling is a time-honored
profession and the Courts owe a duty
to protect the public from
impositions and improper practices.
This duty has repeatedly been
declared by this court. (citations
omitted) Such duty, and the manner
in which it is exercised, must not
be despotic, but the charges must be
sustained by clear and convincing
proof and the misconduct must be
shown to have been fraudulent and
the result of improper motives, and
the proof must show intent.
(citation omitted) The courts must
not exercise their supervisory
control in an arbitrary manner, but
must show a legal discretion in the
exercise thereof. 153 N.E.2d at 840.

Similarly, the court in Fisher expressed
its sentiment on the subject of a lengthy

suspension stating:

The disbarment of an attorney is the
destruction of his professional
life, his character, and his
livelihood. (citations omitted)

The court should, therefore, disbar

=-32-

in moderation. Likewise, the same
considerations obtain in the
application of a three-year
suspension rule. A removal of an
attorney from practice for a period
of years entails the complete loss
of a clientele with its consequent
uphill road of patient waiting to
again re-establish himself in the
eyes of the public, in the good
graces of the courts and his feliow
lawyers. In the meantime his income
and livelihood have ceased to

exist. 153 N.E.2d at 840-841.

In light of these considerations, a
State may not exclude a person from the
practice of law or any other occupation

in a manner or for reasons that

contravene the due process or equal

protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Due process and equal
protection require that the state action
have a “rational connection' with the
attorney's fitness or capacity to

practice law. Schware, supra, 353 U.S.

at 238. Specifically, under the equal

-33-
protection clause a classification must
be reasonable and not arbitrary or
Capricious, and rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of legislation
such that all persons similarly

circumstanced are treated alike. McGowan

ve. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

Similarly, due process requires that the
exercise of power resulting in the
deprivation or partial destruction of an
individual's professional life rest on a
"reasonable basis" and bear some
"rational relation” to that individual's
fitness to pursue his profession. Barsky

v. Board of Regents of New York, 347 U.S.

442 (1953). In either context, where the
evidence does not "rationally support"
the grounds for denying the right to

practice law, the state's action

-34-
may be classified as an arbitrary and
discriminatory “denial of due process and
equal protection of the laws."

Konigsberg, supra, 353 U.S. at 262.

In the instant case, the petitioner
contends he has been denied due process
and equal protection of the law based

upon the following:

1) the imposition of a
sanction equivalent to disbarment
which is:

a) inconsistent with the
sanctions imposed on attorneys
Similarly situated, and

b) in complete disregard
of the findings of fact and
recommendations of the Hearing
and Review Boards without clear
and convincing evidence of
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation in violation
of D.R. 1-102(a) (4), and

2) upon the rigid application
of a mathematically based sanction
without consideration for the
compelling mitigating circumstances
presented by the petitioner.

-35-

The basis of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision as articulated by that
court, rested on its desire to
“safeguard the public and maintain the
integrity of the legal profession.” 101
I11.2d at 539. However, this objective
is not secured by the arbitrary and
discriminatory sanction imposed on the
petitioner. No rational basis exists
for the difference in punishment and in
fact, such a disparity effectively
inhibits the communication to the public
and the profession the standard of
conduct ciiauaiiiiias of persons licensed to
practice law in Illinois. As a result
of the Court's arbitrary failure to
consider any mitigating circumstances,
this case results in the effective

disbarment of an attorney who has

-36-
changed the nature of his practice to
prevent further instances of neglect and
who was commended by the Hearing Board
for his willingness to represent clients
who would not ordinarily have had a day
in court. (Appendix C). Conversely,
uniformity of sanctions after a
consideration of mitigating factors will
secure the rights of due process and
equal protection under the laws as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

I. THE PETITIONER IS DENIED DUE PROCESS
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
AS A RESULT OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT'S ARBITRARY IMPOSITION OF A
SANCTION INCONSISTENT WITH DISCIPLINE
IMPOSED ON ATTORNEYS CHARGED WTH
SIMILAR MISCONDUCT AND IN DISREGARD
OF THE HEARING AND REVIEW BOARDS'
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITHOUT
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF
DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT OR
MISREPRESENTATION IN VIOLATION OF
D.R. 1-102(a) (4).

eatadduaneraticrenalk Cacarttem eee

-37-

A. The Illinois Supreme Court's
Sanction Is An Arbitrary And
Discriminatory Deviation From
The Sanctions Imposed Upon Those
Attorneys Charged With Similar
Misconduct.

The deprivation of a lawyers's

license "is a punishment or penalty"
imposed on the lawyer "by way of

adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal

nature." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,

550-551 (1968). Further

characterizations in Konigsberg, supra,

353 U.S. at 252, and Ruffalo, supra, 390

U.S. at 544, concerning the attorney's
interest in his license, and the nature
of the proceedings depriving him of it,
suggest that standards more exacting than
those governing ordinary civil cases must
be applied to disciplinary proceedings.
In particular, this court's decisions in

Ruffalo, supra, and Spevack v. Klein, 385

-38-

U.S. 511, 515 (1967), where the
reqvirements of adequate notice of
charges and the privilege against
oelf-ines iudactien were extended to
disbarment proceedings, appear to
recognize that because of their
Similarity with conventional criminal
sanctions, disciplinary actions against
attorneys entitle the attorney to many of
the constitutional protections extended
to those accused of criminal violations.

One such constitutional protection

currently being recognized is the need
for uniformity tempered by mitigating
factors in sentencing.

Significantly, the Illinois Supreme
Court in its opinion in the instant case
acknowledges that “in order to safeguard
the public and maintain the integrity of

the legal profession... it is important

-39-
that there be uniformity in the sanctions
afforded to different attorneys." 101

I11.2d at 541, citing In re Clayter, 78

I11.2d 276, 283, 399 N.E.2d 1318 (1980).

As the court stated in In re Saladino, 71

I11.2d 263, 375 N.E. 2d 102 (1978):

Although appropriate facts may
always be considered in mitigation,
predictability and fairness require
a degree of consistency in the
selection of sanctions for similar
types of misconduct. That degree of
consistency can only be achieved if
sanctions are based on articulated
Standards of conduct. These
standards must be “derived from the
underlying purposes of our
disciplinary process, which are to
safeguard the public, maintain the
integrity of the profession, and
protect the administration of
justice from reproach. 375 N.E.2d
at 106-107.

Thus, “where facts are strikingly similar
to those in another case, a degree of

uniformity in the discipline sought

should be imposed." In re Clayter,

-40-
Supra, 399 N.E.2d at 1321.

Despite its recognition of the need
for uniformity of sanctions, the Illinois
Supreme Court failed to consider or
address those cases cited in the
petitioner's brief where the Court had
ordered a lesser sanction as the
appropriate discipline on facts
substantially congruent with those

material to this case. In re Kink, 92

T11.2d 293, 442 N.E.2d 206 (1982); In re
Taylor, 66 I11.2a 567, 363 N.E.2d 845
(1977); In re Ahern, 23 I11.2d 69, 177

N.E.2d 197 (1961).
As early as 1961, the court ordered
censure for an attorney charged with five

counts of neglect. In re Ahern, 23

I11.2d 69, 177 N.E.2d 197 (1961). In

that case, each count contained the

charge that Mr. Ahern received payment

-4l-
for services, but either did not render
any services or the services rendered by
him were simply not commensurate with the
amount received. While it was apparent
in the matter involving all five counts
that respond had failed to perform the
services for which he had been retained,
the court held that censure rather than
suspension constituted sufficient
punishment. There, as in the instant
case, respondent had personal problems
involving the illness of a daughter and
his wife. In reaching its decision, the
Court took into consideration these
extenuating circumstances noting that
respondent's personal problems and his
subsequent difficulties adjusting to his
personal life may have explained a good
part of his misconduct. Moreover,

although Mr. Ahern's misconduct clearly

-42-
involved an error in judgment, it was not
shown to have resulted from corrupt
motives.

In 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a one-year suspension from the
practice of law was the appropriate
sanction for an attorney who showed a
“pattern of consistent neglect." In re
Taylor, 66 I11.2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845
(1977). Respondent's neglect in that
case was based on a series of agreements
to represent clients, acceptance of fees
or money for costs, neglect in peforming
and completing legal services, and
frequent inaccessibility to a client.
Although it was clear that Mr. Taylor
acted with consistent neglect and that
disciplinary action was warranted, the
Court, nonetheless, concluded that a

three-year suspension would not serve the

-43-
interest of the public and the legal
profession given respondent's lack of
overtly dishonest acts and corrupt
motives.

In a more recent decision involving
facts similar to those at bar, censure
was again held to be the appropriate

sanction. In re Kink, 92 I11.2d 293, 442

N.E.2d 206 (1982). Respondent in Kink
manifested a lack of care in handling the
estates of three separate clients,
several instances of which extended over
a period of years and operated to the
irreparable prejudice of his clients.

The record indicated that the respondent
failed to close the estates, failed to
file certain documents, failed to pay
taxes and misrepresented the status of
the case to clients. Respondent was less

than candid with at least one client, and

-44-
he remained inaccessible despite his
clients’ attempts to contact him.

In reaching its decision, the Court
in Kink took into consideration a number
of extenuating circumstances which, in
its opinion, tended to mitigate or
explain respondent's misconduct. Among
other things, the Court noted that
respondent's conduct was apparently not
prompted by dishonest motives and that he
had been cooperative and candid during
the proceedings, two factors which have
been held to be significant in
determining the appropriate punishment.

In re Clayter, 78 I11.2d 276, 399 N.E.2d

1318 (1980); In re Damisch, 38 I1l.2d

195, 230 N.E.2d 254 (1967).
Consideration was also given to the
testimony of witnesses as to respondent's

excellent reputation in the community.

-45-

The Court further observed that although
the respondent had been negligent and
dilatory in representing his clients’
interests, he had in fact--similar to the
instant case--rendered some services on
their behalf. The Court, finding the
circumstances analogous to those in
Ahern, concluded once again that neither
the best interests of the public nor
those of the legal profession would be
served by suspending the respondent.

The facts in In re Chapman, 95 I11l1.2d

484, 448 N.E.2d 852 (1983), which the
Illinois Supreme Court chose to
distinguish solely on the basis of that
respondent's alcoholism, are analogous to
the facts material to the instant case.

In Chapman, the Court held that the

neglect of legal matters coupled with

misrepresentation of the status of the

-46-

case to the client, warranted a two-year
probationary suspension, notwithstandin”
respondent's history of previous
discipline and his failure to cooperate
in the disciplinary proceeding. It is
worthwhile noting that the misconduct in

Chapman commenced less than a year from

the conclusion of an earlier disciplinary
proceeding. In fact, respondent had
already been disciplined for professional
misconduct on two prior occasions. In
one instance, he was reprimanded. In
1978, he was suspended for three months
for neglecting clients' affairs, the same
misconduct with which he was subsequently
charged in 1983.

Petitioner's misconduct in the
instant case differs little from the
cases cited above in which the Illinois

Supreme Court found significantly lighter

-47-

sanctions were warranted. All involved a
pattern of consistent neglect which
amounted to the non-performance of legal
services owed to a client coupled with
"misstatements" and/or actual
misrepresentations, and in Ahern and

Chapman, a history of previous

disciplinary sanctions. Clearly, the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision to
ignore the impact of these cases results
in a gross deviation from the established
sanctions for petitioner's misconduct to
the prejudice of the petitioner's
constitutional rights and the legal

profession as a whole.

B. The Illinois Supreme Court
Ignored The Fine ngs And
Recommendations Of The Hearing
and Review Boards Without Clear
and Convincing Evidence of
Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit Or
Misrepresentation In Violation
of D.R. 1-102(a) (4).

-48-

Paralleling the recognized need for
uniformity in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions, the findings of
the Hearing and Review Boards are given
"great deference" by the Illinois Supreme
Court in its reviewing capacity, as these
entities are best situated to "making
factual findings in contested matters and
developing uniformity ta our disciplinary

system." In re Cohen, 83 I11.2d 521, 416

N.E.2d 256 (1981). As the Court in Cohen

noted:

While this court has the ultimate
responsibility to impose and enforce
attorney discipline... the findings
and recommendations of the Inquiry,
Hearing and Review Boards are
entitled to and receive our serious
consideration. These boards, with
the exception of the Review Board,
see and hear the witnesses and play
important roles in screening and
hearing cases, making factual
findings in contested matters and
developing uniformity in our
disciplinary system. 416 N.E.2d at

-49-
258.

Similarly, the Court in In re Kink,

Supra, 442 N.E.2d at 209, quoting In re
Hopper, 85 I1l1.2d 318, 423 N.E.2d 900
(1981), noted:

Where the question is credibility of
witnesses, resolution of conflicting
testimony, or other such fact-
finding judgments, the hearing panel
should be afforded a good deal of
deference.

Moreover, “where the findings of
those boards are based on uncontradicted

and clear evidence they will be

adopted." In re Wigoda, 77 I1l.2d 155,

395 N.E.2d 571 (1979).

In its opinion in the instant case,
the Illinois Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged that "a finding by the
Hearing Board of the Disciplinary

Commission is entitled to the same

-50-
weight as that of any other factfinder."

101 I11.2d at 539 citing In re Kink, 92

I11.2d 293, 301, 442 N.E.2d 206 (1982),

and In re Feldman, 89 I11.2d 7, 10, 431

N.E.2d 388 (1982). The Court further
conceded that "we give considerable
deference to findings of fact by the
Hearing Board." 101 I11.2d at 539.
Nevertheless, the Court chose to
ignore the findings of the Hearing and
Review Boards--without any further
findings of fact beyond those found by
the Board--on the grounds that it was
“not required to accept [the Board's
findings] when the Board's conclusion is
not established by clear and convincing
evidence.” 101 I11.2d at 540. Conceding
that "although the Board found that there
was no misrepresentation here," the Court

concluded that petitioner's conduct was

-5l1-

in the ambiguous realm of “beyond mere
neglect" without rising to the level of
dishonesty, misrepresentation, fraud or
deceit in violation of D.R. 1-102(a) (4).

This Court has determined that there
is a denial of due process and equal
protection where an individual is denied
the right to practice law where no
evidence in the record rationally
supports a finding of doubt about the
attorney's fitness or capacity to

practice law. Konigsberg, supra, 353

U.S. at 252. In the instant case,
petitioner is faced with a sanction
equivalent to disbarment. While the
petitioner in this case does not concede
that the original two-year suspension was
correct, he maintains that in comparison
with the discipline meted out by the

Illinois Supreme Court, the sanctions of

-52-

the Hearing and Review Boards are more
consistent with the degree of his
misconduct. Clearly, disbarment is an
extreme measure appropriate only in those
limited circumstances where intentional
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or
dishonest motive is shown by clear and

convincing evidence. In re March, 71

I11.2d 382, 376 N.E.2d 213 (1978).
Neither the Hearing and Review Boards nor
the Illinois Supreme Court found evidence
of such egregious conduct as to warrant
the imposition of such a sanction. In
this case, the Court's interest in
protecting the public and the legal
profession from improper conduct of the
petitioner will not be served by the
suspension for three years and “until

further order." Not only does the

-53-
disparity in sanctions prevent the
uniform application of the law, but the
Court's failure to give credence to the
findings of the Hearing Board effectively
inhibits the uniform development of
sanctions by that body best able to judge

the credibility of witnesses and evidence.

a3.
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S MECHANICAL
APPLICATION OF A MATHEMATICALLY
DETERMINED SANCTION IGNORED THE
COMPELLING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE PETITIONER'S MISCONDUCT.
It is well-settled under Illinois law

that while uniformity of sanctions is a

fundamental consideration, In re Clayter,

78 I11.2d 276, 283, 399 N.E.2d 1318

(1980); In re Saladino, 71 I11.2d 263,

375 N.E.2d 102 (1978), the determination
of appropriate discipline must also

involve and often times turn upon, the

-54-
unique factors of mitigation present in

each case. In re McLennon, 93 I11.2d

215, 443 N.E.2d 553 (1982); In re Hopper,

85 Ill.2d 318, 423 N.E.2d 900 (1981).
The rule as established by the Illinois
Supreme Court parallels that enunciated
by this Court for consideration in
Criminal sentencing. As this Court has
stated: "[T]he sentencing judge is
authorized, if not required, to consider
all of the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances involved in the crime."

Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585

(1959). Accord, United States v.

Jonnson, 507 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949

(1975). Underlying this decision is the
rationale that the mechanical application
of a sentence violates the equal

protection and due process clauses of the

-55-
Fourteenth Amendment in that it results
in equal sentences for those defendants
who as a result of individual mitigating
circumstances may not be similarly
situated.

In the instant case, the Illinois
Supreme Court clearly ignored all
evidence of mitigating circumstances
found by the Hearing and Review Boards,
and under the guise of uniformity, sought
to impose a rigid mechanical sanction
derived from its erroneous interpretation
of those sanctions imposed in In re

Johnson, 93 I11.2d 441, 444 N.E.2d 153

(1982) and In re Levinson, 71 I11l1.2d 486,

376 N.E.2d 998 (1978). The Court
maintained that its decision in the
instant case was consistent with the

discipline imposed in Johnson and

Levinson cn the grounds that "the neglect

-56-

found here includes a greater number of
instances and for that reason alone, even
without regard to the respondent's
previous misconduct, calls for a longer
suspension." 101 I11.2d at 543.

Notwithstanding the Illinois Supreme
Court's contention that their decision

"is consistent" with Johnson and

Levinson, the Court's imposition of a

three-year suspension and “until further
order" sanction--a sanction effectively
tantamount to disbarment--is, in fact, a
gross deviation from the discipline
imposed in those two cases and in

Previous decisions. Neither Johnson nor

Levinson imply that each instance of

neglect should be punished with six
months suspension. Clearly, neither

Johnson nor Levinson advise “three years

suspension until further order" as the

-57-
appropriate sanction for misconduct
similar to that in the instant case.

The Court, in the imposition of this
harsh and unwarranted sanction solely on
the basis of “the number of instances of
neglect," clearly sought to avoid the
Plain impact of those decisions in
similar cases where significantly lighter
sanctions were imposed despite the
evidence of a “consistent pattern of
neglect" and misrepresentations to

Clients. In re Kink, supra, 92 I1l.2d

2932, 442 N.E.2d 206 (1982); In re Taylor,

supra, 66 I1l1.2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845
(1977); In re Ahern, supra, 23 Ill.2d 69,

177 N.E.2d 197 (1961). The effective
disbarment imposed in this case not only
grossly deviated from sanctions imposed
in similar cases--to the prejudice of the

petitioner's constitutional rights--but

-58-

Clearly failed to protect the public or
the integrity of the judicial process or
advance the standards of ethics of the
legal profession.

Moreover, the Court's failure to
consider the mitigating circumstances
surrounding the petitioner's misconduct
in the instant case violated the
petitioner's rights of due process and
equal protection under the laws. The
petitioner offered the Illinois Supreme
Court two reasons for the non-performance
of his professional duties, vis., a high
volume intensely demanding practice and
serious personal problems. The record
demonstrates the Hearing Board's
recognition that “the personal problems
of the Respondent may be part of the

reason for his inaction on the cases" and

that “Respondent is to be commended for

-59-

accepting such difficult cases for
clients who would not ordinarily have had
a day in court." (Appendix C) The
record further illustrates that the
petitioner has a reputation for honesty
in the legal community and was
cooperative and candid with the
Commission.

The circumstances surrounding the
petitioner's conduct were sufficiently
compelling to dictate a lesser sanction
than that imposed by the Court. In
addition, the Court's application of a
mathematically based sanction without
consideration of the mitigating
circumstances present in the instant case
resulted in a complete abrogation of the
petitioner's rights of due process and
egual protection as guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment.

-60-

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above,
petitioner respectfully submits that this
Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted and that the decision of the

Illinois Supreme Court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM J. HARTE

WILLIAM J. HARTE

WILLIAM J. HARTE, LTD.

111 West Washington Street
Suite 2025

Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 726-5015

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_2213%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.