# Jurisdictional Statement — Florida v. Zafra

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 471 U.S. 1119

## Text

- Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

DEC 17 1964

$4:953/

NO

ASEXANDER L. STEVAS.
CUmK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Petitioner,
vs.
SILVIO P. ZAFRA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON JURISDICTION

JIM SMITH
Attorney General

CALVIN L. FOX

Assistant Attorney General
401 N.W. 2nd Avenue

Suite 820

Miami, Florida 33128

(305) 377-5441

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

FIRST ISSUE

WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE FLORIDA
COURT, LIMITING THE AUTHORITY OF
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, CON-
STRUING THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION AND HOLDING THAT UNDER 19
U.S.C. §1581(a) UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS OFFICERS MAY NOT BOARD A
VESSEL IN CUSTOMS WATERS FOR A
ROUTINE DOCUMENT EXAMINATION WITH-
OUT REASONABLE SUSPICION IF THE
CUSTOMS OFFICERS ARE ALSO LOOKING
FOR DRUGS, IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT
WITH AND IS A PLAINLY ERRONEOUS
CONSTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES V.
VILLAMONTE-MARQUEZ, _U.S. _, 103
S.Ct. 2573 (1983)?

~ SECOND ISSUE

WHEN CUSTOMS OFFICERS APPROACH TO
INSPECT A VESSEL AND ITS CONTENTS
UNDER UNITED STATES V. VILLAMONTE-
MARQUEZ, AND 19 U.S.C. 1581(a) AND
21 U.S.C. §955 MAY THE DEFENDANT
DEFEAT THE CUSTOMS OFFICER'S LAW-
FUL AUTHORITY BY QUICKLY REMOVING
HIS BOAT FROM CUSTOMS WATERS AND
PUTTING IT ON A LAND BASED
TRAILER?

ia
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(continued)

THIRD ISSUE

WHETHER THE STATE COURT'S REJECTION
OF THE CUSTOMS DRUG SMUGGLER
PROFILE PRESENTATION AND REASONABLE
SUSPICION ANALYSIS UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION IS IN DIRECT
CONFLICT WITH FLORIDA V. ROYER,
G.es. . $0) Gabe. BEEP CAFOs);
UNITED STATES V. MENDENHALL, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) AND UNITED STATES
V. CORTEZ, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)?

FOURTH ISSUE

WHETHER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO NON-EGREGIOUS
POLICE CONDUCT?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. ....cccccccsecs

TABLE OF CITATIONS ......cccccccees

OPINIONS BELOW... ccc ccc cccccccccce
JURISDICTION... cccccccccccccccces

CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS..........0000-.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......-2-cee0-

REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE PETITION... csscccccccccccccscecs

CONCLUSION . ccc cccccccccccccccccces

ii
TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASE PAGE

Brewer v. Williams,
5 eae. tos reer 28

Brown v. Illinois,
B22 U.S. SIO. cece ec cneccnces 29

California v. Mingares,
Ree. Vola PER CEPA PD ccc vcccaas 28

Carroll v. United States,
ee ee kt 26

Chambers v. Maroney.
ge Oe re 26

Florida v. Rodriguez,
Ub. , 105 $.Ct. 308
ee eek ks bon we oo ke, oe

Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 4 > Bee 27

Florida v. Royer,
U.S. , 0s &.Ce. i319
SRS 69.6 00 bE vee ee hn sane ia, 24

Hanson v. State,
445 So.2d 378 (Fla. 3d
Ee SE 6 Va Wa hte 00.0 od 458 19

Lii
TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASE PAGE

Hetland v. State,
366 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979), approved and adopted,
Hetland v. State, 387 So.2d
a eg Oe ee eee 2

Illinois v. Andreas,
U.S. , aes 8.Ce. 3339

Illinois v. Lafayette,
U.S. , 103 $.Ct. 2605
SNe 54k ARDS a 2 Oo oe 0 ck os ae, a

Jenkins v. State,
385 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 1980)... 13

Michigan v. DeFillippo,
ee Wetec Se RASPES ess witvsces 27, 28

Morales v. State,
407 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d
ek rarer ers cere 19

State v. Doyle,
409 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d
8 ee ee 19

State v. Hayes,
333 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA
0) ) ne 30

State v. Zafra,
408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA
PDC Ga Cus bees seus nekeans S$, -32

iv
TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASE PAGE

State v. Zafra,
408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA
1982), rev. den., 418 So.2d
Ee ge... ar 10, 19

State v. Zafra,
444 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA
| LOPES ery ee re eee eee ee

Stone v. Powell,
S26 U.S. 465 (1976) .cccccccee 28

United States v. Albino,
722 F.2d 690 (11th Cir.

"| BRS Pk 2 rae 18, 20
United States v. Cortez

Fk ee ee ia, 24

25. 27

United States v. Forbicetta,
484 F.2d 645 (Sth Cir. 1973). 25

United States v. Herrera,
711 F.2d 1546 (llth Cir.

Se 06e6ebwr weeny 4st at eeees 21
United States v. Mendenhall,
eS ee ee, ia, 24
26
United States v. Ross,
U.S. ‘
eo. wee ae) eee 23, 24

Vv

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASE PAGE

United States v. Santana,
ee 22

United States v. Villamonte-

Marquez,
U.S ,» aes 8.Ce. 2573
TTC CECE Waiscsccc cece TE te
12, 14
15, 18
30
United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. den., 449
EE 29

Warden v. Haden,
ee ee ee CRUDE Deciccccces 22

vi
OTHER AUTHORITIES

PAGE
Fourth Amendment, United
States Constitution...........6.. oe
Fourteenth Amendment, United
States Constitution............. ein
BO ie. Se hikw cc tvcdcicic a os
4, 14
18, 19
28
ees a oko 0's 44d o nee eee ee F
18, 19
y 31
ge a St) 2
Ve ae ee ee rerre + 4,
2

"Select Committee on Narcotics

Abuse and Control, 95th Cong.

2d Sess., Report on Problems of

Law Enforcement and Its Effort

to Reduce the Level of Drug
Trafficking in South Florida"

oe De 2 ) re 20

vii
PRE FACE

The Petitioner, THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
was the Petitioner in the Supreme Court of
Florida; the Appellant in the District
Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
and the prosecution in the Florida trial
court. The Respondent, SILVIO P. ZAFRA,
was the Respondent in the Supreme Court of
Florida; the Appellee in the District
Court and the Defendant in the trial
court. In this brief, the parties will be
referred to as they appeared in the
Florida trial court below.

The following reference is made in
this brief:

(A) For the portions of the record
below sufficient to show jurisdiction in
this court, which are contained in the
Petitioner's Appendix attached hereto and

consist of pages Al-A74.

itt

1
I.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court of
Florida, Third District upon remand from
this Court is reported at State v. Zafra,

444 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

(A59-A63). The original opinion of the
Florida District Court affirming the
granting of the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress is reported at State v. Zafra,
408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The
opinion of the Florida Supreme Court
denying the State's Application for
review, is contained in the Petitioner's
Appendix at "'A73'' and will be reported by
the West Publishing Company. The West
Publishing Company citation is the
official reporter for citation to these

opinions.

ee

2
Il.

JURISDICTION

On October 18, 1984, the Supreme
Court of Florida denied the State's
timely application for review. A73. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under the provisions of Title 28, United
States Code, §1257(3); Title 19, United
States Code §1581(a); and Amedments IV
and XIV of the United States
Constitution.

The interpretation of the Florida
Constitution and the United States

Constitution are identical for purposes

of the application of the criminal law
and search and seizure issues. See, Art.

I, §12 Fla. Const.; see, also, Hetland v.

State, 366 So.2d 831 (FLa. 2d DCA 1979)

approved and adopted, Hetland v. State,

387 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1980).

3
III.

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the
United States provides that:

"The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath

| or affirmation, and particularly

| describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."

Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the
United States provided that:

"All persons born naturalized in
the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside.
No State shail make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the
citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law."

4
Title 19 United States Code §1581(a)

provides specifically that:

"Any officer of the customs may at
any time go on board of any vessel
or vehicle at any place in the
United States or within the custom
waters or, as he may be authorized,
within a customs enforcement area
established under the Anti-
Smuggling Act, or at any other
authorized place, without as well
as within its district, and examine
the manifest and other documents
and papers and examine, any person,
trunk, package, or cargo on board,
and to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use all
necessary force to compel
compliance.

Title 21 United States Code §955 Provides

inter alia, that it is:

"unlawful for any person to bring
or possess on board any vessel.
arriving in or departing from the
United States or the customs
terri-tory of the United States, a
controlled substance. “hp

Article I Section 12 of the Florida
Constitution provides that:
"Searches and seizures.--The right

of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses papers, and effects

Oe

5
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and against the unrea-
sonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall
not be violated. No warrant shall
be issued except upon probable
cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place
or places to be searched, the
person or persons, thing or things
to be seized, the communication to
be intercepted, and the nature of
evidence to be obtained. This
right shall be construed in
conformity with the 4th Amendment
to the United States Constitution,
as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or infor-
mation obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible
in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible
under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the
4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution."

6
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant, Silvio P. Zafra, was

charged by information with three counts

consisting of one count of possession; one

count of importation and one count of
trafficking in marijuana, arising out of
his attempt on October 10, 1980 to bring
ashore one thousand (1000) pounds of
marijuana in a twenty-five (25) foot
speedboat at Crandon Park, Key Biscayne,
Miami, Florida. The Defendant filed a
motion to suppress, which the Florida
trial court granted after a hearing.

At the hearing below the State pro-
duced three witnesses, United States
Customs Officers Ogden, Carlin and
Nasossis. The Defendant did not testify
and produced no witnesses or evidence.

United States Customs Officer Richard

Ogden said that he had been trained by the

Customs Service to intercept

7
contraband coming into the United States

by plane and boat. A5. On October 10,
1980 he went on duty at six p.m. and
began a routine survey of boats in the
Crandon boat ramp area. A6-Al10.

The customs officers at 3:00 a.m.
encountered the Defendant's boat in cus-
toms waters. All. It was undisputed
below that the customs officer thereupon
decided to conduct a routine customs
boarding. Al6 . Officer Nassosis
checked the boat's papers. A44. Officer
Ogden stepped on the trailer fender and
looked into the boat. Al6. The deck was
much higher than the manufacturer had put
ir. Al6. Ogden said that this was a
characteristic profile of smugglers.

Al6. The trend among smugglers had
evolved from throwing contraband into
cabins, to stowing contraband into
cabins, to stowing contraband in hidden

compartments. Al7. Ogden testified that

. —_~™ ~

8
he observed marijuana residue on the boat

carpet. Al8. There was also a rise in
the carpet evidently covering a hatch
area. Al8. Ogden testified that he
considered this suspicious--the way the
vessel was constructed there should not
have been a hatch of that nature under
the carpet tacked to the deck. Al19. The
boat had no fishing gear and had only
tools and mechanics tools on the deck.
A20. Ogden said he pulled the carpet
back and an odor of marijuana was coming
out. A22. The hatch was secured by
screws. A22. In the hatch were twelve
(12) bales of marijuana weighing one

thousand pounds. A24.

Relative to the present petition, as
noted above, the State's evidence was
undisputed. In particular, United States

Customs Officer, James A. Carlin

9
explained the presence of the United

States Customs Officers at the Crandon
Park boat ramps thus:
"[By the prosecutor]:

Q Turning your attention to
October 10, 1980, had you started
work that day or before?

A We started on the 9th at 6:00
p.m.

Q When you say, "we" co whom are
referring?

A Myself, Officer Nasossis and
Officer Ogden.

QO What was your duty for that
period which you were working?

A We're assigned to the marine
section on the night shift. So,
basically we check boat ramps for
any incoming vessels--the various
boat ramps into the Miami area.

A What is the purpose of
checking the boat ramps for the
waterways? What is the relation-
ship to Customs?

A Well, we check basically for
boats coming from foreign
countries.

10
Boats coming into those ramps
do have access to Custom waters.
So, we check for documents and any
undeclared items they might have.”

A38-A39.

Based upon the foregoing and reject-
ing the State's argument based upon other
factors that there was articulable sus-
picion, the trial court granted the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. See,
State v. Zafra, 408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1982), rev. den., 418 So.2d 1281

(Fla. 1982): On appeal to the Florida
District Court of Appeal, the District
Court affirmed the trial court holding
that there was no articulable suspicion
herein and that United States Custom
Officers could not board any vessel to
check papers unless they could show a
"border crossing" or unreasonable sus-

picion. Id.

The undersigned filed his petition

11
for certiorari from said decision contem-

poraneously with the Government's peti-

tion in United States v. Villamonte-

Marquez, v8. , 403 8.Ce. 2573

(1983). In Villamonte-Marquez, this

Court subsequently held that Customs
Officers may lawfully board any vessel in
customs waters to examine documents under
19 U.S.C. §1581(a) without articulable or
reasonable suspicion. Id. On June 27,
1983, this Court therefore granted
Certiorari, vacated the foregoing deci-
sion of the Florida District Court and
remanded for further proceedings

consistent with United States v.

Villamonte-Marquez. Florida v. Zafra,

__U.S.__ 103 $.Ct. 3259 (1983).

On remand, the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal permitted sup-
plemental briefs on the effects of

Villamonte-Marquez and permitted further

12
oral argument. See, A58. On January 24,

1984, the Third District Court again
affirmed the suppression and dismissal by
the trial court. State v. Zafra, 444
So.2d at 1064-1065; see, A59-A63. The

Disrict Court reasoned that United States

v. Villamonte-Marquez was inapplicable

because the Defendants had quickly taken
their boat out to the water and (and it
was no longer a boat?!?) and the Customs
Officers were more interested in looking
for narcotics than solely checking docu-
ments. Id. The Court also stated that
the State had "conceded" that there was
no articulable suspicion in the present

cause! :

1 .The Court's analysis that the State
"conceded that there is no articulable
suspicion herein is based solely upon the
wording of the Court's original opinion
in State v. Zafra, 408 So.2d 746.
However, as reflected in the excerpt to
the State's original brief on appeal, it
states:

a

13
On February 8, 1984, the under-

signed filed a vigorous Motion for
Rehearing which was denied on February 29,
1984. See, A64-A70. On October 18, 1984,
the Supreme Court of Florida denied
review, with the Chief Justice Boyd and
Justice Ehrlich dissenting 2- See, A73.
The Florida District Court however stayed
its mandate pending review in this Court.

See, A74; see, also, A71-A?72.

(Footnote I continued)

"Furthermore, the State would
note that the officers did indeed
have reasonable suspicion, based
upon their observations, to board
the vessel."

Brief of State, at p.14.

(see A54)

2-The fact that the Supreme Court of
Florida may have severely limited juris-
diction to review this matter under
Florida's recent constitutional amend-
ment, see, Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d
1356 (Fla. 1980), should not affect the
proper exercise of this Court's jurisdic-
tion. But see, Florida v. Rodriguez,
U.S. . 195 §.ct. 308 (1984) (dissenting
opinion).

a

14
V.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. Direct Conflict With United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez.

3 Without conceding for a moment that
it was in error in its original opinion,
the Florida District Court again affirmed
the judgment of the trial court below
dismissing the present criminal charges
upon the Defendant's Motion €d Suppress.

Rejecting United States v. Villamonte-

Marquez, 462 U.S. __, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77

L.Ed.2d 22 (1983), permitting customs
officers to board any vessel under
Section 19 U.S.C. §1581i(a), the Court
reasoned that the evidence herein should
be suppressed because the officers
intended to look for illicit narcotics
rather than solely engaging in a routine

customs inspection. 444 So.2d at
1064-1065. (A59-A63).°

ee ~

15
The District Court's analysis that

the customs officers in the case at bar
had no authority to conduct the present
search because the officers were also
looking for narcotics, is in square con-
flict with the plain rejection of that

theory in United States v.

Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct. at 2577,

note 3 wherein this Court clearly
explains, thus:

"There is no issue in this case
concerning the activities of the
officers once they boarded the
Henry Morgan II. The only question
presented to this Court concerns
the validity of the suspicionless
boarding of the vessel for a docu-
ment inspection.

Respondents, however, contend in
the alternative that because the
customs officers were accompanyed
by Louisiana State Policemen, and
were following an informant's tip
that a vessel in the ship channel
was thought to be carrying mari-
juana, they may not rely on the
statute authorizing boarding for
inspection of the vessel's docu-
mentation. This line of reasoning
was rejected in a similar situation
in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.

16
128, 135-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717,
1722-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978),
and we again reject it. Acceptance
of respondent's argument would lead
to the incongruous result criti-
cized by Judge Campbell in his
opinion in United States v. Arra,

630 F.2d 836, 846 (C Al 1980): ‘We
would see little logic in sanc-
tioning such examinations of ordi-
nary, unsuspect vessels but forbid-
ding them in the case of suspected
smugglers.'"

The undersigned brought the foregoing

footnote 3 to the attention of the

District Court to no avail. See, A68.

Furthermore, the District Court's
central position that the Customs
Officers intended to board the boat
because they suspected that it was
carrying narcotics rather than boarding
the boat to check "custom papers" is
wholly contradicted by the record. The

undisputed evidence from the only wit-

nesses presented established that Officer

Nasossis checked the boats papers, A44,

17
and that the officers boarded the boat

because they decided to conduct a routine
customs boarding. Al6. As Customs
Officer Carlin testified:

"We informed the--well, I had what
we call a Customs Raid jacket.

It's a nylon windbreaker with the
Customs badge, you know, embossed o
it, and on the back it says, ‘U.S.
Customs' I think in two inch let-
tering. It has a Customs patch on
each sleeve.

So, they more or less knew who we
were, but we identified ourselves
with our badge holder in the case
and told them we were from U.S.
Customs and that we would like to
inspect their vessel and check
their documents on the vessel.

Q What happened next?

A I believe Mr. Zafra identified
himself as the master of the vessel
and he was asked for documents, I
think, by--I believe Officer
Nasossis who asked him for his
documents in English, and I think I
also asked him in Spanish, you
know, to further clarify what we
wanted."

A43-A44.

The present District Court opinion is

18
therefore a plain miscontruction of

Villamonte and the express authority of

19 U.S.C. 1581(a) and 21 U.S.C. §955,
which provides that it is:

"unlawful for any person to bring
or possess on board any vessel. .
arriving in or departing from the
United States or the customs
territory of the United States, a
controlled substance.

[Emphasis added].

The present decision emasculates 19
U.S.C. 1581(a) and 21 U.S.C. §955 and
makes a mockery of this Court's express
consideration of the present issue and
rejection of the District Court's
analysis. The decision is also in direct
conflict with the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals on the same issue. See,

United States v. Albano, 722 F.2d 690, at

695 (llth Cir. 1984)("Customs officers
may rely on section 1581(a) even though

they may suspect the vessel of smuggling

contraband"). In sum, the Florida Third

eee m ga Le eerie ernment

19
District Court of Appeal has told the

United States Congress that it cannot do
in Florida that which the face of 19
U.S.C. §1581(a) clearly states Congress
intended to do: to give customs officers
authority in "customs waters" to board
vessels for document and customs
examination, irrespective of whether they
are also looking for contraband, which is
expressly authorized under the companion
section, 21 U.S.C. §955 in any event.
This decision comes from the most active
Court in Florida in search and seizure
and boat cases because of its very
proximity to the major sources of illicit

marijuana and cocaine. See, e.g., Hanson

v. State, 445 So.2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA
1984) (citing State v. Zafra); State v.
Doyle, 409 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982);
Morales v. State, 407 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1981). At the same time, the present

decision comes at a time when a major

20
federal and state strike force is

operating in Florida to combat the grave
problem of the narcotics traffick cor-
ridor through Florida, the State with the
nation's largest coastline. See, "Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
95th Cong. 2d Sess., Report on Problems of
Law Enforcement and Its Effort to Reduce
the Level of Drug Trafficking in South
Florida" (Comm. Print 1978). The plainly
erroneous decision of the District Court
is therefore not only important to
Florida, but is also of immediate,
critical importance to federal law
enforcement authority and to the security
and safety of all citizens in virtually
all states in this nation where drug
trafficking is a problem. Additionally,
the bizarre conflict which now exists
between the highest federal court, see,

e.g., United States v.

Albano, supra, and the controlling state

21
court in the same jurisdiction can only

be resolved by this Court. Indeed, the
State submits that the present District
Court has been difficult in its views

on search and seizure3- See, Florida Vv.

Rodriguez, U.S. __, 105 S.Ct. 308

(1984) (reversing the same Florida Third
District Court of Appeals for the second
time in the same case in as many years).
The State has therefore no recourse but
to respectfully request this Court's
patient consideration again.

B. Conflict with Other Decisions

of the United States Supreme
Court.

Similarly, the District's Court's

reasoning that it makes a constitutional

3-It is for this reason that the sua
sponte modification of the Eleventh |
Circuit's opinion in United States v.
Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984),
See, 727 F.2d 1016 llth Cir. 1984), has
had and will have no effect whatsoever
upon the present opinion.

difference that the present vessel was

quickly removed from the water, is abso-
lutely contrary to the constitutional
analysis in this Court's "fresh pursuit"
and "authority to search" cases. See,

e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.

38 (1975) (Defendant's flight into her home
does not vitiate law enforcement officers
authority to detain her acquired prior to
her flight); Warden v. Haden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (same); Illinois v. Andreas, U.S.
___, 103 §.Ct. 3319 (1983) (Authority to

search container acquired at an earlier
point in time carried through and attach
to the time the container was again subse-
quently opened); Illinois v. Lafayette,
__U.S.__, 103 §.Ct. 2605 (1983) (search

pursuant to lawful arrest attaches at the
time of arrest and is still valid even

though conducted later at station); United

23
States v. Ross, U.S. » 102 $.Ct. 2157

(1982) (Authority to search container
acquired at an earlier point in time
carried through and attaches to the time
the container was again subsequently
opened); Illinois v. Lafayatte, ¥.8.
___, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983) (search pur-

suant to lawful arrest attaches at the
time of arrest and is still valid even
thought conducted later at station house).
The singular rule of the foregoing
decisions is that a change in position by
the defendant or the thing to be searched
from the position in which the officer
acquired the authority to lawfully search,
is not constitutionally significant. A

fortiori, the fact that a defendant or

24
defendants may be very clever and quick

about removing their boat from the water
does not defeat the right of customs
officers to demand papers and search for

narcotics. See, United States v. Ross;

Illinois v. Lafayette; Illinois v.

Andreas, supra. The opinion of the

District Court is in direct conflict with
these decisions and the Court has there-
fore completely misapplied and miscon-
trued the federal constitution: See,

Art. I, §12 Fla. Const.

Furthermore, the State would assert
that the federal officers did indeed have
reasonable suspicion, based upon both
their experience with smugglers and their
observations, to board the vessel. See,

Florida v. Royer, U.S. , 403: 8.Ct.

1319 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411 (1981); see, also, United States

25
v. Mendenhall, 446 1.S. 544, (1980)

(approving use of profile characterics) ;

United States v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d

645, 646 (5th Cir. 1973) (approving use of
"profile" characteristics at border
search). In Cortez, the Court repeated
its approval of an officer's use of his
experience for probable cause and arti-
culable suspicion thus:

"The idea that an assessment of the
whole picture must yield a parti-
cularized suspicion contains two
elements, each of which must be
present before a stop is permis-
sible. First, the assessment must
be based upon all the circun-
stances. The analysis proceeds
with various objective observa-
tions, information form police
reports, if such are aailable, and
consideration of the modes or pat-
terns of operation of certain kinds
of lawbreakers. From these date, a
trained officer draws inferences
and makes deductions--inferences
and deductions that might well
elude an untrained perrson."
[Emphasis added].

449 U.S. at 418.

26
Additionally, after the officers were on

the vessel, they certainly acquired
probable cause to search the hold from
the presence and smell of marijuana on
the deck. When the officers so clearly
had probable cause to search the hold,
the warrantless search was obviously
justified by the exigency exception for

vehicles and boats. See, United States

v. Ross, U.S. _, 102 S.Ct. 2157

(1982); Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132 (1925); See also, Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

The Florida District Court's flat
rejection of the State's argument upon
articulable suspicion which was based
upon the customs "profile" and the obser-
vations, training and experience of the
officers, is patently erroneous in the
face of the correct constitutional

analysis in Royer, Mendenhall, and

sg hi lia ai tala ae

27
Cortez. The fact that the events tran-

spired in the proximity of a border is
also a fact, which the Florida courts
erroneously absolutely refused to credit.

See, Cortez. The Florida District

Court's erroneous analysis of "profiles"
reasonable suspicion and "boat'' law is an
extension of the same erroneous analysis

in Florida v. Rodriguez. See, also,

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. (1983).

\

Finally, the State submits that the
cause herein is in direct contravention
to the good faith analysis of this Court

in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31

(1979) where despite the unconstitutional
nature of the statute this Court never-
theless sustained the seizure where the
officers were relying in good faith upon
the statute and its validity. The

federal officers herein were relying upon

28
19 U.S.C. §1581(a) and that, which the

statute plainly says the officers can do:

board any vessels in customs waters for

document and customs inspection. For
Florida and all federal customs officers
in state court, the present ruling

squarely conflicts with Michigan v.

DeFillippo. Moreover, the officers' good

faith reliance upon their observations,
training and experience to conclude that
a detention was necessary, presents a
circumstance herein of plainly non-
egregious police conduct, to which the
harsh penalty of the exclusionary rule
should find no application. See,
California v. Mingares, 443 U.S. 916

(1981) (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, J.,
dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, at 496-502 (1976) (Burger, J., con-
curring); Id, at 537-542 (White, J., dis-

senting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.

29
419, at 420-429 (1977) (Burger, J. dis-

senting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.

590, at 610-612 (Powell, J. concurring) ;
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830

(5th Cir. 1980)(en banc), cert. den., 449
U.S. 1127 (1981).

30
VII

CONCLUS ION

The present opinion is in direct

conflict with United States v.

Villamonte-Marquez and another decision

in the same jurisdiction of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upon an impor-
tant issue of federal law regarding the
authority of federal officers. The
District Court has refused to follow
federal law and the paramount federal
interest in maintaining the integrity of
the borders and "customs waters" of the
United States. At the same time, this
present decision of the Florida Third
District Court is binding on all Florida

trial courts see, State v. Hayes, 333

So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and
emanates from the leading Florida state
court in the construction and analysis of

"boat" law and drug courier case law.

31
Florida has the greatest coastline of any

state and a grave interest in the consis-
tent interpretation of "boat law."' The
present decision's direct adverse effect
upon a national federal and state effort
in Florida to stem the tide of drug
traffic in Florida cannot be gainsaid. The
inconsistent and erroneous analysis of the
Florida District Court presents a conflict
on a matter of substantial public and
national importance. The present cause
presents a most cogent and timely case on
the question of federal officer's
authority under 21 U.S.C. §955 requiring
customs officers to seize contraband,
consistent with their primary statutory

authority.

This Court therefore plainly has

jurisdiction herein and should exercise

KF
exercise its jurisdiction for these,

‘special and important reasons." See,
Sup. Ct. R.1l7.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this
day of December, 1984, at Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.

JIM SMITH
Attorney General

CALVIN L. FOX, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General

A INC he alla Klin Rta tit a

APPENDIX

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CONTENTS

ITEM PAGE

EXCERPT: Hearing on
Motion to SUPPTFEBBS.ccccccccscccces A2-A53

EXCERPT: State's Initial
Brief on AppeAleccccccccccccccces A54-57

Preliminary Order of
Florida 3d District
Court of Appeal on Remand........ A58&

Opinion of Florida 3d
District Court of Appeal
on EPP rerrerirerrrerrerre A59-A63

Florida's Motion for
Rehearing in 3d District
Court of Appeal....ceeeeseeseeees A64-A69

Order of Florida 3d
District Court of Appeal
denying rehearing......2eeeeeee++ AIO

Order of Florida 3d District

Court of Appeal staying mandate

pending review in Florida

Supreme Court..ccccccccccccccvsece AJVI-AT2

Opinion of Florida Supreme
Court denying review......eee++++ A73

Order of Florida 3d

District Court of Appeal

staying mandate pending

review in U.S. Supreme Court..... A74

A2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE ELEVENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
AND FOR DADE COUNTY,
FLORIDA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
THE STATE OF FLORIDA )
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) No. 80-19386
SILVIO ZAFRA, )
Defendant, )

Metropolitan Justice
Building,

Miami, Florida
Friday, 9:00 a.m.,
February 20, 1981.

The above-entitled case came on for
motions before The Honorable James R.
Jorgenson, Circuit Judge, pursuant to

Notice.

A3

APPEARANCES:

JANET RENO, State Attorney, by
ELYSE TARG, Assistant State
Attorney.

Attorney for Plaintiff.

ROSEN, PORTELA, BRONIS, ANGUEIRA,
& CLAY, by WILLIAM A. CLAY, Esq.
of counsel.

Attorneys for Defendant.

AY
[ PREHEARING DISCUSSION OF
ATTORNEYS OMITTED]
RICHARD D. OGDEN was called as a
witness and, having been previously sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. TARG:

Q Would you please state your
name and official capacity for the
record.

A Richard D. Ogden. I ama
patrol officer for the United States
Customs Service.

Q How long have you been so
employed as a Customs Patrol Officer?
A For approximately eighteen months,
Q Pursuant to that job, did you
have any training?

A Yes, ma'am, I did.

Q What training was that?

A5

A I attended a seven-week integrated
law enforcement course of the Federal
Enforcement Center in Glencoe, Georgia.
In addition, I attended a four and a
half week course at the same location,
which dealt with specific duties
assigned to Customs Patrol Officers.

Q Officer, what are the duties of a

Customs Patrol Officer--and, for the
record, I will use a CPO.

What are the duties of a CPO?
A To intercept the flow of contraband
coming into the United States, primarily
narcotics, and to enforce other customs
and related laws.
Q Are your powers basically dealing

with boats, airplanes or what?

A Yes, ma'am.
A high percentage of our work deals
with boats and aircraft coming into

the country.

I i

A6é

Q Were you employed on August 10,
1980?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Were you employed as a CPO then?
A Yes, ma‘am.

Q Did you come on to duty that day?
A I came--reported for duty at

6:00 p.m. on October 9.

Q What were you going to do that
night?
A Generally that night we conducted

a routine survey--myself and my partners
--of the public boat ramps situated in
the local Miami area going from Key
Biscayne up to Bakers Haulover and
making an analysis on the different
types of trucks and boat trailers

parked at these locations.

Q How many boat ramps did you investi-

gate that night, approximately?

A Approximately eight.

A7

Q At any of these ramps did you
notice anything unusual or was anything

brought to your attention?

= Yes, ma‘an.
Q What was that?
A At Crandon Boat Ramp, I would

estimate at approximately eight to
nine p.m. that evening, we observed
two pick-up trucks with trailers at-

tached which attracted our attention.

Q Why did they attract your at-
tention?
A Based on my prior experience as

well as the documented experience of
all the other officers in our office,
this particular trailer, which was a
three axle float on, fit somewhat of a
profile commonly used in smuggling
activities.

Q Why did this seem suspicious?

What was it about this type of trailer

A&

which seemed suspicious?

A That this particular type of
trailer has the capability of carrying
a very large vessel as opposed to what
would be used just for fishing around
the bay.

The vessel generally carried on
this type of trailer hi« long range
capabilities and they are generally
very wide vessels.

Q Have you ever made any seizures

involving these typical-type trailers?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q Approximately how many?
A I would estimate approximately

twelve to fifteen.

Q When you have made these types of
seizures, have you found contraband,
drugs and the like?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Do you know of any other seizures

A9

made of these types of trailers in-

volving contraband?

A Yes, ma‘am.
Q How many, approximately?
A Throughout our office I would say

there has been several dozen made, or
more, in the eighteen months I have
been employed there.

Q Officer, you stated that you saw

that first at eight o'clock.
What did you do after you noticed it?
A We first observed it at approxi-

mately eight o'clock that evening. It

was the only truck and trailer at the
local ramps which had any potential as
far as we were concerned.

We established a surveillance on
the truck and trailer at the Crandon
boat ramp.

Q Did you sit on it? Did you watch

it all night or did you do anything during

that time?

————_ lS

Al10

A To the best of my recollection, we
did not sit on the truck and trailer
immediately after we spotted it.

We more or less made a note on it,
checked the other ramps and then came
back.

Q When was the next time you saw this
particular trailer?

A I would imagine about an hour and

a half, maybe two hours after we first
observed it, we came back to it.

That's just a rough estimate.

Q Did you see anything at that time?
A No, ma‘am.

It was in the exact position and
place as we had left it. |
Q What did you do then?

A At that time we established a sur-
veillance on the truck and trailer,
parked our vehicle somewhat in a
darkened area of the parking lot and

just sat and waited. bi sini

a a

All

Q Did you see anyone approach that
trailer later on, either that night or
the next morning?

A ¥es, ma’am.

Q Approximately when was the next
time you saw somebody approach that
trailer?

A The first and only time we saw some-

One approach that trailer was when one

of two persons boarded the 25 foot
Bertram, which arrived at Crandon Marina.
Q What time was that, approximately?
A I believe that was a little after

three o'clock in the morning.

Q Was that on October 10?
A Yes, ma‘an.
Q Was the length of time between which

you had first seen it and the fact that
it was three o'clock--did that affect you
in any way?

[OBJECTION OVERRULED].

eC ##swésedeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

Al12
A Yes, ma‘an. bs
Q How so?
A From the time we first spotted the

truck and trailer until the time someone
approached it, it was nearly seven hours.
That, to me, aroused my suspicions
in that it would have been an unusualiy
long fishing trip, in my opinion.
Q Would it have any other influence
on you, as to the length of time?
A Yes, ma‘an.
We have made notes in our office
and calculated on several occasions
that it generally takes vessels approxi-
mately four and a half to five hours to
go from here to any of the islands in
the Bimini area and to return. This
affected my thinking in that they had
more than sufficient time to go to any

of the islands, which could be used as

a stash site--and there are intelligence

Al3

bulletins that we have which indicate
that that is a common method--store the
marijuana on a vessel and return.

Q Did you have occasion to see anybody

on the boat?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q Who was that?
A The defendant, Mr. Siovio Zafra, and

one other individual.

Q Did anything about those two sini
arouse your suspicions?

A When we first initially spotted

the vessel arriving at the dock, I really
could not see them all that well. We

did notice that there were two persons,

: as they brought the boat out of the water
: and, as we approached, there were several
things which caught my attention.

Q what was that?

A First of ali, it was quite evident

right off, once I got close enough, that

Al4
both of the individuals were Latin.

Q Was there anything suspicious

about that?

A Not suspicious. Only in that we do
make a lot of arrests and seizures with
boats loaded with marijuana which are
manned by two or usually two or three
Latin males.

Very rarely, in fact never, have I
participated in one that I recall with a
woman on board or children or where both
individuals were Americans.

Q What about blacks--have you ever made
a seizure where there are blacks?

A I believe perhaps on one occasion.

Q In terms of the experience of Customs
Officers with which you are familiar, do
you know what percentage of their seizures
are made in cases where there are Latin

males?
{OBJECTION SUSTAINED]

[DISCUSSION OMITTED].

A detente

A15

Q Officer Ogden, was there anything
else about the appearance of these two

Latin males which you found to be suspi-

cious?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q What was that?

A On the initial glance at the two

individuals they appeared to be somewhat--
excuse the term-~-weatherbeaten. They
looked like they had been out for some
time engaging in perhaps heavy work or
something. |

Their clothes were somewhat dirty.
They just looked like they had really
been worked over.
Q Did there come a time when you

stopped the two individuals?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q When was that?
A A few minutes after we first stopped

the boat coming up to the dock.

Al16
Q What was the purpose of the stop?
A The purpose of the stop was to con-
duct a routine Customs boarding.
Q Pursuant to that, what did you do?
A My two partners went up to talk to
the individuals and to obtain the neces-
sary registration forms. I went to the
vessel, which was already aboard the
three axle float-on trailer and had
aiready been pulled out of the water.
I stepped on the fender above the wheels
of the trailer and looked over the gun-
wale of the vessel into the boat.
Q At that time did you notice anything

unusual about that boat?

A Yes, ma‘an.
Q What was that?
A I noticed that the main deck of the

vessel was considerably higher than what
I would believe the manufacturer would

have put it. This is also a profile

Al17
which has become quite common among
smugglers.

The trends have changed over the
years. They have gone from just throw-
ing it into the cabin and loading it in
remote spots along the coast to using
secret compartments and bringing it on
to the public boat ramps.

Q Have you ever encountered boats
like this in your experience?

A Yes.

Q Have you encountered contraband

in these boats?

A Yes, ma‘am.

Q How many seizures have you made in

boats of this type?

A I would say approximately maybe
fifteen.

Q What did you do next?

A I climbed aboard the vessel, took

a quick glance into the cabin area to

Al18

assure myself that there was no other
persons on board the cabin, and it was
more or less a visual~-just a quick visual
check.

I looked down at the deck and got
down on my hands and knees where I could
get a closer look at it.

I had one flashlight and I did ob-
serve marijuana residue embedded in
the carpet.

You could not see it until you got
down on your hands and knees and looked
really close and spread the pieces of
carpet, you know, apart.

Q Did you find anything else?
A Yes, ma‘am.

Prior to finding the residue, I did
run my hand over the carpet itself in an
effort to determine if I could feel any-
thing underneath and I did feel what ap-
peared to be a small rise underneath

the carpet.

ee

Al9

Due to its shape and size it led me
to believe that there was a hatch under-

neath the carpet.

Q This was covered by the carpet
though?

A That is correct.

Q In your experience, was that
suspicious?

A Yes, ma'am, it was.

Q Why?

A Because, the way the vessel was con-

structed, there shouldn't have been a
hatch of that nature under carpet tacked
down to the deck.

Q Was there anything else about what
you saw on the deck of that boat which »
made you suspicious? |
A Yes, ma‘'am. There were several

tovls and a lot of odds and ends on the
deck that really had nothing to do with

any fishing expedition, as far as I could

| ) —

A20

tell--the tool boxes, odds and ends,
mechanics’ tools and things that I, ordi-
narily, would not expect to see on a boat,
especially for a fishing expedition.

To the best of my recollection,
there was no fishing gear on board the
boat. I believe there might have been
an ice chest, but I didn't see any fish
nor did I see any bait.

Certainly anyone engaging in a
fishing trip for six or seven hours would,
in my opinion, at least come back with
something.

Q What led you to believe that these
people might have been on a fishing trip?

You said that any~ne on a fishing
trip would have had something there.

What led you to believe that they
might have been on a fishing trip?

A Generally--it was just an assump-
tion on my part at that point that

they were.

ee ————————————————

A21

Generally, when we stop boats and
ask the routine questions, they generally
are fishing or they're taking the boat
out for a test run to test it out.

Q In your experience, when you find
this residue on the ground what do you
usually find?

A Usually when we find residue, in my
experience, we'll either find a stash of
marijuana on the vessel or we'll find

a secret peupartecnt which has other
residue in it which is an indication
that perhaps at one time or another it
did carry marijuana.

Q What did you do after you have
gotten down on your hands and knees?

A After I had gotten on my hands and
knees and picked up a little residue and
saw the incongruency in the deck below
the carpet, I asked my partner, Richard

Nasossis, to come aboard the vessel and

i give me a hand.
———————————— OO

A22

Q Did he?

A Yes, ma'am, he did.
Q What happened then"
A I told him what I had found and he

agreed that there was definitely some-
thing amiss.

We pilled back the carpet off the
deck, wnich was--it was just lightly
tacked down with a little adhesive, and
he put his nose---

We did find a hatch. It was basi-
cally rectangular in shape and secured
by probably a dozen or more screws.

He got down on his hands and knees
and put his nose to one of the seams
in the hatch and took a whiff and came
up and said yeah--he could smell what he
thought was marijuana.

Q What did you do then?
A We proceeded to remove the screws

from the hatch and lifted the hatch and

A23

the marijuana was visible--immediately

visible--below the deck.

Q Have you seen marijuana before?
A Yes, ma‘am.
Q To your trained eyes, this was

marijuana?

A Yes, ma‘am.

Q Did you run any test on it?

A Yes, ma'am, we did run a field
test.

Q What did you do?

A We have a small test tube filled

with a chemical agent which, when
exposed to THC, which is in marijuana
and hashish, will turn bright red.

We removed a few leaves. I tore
open one of the bales and removed a few
leaves and a couple of seeds, put then
in the tube, mixed it with the chemical,
shook it up, and it tested positive and

turned bright red.

I acces il eteaieeeieeniasaeuallll

A24

Q How much marijuana was there?
A We found twelve bales and we esti-
mated the weight to be approximately
1000 pounds.

These were somewhat large bales.
Q Did all of this take place in
Dade County, Florida?
A Yes, ma'am.

MS. TARG: The State has no further
questions of this witness.

THE COURT: You may inquire.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. CLAY:
Q Officer Ogden, is it not true that
you and the other two Customs Patrol
Officers with you on the day and night
and morning in question were together

throughout all of your law enforcement

activities?
A That's correct.
Q Is it not also true that enforcement

LL —s

A25

of the laws of the State of Florida is

not within the scope of your authority?
[OBJECTION OVERRULED].

A If we come across violations of

Florida law in our efforts, then we do

make detentions as necessary and turn

them over to the local authorities.

Q That would be incidental to your

investigating a federal customs

violation?

A That's correct.

Q But you would not be conducting a

search for violations of Florida law,
would you?

A No, sir, we wouldn't.

Q Is it not true that you and the

other two Customs Patrol Officers,

while you were still in the surveillance
van, made the decision that you were

going to board this particular boat?

eaibbacmod nase intl hot i

A That's correct.

—s pases ae : ,

A26

A That's correct.

Q Is it not true that the van in which
you were located and from which you were
making some observations was approxi-
mately 100 yards from the boat, the
trailer and the truck, which you have

been describing?

A Approximately, give or take a few
yards.
Q After making the decision in the

van to approach these men and board the

boat, I assume all three of you officers
got out of the van and commenced to do

what you had planned to do?

A That's correct.
Q Your primary role was to climb up
on the trailer and climb up on the boat
and get inside the cockpit of the boat,
was it not?

A I wanted to take a look in the cabin

area to assure myself there were no other

qa ; “ —

; A27

persons there.
Q But you went directly to the
| trailer and to the boat?
A Went directly to the trailer and
stood up and looked in the boat.
Q While you were doing that, the
other two Customs Patrol Officers were
involved in some other activity?
A That's correct.
Q Is it not true that Customs Patrol
Officer Carlin was suffering from a back
injury, specifically a slipped disc,
and he lagged a little bit behind?
A That's correct.
Q You have been testifying regarding
three axle trailers and some type of a
profile associated with it.

Is it not true that three axle
trailers or four axle trailers are just
as consistent with being used by inno-

cent boat owners who happen to have

emacs

A28

large boats that necessitate that type
of trailer equipment? Is that not true?
A Yes, sir.
Q There is nothing uniquely specific
about three wheel or three axle or four
axle trailers which inevitably point to
involvement in drug smuggling, is there?
A They dictate a strong possibility
in our opinions, but it's possible that
they're--I'm sure that they're used by
innocent persons.
Q Would you not agree that probably
there are more three and four axle boat
trailers used innocently--than pursuant
to a criminal venture?
[OBJECTION OVERRULED].

A I would say that a large percentage
of them are probably innocent.

That's hard to say.
Q Sir, are you saying that you and

the other Customs Patrol Officers first

A29
observed the truck and trailer in
question in this case at 8:00 p.m. on

the night in question?

A Or thereabouts--eight or nine
o'clock.
Q That would essentially be the first

involvement of you and the other offi-
cers in this case, would it not?

A That would be the first time we
sighted it--right--and made a note of it.
Q Did I understand you to say that it
is your experience that the typical or
customary time it takes a vessel to
travel from, let us say, Crandon Marina
to the Bimini area and return in four to
five hours?

A Approximately four and a half to
five hours.

Q When you made your observations of
this vessel, you had absolutely no idea

what kind of engine it had in it, did you?

A30

A No, sir, I didn't.

Q You did not know whether it would be
a diesel engine that might be capable of
producing approximately a forward speed
of eight to ten knots, or some type of
high speed engine. Correct?

A That's correct.

Q Obviously the time it would take to
go from Miami to Bimini and return would
be completely dependent upon the kind of
engine a particular boat has. Correct?

A The kind and the fuel capacity,
right.

Q You had no knowledge of any of those
factors?

A No, sir, I didn't.

Q Did I understand you to say that you
and the other officers were traveling
around Dade County and checking out
various boat ramps and marinas?

A We checked a total of about eight

—————— LT Umm

A31

ramps ranging from the Crandon boat
ramp, Key Biscayne, to the public boat
ramp at Bakers Haulover.

Q You have testified regarding the
appearance of Mr. Zafra and the other
individual as weatherbeaten and having

dirty clothes.

A That's correct.

Q Do you recall testifying in a depo-

sition on January 30, 1981, in this case?
A Right.

Q You were under oath, of course?

A Right.

Q Is it not true that you made abso-

lutely no mention of the alleged appea-

rance of these men as being weather-

beaten and wearing dirty clothes?
[OBJECTION SUSTAINED].

Q Did you prepare a report in this

particular case?

A I did not. No, sir.

js —rt~—‘“isOSsSsSsSs—sSsSsOCOlUl_"#. lee

A32

8) Do you own a Bertram boat yourself?
A No, sir, I don't.
Q Do you own any boat?
A No, sir, I don't.
Q Have you ever owned a Bertram?
A No, sir.
Q You have you ever been on one?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times?
A Half a dozen.
We have one at work.
Q This particular Bertram boat in this

case is an older Bertram, is it not?
A Yes, sir, I believe it is.

I think it's a 1975 or something.
Q You know enough about boats that
they were constructed in a heavily built
fashion a few years back than they are
today, do you not?
A Right.

- Q Correct?

A33

A That's correct.
Q The whole structure and thickness
of the fiberglass is a lot thinner today
than it was even two, three, four, five
years ago?
A That's correct.
Q You have never been to the Bertram
factory, have you?
A No, sir.

[OBJECTION OVERRULED].
Q You never studied any Bertram manu-
facturer specifications, did you?
A No, sir, I haven't.
Q In fact you never had any experience
with this type and this year of Bertram
vessel before, did you?
A Not to the best of my recollection.
Q After you went directly to the vessel
and the trailer, climbed up to the fender,
did you then climb into the boat?

A After a few seconds pause looking

,

A34

in the boat--the initial, visual conten-
plation of the deck area.
Q You never asked any questions of

Mr. Zafra or of the other individual,

did you?
A No, sir, I didn't.
Q The other individual was a

Mr. Sanchez?

A That's correct. I believe so.

Q You observed the raised deck after
you climbed to the fender of the trailer?
A That's correct.

Q The fender and the trailer would be
about two and a half to three feet above
the ground?

A I don't believe it would be quite

that high. It would be---

Q Or pretty close to it?
A Maybe eighteen, twenty inches.
Q Prior to climbing aboard the trailer

and viewing the deck of the vessel, you

A35

were unable to see those portions of the

vessel, were you not, from the ground

level?
A That's correct.
Q It was absolutely necessary for you

to climb up in order to get the proper
vantage point to see in?

A That's correct.

Q After climbing up in that fashion
and observing for a few seconds with a
flashlight, you climbed aboard the vessel
and got into the cockpit?

A That's correct.

Q You then flashed your light into the
enclosed or walled off cabin?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is when you then got down on
your hands and knees and commenced a
close examination of the fibers of this

indoor/outdoor carpet?

A That's correct.

A36

Q Before climbing aboard the trailer,
climbing aboard the boat, commencing the
inspection of the carpet in a hand and
knees fashion, pulling up the carpet,
getting tools and unfastening the secret
hatch, did you ever ask Mr. Zafra or
Mr. Sanchez whether they had any articles
aboard the boat which might be subject
to the custom laws in the United States?
A No, sir, I didn't.

MR. CLAY: I have no further
questions.
[REDIRECT AND RECROSS EXAMINATION OMITTED]

[DIRECT EXAMINATION: WITNESS,
JAMES A. CARLIN].

THE COURT: Who is your next
witness?
MS. TARG: Officer Carlir.
Thereupon:
JAMES A. CARLIN

was called as a witness and, having been

ee ee ee

A37

previously sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. TARG:
Q Officer, would you please state
your name and official capacity for
the record.
A James A. Carlin, Customs Patrol
Officer assigned to the Miami
District.
Q How long have you been so
employed?

A A little over two years.

Q Prior to that time, what was
your employment?
A I was a lieutenant with the Canal

i
;
: Zone Police in the Panama Canal zone.
|

Q For how many years?
: A Thirteen.
; Q Have you had any training in

customs work?

A38

A Well, due to my past experience as
a police officer, I went to the ad-
vanced phase of the Custom School,

which is in Glencoe, Georgia.

Q What kind of courses did you take
there?
A Search and seizure, constitutional

law, Miranda warnings, search of
vessels and those types of customs-
related tasks.

Q Turning your attention to

October 10, 1980, had you started work
that day or before?

A We started on the 9th at 6:00 p.m.
Q When you say, "we" to whom are you
referring?

A Myself, Officer Nasossis and
Officer Ogden.

Q What was your duty for that period

which you were working? -

A We're assigned to the marine section

ee Se eee

A39

on the night shift. So, basically we
check boat ramps for any incoming
vessels--the vartous boat ramps into the
Miami area.
Q What is the purpose of checking the
boat ramps for the waterways? What is
the relationship to Customs?
A Well, we check basically for boats
coming from foreign countries.

Boats coming into those ramps do
have access to Customs waters. So, we

check for documents and any undeclared

items they might have.

SSS

; Q What are Customs waters?
|
A Three miles out.
Q That night, turning your attention

to October 10, did you see anything

unusual?

rare rata cted ine

A We noticed an older model pickup

truck--I believe it was a 19/71l--at the

| Crandon Park boat ramp with a large

Te ee ee

A40

trailer on it.

We call it a Tandrum trailer. We
call it a three axle, but it refers
to three wheels on each side. So, it
would be a six wheel trailer.

Normally these types of trailers
do carry larger boats. So, we were sort
of interested in this trailer.

Q Did you look at the truck which
was there, too?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Was there anything unusual about
the truck, in your mind?

A Well, it was an older model truck.

In our experience with contraband
or the smuggling of drugs, they go from
one extreme to the other. They either

have a pretty fancy truck, pretty fancy

rig, or it seems they go te the other
extreme and it's an older truck with a

newer model trailer, of course.

ShGas wamin «

A41

Q Is that what you found that night?
A Yes, ma'‘am.
Q Did you ever see anybody approach

that railer and truck?
A Yes, ma'am.

At approximately 3:10 a.m., on the
10th, a vessel came into the deck at
Crandon Park and an individual did walk
to the truck from the vessel.

Q What happened?

A The truck was backed up, the truck
and trailer were backed down to the
vehicle, at which time, give or take a
few minutes, the Dade County Patrol
Officer drove up in his vehicle and he
went over to the vessel at the dock.

They were parked at a distance away,
but apparently he was talking with the
individuals and he started to walk away

from the vessel on the dock there, at

which time we drove up in our truck, got

A4l-a

out of the vehicle and approached the
vessel.

Q Did you notice how much time it took
for the people to tie up the boat to the

trailer and hitch?

A I would say--you mean, to actually

trailer it up and get it out of there?

Q Yes.
A Probably fifteen minutes.
Q Was there anything unusual about

this, in your mind?
A They knew what they were doing.

In my experience of checking these
ramps, it seems that a lot of the people
seem to have a naturally hard time
trailering their boats up. It's hard
for them to line them up and get them on
the trailer straight and everything

else, and these gentlemen seemed to know

what they were doing. They got it on

rather rapidly and---

A42

Q Was that suspicious to you?
A Well, it arose my suspicion because
normally the people that do get involved
in contraband seem to be more proficient
at trailering a boat than the normal,
everyday fisherman does.
Q Was there anything else about the
boat or the people in it that arose
your suspicions?
A There were only two people on board
and---
Q What was suspicious to you about
that?
A Normally a person who would be
involved in with what we are involved
in--contraband--that would involve two
or three people on board.

Very seldom do you see a family or
kids or anything of that nature on a
boat that is involved with this type

of thing. It's rare, anyway.

A43

Q What did you do?
A As we approached in the vehicle,
Officer Butchko, who was the Dade County
man there, was sort of--I think he was
getting ready to leave, and we identi-
fied ourselves as Customs Officers to
him and we approached the vessel.

We informed the--well, I had what
we call a Customs Raid jacket. It's a
nylon windbreaker with the Customs Raid
jacket. It's a nylon windbreaker with
the Customs badge, you know, embossed
on it, and on the back it says, "U.S.
Customs" I think in two inch lettering.
It has a Customs patch on each sleeve.

So, they more or less knew who we

were, but we identified ourselves with
our badge holder in the case and told
them we were from U.S. Customs and that
we would like to inspect their vessel

and check their documents on the vessel.

A44G

Q What happened next?

I believe Mr. Zafra identified
himself as the master of the vessel and
he was asked for documents, I1 think,
by--I believe Officer Nasossis who asked
him for his documents in English, and I
think I also asked him in Spanish, you
know, to further clarify what we wanted.

At that time I returned to our
vehicle to begin filling out a search
and béetedac form, which we routinely
do in most cases involving Customs
seizures.

MS. TARG: I have no further
questions of this witness, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CLAY:
Q Officer Carlin, as I understand it,
you had a slipped disc or a back injury
which kind of disabled you a little bit?

A Yes, sir.

A45

Q Climbing in and out of the van was
a little more difficult for you than it
was for the other gentlemen with you?
rN Right.
Q Did you lag behind when the three
of you decided to get out of the
Customs van?
A Right, plus I was driving the van
so, by the time I secured it, put the
brake on aud everything else, they had
already gone out.

I was probably a few steps behind
then.
Q Is it not true that Customs Patrol
Officer Ogden went directly to the
trailer and boat, climbed onto the
trailer and then climbed aboard the
vessel?
A I believe there were a few pre-
liminary questions ferer; but I'm sure

Ogden was the first one on board.

»

A 46

He didnit alii just walk up and
jump on per se, but he did go on shortly
thereafter, after a few preliminary
questions.

"We're from Customs. We want to
check your documents."

Q Officer Ogden was already up on the
trailer at the time you came up to

Mr. Zafra and Officer Nasossis?

A I'm not sure. I don't think he got
on quite that fast.

Q Are you guessing on this or do

you know?

A I would say no.

Q You testified regarding the signi-
ficance of this truck being an older
truck. Correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Would you not agree that the fact

that this was an older truck is just as

consistent with somebody who is an

A47
unocent owner or user of the truck as
it is with somebody who is a person who
is criminally involved in the smuggling
of contraband?
A Yes, sir.

We see lots of vehicles there that,
just like you're saying, are not in-
volved in this type of activity.

Q You would agree that there are
probably more older trucks used by
people innocently than there are used
by people involved in smuggling, would
you not?

A Sure. I'd have to say that.

Q Regarding the proficiency of these
two men at trailering a boat, is it not
true that this proficiency and the short
period of time it took them to trailer
the vessel in this case is just as con-
sistent with a couple of men who were

innocent, experienced boaters and

fishermen?

A48

Is that not true?
A Yes, but it's a proficiency seldom
displayed on the ramps in South Florida
by the average, everyday person.

For some reason, they have a hard
time getting their boats on the trailer.
Q Mainly it depends on how many beers

they have while they are out doing some

boating?
A Could be.
es The proficiency is just as con-

sistent with an innocent man as with a

smuggler?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of your duties, you

observed many people who were out

boating in the evening and fishing in

the evening, did you not?
A Fase. Gif «
Q Boats coming back to dock in the

middle of the night or the early morning

a cr a

A49

hours is certainly not unusual for
fishermen or boaters, is it?
A One thing that was unusual---
Q But my question is---

[OBJECTION OVERRULED].
Q My question is: Night fishing and

night boating is not something unusual,

is it?
A No, sir.
Q Would you describe your role in the

case as a relativély minor one in light
of the fact that you had a back injury?
A Yes.

Normally we take our turns in
boarding vessels and getting directly
involved but, because of the injury, I
filled out the boarding form and the
paperwork-type angle of it that night.
Q Would you not agree, sir, that
there was nothing unusual about this

particular 25 foot Bertram or the two

ee a

——— eee

A50
men, Zafra and Sanchez, prior to their
being stopped, detained and the boat
being boarded and searched?

A The only thing unusual about it---
it had been out for quite a long time.
We first observed it at about
8:00 p.m. on the 9th, and it came back
at about 3:00 p.m. on the following

morning.

That's quite a time lapse to be
out in the bay itself. Normally you
don't stay out for that many hours.

That's the only factor.

Q So, your answer would be that there
was nothing unusual, other than the

time lapse that the boat was out?

A No, sir. Yes, that would be my
answer.
Q Obviously you have no knowledge

whatsoever of whether the boat broke

down or was out for that long a period

a ak a

A51

’ of time due to an engine breakdown,

do you?
A No, I don't.
Q The fact that the boat was out of

your sight for seven or eight hours is
just as consistent with innocent fishing
or an innocent, down on his luck boat
owner whose boat breaks down out there
on the bay?
A Sob: ahs:

MR. CLAY: Nothing further.

[REDIRECT AND RECROSS EXAMINATION OMITTED].

A52

[ EXCERPT: ARGUMENT OF PROSECUTOR]
{[1. Customs Search]

MS. TARG: I will argue that it was
a Customs search and, in determining
whether the search was good or not good,
you just have to look at the federal law
on searches and the federal law on
boarding on vessels.

Customs authority 19 U.S.C. 1581A
provides that Customs has a right to board
any vessel in Customs water to zesk for
documents or other papers regarding the
boat within twelve miles of the coast of
the United States, and this boat was seen
coming from the waters.

The officers testified that it was
only a few miles outside the Atlantic
Ocean. It was clearly in Customs waters.

* * *

[2. Articulable Suspicion]
The Court cases have held that, in

deciding whether there is reasonable sus-

picion, a Customs Patrol Officer is

re ae

A53

entitled to assess the facts in the
light of their experience, and you must
look at t..e totality of the circun-
stances.

We would, for those reasons, argue
that the test to be given is: Did these
CPO‘'s, in their experience in the Customs
Service, have articulable facts together
with rational inferences from these
facts to engender a reasonable suspicion
that the vessel in this case was being
used for narcotics trafficking and, again,
we rely on those cases and on U.S. versus

Brignoni-Ponce, a Supreme Court case

cites at 95 Supreme Court 2574.

A54

[EXCERPT OF STATE'S INITIAL BRIEF ON APPEAL
TO FLORIDA 3d DCA]

B. Furthermore, the State would note
that the officers did indeed have reason-
able suspicion, based upon both their ex-

perience with smugglers and their observa-

tions, to board the vessel. See, United

States v. Cortez, U.8. > nen BaSt.

690 (1981); see, also, United States v.

Mendenhall, es. ; 866 8.6. 21679,

64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (approving use of

profile characteristics); United States v.

Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645, 646 (5th Cir.

1973) (approving use of "profile" charact-
eristics at border search). In Cortez
the Court repeated its approval of an of-
ficer's use of his experience for probable
cause and articulable suspicion thus:

"The idea that an assessment of

the whole picture yield a par-

ticularized suspicion contains

two elements, each of which must

be present before a stop is per-
missible. First, the assessment

Additionally, after the officers were on
the vessel,
bable cause to search the hold from the

presence and smell of marijuana on the

deck.

officers so clearly had probable cause to
search the hold,
was obviously justified by the exigency
exception for vehicles and boats.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 5

A55

must be based upon all the cir-
cumstances. The analysis pro-
ceeds with various objective
observations, information from
police reports, if such are
available, and consideration

of the modes or patterns of

operation of certain kinds of

lawbreakers. From these data,

a trained officer draws in-
ferences and makes deductions
--inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained
person.” Emphasis added.

101 8.Ce. at 695.

{Citations Omitted]. When the

S.Ct

statute in Florida Statute 8933.19.

also,

they certainly acquired pro-

the warrantless search

See,

4

280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted by

Texas v. White, S23 UeBe G7 e

See

ini

) A56

96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975);

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 99 S.Ct.

1975, 26 L.Ed. 419 (1970); State v. Lopez,
369 So.2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In

Chambers v. Maroney, the Court explained

the exigency requirement thus:

"Arguably, because of the
preference for a magistrate's
judgment, only the immobili-
zation of the car should be '
permitted until a search war-

rant (sic) is obtained; argua-
bly, only the ‘lesser’ intru-

sion is permissible until the
magistrate authorizes the
‘greater’. But which is the
‘greater’ and which the ‘les-

ser’ intrusion itself a deba-
table question and the answer

may depend on a variety of cir-
cumstances. For constitutional
purposes, we see no difference
between on the one hand seizing
and holding a car before present-
ing the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is
reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment’. [Emphasis addedj 399 U.S.
at p. 51-52.

Undoubtedly the exigency exception to the

Warrant requirement was manifest in the

A57

case at bar. The trial court's suppres-
sion of the evidence is therefore erro-
neous even under traditional search and

seizure analysis and must be reversed.

A58

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

THIRD DISTRICT

JULY TERM, A.D. 1983

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1983

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, **

Appellant, ak
vs. ** CASE NO. 81-474
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, 8%

Appellee. ak

The cause is set for oral argument
upon the mandate of the Supreme Court of
the United States on Monday, December 12,
1983 at 10:30 o'clock A.M. with twenty
(20) minutes being allowed each side to
present oral argument. The parties may
submit supplemental briefs twenty (20)

days from date hereof.

A59

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT

JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1984

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, **

Appellant, ak
vs. ** CASE NO. 81-474
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, ek

Appellee. salad

Opinion filed January 24, 1984.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Dade County, James R. Jorgenson, Judge.

Jim Smith, Attorney General, and
Calvin L. Fox, Assistant Attorney General,
for appellant.

Paul Morris; Rosen, Portela, Bronis,
Angueira & Clay and William A. Clay, for
appellee.

Before HUBBART, C.J. and BARKDULL AND
SCHWARTZ, JJ.

A60

On Mandate of Supreme Court of
the United States

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us pursuant to the
mandate of the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted States in Florida v. Zafra, 462 U.S.
__» 103 S.Ct. 3529, 77 L.Ed.2d 1382
(1983), which vacated our decision in
State v. Zafra,408 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1982), rev. denied, 418 So.2d 1281
(Fla. 1982), and remanded the cause "for
further consideration in light of United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
',103 6.Ct.23735 77 Ls86.2¢ 22)
(1983)." In that decision the Supreme
Court held that U.S. Customs officials
may, consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment, board a vessel located in waters
having ready access to the open sea for
the purpose of examining the manifest
and other vessel documents under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a) (1976),1 without any reasonable
suspicion of prior wrongdoing.

1, Footnote 2 to the opinion specifically
states:

Section 1581(a) provides Customs offi-
cials with authority beyond boarding for
document inspections. In this case, how-
ever, we are concerned only with the more
narrow issue, United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S.at Bee, 103 Sst.
at-Za7> @s2.

(Footnote 2 on page A61)

<cltliatstitliai inant

A6é1

We conclude that, for two reasons,
Villamonte-Marquez is inapposite to the
present case. First, the vessel involved
was boarded while located on land atop a
boat railer at the Crandon Park Marina in
Miami. It was obviously not therefore in
“waters offering ready access to the open
sea," an essential requirement of the
decision. See 462 U.S. at——, 103 S.Ct.
at 2580, 77 L.Ed.2d at 31.

2. The court at the outset of its opinion
states:

Congress has provided that "[a]ny of-
ficer of the customs may at any time go on
board of any vessel...at any place in the
United States...and examine the manifest
and other documents and papers...and to
this end may hail and stop such vessel...
and use all necessary force to compel con-
pliance."” 19 U.S.C. 8 1581(a) (1976). We
are asked to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment is offended when Customs offi-
cials, acting pursuant to this statute and
without any suspicion of wrongdoing,
board for inspection of documents a vessel
that is located in waters providing ready
access to the open sea. United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at ». 403
S.Ct. at 2575 (footnotes omitted). The
Court's decision answers this question in
the negative.

A62

Second, and probably more important,
the boarding and subsequent search of this
land-situated vessel was in no sense under-
taken as a document inspection. As the
eleventh circuit has recently, and we
think correctly, stated in United States
v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546 (llth Cir.

1983):

In United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, US... , 103 S.Ct. 2573,
77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that no suspicion is nece-
Ssary to stop and board a vessel that
is located in waters providing ready
access to the open sea to conduct a
document inspection pursuant to 19
U.S.C. $ 1581(a). The Court also
made clear that Customs officers are
not precluded from using document
check authority simply because they
Suspect drug smuggling or other il-
legality on board, U.S. at __e=s,
n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 2577 n. 3. How-
ever, nothing in that opinion
Suggests that reasonable suspicion
is not required when the Customs
officers‘ conduct, objectively asses-
sed, indicates they did not stop and
board the vessel to make a document
inspection. [e.s.]

711 F.2d at 1554 n. 13. The emphasized
observation plainly applies here. No one
was even on the vessel at the time of the
boarding; no effort was made by the Cus-
toms officer while aboard to inspect
vessel documents or examine the manifest;
and the entire search was for the admit-
ted purpose of discovering whether mari-
juana was concealed on the vessel.3

(Footnote 3 on page A632)

A63

Neither Villamonte-Marquez nor any
other decision of the United States Su-
preme Court or the courts of Florida has
ever authorized such a search without a
prior showing of founded suspicion, one
which the state concedes was not made in
this case. See State v. Zafra, supra.
Indeed, Villamonte-Marquez was careful
to hold that the suspicionless stop of a
vessel located in waters providing ready
access to the open sea for a vessel docu-
ment check, while constitutionally valid,
did not thereafter authorize a general
search of the vessel--as was conducted
in this case--because the stop

involves only a brief detention where
officials come on board, visit public
areas of the vessel, and inspect docu-
ments. "Neither the [vessel] nor its
occupants are searched, and visual
inspection of the [vessel] is limited
to what can be seen without a search."
(citations omitted)

462 U.S. at » 103 S.Ct. at 2581, 77
L.Ed.2d at 33.

For these reasons, we hold that our
previous dicision is unaffected by Villa-
monte-Marquez. The order below is there-
fore again

Affirmed.

3. See also, United States v. Whitmire,

595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir.1979), in which

Customs officers boarded a docked vessel

after checking its documents ashore; in

Herrera, the court stated that
{[iln these circumstances, neither bor-
der crossing authority nor section
1581(a) document and safety check au-
thority was available to render the
boarding search reasonable under the
fourth amendment.

711 F.2d at 1553.

A64

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT

CASE NO. 81-474

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, **

Appellant, wk
MOTION FOR
vs. ** REHEARING
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, salad
Appellee. xk

COMES NOW, the Appellant, THE STATE
OF FLORIDA, by and through its under-
signed counsel and submits this Motion

for Rehearing, to wit:

1. That on January 44, 1984, this
Honorable Court again affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court below dismissing
the present criminal charges upon the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. This
cause had been previously reversed in

Florida v. Zafra, 462 U.S. 5 nee Bets

A65

3529, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1382 (1983). In so
ruling, this Court held that United

States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.

__, 103 8,Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed. 2d 22
(1983), permitting customs officers to
board any vessel under Section 19 U.S.C.
Section 158l(a) without articulable sus-
picion, was inapplicable to the present
circumstance. Citing this Court's ori-
ginal opinion in State v. Zafra, 408 So.2d
745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this Court stated
that the State had "conceded" that there
was no articulable suspicion in the

present case.

2. This Court's analysis that Th
State "conceded" that there is no arti-
sitesi suspicion herein is based solely
upon the wording of this Court's opinion
in State v. Zafra, 408 0.2d, supra. As
reflected in the excerpt to the State's

original brief on appeal in this matter,

iain

A66

it states:

"Furthermore, the State would
note that the officers did indeed
have reasonable suspicion, based
upon their experience with smugg-
lers and their observations, to
board the vessel."

Brief of State at p. 14.

The undersigned has litigated this matter
throughout on behalf of the State and the
undersigned never conceded anywhere that
there was no articulable suspicion in the
present oie: This is particularly so
since the undersigned was aware that

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. | Zee B.Sks

1319, 75 L.Ed. 2d 229 (1983), was pending
at the time this present matter was being
litigated and prepared for presentation
to the United States Supreme Court. This
Court's reference to any “concession" by

the State should thereby be deleted.

3. The State submits that this Court

has totally overlooked the fact that the

A67

officers observed the boat in "customs
waters" and boarded the boat within
seconds after it had been removed from
"customs waters" as it sat on a boat trai-
ler on the boat ramp leading to "customs
waters". Therefore, this Court's analysis
that the boat was not in “customs waters"
at the time it was boarded is not control-

ling nor dispositive of the present issues.

4. This Court's central position that
the customs officers intended to board the
boat because they suspected that it was
carrying narcotics rather than boarding
the boat to check “customs papers" is not

accurate. First of all, the undisputed

evidence below from the testifying officers
established that Officer Nasossis checked
the boat's papers. See T.16; T.41.
Secondly, the officers boarded the boat

because they decided to conduct a routine

aaa

; A68

customs boarding. T1T.16. The evidence

Hanes _

in this regard is undisputed. Further-

more, this Court's foregoing analysis as

ee Fe -

to the intent of the officers is not rele-

vant. See State v. Valdes, 423 So.2d 944

(Fla. 1982). In Valdes, the officer

indicated that he conducted an "inventory

search". The Valdes court rejected the

Statement of the officer's intent as
controlling because the officer had law-
; ful authority to conduct the search on

other grounds. In United States v.

Villamonte-Marquez, supra, 103 S.Ct. at

2577, N.3, the United States Supreme Court

?

specifically rejected this Court's ana-
lysis, holding that the officer's sub-

jective intent to seize narcotics from the

vessel in Villamonte-Marquez, was not rele-

vant inasmuch as the officers had lawtul

authority to board the boat in any event.

ee a

A69

5. Finally, the State submits
that the Customs Officers plainly had
authority to search the vessel for nar-
cotics under the specific terms of 19
U.S.C. 1581(a) and 21 U.S.C. 8 955.
This Court's iimitation of the authority
of Custom's Officers is therefore unlaw-

ful and contrary to Congressional intent.

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, the
Appellant, THE STATE OF FLORIDA, prays
that this Honorable Court will vacate its
prior opinion in this matter and grant
rehearing and upon rehearing will reverse
the trial court's judgment granting the

present motion to suppress.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ths 8th
day of February 1984, at Miami, Dade

County, Florida.
Respectfully submitted,
JIM SMITH
Attorney General

(signed) Calvin L. Fox
Assistant Attorney General

A70

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT

JANUARY TERM,A.D., 1984

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984

STATE OF FLORIDA, at

Appellant, kk
vs. kk 6CASE NO. 81-474
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, ak

Appellee. ak

Upon consideration, appellant's

motion for rehearing is hereby denied.

A71
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT
JANUARY TERM, A.D., 1984

FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1984

THE STATE OF FLORIDA **

Appellant, ak
vs. ** CASE NO. 81-474
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, sadhel

Appellee. ae

The motion of appellant to stay the
issuance of our mandate pending review by
the Supreme Court of Florida of the order
of judgment of this court entered herein
on January 24, 1984 is granted pending
entry of an order by the Supreme Court
accepting or rejecting jurisdiction for
review and for fifteen days thereafter;
provided, however that this order so
staying the mandate shall stand vacated

without further order of this court in

A72

the event proceedings to invoke such
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are
not timely commenced, through failure
of the movant to file notice thereof
in this court as and within the time

required by Fla.R.App.P. 9.120(b).

A73

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1984

STATE OF FLORIDA,

CASE NO. 65,129
Petitioner, : District Court of
Appeal 3d District

vs. : Case No. 81-474

SILVIO P. ZAFRA, :

Respondent. $

This cause having herefore been sub-
mitted to the Court on jurisdictional
briefs and portions of the record deemed
necessary to reflect jurisdiction under
Article V, Section 3(b), Florida Consti-
tution (1980), and the Court having de-
termined that it should decline to accept
jurisdiction, it is ordered that the Pe-
tition for Review is denied.

No Motion for Rehearing will be en-
tertained by the Court. See Fla.R.App.P.
9.330(d).

ADKINS, ALDERMAN, OVERTON, MCDONALD,
and EHRLICH, J.J., Concur.

BOYD, C.J. and SHAW, J., dissent.

A74

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT
JULY TERM, A.D., 1984

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1984

STATE OF FLORIDA, aa

Appellant, ak
vs. alia CASE NO. 81-474
SILVIO P. ZAFRA, ae

Appellee del

Upon consideration, appellant's
motion to stay the issuance of our mandate
| pending review of the Supreme Court of

the United States is granted.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1845%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
