# Appendix — Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1453%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 530 U.S. 1271

## Text

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Table of Contents

Page
Opinion below, Hope Clinic v. Ryan,
BD Te Bee PUN, SOG vsiscnsinsncnsscroscsecoscssintvores A-2
District Court opinion denying permanent
injunction, Planned Parenthood v. Doyle,
44 F. Supp 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999)...........cccceeeeees A-63

Seventh Circuit opinion reversing denial of
preliminary injunction, Planned Parenthood
v. Doyle, 162 F. 3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998)..............00 A-85

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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 98-1726
The Hope Clinic, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard K.
Devine, State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,

Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 97 C 8702--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
Nos. 99-2528 & 99-2533
Dennis D. Christensen, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Diane
M. Nicks, District Attorney for Dane County, Wisconsin,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.

A-3 .
No. 98-C-0305-S--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.
Argued September 22, 1999--Decided October 26, 1999

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY, FLAUM,
EASTERBROOK, MANION, KANNE, ROVNER, DIANE
P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges."

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. We must decide whether
state laws’ prohibiting partial-birth abortions are
unconstitutionally vague or unduly burden women’s rights.
Acting without an evidentiary hearing, a district court held
the Illinois statute unconstitutional and entered a permanent
injunction. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. -
1998). But after a trial, another district court concluded that
the Wisconsin statute is valid. Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
A panel of this court earlier had ordered preliminary relief
against Wisconsin’s law, see Planned Parenthood of
Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998), and
plaintiffs say that this decision, applying Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), justifies permanent injunctions against both
states’ rules. To ensure consistency, we heard the appeals en
banc. We conclude that both laws can be applied in a
constitutional manner. Whether that will occur depends on
State coufig which alone can settle questions about the
construction of the statutes. To ensure that physicians are not
deterred from performing other medical procedures while
issues wend their way through state tribunals, we hold that
both sets of plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will
limit the statutes’ application to the medical procedure that
each state insists is its sole concern.

* Circuit Judge Ripple did not participate in the consideration or decision
of these cases.

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I

Induction, suction curettage, and dilation and evacuation
(D&E) are the principal methods of performing abortions in
the United States. Prohibiting any one_of these would
conflict with the right of abortion recognized by cases such
as Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion) (adopting
“undue burden” as the constitutional standard), and Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri-v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75-79 (1976) (holding that a state may not forbid saline
amniocentesis, at the time the principal means of induction).
Our cases involve an uncommon procedure known to the
medical community as “intact dilation and extraction” or just
“dilation and extraction (D&X),” and to the public as
“partial-birth abortion.”

Some medical background is essential to understanding the
issues. Induction means inducing preterm labor, which
causes the expulsion of the conceptus. Methotrexate or
mifepristone (RU-486, now in clinical trials), in combination
with misoprostol, can be used for this purpose early in
pregnancy; saline amniocentesis and injected prostaglandins
serve the same function in the second trimester. Suction
curettage (vacuum aspiration), the most common surgical
method of abortion early in pregnancy, refers to evacuation
of the uterine cavity; the embryo or fetus is separated from
the placenta either by scraping or vacuum pressure, then is
removed by suction. When these methods are inappropriate,
or do not work, physicians employ the D&E procedure. To
perform a D&E, the physician dilates the cervix and
dismembers the fetus inside the uterus using forceps. Fetal
parts are removed with forceps or by suction.

A D&X is a variant of a D&E in which the fetus is
removed without dismemberment. The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) defines D&X as
follows: “1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a

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sequence of days; 2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a
footling breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting
the head; and 4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents
of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but
otherwise intact fetus.” Martin Haskell, the physician who
developed the D&X procedure, see Dilation and Extraction
for Late Second Trimester Abortion (1992), reprinted in 139
Cong. Rec. E1092 (Apr. 29, 1993), believes that how the
head is diminished in size so that it can pass through the
cervix is not important: mechanically crushing the skull
serves the same end as evacuating its contents, which causes
its collapse. It is this combination of coming so close to
delivering a live child with the death of the fetus by reducing
the size of the skull that not only distinguishes D&X from
D&E medically but also causes the adverse public (and
legislative) reaction. Opponents deem the D&X procedure
needlessly cruel and bordering on infanticide, and all three
states in this circuit have enacted statutory restrictions.

The statute in Illinois has three sections with legal
significance: ;

720 ILCS § 513/5. Definitions

In this Act: “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion
in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living human fetus or infant
before killing the fetus or infant and completing the
delivery. The terms “fetus” and “infant” are used
interchangeably to refer to the biological offspring of
human. parents.

720 ILCS § 513/10. Partial-birth abortions prohibited

Any person who knowingly performs a partial-birth
abortion and thereby kills a human fetus or infant is
guilty of a Class 4 felony. This Section does not

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apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to
save the life of a mother because her life is
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or
physical injury, including a_ !ife-endangering
condition caused Fy or arising from the pregnancy
itself, provided that no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.

720 ILCS § 513/15. Civil action

The maternal grandparents of the fetus or infant, if the
mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time
of the abortion, may in a civil action obtain
appropriate relief unless the pregnancy resulted from
the plaintiffs criminal conduct or the plaintiff
cgnsented to the abortion. The relief shall include
money damages for all injuries, psychological and
physical, occasioned by the violation of this Act and
statutory damages equal to 3 times the cost of the
partial-birth abortion.

The Indiana statute defines “partial-birth abortion” in
identical terms. Ind. Code § 16-18-2-267.5. Like Illinois it
forbids partial-birth abortions unless that procedure is
necessary to save the mother’s life, and no other procedure
would suffice. Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1(b). The Indiana
statute has never been challenged and has been in effect since
July 1, 1997.

Wisconsin has taken a slightly different approach. Its
statutes provide:

Wis. Stat. § 895.038 Partial-birth abortions; liability.

(1) In this section:

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(a) “Child” has the meaning stn in § 940.16 (1)
(a).

(b) “Partial-birth abortion” has the meaning given
in § 940.16 (1) (b).

(2) (a) Except as provided in par. (b), any of the
following persons has a claim for appropriate relief
against a person who performs a_ partial-birth
abortion:

1. If the person on whom a partial-birth
abortion was performed was a minor, the
parent of the minor.

2. The father of the child aborted by the
partial-birth abortion.

(b) A person specified in par. (a) 1. or 2. does not
have a claim under par. (a) if any of the following

apply:

1. The person consented to performance of the
partial-birth abortion.

2. The pregnancy of the woman on whom the
partial-birth abortion was performed was the
result of a sexual assault in violation of §
940.225, 944.06, 948.02, 948.025, 948.06 or
948.09 that was committed by the person.

(3) The relief available under sub. (2) shall include all
of the following:

(a) If the abortion was performed in violation of §
940.16, damages arising out of the performance of
the partial birth abortion, including damages for

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personal injury and emotional and psychological
distress.

(b) Exemplary damages equal to 3 times the cost
of the partial-birth abortion.

(4) Subsection (2) applies even if the mother of the
child aborted by the partial-birth abortion consented
to the performance of the partial-birth abortion.

Wis. Stat. § 940.16 Partial-birth abortion.
(1) In this section:

(a) “Child” means a human being from the time of
fertilization until it is completely delivered from a
pregnant woman.

(b) “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in
which a person partially vaginally delivers a
living child, causes the death of the partially
delivered child with the intent to kill the child,
and then completes the delivery of the child.

(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever
intentionally performs a partial birth abortion is guilty
of a Class A felony.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the partial-birth
abortion is necessary to save the life of a woman
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,
physical illness or physical injury, including a life-
endangering physical disorder, physical illness or
physical injury caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself, and if no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.

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Wisconsin’s definition of partial-birth abortion is
substantially the same as Illinois’, but the mental-state
elements differ, as do the maximum penalties: Illinois makes
unjustified partial-birth abortion a Class 4 felony, with a
maximum penalty of three years; in Wisconsin the offense is
a Class A felony, for which Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a)
provides a penalty of life imprisonment.

Because Wisconsin and Illinois use similar language to
define partial-birth abortions, we _ illustrate plaintiffs’
concerns with the latter’s statute:

“Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which
the person performing the abortion partially vaginally
delivers a living human fetus or infant before killing
the fetus or infant and completing the delivery. The
terms “fetus” and “infant” are used interchangeably to
refer to the bioiogical offspring of human parents.

This legal definition is an imperfect match for the medical
definition of D&X. It is easy to see why a legislature would
be chary of the ACOG’s specification: then any small
variation (such as a change in the method of reducing the
head size, or snipping off a toe to defeat the “otherwise
intact” specification) would take’ the abortion outside the
prohibition, even though the reasons why the technique has
been deemed objectionable would be unaffected. But, as is
common with legislation, the price of avoiding loopholes is
generality. Section 513/5 captures the idea, central to the
D&X procedure, that an intact fetus moves from uterus to
vagina before death occurs. But it also uses the words
“delivers” and “delivery,” which many physicians understand
to refer to any removal of fetal material from the uterus. The
law might be read to prohibit the extraction of dismembered
parts following a D&E, or to prohibit abortion by induction if
by chance the fetus survives until it reaches the birth canal.
Moreover, physicians performing a D&E sometimes do not

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complete the dismemberment inside the uterus, and some
fear that this could lead the procedure to be characterized as a
partial delivery under the statute.

The possibility that § 513/10 might discourage risk-averse
physicians from performing the D&E procedure led the
district court in Illinois to declare that it is too vague to be
enforced, and a similar concern animated our panel’s
decision to require preliminary relief against Wisconsin’s
law. Moreover, if these lawsneedlessly raise the effective -
costs of induction, suction curettage, or D&E, then they
would unduly burden the right of abortion, another concern
expressed not only by the district court in the Illinois case but
also by the panel in the Wisconsin case. But after a trial on
remand, the district court in Wisconsin concluded that
physicians who perform abortions recognize that the
statutory formula, however vague or broad these words
appear to lay eyes, refers to the D&X procedure alone. The
court held ‘that, as so limited, the statute does not
substantially burden any woman’s right to an abortion,
because D&X is never the only safe procedure.

Litigation elsewhere has produced results mirroring the
divergence between the outcomes in Jllinois and Wisconsin.
The sixth circuit held that Ohio’s ban on partial-birth
abortions is unconstitutional, Women’s Medical Professional
Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), but the
fourth circuit issued a stay preventing interference with
Virginia’s statute. Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998), motion to vacate stay
denied, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18547. Both of those
decisions were rendered over dissents. A single panel of the
eighth circuit recently held three states’ partial-birth-abortion
laws unconstitutional, but only after first concluding that all
three statutes forbid the D&E procedure. Carhart v.
Stenberg, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23162 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999) (Nebraska); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A.

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v. Jegley, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23165 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999) (Arkansas); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc.
v. Miller, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23166 (8th Cir. Sept. 24,
1999) (Iowa).

Il

Plaintiffs would like us to employ the approach of our
panel’s opinion in the Wisconsin case and declare both
States’ laws unconstitutional without ado. But different
statutes have different language, which may be important.
Litigants also have made distinctive arguments--for example,
Illinois relies on United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), for the proposition that, except in first amendment
cases, a law may be held unconstitutional only when “no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”
Moreover, two events since the panel wrote call for fresh
analysis. First, that opinion dealt with preliminary relief and
observed that “the full trial may cast the facts in a different
light”. 162 F.3d at 466. That trial has been held in
Wisconsin, and its results must be considered. Second, both
the panel’s decision in the Wisconsin case and the district
court’s opinion in the Illinois case conclude that the statute as
written is vagué. A more recent decision of the Supreme
Court, Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), stresses
that state courts are entitled to construe state laws to reduce
their ambiguity, and that federal courts should evaluate state
laws as they have been construed, not just as they appear in
the statute books. See also, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974); Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973). This implies that Illinois and Wisconsin are
entitled to interpret their own laws--that federal courts should
not enjoin all application before enforcement and thus
prevent the state courts from having a chance to save their
Statutes.

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Salerno offers a potential ground for giving the states that
chance. It would be hard to say that every possible instance
of the D&X procedure is protected by the Constitution.
Along similar lines are the many cases saying that outside the
domain of the first amendment, vagueness challenges must
be assessed “as applied.” See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 1853 (1988); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hofjiman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). But we
are reluctant to rely too heavily on this approach, because
Morales shows that three Justices believe that this language
is too sweeping, see 119 S. Ct. at 1858-59 & n.22 (Stevens,
J., joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.), and the Supreme Court
has on occasion resolved constitutional challenges to statutes
that do not involve speech without asking whether every
conceivable application would be unconstitutional. E.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 358-59 n.8 (1983); Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1913). Only one Justice offered any support for
Salerno’s approach in Morales, and he did so in a dissenting
opinion. 119 S. Ct. at 1867-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia identified many cases that articulate Salerno’s
requirement, and many others that bypass the inquiry. Courts
of appeals are divided on the question whether Salerno
applies to abortion legislation. Compare Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996), with
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (Sth Cir. 1992). The
safest course for a court of appeals, when confronted with
inconsistent lines of precedent, is to decide on other grounds
if at all possible. Here it is possible, for we think that the
Supreme Courts of Illinois and Wisconsin could read their
laws in ways that comport with the Constitution.

1. One means of doing this would be to assimilate the
statutory definitions to the medical definition of D&X, with
allowance for different ways of reducing the head size and
other immaterial variations. Both states are concerned about
the D&X procedure and did not set out to forbid any other.

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The Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, the
principal defendants, tell us that their statutes are concerned
only with the D&X procedure and will be enforced only
against its use. That assurance might be enough by itself, in
the absence of any contrary indication from the state
judiciary, to resolve immediate vagueness concerns. See
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); cf. Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-80 (1997).
Although local prosecutors (States’ Attorneys in Illinois,
District Attorneys in Wisconsin) initiate criminal
prosecutions, representatives of these prosecutors have been
named as parties in each case, and they agree with the
Attorneys General. Plaintiffs object that this approach would
rewrite rather than interpret the law, but we doubt this. Both
medical and popular literature equate “partial-birth abortion”
(the statutory term) with the D&X procedure. See Janet E.
Gans Epner, Harry S. Jonas & Daniel L. Seckinger, Late-
term Abortion, 280 J. Am. Medical Ass’n 724 (Aug. 26,
1998); M. LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhof, Rationale for
Banning Abortions Late in Pregnancy, 280 J. Am. Medical
Ass’n 744 (Aug. 26, 1998). The district court in Wisconsin
found that this is the statute’s aim. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 984
(relying on the Attorney General’s concession). Using a
medical definition to supplement a vague lay definition does
not strike us as revisionism or an exercise in deconstruction.

But if this approach would nonetheless be an example of
brute force used to save a statute-- well, courts do it all the
time. Florida had a law forbidding “the abominable and
detestable crime against nature”. Placement in the code
showed that this crime had something to do with sex, but
what? Did it forbid incest? Necrophilia? Bestiality? A
legal historian might give an answer, but to lay readers of the
Statute, and even to most lawyers, the words are Delphic.
The state’s highest court filled in the blank by saying that the
object was sodomy--and the Supreme Court of the United
States rebuffed a charge of unconstitutional vagueness, given

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the state court’s prestidigitation. Wainwright v. Stone, 414
U.S. 21 (1973). Only if vagueness remains after judicial
interpretation is there a constitutional problem, the Court
held. See also, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259
(1997); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1939); Kolender, 461 U.S. at
355-57. Federal courts have performed equally dramatic
feats. As written, the Federal Election Campaign Act is
hopelessly vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), saved the bulk of the statute by adding details. In
two recent cases we predicted that state courts would follow
suit with comparable state laws. See Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998); Brownsburg
Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503
(7th Cir. 1998). In the latter case, because we were not
completely confident that the state judiciary would follow
Buckley’s path of freewheeling interpretation, we certified
the issue to the Supreme Court of Indiana--which responded
that it indeed possesses, and is inclined to use, that power.
Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714
N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 1999).

Relying on Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), the
sixth circuit concluded in Women’s Medical Professional
Corp. v. Voinovich that any statute concerning abortion is
unconstitutionally vague, no matter how precise an
interpretation state courts eventually develop, unless it
requires proof that the physician knows that a given act has
been forbidden. If this were so, then the approach to
avoiding vagueness that we have just sketched would be
untenable. But it is not so; never has the Supreme Court held
that all criminal laws (or even just all criminal laws affecting
abortion) depend on scienter. Cases we have mentioned
already (and more that we cite later) hold that a statute may
be sustained against a charge of vagueness if, as construed, it
gives reasonable notice of the forbidden conduct. That the
notice does not sink in--that some people close their eyes (or

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minds) and thus do not learn of the law’s contents or
appreciate its application to their conduct--does not prevent a
state from enforcing its rules. See United States v: Wilson,
159 F.3d 280, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1998). This subject received
sustained attention in Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 460-64
(7th Cir. 1999). For the reasons laid out in Karlin we
respectfully disagree with the sixth circuit’s understanding of
this question. See also Note, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 731 (1999)
(criticizing Women’s Medical Professional Corp.).

2. Although the Constitution does not compel states to
ameliorate vagueness problems by using a mental-state
requirement to limit prosecutions to situations in which the
defendant knows that his acts are forbidden, they are free to
do so. This is the path the Supreme Court took in Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), and United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), to save 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
and 242. These companion statutes, the poster children for a
vagueness campaign, make it a crime to deprive anyone of
any constitutional right (or conspire to do so). These statutes
are written entirely in terms that have been difficult to pin
down, such as “under color of any law” and “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution . . . of the United States”. Section 242 contains
the word “willfully”, and in Screws the Court read this to
mean that a person commits the offense only if he knows that
his acts deprive someone of a constitutional right. A person
who actually recognizes his legal obligation can’t complain
that he lacked notice. Many cases since Screws use a
knowledge requirement to prevent unfair surprise when the
statute is vague or complex. E.g., Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192 (1991) (tax laws); Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600 (1994) (gun-control laws).

Both Illinois and Wisconsin put mental-state elements in
their statutes. Attorneys General of both states contend that
under their laws a procedure may be deemed a “partial-birth

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abortion” only if at the outset of the procedure the physician
intends to perform all of the steps that mark the D&X. We
think that the Supreme Courts of both states could go even
farther and read the statutes to require knowledge of the legal
rules, and thus to follow the trail blazed in Screws.

The critical language in Illinois reads: “Any person who
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills
a human fetus or infant is guilty of a Class 4 felony.” 720
ILCS § 513/10 (emphasis added). If the Supreme Court of
Illinois reads “knowingly” in § 513/10 the same way the
Supreme Court of the United States read “willfully” in § 242,
then there is no vagueness problem with § 513/10. And we
can’t see any impediment to giving “knowingly” such a
reading. In context, the word sounds distinctly like a
requirement that the physician know that the medical
procedure being performed is a “partial-birth abortion” and
not simply that the physician know that he is performing
particular physical acts. The most natural reading is one that
requires knowledge of the law’s application to the medical
procedure being performed. Federal courts have been
creative with knowledge requirements as a means of saving
Statutes against constitutional infirmity. E.g., United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). Section
513/10 readily supports a construction that eliminates all
concern about vagueness, which makes it inappropriate for a
federal court to enjoin its application. (In Morales, the
Supreme Court’s most recent vagueness opinion, the lead
opinion stressed that the statute lacked any mental-state
requirement.)

Wisconsin uses the word “intentionally” rather than the
word “knowingly.” Its statute has two intent elements: a -
partial-birth abortion is defined as one in which the physician
acts with “the intent to kill the child”, Wis. Stat. §
940.16(1)(b), and the section defining the offense reads:
“Whoever intentionally performs a partial-birth abortion is

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guilty of a Class A felony.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(2). The
reference to “intent” in § 940.16(1)(b) must mean “that the
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically
certain to cause that result.” Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4) (defining
“with intent to”). The reference to “intentionally” in §
940.16(2) has at least potentially a broader scope. Although
§ 939.23(3) defines “intentionally” as “a purpose to do the
thing or cause the result specified”, a “partial-birth abortion”
is neither a thing nor a result; it is a defined legal term. It is
therefore a distinct possibility that the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin will read this reference as equivalent to “wilfully”
or “knowingly” notwithstanding the caution in § 939.23(5)
that criminal intent “does not require proof of knowledge of
the . . . scope or meaning of the terms used in” a statute. The
question here is not whether a physician understands the
terms of § 940.16(1)(b) in the abstract, but whether the
physician intends that the plan of action add up to a “partial-
birth abortion.” In cases such as X-Citement Video, Cheek,
and Staples, the Supreme Court of the United States was
exceptionally creative with statutory allusions to mental
states; plaintiffs have not established that the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin would be unwilling to save its statutes the way
the Supreme Court of the United States saved 18 U.S.C. §
242.

3. Still a third interpretive approach is open to the state
courts. They may elect to apply the statute to its central core
of meaning, the D&X, while working out in common law
fashion its outer boundaries. See United States v. Pitt-Des
Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 986-90 (7th Cir. 1999). This is
how the Supreme Court has chosen to proceed with respect to
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, a statute much
less: precise than the partial-birth-abortion laws. Long before
the development of a body of antitrust rules, or even of a
clear distinction between the domains of the per se rule and
the rule of reason, the Court rebuffed a vagueness challenge,

A-18

remarking that “law is full of instances where a man’s fate
depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.” Nash, 229
U.S. at 377 (Holmes, J.). The Court took the same approach
in Parker v. Levy for Article 133 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which makes it a crime for a commissioned
officer to engage in “conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman.” That statute, compared to which § 513/5 and §
940.16(1)(b) are paragons of specificity, was sustained
against a vagueness challenge because the military courts had
added details over many years, and the Supreme Court
anticipated that they would continue to do so as new
situations arose. Letter Carriers applies the same approach
to vague provisions of the Hatch Act. Parker cannot be
passed off as a sport of military law; it is just’one illustration
of the proposition that vagueness may be overcome
incrementally, as well as by an all-at-once construction.
Consider United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975), a
civilian case dealing with 18 U.S.C. § 1715, which makes it a
crime to mail a firearm capable of being concealed on the
person. A Derringer unquestionably qualifies, and although
larger guns pose tough questions, the combination of a core
meaning plus size as a metric for adjudication enabled the
Court to hold that borderline cases could be decided later, as
they arose.

Notice the difference between this approach and Salerno.
In cases such as Nash, Parker, and Powell, the Court did not
ask simply whether there was one constitutional application.
It asked whether there was a core of meaning that people
could grasp. In Nash the common law of restraint of trade
supplied that core; in Parker the accumulated body of
military precedents did so; in Powell the core comprised
handguns. Occasionally the Court fortifies this approach by
combining it with a scienter requirement, as United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), did for the
Sherman Act. Illinois and Wisconsin can follow the same

A-19

path. For their statutes, the medical definition of the D&X
procedure supplies the core of understandable application.
Indeed, the district court in Wisconsin found as a matter of
fact that physicians who are likely to perform an abortion
already understand that this is the point of partial-birth-
abortion statutes. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 978. That finding cannot
be set aside as clearly erroneous.

Plaintiffs respond to this core-plus-common-law approach
by contending that a statute is unconstitutionally vague until
the interstices have been filled in. But then all of the cases
we have cited were wrongly decided, for the interstices of
antitrust law were not filled in by 1913, nor were all of the
gun-mailing issues worked out before 1975: Powell involved
a sawed-off shotgun, not a pistol. To say that the law cannot
be applied to anyone, even a person who commits a violation
within the core of the statute, until all issues about its reach
have been resolved would prevent those issi es from coming
before the court to be resolved. How, precisely, are the
interpretive wrinkles to be smoothed if the law can’t be
invoked? By advisory opinions? Anyway, there is always a
periphery, no matter how many situations judges have
evaluated. Resolving each new question moves the area of
uncertainty but can’t abolish it. “Whenever the law draws a
line there will be cases very near each other on opposite
sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no
one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he
thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to
make him take the risk.” United States v. Wurzbach, 280
U.S. 396, 399 (1930) (Holmes, J.).

Protection for events outside the core is provided by the
principle that surprising and unanticipated applications of a
criminal statute violate the due process clause. See, e.g.,
Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964); Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977); Lanier, 520 U.S. at
266. Given the assurances made in this litigation by the

A-20

Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, application of
these states’ partial-birth-abortion statutes to a normal D&E
or induction (including one that began as a D&E but turned
out to have elements of a D&X because of inadvertence or
developments during- surgery) would be surprising and
constitutionally impermissible. Plaintiffs therefore can
practice medicine without undue concern on the legal front.
The Constitution provides the assurance they crave--but
without the need to prevent application of the state law to the
D&X procedure itself. States have a powerful interest in
working out the details of their criminal laws in their own
courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.-37 (1971); Nelson v.
Murphy, 44 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1995). On remand the district
judges should enter precautionary injunctions, limited to
implementing the conclusion of this paragraph that the state
laws may not be applied to a normal D&E or induction until
after the state has provided additional specificity, by statutory
amendment, regulations, or judicial interpretation (which
could arise either from civil litigation, see Part IV below, or
from criminal prosecutions in which the parties disagree
about whether the medical procedure properly may be
labeled a D&X). With that assurance in hand, plaintiffs
would not face any substantial threat of prosecution.

A skeptic might respond: what’s the basis for an injunction
without a finding of actual constitutional violation? The
basis is the risk that plaintiffs face. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). Whenever suit is brought against a statute
that has yet to be enforced, there is a chance that what the
federal court does will be unnecessary or even advisory--for
in the absence of relief the statute might never be enforced in
a way that plaintiffs fear, or that would violate their rights.
Everything depends on probabilities. Plaintiffs believe that
the probability of improper prosecution is so high that the
statutes must be enjoined root and branch. We think that the
probability of improper prosecution is low, but non-zero; and
a prosecution for performing a D&E not only raises

—

A-21

vagueness concerns but also could unduly burden women’s
rights (see Part III below). That risk can be reduced to a
constitutionally acceptable level with a simple injunction
based on Bouie.

Persons who believe that the risk of improper prosecution
is so high that all prosecution under the statute should be
enjoined are poorly situated to contend that the risk also is so
low that the plaintiffs lack standing under Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660
(1983). When this case began the plaintiffs faced a real risk
and therefore had standing; and no one thinks that
defendants’ representations about their projected course of
enforcement have made the controversy moot. If as plaintiffs
believe the Constitution requires an injunction against
everything Illinois and Wisconsin have enacted, despite these
assurances, then the Constitution can’t simultaneously forbid
an injunction against potential misuses of state power in the
enforcement of these laws. Article III does not limit a federal
court’s choice to enjoining nothing, or enjoining everything.
The path we choose allows the states to interpret their laws
and supply more concrete rules, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976); the path the plaintiffs (and our
dissenting colleagues) prefer would foreclose now and
forever all interpretation by the state judiciary. By filing suit
against a novel and ambiguous law in federal court, litigants
can’t preclude interpretation by the state judiciary. Our
precautionary approach preserves the state judiciary’s role
while protecting plaintiffs’ (and their patients’) legitimate
interests in the interim.

4. In the Wisconsin case our panel expressed concern that
even if the probability of unanticipated application is low, the
penalty is so high (life imprisonment) that physicians would
avoid performing the D&E procedure. 162 F.3d at 469. This
cannot be said of Illinois, where the maximum penalty is
three years’ imprisonment. Although the threat of life in

A-22

prison has a greater potential to induce caution than does the
threat of three years in prison, the precautionary injunction
discussed above should reduce the risk of improper or
unanticipated application to a trivial level. The right
constitutional objection to a Draconian penalty is not
vagueness (a statute’s scope is equally clear or uncertain
whether the penalty is a $10 fine or 20 years in prison) but a
contention that severe criminal punishment for a medical
misunderstanding would inflict cruel and _ unusual
punishment. Plaintiffs themselves do not make such an
argument, however; they object to the substance of the state
laws, not to the punishment available on conviction. The
penalty is an afterthought, scarcely mentioned in their briefs.
If Wisconsin should some day impose a lengthy prison term
for a violation of § 940.16(2), then it will be time to consider
arguments based on the eighth amendment.

5. For the last two years, a natural experiment has been
conducted in the United States. Thirty states enacted laws
forbidding most partial-birth abortions. Judges prohibited
the application of these laws in two-thirds of these states; in
the other third the statutes have been in force. One way to
perform a reality check on the district court’s conclusion in
the Wisconsin case that physicians know that these statutes
cover only the D&X is to see what has happened in the states
where the laws have been permitted to take effect.
Vagueness could affect physicians in either or both of two
ways. First, they might send women seeking second-
trimester abortions to other states that do not regulate partial-
birth abortions. The result would be a decrease in second-
trimester abortions as a percentage of all abortions in the
state. Second, physicians might select a different procedure--
principally substituting induction for a D&E--even though
the replacement was medically infevior. This would produce
a change in the ratio of inductions to D&E procedures in the
affected state.

A-23

Indiana supplies a nice test, because its law took effect on
July 1, 1997, so it is easy to compare the first six months of
1997 to the second six. Moreover, Indiana is surrounded by
states that lack an effective prohibition on partial-birth
abortions (because of the Illinois injunction and the sixth
circuit’s ruling in Women’s Medical Professional Corp.), so
it was relatively easy for physicians to send their patients
elsewhere. Although the maximum penalty in Indiana is not
steep (an unjustified partial-birth abortion there is a Class C
felony, Ind. Code § 16-34-2-7(a), for which the punishment
is four years’ imprisonment, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a)), no
state or federal court has construed the statutory term, so
whatever uncertainty the raw text of the statute engenders is
unabated.

During 1997 a total of 13,208 abortions were performed in
Indiana. (These data come from tables prepared by Indiana’s
State Epidemiologist.) During the first six months, 74 late-
second-trimester abortions were performed: 72 by D&E and
2 by intra-uterine prostaglandin injection. During the second
six months (that is, after the partial-birth-abortion law took
effect), 87 late-second-trimester abortions were performed,
all by D&E. Thus physicians did not substitute induction for
D&E in order to reduce risk to themselves. Nor did they
avoid the D&E procedure by sending women to other states.
Abortion by D&E during the first six months represented
1.03% of all abortions performed in Indiana (72 of 6,950).
Abortion by D&E during the second six months represented
1.39% of all abortions in the state (87 of 6,258). These data
are incompatible with plaintiffs’ a priori belief that the
partial-birth-abortion statutes will discourage the
performance of the D&E procedure or cause the physician to
substitute an inferior procedure. Perhaps things have turned
out differently in other states, or perhaps physicians behaved
differently in 1998 or 1999. We do not mean to preclude
plaintiffs from submitting the data in Indiana and other states
to rigorous analysis. A few procedures were classified in the

A-24

tables as “unknown,” which may mask some effects--though
the number of “unknown” procedures did not change much
from the first to the second half of 1997. Our point is only
that a simple inquiry reinforces the findings of fact made in
the Wisconsin case and implies that partial-birth-abortion
statutes need not have the baleful effects that plaintiffs
foresee.

Plaintiffs in both cases contend that, even if the statutes are
precise enough to be enforced, they create an undue (and
therefore unconstitutional) burden on abortion. The eighth
circuit reached this conclusion in Carhart and its two
companion cases, but only after first holding that the state
laws effectively prohibit the D&E procedure. If we thought
that the Illinois or Wisconsin laws forbade D&E, then
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth would
require us to agree with the eighth circuit. For reasons we
have already given, however, we believe that state courts are
entitled to accept the view of both states’ Attorneys General
that their laws do not forbid, or even affect, the D&E
procedure. The question we must address, then, is whether a
statute limited to D&X unduly burdens abortion.

One reason why this might be so is that neither state’s law
contains an exception for situations in which the D&X
procedure is necessary to protect the woman’s health. A
second argument is that any prohibition of any medical
procedure unduly burdens a woman’s right to abortion. The
first line of argument finds some support in Casey, which
held that any regulation of abortion must make an exception
for procedures that protect “the woman’s life or health”, 505
U.S. at 846 (emphasis added), as well as our panel’s decision
_ in the Wisconsin case, 162 F.3d at 467-68, 470-71. But we
do not think that the plurality in Casey meant this as a
universal rule, one applicable even when the procedure in

A-25

question lacks demonstrable health benefits. The point that
the plurality made was that a statute that lacks a “health
exception” may unduly burden the woman’s right to obtain
an abortion before the fetus has reached viability; when state
law offers many safe options to that end, the regulation of an
additional option does not produce an undue burden.

Section 513/10 of the Illinois statute contains an exception
for “‘a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life
of a mother because her life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-
endangering condition caused by or arising from fhe -
pregnancy itself, provided that no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.” It does not contain a
comparable exception for a partial-birth abortion that
promotes the woman’s health. Wisconsin’s law has a similar
structure. Both sets of plaintiffs contend that the lack of an
exception for a woman’s health dooms the statute. Coming
from the Illinois plaintiffs, this is a weak argument indeed,
for none of the plaintiff physicians or clinics in Illinois uses
the D&X, and none asserts any desire to start. Whether the
D&X procedure sometimes would protect a woman’s health
is therefore immaterial to these physicians and the women in
their care. But several of the plaintiff physicians in the
Wisconsin case do employ the D&X procedure on occasion,
sO we must consider the merits of the argument.

After a trial, the district court in the Wisconsin case
concluded that the D&X procedure is never necessary from
the perspective of the patient’s health. 44 F. Supp. 2d at 979-
82. This conclusion cannot be called clearly erroneous; as
things transpired, it was not a seriously contested issue.
None of the plaintiff physicians in that case testified to the
contrary. The district court summed up:

None of the physicians would state unequivocally that
the D&X procedure is safer than the D&E procedure.

A-26

Broekhuizen conceded that further study of the
procedures is required. Smith admitted that he had
never encountered a situation where D&X would
have been the best procedure to use. Haskell, who
invented the procedure, admitted that the D&X
procedure is never medically necessary to save the
life or preserve the health of a woman. Giles agreed.

Id. at 980. The judge added that, although the D&X
procedure has been used for more than a decade, no
published study compares the risks of D&X to those of D&E.
Id. at 979. Some authors believe that the D&X procedure is
more hazardous. See Sprang & Neerhof, supra, 280 J. Am.
Medical Ass’n at 746 (“Intact D&X (partial-birth abortion)
should not be performed because it is needlessly risky,
inhumane, and ethically unacceptable.”); Nancy G. Romer,
The Medical Facts of Partial-Birth Abortions, 3 Nexus 57
(1998).

_ Plaintiffs have not identified any data that undercut the
district court’s finding of fact. Their principal medical
reference is the ACOG’s 1997 statement and technical
bulletin on the D&X procedure, which concluded that,
although D&X is never the only medically appropriate
option, choice still should be reserved to the physician.
Although the statement asserts that D&X sometimes may be
the best option, the ACOG did not identify any concrete
circumstance under which this would be so or provide
support for the assertion. Several of the plaintiff physicians
testified to like effect, again without specifics or data. No
published medical study fills the gap. Cf. Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1177-79 (1999). Unelaborated
avowals do not demonstrate that a finding of fact reached
after a trial is clearly erroneous. When there is a conflict in
the testimony--and that is the description most favorable to
the plaintiffs--the finder of fact is entitled to choose. See

A-27

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). We
proceed on the assumption, which appears to be shared by
the American Medical Association, that the D&X is not the
best or safest option in any articulable category of situations.
The AMA’s Policy H-5.982 concludes, among other things,
that “there does not appear to be any identified situation in
which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to
induce abortion.” The district court in Illinois did not make
contrary findings, or indeed any finding; acting without a
trial or even an evidentiary hearing, it could not properly
have rendered “findings” about disputed issues. District
courts in other circuits have disagreed with the conclusions
the district judge reached in the Wisconsin case, but this does
more to show that the issue is debatable among reasonable
persons than to show that a particular view is in error.

The question in the end is not what one or another judge
found on a given record; it is whether the state legislatures
exceeded their constitutional powers. Factual premises
underlying legislation normally are not subject to review by
trial courts. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 315 (1993); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
111 (1979); National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. Chicago, 45
F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court’s
findings, the statements of medical groups, and the inferences
to be drawn from what has happened in states that have
implemented partial-birth-abortion statutes, are informative
rather than conclusive on the question whether the
underpinnings of the legislation are tenable. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
229 (1985). Although “undue burden” analysis does not map
neatly to the standard classifications (“rational basis,” “strict
scrutiny,” and the like), making it hard to know the extent to
which courts must respect legislative decisions about
contestable factual matters, it is significant that none of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in abortion cases suggests that the

A-28

same law would be constitutional in one state, and
unconstitutional in another, depending on a district judge’s
resolution of factual disputes. Thus we treat the findings in
the Wisconsin case, like the view of the AMA, not as
replacements for legislative conclusions, but as establishing
that there is real, and not just hypothetical, support for a
belief that the partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards
to maternal health. (This is the approach to evaluation of
facts when the constitutional standard prescribes an
intermediate level of analysis. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 199-204 (1976).)

Only if every regulation related to abortions must contain a
case-by-case “health exception” is there a problem with these
laws. Yet Casey did not say that health effects must be
evaluated case by case, rather than procedure by procedure.
Abortions are not havens for-junk science--so that, for
example, the state must let any chiropractor perform an
abortion, if the chiropractor believes that manipulation of the
spine is safest for the woman. Cases such as Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), which held that states may
limit performance of abortions to physicians, permit laws that
regulate by class of procedures (or of medical providers). Cf.
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (FDA may
ban a generally ineffective drug, even though for a few
people it may be the only cure). Doubtless some nurses are
better than some physicians at performing abortions, so
patients’ health would be improved by allowing these nurses
to perform abortions; yet the Court held that states may
provide otherwise. Similarly, Illinois and Wisconsin
concluded that the D&X procedure is not essential to protect
the health of any woman, given the availability of other
procedures. Compilation of additional information by the
medical profession could call this conclusion into question.
As things stand, however, interference with the operation of
the siate laws cannot be justified on the ground that the D&X
procedure is necessary to protect women’s health.

; SE ERNE ET
Pe eh ae go

)
*
\

A-63

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF WISCONSIN,
GARY T. PROHSKA, M.D., FREDRIK F.
BROEKHUIZEN, M.D., GAVIN JACOBSON, M.D.,
NEVILLE SENDER, M.D., DENNIS D.
CHRISTENSEN, M.D. and BERNARD SMITH,
M.D., on behalf of themselves and their patients
seeking abortions,

Plaintiffs,
v.

JAMES E. DOYLE, in his official Capacity as the
Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin and
DIANE M. NICKS, in her official Capacity as District
Attorney for Dane County and as representative of a
class of all District Attorneys in Wisconsin,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
98-C-305-S

At issue in this matter is the constitutionality of 1997
Wisconsin Act 219, codified at Wis. Stat. §§ 895.038 and
940.16 (the “Act”.

The Act forbids any person from intentionally performing a
“partial-birth abortion.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(2). It defines
“partial-birth abortion” as “an. abortion in which a person
Partially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of
the partially delivered child with the intent to kill the child,
and then completes delivery of the child.” Wis. Stat. §
940.16(1)(b). “Child” is defined as a “human being from the

A-64

time of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a
pregnant woman.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(1)(a). The Act
provides an exception to its criminal sanction where a partial-
birth abortion “is necessary to save the life of a woman
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical
illness, or physical injury . . . if no other medical procedure
would suffice for that purpose.” Wis. Stat. § 940.16(3).
Violation of the Act is a class “A” felony under Wisconsin
law, subjecting violators to life imprisonment.

The Act also creates civil liability for its violation. It
authorizes the father of the child aborted by the partial-birth
abortion and, if the woman on whom the abortion was
performed is a minor, either of her parents, to sue for
damages. Wis. Stat. § 895.038(2)(a). Either may sue
regardless of whether the woman consented to the partial-
birth abortion. However, neither may sue if he or she
consented to the partial-birth abortion. Wis. Stat. § 895.038.

In its enactment the Wisconsin legislature rejected
proposed amendments, Exhibits 1 - 15.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs previously sought a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Act which this Court denied.
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D.
Wis. 1998). On the basis of undisputed facts, the Court
found that (1) the Act could be narrowly construed to apply
only to the dilation and extraction (“D&X”) method of
abortion, (2) the scienter requirements in the law helped save
it from a vagueness challenge, and (3) the Act did not place
an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiffs had failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

A-65

The Court of Appeals disagreed. Planned Parenthood v.
Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998). It found that plaintiffs
might succeed in proving the Act unconstitutional for any of
three reasons. First, the Act makes no exception for cases in
which the fetus is not yet viable at the time of the abortion.
Id. at 466. Second, the Act contains no exception for cases in
which a D&X procedure is necessary for the preservation of
the mother’s health. /d. at 467. Third, the Act is vague. Id.
at 469.

The Court of Appeals specifically noted that its opinion
was based on the record compiled at the time and that “the
full trial may cast the facts in a different light.” Jd. at 466.
Accordingly, a trial was held in this matter to determine
whether the evidence presented by the parties would continue
to justify the Court of Appeals’ concerns regarding the
constitutionality of the Act.

Findings of Fact

Based on the evidence presented at trial and those facts to
which the parties have Stipulated, the Court makes the
following findings of fact. These findings may be divided
into three parts according to the issue they primarily address.
In the first group is evidence relating to the vagueness of the
Act -- whether the Act can be construed to apply to any
procedure other than the D&X procedure. In the second
group is evidence relating to the impact of the Act -- whether
its purpose or effect is to place an undue burden on a
woman’s right to an abortion. In the third group is evidence
relating to the state interests served by the Act.

The Court will present its factual findings according to this
division of the relevant evidence. The facts to which the
parties have stipulated are accepted as true except to the
extent they conflict with the following findings.

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\
Vagueness -- The following facts are relevant to the issue
of whether the Act is unconstitutionally vague.

The most commonly used methods of abortion are suction
curettage, dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) and induction.
Some physicians also use the dilation and extraction
(“D&X”’) method of abortion.

In a suction curettage procedure, the physician generally
dilates the cervix, inserts a tube (cannula) through the vagina
and the cervix into the uterus, and removes the embryo or
fetus and other products of conception through the cannula
while it is inside the vagina, cervix, and uterus.

Abortion by induction involves inducing preterm labor.
The physician uses laminaria to dilate the cervix and
introduces medications into the patient that will both
continue the dilation and induce labor. As a result of the
labor, the fetus is expelled from the woman’s uterus.

In a D&E procedure, the physician generally dilates the
cervix by inserting laminaria. When sufficient dilation is
achieved, the physician removes the laminaria and ruptures
the amniotic sac. Depending on the gestational age and the
size of the fetus and the amount of dilation achieved, the
physician may use suction to remove the parts of the fetus
and products of conception that are removable by suction.
The physician will then insert forceps into the woman’s
uterus in order to grasp and remove the remaining parts of
the fetus from the uterus through the cervix into the vagina
and then from the woman’s body. This process involves
dismemberment of the fetus and repeated insertions of the
forceps into the woman’s uterus to grasp and remove
remaining fetal parts. During an abortion performed in this
manner, there often is fetal cardiac activity and other signs of
life after a fetal part has been delivered into the vagina while
the remainder of the fetus is in utero.

A-67

Plaintiffs Christensen and Smith define the D&X procedure
as follows:

In the intact D&E procedure (which is also known as
“dilation and extraction,” “D&X”’ or “intact D&X’’),
the physician dilates the cervix and then removes the
fetus from the uterus through the vaginal canal intact.
The physician extracts the fetal body intact, usually
feet first, until the cervix is obstructed by the after
coming head, which is too large to pass through the
cervix. Then the physician creates a small opening at
the base of the skull and evacuates the contents, —
allowing the calvarium to pass through the cervical
opening. The intentional removal of the fetus intact is
what distinguishes an intact D&E procedure from a
D&E procedure.

Similarly, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (“ACOG”) defines the D&X procedure to
include the following steps:

1. deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a
sequence of days;

2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling
breech;

3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head;
and

4. partial evacuation of the intzacranial contents of a
living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but
otherwise intact fetus.

Dr. Broekhuizen agrees with this definition but would
define D&X more broadly to include other variations on the
technique, including crushing the skull to allow it to pass
through the cervix. Haskell agrees that how the skull is
reduced in size is not an important distinction. He stated that

A-68

“the medical distinction between a D&E and a D&X is the
extent to which the surgeon attempts to extract portions of
the fetus intact.”” Ex. 227 at 8.

Haskell also testified that in perhaps 75% of the D&X
procedures he performs, he cuts the umbilical cord before
removing the fetus from the uterus. However, sometimes the
child is partially delivered before he cuts the umbilical cord.
Haskell stated that the child is likely to die within minutes
after Haskell cuts its cord.

As evidenced by the policy statements of the American
Medical Association (Ex. 17) and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (Ex. 16) as well as articles
published in prominent medical journals (Exs. 205, 206, 207
_and 240), the medical community understands the phrase
“partial birth abortion” to refer to the dilation and extraction
or “D&X” procedure. See also Ex. 239 at 35 (“The breech
extraction variation of intact D & E, described in the lay
press as ‘partial birth abortion’ has been made illegal in
several states.”) Nevertheless, the plaintiff physicians state
that they find the definition of partial birth abortion in the
Act to be vague because the definition could be construed to
cover the three most common methods of abortion including
suction curettage, induction, and dilation and evacuation
(“D&E”). See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24.
They expressed concern over the following situations:

Suction Curettage -- Occasionally, in some suction
curettage procedures, it is necessary for the physician
to use forceps to remove the fetus from the uterus.
Sometimes the physician removes the fetus in parts
and other times it is intact. When the fetus is intact,
there may be a point in the procedure when part of the
fetus is outside of the uterus while the rest of the fetus
remains in the uterus.

A-69

Induction -- Sometimes during an induction the
physician must assist in the removal of the fetus; and
sometimes the physician collapses or compresses the
skull or some part of the fetal abdomen to allow it to
pass through the cervix.

D&E -- In some D&E procedures, a physician draws
part of the intact fetus partially through the cervix and
into the vaginal canal. After the grasped part has
come through the cervix the physician disjoins the
part from the rest of the fetus, which remains in the
uterus. Physicians who perform abortions know that
disarticulating a fetal limb from a pre-viable fetus will
cause the fetus to die within a few minutes.

Trial testimony and the stipulated facts establish that
physicians cannot control when a child’s death occurs in
either the suction curettage or induction methods of abortion.
While death of the pre-viable fetus is the ultimate outcome of
these procedures, there is no particular step taken in either of
these procedures that is practically certain to kill the fetus at
an identifiable point in time. Fetal demise occurs at different
times and from different causes.

Similarly, when beginning a D&E abortion, a physician
cannot predict when the child will die and generally it is not
known when a child does die. If the child is alive when
dismemberment begins, the physician may be practically
certain that dismembering substantial portions of the child
will kill the child before delivery of all parts of the fetus is
completed. In those circumstances, however, the physician
does not complete delivery of a “child.” Rather, the
physician delivers dismembered body parts.

By contrast, physicians who perform D&X abortions know
that crushing the fetal skull or piercing the skull and
suctioning the contents will cause the fetus to die
immediately or within a few minutes. They take this step

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after partially vaginally delivering the child. Accordingly,
they are practically certain to kill a child in the birth canal on
most occasions. Except for beginning the abortion with an
injection that is lethal to the fetus, the piercing or crushing of
the skull in a D&X procedure and cutting the umbilica! cord,
a physician does not intentionally kill the child at any
specific point during the procedure.

Accordingly, based on this evidence, the Court concludes
that only in the D&X procedure is the physician aware that
his conduct is practically certain to kill a living child in the
birth canal before completing delivery of the child.

Undue Burden -- In addition to the facts already stated,
the following facts are relevant to whether the Act imposes
an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.

There are both advantages and disadvantages of the D&X
procedure as compared to the D&E procedure. One of the
advantages of the D&X procedure is that it is quicker and
easier to perform than the D&E procedure after 18 weeks
Imp. The shorter procedure time reduces the amount of
bleeding and reduces the amount of time that the patient has
to be subject to anesthesia. Another advantage is that the
physician in the D&X procedure does not have to make
multiple insertions of the forceps into the uterus. Reducing
the use of instruments in the uterus reduces the risk of uterine
perforation.

The D&X also has certain disadvantages in that it creates
risks not found in the D&E procedure. The D&X procedure
requires greater dilation of the cervix through an additional
24 hours of laminaria. The testifying physicians agreed that
delaying an abortion creates additional risks. With regard to
the D&X procedure these risks include a risk that the
woman’s membranes might rupture or that she may develop
an infection. The greater dilation used in D&X also poses

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the risk of cervical incompetence, which may lead to
premature births in future pregnancies.

Also, the D&E procedure has a proven track record that the
D&X procedure does not have. D&E is the most common
method of second-trimester abortion, accounting for
hundreds of abortions in Wisconsin each year. D&X, by
contrast, is rarely used. Among the plaintiff physicians, only
Christensen regularly performs the D&X procedure and he
performs just 2-3 such procedures each year.

There are no published, medically-recognized studies
comparing the risks of D&E to D&X. Haskell testified to an
informal comparison. He stated that in 10 years of
performing abortions he does not recall any complications in
the D&X procedures he has performed and recalls perhaps 2-
3 complications in the D&E procedures he has_performed.
His experience conflicts with that of his mentor, Dr.
McMahon, as reported in Exhibit 228. McMahon
encountered major complications in 4 out of 1362 patients
using the D&X procedure. This success rate was no better
than for D&E’s. The Court places little reliance on any of
this anecdotal evidence because there has been no suggestion
that the women receiving D&E abortions were similarly
Situated to the women receiving D&X abortions, or that the
complication rates experienced by Haskell and McMahon
were statistically significant.

More telling evidence concerning the relative safety of the
D&X procedure may be found in the opinions of the
testifying physicians, None of the physicians would state
unequivocally that the D&X procedure is safer than the D&E
procedure. Broekhuizen conceded that further study of the
procedures is required. Smith admitted that he had never
encountered a situation where D&X would have been the
best procedure to use. Haskell, who invented the procedure,
admitted that the D&x procedure is never medically

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necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a woman.
Giles agreed.

Major medical associations are equally reluctant to endorse
the D&X procedure. ACOG reviewed the D&X procedure
and “could identify no circumstances under which [the D&X
procedure] would be the only option to save the life or
preserve the health of the woman.” Ex. 16 at 2. ACOG did
state that there “may” be circumstances in which the D&X
procedure is the best or most appropriate procedure, but it did
not identify what those circumstances might be. Jd.

Similarly, the American Medical Association concluded
that “there does not appear to be any identified situation in
which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to
induce abortion, and ethical concerns have been raised about
intact D&X. The AMA recommends that the procedure not
be used unless alternative procedures pose materially greater
risk to the woman.” Ex. 17 at 15. Again, however, the AMA
did not identify any particular circumstances in which
“alternative procedures pose materially greater risk to the
woman.” /d.

The plaintiff physicians’ reluctance to endorse the safety of
the D&X procedure is evidenced by their conduct. Actions
often speak louder than words, and in this case plaintiffs’
conduct indicates that the D&X procedure offers no material
advantage in terms of safety. As noted, none of the plaintiff
physicians routinely performs the D&X procedure. Nor do
they train their staff or medical students to perform the
procedure. They also do not routinely inform their patients
as to the procedure’s availability or its supposed advantages.
All of the physicians use the same consent form regardless of
the method of abortion used.

The conduct of the other physician witnesses offered by
plaintiffs suggests the same conclusion. Haskell invented the

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D&X procedure and has demonstrated an unusual fondness
for it. Nevertheless, he sometimes chooses to perform a
D&E abortion -- despite his alleged concerns regarding its
safety -- because the additional delay involved in a D&X
procedure would be inconvenient for the woman. Similarly,
Stubblefield and his colleagues perform induction abortions
at 17 - 20 weeks Imp and do not offer D&X abortions
because the added time necessary to dilate the cervix is not
worth the benefits of the D&X procedure.

Similarly, plaintiffs’ conduct during the two weeks that the
Act was in effect provides further evidence concerning the
alleged burdens imposed by the Act. Broekhizen conceded
that during this period he continued to perform abortions
without altering his procedures. Smith effectively conceded
the same when he declined to answer a question on this point
and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination. Christensen also continued to perform
abortions during this period. He issued a press release stating
that he could comply with the Act as he interpreted it only by
altering his procedures in a way that would impose greater
health risks on women. Nevertheless, Christensen’s rate of
complications from abortions did not go up in a “statistically
significant fashion” while Wis. Stat. § 940.16 was in effect.

Regardless of the general safety of the D&X procedure,
plaintiffs argue the procedure is safer in Certain
circumstances. They contend that in some induction
procedures the fetal skull is too large to pass through the
cervix and must be crushed in order to complete delivery.
Several of the plaintiff physicians admitted that they could
wait for the skull to pass the cervix naturally, but they stated
that there would be no medical reason for doing so and the
delay may lead to excessive bleeding.

Plaintiffs also contend there are certain maternal conditions
or fetal anomalies in which the D&X procedure is the best

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procedure to use in order to accomplish an abortion. In
support of this position they offered the testimony of Dr.
Broekhuizen who described three circumstances in which he
intended to perform D&X abortions. In the first case,
Broekhuizen aborted a pregnancy in a woman with
schleroderma. He dilated the cervix through serial
application of laminaria and the fetus was completely
expelled intact. He did not crush the skull or puncture the
skull and suction out the contents.

In the second case, Broekhuizen intended to perform a
D&X abortion to terminate the pregnancy of a woman with
skeletal dysplasia. He chose the D&X procedure because the
woman opposed dismemberment of the fetus through the
D&E procedure and had an “inerdinate” fear of labor pains
so that she did not want an induction. Broekhuizen also
wanted to deliver an intact fetus in order to obtain a more
definite diagnosis of dysplasia. Despite Broekhuizen’s intent
to perform a D&X abortion, serial dilation of the cervix led
to a spontaneous onset of labor and an intact fetus was
delivered.

In the third case, Broekhuizen performed the D&X
procedure to abort a fetus 28 weeks Imp with hydrocephalus.
Due to this fetal anomaly the head was larger than that of a
child carried to term. Broekhuizen performed a combination
of dilation and induction, and then decompressed the head
with scissors and needles and completed delivery.

Dr. Giles disagreed that the D&X procedure was the best
procedure to use in any of these circumstances. Indeed, with
25 years of experience in high risk pregnancies, Giles has
never seen a situation where D&X would be the best
procedure to use. He deemed induction the safest method in
all late-term (20 or more weeks Imp) pregnancies because it
does not require instrumentation in the uterus. Accordingly,
in his view, induction is safer even than D&E. Moreover, -

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like D&X, the induction procedure yields an intact fetus
which could be studied by physicians and grieved over by
mothers.

Giles disputed the need to crush the fetal skull in induction
procedures. He routinely uses cervical relaxants and other
drugs to allow the fetal head to pass quickly without
complications. He also noted that a physician could assist an
induction procedure by gently compressing the fetal head
without either the intent to kill the fetus or the practical
certainty that death of the fetus would be the result.

Giles also stated that D&X is not the best method of
abortion where a child has hydrocephalus. He stated that a
needle could be inserted through the mother’s abdomen to
safely reduce the size of the child’s head in order to allow the
physician to perform an abortion through induction.

The Court finds Giles’ testimony more credible. Giles
spoke from substantial experience in high risk pregnancies,
having performed over 1,000 abortions through induction
without any major complications. His view that induction
could be used in the situations Broekhuizen described is
Supported by Broekhuizen’s experience. Although
Broekhuizen intended to perform the D&X procedure in the
first two circumstances he described, he did not actually
perform the procedure. In each case the pregnancy was
aborted through what was essentially an induction procedure.

Moreover, Giles expressed his opinion that the D&X
procedure is never necessary to save the live or preserve the
health of a woman despite the fact that Giles regularly
provides abortions and otherwise supports a woman’s right to
an elective abortion. Giles’ willingness to state what must be
an unpopular view in the circles in which he travels bolsters
his credibility.

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Haskell and Broekhuizen criticized Giles’ use of cervical
relaxants and other drugs, but there was no showing that
these doctors had the expertise or experience to offer this
criticism. Moreover, Giles’ substantial success in performing
abortions through inductions is more credible evidence than
the unsupported opinions of these physicians.

In light of this substantial evidence, the Court concludes
that partial birth abortion is never medically necessary to
preserve the health or life of a woman and abolition of the
procedure does not subject women to materially greater
health risks. D&E is nearly always an option and there has
been no credible showing that D&E is riskier that D&X.
Moreover, induction is safer than even D&E and can be used
in those rare pregnancies, if any, where D&E would be
problematic.

Moreover, having reviewed the proposed amendments to
the Act as well as the amicus brief filed by state legislators,
the Court finds that the Legislature did not adopt the Act for
the purpose of placing an obstacle in the path of women
seeking an abortion. As the Court has previously stated, the
proposed amendments were reasonably rejected to avoid
creating loopholes in the law that would have allowed
physicians to easily avoid the restrictions the law imposes.
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.

The State Interest Served by the Act -- In addition to the
facts already stated, the following facts are relevant to
whether the Act serves a compelling state interest.

As Giles testified, partial birth abortion raises several
concerns including pain to the child, denying the child any
possibility of survival, and risks to maternal health. These
concerns have been noted by the AMA and have been
discussed in prominent medical journals. See Exs. 17, 205,
206, 207 and 240. In an article in the Journal of the

EE

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American Medical Association, Drs. Sprang and Neerhof
concluded that “intact D&X partial-birth abortion should not
be performed because it is needlessly risky, inhumane and
ethically unacceptable.” Ex. 206 at 746. They observed that
when the physician kills a child in a partial birth abortion, the
child “is merely inches from being delivered and obtaining
full legal rights of personhood under the US Constitution.”
Id. at 746. Accordingly, the doctors concluded that partial
birth abortion is “closer to infanticide than it is to abortion.”
Id. The legislators who filed an amicus brief make similar
arguments.

The Court concludes that these facts demonstrate that the
Act serves compelling state interests.

Conclusions of Law

The Court now turns to its conclusions of law with a view
toward determining whether the Court of Appeals’ concerns
regarding the constitutionality of the Act remain valid.

In undertaking this task, the Court must begin its review of
the Act with the strong presumption that it is constitutional.
State v. Cissell, 378 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1985); Andree v.
Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the Act is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Wisconsin v.
Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Wis. 1995). In assessing
whether a party has carried its burden of proof, “every
presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all
possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative
enactment’s constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of
constitutionality.” Jd. In light of these considerations and
the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Act is
constitutional. The fully developed record demonstrates that
the Court of Appeals’ concerns have not been borne out by
the evidence.

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First, the evidence establishes that the Act need not make
an exception for cases in which the fetus is not yet viable at
the time of the abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), plainly
establishes that states may regulate abortions pre-viability.
They may do so in order to “further the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest” so long as their
regulation does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion. Casey 505 U.S. at 877
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Act is not
unconstitutional per se merely because it does not make an
exception pre-viability. Rather, the Court of Appeals found
the Act unconstitutional based on its finding that the Act did
not serve the state’s interest in maternal health or potential
life or any other compelling state interest. See Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d at 466-67.

As noted, the fully developed record establishes that the
Act serves several compelling state interests, including
interests in maternal health, potential life and morality.

Maternal Health -- The Act serves Wisconsin’s interest in
maternal health insofar as use of the D&X procedure places
women at higher risk of infection, rupture of the amniotic
sac, and cervical incompetence. Wisconsin could rationally
prohibit use of what is clearly an unnecessary procedure in
order to protect women from these dangers.

Potential Life -- The Act also serves Wisconsin’s interest
in potential life insofar as use of the D&X procedure creates
risks for subsequent pregnancies due to cervical
incompetence.

Morality -- It has long been recognized that states have a
legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct deemed immoral.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)

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(upholding constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy law in part
because it was rationally related to “the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”). Although abortion
laws are typically justified according to the state’s interest in
maternal health or potential life, the Casey court specifically
recognized that “other valid state interest[s]” could justify a
pre-viability abortion restriction. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

As the Court of Appeals observed, the Act is not likely to
save the life of any child because other safe alternative
methods of abortion are available. Planned Parenthood vy.
Doyle, 162 F.3d at 470. Nevertheless, even if the state’s
interest in a child previability is not sufficient to allow the
State to protect it from destruction, in the D&X procedure the
child is just inches from being born. Surely at that point the
State has a sufficient interest in the child to allow the state to
regulate the manner of the child’s death, regardless of
whether the State is able to keep the child alive. Wisconsin
has declared that such children are not to endure -- and
Wisconsin physicians are not to inflict -- the gruesome death
imposed in the D&X procedure. It is well-within the
province of the state to legislate against the immorality of
partial birth abortion.

Perhaps, as plaintiffs argue, the child will endure a
gruesome death through some other method of abortion.
This does not detract from the legitimacy of Wisconsin’s
partial birth abortion law, however, because it is apparently
beyond Wisconsin’s power to eliminate those other methods
of abortion. Wisconsin can eliminate this one method.
Given the national groundswell of Opposition to partial birth
abortion and the ethical concerns raised within the medical
community concerning the procedure, the State cannot be
faulted for acting where it can to outlaw an unnecessary
procedure that in most cases in which it is used is literally
inches away from being infanticide.

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Any and all of these state interests justify Wisconsin’s
partial birth abortion law so that the Act need not make an
exception for cases in which the fetus is not yet viable at the
time of the abortion.

Second, the Act need not contain an exception for cases in
which a D&X procedure is necessary for the preservation of
the mother’s health. As noted, a pre-viability restriction on
the right to an abortion is unconstitutional if it places an
undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. As the Court of Appeals found, a
law which prohibits women from obtaining an abortion
through a method that is necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s health places an undue burden on the woman’s
right to an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d
at 468.

But as the fully developed record reveals, Wisconsin’s
partial birth abortion law is not such a law. Partial birth
abortion is never medically necessary to preserve the health
or save the life of a woman and abolition of the procedure
does not subject women to materially greater health risks.
Accordingly, the trial has “cast the facts in a different light.”
While the Court of Appeals assumed that the D&X procedure
would be the best medical procedure for obtaining an
abortion in at least some circumstances, the evidence
demonstrates that it is not. Because the Act leaves women
with safe, alternative methods of abortion, it does not impose
an undue burden on their abortion rights.

Third, the Act is not vague. The Court remains convinced
that plaintiffs’ alleged confusion concerning the meaning of
the Act is a demon of their own creation. Everyone
understands what partial birth abortion is and what it is not.
It is the D&X procedure. It is not the suction curettage
procedure, the induction procedure or the D&E procedure.

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Defendants have stipulated to this reading of the law, which
supports the Court’s interpretation. See Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (Blackmun, J.) (relying in part on
the defendants’ stipulation as to the meaning of a law in
rejecting the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute at issue was
“so vague as to fail to insure against sectarian abuse.”’)

In rejecting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
this Court found that only in the D&X method of abortion
does a physician act with the purpose of performing a
procedure in the steps described by the statute -- first
partially vaginally delivering a living child and then causing
the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to kill
the child and then completing delivery of the child. Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-44. The Court of
Appeals did not take issue with this conclusion.
Nevertheless, it observed that the Act “must be read in light
of the definition of ‘intentionally’ elsewhere in Wisconsin *
criminal-law statutes as either acting purposely to accomplish
the forbidden end or being ‘aware that [one’s] conduct is
practically certain to cause that result.’” Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d at 469, citing Wis. Stat. §
939.23(3). The Court of Appeals observed that in some
methods of abortion other than D&X a physician might be
aware that he or she is “practically certain” to kill an intact
living child in the birth canal before delivery is completed.
Plaintiffs took the same position at trial. See Plaintiffs’
Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24.

The fully developed record has not justified this concern.
As noted, physicians cannot control when death occurs in
induction and suction curettage abortions and cannot be
“practically certain” that any step they take will kill a fetus in
the birth canal. Accordingly, even if their conduct in
performing these abortions is construed as_ partially
delivering a living child, they do not thereafter take any
second step for the purpose of killing the child or that is

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practically certain to kill the child before completing
delivery. Moreover, a physician who sets out to perform an
abortion through suction curettage or induction does not
purposely perform the three steps proscribed by the act in the
order proscribed, nor is he or she practically certain to do so.

The D&E procedure also is not covered by the Act. The
physician in the D&E procedure removes the fetus in parts.
As this Court has already held, the Act refers to delivery of a
“child” which cannot be equated to delivery of
“dismembered body parts.” Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9
F. Supp. 2d at 1041. Accordingly, the /ega/ interpretation of
the Act excludes delivery of a dismembered fetus, regardless
of the /ay interpretation which the testifying physicians --
including Giles, defendants’ expert -- sought to impose upon
the Act. The Act does not apply to the D&E procedure.

For similar reasons, the Act does apply to the D&X
procedure. The D&X procedure is distinct from the D&E
procedure in that the goal of the D&X is to extract an intact
fetus -- a “child” -- rather than a dismembered fetus. Haskell,
Christensen and Smith agreed with this distinction.
Moreover, the D&X procedure is the only procedure in
which the physician purposely follows the sequence of steps
proscribed by the Act. Accordingly, D&X is the only
abortion procedure abolished by the Act.

Plaintiffs also complain that there is disagreement
concerning what a D&X is, thereby making the law vague.
But the evidence demonstrated substantial agreement
concerning the meaning of D&X. All of the medical
authorities offer substantially the same definition of D&X.
To the extent they disagree in any relevant way, it is a
disagreement concerning how physicians kill the child --
whether through suctioning the cranial contents, crushing the
skull or cutting the umbilical cord. But there is no
disagreement that if a physician takes one of these steps after

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partially vaginally delivering a living child and then
completes delivery of the child, he or she has performed a
partial birth abortion. Accordingly, the law gives physicians
reasonable notice of the conduct proscribed.

As noted, the Act is constitutional if it prohibits only the
D&X procedure. In reviewing the language of the Act, it is -
difficult to discern how the Legislature could have signaled
any more clearly its intent to adopt this limited prohibition --
without creating enormous loopholes in the law. The Act
specifically uses the term “partial birth abortion” which
physicians understand to mean D&X abortions. Moreover,
the steps it describes as constituting a “partial birth abortion”
apply most naturally and easily to the D&X procedure. Dr.
Broekhuizen conceded that it is only by bending the language
of the Act beyond its most obvious meaning that it can be
construed to apply to the suction curettage method of
abortion. The same is true with regard to all other methods
of abortion except D&X. The contortions the plaintiffs invite
this Court to impose on the law run contrary to the command
that every presumption in favor of constitutionality be
indulged. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the law is
not vague.

Consent

One issue remains that was not addressed by the Court of
Appeals. Plaintiffs argue that the civil liability provisions in
the Act amount to an unconstitutional tacit consent
requirement. However, as this Court held in response to
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, if the law
criminalizing partial-birth abortions is constitutionally sound,
then a law imposing civil sanctions for the same activity
must withstand a constitutional challenge as well. See United
States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991).
Having found the criminal sanctions in the Act constitutional,
the Court finds the civil sanctions constitutional as well.

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ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of
defendants against plaintiffs dismissing their complaint and
all claims contained therein with prejudice and costs except
as to Section 895.038(3)(b) of the Act which is severed and

declared unconstitutional.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that enforcement of the
judgment is stayed pending appeal.

Entered this 4th day of June, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN C. SHABAZ
District Judge

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IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2521
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

James E. Doyle, in his official capacity as Attorney General
of the State of Wisconsin, and Diana M. Nicks, in her official
capacity as District Attorney for Dane County andasa
representative of a class consisting of all district attorneys in
the State of Wisconsin,

Defendants-Appellees,
and Thomas J. Back and Fredric K. Buford, II,
Intervening Defendants-Appellees.

‘ Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 98 C 305--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.

Argued August 10, 1998--Decided November 3, 1998

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and MANION and
ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the denial
(reported at 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D. Wis. 1998)) of a
motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of a recently enacted Wisconsin statute that decrees life

A-86

imprisonment for anyone who performs a “partial birth
abortion.” Wis. Stat. §§ 939.50(3)(a), 940.16(2). We stayed
both the enforcement of the statute and further proceedings in
the district court pending the decision of this appeal.

The statute defines a partial birth abortion as “an abortion
in which 2 person partially vaginally delivers a living child,
causes the death of the partially delivered child with the
intent to kill the child, and then completes the delivery of the
child.” § 940.16(1)(b). The statute defines “child” to mean
“a human being from the time of fertilization,” §
940.16(1)(a), and the parties assume that “living” means
having a heartbeat. Hence a partial birth abortion is criminal
even if the fetus is not yet viable (that is, couldn’t survive
outside of the womb), provided that it has a heartbeat. The
only exception to the statutory prohibition is where the
partial birth abortion is “necessary to save the life of the
[mother].” § 940.16(3).

The Wisconsin branch of Planned Parenthood, plus several
physicians who perform abortions in Wisconsin, brought suit
against the state’s attorney general and other state law
enforcement officials to enjoin the enforcement of the new
statute, contending that it violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. One of the plaintiff physicians regularly
though infrequently performs the type of abortion variously
termed “intact dilation and evacuation,” “dilation and
extraction,” and (the term we’ll use) “D&X.” The others
would like the option to consider performing it should the
condition of a patient so warrant. The standing of the
physician plaintiffs, and of Planned Parenthood as the owner
of abortion clinics in Wisconsin, to maintain this suit is not
open to question. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 188-89 (1973). Not so the standing of the intervening
defendants, two husbands of pregnant women, to be parties
to the suit. As these men are passionately opposed to

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abortion of any kind and do not Suggest that their wives
disagree with them about the issue and so might consider
undergoing a D&X, they have no significant interest in this
litigation other than an ideological one. A purely ideological
interest is not an adequate basis for Standing to sue in a
federal court, Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 67 (1986);
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972)--and we
require such standing of all would-be intervenors. Solid
Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F.3d
503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996). If these men have standing to
oppose a challenge to the partial abortion law, then any
potential beneficiary of a statute could intervene in any suit
challenging the statute’s scope or validity, something no one
believes. We add that there is nothing to suggest that the
State is not an adequate representative of the intervenors’
interests.

We turn from standing to the merits. The decision whether
to grant a preliminary injunction requires consideration both
of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win when the Case is
tried in full and of the relative harms to the parties of
granting or denying the injunction. The stronger the
likelihood that the plaintiff will win, the less of a showing he
need make that the denial of the preliminary injunction
would hurt him more than granting it would hurt the
defendant. Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1155, 1158
(7th Cir. 1998); American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital
Products Lid., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1985); EEOC v.
Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 743 (ist Cir. 1996); cf.
Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v.
Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991). If the
defendant is very likely to lose, allowing him to continue in
his probably unlawful course of conduct until the end of what
may be protracted proceedings would give him a windfall.

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The balancing of the imponderables involved in the
decision whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is
a task calling for a judgment based on the particulars of the
individual case. The district judge’s decision is therefore
entitled to considerable weight--the weight encapsulated in
the concept of appellate review for “abuse of discretion.”
Fleet Wholesale Supply Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 846
F.2d 1095, 1097 (7th Cir. 1988); American Hospital Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., supra, 780 F.2d at 595;
Smith, Bucklin & Associates, Inc. v. Sonntag, 317 U.S. App.
D.C. 364, 83 F.3d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But when it is
clear that the plaintiff is both highly likely to prevail when
the case is tried in full and is more likely to be harmed by the
denial of preliminary relief than the defendant is to be
harmed by its grant, we reverse. Meridian Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (7th Cir.
1997); Kirkeby v. Furness, 52 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 1995);
see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d
654, 657-64 (7th Cir. 1995); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco,
Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 619-20 (7th Cir. 1995). It should go
without saying that in deciding these questions in this appeal
we must, so far as it is humanly possible to do, lay to one
side whatever personal reservations any of us may have
either about abortion in general or about the decisions in
which the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as
creating a right to abortion.

The origin of the statute challenged in this case is a paper
by a physician describing the D&X method of abortion.
Martin Haskell, “Dilation and Extraction for Late Second
Trimester Abortion” (1992), reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec.
E1092, 1993 WL 135664 (Apr. 28, 1993), and in The Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, Hearing before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (Nov. 17,
1995). The procedure is employed rarely (though how rarely
we don’t know-there are no reliable statistics on this
question), and usually only in late-term abortions (20 weeks

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or more). After the cervix (the mouth of the uterus), has been
dilated, a process that can take several days, the D&X
procedure is ready to begin. The physician draws the fetus
out feet first. When only the fetus’s head remains in the
uterus, the physician inserts a scissors into the base of the
fetus’s brain, inserts a tube in the hole made by the scissors,
and removes the contents of the skull by suction, causing the
skull to collapse. The physician then completes the
extraction of the now-dead fetus from the woman’s body,
death having occurred while the body of the fetus was in the

vagina.

The unpleasantness of the procedure (and perhaps the fact
that the only reason Haskell’s paper gave for it is that it can
be performed on an outpatient basis with a local anesthetic--
though this implies that it may be safer for the woman than
alternative methods of abortion) has given rise to a host of
State statutes, as well as to bills in Congress (two of which
President Clinton has vetoed), designed to outlaw it. There
are differences among these statutes (see, e.g., Women’s
Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th
Cir. 1997), invalidating the Ohio statute), but we ignore them
and confine our attention to the Wisconsin law. On the basis
of the record compiled to date in this litigation--a potentially
important qualification, since the full trial may cast the facts
in a different light--it is apparent that whatever may be the
case with the other statutes, Wisconsin’s statute
impermissibly burdens the constitutionally recognized right
to an abortion in three respects.

First, it contains no exception for cases in which the fetus is
not yet viable (that is, cannot survive outside the mother’s
body); all that is required, as we noted, is that the fetus have
a heartbeat, and that is well before viability. The fetal
heartbeat is detectable at 6 weeks, Robert Berkow et al., The.
Merck Manual 1851 (16th ed. 1993), while in the present
state of medical technology the fetus may become viable as

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early as 20 weeks into the pregnancy or as late as 27 weeks
(or later--and some terribly malformed: fetuses never attain
viability). Therefore some D&X abortions (a procedure
employed from week 20 on) are likely to be of fetuses that
are not yet viable but have a heartbeat and so are protected by
the statute. The statutory prohibition of aborting such
fetuses--a prohibition that, remember, allows as the sole
exception cases in which the mother’s life is at stake--is
unconstitutional.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct.
705 (1973), allowed states to regulate abortion after the first
trimester even though most second-trimester and some
thirdtrimester fetuses are not viable. But in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), the Supreme Court jettisoned the trimester
framework of analysis and in the course of doing so ruled
that government may not rely on its interest in the potential
life of the fetus to interpose a significant obstacle to abortion
before viability. Jd. at 846. It may adopt measures that,
while not preventing the pregnant woman from deciding
whether to have an abortion, remind her of the gravity of the
choice and the value of fetal life. Jd. at 877-78, 899-900
(plurality opinion, but expressing a view supported by a
majority of the Justices). And it may adopt paternalistic
measures for the protection of the mother’s health, as by
requiring that only physicians be allowed to perform
abortions. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865 (1997)
(per curiam). Although such a requirement might in
principle pose a substantial obstacle to abortion, the record in
Mazurek showed that it did not in fact. /d. at 1866-67. But
Wisconsin’s law cannot be defended by reference to either
rationale. It does not seek to make the woman more
informed. It emphatically does not protect her health--it
endangers her health, as we are about to see. It does not
protect fetal life, for it merely bans one method of abortion,

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leaving all others unregulated regardless of the Stage the
pregnancy has reached.

Second, the statute contains no exception for the case in
which a D&X, either before or after viability, is necessary for
the preservation of the mother’s health. Even if the mother
would become sterile if an alternative procedure were used
(or if she carried the fetus to term)--even if she would
become paralyzed, or, as the state’s lawyer affirmed at
argument, put at a risk though not a certainty of death--the
physician who performed the abortion would still be guilty of
a crime that is punished as severely as Wisconsin, which
does not have capital punishment, punishes murder. The
Supreme Court has made clear that even a law limited to
viable fetuses, as Wisconsin’s is not, must make an exception
“for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.”
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
supra, 505 U.S. at 846; Women’s Medical Professional Corp.
v. Voinovich, supra, 130 F.3d at 209; Jane L. v. Bangerter,
61 F.3d 1493, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds
under the name Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (per
curiam). Wisconsin’s law contains no such exception, no
matter how grave the threat to the woman’s health short of a
certainty of death.

The state tells us that there is no necd for such an exception
because there is no pregnancy in which an equally safe
alternative procedure is not available. There is indeed always
an alternative form of abortion to a D&X. But the alternative
may not always be the best from the standpoint of the
mother’s health. The most common methods of late-term
abortion (the only stage at which a D&X would be
considered) are, first, medical induction, and, second, dilation
and evacuation (D&E}. In the most common form of
induction, the physician injects into the uterus a substance
designed both to kill the fetus and to induce labor, which will
cause the fetus to be expelled. Less commonly, the physician

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will use a drug that merely induces labor, in which event the
contractions will usually kill the fetus but in a few cases will
(unintentionally, of course) produce a live birth. The most
common alternative to induction is dilation and evacuation
(D&E), the standard second-trimester method of abortion but
sometimes employed later, often in conjunction with
induction. D&E involves killing the fetus in the womb either
by injecting a lethal drug into the fetus or by crushing its
skull and removing the dead fetus (often piecemeal) with
instruments. See generally Warren M. Hern, Abortion
Practice 122-60 (1984); Mokhtar Toppozada, “Terminations
of Pregnancy After 14 Weeks,” in Modern Methods of
Inducing Abortion 70 (David T. Baird, David A. Grimes &
Paul F.A. Van Look eds. 1995).

Both induction and D&E pose risks to the mother.
Induction, involving as it does labor, creates some of the
same risks as childbirth itself (though presumably fewer
because the labor involved in induction occurs earlier in the
pregnancy), as well as a risk of injury from the drugs that are
used. And when a nonlethal drug is used to induce the labor,
the fetus may be bom alive. D&E creates a risk of
perforating the uterus and of leaving pieces of the fetus in the
uterus, which may cause serious infection. The larger the
fetus, the greater these risks. The D&X procedure is a
variant of D&E designed to avoid both labor and the
occasional failures of induction as a method of aborting the
fetus, while also avoiding the potential complications of a
D&E.

For some women, it may be the safest procedure. So at
least the plaintiff physicians believe, and these beliefs are
detailed in affidavits submitted in the district court. This is
also the opinion of the most reputable medical authorities in
the United States to have addressed the issue: the American
Medical Association and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. See AMA, Report 26 of the

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Board of Trustees (1997); ACOG, Statement on Intact
Dilation and Extraction (1997). It is true that the AMA has
endorsed one of the federal partial-birth abortion bills (see its
May 20, 1997, press release entitled “AMA Supports H.R.
1122 as Amended”), H.R. 1122, 105th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1997) (as amended by the Senate that day). But the bill
contains a number of safeguards absent from Wisconsin’s
law and in endorsing the bill the AMA did not retract the
views expressed in Report 26.

The opinion of the medical authorities that for some
women in some circumstances a D&X may be the safest
procedure is just that, an opinion, or if you will a speculation,
because the procedure has not been studied systematically,
maybe because of its infrequency, novelty, and
controversiality. But responsible medical opinion is often in
advance of clinical trials, which may take many years to
complete. Against the informed though not infallible opinion
of the medical establishment the defendants offer only the
virtually word-for-word-identical affidavits of five
physicians. Insofar as they address the question of safety or
health at all, these physicians make Only two points, and
make them without elaboration or Supporting reasons. The
first is that there are as yet no peer-reviewed, scientific
studies of the relative safety of the D&X procedure, which is
true but of little significance in itself, for the reason just
noted. The second point, which mixes statutory
interpretation with medical opinion, is that “in every situation
where the life of the mother is not at risk--an exception
permitted by the [Wisconsin] Act--the proposed procedure
may be safely varied to avoid the prohibitions of the Act...
and/or commonly used, safe alternative abortion procedures
may be used.” The premise of this crucial assertion is false.
The statute contains no exception for cases in which the life
of the mother is merely “at risk.” These physicians nowhere
State that in every pregnancy there is an alternative procedure
that will protect the health of the mother as effectively as a

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D&X would do. Their affidavits are thus no evidence at all
concerning the health implications of banning the procedure,
and leave the balance of evidence on the issue of health
decisively inclined in favor of the plaintiffs.

Wisconsin law, following the Casey decision, forbids
performing an abortion after the fetus has become viable
unless the life or health of the mother is in jeopardy. Wis.
Stat. § 940.15(3); see 509 U.S. at 879. This means that the
universe of lawful late-term abortions in Wisconsin is largely
(not entirely, because some late-term abortions are of
nonviable fetuses) confined to ones in which there is a health
risk. These are precisely the cases in which it is most
important for the woman’s health that the physician have the
maximum latitude to choose the procedure that is best in the
particular circumstances.

Wisconsin is taking chances of unknown magnitude with
the health of pregnant women. This the Supreme Court’s
decisions do not permit. Those decisions require that
maternal health be the physician’s paramount concern.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, 428 U.S. at 78-79. It is
true that Casey permits the state to trade off a de minimis risk
to the mother’s health against an interest in fetal life.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
supra, 505 U.S. at 885-96. But here there is no interest in
fetal life. Casey upheld a 24-hour waiting-period
requirement, the intention of which was to encourage the
woman to rethink her decision to have an abortion. This case
involves merely the method of abortion.

Nor is it clear that the risk is slight for all women; and in
this respect the fact that the procedure is rare is irrelevant. A
woman whose health depends on it will not be comforted to

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learn that Wisconsin has decided to ban the procedure
because only a few women need it and so the state can make
a low-cost statement of opposition to abortion rights.

Third, the statute is vague. Fearful of creating loopholes,
Wisconsin decided not to forbid the specific procedure
described by Dr. Haskell but to adopt a more sweeping
prohibition. Loopholes are an entirely legitimate concern of
legislatures, and despite much judge and lawyer talk about
the imperative of clarity in criminal legislation, criminal laws
are rarely struck down on grounds of vagueness; vagueness is
recognized to be necessary to make criminal laws fully
effective. 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,
Substantive Criminal Law § 2.3(a), p. 128 (1986). - It
becomes a graver concern when it operates to deter the
exercise of constitutional rights. Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982);
Colautti v. Franklin, supra, 439 U.S. at 391; John C. Jeffries,
“Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes,” 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 196 (1985); Note, “The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,” 109 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 67, 75 (1960). When vague statutes prescribe heavy
penalties for violation, rational people avoid any conduct that
might be thought to fall within the statute’s scope, even if in
an error-free litigation the conduct would be sure to be found
constitutionally protected. Hence a statute that punishes a
class of constitutionally punishable abortions so vaguely that
it makes doctors afraid to perform constitutionally
permissible abortions is quite likely to infringe constitutional
rights. Colautti v. Franklin, supra, 439 U.S. at 390-401;
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1984);
Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, supra,
130 F.3d at 203. Wisconsin’s partial birth abortion statute is
such a statute, especially given the severity of the punishment
for violation. The threat of life imprisonment is bound to
induce doctors to give the core of the statutory prohibition a
wide berth. As a result, pregnant women in Wisconsin may

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find it impossible to obtain any type of abortion that might
conceivably though mistakenly be held in a prosecution of
the physician to be a partial birth abortion.

The statute does not define any of its terms except “child.”
But it must be read in light of the definition of “intentionally”
elsewhere in Wisconsin criminal-law statutes as either acting
purposely to accomplish the forbidden end or being “aware
that [one’s] conduct is practically certain to cause that
result.” Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3). As glossed by the case law
in Wisconsin and elsewhere, this definition is satisfied by
conduct carrying a known high risk of the forbidden result
~ even if that result is not desired. See State v. Gould, 56 Wis.
2d 808, 202 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. 1973); State v.
McCarter, 36 Wis. 2d 608, 153 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Wis.
1967); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 444-46 (1978); Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663 (7th
Cir. 1995); United States v. McAnally, 666 F.2d 1116, 1119
(7th Cir. 1981); 1 LaFave & Scott, supra, § 3.5(a)-(c), pp.
304-11. The district court gave an example, finding on the
basis of uncontradicted evidence that in some instances of
medical induction the fetus still has a heartbeat when it enters
the birth canal. If so, often death will occur there. Perhaps,
therefore, a Wisconsin court would allow a jury to find that a
physician who performed medical induction on a regular
basis (as one of the plaintiffs does) was “practically certain”
that he was causing a certain number of fetuses to die in the
birth canal. Or perhaps not. But even if the probability of
prosecution and conviction of such physicians is small, it
doesn’t take a high probability of such consequences to have
a deterrent effect when the penalty upon conviction is life in
prison.

The state’s argument that induced labor is not a form of
physician-assisted delivery has no support in the statute and
is contrary to common usage. Often labor is induced by a
physician when a pregnant woman reaches the end of her

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term and fails to go into labor spontaneously, or earlier if the
health of the mother or fetus would be endangered by
waiting.

The statute’s infirmities are magnified by the difficulty that
the state’s lawyers have had in explaining what interest the
Statute is designed to protect. Even if the standard for
judicial review of state abortion laws challenged under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were
merely that of ratioral relation to a legitimate state interest,
Wisconsin’s partial birth statute would be in trouble. Not
because states do not have legitimate interests in the
regulation of abortion, especially late-term abortions, but
because the Wisconsin statute does not seem rationally
related to any of those interests, and in particular to the
interest in the preservation of fetal life. If the state is right
that there is always an equally safe alternative form of
abortion to a partial birth abortion, then the statute cannot
discourage abortions--cannot save any fetuses--but can
merely shift their locus from the birth canal to the uterus.
What interest has the state in such a shift? This is not a
statute, like the one upheld in Casey, rationally designed to
protect fetal life by making women think carefully about
alternatives to abortion (such as completing the pregnancy
and putting up the baby for adoption). It is not a statute
designed to protect a woman’s health; on the contrary. And
it can save fetuses only by endangering pregnant women,
since the only time a woman denied a partial birth abortion
will decide to carry the fetus to term is when the alternative
methods of abortion would pose a greater risk to her. No
argument is made, and we are not aware of any basis for such
an argument, that if a fetus feels pain, the pain is worse when
the fetus is killed in the birth canal than when death occurs a
moment earlier in the womb. And therefore Wisconsin’s
statute cannot be analogized to statutes that prohibit cruelty
to animals.

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Partial birth abortion is a gruesome procedure. But ail
abortion procedures, and indeed a vast number of surgical
procedures unrejated to the reproductive process, including
forms of cosmetic surgery that strike many people as
frivolous, are bloody and horrible. It is difficult to see how
anyone acquainted with abortion techniques (lucidly
described in Alan F. Guttmacher & Irwin H. Kaiser, “The
Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York: A Personal
Insight,” in Abortion, Medicine, and the Law 546, 557-564
(4th ed., J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 1992))
could suppose partial birth abortion more gruesome than the
alternatives that Wisconsin has not attempted to prohibit. In
a first-trimester abortion the physician uses either surgical
instruments or a suction pump to remove the fetus from the
uterus. D&E, standard in a second-trimester abortion,
routinely involves the crushing of the fetus’s cranium; and
even in -first-trimester abortion the fetus is sometimes
removed piecemeal; “if a fetus beyond 10 weeks of age is
recognized, the fragments should be reassembled to see if the
fetus is essentially complete” because any fetal tissue
remaining in the uterus could cause infection. Michael S.
Burnhill, “Reducing the Risks of Pregnancy Termination,” in
Prevention and Treatment of Contraceptive Failure: In
Honor of Christopher Tietze 141, 145 (Uta Landy & SS.
Ratnam eds. 1986); see also Guttmacher & Kaiser, supra, at
558-560; David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, “Morbidity
and Mortality from Second-Trimester Abortions,” 30 J.
Reproductive Medicine 505, 508 (1985). In the rare third-
trimester abortion, the doctor may kill the fetus by injecting a
chemical into the fetus’s heart or by drilling a hole in the
fetus’s cranium and removing the fetus’s spinal fluid through
the hole.

We do not question a state’s right to express moral
indignation through its criminal law, Milner v. Apfel, 148
F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1998), but of course that right is
limited by the constitutional rights of the persons whose

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conduct the state seeks to punish. And we have difficulty
understanding--and the state’s briefs and argument have
made no effort to explain--how a rational legislature could
sense a moral difference between the method of concededly
lawful abortion described at the end of the preceding
paragraph and the partial birth method that the statute forbids
under penalty of life imprisonment.

Nor do we question the state’s right to regulate the practice
of medicine. But when that right comes into collision with a
constitutional right, the state has to give a reason for
regulating medicine in a way that impairs the interest that the
constitutional right seeks to protect. Obviously a state would
not be permitted to justify a law forbidding black doctors to
treat white patients on the ground that it was a regulation of
medicine.

We also do not doubt that if in the course of a normal labor
the mother asked her obstetrician to kill the baby in the birth
canal and he did so, the state could criminalize this act as
infanticide. Cf. Wis. Stat. § 940.05. But here, to repeat, the
state has criminalized merely a procedure, and acknowledged
the right to abort by an alternative procedure the same fetus
whose death by partial birth abortion would subject the
doctor to punishment as a murderer. So there is no issue of
infanticide, of killing a live baby that is half-born.

The constitutional right to an abortion carries with it the
right to perform medical procedures that many people find
distasteful or worse. The singling out of the D&X procedure
for anathematization seems arbitrary to the point of
irrationality. Annexing the penalty of life imprisonment to a
medical procedure that may be the safest alternative for
women who have chosen abortion because of the risk that
childbirth would pose to their health adds a note of the
macabre to the Wisconsin statute, especially when we
consider that physicians can insulate themselves from all

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legal risk by killing the fetus in utero. The only fetuses
whom the statute will save are those whose mothers are
afraid for reasons of health to undergo an alternative
procedure to a partial birth abortion.

This question of just what interest of the state the partial
birth abortion statute protects bears on the balance of harms
involved in the decision whether to grant or deny preliminary
relief against the statute. If that relief is denied and the
statute is permitted to go back into force, a few fetuses will
die in a manner different from what the physician would
prefer and some women will be endangered; no fetuses will
be saved unless physicians are deterred by threat of life
imprisonment from performing any type of late-term
abortion. The balance favors the grant of preliminary relief;
the case for that relief becomes conclusive when the
constitutional defects of the statute are considered.

The decision of the district court is reversed with directions
to grant a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of
the Wisconsin partial birth abortion statute and to dismiss the
defendant intervenors as parties.

REVERSED.

MANION, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I.

“Partial birth abortion” is neither a legal nor a medical
term. That is why some legal and medical experts have
difficulty determining the parameters of the Wiscons

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1453%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
