# Appendix — Lovell v. Cochran Et Ux > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1572%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2005 - **Citation:** 544 U.S. 1058 ## Text la APPENDIX A UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 03-2522 JOSEPH S. COCHRAN; BRENDA S. COCHRAN, Appellants, V. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture; NATIONAL DAIRY PROMOTION BOARD Appellees And FRED LOVELL; LEE GREENWALT; JACKIE ROOT; EARNEST NORMAN; STEPHEN MASHALL; CECIL MOYER; JAMES VANBLARCOM, Intervenors-Appellees. January 12, 2004, Argued February 24, 2004, Filed JUDGES: Before: Sloviter. Rendell and Aldisert, Circuit Judges. The American public is very familiar with the “Got Milk?™ “ ads on television and in the print media. This appeal requires us to decide whether a federal statute may compel a small dairy farm in Pennsylvania to help pay for the white-mustache milk advertisements and other dairy promotions. Implicated here are general First Amendment precepts that protect the right to refrain from speaking and the right to refrain from association, and the specific issue of whether the government may compel individuals to fund speech with which they disagree. 2a Joseph and Brenda Cochran are independent small-scale dairy farmers. They are not members of any dairy manu- facturing or marketing cooperative. They alone determine how much milk to produce, how to sell and market it and to whom it will be sold. The Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983, 7 U.S.C. § 4501 et seg. (“Dairy Promotion Act,” “Dairy Act,” or “Act”), provides for the creation of the Dairy Promotion Program and authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (“Secretary”) to issue an order creating the Na- tional Dairy Promotion and Research Board (“Dairy Board”) to administer the program. To finance the promotional projects and the Dairy Board’s administration of them, the Dairy Act and implementing order require every milk pro- ducer in the United States to pay mandatory assessments of 15 cents per hundredweight of milk sold.” Jd. § 4504(g); 7 C.F.R. § 1150.152. Neither the Dairy Act nor the order permits dissenting milk producers to withhold contributions for advertising or promotional projects to which they object. The Cochrans object to paying these assessments and filed an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking a declaration that the Dairy ' The Dairy Act provides: The order shall provide that each person making payment to a producer for milk produced in the United States and purchased from the producer shall . . . collect an assessment based upon the number of hundredweights of milk for commercial use handled for the account of the producer and remit the assessment to the Board. The rate of assessment for milk . . . prescribed by the order shall be 15 cents per hundredweight of milk for commercial use or the equivalent thereof, as determined by the Secretary. 7 U.S.C. § 4504(g). ssnspeaerananenseenans niente eens, 3a Actviolates their First Amendment rights of free speech and association. The Cochrans operate a small commercial dairyfarm with approximately 150 cows on about 200 acres of land in Tioga County, north-central Pennsylvania. In contrast to many lar- ger-scale commercial dairy farms, the Cochrans employ what is known as “traditional” methods of dairy farming. Tradi- tional dairy farming is less aggressive than larger-scale com- mercial farming, as it allows cows more room to move and graze and does not use the recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone (rBGH).” The Cochrans believe that their methods result in healthier cows, a cleaner environment and superior milk. The Cochrans object to the advertising under the Dairy Act because it conveys a message that milk is a generic product that bears no distinction based on where and how it is produced, and thereby forces them to subsidize speech with which they disagree. As the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, it may also prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain views, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943), or pay suosidies for speech to which individuals object, Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 9-10, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Dep't of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977). ? rBGH, also known as recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), is a genetically engineered growth hormone administered to dairy cows to boost milk production. Although the Food and Drug Administration has approved the use of rBGH for dairy production in the United States, consumer advocates and small dairy producers have questioned the longterm effects of the growth hormone on humans, cows and the environment. See Barnes v. Shalala, 865 F. < .pp. 550, 554 (W.D. Wis. 1994). 4a The Cochrans’ lawsuit named as defendants Ann Veneman in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the National Dairy Promotion Board, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the remittance of compelled assessments by all dairy producers to finance generic dairy advertisements. Alleging that the Dairy Act unconstitutionally compels them to subsi- dize speech with which they disagree, the Cochrans filed a motion for summary judgment contending that their case was controlled by the teachings of United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001), in which the Supreme Court held that compelled subsidies under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 (“Mushroom Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq., violated First Amendment protections. The Government filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that this case is controlled by the teachings of Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997), in which the Supreme Court upheld compelled subsidies for advertising California tree fruit under two mar- keting orders issued pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing and Agreement Act of 1937 (“AMAA”), 7 U.S.C. § 608c ef seq. The Government argued that the generic dairy advertis- ing subsidized under the Dairy Act constitutes “government speech” and is therefore immune from First Amendment scrutiny and, moreover, that the Dairy Act is a species of economic regulation that does not violate the First Amend- ment.’ The district court agreed with the Government and * Seven Pennsylvania dairy farmers who support the Dairy Promotion Act and Program petitioned the district court for leave to intervene as defendants and the district court granted the petition for intervention under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Intervenors filed a cross motion for summary judgment, echoing the arguments made by the Government in its motion. coeneiemmeereemmanieeeemeemneninnsnsienenecemeneemnesstnetaemeemasaniemmmasinate, | Sa granted summary judgment in its favor, holding that the Dairy Act. survives the deferential First Amendment scrutiny afforded to economic regulation. The Cochrans appeal. We must decide whether the challenged communications pursuant to the Dairy Act are government speech and thereby immune from First Amendment scrutiny. If these commu- nications are private speech, we must decide whether the Dairy Act violates the First Amendment free speech and association rights of dairy farmers. In doing so, we must consider the quantum of scrutiny to be applied to determine the validity of regulations, such as the Dairy Act, that compel commercial speech. For the reasons that follow we reverse the judgment of the district court and hold that the compelled speech pursuant to the Dairy Act is private speech, not government speech, and is therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny. We hold also that the Act violates the Cochrans’ First Amendment free speech and association rights by compelling them to subsidize speech with which they disagree. In so doing we conclude that the subsequent Supreme Court decisions of Glickman in 1997 and United Foods in 2001 severely dilute the precedential vitality of our ultimate holding in United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989), in which we concluded that the compelled assessments pursuant to the Beef Promotion Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 2901 ef seq., Survived First Amendment scrutiny. I. In determining the side on which the axe must fall—on Glickman or on United Foods—we must start by examining why the Supreme Court went one way in its first case of Glickman and the other way in its subsequent decision in United Foods. 6a A. In Glickman, producers of California tree fruits (including nectarines, plums and peaches) challenged the constitutional- ity of regulations contained in marketing orders promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to the AMAA, 7 U.S.C. § 608c ef seq., that imposed mandatory assessments on fruit tree grow- ers to cover the expenses associated with the marketing orders, including the costs of generic advertising. 521 U.S. at 460. The Court emphasized that besides the advertising decisions, the economic autonomy of the fruit tree growers was otherwise restricted by a broader collective arrangement set forth in the marketing orders: California nectarines and peaches are marketed pursuant to detailed marketing orders that have displaced many aspects of independent business activity that characterize other portions of the economy in which competition is fully protected by the antitrust laws. The business enti- ties that are compelled to fund the generic advertising at issue in this litigation do so as part of a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act independently is already constrained by the regulatory scheme. Id. at 469. In addition to advertising, the marketing orders for Califor- nia fruit tree growers provided for mechanisms for establish- ing uniform prices, limiting the quality and quantity of tree fruit that could be marketed, determining the grade and size of the fruit and orderly disposing of any surplus. /d. at 461. The orders also authorized joint research and develop ment projects, quality inspection procedures and standardized packaging requirements—all of which were financed by the compelled assessments. /d. The Court determined that the collective arrangement of the fruit tree farmers was similar to the union arrangement at issue in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, i 7a 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977), and the bar associa- tion at issue in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990). In Abood, the Court held that the infringement upon First Amendment associa- tional rights by compelled assessments for a union shop arrangement was “constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.” 431 U.S. at 222. Similarly, in Keller, the Court held that the infringement upon First Amendment associational rights by compelled assessments for a state bar program was consti- tutionally justified by the State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. 496 U.S. at 13. Finding parallels between the facts of Abood and Keller, in Glickman the Court concluded that as part of the AMAA marketing orders, the compelled assessments for generic advertising of California tree fruit were ancillary to a comprehensive marketing program, and therefore were “a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress.” 521 U.S. at 477. “The opinion and the analysis of the Court [in Glickman] proceeded upon the premise that the producers were bound together and required by the statute to market their products according to cooperative rules. To that extent, their mandated participation in an advertising program with a particular message was the logical concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation.” United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412. B. Four terms later, in United Foods the Court held that mandatory assessments imposed on mushroom producers for the purpose of funding generic mushroom advertising under the Mushroom Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6101 ef seqg., violated the First Amendment. 533 U.S. at 416. The Court distinguished the Statutory context at issue in United Foods from that in 8a Glickman, explaining that under the stand-alone Mushroom Act “the compelled contributions for advertising are not part of some broader regulatory scheme” and the advertising was itself the “principal object” of the Mushroom Act. /d. at 415. As such, “the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity.” /d. at 413 (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at 209; Keller, 496 U.S. at 1). The Court concluded that the com- pelled assessments pursuant to the Mushroom Act were un- like the situation in Abood, Keller and Glickman, in which: Those who were required to pay a subsidy for the speech of the association already were required to associate for other purposes, making the compelled contribution of moneys to pay for expressive activities a necessary incident of a larger expenditure for an otherwise proper goal requiring the cooperative activity. Id. at 414. Fundamentally, the Court noted that “[w]e have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself.” /d. at 415. Concluding that the only program the compelled contribu- tions for advertising pursuant to the Mushroom Act serve “is the very advertising scheme in question,” the Court ruled that the compelled assessments were not permitted under the First Amendment. /d. at 416. C. Guided by the express reasoning of the Court in Glickman and United Foods, we must first look at the broader statutory scheme presented in the Dairy Act, or more specifically, we must ascertain whether the dairy producers are “bound to- gether and required by the statute to market their products according to cooperative rules” for purposes other than 9a advertising, or speech. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412. It is to a description of the Dairy Act we now turn. Il. The Dairy Promotion Program set forth in the Dairy Act is one in a long series of federal “checkoff” programs for pro- moting agricultural commodities.‘ Enacted in 1983, the Dairy Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a program for the “advertisement and promotion of the sale and consumption of dairy products [and] for research projects related thereto.” 7 U.S.C. § 4504(a). The declared purpose of the Dairy Act is to provide for “an orderly procedure for financing . . . and carrying out a coordinated program of pro- motion designed to strengthen the dairy industry’s position in the marketplace .. . .” /d. § 4501(b). The Dairy Act is a stand-alone law that was not passed as part of any other federal dairy regulatory scheme. It directs the Secretary to appoint a Dairy Board composed of private milk producers to administer the Dairy Promotion Program. Id. §§ 4504 (b) & (c). The Act provides that every milk producer must pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents per hundredweight of milk sold to finance the promotional programs and the Dairy Board’s administration of them. * Other stand-alone checkoff programs established by Congress which have been subject to First Amendment challenges include: Beef Research and Information Act of 1976 (“Beef Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 2901 ef seq. (invalidated by Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (reh’g den. Oct. 16, 2003)); Pork Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1985 (“Pork Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 4801 ef seq. (invalidated by Michigan Port Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003)); Mushroom Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (invalidated in 2001 by United Foods, 533 U.S. at 405). Cf. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 457 (upholding as constitutional marketing orders for California tree fruits promulgated pursuant to the AMAA, 7 U.S.C. § 608c ef seqg., which included compelled assessments to fund, among other things, generic advertising). 10a Pursuant to the authority provided in 7 U.S.C. § 4503(a), the Secretary issued an order in March 1984 establishing the Dairy Board, 7 C.F.R § 1150.131, and the Board proceeded to collect the mandatory assessments from all milk producers, 7 C.F.R § 1150.152. For the Cochrans, the compelled assess- ments amount to roughly $ 3,500 to $ 4,000 per year. The Dairy Board is composed of commercial milk produc- ers who are nominated by “eligible associations,” which are private associations of milk producers that engage in dairy promotion at the state and regional level. /d. §§ 1150.133, 1150.273. The primary consideration in determining an organization’s eligibility is “whether its membership consists primarily of milk producers who produce a substantial vol- ume of milk” and whose overriding interests lay in the pro- duction and promotion of fluid milk and other dairy products. Id. § 1150.274(b). In 1994, the Dairy Board created Dairy Management, Inc. (“DMI”), a District of Columbia corporation that now over- sees and administers the promotional activities of the Dairy Act. DMI is a joint undertaking of the Dairy Board and the United Dairy Industry Association (“UDIA”), which is an association of state and regional dairy promotional programs that are considered “Qualified Programs” under the Dairy Act. “Qualified Programs” are local promotional programs, many of which preexisted the Dairy Act, to which milk producers may contribute a portion of the money they would otherwise pay in assessments under the Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 4504(g)(4), 7 C.F.R. §§ 1150.152(c), 1150.153. The Act thus requires dairy farmers to pay either the full 15 cent per hundredweight assessment to the Dairy Program or part to the Dairy Program and part to a Qualified Program that engages in state or regional generic advertising. The Dairy Board and the DMI Board are composed entirely of private milk pro- ducers and other private parties, and the Dairy Promotion Program is funded entirely by private milk producers through lla the compelled assessments. The Dairy Promotion Program website explains: “Checkoff programs are funded by dairy producers—NOT TAXPAYERS. They are not governmental programs; rather, they are businesses with governmental oversight.” The Secretary’s oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Dairy Act are conducted by the Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”), a division of the USDA, and are limited to ensuring that the Dairy Promotion Program is in compliance with the Act. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 4507(a) (authorizing the Secretary to terminate an order issued under the Act only when she determines that it “obstructs or does not tend to effectuate the declared policy of” the Act). AMS guidelines explain that “[i]t is the policy of AMS in carrying out the oversight responsibility to ensure that legislative, regulatory, and Department policy requirements are met. It is not the intent to impose constraints on board operations beyond these requirements.” AMS, Guidelines for AMS Oversight of Com- modity Research and Promotion Programs 1 (1994). The Secretary’s oversight functions for the Dairy Program are funded by the compelled assessments. 7 U.S.C. § 4504(g)(2); 7 C.F.R. § 1150.151(b). Moreover, the dairy producers, not the government, control whether the Dairy Promotion Program continues via a referendum process. 7 U.S.C. § 4506(a). All advertising and promotional programs that are financed by the compelled assessments under the Dairy Act and cre- ated by the Dairy Board and DMI promote milk as a generic product. 7 C.F.R. § 1150.114. Among advertising campaigns financed by the Dairy Promotion Program are “Got milk? tm “and “Ahh, the power of cheese.” * Dairy checkoff Works!—How the Dairy Checkoff works, available at http://www.dairycheckoff.com/howitworks. htm (last visited June 3, 2002 (J.A. at 231)). 12a Ill. In addition to the Dairy Act, the dairy industry is subject to a patchwork of federal and state regulatory laws. The district court noted four federal laws in particular that it deemed relevant to this case: (1) the Agricultural Marketing Agree- ment Act of 1937 (“AMAA”), 7 U.S.C. § 608c ef seq.; (2) the Agriculture Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. § 1446; (3) import control regulations under 19 U.S.C. § 1202; and (4) the Capper- Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291. An examination_of the provisions of these statutes is cru- cial to determine whether these legislative acts, in conjunc- tion with the Dairy Act, bring the case at bar within the rubric of Glickman—i.e., requiring that milk producers are bound together and obligated by statute to market their products according to some set of cooperative rules. The district court held that such a cooperative arrangement exists for dairy producers, but we conclude otherwise. A. The AMAA, 7 U.S.C § 608c, permits the Secretary to issue marketing orders that regulate the handling and sales of vari- ous agricultural commodities, including milk, in different regions of the country. For milk, the marketing orders estab- lish a classification system and set minimum prices that han- dlers must pay in the regions in which the orders apply. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5); 7 C.F.R. § 1000.1 et seg. The AMAA applies only to “handlers” of the covered commodities. 7 U.S.C. §§ 608c(1) & (5)(A). “Producers,” such as dairy farmers in general, and Joseph and Brenda Cochran in particular, are specifically exempted from the application of marketing orders. /d. § 608c(13)(B) (stating that no marketing ° A handler is a person who purchases milk from a producer in an unprocessed form for the purpose of processing it. 13a order “shall be applicable to any producer in his capacity as a producer”). Although milk marketing orders restrict the decisions of dairy handlers, they do not interfere with the decisions of dairy producers, such as the Cochrans, with regard to how much milk to produce, sell or whether they must sell milk at all to dairy handlers. See id. § 608c(5).’ At least 25 percent of the milk sold in the United States is sold outside of federal milk marketing orders. The Cochrans are able to and do sell much of their milk outside any milk marketing order. B. The Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. § 1446, establishes a price support program wherein manufacturers and proces- sors of cheese, nonfat dry milk and butter can sell those products to the federal government as buyer of last resort. Producers of fluid milk, such as the Cochrans, however, are not covered by the Agricultural Act and are not permitted to sell their product to the government under the price support program. c. Similarly, the import control regulations under Chapter 4 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, subject a multitude of commodities and prod- ” Milk marketing orders under the AMAA are implemented on a regional basis. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(11). Not all parts of the country are covered, and some states—including California, Virginia, Maine and Montana—are outside the territory of any milk marketing order. Portions of Pennsylvania fall within two different milk marketing regions, the Northeast Area and the Mideast Area. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1001.1, 1033.1. Certain portions of the state, however, including where the Cochrans are located, fall outside of any federal milk marketing order. The effect of the AMAA provisions is that any particular producer’s milk is subject to a marketing order only if the producer chooses to sell to a regulated handler in an area covered by a marketing order. See id. §§ 1001.13, 1033.13. l4a ucts to annual import quotas. Although certain dairy products are included - namely butter, dry milk and cheese—fluid milk is not. See 7 C.F.R. Pt. 6, Apps. 1, 2, 3. OO i D. Finally, the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291, permits producers of agricultural products—-including milk, mush- rooms and others - to enter into manufacturing and marketing cooperatives without fear of violating antitrust laws. It does not, however, require producers to enter into such coopera- tives, as federal law expressly protects producers’ freedom not to join any cooperative. See Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, 7 U.S.C. § 2301 et seg.; Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 477-478, 81 L. Ed. 2d 399, 104 S. Ct. 2518 (1984). The Cochrans do not belong to any cooperatives protected by the antitrust exemption created by the Capper-Volstead Act. E. Considering the foregoing provisions of the Dairy Act and other statutes governing the dairy industry, we now turn to the First Amendment issues that constitute the heart of this appeal.* IV. We must first consider whether the compelled assessments generated under the Dairy Act constitute private or govern- ment speech. Although the district court did not address this ®The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on the Cochrans’ First Amendment claim. We have jurisdiction in this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291. We review de novo the constitu- tionality of an Act of Congress. Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 1993). Similarly, our review of the district court’s granting of judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment is plenary. Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1999). 4 A. ‘= px: my 34 Es. ee aut: e i 2 a3" %; % e a : & = Pegh TAR MELON 15a issue, the Government contended before the district court that the expressions generated under the Dairy Act constitute government- speech. Therefore, the issue is subject to our review. The First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating private speech based on its content, but the Court has “permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when [the government] is the speaker or when [the government] enlists private entities to convey its own message.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). - The Court has not decided whether speech generated under commodity promotion laws such as the Dairy Act constitutes government speech and is thereby immune from First Amendment scrutiny.” But in Frame, this court did meet the issue, 885 F.2d at 1132-1133. In line with our sister Courts of Appeals in Michigan Port Producers Ass’n, Inc. v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 161-162 (6th Cir. 2003) and Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 720 (8th Cir. 2003), we held that the Beef Promotion Program was not government speech because it required only beef producers to fund it and it attributed the advertising under the program to the beef producers. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132-1133. Recognizing that the Beef Promotion Program directed the Secretary to appoint all Cattlemen Board members and approve all budgets, plans, contracts and projects entered into by the Board, this court nevertheless * The two decisions of the Court involving commodity promotion programs do not address the issue of government speech. In Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture waived the issue by not pursuing it before the Supreme Court. 521 U.S. at 482 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). In United Foods, the Court refused to address the issue because the government failed to raise it before the Court of Appeals. 533 U.S. at 416-417. l6a concluded that “[t]he Secretary’s extensive supervision . . . does not transform this self-help program for the beef industry into ‘government speech.’ We explained: The Cattlemen’s Board seems to be an entity “repre- sentative of one segment of the population, with certain common interests.” Members of the Cattlemen’s Board and the Operating Committee, though appointed by the Secretary, are not government officials, but rather, individuals from the private sector. The pool of nomi- nees from which the Secretary selects Board members, moreover, are determined by private beef industry organizations from the various states. Furthermore, the State organizations eligible to participate in Board nominations are those that “have a history of stability and permanency,” and whose “primary or overriding purpose is to promote the economic welfare of cattle producers.” Id. at 1133 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2905(b)(3) & (4)). The gov- ernment’s role in the Dairy Promotion Program is in all material respects the same as it was in the Beef Promotion Program, and under the precedent established in Frame, the Secretary’s supervisory responsibilities are not sufficient to transform the dairy industry’s self-help program into “gov- ernment speech.” On the dairy checkoff website, the government itself describes the Dairy Promotion Program as a non-governmental program, financed and directed by dairy farmers. Although this court’s First Amendment discussion and ultimate holding in Frame have been abrogated by Glickman and United Foods, none of the Court’s subsequent decisions regarding “government speech” undermine our analysis of that issue in Frame.'° Accordingly, we conclude that this is a '° Notwithstanding the Government’s assertions to the contrary, we are not convinced that any decisions rendered by the Court in the years following our decision in Frame require us to cast aside the government tice 17a private speech case, and thus is not immune from First Amendment scrutiny. V. The teachings of United Foods require us to decide whether the dairy producers are “bound together and required by the statute to market their products according to cooperative rules[,]” 533 U.S. at 412, for purposes other than. advertising, or speech. That is our next task. The Cochrans contend that the Dairy Act violates their First Amendment free speech and association rights by com- pelling them to subsidize generic advertising that promotes milk produced by methods they view as wasteful and harmful to the environment. The First Amendment protects the nght to refrain from speaking and the right to refrain from association. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. Moreover, the government may not compel individuals to fund speech or expressive associations with which they disagree. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411. “First Amendment values are at serious risk if the govern- speech analysis we performed in Frame. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. | Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 149 L. Ed. 2d 63, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001) (concluding that restrictions placed on the private speech of a lawyer receiving government funding from the Legal Services Corporation were unconstitutional); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193, 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000) (stating in dicta, in a case where the government affirmatively disavowed any connection to the speech involved, that a government speech analysis might apply if a state university used general tuition money to fund speech attributed to the school or its administrators); Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 130 L. Ed. 2d 902, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995) (holding that Amtrak is a government actor for First Amendment purposes because it was created by statute to further government objectives and the government maintained substantial control over its daily operations); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (concluding that the government can prevent private doctors at family planning clinics that receive federal funding from providing abortion counseling). 18a ment can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors .. . . As a consequence, the compelled funding for the advertising must pass First Amendment scrutiny.” /d. The individual’s disagreement can be minor, as “[t]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented.” /d. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767, 123 L. Ed. 2d 543, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993)). When, however, regulation compelling funding for speech is ancillary to a broader collective enter- prise that otherwise restricts the individual’s market auton- omy, it is considered “economic regulation,” which enjoys a “strong presumption of validity” when facing a First Amend- ment challenge. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477. We conclude that in upholding as constitutional the compelled subsidies under the Dairy Act, the district court misapplied Glickman and misconstrued the effect of the “entire regulatory scheme applicable to milk producers... .” (District Court Op. at 15 n. 5.) The Court in United Foods made clear that Glickman applied only in circumstances similar to Abood and Keller—in which individuals are “bound together” in a collective enterprise, such as a union or an integrated state bar, and the compelled subsidies are the “logical concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regula- tion.” 533 U.S. at 412. The provisions of the Dairy Act do not require milk producers to participate in a collective enterprise and do not compel them to market their product, fluid milk, according to any rules of a cooperative. Although the dairy industry is “regulated” in the sense that it is subject to a patchwork of state and federal laws, there is no association that all milk producers must join that would make the entire industry analogous to a union, an integrated bar or the collective enterprise at issue in Glickman. : } ape iee 19a The Dairy Act is a free-standing promotional program that applies to all dairy producers regardless of whether they are subject to marketing orders or any other dairy regulations. It is not ancillary to any collective enterprise or compelled association with a non-speech purpose because theré is no such enterprise or association for milk that encompasses all dairy producers. Indeed, the AMAA provision for milk marketing orders, which preexisted the Dairy Act, authorizes the Secretary and marketing administrators to create dairy promotional programs that literally would be ancillary to the regulatory aspects of the milk marketing orders. See 7 U.S.C. 608c(5)(I). Congress chose not to utilize this precise provision of the AMAA, however, and instead adopted an entirely separate program which does not operate in concert with any collective aspect of any milk marketing order. Moreover, as independent small-scale dairy producers, the Cochrans are exempted from the regional marketing orders under the AMAA and have chosen not to enter into manufacturing and marketing cooperatives. They, and they alone, determine how much milk to produce, how to sell and market it and to whom it will be sold. Nevertheless under the Dairy Act they are compelled to pay assessments to subsidize generic dairy advertising, a form of speech with which they are in total disagreement. Cf. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471 (noting that “none of the generic advertising conveys any message with which respondents disagree”’). Furthermore, as the Court in United Foods determined that speech is the principal purpose of the Mushroom Act, so it is of the Dairy Act.'’ Indeed, “almost all of the funds collected '' Congress’ declared policy of the Mushroom Act was that it is in the public interest to authorize the establishment, through the exercise of the powers provided in this chapter, of an orderly procedure for developing, financing through adequate assessments on mushrooms produced domestically or imported into the United States, and carrying out, an effective, continuous, and 20a under the mandatory assessments are for one purpose: generic advertising.” United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412. In United Foods, the Court made clear that compelled subsidies may not be upheld where they are only germane to a program whose “principal object is speech itself.” /d. at 415. We conclude, therefore, that being compelled to fund advertising pursuant to the Dairy Act raises a First Amend- ment free speech and associational rights issue. But our determination that the Act’s compelled assessments for generic advertising implicate the Cochrans’ First Amendment rights does not end our inquiry. As this court held in Frame, “[t}]he rights of free speech and association are not absolute. Thus, we must next identify the proper standard for evaluat- ing whether the statute . . . nevertheless passes constitutional muster.” 885 F.2d at 1133." cocrdinated program of promotion, research, and consumer and industry information designed to—(1) strengthen the mushroom industry's position in the marketplace; (2) maintain and expand existing markets and uses for mushrooms; and (3) develop new markets and uses for mushrooiis. 7 U.S.C. § 6101(b). Congizs: declared purpose for the Dairy Act is that it is in the public interest to authorize the establishment . . . of an orderly procedure for financing (through assessments on all milk produced in the United States for commercial use and on imported dairy products) and carrying out a coordinated program of promo- tion designed to strengthen the dairy industry's position in the marketplace and to maintain and expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for fluid milk and dairy products. 7 U.S.C. § 4501(b). '? Upon concluding that milk producers are regulated to a similar degree as the California tree fruit growers in Glick-man, the district court applied a three-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in Glickman: (1) whether the Act imposes a restraint on the freedom to communicate; (b) whether the Act compels any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech; (c) whether the Act compels dairy producers to endorse 2la VL. This case is properly characterized as a compelled com- mercial speech case. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410; Frame, 885 F.2d at 1146 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The Su- preme Court, however, has left unresolved the standard for determining the validity of laws compelling commercial speech, and the circuit courts are divided on the issue. There are at least four variations in the judiciary’s cumulative experience. One is the more lenient standard applied to com- mercial speech cases. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980). Another is the “germaneness” test of compelled speech cases. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 235- 236. Still another is an adaptation of the commercial speech standard. See Livestock Marketing, 335 F.3d at 722-723. And, in Frame, a pre-Glickman and pre-United Foods case, this court applied the stringent level of scrutiny for associational rights cases. 885 F.2d at 1134. We now summarize the various standards. A. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court held that to evaluate the constitutionality of regulatory restrictions on commercial speech the Constitution requires only intermediate scrutiny— namely, that (1) the state must “assert a substantial govern- ment interest”; (2) “the regulatory technique must be in pro- portion to that interest”; and (3) the incursion on commercial speech “must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.” 447 U.S. at 564. Commercial speech is “expression or finance any political or ideological views. (District Court Op. at 16-18.) This test, however, is inappropriate because, like the Supreme Court in United Foods, we have concluded that the Dairy Act is not a species of economic regulation, as it is not ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting the marketing autonomy of dairy farmers. In United Foods the Court did not apply this three-part test. Nor do we. 22a related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” /d. at 561. But the Court has left open the question of whether Central Hudson’s more relaxed First Amendment test applies to cases involving compelled commercial speech. In United Foods the Court stepped back from addressing the issue in ipsis verbis, explaining: “the Government itself does not rely upon Central Hudson to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision, . . . and we therefore do not consider whether the Government's interest could be considered substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson test.” 533 U.S. at 410. Nevertheless, in the earlier case of Glickman, the Court questioned the application of the commercial! speech test to compelled speech cases: The Court of Appeals fails to explain why the Cenitral Hudson test, which involved a restriction on commercial speech, should govern a case involving the compelled fund- ing of speech. Given the fact that the Court of Appeals relied on Abood for the proposition that the program implicates the First Amendment, it is difficult to understand why the Court of Appeals did not apply Abood’s “germaneness” test. 521 U.S. at 474 n. 18. Indeed, in United Foods, notwithstanding its specific disclaimer regarding Central Hudson, the Court seemingly applied the “germaneness” test: The only program the Government contends the com- pelled contributions serve is the very advertising scheme in question. Were it sufficient to say speech is germane to itself, the limits observed in Abood and Keller would be empty of meaning and significance. The cooperative marketing structure relied upon by a majority of the Court in Glickman to sustain an ancillary assessment finds no corollary here; the expression respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself; and the rationale of Abood extends to the party who objects 23a to the compelled support for this speech. For these and other reasons we have set forth, the assessments are not permitted under the First Amendment. 533 U.S. at 415-416 (emphasis added). As we previously explained, the purpose of the Dairy Act is in all material respects the same as that of the Mushroom Act at issue in United Foods, and the Dairy Act is not ancillary to a broader cooperative marketing regime like the fruit tree marketing orders at issue in Glickman. The compelled assessments for generic dairy advertising under the Dairy Act are germane to nothing but the speech itself. “fA]lmost ali of the funds collected under the mandatory assessments are for one purpose: generic advertising.” /d. at 412. It would thus seem that the Dairy Act would not survive Abood’s germaneness test. Other courts have applied the germaneness test to cases involving compelled assessments pursuant to promotional programs and have rejected the application of Central Hudson. See, e.g., Michigan Port, 348 F.3d at 163 (noting that “[e]ven assuming that the advertising funded by the {Pork] Act is indeed commercial speech, the more lenient standard of review applied to limits on commercial speech has never been applied to speech—commercial or other- wise—that is compelled”); In re Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1287 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (concluding that “[b]ecause the Commission’s assess- ments do not restrict speech, it is inappropriate to apply the Central Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech”). In Livestock Marketing, however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that an adaptation of the Central Hudson test applied, explaining that “Central Hudson and the case at bar both involve government interference with private speech in a commercial context.” 335 F.3d at 722. All the same, the court concluded that the Beef Act did not survive the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson. /d. at 725-726. Relying on the 24a reasoning set forth in United Foods, the court determined that the beef checkoff program is in all material respects identical to the mushroom checkoff program, and concluded that “the government’s interest in protecting the welfare of the beef industry by compelling all beef producers and importers to pay for generic beef advertising is not sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on appellees’ First Amendment free speech right.” Jd. Finally, in Frame, which was decided before the teachings of both Glickman and United Foods, this court applied the stringent associational rights standard but nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of the Beef Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. Back in 1989, this court concluded that the government’s interest in “maintaining and expanding beef markets proves . . . compelling[,]” and “[m]aintenance of the beef industry ensures preservation of the American cattlemen’s traditional way of life.” Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134-1135 (citations omitted). Judge Sloviter, however, dissented on this issue in Frame: I doubt that the type of compelled speech at issue here can be justified on any basis. Nonetheless, I do not reach the majority’s stringent associational rights standard be- cause I believe that no justification can be found, even under the less exacting criteria adopted by the Supreme Court in evaluating the permissibility of regulation of commercial speech [in Central Hudson] . . . . While the government has a general interest in the health of the beef industry, it does not follow that the government has a substantial interest in compelling the beef industry to make and support such a promotion campaign. Instead, ... the messages represent the economic interests of one segment of the population .... Id. at 1146-1147 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotations omitted). CES iat Mea aD hate Dio te 25a As in Frame, the Government here argues that it has a sufficient interest in increasing the demand for an agricultural product. Moreover, the Government contends that it has an interest in decreasing its obligation to purchase dairy products under the price support program, 7 U.S.C § 1446. We previ- ously have emphasized, however, that the Court’s subsequent holding in United Foods that clarified and limited the teachings of Glickman, cut away the underpinning of this court’s analysis in Frame. United Foods makes clear that the government may not compel individuals to support an adver- tis'ng program for the sole purpose of increasing demand for at product. 533 U.S. at 415. In United Foods, the Court concluded that the Mushroom Act’s compelled suosidies would be unconstitutional even under the lesser scrutiny accorded to commercial speech. /d. at 410. Although the Government’s contention that it has a sub- stantial interest in decreasing its obligation under the dairy price support program is somewhat unique from the govern- ment interest asserted in United Foods, this interest is undermined by the fact that as a stand-alone statute, the Dairy Act does not operate in conjunction with the price support program. Indeed, producers of liquid milk such as the Cochrans are not covered by the support program. Moreover, reductions in the government’s obligations under the price support program are insignificant to the Dairy Promotion Program’s existence, as whether the compelled assessments continue is controlled by the dairy producers via the referen- dum process. 7 U.S.C. § 4506(a). We conclude, therefore, that the government’s interest in promoting the dairy industry is not sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on the Cochran’s First Amendment free speech and association rights. As Judge Sloviter sug- gested in her dissent in Frame, promotional programs such as the Dairy Act seem to really be special interest legislation on behalf of the industry’s interest more so than the govern- 26a ment’s. We believe that the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion by ruling in United Foods that the compelled assessments pursuant to the Mushroom Act are not permitted by the First Amendment. B. In light of the reluctance of the Supreme Court in United Foods to enter the controversy over the applicable scrutiny for compelled commercial speech cases, however, we will follow suit. “[W]e find no basis under either Glickman or our other precedents to sustain the compelled assessments sought in this case.” 533 U.S. at 410.'° The compelled assessments for generic dairy advertising under the Dairy Act relate to speech and only to speech. Indeed, “almost all of the funds collected under the manda- tory assessments are for one purpose: generic advertising.” Id. at 412. Measured by any degree of scrutiny set forth in the foregoing discussion, we conclude that this case runs on all fours with the teachings and holding of United Foods, and accordingly hold that the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 does not survive the First Amendment challenge lodged by Appellants Joseph and Brenda Cochran. The district court erred in sustaining the constitutionality of the Dairy Act on the basis of Glickman. **e eke * In sum, we conclude that the generic advertising pursuant to the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 does not constitute government speech and is therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny. We hold that the Dairy Act violates the Cochrans’ First Amendment free speech and associational '? We reach this conclusion whether accepting the standard explicitly expressed in Frame or deciding that in view of the Court’s discussion in United Foods, that standard is not longer controlling. 27a rights. Although the dairy industry may be subject to a labyrinth of federal regulation, the Dairy Act is a stand-alone law and the compelled assessments for generic dairy advertis- ing are not germane to a larger regulatory purpose other than the speech itself. The judgment of the district court sustaining the consti- tutionality of the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 will be reversed and the proceedings remanded with a direction to enter a decree in favor of Appellants in accor- dance with the foregoing. CONCURBY: TRENDELL CONCUR: TRENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join in our opinion and judgment but write separately to register my view that, having found that the assessments do not pass muster under the Supreme Court’s analysis in United Foods, and, having noted at the end of Pat IV that the compelled subsidies were assessed to support a program whose principal object was speech itself, we need not engage in the exercise of determining the “standard” regarding the extent of the government’s interest for purposes of a commer- cial speech analysis under Central Hudson, as the opinion does at Part VI-A. Twice—in both Glickman and United Foods—the Supreme Court has questioned the need for engaging in a Central Hudson analysis.'* And, I think it '* The Court has not treated these cases as involving a discrete com- mercial speech issue, instead indicating that “[t]he question is whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced.” United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410; see also id. (stating that, even if commercial speech is less protected than other speech, there is “no basis under either Glickman or our other precedents to sustain the compelled assessments,” but refusing to consider “whether the Government’s interest could be considered substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson test”); Glickman, 521 U.S. at 474 & n.18 (noting that it was “error for the [Ninth Circuit] to rely on Central Hudson 28a unnecessary to apply Central Hudson in light of the Court’s analysis in United Foods. '° In United Foods the Court distinguished the situation it faced from the one it considered in Glickman by examining the following question: Is the challenged assessment part of a “broader regulatory system” that does not have speech as its primary object. 533 U.S. at 415. There appear to be two parts to this basic inquiry. First, are the plaintiffs part of a group that is “bound together and required . . . to market their products according to cooperative rules?” /d. at 412. for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of market order assessments for promotional advertising,” and stating that the Ninth Circuit “fails to explain why the Central Hudson test, which involved a restriction on commercial speech, should govern a case involving the compelled funding of speech”). In fact, in United Foods the Court appears to explicitly endorse the applicability of the Abood/Keller germaneness test: “It is true that the party who protests the assessment here is required simply to support speech by others, not to utter the speech itself. We conclude, however, that the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity.” 533 U.S. at 413 (citing Abood and Keller). '' The Sixth Circuit, in Michigan Port Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003), also rejected the application of the Central Hudson test to an assessment created by a similar promotional program. I find that court’s comments on this matter to be instructive: “(W]e find inapplicable to this case the relaxed scrutiny of commercial speech analysis provided for by Central Hudson, and relied upon by Appellants. The Pork Act does not directly limit the ability of pork producers to express a message; it compels them to express a message with which they do not agree. Even assuming that the advertising funded by the Act is indeed commercial speech, the more lenient standard of review applied to limits on commercial speech has never been applied to speech—commercial or otherwise—that is compelled. It is one thing to force someone to close her mouth; it is quite another to force her to become a mouthpiece.” /d. at 163 (citation omitted). 29a Second, is the assessment regulation related to and in fur- therance of other nonspeechpurposes, carrying out other — aspects to further other economic, societal, or governmental goals? Id. at 415. Even if the answer to the first question is “no,” the assessment might nonetheless be permitted if it is not only related to speech. This second inquiry could signal consideration of “germaneness” if, in fact, other goals were implicated. But here, we answered “no” to both questions: we decided that the Cochrans did not surrender their freedom to make independent competitive choices to any collective enterprise, and we concluded that speech was the only purpose of the Dairy Act. Thus, it was purely “compelled speech,” forbidden by United Foods under any level of scrutiny. 533 U.S. at 410. In fact, after discussing the various standards potentially applicable here, Judge Aldisert clearly states in the ensuing Part VI-B that under any level of scrutiny, the asséssments for speech only do not pass constitutional muster given United Foods. The analysis in Part VI-A regarding the proper level of scrutiny is therefore unnecessary, and, I believe, dicta. ae 30a APPENDIX B UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 4:CV-01-0529 JOSEPH P. COCHRAN, ef al., Plaintiffs, we ANN VENEMAN, ef al., Defendants, and FRED LOVELL, et al., Intervenor Defendants. March 24, 2003, Decided OPINION This is a declaratory judgment action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 by Plaintiffs Joseph S. Cochran and Brenda S. Cochran (“Plaintiffs” or “the Cochrans”). Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment ruling that the Dairy Promotion and Research Program (“the Dairy Program”) as set forth in Title I, Subtitle B of the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 (“the Stabilization Act” or “the Act”), Pub. L. 98-180, 97 Stat. 1128, 7 U.S.C. § 4504(g) is an unconstitutional restric- tion on their right to free speech. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against Ann Veneman, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“the Secretary”) and the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board (“the Dairy Board”) (together, “the Governmental Defendants”), enjoin- ing the continued collection of the dairy checkoff assessment created pursuant to the Act. 3la Some of the advertisements funded by assessments collected pursuant to the provisions of the Stabilization Act currently under attack by Plaintiffs are part of the Milk Mustache/got milk? (R) campaign. The question presented to the Court, phrased in an equally ungrammatical fashion, may be reduced to: “Got Advertising Money for Milk?”. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Dairy Program and resulting diary checkoff assessment are not unconstitutional. Our holding will allow the American public to continue to view advertisements containing white mus- tachioed celebrities and other pop culture icons depicting the salutary effects of milk. PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Plaintiffs are dairy producers engaged in the production of milk for commercial use on a dairy farm located in Pennsylvania. They initiated this action by filing a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governmental Defendants on April 2, 2002. The case. was assigned to the Honorable James F. McClure Jr. On June 6, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, on June 14, 2002, the Governmental Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. By Order issued August 6, 2002, this matter was trans- ferred to the undersigned. - On January 13, 2003, this Court granted the Petition to Intervene brought by Fred Lovell, Lee Greenwalt, Jackie Root, Earnest Norman, Stephen Marshall, Cecil Moyer, and James Vandblarcom (“the Intervening Parties” or “the Intervenors”) on June 14, 2002. The Intervening Parties are dairy producers who, unlike Plaintiffs, support the dairy checkoff provision within the Act and believe it to be constitutional in all respects. 32a On January 21, 2003, the Intervening Parties filed their own motion for summary judgment. Each of the pending motions has been fully briefed by the parties. Oral argument was held on March 19, 2003. This matter is now ripe for disposition. STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”' F.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing “there is no genuine issue for trial.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 357 (3d Cir. 1992). Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences which a fact finder could draw from them. Peterson v. Lehign Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). Initially, the moving party has a burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). This burden may be met bv the moving party pointing out to the court that there is an absence of evidence tu support an essential element as to which the non-meving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. /d. at 325. Rule 56 provides that, where such a motion is made and —properly supported, the non-moving party must then show by ' We note that the Governmental Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, one for summary judgment. Because the Govern- mental Defendants presented matters outside of the pleadings for the Court’s consideration within their motion, we will treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b). 33a affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The United States Supreme Court has commented that this requirement is tantamount to the non- moving party making a sufficient showing as to the essential elements of their case that a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). It is important to note that “the non-moving party cannot rely upon conclusory allegations in its pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Jd. at 248. Fur- thermore, a dispute is genuine only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” /d. camper ata Sh STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS: The history of government involvement in the regulation of milk is an extensive one. “Federal programs have been deeply imbedded in the economic fabric of the United States dairy industry” since the late 1930s. S. Rep. No. 98-163, 13, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1658, 1670. 34a There are four clearly interrelated federal programs involved: 1. The dairy price support program which explicitly puts a fluor under the price of manufacturing grade milk and thus maintains a floor under all milk prices. 2. The milk marketing order program which establishes minimum prices for fluid grade milk in most parts of the country. 3. Import controls which protect the price support program and keep the U.S. government from supporting world milk prices. | 4. Federal cooperative policy which encourages the development of farmer-owned cooperatives but provides they may not use their market power to raise prices excessively. Id. “The thrust of these programs has been to deal with the level of milk prices and with problems of instability in milk prices and dairy farm incomes.” /d. Ia 1983, upon finding that “dairy products are basic foods that are a valuable part of the human diet,” that “the production of dairy products plays a significant role in the Nation’s economy,” that “dairy products must be readily availabie and marketed efficiently to ensure that the people of the United States receive adequate nourishment,” and that “the maintenance and expansion of existing markets for dairy products are vital to the welfare of milk producers and those concerned with marketing, using, and producing dairy products, as well as to the general economy of the Nation,” Congress created the Dairy Promotion Program. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501(a)(i}-(4). In so doing, Congress declared that it is ‘n the public interest to authorize the estab- lishment, .arough the exercise of the powers provided herein, of an orderly procedure for financing (through 35a assessments on all milk produced in the United States for commercial use and on imported dairy products) and carrying out a coordinated program of promotion de- signed to strengthen the dairy industry’s position in the marketplace and to maintain and expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for fluid milk and dairy products. 7 U.S.C. § 4501(b). In accordance with the guidelines set forth within the Stabilization Act, see 7 U.S.C. § 4505(b)(1), the Dairy Board was established by an order (“the Dairy Order”) issued by the Secretary. See 7 C.F.R. § 1150.131(a). Currently, the Dairy Board consists of 36 milk producers, each appointed by the Secretary. See 7 C.F.R. § 1150.131(a), 7 C.F.R. § 1150.135; see also 7 U.S.C. § 4504(b)(2). Vacancies on the Dairy Board “occasioned by the death, removal, resignation, or disquali- fication of any member” are filled by the Secretary from a list of nominations made by the Board. 7 C.F.R. § 1150.136. The powers of the Dairy Board are limited to those enumerated within the Stabilization Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 4504(c). Included among those enumerated powers are the authority to “administer the provisions of [the Dairy Order] in accordance with its terms and conditions,” 7 C.F.R. 1150.139(b); see also 7 U.S.C. § 4504(c)(2), and to receive and evaluate, or on its own initiative develop, and budget for plans or projects to promote the use of fluid milk and dairy products as well as projects for research and nutrition education and to make recom- mendations to the Secretary regarding such proposals. 7 C.F.R. § 1150.139(a); see also 7 U.S.C. § 4504(c)(1). The Act provides that the Dairy Board will “provide for the establishment and administration of appropriate plans or projects for advertisement and promotion of the sale and consumption of dairy products, for research projects related 36a thereto, for nutrition education projects, and for the disbursement of necessary funds for such purposes.” 7 U.S.C. § 4505(a). Advertising created by the Dairy Board must be approved by the Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”), the division of the Department of Agriculture to which the Secretary has assigned this congressionally delegated role. (Gov. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. A at 1 and P VII(B)). Of particular relevance to the case at bar, the Stabilization Act contains a provision for assessments which are to be issued to milk producers and thereafter paid to the Dairy Board: (g) Assessments (1) The order shall provide that each person making payment to a producer for milk produced in the United States and purchased from the producer shall. in the manner as prescribed by the order, collect an assessment based upon the number of hundredweights of milk for commercial use handled for the account of the producer and remit the assessment to the Board. (2) The assessment shall be used for payment of the expenses in administering the order, with provision for a reasonable reserve, and shall include those administrative costs incugred by the Department after an order has been promulgated under this subchapter. (3) The rate of assessment for milk produced in the United States and imported dairy products prescribed by the order shall be 15 cents per hundredweight of milk for commercial use or the equivalent thereof, as determined by the Secretary. (4) A milk producer or the producers’ cooperative who can establish that the producer is participating in active, ongoing qualified State or regional dairy product promotion or nutrition education programs 37a intended to increase consumption of milk and dairy products generally shall receive credit in determining the assessment due from such producer for contri- butions to such programs of up to 10 cents per hundredweight of milk marketed or, for the period ending six months after November 29, 1983, up to the aggregate rate in effect on November 29, 1983, of such contributions to such programs (but not to exceed 15 cents per hundredweight of milk marketed) if such aggregate rate exceeds 10 cents per hun= dredweight of miik marketed. (5) Any person marketing milk of that person’s own production directly to consumers shall remit the as- sessment directly to the Board in the manner prescribed by the order. 7 U.S.C. § 4504(g). The Secretary issued an order in ac- cordance with the Stabilization Act adopting the substance of the provisions listed above. See C.F.R. § 1150.152(a), (b) (requiring producers of milk to pay an assessment of 15 cents to the Dairy Board of reach hundredweight of milk marketed commercially). It is these provisions of the Act whose constitutionality are currently under review. The Dairy Board is empowered to use funds collected through the assessments in order to fulfill its obligations under the Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 4504(f); see also 7 C.F.R. § 1150.140(i). None of these funds may, however, be utilized “in any manner for the purpose of influencing governmental policy or action” except insofar as those funds are used to make recommendations to the Secretary regarding proposed amendments to the Dairy Order. See 7 U.S.C. § 4504(j); see also 7 C.F.R. § 150.154. In 1994, the Dairy Board joined with the United Dairy Industry Association (“UDIA”), a federation of Qualified Programs, in order to create Dairy Management Inc. 38a (“DMI”), a District of Columbia corporation. (Gov. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C P 1). The Dairy Board and UDIA “develop[] their marketing plans and programs through DMI.” (Gov. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. B at 9). The DMI Board consists of an equal number of dairy farmers from the Dairy Board and the UDIA Board. /d. “The goals of DMI are to reduce administrative costs, to have a larger impact on the consumer, and to be better able to drive demand and help increase human consumption of fluid milk and dairy products.” /d. All advertising created by DMI requires the approval of Dairy Programs, a component of AMS, prior to its dissemination to the public. See Mengel Decl. PP 2-3. Plaintiffs operate a dairy farm in Tioga County, Penn- sylvania,> where they produce milk for commercial use. They are subject to the Dairy Program’s assessment, which costs them approximately $3,500 to $4,000 per year. See Cochran Decl. P 8. The Cochrans operate their dairy farm autonomously using traditional farming methods. They are not members of any dairy cooperative. See Compl. P 25. They believe “that the use of sustainable agriculture in the form of less intensive ? In the year 2000, DMI’s program of generic promotion included “a full year of fluid milk print advertising through the Milk Mustache/got milk? (R) campaign.” (Gov. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. B at 21). * A total of eleven federal marketing orders exist for milk. (Gov. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. L at 1). Plaintiffs emphasize, however, that Tioga County is not covered by a milk marketing order. See Compl. at P 6; see also 7 C.F.R. §§ 1001.2, 1033.2. Still, the fact remains that “handlers regulated under federal milk orders process about 75 percent of all the milk marketed in the U.S.” (Gov. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. K at 2). Indeed, “in total, more than 96 percent of the fluid eligible milk produced in the United States is priced under a state or federal marketing order.” Second Mengel Decl. P 2. 39a herd management and grazing system makes for a superior milk, promotes a better use of the resources, promotes the environment, and, in sum, provides a healthier product for humans and our planet.” Cochran Decl. P 10. Based upon the perceived differences in the farming methods used by the Cochrans and dairy producers at-large, the Cochrans object to the promotion of milk generically as “speech that denies there is any difference in milk.” /d. P 13. LEGAL ANALYSIS Our holding hinges upon a determination of whether the facts in this case more closely parallel those in Glickman v. Wileman Bros & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997), or in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001). In Wileman, producers of California tree fruits (including nectarines, plums, and peaches) challenged the constitutional- ity of regulations contained in marketing orders promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture which imposed assessments on the producers to cover costs associated with the orders, including generic advertising. See Wileman, 521 U.S. at 460. The United States Supreme Court framed the issue before it succinctly: “whether being compelled to fund this advertising raises a First Amendment issue . . . to resolve, or rather is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve.” /d. at 468. In deciding upon the latter, the Supreme Court placed emphasis upon the fact that California nectarines and peaches are marketed pursuant to detailed marketing orders that have displaced many aspects of independent business activity that characterize other portions of the economy in which competition is fully protected by the antitrust laws. The business entities that are compelled to fund the generic advertis- ing at issue in this litigation do so as part of a broader 40a collective enterprise in which their freedom to act independently is already constrained by the regula- tory scheme. Id. at 469. In conjunction with the applicable statutory scheme, the Court noted three critical characteristics about the marketing orders in effect: First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience. Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they -do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views. Id. at 469-70. On these grounds, the Supreme Court con- cluded that the regulation at issue would properly be judged under the standard of review appropriate for economic regula- tions rather than under the heightened scrutiny applicable to First Amendment issues. /d. at 469-70. Several terms later, in United Foods, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute mandating the issuance of assessments on handlers of fresh mushrooms in order to fund advertising for their products. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408. In finding that the First Amendment was violated, the Supreme Court outlined the fundamental difference between the facts before it in United Foods and those before it in Wileman: In [Wileman] the mandated assessments for speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy. Here, for all practical purposes, the advertising itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory scheme. Id. at 411-12. More specifically, the Supreme Court observed that the rationale of the holding in Wileman was premised upon the fact that the nectarine and peach producers “were bound together and required by the statute to market their 4la products according to cooperative rules,” and that “their mandated participation in an advertising program with a particular message was the logical concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation.” /d. at 412. In the case of mushroom handlers, on the other hand, no comparable regulatory scheme existed: there were no marketing orders in place regulating the production and sale of mushrooms, no exemption existed for mushroom producers from antitrust laws, and no encroachments existed upon the ability individual mushroom producers to make their own marketing decisions. /d. at 412. In fact, the only regulations affecting mushroom producers were the mandatory assessments which were instituted for the sole purpose of creating and funding generic advertising for mushrooms. /d. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no support for the proposition that the compelled contributions for advertising were part of a broader regulatory scheme whereby the statute would be appropriately relegated to the standard of review applicable to economic regulations as applied in Wileman.’ Id. at 415. Instead, the Supreme Court analyzed the assessments under the standard of review appropriate for First Amendment issues and ultimately determined that the assessments were impermissible intrusions upon the mushroom handlers’ First Amendment rights. /d. at 416. Based upon the aforementioned decades of regulations affecting the milk industry and milk producers in particular, we conclude that Section 4505(g) of the Stabilization Act is part of a larger regulatory scheme affecting the sale and * Quoting the Court of Appeals opinion in the case, the Supreme Court recognized that “‘the mushroom growing business . . . is unregulated, except for the enforcement of a regional mushroom advertising program,’ and ‘the mushroom market has not been collectivized, exempted from antitrust laws, subjected to a uniform price, or otherwise subsidized through price supports or restrictions on supply.’ United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412 (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 197 F.3d 221, 221, 223 (6th Cir. 1991)). ESE SE 42a production of milk.’ On this basis, we find that milk produc- ers are regulated to a similar degree as were the tree fruit growers in Wileman and that “the mandated assessments for speech [are] ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy.”® United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411. The remainder of our analysis will accordingly be devoted to whether or not the provisions of the Stabilization Act at issue in this case pass the three part test set out by the Supreme Court in Wileman. See Wileman, 521 U.S. at 469-70. a. Whether Section 4504(g) of the Stabilization Act im- poses a restraint on the freedom to communicate. Neither Section 4504(g) of the Stabilization Act, nor any other provision within the Act that we are aware of, imposes a restraint on the Cochrans’ (or any other milk producer’s) freedom to communicate any message they desire to any audience whatsoever.’ * We note, for the sake of clarity and completeness, that in making this determination we have considered the entire regulatory scheme applicable to milk producers as opposed to limiting our analysis to the Stabilization Act alone. See Gallo Cattle Company v. California Milk Advisory Board, 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999) (where the court considered the entire regulatory scheme affecting milk producers rather than limiting its review to the single milk marketing order being challenged in that case). ° We believe that there can be no dispute that milk producers are regulated to a far greater extent than were the mushroom growers in United FoodsUnited Foods. ’ The fact that the assessments “may indirectly lead to a reduction in a [dairy producer’s] individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a restriction on speech.” Wileman, 521 U.S. at 470. 43a b. Whether Section 4504(g) of the Stabilization Act compels any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. | Section 4504(g) does not compel the Cochrans to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. The mandatory assessments charged to the Cochrans and other milk producers pursuant to the Act, although used to subsidize the generic advertising of milk, are not considered to be “compelled speech.”® See Gallo, 185 F.3d at 976 (citing Wileman, 521 U.S. 470-72, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130). Moreover, the generic advertisements funded by the assessments are attributed to the National Dairy Promotion Board rather than to the Cochrans or any other individual dairy producers. See 7 U.S.C. § 4504(c). c. Whether Section 4504(g) of the Stabilization Act compels dairy producers to endorse or finance any political or ideological views. Pursuant to the provisions of the Stabilization Act, the Cochrans are obligated to finance advertisements which contain messages to which they object. Specifically, the Cochrans assert that they disagree with the promotion of milk generically as “speech that denies there is any difference in milk.” Cochran Decl. P. 13. * This is because “the use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require [the Cochrans] to repeat an objectionable message out of their own mouths, require them to use their own property to convey and antagonistic ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile message when they would prefer to remain silent, or require them to be publicly identified or associated with another’s message.” Wileman, 521 U.S. 470-471, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotations omitted). * At oral argument, the Cochrans asserted additional, albeit somewhat imprecise, objections to the content of the advertisements: that the Cochrans prefer more traditional farming methods than those employed 44a For the sake of deciding upon the pending motions, we assume without holding that the Cochrans’ objections are ideological in their nature. “Assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes be used to pay for [ideological] speech over the objection of some members of the group,” Wileman, 521 U.S. at 472-3, but only if the advertising funded by those assessments is “germane to the purposes for which compelled association [is] justified.” See id. at 473; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 230, 235-36, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977); Gallo, 185 F.3d at 976. The Stabilization Act was conceived of as a means of creating “a coordinated program of promotion designed to strengthen the dairy industry’s position in the marketplace and to maintain and expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for fluid milk and dairy products.” 7 U.S.C. § 4501(b). “Generic advertising is intended to stimulate consumer demand for an agricultural product in a regulated market.” Wileman, 521 U.S. at 476. There can be no doubt if the relevant advertising is effective in that it increases the demand for milk, it will have furthered the articulated objectives of the Act. Therefore, we hold that the creation of a generic advertising campaign for milk is germane to the declared purposes of the Stabilization Act.'° by the majority of milk producers and that advertisements may be deemed to promote sexually explicit messages. ' It is worth noting that Plaintiffs do not assert that the advertising at issue is in any way false or deceptive. In this regard, Plaintiffs’ imprecise “criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgment of anybody’s right to speak freely.” Wileman, 521 U.S. 474, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130. 45a CONCLUSION: It became clear to the Court at oral argument that despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to frame their argument within the ambit of the United Foods and Wileman continuum of cases, in reality Plaintiffs are urging this Court to embrace and apply Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Wileman to the case at bar." To follow Justice Souter’s position would necessarily entail applying a standard of review contrary to the holding of Wileman. As a district court, we are bound to apply the law of the land in a manner consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. We will not, therefore, disregard controlling precedent. ' Accordingly, we find that Section 4504(g) of the Sta- bilization Act is a species of economic regulation that does not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the Cochrans. We will deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and grant both the Governmental Defendants’ and the Intervenors’ motions for summary judgment. '' Justice Souter would “adhere to the principle laid down in our com- pelled-speech cases: laws requiring an individual to engage in or pay for expressive activities are reviewed under the same standard that applies to laws prohibiting one from engaging in «* paying for such activities. Under the test for commercial speech, the law may be held constitutional only if (1) the interest being pursued by the government is substantial, and (2) the regulation direction advances that interest and (3) is narrowly tailored to serve it.” Wileman, 521 U.S. 491, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). '? Cognizant that we may be stating the cbvious, our holding should be considered apart from any perceived appraisal on our part as to the bene- fits ov harms arising out of the imposition of a generic advertising pro- gram funded by assessments charged to milk producers pursuant to the Stabilization Act. Reasonable people can and do differ as to the virtues of such a scheme. 46a NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 2) is denied. 2. The Governmental Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 9) is granted. 3. The Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 45) is granted. 4. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record (doc. 62) is granted. 5. The Clerk is directed to close the file on the case. John E. Jones Ill United States District Judge 47a APPENDIX C UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 03-2522 JOSEPH S. COCHRAN; BRENDA S. COCHRAN, Appellants, V. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture; NATIONAL DAIRY PROMOTION BOARD, FRED LOVELL; LEE GREENWALT; JACKIE ROOT; EARNEST NORMAN; STEPHEN MASHALL; CECIL MOYER; JAMES VANBLARCOM Intervenor/Defendants in D.C. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 02-cv-00529) District Jude: The Honorable John E. Jones Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 12, 2004 SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING AND HEARING EN BANC Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, McKEE, RENDELL, BARRY, AMBRO, FUENTES, SMITH CHERTOFF, FISHER and ALDISERT’, Circuit Judges * Judge Aldisert’s vote was limited to panel rehearing only. 48a The Petition for Rehearing filed by Appellant filed by Appellees and the Petition for Rehearing on behalf of the Intervenors having been submitted to the judges who participate din the decision of this Court, and to all the other available circuit judges in active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular avtive service not having voted for rehearing by the court en banc, the petition for rehearing is DENIED. BY THE COURT /s/ Ruggero J. Aldisert RUGGERO J. ALDISERT Circuit Judge DATED: May 3, 2004 49a APPENDIX D 7 USCS § 4501 (2004) § 4501. Congressional findings and declaration of policy (a) Congress finds that— (1) dairy products are basic foods that are a valuable part of the human diet; (2) the production of dairy products plays a significant role in the Nation’s economy, the milk from which dairy products are manufactured is produced by thousands of milk producers, and dairy products are consumed by millions of people throughout the United States; (3) dairy products must be readily available and marketed efficiently to ensure that the people of the United States receive adequate nourishmeift; (4) the maintenance and expansion of existing markets for dairy products are vital to the welfare of milk producers and those concerned with marketing, using, and producing dairy products, as well as to the general economy of the Nation; and (5) dairy products move in interstate and foreign commerce, and dairy products that do not move in such channels of commerce directly burden or affect interstate commerce of dairy products. (b) It, therefore, is declared to be the policy of Congress that it is in the public interest to authorize the establishment, through the exercise of the powers provided herein, of an orderly procedure for financing (through assessments on all milk produced in the United States for commercial use and on imported dairy products) and carrying out a coordinated program of promotion designed to strengthen the dairy industry’s position in the marketplace and to maintain and 50a expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for fluid milk and dairy products. Nothing in this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seg.) may be construed to provide for the control of production or otherwise limit the right of individual miik producers to produce milk or the right of any person to import dairy products. § 4502. Definitions As used in this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seqg.|— (a) the term “Board” means the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board established under section 113 of this subtitle [7 USCS § 4504]; (b) the term “Department” means the Department of Agriculture; (c) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Agriculture; (d) the term “milk” means any class of cow’s milk; (e) the term “dairy products” means products manufactured for human consumption which are derived from the processing of milk, and includes fluid milk products; (f) the term “fluid milk products” means those milk pro- ducts normally consumed in liquid form as a beverage; (g) the term “person” means any individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association, coopera- tive, or any other entity; (h) the term “producer” means any person engaged in the production of milk for commercial use; (i) the term “promotion” means actions such as paid adver- tising, sales promotion, and publicity to advance the image and sales of and demand for dairy products; (j)the term “research” means studies testing the effective- ness of market development and promotion efforts, studies S5la relating to the nutritional value of milk and dairy products, and other related efforts to expand demand for milk and dairy products; (k) the term “nutrition education” means those activities intended to broaden the understanding of sound nutritional principles including the role of milk and dairy products in a balanced diet; (1) the term “United States” as used in sections 110 through 117 [7 USCS §§ 4501-4508] means the forty-eight contigu- ous States in the continental United States; (m) the term “imported dairy product” means any dairy product that is imported into the United States (as defined in subsection (1)), including dairy products imported into the United States in the form of— (1) milk, cream, and fresh and dried dairy products; (2) butter and butterfat mixtures; (3) cheese; and (4) casein and mixtures; (n) the term “importer” means a person that imports an imported dairy product into the United States; and (o) the term “Customs” means the United States Customs Service. § 4503. Issuance of orders (a) Notice and opportunity for public comment. During the period beginning with the date of enactment of this subtitle [enacted Nov. 29, 1983] and ending thirty days after receipt of a proposal for an initial dairy products promotion and research order, the Secretary shall publish such proposed order and give due notice and opportunity for public comment upon the proposed order. The proposal for an order may be submitted by an organization certified under section 52a 114 of this subtitle [7 USCS § 4505] or by any interested person affected by the provisions of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.]. (b) Effective date of orders. After notice and opportunity for public comment are given, as provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall issue a dairy products promotion and research order. Such order shall become effective not later than ninety days following publication of the proposal. (c) Amendment of orders. The Secretary may, from time to time, amend a dairy products promotion and research order. (d) Order implementation and _ international trade obligations. The Secretary, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, shall ensure that the order is implemented in a manner consistent with the international trade obligations of the Federal Government. § 4504. Required terms in orders Any order issued under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seq.| shall contain terms and conditions as follows: (a) The order shall provide for the establishment and administration of appropriate plans or projects for adver- tisement and promotion of the sale and consumption of dairy products, for research projects related thereto, for nutrition education projects, and for the disbursement of necessary funds for such purposes. Any such plan or project shall be directed toward the sale and marketing or use of dairy products to the end that the marketing and use of dairy products may be encouraged, expanded, improved, or made more acceptable. No such advertising or sales promotion program shall make use of unfair or deceptive acts or practices with respect to the quality, value, or use of any competing product. : socal abeeicuiiiaiaaasaasmeaesiaaiiiiiaeaeeneaiaaiatiiea emiaiani: 53a (b) National Dairy Promotion and Research Board. (1) The order shall provide for the establishment and appointment by the Secretary of a National Dairy Promotion and Research Board that shall consist of not less than thirty-six members. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (6), the members of the Board shall be milk producers appointed by the Secretary from nominations submitted by eligible organizations certified under section 114 of this subtitle [7 USCS § 4505], or, if the Secretary determines that a substantial number of milk producers are not members of, or their interests are not represented by, any such eligible organization, then from nominations made by such milk producers in the manner authorized by the Secretary. (3) In making such appointments, the Secretary shall take into account, to the extent practicable, the geographical distribution of milk production volume throughout the United States. (4) In determining geographic representation, whole States shall be considered as a unit. (5) A region may be represented by more than one director and a region may be made up of more than one State. (6) Importers. (A) Initial representation. In making initial appointments to the Board of importer representatives, the Secretary shall appoint 2 members who represent importers of dairy products and are subject to assessments under the order. (B) Subsequent representation. At least once every 3 years after the initial appointment of importer representatives under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall review the average volume of domestic production of dairy products compared to 54a the average volume of imports of dairy products into the United States during the previous 3 years and, on the basis of that review, shall reapportion importer representation on the Board to reflect the proportional share of the United States market by domestic production and imported dairy products. (C) Additional members; nominations. The members appointed under this paragraph— (i) shall be in addition to the total number of members appointed under paragraph (2); and . (ii) shall be appointed from nominations submitted by importers under such procedures as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. (7) The term of appointment to the Board shall be for three years with no member serving more than two consecutive terms, except that initial appointments shall be proportionately for one-year, two-year, and three-year terms. (8) The Board shall appoint from its members an executive committee whose membership shall equally reflect each of the different regions in the United States in which milk is produced as well as importers of dairy products. (9) The executive committee shall have such duties and powers as are conferred upon it by the Board. (10) Board members shall serve without compensation, but shall be reimbursed for their reasonable expenses incurred in performing their duties as members of the Board including a per diem allowance as recommended by the Board and approved by the Secretary. (c) The order shall define the powers and duties of the Board that shall include only the powers enumerated in this section. These shall include, in addition to the powers set forth elsewhere in this section, the powers to (1) receive and 55a evaluate, or on its own initiative develop, and budget for plans or projects to promote the use of fluid milk and dairy products as well as projects for research and nutrition education and to make recommendations to the Secretary regarding such proposals, (2) administer the order in accordance with its terms and provisions, (3) make rules and regulations to effectuate the terms and provisions of the order, (4) receive, investigate, and report to the Secretary complaints of violations of the order, and (5) recommend to the Secretary amendments to the order. The Board shall solicit, among others, research proposals that would increase the use of fluid milk and dairy products by the military and by persons in developing nations, and that would demonsirate the feasibility of converting surplus nonfat dry milk to casein for domestic and export use. (d) The order shall provide that the Board shall develop and submit to the Secretary for approval any promotion, research, or nutrition education plan or project and that any such plan or project must be approved by the Secretary before becoming effective. (e) Budgets. (1) Preparation and submission. The order shall require the Board to submit to the Secretary for approval budgets on a fiscal period basis of its anticipated expenses and disbursements in the administration of the order, including projected costs of dairy products promotion and research projects. (2) Foreign market efforts. The order shall authorize the Board to expend in the maintenance and expansion of foreign markets an amount not to exceed the amount collected from United States producers for a fiscal year. Of those funds, for each of the 2002 through 2007 fiscal years, the Board’s budget may provide for the expenditure of revenues available to the Board to 56a develop international markets for, and to promote within such markets, the consumption of dairy products pro- duced or manufactured in the United States. (f) The order shall provide that the Board, with the approval of the Secretary, may enter into agreements fo~ the development and conduct of the activities authorized u.der the order as specified in subsection (a) and for the payment of the cost thereof with funds collected through assess ments under the order. Any such agreement shall provide that (1) the contracting party shall develop and submit to the Board a plan or project together with a budget or budgets that shall show estimated costs to be incurred for such plan or project, (2) the plan or project shall become effective upon the approval of the Secretary, and (3) the contracting party shall keep accurate records of all of its transactions, account for funds received and expended, and make periodic reports to the Board of activities conducted, and such other reports as the Secretary or the Board may require. (g) Assessments. (1) The order shall provide that each person making payment to a producer for milk produced in the United States and purchased from the producer shall, in the manner as prescribed by the order, collect an assessment based upon the number of hundredweights of ntiik for commercial use handled for the account of the producer and remit the assessment to the Board. (2) The assessment shall be used for payment of the expenses in administering the order, with provision for a reasonable reserve, and shall include those admini- strative costs incurred by the Department after an ord- - er has been promulgated under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seq.}. (3) The rate of assessment for milk produced in the United States and imported dairy products prescribed by aa 57a the order shall be 15 cents per hundredweight of milk for commercial use or the equivalent thereof, as provided by the Secretary. (4) A milk producer or the producer’s cooperative who can establish that the producer is participating in active, ongoing qualified State or regional dairy product promotion or nutrition education programs intended to increase consumption of milk and dairy products generally shall receive credit in determining the assess- ment due from such producer for contributions to such programs of up to 10 cents per hundredweight of milk marketed or, for the period ending six months after the date of enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 29, 1983], up to the aggregate rate in effect on the date of enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 29, 1983] of such contributions to such programs (but not to exceed 15 cents per hundredweight of milk marketed) if such aggregate rate exceeds 10 cents per hundredweight of milk marketed. (5) Any person marketing milk of that person’s own production directly to consumers shall remit the assessment directly to the Board in the manner _______- prescribed by the order. (6) Importers. (A) In general. The order shall provide that each importer of imported dairy products shall pay an assessment to the Board in the manner prescribed by the order. (B) Time for payment. The assessment on imported dairy products shall be paid by the importer to Customs at the time the entry documents are filed with Customs. Customs shall remit the assessments to the Board. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “importer” includes persons who hold title to foreign-produced dairy products immediately upon release by Customs, as well as persons who act on behalf of 58a others, as agents, brokers, or consignees, to secure the release of dairy products from Customs. (C) Use of assessments on imported dairy provucts. Assessments collected on imported dairy products shall not be used for foreign market promotion. (h) The order shall require the Board to (1) maintain such books and records (which shall be available to the Secretary for inspection and audit) as the Secretary may prescribe, (2) prepare and submit to the Secretary, from time to time, such reports as the Secretary may prescribe, and (3) account for the receipt and disbursement of all funds entrusted to it. (i) The order shall provide that the Board, with the approval of the Secretary, may invest, pending disbursement under a plan or project, funds collected through assessments authorized under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.] only in obligations of the United States or any agency thereof, in general obligations of any State or any political subdivision thereof, in any interest-bearing account or certificate of deposit of a bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System, or in obligations fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States. (j) The order shall prohibit any funds collected by the Board under the order from being used in any manner for the purpose of influencing governmental policy or action except as provided by subsection (c)(5). (k) The order shall require that each importer of imported dairy products, each person receiving milk from farmers for commercial use, and any person marketing milk of that person’s own production directly to consumers, maintain and make available for inspection such books and records as may be required by the order and file reports at the time, in the manner, and having the content prescribed by the order. Such information shall be made available to the Secretary as is appropriate to the administration or enforcement of this nt S|. a, 59a subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seq.], or any order or regulation issued under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.]. All information so obtained shall be kept confidential by all officers and employees of the Department, and only such information so obtained as the Secretary deems relevant may be disclosed by them and then only in a suit or administrative hearing brought at the request of the Secretary, or to which the Secretary or any officer of the United States is a party, and involving the order with reference to which the information to be disclosed was obtained. Nothing in this subsection may be deemed to prohibit (1) the issuance of general statements, based upon the reports, of the number of persons subject to an order or statistical data collected therefrom, which statements do not identify the information furnished by any person, or (2) the publication, by direction of the Secretary, of the name of any person violating any order, together with a statement of the particular provisions of the order violated by such person. No information obtained under the authority of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.] may be made available to any agency or officer of the Federal Government for any purpose other than the implementation of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seg.] and any investigatory or enforcement action necessary for the implementation of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.]. Any person violating the provisions of this subsection shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $ 1,000, or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and, if an officer or employee of the Board or the Department, shall be removed from office. (1) The order shall provide terms and conditions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.], as necessary to effectuate the provisions of the order. 60a § 4505. Certification of organizations (a) The eligibility of any organization to represent milk producers, and to participate in the making of nominations under section 113 of this subtitle [7 USCS § 4504] shall be certified by the Secretary. The Secretary shall certify any organization that the Secretary determines meets the eligi- bility criteria established by the Secretary under this section and the Secretary’s determination as to eligibility shall be final. (b) Certification shall be based, in addition to other available information, on a factual report submitted by the organization, which shall contain information deemed relevant and specified by the Secretary, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) geographic territory covered by the organization’s active membership; (2) nature and size of the organization’s active membership including the proportion of the total number of active milk producers represented by the organization; (3) evidence of stability and permanency of the organization; (4) sources from which the organization’s operating funds are derived; (5) functions of the organization; and (6) the organization’s ability and willingness to fur- ther the aims and objectives of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.}. The primary considerations in determining the eligibility of an organization shall be whether its membership consists primarily of milk producers who produce a substantial volume of milk and whether the primary or overriding interest of the organization is in the production or processing 6la of fuid milk and dairy products and promotion of the nutritional attributes of fluid milk and dairy products. § 4506. Requirement of referendum (a) Within the sixty-day period immediately preceding September 30, 1985, the Secretary shall conduct a referendum among producers who, during a representative period (as determined by the Secretary), have been engaged in the production of milk for commercial use for the purpose of ascertaining whether the order then in effect shall be continued. Such order shall be continued only if the Secretary determines that it has been approved by not less than a majority of the producers voting in the referendum, who during a representative period (as determined by the Secretary) have been engaged in the production of milk for commercial use. If continuation of the order is not approved by a majority of the producers voting in the referendum, the Secretary shall terminate collection of assessments under the order within six months after the Secretary determines that such action is favored by a majority of the producers voting in the referendum and shall terminate the order in an orderly manner as soon as practicable after such determination. (b) The Secretary shall be reimbursed from assessments collected by the Board for any expenses incurred by the Department in connection with the conduct of any referendum under this section and section 116 [7 USCS § 4507], except for the salaries of Government employees. § 4507. Suspension and termination of orders (a) After September 30, 1985, the Secretary shall, whenever the Secretary finds that any order issued under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.] or any provision thereof obstructs or does not tend to effectuate the declared policy of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.], terminate or suspend the operation of such order or such provisions thereof. 62a (b) After September 30, 1985, the Secretary may conduct a referendum at. any time, and shall hold a referendum on request of a representative group comprising 10 per centum or more of the number of producers and importers subject to the order, to determine whether the producers and importers favor the termination or suspension of the order. The Secretary shal] suspend or terminate collection of assessments under the order within six months after the Secretary determines that suspension or termination of the order is favored by a majority of the producers voting in the referendum who, during a representative period (as deter- mined by the Secretary), have been engaged in the production of milk for commercial use and importers voting in the referendum (who have been engaged in the importation of dairy products during the same representative period, as determined by the Secretary) and shall terminate the order in an orderly manner as soon as practicable after such determination. (c) The termination or suspension of any order, or any provision thereof, shall not be considered an order within the meaning of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.]. § 4508. Cooperative association representation Whenever, under the provisions of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.], the Secretary is required to determine the approval or disapproval of producers, the Secretary shall consider the approval or disapproval by any cooperative association of producers, engaged in a bona fide manner in marketing milk or the products thereof, as the approval or disapproval of the producers who are members of or under contract with such cooperative association of producers. If a cooperative association of producers elects to vote on behalf of its members, such cooperative association shall provide each producer, on whose behalf the cooperative association is expressing approval or disapproval, a description of the ques- tion presented in the referendum together with a statement of 63a the manner in which the cooperative association intends to cast its vote on behalf of the membership. Such information shall inform the producer of procedures to follow to cast an individual ballot should the producer so choose within the period of time established by the Secretary for casting ballots. Such notification shall be made at least thirty days prior to the referendum and shall include an official ballot. The ballots shall be tabulated by the Secretary and the vote of the cooperative association shall be adjusted to reflect such individual votes. § 4509. Petition and review (a) Any person subject to any order issued under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.] may file with the Secretary a petition stating that any such order or any provision of such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in accordance with law and requesting a modification thereof or an exemption therefrom. The petitioner shall there- upon be given an opportunity for a hearing on the petition, in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling on the petition, which shall be final if in accordance with law. (b) The district courts of the United States in any district in which such person is an inhabitant or carries on business are hereby vested with jurisdiction to review such ruling, if a complaint for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had on the Secretary by delivering a copy of the complaint to the Secretary. If the court determines that such ruling is not in accordance with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the Secretary with directions either (1) to make such ruling as the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. 64a § 4510. Enforcement om (a) Restraining order; civil action; minor violation. The district courts of the United States are vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person from violating, any order or regulation made or issued under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seqg.]. Any civil action authorized to be brought under this subsection shall be referred to the Attorney General for appropriate action, except that the Secretary is not required to refer to the Attorney General minor violations of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.] whenever the Secretary believes that the administration and enforcement of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.] would be adequately served by suitable written notice or warning to any person committing such violation. (b) Civil penalties. Any person who willfully violates any provision of any order issued by the Secretary under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.] shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $ 1,000 for each such violation and, in the case of a willful failure to pay, collect, or remit the assessment as required by the order, in addition to the amount due, a penalty equal to the amount of the assessment on the quantity of milk as to which the failure applies. The amount of any such penalty shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil suit brought by the United States. (c) Availability of other remedies. The remedies provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be in addition to, and not exclusive of, other remedies that may be available. § 4511. Investigations; power to subpoena and take oaths and affirmations; aid of courts The Secretary may make such investigations as the Secretary deems necessary for the effective administration of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.] or to determine 65a whether any person subject to the provisions of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.] has engaged or is about to engage in any act that constitutes or will constitute a violation of any provision of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.] or of any order, or rule or regulation issued under this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.|. For the purpose of such investigation, the Secretary may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any records that are relevant to the inquiry. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of any such records may be required from any place in the United States. In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena to, any person, the Secretary may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of records. The court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Secretary to produce records or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by suc) court as a contempt thereof. Process in any such case may be served in the judicial district in which such person is an inhabitant or wherever such person may be found. § 4512. Administrative provisions (a) Nothing in this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.] may be construed to preempt or supersede any other program relating to dairy product promotion organized and operated under the laws of the United States or any State. (b) The provisions of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 e/ seq.| applicable to orders shall be applicable to amendments to orders. 66a § 4513. Authorization of appropriations There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seg.]. The funds so appropriated shall not be available for payment of the expenses or expenditures of the Board in administering any provisions of any order issued under the terms of this subtitle [7 USCS §§ 4501 et seq.] § 4514. Dairy reports The Secretary of Agriculture shall submit to the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry the following reports: (1) Not later than July 1, 1984, a report on the effect of applying, nationally, standards similar to the current California standards for fluid milk products in their final consumer form, as they would relate to— (A) consumer acceptance, overall consumer consumption trends, and total per capita consumption; (B) nutritional augmentation, particularly for young and older Americans; (C) implementing improved interagency enforcement of minimum standards to prevent consumer fraud and deception; (D) multiple component pricing for producer milk; (E) reduced Commodity Credit Corporation purchases; (F) consistency of product quality throughout the year and between marketing regions of the United States; and (G) consumer prices. (2) Not later than December 31, 1984, a report on (A) recommendations for changes in the application of the parity formula to milk so as to make the formula more consistent with modern production methods and with special attention to the cost of producing milk as a result 67a of changes in productivity, and (B) the feasibility of imposing a limitation on the total amount of payments and other assistance a producer of milk may receive during a year under section 201(d) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7 U.S.C. 1446(d)) [7 USCS § 1446(d)]. (3) Not later than April 15, 1985, a report on the effectiveness of the paid diversion program carried out under section 201(d) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 [7 USCS § 1446(d)]. (4) Not later than July 1, 1985, and July 1 of each year after the date of enactment of this title [enacted Nov. 29, 1983], an annual report describing activities conducted under the dairy products promotion and research order issued under subtitle B of title I of this Act [7 USCS §§ 4501 ef seq.], and accounting for the receipt and disbursement of all funds received by the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board under such order including an independent analysis of the effectiveness of the program. 68a APPENDIX E TITLE 7—AGRICULTURE SUBTITLE B—REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CHAPTER X—AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (MARKETING AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS; MILK), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE PART 1150—DAIRY PROMOTION PROGRAM SUBPART—DAIRY PROMOTION AND RESEARCH ORDER § 1150.101 Act. Act means Title I, Subtitle B, of the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-180, 97 Stat. 1128, as approved November 29, 1983, and any amendments thereto. § 1150.102 Department. Department means the United States Department of Agriculture. § 1150.103 Secretary. Secretary means the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States or any other officer or employee of the Department to whom authority has heretofore been delegated, or to whom authority may hereafter be delegated, to act in the Secretary’s stead. § 1150.104 Board. Board means the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board established pursuant to § 1150.131. 69a § 1150.105 Person. Person means any individual, group of individuals, partner- ship, corporation, association, cooperative or other entity. § 1150.106 United States. United States means the 48 contiguous States in the continental United States. § 1150.107 Fiscal period. Fiscal period means the calendar year or such other annual p [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1572%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.