# Appendix — Illinois State University v. Varner

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1419%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 528 U.S. 1110

## Text

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No. OFFICE OF THE GLeRK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1998

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Petitioners,
v

Dr. Iris I. VARNER, et al.,

Respondents,
AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAROL HANSEN POSEGATE JOHN P. LYNCH
Davip A. HERMAN Counsel of Record
GIFFIN, WINNING, COHEN & MARK S. MESTER

BopDEwEs, P.C. MATTHEW RAWLINSON
1 West Old State Capitol LATHAM & WATKINS

Plaza, Suite 600 233 South Wacker Drive,
Springfield, Illinois 62701 Suite 5800
(217) 525-1571 Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 876-7700
MAUREEN E. MAHONEY
LATHAM & WATKINS
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.,
Suite 1300
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-2200
Counsel for Petitioners,
Dated: January 11, 1999 Illinois State University, et al.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc, filed October 13, 1998 ...........
Opinion of Court of Appeals, Filed July 21, 1998........

Order Granting In Part and Denying in Part
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

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Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

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Relevant Portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,

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Constitution of the State of Illinois,

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Illinois Human Rights Act,

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Chicago, Illinois 60604

October 13 , 1998

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
Hon. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge
Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

Dr. IRIS I. VARNER, et al., ) Appeal from the
Plaintiffs-Appellees, United States District,
Court for the Central
No. 97-3253 v. | District of Illinois.
ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, No. 95 C 1355
et al., Michael J. Mihm
Defendants-Appellants. } Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc filed in the above-entitled case on Septem-
ber 4, 1998, by defendants-appellants, no judge in active service
has requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original
panel have voted to deny a rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing
be, and the same is hereby DENIED.

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No. 97-3253

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

IRIS I. VARNER, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-A ppellee,

Vv.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeal from the United States Disirict Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 95 C 1355—Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 1998
DECIDED JULY 21, 1998

Before BAUER, HARLINGTON Woop, Jr., and FLAUM,
Circuit Judges.

FLAuM, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns the confluence
of two recent, significant Supreme Court decisions, City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996). The plaintiffs represent a class comprised of
all tenured or tenure-track female faculty at Illinois State Univer-
sity (“ISU”) from the 1982-83 academic year to the present. In
1995, they filed a complaint against ISU, four of its officials, its
Board of Regents, and ten members of the Board (collectively,

en ee ee ee, ee Prt “he

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“the University”). The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and
sought injunctive and monetary relief, including compensatory dam-
ages for intentional violations of Title VII under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
The University, which is concededly a state entity, moved to dismiss
the Equal Pay Act claim, as well as that part of the Title VII claim
seeking compensatory damages. The University argued that its
Eleventh Amendment immunity served as a bar to federal jurisdic-
tion with respect to these claims. The district court denied the
University’s motion to dismiss. See 972 F. Supp. 458 (C.D. IIL.
1997), and 986 F. Supp. 1107 (C.D. Ill. 1996).

The University appealed the district court’s denial of its
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. We granted the United
States’ motion to intervene to defend the constitutionality of this
application of federal law to the States. We ‘ave jurisdiction over
this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 under the
collateral order doctrine. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993). We
affirm the district court’s decision in all respects.

I.

The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. While
the amendment by its terms appears to limit only the federal
courts’ Article III diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
long “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much
for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779

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(1991). The text of the amendment, narrowly written to overrule
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793), see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 67-70,
stands for the larger proposition, inherent in our federal system,
that each state remains a sovereign entity. See id. at 54 (“For over
a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits
against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by the Consti-
tution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States.’”’) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
Accordingly, the States enjoy an immunity from suit in federal
court by all private parties for all causes of action, including suits
arising under federal statutes. See, e.g., Doe v. University of IIL.,
138 F.3d 653, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1998). State sovereign immunity,
however, is not absolute: A state may consent to suit in federal
court! and, under certain circumstances, Congress may abrogate a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Congress may constitutionally abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity under a particular statute if it both un-
equivocally expresses its intent to do so and acts pursuant to a
valid exercise of power. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. With
respect to the latter inquiry, Seminole Tribe rejected the notion
that the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S ConsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
confers upon Congress the power to abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See id. at 71-73 (“The Eleventh Amend-
ment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I
cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed
upon federal jurisdiction.”). In so holding, the Court also explic-
itly overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
in which a plurality of the Court held that the Interstate Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, gave Congress the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. See 517 U.S. at 63-66.

' No party contends that Illinois has consented to suit in the instant case.

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No. 97-3253

The Court in Seminole Tribe reaffirmed, however, that valid
legislation pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could
serve as a basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity.’ See id.
at 59-60, 63-66 (discussing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976) ) (“Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplica-
ble to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to
alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power
achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.”). Thus,
“Cejven after Seminole Tribe, ‘the Eleventh Amendment does not
insulate the states from suits in federal courts to enforce federal
Statutes enacted under the authority of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’” Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,
141 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Crawford v. Indiana
Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997)).

The University raises a number of arguments contending that
Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it passed the Equal Pay Act. First, the University
asserts that the Equal Pay Act does not contain a clear and
unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate the States’
immunity. Second, the University posits that Congress passed the
Equal Pay Act pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause
and not pursuant to its power under § 5. The University argues that,
following Seminole Tribe, Commerce Clause legislation cannot
validly abrogate the States’ immunity from suit in federal court.
Third, the University asserts that the Equal Pay Act does not

? Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
This section enables Congress “‘to enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantees that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law” or deny any person “the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

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constitute valid legislation under Congress’s § 5 power in any event.
In this context, the University relies on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of § 5 in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157
(1997), in conjunction with the fact that the Equal Pay Act does not
require proof of intentional discrimination to support a valid claim
for relief. The University’s Title VII argument is more narrow. It
concedes that Title VII itself contains a clear statement of legislative
intent to abrogate the States’ immunity. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S.
at 456. However, the University argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a,
which made available a compensatory damages remedy to Title VII
plaintiffs, is a distinct statute from Title VII that does not contain its
own statement of congressional intent to abrogate the States’ Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. We address these arguments in turn.

II. The Equal Pay Act
A. Intent to Abrogate

In deciding whether Congress unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Equal Pay Acct, it is helpful to consider the context and
history of the statute. Congress passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)),
as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 to § 219. The Equal Pay Act, which
prohibits wage disparities on the basis of sex,’ therefore employs
the same definitional and enforcement provisions as do the

> The Equal Pay Act provides in relevant part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees cf the opposite sex in such establishinent for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures

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No. 97-3253

overtime and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206-07, 216; see also Timmer v. Michigan
Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 838 n.6 (6th Cir. 1997). In
1966, Congress amended the FLSA’s definition of “employer” to
include state government workers employed in hospitals, institu-
tions, or schools. See Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 102(b), 80 Stat. 831
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)). The Supreme Court subse-
quently held, however, that the 1966 amendment to the FLSA
did not abrogate the States’ immunity from suit in federal court.
See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 284-86 (1973). As we have noted, see Mueller v.
Thompson, 133 F.3d 1063, 1065 (7th Cir. 1998), Congress
responded to Employees by amending certain provisions of the
FLSA in the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, including its definitions of “employer,”
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) & (x), and “employee,” id. § 203(e)(2)(c),
as well as its enforcement provision, id. § 216(b).*

Following the 1974 amendments to the FLSA, the term
“employer” is defined to “include[ ] a public agency.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d). The statute in turn defines “public agency” to include
“the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any
agency of .. . a State, or a political subdivision of a State.” Jd.

earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based
on any other factor other than sex....
29 US.C. § 206(d) (1).

“While our recitation of the history of the Equal Pay Act is helpful in
understanding the context of the statutory provisions at issue, this history in itself
has no bearing upon our inquiry into whether Congress unequivocally expressed
its intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Rather, that
intent must be made “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989); see also, e.g., Hilton v. South
Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991) (“Congressional intent
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity must be expressed in the text of the
statute; the Court will not look to legislative history in making its inquiry.”).

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§ 203(x). The FLSA defines “employee” to include “any individ-
ual employed by a State, political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate governmental agency.” Jd. § 203(e)(2)(C). Finally,
the Act’s private enforcement provision provides in pertinent part,
“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the
preceding sentences [including violations of § 206] may be
maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or
more employees.” Jd. § 216(b) (emphasis added).

In light of the plain statutory language, which authorizes
“employees” to sue “public agencies” in federal court for violations
of the Equal Pay Act, we have little difficulty holding that Congress
clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity when it amended § 216(b) in 1974. We have
previously hinted at this holding in both Mueller, 133 F.3d at 1065,
and Ende v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 176, 177 n.3 (7th Cir.
1985), and we make it explicit today. In so doing, we join the other
circuits that have examined this issue in the context of both the
Equal Pay Act and the FLSA. See Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31,
36 (2d Cir. 1997) (FLSA); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 41-42
(1st Cir. 1997) (FLSA); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 814-15
(10th Cir. 1997) (FLSA); Timmer, 104 F.3d at 837-38 (Equal Pay
Act); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(FLSA), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 946 (1993).

While the University concedes that the Equal Pay Act creates
a private cause of action for state employees, it argues that the
statute does no more than permit those employees to sue the States
in their own courts. Compare, eg. Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (holding that the
Jones Act does not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity), with Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502
U.S. 197 (1991) (holding that the Federal Employers’ Liability

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Act, which provides the statutory remedial scheme for the Jones
Act, creates a cause of action against state employers in their own
courts). In this context, the University emphasizes that the statutory
provisions discussed above do not contain any explicit references to
the “Eleventh Amendment,” or to “abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.” See, eg. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 246. (1985) (“A general authorization for suit in federal
court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.”). We previously have con-
cluded, however, that such “magic words” are unnecessary, because
“that degree of explicitness is not required.” Davidsen v. Board of
Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 56-57 (holding that, even though the statute at issue did
not refer explicitly to the Eleventh Amendment, “the numerous
references to the ‘State’ in the text of [the statute] make it
indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the
States’ sovereign immunity from suit”). Rather, as we stressed in
Davidson, all that is necessary is that Congress make “its desire to
override the states’ sovereign immunity clear[ ]” from the language
of the statute. 920 F.2d at 443.

We recently addressed a similar assertion of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity by the State of Illinois under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, in
Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 141 F.3d
761, 765-66 (7th Cir. 1998). Goshiasby explicitly reaffirmed David-
son's rationale on this point. See id. Moreover, Goshtasby rejected
the notion that Seminole Tribe altered in any way the traditional
inquiry to determine whether Congress unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate. We concluded that “Seminole Tribe simply
recycled [the] well-established verbiage in stating that Congress
must be ‘unmistakably clear.’ The analysis was the same one federal
courts have used for years.” Jd. at 766 (citations omitted). Thus, we

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conclude that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate the States’
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it arnended the Equal Pay
Act in 1974.

B. Power to Abrogate

But for the Supreme Court’s holding in Seminole Tribe, our
Eleventh Amendment inquiry into the Equal Pay Act would be
complete, as the Equal Pay Act (along with the rest of the FLSA)
Clearly is within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1978).
However, as we have discussed, see supra at 3-4, Seminole Tribe
established that Congress may only abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity through legislation validly enacted pursuant
to its § 5 enforcement powers.’ Because we must determine whether

* Accordingly, all of the circuits to have addressed the issue following
Seminole Tribe have held that the minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the FLSA do not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Those circuits have rejected, either explicitly or implicitly, the argument that the
wage and overtime provisions serve a valid Fourteenth Amendment purpose. See
Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 66 US.L.W. 3780
(U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1667); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136, 1137
(9th Cir. 1997); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1997); Mills v.
Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 48-49 (Ist Cir. 1997); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 816-
18 (10th Cir. 1997); Raper v. lowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson-
Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208-11 (6th Cir. 1996). In a case remanded to
this Court by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Seminole Tribe,
we implicitly reached the same holding. See Mueller v. Thompson, 133 F.3d
1063, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that, in light of Seminole Tribe, “(t]he only
issue is whether Wisconsin has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit in federal court under the FLSA” and citing Mills, Raper, and Wilson-
Jones). Three of these courts, though, expressly reserved the question of whether ~
the Equal Pay Act validly serves a Fourteenth Amendment purpose. See Mills,
118 F.3d at 48; Aaron, 115 F.3d at 817; Raper, 115 F.3d at 624. Moreover, the
Sixth Circuit, in holdin» that the Equal Pay Act validly abrogates the States’
Eleventh Amendment immunity, noted that its holding was not in tension with
its contrary holding in Wilson-Jones. See Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Com-
merce, 104 F.3d 833, 842 (6th Cir. 1997).

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“the Act in question [was] passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power to abrogate,” Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 59, we therefore are required to consider two questions:
(1) whether Congress, in applying the Equal Pay Act to the States,
did so pursuant to its § 5 powers and, if so, (2) whether the Equal
Pay Act is within Congress’s § 5 powers, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).

1. Whether Congress Exercised its § 5 Powers in Making the
Equal Pay Act Applicable to the States

In EEOC y. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 604-09 (7th Cir. 1982), we
considered whether Congress had employed its § 5 enforcement
powers when it amended the ADEA in 1974 to cover state
employees.® Although we recognized that the 1974 amendments
to the ADEA did not explicitly refer to Congress’s § 5 powers, id.
at 607-08, we did not believe that this fact was dispositive of our
inquiry. Instead, we concluded that “the test of whether legisla-
tion is enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires no talismanic intoning of the amendment. Rather, the
inquiry is whether the objectives of the legislation are within
Congress’ power under the amendment.” /d. at 608 (citation
omitted). Because we concluded that the objectives of the 1974
amendments to the ADEA were “clearly tied to the guarantee of
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” we
held that Congress acted pursuant to its § 5 enforcement powers
when it extended the ADEA’s coverage to state and local govern-
ment employees. See id. at 608-09.

We recently have had two opportunities to consider Elrod’s
rule, in Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 657-60 (7th

* These amendments to the ADEA, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74, were
in fact included in the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974—the same
legislation that amended the FLSA. See Elrod, 604 F.2d at 605.

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Cir. 1998), and in Gaoshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 766-68 (7th Cir. 1998). In Doe,
which considered the State of Illinois’s Eleventh Amendment
challenge to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681, we explicitly reaffirmed F/rod’s analysis, stating
that “[t]he appropriate question is, were ‘the objectives of [Ti-
tle IX] . . . within Congress’ power’”’ under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 138 F.3d at 660 (alterations in original) (quoting
Elrod, 674 F.2d at 608). Similarly, Goshtasby, which like Elrod
addressed the ADEA, reaffirmed our holding in E/rod, concluding
that “the rule remains that Congress need not use magic words to
exercise its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 141 F.3d at 768. See also Doe, 138 F.3d at 678
(Easterbrook, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (“Sex
discrimination by public schools is a subject within the legislative
power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and Congress need
not catalog the grants of power under which it legislates; courts do
not remand statutes for better statements of reasons.’’).

Both Goshtasby and Doe also rejected the argument, which
the University raises in the instant case, that E/rod’s rule contra-
venes the Supreme Court’s cautionary language that “we should
not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under
its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) (quoting Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981)). We
recognized in Doe that the inquiries involved in both Gregory and
Pennhurst were not similar to our inquiry into whether Congress
acted pursuant to § 5 in enacting legislation, the substantive reach
of which was clear. Rather, we concluded, those cases concerned
the substantive reach of statutory provisions and whether
Congress intended to subject the States to mandatory obligations
by enacting legislation pursuant to its § 5 powers. See Doe, 138

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F.3d at 658 & n.6; see also Goshtasby, 141 F.3d at 767-68. “In the
present inquiry, by Contrast, the intended result (of subjecting
States to suit for violations of [the Equal Pay Act’s] substantive
provisions) is clear, and the grant of power under which Congress
acted is at issue.”” Doe, 138 F.3d at 658. We therefore continue to
adhere to the method of analysis set forth in Elrod, which is
consistent with the long-recognized rule that “the constitution-
ality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of
the power which it undertakes to exercise.” Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); see also EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (recognizing that “Congress
need [not] anywhere recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Fourteenth
Amendment’ or ‘Equal Protection’”’ in order to exercise its § 5

powers).

The Equal Pay Act, however, presents an additional wrinkle
that prevents us from proceeding immediately to consider
whether the objectives of the Act are within Congress’s § 5
powers. The FLSA as originally enacted explicitly stated that the
statute constitutes an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(b); see also United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the
FLSA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause pow-
ers). Moreover, when Congress amended the FLSA in 1963 by
passing the Equal Pay Act, it explicitly stated that it was relying
on its authority to regulate interstate commerce. See Pub. L.
No. 88-38, § 2(b), 77 Stat. 56, 56. This history would be
unexceptional by itself, as it is consistent with Congress’s pattern
of enacting civil rights statutes under the Commerce Clause to
regulate private conduct, as mandated by the holding of the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and later amending those
statutes pursuant to its § 5 authority to encompass government

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conduct as well. See, e.g., Elrod, 674 F.2d at 606-08 (discussing
this pattern with respect to Title VII and the ADEA).

The University contends, however, that Congress made a
similarly express statement thet it was exercising its powers under
the Commerce Clause when it extended the FLSA to the States
through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. According
to the University’s argument, the Equal Pay Act is unlike the
ADEA, in which Congress left the source of its power unstated
when it extended the statute’s coverage to the States. See Goshtasby,
141 F.3d at 767. Therefore, the University argues, the inquiry
mandated by E/rod—whether the objectives of the statute are within
Congress’s § 5 powers—is simply inapplicable to this case. Rather,
the University believes that we should take Congress at its word and
definitively conclude that the 1974 amendments to the Equal Pay
Act were enacted solely pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.

As an initial matter, we note that another court of appeals
has rejected the premise that Congress explicitly relied upon its
Commerce Clause powers when it extended the Equal Pay Act’s
protections to the States. The Sixth Circuit, in addressing the
identical question that is before us today, extensively analyzed the
legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974’ and reaffirmed its prior holding that “Congress did not
expressly state the constitutional basis of its extension of the

” As our analysis in Elrod made clear, we must focus upon the particular
legislation that extended a statute’s coverage to the States, as opposed to the
original statute itself, when determining the source of Congress’s power. See
Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604-08 (considering the 1974 amendments to the ADEA, as
opposed to the orginal legislation enacted in 1967). Accord, e.g., Mills v. Maine,
118 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1997) (considering the 1974 amendments to the FLSA
as opposed to the original legislation); Timmer v. Michigan Dep’t of Commerce,
104 F.3d 833, 838 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he court properly focused on the
1974 amendments as opposed to the 1963 version of the Equal Pay Act.
Although the 1974 legislation was an amendment to an already existing act, it
was nevertheless a separate act of Congress.”).

15a
No. 97-3253

FLSA to the States in 1974.” Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of
Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir. 1997). The court in
Timmer noted that the report of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, S. REP. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1974), merely indicated the Committee’s belief that “it had the
power to extend the FLSA to the States under the Commerce
Clause.” * Timmer, 104 F.3d at 838-39 n.7.

The Equal Pay Act, which Congress designated as severable
from the other protections of the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. § 219, is
mentioned only once in the Senate Committee’s 116-page report,
in a discussion of the FLSA’s historical background. See S. REP.
No. 93-690, supra, at 6. Indeed, the relevant legislative history
indicates that Congress concentrated primarily upon extending
the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions when it
passed the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. See id.;
see also Timmer, 104 F.3d at 846 n.2 (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(“The items debated were primarily the minimum wage and
overtime provisions.”); cf. Elrod, 674 F.2d at 605 (noting that
{little legislative history exists on the ADEA amendment, .. .
because the breadth and significance of the amendments to the
FLSA overshadowed the ADEA amendment”). Thus, we do not
accept the University’s contention, which is solely based upon a
murky legislative history, that Congress expressly relied upon its

® The report states, in part:
The Committee believes that there is no doubt that the activities of
public sector employers affect interstate commerce and therefore that
the Congress may regulate them pursuant to its power to regulate
interstate commerce. Without question, the activities of government at
all levels affect commerce.

S. Rep. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974). See also H.R. REp.
No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) (“It is hereby declared to be the
policy of this Act, through the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate
commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to correct and as
rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to... .”).

l6a
No. 97-3253

Commerce Clause powers in extending the Equal Pay Act to the
States. Accord Mills, 118 F.3d at 44 (“[O]ne cannot read
Congress’ statement regarding the Act’s validity under the Com-
merce Clause to indicate that Congress intended to exclude other
applicable constitutional bases for the Act.”) (quotations and
alteration omitted); Timmer, 104 F.3d at 838-39 n.7 (“We
believe that this legislative history falls far short of an ‘express
statement’ of congressional intent.”’).

Because we are unconvinced that Congress expressly declared
its intention to proceed solely pursuant to its Commerce Clause
powers, we conclude that Elrod’s analysis controls the present
inquiry. Pursuant to this analysis, we have little difficulty in conclud-
ing that the objectives of the Equal Pay Act were within Congress’s
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.” As we have discussed,
see supra at 5-6 & n.3, the purpose of the Equal Pay Act is to
prohibit arbitrary sex-based wage disparities. Prohibiting “arbitrary,
discriminatory government conduct. . . is the very essence of the
guarantee of ‘equal protection of the laws’ of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604. Thus, we conclude that the
Equal Pay Act constitutes an exercise of Congress’s § 5 enforcement
powers.”

* We note that this conclusion is not dispositive of the issue of whether the
extension of the Equal Pay Act to the States is constitutionally-valid legislation,
which we consider infra at 16-22.

'© Two other courts of appeals, in addition to the Sixth Circuit in Timmer, have
arrived at the same conclusion. See Usery v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d
1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977). Those courts both rejected Tenth
Amendment challenges to the Equal Pay Act under the then-prevailing rule of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), by holding that the Equal
Pay Act was enacted pursuant to Congress’s § 5 powers. We applied a different
rationale to reject a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Equal Pay Act in
Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978), but we expressly
reserved the question of whether the statute was also a proper exercise of Congress’s
§ 5 powers. See id. at 6 n.19.

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No. 97-3253

2. Whether The Equal Pay Act is Within Congress’s § 5
Enforcement Powers

The University argues that Congress exceeded its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment when it extended the protec-
tions of the Equal Pay Act to the States. In this context, the
University relies on the fact that the Equal Pay Act does not
require proof of an employer’s discriminatory purpose. See Fal-
lon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
that “the Equal Pay Act creates a type of strict liability in that no
intent to discriminate need be shown’’) (quotation omitted); see
also Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118 (2d
Cir. 1997). Because claims of discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment require proof of purposeful discrimination,
see, e.g., Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979),
the University contends that the Equal Pay Act is not within
Congress’s power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 5. We previously have addressed similar challenges to
Title VII’s imposition of disparate impact liability. See Liber-
ales v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 422-24 (7th Cir.
1978). We rejected those challenges, holding that the prohibition
of policies that had a discriminatory impact was “plainly adapted”
to the end of “enforc[ing] the anti-discrimination provisions of
the Equal Protection Clause.” Jd. at 423. The University argues,
however, that the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Boerne vy.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), altered our prior understanding of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and war-
rants a different result in the instant case.

In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4. RFRA was a legislative response

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No. 97-3253

to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division vy.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Court had held that the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause did not require the
States to provide exceptions from neutral, generally applicable
laws that significantly burden religious practices. See id. at 887.
Congress enacted RFRA, through its § 5 power to enforce the
Due Process Clause, to overcome Smith’s holding. Accordingly,
RFRA provided that laws that substantially burdened the exercise
of religion must be justified as the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling state interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.

The Court in City of Boerne considered whether legislative
resurrection of the “compelling interest” test—“the most de-
manding test known to constitutional law,” 117 S. Ct. at
2171—constituted a permissible exercise of Congress’s § 5 power.
The Court examined the legislative record and found that Con-
gress did not enact this test in response to a history of unconstitu-
tional conduct: “RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of
modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry.” /d. at 2169. The Court concluded that RFRA
was “so out of proportion” to the burdens on religion that
Congress identified and attempted to prevent that the statute
could not be understood as an effort to respond to, or prevent,
unconstitutional behavior. See id. at 2170. Rather, the Court
determined that RFRA “attempt[s] a substantive change in
constitutional protections,” id., such that the statute went beyond
attempting *» “enforce” an established constitutional right. Be-
cause “Congiess’s power under § 5 . . . extends only to ‘en-
forc[ing]’ the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id. at
2164 (alteration in original), the Court struck down RFRA as
unconstitutional. See id. at 2172.

This analysis clarified what had been an unsettled question in
regard to Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth

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No. 97-3253

Amendment. The Court rejected the substantive, or “ratchet”
theory, expressed most forcefully in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 653-56 (1966), which maintained that Congress could
expand the substantive rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment even when the courts had explicitly refused to
recognize the existence of such rights.'' In rejecting this theory,
the Court explained, “Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to
enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation.” City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.

Accordingly, in order to determine whether legislation is
appropriate under Congress’s enforcement power, we must con-
sider whether it deters or remedies unconstitutional conduct. See
id. at 2163. However, legislatior that satisfies this consideration
may be appropriate “even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional.” See id. For an act to be
appropriate remedial legislation, “[t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or reme-
died and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connec-
tion, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.”
Id. at 2164.

The University posits that the Equal Pay Act, by not requir-
ing proof of discriminatory intent, necessarily proscribes some
state action that is constitutional. Because of this feature, the

"The Court in City of Boerne asserted that “[a)ny suggestion that
Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not supported by our case law.” 117 S. Ct. at 2167. It did recognize that
Morgan “‘could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact
legislation that expands the nights contained in § | of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” Jd. at 2168. However, the Court believed that this was “not a necessary
interpretation, . . . or even the best one.” Rather, the Court asserted that the
legislation at issue in Morgan could be justified as a reasonable attempt by
Congress to combat unconstitutional discrimination. See id.

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No. 97-3253

University argues that the Equal Pay Act constitutes “substan-
tive” legislation. This contention is not without some appeal.’
The Supreme Court’s recognition that Congress’s “remedial”
power “extends only to enforc[ing] the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment” is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s
statement that remedial legislation may be appropriate “even if in
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitu-
tional.” City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163-64. The Supreme
Court recognized this difficulty, stating that “the line between
measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is
not easy to discern.”’ Jd. at 2164. Nonetheless, “the distinction
exists and must be observed.” Jd. Therefore, we reject the
University’s contention that the Equal Pay Act automatically
constitutes inappropriate legislation merely because it proscribes
some constitutional conduct.

Instead, we consider whether the Equal Pay Act satisfies
City of Boerne’s “proportionality and congruence”’ test. See id. In

'? The Supreme Court’s distinction between substantive and remedial
legislation has not been applied uniformly in the courts of appeals. In the context
of Eleventh Amendment challenges to antidiscrimination statutes, the distinc-
tion has resulted in disarray. Compare Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d
1426, 1433, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding, in a splintered opinion, that the
ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity),
with Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 772
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the ADEA is a proper exercise of Congress’s
enforcement power); compare also Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d
802, 805 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In passing the [Amefieans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) ], Congress was not atiempting to make a substantive constitutional
change.”), with Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 440 (Sth Cir. 1998)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (“Both RFRA and the ADA purport to establish greater
rights for individuals against the states by increasing the measure of judicial
scrutiny for conflicting state actions to a level higher than the Supreme Court
has found appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment.”), petition for cert.
filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. May 28, 1998) (No. 97-1941).

No. 97-3253

this context, it is significant that Congress inquired into the extent
of sex-based wage discrimination in the workplace prior to enact-
ing the Equal Pay Act.”’ See, e.g., S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 1 (1963). The Supreme Court has recognized that

Congress’ purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to
remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic
problem of employment discrimination in private industry—
the fact that the wage structure of “many segments of
American industry has been based on an ancient but outmo-
ded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should
be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the
same.”

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 176, supra). Congress accordingly had
substantial justification to conclude that pervasive discrimination
existed whereby women were paid less tham men for equal work.
We accord these findings substantial deference, given that “Con-
gress must have wide latitude,” City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164,
to determine where the line lies between substantive and remedial
measures. These legislative findings stand in contrast to RFRA, in
which the legislative record was devoid of any reference to
modern examples of the kind of unconstitutional conduct purport-
edly targeted by the legislation. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at
2169-70.

Moreover, in examining the provisions of the Equal Pay Act,
we do not believe that their scope is out of proportion to the

'? Legislative findings in this context may be helpful to our inquiry. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, however, they are not required. See City of
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169-70 (“Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not
on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but ‘on due regard for
the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.’”) (quoting
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J.)).

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No. 97-3253

harms that Congress sought to redress. See Goshtasby, 141 F.3d
at 772. In order to establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer pays different wages
to employees of the opposite sex “for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibil-
ity, and which are performed under similar working conditions.”
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). This, however, does not automatically
establish liability. Rather, employers enjoy three specific affirma-
tive defenses: that the wage differentials are due to either (i) a
seniority system, (ii) a merit system, or (iii) a system that
measures wages by quantity or quality of production. Jd. In
addition, employers may avoid liability under a catch-all provision
that affords a defense when the differential is “based on any other
factor other than sex.” Jd. § 206(d)(1)(iv); see also Fallon v.
Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989). The broad scope of
these defenses protects employers from liability when the em-
ployer has sound reasons for wage disparities (“any other factor
other than sex’’), but they allow for liability when no such reasons
exist. We believe that these siatutory provisions are reasonably
tailored to remedy intentional gender-based wage discrimination.
Cf. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir.
1978) (holding that Congress’s extension of Title VII’s protet-
tions to government employees was “clearly rationally related to
and consistent with the ‘letter and spirit’ of the Fourteenth
Amendment’). As we recognized in Goshtasby, the fact that the
Statute’s sweep includes some constitutional conduct is not fatal.
See 141 F.3d at 423 (quoting City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163).
The Equal Pay Act, unlike RFRA, does not redefine the substan-
tive nghts of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor are its provisions

23a
No. 97-3253

out of proportion to the harms that Congress intended to remedy
and deter.'*

Thus, in light of the above, we conclude that Congress
validly abrogated the University’s Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity from suit under the Equal Pay Act.

Ill. The Civil Rights Act of 1991

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e,
was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 78 Stat. 253, to expressly abrogate the
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1976). Title VII's definition of “person”
was amended to include “governments, governmental agencies,
[and] political subdivisions,”’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), and the term
“employer” is defined as a “person’”’ who also satisfies other
statutory conditions not relevant here. Jd. § 2000e(b). The statute
also defines the term “respondent” to include an employer. /d.
§ 2000e(n). Finally, the 1972 amendments included within the
statute’s definition of “employee” those individuals “subject to
the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency
or political subdivision.” Jd. § 2000e(f). Title VII’s enforcement
provisions state that “a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be

'* In a footnote to its Equal Pay Act argument, the University’s Brief states:
“To the extent that plaintiffs assert disparate impact claims under Title VII,
those claims raise identical Fourteenth Amendment concerns.” If the University
is attempting to argue that, in light of City of Boerne, we should overrule City of
Chicago and Liberales, it has waived this argument. See, e.g., United States v.
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (“We repeatedly have made
clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments . . . are waived (even where
those arguments raise constitutional issues).”). At any rate, in light of the
foregoing discussion, we see no reason to revisit those cases without the benefit
of full briefing.

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No. 97-3253

aggrieved,” id. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and that “each United States
district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
this subchapter.” Jd. § 2000e-5(f) (3). These provisions make it
unmistakably clear, as the Supreme Court recognized in Fitzpat-
rick, that Congress intended to abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title VII. The University argues,
however, that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA)—which for
the first time provided a compensatory damages remedy for
Title VII plaintiffs who proved intentional discrimination, see
42 U.S.C. § 198la—does not contain a similar expression of
legislative intent to abrogate.

The plain language of § 1981a shows that Congress intended
to create an additional remedy for Title VII violations, as opposed
to a separate cause of action. The statute provides:

In an action brought by a complaining party under
section 706 ... of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[42 U.S.C. 2000e-5] against a respondent who engaged
in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . prohibited
under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C.
2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16], and provided that the
complaining party cannot recover under [42 U.S.C.
1981], the complaining party may recover compensa-
tory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b)
of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)], from the respondent.

42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1). As the University concedes, Congress
incorporated Title VII's definitional provisions into § 198la.
These definitional provisions establish that the States, as potential
“respondents,” see supra at 22, are within the class of employers
from which a “complaining party” under § 198la may recover

25a
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compensatory damages, and they are not elsewhere expressly
excluded from that class. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1) &
(b)(2). Section 1981a defines the term “complaining party”’ to
include “a person who may bring an action or proceeding under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Jd. § 198la(d) (1) (A).
Thus, a “complaining party” in an “action brought” under Ti-
tle VII may be entitled to compensatory damages by showing that
a “respondent” (which includes State governments) engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination. Further, as we have indi-
cated, Title VII confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts for
“actions brought” under its provisions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3). Therefore, we conclude that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 mercly creates an additional remedy for actions
brought under Title VII. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,
553 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Congress amended Title VII in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to permit victims of unlawful intentional
discrimination to collect compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. .. .”). It does not, as the University contends, create a
distinct cause of action that would require its own statement of
abrogation. When Congress authorized compensatory damages
claims against Title VII respondents (who may be sued in federal
court), it expressed its intent to authorize such claims against the
States.

Our conclusion is further buttressed by Congress’s explicit
exclusion of the States as respondents that may be subject to
punitive damages claims under Title VII. See 42 US.C.
§ 1981a(b)(1) (“A complaining party may recover punitive
damages under this section against a respondent (other than a
government, government agency or political subdivision)... .’’).
) No similar exclusion exists with respect to claims for compensa-
tory damages. See id § 1981a(b) (2). Congress would have had no
; need to provide this explicit exception to the CRA’s expanded

|

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No. 97-3253

remedies unless it understood the remainder of those remedies—
including compensatory damages claims—to apply to the States.
Indeed, “a limitation of liability is nonsensical unless liability
existed in the first place.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 13 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Thus, we believe that
the language of § 198la makes clear Congress’s desire to add
remedies to Title VII (including a compensatory damages rem-
edy against the States), rather than a separate cause of action.
Under Title VII, the abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity is settled. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject the University’s asser-
tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to both the
Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We therefore
affirm the decision of the district court.

A true Copy:
Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

27a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dr. IRIS VARNER, et al., ,
Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 95-1355

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, et al,
Defendants. )

FILED
JUL 30 1997

JOHN M. WATERS, Clerk
U.S. District Court
Central District of Illinois

ORDER

This matter is now before the Court on Magistrate Judge
Robert J. Kauffman’s Report & Recommendation and two
Motions to Dismiss by Defendants. For the reasons set forth
herein, the Report & Recommendation [ #128] is adopted in part
and rejected in part, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#71] is
granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [ #18] is granted in part and denied in part as moot.

Background

The relevant facts of this case have been sufficiently set forth
in the Report & Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as
well as the prior Orders of this Court, and need not be restated
here. Suffice it to say that this matter is brought on behalf of a

a

28a

class including any female teaching faculty at Illinois State
University who was an Assistant Professor, Associate Professor,
or ful! Professor anytime during the period beginning with the
1982-1983 academic year up to and including the present. Plain-
tiffs allege that the class of women has been paid less than their
male counterparts, given considerations of teaching experience,
the number of classes and class size they taught, academic papers
published, service to the University, and other matters to go to the
quality of their services. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants
engaged in retaliation against female professors who complained
of their alleged employment practices.

On September, 24, 1996, the Court ruled on-a motion to
dismiss filed with respect to the original Complaint (“Motion to
Dismiss 1”). Motion to Dismiss | was premised upon the argu-
ment that Plaintiffs cannot proceed in federal court on any claims
based on the Equal Pay Act because the State of Illinois has not
consented to suit. Upon the filing of Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint, Defendants revived this motion to dismiss, as well as a
second motion to dismiss that had been filed prior to the case
being transferred to this district (“Motion to Dismiss 2”). Motion
to Dismiss 2 challenged Plaintiffs’ ability to hold Defendants
liable in their individual capacities under Title VI] and the Equal
Pay Act. This matter then was referred to the Magistrate Judge
under Local Rule 72.1 for a report and recommendation.

On May 22, 1997, Magistrate Judge Robert J. Kauffman
entered a Report & Recommendation which recommended that
the motions be granted in part and denied in part. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) (1), the parties had ten (10) working days after service
of the Report & Recommendation to file objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s decision. Objections were timely filed on
behalf of both parties. Additionally, the United States sought and
was granted leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae with respect to
the issue of sovereign immunity. This Order follows.

29a

Discussion

In resolving a motion to dismiss, this Court must consider all
well-pled facts as true and must draw all inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. Bontkowski v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, 998
F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 602 (1993).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts consider whether relief is
possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent
with the allegations in the Complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957). This Court will dismiss a claim only if it is
beyond doubt that no set of facts would entitle the Plaintiffs to
relief. Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.,
987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993).

I. Motion to Dismiss 1—Sovereign Immunity
A. Equal Pay Act Claims

In their renewed Motion to Dismiss [#71], Defendants first
allege that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Pay Act should be
dismissed because the State of Illinois has not consented to be
sued in federal court under this statute and such a suit is therefore
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants rely on the

‘Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

US. , 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996), which found:

In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated
the States’ sovereign immunity, we ask two questions:
first, whether Congress has “unequivocally expresse[d]
its intent to abrogate the immunity,” Green v. Mansour,
474 US. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 426, 88 L.Ed.2u 371
(1985); and second, whether Congress has acted “pur-
suant to a valid exercise of power.”

Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1123.

When last confronted with this issue in September 1996, the
Court engaged in substantial analysis of the effect of Seminole

30a

Tribe on suits brought pursuant to the Equal Pay Act. Ultimately,
the Court determined that the portion of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (“FLSA”) constituting the Equal Pay Act was enacted
to prohibit discrimination in pay based on sex in furtherance of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
is a valid exercise of Congressional power.' After careful consider-
ation of the briefs submitted in connection with this issue, as well
as subsequent case authority,’ the Court remains confident that
the prior decision is correct and constitutes the law of the case. To
the extent that Defendants seek reconsideration of this Court’s
prior finding that the Equal Pay Act was properly enacted in
furtherance of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, such a request is denied.

However, Defendants now argue for the first time that
Congress did not clearly express its intent to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment in enacting the Equal Pay Act. As this
Court’s September 24, 1996 Order did not contain an in-depth
discussion of this aspect of the Seminole Tribe test, the Court
will elaborate now in the interest of making a complete record.

The intent to abrogate “must be obvious from ‘a clear
legislative statement.’ ” Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1123, quot-
ing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 111
S.Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991). Here, the Equal Pay Act itself contains
neither definitions nor enforcement provisions. Rather, such

Cf. Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487
(7th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act, “like other
antidiscrimination statutes,” was an exercise of Congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Commerce Clause).

> In Timmer v. Michigan Department of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir.
1997), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the holding of Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess
County Hospital, 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978), cited in this Court’s Septem-
ber 24, 1996 Order. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit found that, although not
expressly stated, Congress clearly and properly acted in furtherance of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in_extending the Equal Pay Act to state employces.
Timmer, 104 F.3d at 838-39.

3la

interpretative terms and mechanisms must be drawn from the
context of the remainder of the FLSA.

The term “employer: is defined in the FLSA to “include[] a
public agency,” which in turn is defined as “the government of
a State or political subdivision thereof” and any agency of a
State. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (x). The term “employee” is
defined to include “any individual employed by a State, politi-
cal subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency.
Id. § 203(e) (2)(C). Finally, the private enforcement provision
provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability prescribed . . .
may be maintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction
by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated.”

Timmer, 104 F.3d at 837-38. Such language makes it abundantly
clear that Congress intended to permit actions against states and
State agencies under the Equal Pay Act, thereby purposely abro-
gating sovereign immunity from suit.

Thus, the Court concurs with the other courts which have
confronted this question with respect to the FLSA and reached
the conclusion that the FLSA’s current definitional and enforce-
ment provisions, which are fully applicable to the Equal Pay Act,
as well as the accompanying legislative history, provide an unmis-
takably clear statement of Congress’ intent to abrogate the states’
sovereign immunity.’ Accordingly, the Court finds that Congress

>See also Brinkman yv. Department of Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 315 (1994); Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-
91 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1187 (1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d
1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 386 (1993). Further-
more, the Court notes that the FLSA definition of “employer” and enforcement
provisions at issue are substantially similar to those set forth in the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, in which context the Seventh Circuit held such provisions
to evidence Congress’ clear “desire to override the states’ sovereign immunity.”
Davidson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 920 F.2d 441, 443
(7th Cir. 1990).

32a

clearly intended to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from
suit through the Equal Pay Act, and the portion of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss which requests dismissal of all claims based on
the Equal Pay Act must be denied.

B. Claims for Monetary Damages

In their Objections to the Report & Recommendation,
Defendants also raise the new argument that Plaintiffs’ claims for
monetary damages under § 198la are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Defendants contend that § 1981a contains no indi-
cation of any intent to abrogate sovereign immunity with respect
to claims for compensatory and punitive damages, failing to
satisfy the Seminole Tribe standard for abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages, the
Court agrees with Defendants’ position. Under § 1981la, govern-
ments, governmental agencies or political subdivisions are ex-
pressly excluded from liability for punitive damages. 42 U.S.C.
§ 198la(b)(1). This interpretation is further supported by the
relevant legislative history, which reveals that the purpose of the
language in § 1981la was to establish that punitive damages are
not available against state and local government defendants. See
137 Cong. Rec. S15445-02, S15460, S15472-01, S15484,
H950501, H9527 (1991). Thus, the Court finds that Congress
made no unequivocal expression of intent to abrogate the states’
sovereign immunity with respect to punitive damages in enacting
§ 1981la, and the standard set forth in Seminole Tribe for a valid
abrogation of sovereign immunity has not been satisfied. Accord-
ingly, the portion of Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts IIT and IV of the
First Amended Complaint seeking punitive damages pursuant to
§ 198la are barred, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be
granted in this respect.

33a

Defendants also urge the Court to adopt their myopic view
with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages and
find no indication of Congressional intent in § 198la itself.
However, in considering the availability of compensatory dam-
ages, the Court finds that the appropriate analysis must reach
further. It is clear that Title VII permits recovery of front pay, 7
back pay, and other equitable relief against employers who violate
its provisions but does not, as enacted, provide an avenue of relief
with respect to monetary damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢e ef seq.
However, in 1991, Congress passed § 198la to expand the
remedies available to successful Title VII plaintiffs to include
compensatory damages. Blankenship v. Warren County, Virginia,
931 F.Supp. 447, 450 (W.D.Va. 1996), citing H.R.Rep.
No. 40(1), 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 65, 71 (1991), 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. While § 1981a does not technically amend
Title VII but, rather, stands alone as a separate statutory provi-
sion, this is not dispositive. To the contrary, the Court concurs
with the district court in Blankenship that an examination of
§ 198la necessarily involves reference to the definitional and
enforcement provisions of Title VII.

Section 1981a provides:

In an action brought by a complaining party under sec-
tion 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimina-
tion . . . prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the
Act ... and provided that the complaining party cannot
recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining
party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in additional to any
relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ... from the respondent.

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1). Although a complaining party includes
“a person who may bring an action or proceeding under Title VII

34a

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. § 198la(d)(1)(A),
the term “respondent” is not defined by § 1981a. However, by its
own terms, § 1981a looks to § 2000e to give meaning to its
provisions. Sattar v. Unocal Corp., 829 F.Supp. 331, 333 n.3
(N.D.Cal. 1993).

To determine who qualifies as a respondent, one has no
recourse but to look to § 2000e-5(b), which defines “respon-
dent” as, inter alia, an “employer.” .. . [I]t is beyond cavil
that employers under Title VII include state employers.
Therefore, § 1981a, which permits suits against respondents,
allows suits against state employers as well.

Blankenship, 931 F.2d at 450. In other words, the term
“*[r]Jespondent’ can only be interpreted by reference to § 2000e
and, thus, to the use of the word ‘employer’.” Sattar, 829 F.Supp.
at 333 n.3. i

Thus, the Court finds that by including the references to
Title VII in the text of § 198la and failing to provide an
alternative definition, Congress expressed its intent that Title VII
supply the definition of “respondent” for purposes of assessing
liability under § 1981a. This, in combination with the other overt
references to Title VII’s enforcement and definitional provisions
in the text of § 198la, evidences Congress’ intent in enacting
§ 1981a to supplement the remedies available under Title VII and
expand its prior abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, the legislative history of § 198la evidences Con-
gress’ understanding that the provisions concerning compensatory
damages would apply to the states. See 137 Cong. Rec.
H9505-01, H9527 (1991) (“By reference to sections 703, 704
and 706 of Title VII, the statutory language of section [1981a] is
explicit that compensatory damages are available against state
and local governmental defendants . . . .”); 137 Cong. Rec.
S$15472-01, S15484 (1991) (“[C]ompensatory damages may be
awarded against federal, state and local government

35a

agencies ....”). Accordingly, in applying the first step of the two-
part analysis set forth in Seminole Tribe, the Court concludes that
Congress has provided a ciear statement of its intent to subject
states to claims for compensatory damages pursuant to § 1981a in
federal court.

The second part of the Seminole Tribe analysis requires that
Congress act “pursuant to a valid exercise of power” in attempt-
ing to abrogate sovereign immunity. 116 S.Ct. at 1123. In
enacting § 1981a, Congress sought to expand the remedies availa-
ble to plaintiffs in Title VII actions. The Supreme Court has held
that Title VII constitutes a valid abrogation of the states’ Elev-
enth Amendment immunity because Congress acted in further-
ance of the Fourteenth Amendment, “which operated to alter the
pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.” Seminole Tribe, 116
S.Ct. at 1128; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666
(1976). Like Title VII, § 198la provides additional remedies
against discrimination in the workplace on account of sex, and
Defendants cannot reasonably argue that Congress lacks power to
provide remedies for discrimination under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As such, the Court finds that § 198la is an anti-
discrimination measure that may be viewed as an exercise of
Congress’ power to adopt legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law. Therefore,
under Seminole Tribe, sovereign immunity would not insulate the
State of Illinois from suit for compensatory damages pursuant to
§ 198la, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss | must be denied
with respect to Plaintiffs’ claums for compensatory damages in
Counts III and IV.

36a

II. Motion to Dismiss 2—Individual Liability
A. Equal Pay Act Claims

Defendants assert that the Equal Pay Act does not permit
suits against defendants in their individual capacities. Although
the Seventh Circuit has found that an individual employee may
be named in lieu of the employer in an Equal Pay Act claim,
- Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987), the
Court of Appeals did not decide the precise issue of whether an
individual employee may be named in addition to the employing
entity in this context. However, this issue has been addressed by
Other district courts in this circuit. In Pommier v. James L.
Edelstein Enterprises, the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen held that
the definition of the term “employer” as used in both the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII is “identical,” and case law in the Title VII
area directs that an individual supervisor cannot be held person-
ally liable for Equal Pay Act violations made as agent of the
employer. 816 F.Supp. 476, 481 (N.D.III. 1993), citing Weiss v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 772 F.Supp. 407, 412
(N.D.III. 1991). The district judge in Weiss likewise concluded
that allegations against an individual regarding actions that were
taken as an agent of the employer cannot result in individual
liability. 772 F.Supp. at 412. See also Jaskowski v. Rodman &
Renshaw, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 1094, 1098 (N.D.III. 1994) (recog-
nizing that neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay Act permits suits
against individuals. )*

“The Court also notes that although the decisions in Witham v. Regency
Savings Bank, 1995 WL 723888 (N.D.III. December 5, 1995), and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Home by Hemphill. Inc., 1995 WL
683502 (N.D.III, November 16, 1995), technically allow allegations of individ-
ual liability under the Equal Pay Act to survive a motion to dismiss, the Court
finds these opinions unpersuasive. In Witham, the Honorable Milton I. Shadur
expressly stated that the court would be willing to entertain a motion for
dismissal of the individual claim that was “properly supported by persuasive
authority.” 1995 WL 723888 at *1. Similarly, although leave to replead was

37a

Whereas the Equal Pay Act derives its definition of “em-
ployer” from the Fair Labor Standards Act and “includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer
in relation to an employee and includes a public agency,” 29
U.S.C. § 203(d) (emphasis added), “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person” is an employer under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(emphasis added). Although this Court does not agree that the
definitions of “employer” in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are
identical, the definitions may be functionally equivalent as ap-
plied. Furthermore, the remedies available under the applicable
sections of the Equal Pay Act include unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, reinstate-
ment, and promotion. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Like the remedies
available under Title VII, these are remedies which are more
likely provided by an employer rather than an individual, and the
language of the Equal Pay Act uses the term “employer” in the
context of the entity paying the disparate wages. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216(b), 206(d) (1).

Additionally, the Court’s review of the First Amended Com-
plaint reveals that Plaintiffs’ allegations against the named De-
fendants are directed toward actions purportedly taken by these
persons in their capacities as agents for Illinois State University.
Plaintiffs do not allege that any of these persons was acting
outside the scope of their official capacities at the time they
engaged in violations of the Equal Pay Act. Thus, there does not
appear to be a basis for imposing personal liability against these
individuals. Accordingly, this aspect of the Report & Recommen-
dation is rejected, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in
their individual capacities are dismissed from Counts I and II.

granted, the decision in Hemphill actually dismissed the claim of individual
liability as insufficient. 1995 WL 683502 at *3.

38a

B. Title VII Claims

In the Motion to Dismiss 2, Defendants also contend that
they cannot be sued in their individual capacities for violations of
Title VII and ask that Plaintiffs’ claims in this regard be dis-
missed. In the Report & Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge
concurs and recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Title VII claims against the individuals in Counts III and IV, be
granted. However, this Court’s review of the Amended Complaint
reveals that Counts III and IV, as amended, do not state any
claim against Defendants in their individual capacities. Accord-
ingly, the Court rejects this portion of the Report & Recommen-
dation. This aspect of Motion to Dismiss 2 will be denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Report & Recommenda-
tion is ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part. Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [#71] is GRANTED IN PART and DE-
NIED IN PART, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#18] is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.
The previously imposed stay is now lifted, and this matter is
referred to Magistrate Judge Kauffman for further proceedings.

ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1997.

MICHAEL M. MIHM
Chief United States District Judge

39a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dr. IRIS VARNER, ef al
Plaintiff

VS. > ~—s-s Case No. 95-1355

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, ef al
Defendants }

FILED
MAY 22 1997

JOHN M. WATERS, Clerk
U.S. District Court
Central District of Illinois

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Now before the court are the defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
(#18 and #71), which were revived by motion following the
filing of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The motions are
fully briefed, and oral arguments were heard on February 27.
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, the district judge has referred the
matter to me for a report and recommendation. After carefully
considering all of the submissions of the parties, and pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the motions be
granted in part and denied in part.

40a

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Iris Varner, Teresa Palmer, and Paula Pomerenke,
on behalf of themselves and a certified class, allege that defend-
ants have violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§1981),
and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§1983).

Plaintiffs are all tenure track faculty at Illinois State Univer-
sity. Defendants are Illinois State University, four officials of the
University, and members of the Board of Regents and its succes-
sor Board of Trustees in their official capacities. (The caption of
the complaint indicates that these individuals are sued in both
individual and official capacities. However, the body of the
complaint reveals that relief is sought against the individuals in
their official capacities only.)

~The complaint was originally filed in the Northern District of
Illinois. Upon a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer, Judge Zagel
granted the motion to transfer and denied the motion to dismiss.
A second motion to dismiss, filed after transfer to this court, was
granted in part and denied in part by Judge Mihm, after which
plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint.

The First Amended Complaint consists of five counts.
Counts I and II, against the University and the board members in
their official capacities, allege sex discrimination and retaliation in
violation of the Equal Pay Act. Counts III and IV are also against
the University and members of the board in their official capaci-
ties; these Counts claim violations of Title VII and §1981.
Count V alleges a violation of §1983 against the individual
defendants in their official capacity. After the amended complaint
was filed, Defendants moved to revive the previous motions as
they related to the amended complaint, a motion that was
allowed.

4la

Because one of the issues raised in the second motion to
dismiss was the constitutionality of the two statutes at issue, the
United States Attorney General was notified. Although the
United States subsequently declined to intervene, the Attorney
General requested that the court consider briefs on the same issue
that had been filed in another case currently pending in this court.

The constitutional issue raised is whether Congress properly
abrogated State immunity from Equal Pay Act liability under the
Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
US., 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). In an Order
dated September 24, 1996, resolving the second motion to dis-
miss, Judge Mihm ruled that Congress had properly abrogated
Illinois’ sovereign immunity and that the State was not insulated
from suit under the Equal Pay Act. Because this issue has been
resolved in this case by the District Judge, I decline to reconsider
the issue, believing the Order to constitute law of the case. To the
extent the defendants had wished to revive this portion of the
earlier motions, they may take up the Eleventh Amendment
issues in objections to this Report and Recommendation.

The other issue raised is whether suit against the individual
defendants is proper. That issue will be addressed in this Report
and Recommendation.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears from
the pleadings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544,
548 (7th Cir. 1993). Rather, it should be construed broadly and
liberally in conformity with the mandate in Rule 8(f).

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual

42a

allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn inferences
are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Hishon v. King, 467 U.S. 69 (1984);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); MCM Partners y.
Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1995);
Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992);
Yeksigean v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition, a
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recov-
ery under some viable legal theory. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos.,
727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984). If the plaintiffs claim as plead is
“without legal consequence,” dismissal is proper; Grzan v.
Charter Hospital, 104 F.3d 116, 119 (7th Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

A. Individual liability under the Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (EPA), is part of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The latter statute defines
“employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a
public agency .. .” 29 U.S.C. §203(d). “Public agency” means
“the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any
agency of . . . a State, or a political subdivisions of a State.”
29 U.S.C. §203(x). “Person’’ includes “an individual.” 29 U.S.C.
§203(a).

There are cases discussing individual liability under the EPA
but this is an issue not yet addressed by the Supreme Court. The
Seventh Circuit has mentioned it in dicta, Riordan v. Kempiners,
831 F.2d 690, 694-5 (7th Cir. 1987), but that reference scems to
cut against defendants’ position:

For reasons unclear to us, [plaintiffs] lawyer decided to
name .. . the director of the Department [] as the only

43a

defendant to her suit under the Equal Pay Act. The word
“employer” is defined broadly enough in the Fair Labor
Standards Act (of which the Equal Pay Act is an amend-
ment) to permit naming another employee rather than the
employer as defendant, provided the defendant had supervi-
sory authority over the complaining employee and was re-
sponsible in whole or part for the alleged violation.

Id. at 694.

The Northern District of Illinois has ruled on the issue
directly several times with inconsistent results. See, Jaskowski v.
Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 1094, 1098 (N.D.IIL.
1994) (finding individual liability under EPA); Pommier v.
James L. Edelstein Enter, 816 F.Supp. 476 (N.D.III.
1993) (same); and Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F.Supp.
407 (N.D.IIl. 1991) (same); but see, EEOC v. Home by Hemp-
hill, Inc., No. 95 C1138, 1995 WL 683502 (N.D.IIl. Nov. 16,
1995) (rejecting individual liability under EPA); and Witham v.
Regency Savings Bank, 1995 WL 680313 (N.D.IIl. Nov. 13,
1995) (same). See also, Bergstrom v. Univ. of New Hampshire,
943 F.Supp. 130 (D.N.H.1996) (rejecting individual liability and
criticizing Pommier as “thinly reasoned” and based in part on the
erroneous conclusion that “employer”’ is defined identically in the
EPA and Title VII). Cf, Freemon v. Foley, 911 F.Supp. 326
(N.D.IIl. 1995) (finding individual liability under Family and
Medical Leave Act, which adopts definition of “employer” from
FLSA).

In my opinion, the definition of “employer” in the FLSA
clearly and unambiguously includes individuals. The cases cited
above that have concluded differently have, as the New
Hampshire court pointed out, simply assumed that the statutory
definition is the same as is contained in Title VII and other
employment statutes. It is not. Under the EPA, an individual may
be held liable.

44a

However, that conclusion does not mean that all individual
co-employees, supervisors, officers and board members are ac-
countable under the EPA. To determine if any “person” is an
employer, courts look to such factors as the powers to hire and
fire, to supervise and control work schedules or conditions of
employment, to set rate and method of payment, and to maintain
employment records. See, Keenan v. Allan, 889 F.Supp. 1320
(E.D.Wash. 1995), affd. 91 F.3d 1275. Accord, Brock v. Hamad,
867 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1989) (power to hire and direct employ-
ees); U.S. Dept of Labor v. Cole Enter., Inc., 62 F.3d 775
(6th Cir. 1995) (CEO with significant ownership interest, signifi-
cant control of business operation, power to determine salaries
and to make hiring decisions is employer). These powers need not
be exclusively exercised by the “person” who has been sued.
Freemon, 911 F.Supp. 326; Reich v. Cole Enter., Inc., 901
F.Supp. 255 (S.D.Ohio 1993) aff'd, 62 F.3d 775. If a director or
officer has sufficient control over the entity that his decisions
determine if a violation of the FLSA occurred, then the FLSA
considers that “person” to be the “employer.” Dole v. Simpson,
784 F.Supp. 538 (N.D.Ind.1991).

I believe the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint contains
sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss. It may or
may not be possible for plaintiff to develop evidence as to each of
these individuals sufficient to withstand summary judgment, but
that is an issue for another day. I recommend that the motion to
dismiss the EPA claims against the individual defendants be
denied.

B. Individual Liability under Ti*le VII as amended

In Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995), the
Seventh Circuit clearly held that there is no Title VII liability for
individuals, unless the individual meets the statutory definition of
“employer” independently of the entity. Otherwise, under
Title VII, only the entity that is the employer is subject to suit.

45a

Accord, Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1996) (su-
pervisor does not fall within Title VII definition of employer);
Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996) (in
sexual harassment Title VII suit in which supervisor was sued in
official capacity, proper defendant was University not supervisor;
summary judgment for supervisor affirmed).

The individuals named as defendants in this suit are not
“employers.” See, Feltner v. Partyka, 945 F.Supp.1188
(N.D.II1.1996) (owners of company not “employers”); Fernandez
v. Wolff, 919 F.Supp. 1120 (N.D.III. 1996) (university president
and dean not “employers”); Vakharia v. Little Company of Mary
Hosp., 917 F.Supp. 1282 (N.D.IIl. 1996) (hospital officers not
“employers”); Whitechurch v. Apache Products Co., 916 F.Supp.
809 (N.D.Ill. 1996)(CEO not “employer”); Briggs v. North
Shore Sanitary Dist., 914 F.Supp.245 (N.D.IIl. 1996) (board of
trustees member not “employer”). They are therefore not subject
to suit under Title VII.

For this reason, I recommend that defendants’ motion to
dismiss the Title VII claims against the individuals in Counts III
and IV be granted.

C. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I recommend that defendants’
motion be granted as to the Title VII claims asserted in
Counts III and IV and denied as to all other issues. Plaintiff
should be directed to file an amended complaint. The parties are
advised that any objection to this Report and Recommendation
must be filed in writing with the Clerk within ten (10) working
days after service of this Report and Recommendation.
Fed.R.Civ.P.72(b); 29 U.S.C.636(b) (1). Failure to object will
constitute a waiver of objections on appeal. Video Views Inc. V.
Studio 21, Lid., 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).

46a

ENTER this 22nd day of May, 1997.

Ce

ROBERT J. KAUFFMAN
United States Magistrate Judge

47a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dr. IRIs I. VARNER, DR. TERESA M.
PALMER, and Dr. PAULA J.
POMERENKE, on their own behalf and
on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY;
ROBERT W. JEFFERSON, Dean;
DAVID STRAND, Provost; JOHN K.
URICE, Vice President and Provost;
THOMAS P. WALLACE, President; the
Board of Regents; including Davip T.
Murpuy; CAROL K. BURNS;
JOSEPH B. EBBESEN; CARL E. Kas-
TEN; NANCY J. MASTERSON;
PATRICIA A. MCKENZIE; JAMES W.
MYLES; BARBARA SCHEIBLING;
NIRANJAN SHAH; and WILLIAM
SULASKI, individually and in their
capacity as members of the Board of
Regents,

Defendants.

FILED
SEP 24 1996

d

> Case No. 95-1355

JOHN M. WATERS, Clerk
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

48a

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [#71] and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Prior Order and
for Extension of Time [#81]. For the reasons set forth below, the
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,
and Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.

Background

On March 13, 1995, three female professors employed at
Illinois State University (“the University’), Dr. Iris I. Varner,
Dr. Teresa M. Palmer, and Dr. Paula J. Pomerenke, filed a
Complaint against Illinois State University, four officials of Illi-
nois State University, the Board of Regents, and the ten members
of the board. The Complaint has been certified, as a class action
on behalf of any female teaching faculty at Illinois State Univer-
sity who was an Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, or full
Professor anytime during the period beginning with the 1982-
1983 academic year up to and including the present.

The named Plaintiffs have been employed by the University
as teaching faculty (in the case of one Plaintiff simce 1969).
Drs. Varner, Palmer, and Pomerenke allege that from the dates of
their respective employment, they have been paid less than their
male counterparts, given considerations of teaching experience,
the number of classes and class size they taught, academic papers
published, service to the University, and other matters to go to the
quality of their services. The Complaint further alleges that the
Defendants engaged in retaliation against female professors who
complained of the Defendants’ alleged employment practices.

49a

Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs brought this suit pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000, ef seq.; and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, et seq. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000,
et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, et seq.

Discussion

In resolving a motion to dismiss, this Court must consider all
well-pled facts as true and must draw all inferences in favor of the
non-moving ‘party. Bontkowski v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, 998
F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 602 (1993). In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts consider whether relief is
possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent
with the allegations in the Complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957). This Court will dismiss a claim only if it is
beyond doubt that no set of facts would entitle the Plaintiffs to
relief. Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.,
987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993).

On August 14, 1996, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss,
to which Plaintiffs filed a Response instanter on September 10,
1996. In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants make the
following arguments: (1) By adding a Defendant, Plaintiffs have
amended the pleadings and should file an amended complaint;
and (2) Plaintiffs cannot proceed in federal court on any claims
based on the Equal Pay Act because the State of Illinois has not
consented to suit. Each of these arguments will be addressed in
turn.

John Urice (“Urice’”’) was initially named as a Defendant in
this case. However, Judge James B. Zagel of the Northern

50a

District of Illinois dismissed Urice in an Order dated August 18,
1995 because Urice was not alleged to have participated in the
basic claims of gender discrimination and had been sued in his
individual capacity. Plaintiffs then filed a related suit making
similar allegations against Urice, Case No. 96-1355. On July 15,
1996, Plaintiffs filed a Motion before this Court to add Urice as a
Defendant once again. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion on
July 26, 1996, stating that Urice was to be added as a named
Defendant in this case, and Plaintiffs were to submit a voluntary
dismissal regarding the related case against Urice. To date,
Plaintiffs have taken no steps to implement this Court’s Order.

Plaintiffs have not only failed to file an amended complaint
adding Urice to the present case, but they have also failed to
dismiss the related action. Rather, Plaintiffs state that they are
exercising “an abundance of caution” and have moved to vacate
the order they requested adding Urice as a Defendant in order “to
keep the Title VII and § 1981 claims presented in 96-1355
separate from the issues raised by Defendants under the Equal
Pay Act.” (Plaintiffs’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Plaintiffs
have presented no logical or practical reason why two separate
suits should be conducted based on the same set of facts and
similar issues. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Prior
order is denied.

Defendants argue that adding a party generally requires an
amendment to the Complaint. In the present case, they claim that
the addition of Urice as a Defendant requires Plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint because there are no allegations currently
pending against him as a result of Judge Zagel’s previous Order
dismissing Urice from the case. Thus, without an amended
complaint, Defendants claim that it is not currently possible to
determine what allegations are pending against Urice.

5la

While notice pleading may not require a plaintiff to plead in
great detail, Rule 8 does require sufficient clarity to determine
that “‘the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2).

The primary purpose of these provisions is rooted in fair
notice: Under Rule 8, a complaint “must be presented
with intelligibility sufficient for a court or opposing party
to understand whether a valid claim is alleged and if so
what it is.”

Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d, 771,
775 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Court also noted
that a properly pled complaint allows the defendant to formulate
an answer. Jd. at 776. Additionally, “[w]here an amendment of
pleadings is necessary for purposes of clarity or otherwise, after
parties have been added, the complaint should be amended.” Fair
Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414, 415
(D.C.N.Y. 1972) (quoting Bartels v. Sperti, Inc., 73 F.Supp. 751
(S.D.N.Y. 1947)).

The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to add Urice as a
Defendant with the understanding that the claims raised in the
related case were similar to those raised in the present case and
involved the same set of basic facts. In doing so, the Court sought
to eliminate unnecessary duplication and maximize judicial effi-
ciency. However, Plaintiffs have not amended their Complaint to
add Urice. Based on Judge Zagel’s previous dismissal of Urice
from this case, principles of res judicata prevent Urice from being
called upon once again to answer the same Complaint. To the
extent that Defendants’ Motion requests that the entire suit be
dismissed on these grounds, that portion of the Motion to Dismiss
is denied. Nevertheless, the portion of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss requesting that Urice be dismissed for failure to file an
amended complaint stating any allegations against Urice is
granted. Plaintiffs have 21 days to file an Amended Complaint in
this case including allegations against Urice and to voluntarily

52a

dismiss the related suit, Case No. 96-1355, in compliance with
this Court’s July 26, 1996 Order.

Defendants ask the Court to confirm that Urice, like the
other Defendants in the case, may only be sued in his official
capacity. Judge Zagel’s August 18, 1995 Order held that Title
VII did not permit suits against supervisory employees and
dismissed all claims against Defendants in their individual capaci-
ties. However, Judge Zagel refused to dismiss claims against
Defendants in their individual capacities with respect to the Equal
Pay Act claims, with the exception of Urice. Thus, with respect to
Title VII claims, Urice, like the other Defendants, may only be
sued in his official capacity, but no such restriction would apply
with respect to Equal Pay Act claims or other claims that may be
made against Urice in the Amended Complaint.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants also allege that any
claims based on the Equal Pay Act or other parts of the Fair
Labor Standards Act should be dismissed because the State of
Illinois has not consented to suit in federal court and such a suit
therefore is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants
cite Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, US. ,
116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996), for the proposition that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over these claims because Congress did not expressly
waive the sovereign immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.

In Seminole Tribe, the Court examined a provision of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“the Act’), 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(3)(A), which requires that States negotiate in good
faith with Indian tribes. The Act authorizes an Indian tribe to sue
a State for breaching the duty to negotiate in good faith. 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). The Court found that Congress did not
have the authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Indian Commerce Clause and, therefore, federal courts
do not have jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Act

53a

because the State had not consented to suit. Seminole Tribe, 116
S.Ct. at 1132-33.

Prior to the expansive view of sovereign immunity expressed
in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court had recognized congres-
sional authority to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity when
legislation was enacted pursuant to either § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Interstate Commerce Clause, based on Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666 (1976), and
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273
(1989), respectively. Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1125. The
Court overruled its prior holding in Union Gas, stating that “both
the result in Union Gas and the plurality’s rationale depart from
our established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and
undermine the accepted function of Article III.” Jd. The Court
found that Congress could not overcome the jurisdictional bar of
the Eleventh Amendment when legislating pursuant to the Inter-
state Commerce Clause because “Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction” by Article III. Jd. at 1132. However, the Court did
not disturb its prior decisions with respect to legislation enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, “which operated to alter
the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved
by Article III] and the Eleventh Amendment.” Jd. at 1128. Thus,
in the wake of Seminole Tribe, the only source of congressional
authority capable of abrogating sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment that has been recognized by the Supreme
Court is legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

As noted by the Defendants, the Equal Pay Act is part of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”). Congress expressly

54a

stated that it was enacting the FLSA pursuant to its power under
the Commerce Clause:

It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through
the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate com-
merce among the several States and with foreign na-
tions, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to
eliminate the conditions above referred to in such indus-
ties [sic] without substantially curtailing employment
or earning power.

29 U.S.C. § 202(b); see also Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577
F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding that the Equal Pay Act is a
valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause).

Plaintiffs admit that the FLSA was enacted pursuant to
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause but argue that the
portion of the FLSA constituting the Equal Pay Act was enacted
in furtherance of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore should be undisturbed by Seminole
Tribe, citing Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital,
581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978), in support of this position. In
Marshall, the Sixth Circuit found that the Equal Pay Act amend-
ments to the FLSA were authorized by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Jd. at 119 (quoting Usery v. Allegheny County
Institution Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1582 (1977), and Usery v. Charleston County
School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977).

In Allegheny County, the Third Circuit rejected the proposi-
tion that because the Equal Pay Act is housed within the FLSA
and uses its administrative and enforcement mechanisms, it is
necessarily a Commerce Clause enactment. 544 F.2d at 155.
Rather, “the Equal Pay Act is a separate law, enacted at a
different time, and aimed at a separate problem—discrimination
on account of sex in the payment of wages” and “Congress has
§ 5 fourteenth amendment power to prohibit sex discrimination.”

55a

Id. The Fourth Circuit adopted this view in Charleston County
adding that, unlike the other provisions of the FLSA:

[T]he Equal Pay Act is an anti-discrimination measure;
and, as such, may be viewed as an exercise of Congress’
power to adopt legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law.

558 F.2d at 1170.

The Seventh Circuit has adopted analogous reasoning with
respect to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), which was also amended to authorize suits against
state, and local governments. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982). In Elrod, the
Seventh Circuit set forth the test for determining whether legisla-
tion is enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
“whether the objectives of the legislation are ‘within Congress’
power under the amendment.” 674 F.2d at 608 (emphasis in
Original ).

The Seventh Circuit found that despite the fact that the
ADEA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, it was
also a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Jd. at 603; see also, Davidson v. Board of Governors
of State Colleges, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). Prohibiting
arbitrary or discriminatory government conduct is the “very
essence” of the guarantee of equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604. This reasoning is also
consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court with regard to
Title VII in Fitzpatrick, which was affirmed in Seminole Tribe.
116 S.Ct. at 1125, 1128.

In light of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in connection with
the ADEA cases, this Court agrees with the position taken by the
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits that the portion of the FLSA
constituting the Equal Pay Act was enacted to prohibit

56a

discrimination in pay based on sex in furtherance of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, sov-
ereign immunity would not insulate the State of Illinois from suit
under Seminole Tribe. Accordingly, the portion of Defendants’
Motion requesting dismissal of all claims based on the Equal Pay
Act is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the portion of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [#71] requesting dismissal with leave to file
an amended complaint adding Urice as a defendant is
GRANTED and the portion requesting dismissal of the Equal
Pay Act claims is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Prior
Order and for Extension of Time [#81] is DENIED. Plaintiffs
have 21 days to file an Amended Compiaint in this case including
allegations against Urice and to voluntarily dismiss the related
suit, Case No. 96-1355. This case is referred to Magistrate Judge
Robert J. Kauffman.

ENTERED this 24th day of September, 1996.

MICHAEL M. MIHM
Chief United States District Judge

57a

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seg.

§ 203. Definitions

As used in this chapter—

+++ ¢ €

(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and
(4) the term “employee” means any individual employed by an
employer.

(2) In the case of an individual employed by a public
agency, such term means—

(A) any individual employed by the Government of the
United States—

(i) as a civilian in the military departments (as
defined in section 102 of Title 5),

(ii) in any executive agency (as defined in
section 105 of such title),

(iii) in any unit of the judicial branch of the
Government which has positions in the competitive
service,

(iv) in a nonappropriated fund instrumentality
under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces,

(v) in the Library of Congress, or
(vi) the Government Printing Office;

(B) any individual employed by the United States
Postal Service or the Postal Rate Commission; and

58a

(C) any individual employed by a State, political subdi-
vision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency, other
than such an individual—

(i) who is not subject to the civil service laws of
the State, political subdivision, or agency which em-
ploys him; and

(11) who—

(1) holds a public elective office of that
State, political subdivision, or agency,

(II) is selected by the holder of such an
office to be a member of his personal staff,

(III) is appointed by such an officeholder to
serve on a policymaking level,

(IV) is an immediate advisor to such an of-
ficeholder with respect to the constitutional or legal
powers of his office, or

(V) is an employee in the legislative branch
or legislative body of that State, political subdivi-
sion, or agency and is not employed by the legisla-
tive library of such State, political subdivision, or
agency.

s+ ¢ 2

(x) “Public agency” means the Government of the United
States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof;
any agency of the United States (including the United States
Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a
political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental

agency.

59a

§ 206. Minimum Wage

*+t & £
Prohibition of sex discrimination

(d)(1) No employer having employees subject to any provi-
sions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment
in which such employees are employed, between employees on
~ the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establish-
ment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar work-
ing conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (ili) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in
violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee.

§ 216. Penalties

*e¢2t

(b) Damages; right of action; attorney’s fees and costs;
termination of right of action

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or
section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may
be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any
employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a) (3) of this
title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of

60a

this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement,
promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability
prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained
against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be 2 party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing
to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in
which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring
an action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any
employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall
terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor
in an action under section 217 of this title in which (1) restraint is
sought of any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum
wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, as the
case may be, owing to such employee under section 206 or
section 207 of this title by an employer liable therefor under the
provisions of this subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is
sought as a result of alleged violations of section 215(a) (3) of
this title.

6la

CONSTITUTION
OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS

Date Effective
Adopted at Special Election on December 15, 1970
General Effective July 1, 1971

ARTICLE I. BILL OF RIGHTS

§ 18. No Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local
government and school districts.

62a

CHAPTER 775
HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT 5. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
ARTICLE 1. TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITIONS

775 ILCS 5/1-101

5/1-101. Short title

§ 1-101. Short Title. This Act shall be known and may be
cited as the Illinois Human Rights Act.

775 ILCS 5/1-102

5/1-102. Declaration of policy

§ 1-102. Declaration of Policy. It is the public policy of this
State:

(A) Freedom from Unlawful Discrimination. To secure for
all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable dis-
charge from military service in connection with employment, real
estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability
_ of public accommodations.

(B) Freedom from Sexual Harassment-Employment and
Higher Education. To prevent sexual harassment in employment
and sexual harassment in higher education.

(C) Freedom from Discrimination Based on Citizenship
Status-Employment. To prevent discrimination based on citizen-
ship status in employment.

63a

(D) Freedom from Discrimination Based on Familial Sta-
tus-Real Estate Transactions. To prevent discrimination based
on familial status in real estate transactions.

(E) Public Health, Welfare and Safety. To promote the
public health, welfare and safety by protecting the interest of all
people in Illinois in maintaining personal dignity, in realizing their
full productive capacities, and in furthering their interests, rights
and privileges as citizens of this State.

(F) Implementation of Constitutional Guarantees. To se-
cure and guarantee the rights established by Sections 17, 18 and
19 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(G) Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action. To establish
Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action as the policies of this
State in all of its decisions, programs and activities, and to assure
that all State departments, boards, commissions and instrumen-
talities rigorously take affirmative action to provide equality of
opportunity and eliminate the effects of past discrimination in the
internal affairs of State government and in their relations with the
public.

(H) Unfounded Charges. To protect citizens of this State
against unfounded charges of unlawful discrimination, sexual
harassment in employment and sexual harassment in higher
education, and discrimination based on citizenship status in
employment.

TTS ILCS 5/1-103

5/1-103. General definitions

§ 1-103. General Definitions. When used in this Act, unless
the context requires otherwise, the term:

(A) Age. “Age” means the chronological age of a person
who is at least 40 years old, except with regard to any practice

64a

described in Section 2-102, insofar as that practice concerns
training or apprenticeship programs. In the case of training or
apprenticeship programs, for the purposes of Section 2-102, “age”’
means the chronological age of a person who is 18 but not yet
40 years old.

(B) Aggrieved Party. “Aggrieved party” means a person
who is alleged or proved to have been injured by a civil rights
violation or believes he or she will be injured by a civil rights
violation under Article 3 that is about to occur.

(C) Charge. “Charge” means an allegation filed with the
Department by an aggrieved party or initiated by the Department
under its authority.

(D) Civil Rights Violation. “Civil rights violation” in-
cludes and shall be limited to only those specific acts set forth in
Sections 2-102, 2-103, 2-105, 3-102, 3-103, 3-104, 3-104.1, 3-105,
4-102, 4-103, 5-102, SA-102 and 6-101 of this Act.

(E) Commission. “Commission” means the Human Rights
Commission created by this Act.

(F) Complaint. “Complaint” means the formal pleading
filed by the Department with the Commission following an
investigation and finding of substantial evidence of a civil rights
violation.

(G) Complainant. “Complainant” means a person includ-
ing the Department who files a charge of civil rights violation with
the Department or the Commission.

(H) Department. “Department” means the Department of
Human Rights created by this Act.

(1) Handicap. “Handicap” means a determinable physical
or mental characteristic of a person, including, but not limited to,
a determinable physical characteristic which necessitates the
person’s use of a guide, hearing or support dog, the history of such

65a

characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the
person complained against, which may result from disease, injury,
congenital condition of birth or functional disorder and which
characteristic:

(1) For purposes of Article 2 is unrelated to the person’s
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position;

(2) For purposes of Article 3, is unrelated to the person’s
ability to acquire, rent or maintain a housing accommodation;

(3) For purposes of Article 4, is unrelated to a person’s
ability to repay;

(4) For purposes of Article 5, is unrelated to a person’s
ability to utilize and benefit from a place of public
accommodation.

(J) Marital Status. “Marital status” means the legal status
of being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed.

(K) National Origin. “National origin” means the place in
which a person or one of his or her ancestors was born.

(L) Person. “Person” includes one or more individuals,
partnerships, associations or organizations, labor organizations,
labor unions, joint apprenticeship committees, or union labor
associations, corporations, the State of Illinois and its im tcumen-
talities, political subdivisions, units of local government, legal
representatives, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers.

(M) Public Contract. “Public contract’ includes every
contract to which the State, any of its political subdivisions or any
municipal corporation is a party. .

(N) Religion. “Religion” includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, except that with respect
to employers, for the purposes of Article 2, “religion” has the
meaning ascribed to it in paragraph (F) of Section 2-101.

66a

(O) Sex. “Sex” means the status of being male or female.

(P) Unfavorable Military Discharge. “Unfavorable mili-
tary discharge” includes discharges from the Armed Forces of the
United States, their Reserve components or any National Guard
or Naval Militia which are classified as RE-3 or the equivalent
thereof, but does not include those characterized as RE-4 or
“Dishonorable”.

(Q) Unlawful Discrimination. “Unlawful discrimination”
means discrimination against a person because of his or her race,
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status,
handicap or unfavorable discharge from military service as those
terms are defined in this Section.

ARTICLE 2. EMPLOYMENT
775 ILCS 5/2-101

5/2-101. Definitions

§ 2-101. Definitions. The following definitions are applica-
ble strictly in the context of this Article.

(A) Employee.
(1) “Employee”’ includes:

(a) Any individual performing services for remu-
neration within this State for an employer,

(b) An apprentice;

(c) An applicant for any apprenticeship.
(2) “Employee” does not include:

(a) Domestic servants in private homes;

(b) Individuals employed by persons who are not
“employers” as defined by this Act;

67a

(c) Elected public officials or the members of
their immediate personal staffs;

(d) Principal administrative officers of the State or
of any political subdivision, municipal corporation or
other governmental unit or agency;

(e) A person in a vocational rehabilitation facility
certified under federal law who has been designated an
evaluee, trainee, or work activity client.

(B) Employer.
(1) “Employer” includes:

(a) Any person employing 15 or more employees
within Illinois during 20 or more calendar weeks within
the calendar year of or preceding the alleged violation;

(b) Any person employing one or more employees
when a complainant alleges civil rights violation due to
unlawful discrimination based upon his or her physical
or mental handicap unrelated to ability or sexual
harassment;

(c) The State and any political subdivision, munic-
ipal corporation or other government unit or agency,
without regard to the number of employees;

(d) Any party to a public contract. without regard
to the number of employees;

(e) A joint apprenticeship or training committee
without regard to the number of employees.

(2) “Employer” does not include any religious corpora-
tion, association, educational institution, society, or non-
profit nursing institution conducted by and for those who rely
upon treatment by prayer through spiritual means in accor-
dance with the tenets of a recognized church or religious

68a

denomination with respect to the employment of individuals

of a particular religion to perform work connected with the

carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, society or non-profit nursing institution of its
activities.

(C) Employment Agency. “Employment Agency” includes
both public and private employment agencies and any person,
labor organization, or labor union having a hiring hall or hiring
office regularly undertaking, with or without compensation, to
procure opportunities to work, or to procure, recruit, refer or place
employees.

(D) Labor Organization. “Labor Organization” includes
any organization, labor union, craft union, or any voluntary
unincorporated association designed to further the cause of the
rights of union labor which is constituted for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or
apprenticeships or applications for apprenticeships, or of other
mutual aid or protection in connection with employment, includ-
ing apprenticeships or applications for apprenticeships.

(E) Sexual Harassment. “Sexual harassment” means any
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any
conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
working environment.

(F) Religion. “Religion” with respect to employers in-
cludes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to

69a

reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective em-
plo

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1419%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
