# Reply Brief — Massachusetts v. American Trucking Assns.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1458%3A13

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 532 U.S. 901

## Text

(is)
Nos. 99- 7,99

In The |

ey \ % Supreme Court, US
-1263,99-1265 FILED

APR 17 oy99
Supreme Court of the Un

j ed yates K

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
AND THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,

Petitioners,
v.
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al.,
Respondents.

-@
On Petitior. For A Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For The District of Columbia Circuit
4
REPLY BRIEF OF MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW JERSEY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

4

JOHN J. FARMER THOMAS F. REILLY
Attorney General Attorney General
State of New Jersey Commonwealth of

Massachusetts
HOWARD L. GEDULDIG
JOHN R. RENELLA LISA HEINZERLING
Deputy Attorneys General, Counsel of Record

New Jersey Special Assistant Attorney

Richard J. Hughes Justice
Complex, 7th Floor

P.O. Box 093

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 633-8109, 984-5612

General, Massachusetts
Georgetown University
Law Center
600 New Jersey Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 662-9115

EDWARD G. BOHLEN

Assistant Attorney General,
Massachusetts

200 Portland Street

Boston, MA 02114

(617) 727-2200, Ext. 3358

TABLE OF CONTENTS
pp ee wee ee eer ee ee il
REPLY BRIEF OF STATE PETITIONERS............. ]
TEE 5 HAN lle ees SN eed 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Lung Ass’nv. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 3
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) ...... 6
— U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . .2, 5, 6

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 UB. FOGG) a's cdccnckabhca cadens cocoate 4

United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990)... 6

Statutory Provisions

2 USL..6 PRPC 4 455 hp eee ee ee ee 8
42 UDG, | PRP 5 464445 ReM eek eenh okie cees 8
42 UBL. § TREN kas cdceennwoes ee 7,8
Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 6103, 112 Stat. 465 (1998) ........ 8
Other Sources

H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, Pt. 1, at 229-232, reprinted in 2 1990
Legis. Giih. Sean s unnanekeuieneee shsu becuse ces 9

li

REPLY BRIEF OF STATE PETITIONERS

This case concerns two separate rules issued by EPA with
respect to two different pollutants: particulate matter and ozone.
The court below invalidated both rules on the basis of the
~ “nondelegation” doctrine. A large number of respondents
concede that this deviant but important constitutional ruling
warrants this Court’s review. (Brief in Response for
Respondents American Trucking Associations, et al., 10 (“ATA
Resp.”); Brief in Response for States of Ohio, Michigan and
West Virginia 3 (“Ohio Resp.”).) However, one group of
respondents avers that the lower court’s invalidation of EPA’s
rules on the basis of a constitutional doctrine not used by this
Court to overturn a statute in more than six decades is so
“pedestrian” that it requires “no comment, let alone Supreme
Court review.” (Brief in Response for Appalachian Power Co.,
et al., 24 (“App. Pwr. Resp.”).) As set forth below, however,
respondents premise this audacious claim on a mistaken reading
of the opinion below, and on the implicit constitutionalization
of basic principles of administrative law.

The court also held that the ozone standard could not be
enforced. As to the question whether this ruling comports with
the Clean Air Act, all respondents urge this Court to leave
matters where they stand. But the two questions that petitioners
have brought before this Court concerning the ozone standard
— constitutional and statutory — should be heard together.
Unless this Court grants review of the statutory question
whether EPA may enforce the revised ozone standard, review
of the constitutional question as it applies to the ozone rule may
amount to a pointless exercise in abstraction. To avoid this
eventuality, the Court should grant review of both questions,
constitutional and statutory, presented by petitioners.

1. The constitutionalityof the Clean Air Act as applied to
_EPA’s revised rules.

The court below held that the “statutory language” of the
Clean Air Act and the “existing agency interpretation” of that
language “involve an unconstitutional delegation of power.”
(Appendix to State Petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari 12
(“App.”).) Many respondents, including the State of Ohio,
concede that this remarkable constitutional ruling warrants this
Court’s review. (ATA Resp. 10; Ohio Resp. 3.) When the
United States Government and States that are parties to a case
collectively request this Court’s review and when, moreover, a
large contingent of industry parties acquiesces in that request,
such a case comes to this Court with a heavy presumption that
review is warranted.

Despite their sensible concession about the importance of |
this case, however, Respondents ATA, et al., attempt to recast
the decision below as a “work-a-day” remand under Chevron
- U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). (ATA Resp. 14.) Similarly, Respondents
Appalachian Power, ef al., strain to fit the court’s problematic
constitutional decision into the familiar framework of “arbitrary
and capricious” review under the Administrative Procedure Act
and statutory interpretation under Chevron (App. Pwr. Resp.
12-13, 15.) Respondents National Stone Association, ef al.,
make a similar attempt. (Brief in Response for Respondents
National Stone Association and Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, et al., 7-8 (“Nat’] Stone Resp.”).) These efforts to
domesticate the D.C. Circuit’s bold ruling do not succeed.

Tellingly, none of the respondents defends the lower
court’s ruling that the “statutory language” of the Clean Air Act
violates the nondelegation doctrine. (App. 12.) Instead,
respondents seek to reassure this Court that the constitutional
status of the Clean Air Act itself— which has been on the statute

books for three decades and has been the subject of numerous
judicial challenges, including several in this Court — is secure. |
(App. Pwr. Resp. 8 (“The court did not hold the statute itself
unconstitutional”); ATA Resp. 15 (statute “undisputedly is not”
unconstitutional)). Presumably, respondents recognize that a
_ failure to concede the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act
would place their views at obvious odds with this Court’s
numerous precedents upholding far broader delegations against
constitutional attack (discussed in our petition at 18-21). Thus,
rather than acknowledging that the court below found that the
“statutory language” of the Clean Air Act violated the
nondelegation doctrine (App. 12), respondents repeatedly claim
that the court found only that EPA’s interpretation of the Act
was unconstitutional.

But how does a statute that is “undisputedly” constitutiond
somehow become unconstitutional when interpreted by an
administrative agency?

Respondents Appalachian Power, et al., offer the most
adventuresome answer to this question. Distancing themselves
from the dubious constitutional grounding of the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion, these respondents implicitly equate the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review with the constitutional doctrine
of delegation. For example, respondents cite decisions based
on the arbitrary and capricious standard as if those decisions
support the D.C. Circuit’s constitutionalruling. (See, e.g., Aipp. .
Pwr. Resp. 17 (citing American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d
388 (D.C. Cir. 1998).) Even more bewilderingly, respondents
also suggest that the D.C. Circuit’s rationale for remanding
EPA’s rules

might as well have been articulated as “arbitrary and
Capricious” agency action — that EPA failed to state a
rational basis for its decision. Whatever the rationale, the

proposition that an agency’s discretion must be guided by
an intelligible criterion is so pedestrian as to require no
comment, let alone Supreme Court review. (App. Pwr.
Resp. 12-13 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).)

See also Nat’! Stone Resp. at 7-8. Respondents’ casual
equation of the nondelegation doctrine with the arbitrary and
capricious standard should not be countenanced.’ Respondents’

'It is possible that the respondents, in the passage cited
in text, are inartfully attempting to defend the court’s judgment
on the basis of an argument not reached by the court below.
This Court should not decide the question whether EPA’s rules
are arbitrary and capricious. Addressing this question would
require systematic, in-depth scrutiny of the voluminous record
in this case. This complex and fact-bound issue should be
considered in the first instance by the appeals court. Moreover,
respondents did not present this argument in this same form
below, and therefore the question whether EPA’s rules are
arbitrary and capricious in the way respondents now allege is
not properly before this Court. With respect to particulate
matter, for example, respondents did not argue to the lower
court that EPA’s revised particulate matter rule was arbitrary
and capricious due to the agency’s failure to explain why it
targeted one pollutant level rather than another. Rather,
respondents took issue with the scientific evidence underlying
the revised standard, see Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine
Particulate Matter NAAQS, and with EPA’s failure to consider
the effects of the rules on small businesses, see Brief of Small
Business Petitioners and Intervenor (PM Rule). Likewise, with
respect to the ozone standard, respondents challenged the
scientific evidence underlying EPA’s finding of an
unacceptable risk to human health, but did not ask the court to
require EPA, in the name of arbitrary and capricious review, to
set “determinate, binding standards” such as those ultimately

4

theory would threaten to turn every departure from the
principles articulated in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), into a
constitutional case. Needless to say, such a result would vastly
and inappropriately enlarge courts’ authority to invalidate
agency action on constitutional grounds.

Respondents Appalachian Power, et al., also offer a second
theory as to how an “undisputedly” constitutional statute may
be transmuted into an unconstitutional one in an agency’s
hands, and in this instance they are joined in their argument by
respondents ATA, ef al. Respondents contend that the court’s
ruling invalidating EPA’s rules under the Clean Air Act on
constitutional grounds is “functionally indistinguishable” from
a “work-a-day” ruling that, according to the principles of
Chevron, the agency simply misinterpreted the Clean Air Act.
(ATA Resp. 14; see also App. Pwr. Resp. 13 & n. 27, 15; cf
Nat’! Stone Resp. 9).?

required by the court (App. 12). See Brief of Non-State Clean
Air Act Petitioners and Intervenors 48-53 (Ozone Rule).

Although all of the respondents appear to agree that
EPA misinterpreted the Clean Air Act, they do not agree as to
how the agency should have interpreted the Act. For example,
compare Nat’! Stone Resp. 9 (arguing that EPA misinterpreted
Act in not quantifying risk before regulating) with App. Pwr.
Cross-Pet. (arguing that EPA misinterpreted Act to preclude
consideration of factors unrelated to public health effects
resulting from pollution’s presence in ambient air). As we
discuss in our opposition to respondents’ cross-petitions,
respondents offer quite a varied array of different possible
interpretationsof the Clean Air Act in the course of arguing that
the meaning of the statute is clear. See Brief in Opposition for
Petitioners Massachusetts and New Jersey.

5

Nowhere did the court below suggest, however, that EPA
had misinterpretedthe Clean Air Act. Indeed, the court upheld
EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the statute to forbid the
consideration of costs and feasibility in setting the NAAQS.
(App. 17-20.)° Rather than finding that EPA’s position was a
misinterpretationof the Clean Air Act, the court found that the
agency’s interpretation, though permissible under the statute,
was unconstitutional. This ruling is a world away from a ruling
that EPA merely misinterpreted the statute. Here, too,
therefore, respondents work hard to dismiss the constitutional
significance of the court’s ruling, and in doing so both misread
the court’s opinion and intimate that agencies that violate
Chevron, violate the Constitution. (App. Pwr. Resp. 16 & n. 35
(citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), a
garden-variety statutory interpretation case, as a
““nondelegation’” case).)

Respondents’ understandabledesire to distance themselves
from the dubious constitutional foundations of the lower court’s
decision cannot be squared with their argument that the
constitutional status of the Act as interpreted for thirty years is
so seriously in doubt that this Court should rewrite the Act in
order to avoid deciding a constitutional question. (ATA Cross-
Pet. I.) Respondents cannot have it both ways. An
“undisputedly” constitutional statute does not require or permit
invocation of the canon counseling avoidance of constitutional
decisions: “The canon about avoiding constitutional decisions

. must be used with care, for it is a closer cousin to
invalidation than to interpretation. . . . Constitutional decisions
breed penumbras, which multiply questions. Treating each as

In our Brief in Opposition, we explain why the
Conditional Cross-Petitionson this statutory question should be
denied. See Briefin Opposition for Petitioners Massachusetts
and New Jersey.

justification to construe laws out of existence too greatly
enlarges the judicial power.” United States v. Marshall, 908
F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).

2. The enforceability of the revised ozone standard.
Respondents do not seek review of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling
that the Clean Air Act authorized EPA to revise the air quality
standard for ozone. (App. 31-33.) Nor do they challenge the
court’s holding that EPA must designate areas as attainment,
nonattainment, or unclassifiable under the revised standard.
(App. 33-34.) Nevertheless, they argue that the court’s ruling
that section 181(a)(1) precludes EPA from enforcing the revised
ozone standard is unworthy of this Court’s review because the
court’s decision is correct and because the ruling is in an
interlocutory posture. Neither of thése assertions has merit.

In arguing that the language of section 181(a)(1) supports
the lower court’s ruling, respondents ignore most of the
language of this provision. As we set forth in detail in our
Petition, the language of sections 181 and 182 overwhelmingly
points to the conclusion that these provisions are exclusively
concerned with implementation of the former, one-hour ozone
standard — the standard that existed when these sections were
enacted. (Pet. 21-25.)

Respondents also never confront the absurd implications
of the lower court’s interpretation of section 181(a)(1). The
court held that EPA may revise the ozone standard and, if it
does so, it must designate areas according to their attainment
status under the revised standard. (App. 33-34.) However, if
section 181(a)(1) is interpreted as the court below interpreted it,
then the agency must disregard its designations under the
revised standard and classify areas according to the previous,
one-hour ozone standard. (Pet. 23-24.) This conclusion
follows from the plain language of section 181(a)(1): areas

designated nonattainment under this provision must be
classified “according to the interpretation methodology issued
by the Administrator most recently before the date of the
enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.” 42
U.S.C. 7511(a)(1). The interpretation methodology in effect at
that time was based on the previous, one-hour ozone standard.
(Pet. 23 & n. 9). Thus, if EPA must, as the court below held
and as respondents claim, classify areas under the revised
standard under section 181(a)(1) of the Act, and not under
Subpart 1, then EPA will be forced to classify areas according
to the ozone standard that it has abandoned. There is no
warrant in the language, structure, or purpose of the Clean Air
Act for sanctioning such an odd result.‘

Nor does the legislative history support respondents’
awkward reading of section 181(a)(1). Respondents ATA, ef
al., claim that “Congress specifically considered and rejected
bills that would have expressly limited Subpart 2's reach in just
the manner EPA claims that enacted statute does.” (ATA Resp.
23 (emphasis added and in original).) While it is true that the
version of Subpart 2 contained in the original House and Senate
bills referred specifically to the bills’ equivalent of section
107(d)(4) rather than to 107(d) as a whole, there is nothing in

‘Subsequent legislation confirms our reading of the
statute. In the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,
Congress reaffirmed the States’ and EPA’s obligations to
designate areas under the revised ozone standard. Congress
extended the States’ statutory deadline for submitting
designations, and shortened EPA’s deadline for promulgating
them. Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 6103, 112 Stat. 465 (1998).
Under respondents’ interpretation of the Clean Air Act,
Congress, in taking this action in 1998, simply — pointlessly —
reaffirmed the States’ and EPA’s obligations to promulgate
designations that would then be completely ignored.

8

the legislative history to suggest that this change was meant to
transform a revised ozone standard from an enforceable
standard into an unenforceable one. Indeed, the failure to
include the single number “(4)” in the final law — which, on
respondents’ reading, dramatically reworked the regulatory
_ scheme — went unremarked in the legislative history.°

Respondents also argue that the question whether the
revised ozone standard may be énforced is in an “interlocutory
posture” because EPA must now, in light of a part of the D.C.
Circuit’s decision not challenged here, consider and evaluate
the claim that smog is good for people. (E.g., App. Pwr. Resp.
29-30.) Respondents claim that EPA must now redo the entire
process of setting air quality standards, including issuing a new
Criteria Document — a process that Respondents ATA, et al.,
assert will take from “three to five years.” (ATA Resp. 17.)

Even assuming that respondents are correct in claiming
that EPA must now entirely redo its work on the ozone
standard, and even assuming they are correct that this process
will take from three to five years, this gives this Court all the
more reason to grant review of the question whether the ozone
standard may be enforced. For if respondents are correct, EPA
must now engage in a lengthy and complex process, likely
involving scores of agency personnel, in order to revise a
standard that the court below has ruled cannot be enforced.
This would be a colossal waste of precious resources.®

*See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, Pt. 1, at 229-232, reprinted
in 2 1990 Legis. Hist. 3253-3256.

*Respondents also oppose review on the Subpart 2 issue
on the ground that the lower court has “left open the door” to
further proceedings with respect to Subpart 2. (ATA Resp. 20,
citing the United States’ appendix to its petition, at 8la.) The

9

Many of the parties in this case agree that the question
whether EPA’s revised ozone standard violates the
nondelegation doctrine is worthy of this Court’s review. Yet
unless this Court also agrees to review the question whether this
standard may be enforced, review of the constitutional question
pertaining to the ozone standard may turn out to be a pointless
exercise, as it may succeed only in either ratifying or undoing
an agency standard that in any event may not be enforced. In
this way, the constitutional and statutory questions petitioners
have raised are closely connected, and this Court should review
them together.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS F. REILLY
Attorney General
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

JOHN J. FARMER
Attorney General
State of New Jersey

HOWARD L. GEDULDIG
JOHN R. RENELLA

Deputy Attys. General, N.J.

Richard J. Hughes Justice
Complex 7th Floor

P.O. Box 093

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 633-8109, 984-5612

LISA HEINZERLING

Counsel of Record

Special Assistant Atty. General,
Massachusetts

Georgetown Univ. Law Center
600 New Jersey Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-9115

EDWARD G. BOHLEN
Assistant Atty. General, Mass.

200 Portland Street
Boston, MA 02114
(617) 727-2200, ext. 3358

only proceedings for which the court left open the door,
however, are proceedings to reconsider the court’s decision not
to vacate the ozone standard. (U.S. App. 81a.)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1458%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
