# Brief for the United States — Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. Bestfoods

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1374%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 524 U.S. 924

## Text

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/ ® NOV 12 1997

No. 97-296 and 97-464 ERIK
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
PETITIONER

v.

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., CROSS-PETITIONER
v.

AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION AND CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a parent corporation can be held di-
rectly liable under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2), as an operator of its
wholly-owned subsidiary’s facility, based on the
parent corporation’s own actions in directing the
operation of the facility at the time of disposal of
hazardous substances (Question Presented in No.
97-296).

2. Whether, if the Court grants the petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 97-296, it should also review
the Sixth Circuit’s holding that Aerojet-General is
not liable as an “operator” (Question Presented in No.
97-464).

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Cordova Chemical Co. v. MDNR, 536 N.W.2d 860

(Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 554 N.W.2d

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Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ........... 5
United States v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 83 F.3d510

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United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113

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United States v. CPC, Int'l, Inc., petition for cert.

pending, No. 97-454 (filed Sept. 10, 1997) ............. 2, 3,8
United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796 (8th

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Statutes, regulations and rule:

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

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Statutes, regulations and rule—Continued: Page

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
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Miscellaneous:

H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ....... 5, 10

OES

Jn the Supreme Court of the Giited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-296

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
PETITIONER

Vv.

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

No. 97-464
CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC., CROSS-PETITIONER

v.

AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION AND CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

STATEMENT

The Michigan Department of Environmental Qual-
ity (MDEQ) seeks review of a decision of the United
| States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in

(1)

Dn eran Ee a

2

United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 113 F.3d 572
(1997) (en banc). See 97-296 Pet. App. la-42a. The de-
cision holds, among other things, that two corpora-
tions, CPC International, Inc. (CPC), and Aerojet-
General Corporation (Aerojet), are not liable to the
United States and the MDEQ, under Section 107(a) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. 9607(a), for the governments’ expenses in
responding to releases of hazardous substances from
a facility located near Muskegon, Michigan. The
United States has also filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari seeking review of that decision. United
States v. CPC, Int'l, Inc., petition for cert. pending,
No. 97-454 (filed Sept. 10, 1997). The United States’
petition sets forth the facts and procedural history of
the case in the lower courts. See 97-454 Pet. 3-14.

The United States and the MDEQ have raised the
same issue in their respective petitions for a writ of
certiorari. Each urges that the court of appeals erred
in ruling that a parent corporation that actively par-
ticipates in, and exercises control over, a wholly-
owned subsidiary’s facility does not qualify as an
“operator” of the facility. Compare 97-454 Pet. I, 15-
21, with 97-296 Pet. i, 8-19. The petitions differ, how-
ever, in that the United States seeks relief against
both CPC and Aerojet, while the MDEQ seeks relief
only against CPC. Compare 97-454 Pet. II, 20-21, with
97-296 Pet. ii, 4. The MDEQ’s decision to seek relief
against only one of the companies has prompted CPC
to file a conditional cross-petition urging that, if the
Court grants the MDEQ’s petition, it should review
Aerojet’s liability as well. See 97-464 Pet. i, 4-7.

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ARGUMENT

The United States submits this brief to explain
our understanding of the relationship between the
United States’ petition for a writ of certiorari, the
MDEQ’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and CPC’s
conditional cross-petition. As described below, the
United States and the MDEQ each have impor-
tant and complementary interests in the issue pre-
sented by their petitions, but, as a consequence of
CERCLA’s statutory provisions and the facts of this
particular case, their interests are not entirely con-
gruent. The United States and the MDEQ agree on
the question of law at issue here. The United States
suggests, however, as a matter of sound procedure,
that the Court should hold the MDEQ’s petition and
CPC’s conditional cross-petition pending the Court’s
disposition of the United States’ petition in No.
97-454, which places before the Court all of the rele-
vant parties and all of the relevant claims.

1. As noted in the United States’ petition (97-454
Pet. 3-6), Congress enacted CERCLA to create a
comprehensive federal program for addressing the
national problem posed by decades of improper dis-
posal of hazardous substances. CERCLA authorizes
the United States to undertake direct response ac-
tions to protect the public from the release and
threatened release of hazardous substances. See
CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. 9604. CERCLA also
grants the United States authority to issue orders
and to seek injunctive relief to compel persons to
respond to releases, or threats of release of those
substances. See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. 9606.

CERCLA provides a mechanism for financing
government-initiated cleanups of hazardous waste

sites and recovering those costs from the responsible
parties. Upon satisfying statutory conditions, the
United States may use the “Hazardous Substance
Superfund” as the initial source of funding for federal
response actions. See CERCLA §§ 101(11), 104, 42
U.S.C. 9601(11), 9604; 26 U.S.C. 9507. The United
States may then bring judicial actions against re-
sponsible parties under Section 107 of CERCLA to
recover the government’s response costs and replen-
ish the Superfund. 42 U.S.C. 9607.

The individual States have a significant role in
federally-financed cleanups. Of particular relevance
here, Section 104(c)(3) of CERCLA requires each
State to provide cost-sharing and other assurances
before any Superfund-financed remedial action may
take place. Section 104(c)(3) provides in relevant part:

The President shall not provide any remedial ac-
tions pursuant to this section unless the State in
which the release occurs first enters into a con-
tract or cooperative agreement with the President
providing assurances deemed adequate by the
President that (A) the State will assure all future

vintenance of the removal and remedial actions
provided for the expected life of such actions as
determined by the President * * * and (C) the
State will pay or assure payment of (i) 10 per
centum of the costs of the remedial action, includ-
ing all future maintenance [or (ii) 50 percent or
more in circumstances where the State operated
the facility at which the release occurred].

42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(3). In other words, the State is
responsible for (1) paying 10 percent of the costs of a
Superfund-financed “remedial action” at a facility
that has not been operated by the State, and (2) fully

>. =

funding the costs of “maintenance” of the remedial
action under CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. 300.435(f),
300.510; see also Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1543-1545
(D.C. Cir. 1998).

Section 104(c)(6) of CERCLA provides that, for pur-
poses of subsection (c)(3) cost share and maintenance
responsibilities, treatment measures necessary to
restore ground or surface water quality shall be
considered “remedial action,” rather than “operation
and maintenance,” for a period of up to ten years after
commencement of operations, or until the ground
or surface water quality is restored to a level that
ensures protection of human health and the en-
vironment.! 42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(6); see 40 C.F.R.
300.435(f)(3). Consequently, for groundwater treat-
ment remedies (such as the one being implemented at
the “Muskegon” site), the United States contributes
90 percent of the funding for the operation and main-
tenance of the groundwater treatment remedy, and
the State contributes the remaining 10 percent of the
funding, for up to ten years after the remedy becomes
operational. Thereafter, the State pays the full main-
tenance costs for the groundwater treatment mea-
sure.

2. The United States has incurred the bulk of the
response costs to date for cleaning up the hazardous
conditions at the Muskegon site. Nevertheless, the
MDEQ (which was formerly known as the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)), has also

1 The Section 104(c)(6) provisions were added to CERCLA
through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104(i), 100 Stat. 1620; see
also H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1, at 60, 70
(1985); Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d at 1544.

incurred significant response costs at the site. See,
e.g., 97-296 Pet. App. 82a-83a (stipulation and order en-
tered in April 1992 by the district court indicating
that the MDNR had incurred $1.65 million in past
response costs); see also 97-296 Pet. App. 80a. Both
the United States and the MDEQ will also incur
future response costs at the Muskegon site.

Most significantly, the MDEQ will be obligated
to pay its statutory cost-share of implementing the
groundwater treatment measure at the site. The
EPA has not yet declared the groundwater treatment
remedy “operational and functional.” See 40 C.F.R.
300.435(f)(3). Once it does so, Section 104(c) of
CERCLA will require the MDEQ to pay 10 percent of
the operation costs for up to ten years and to pay the
full costs of operation and maintenance in the ensuing
years. 42 U.S.C. 9604(c). The EPA currently esti-
mates that the long-term operation of that remedy
will last approximately 30 years and, therefore, that
the present value of the MDEQ’s financial commit-
ment at this site is likely to be substantial.

3. Section 107 of CERCLA provides that the
United States, as well as a State, may recover re-
sponse costs from the parties that Congress has
deemed liable under the statute. See CERCLA § 107,
42 U.S.C. 9607. In the instant case, the United States
filed a cost recovery action under Section 107 of
CERCLA to recover its response costs at the Muske-
gon site against CPC, Aerojet, Aerojet’s subsidiaries,
Cordova Chemical Company (Cordova/California) and
Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan (Cordova/
Michigan), and Arnold Ott. See 97-296 Pet. 5. The
MDEQ initially was drawn into this dispute be-
cause CPC and Aerojet filed contribution actions
against the MDNR. The MDNR later filed a counter-

7

claim against CPC and a cross-claim against Aerojet
and the Cordova subsidiaries for cost recovery and
contribution. Ibid.’

The MDEQ also has an unusual financial interest
in the instant cost-recovery action against CPC and
Aerojet that arises from the pre-litigation history_of
the Muskegon site. In 1977, Aerojet’s subsidiary,
Cordova/California, purchased the site and also en-
tered into an agreement with the MDNR under which
Cordova/California agreed to undertake certain clean-
up actions, the MDNR agreed to share in the funding
of those actions, and the MDNR agreed to indemnify
Cordova/California for other expenses. 97-296 Pet.
App. 105a-112a. The Michigan state courts have held
that because of that agreement, the MDNR must in-
demnify Aerojet and its Cordova subsidiaries against
any CERCLA liability that they may incur at
the Muskegon site. See Cordova Chemical Co. v.

2 CPC actually initiated the legal actions by filing contribu-
tion actions in anticipation of the United States’ suit. See
97-296 Pet. 4-5. CPC sued not only the MDNR, but also
Aerojet, the Cordova subsidiaries and ultimately CPC’s insurer,
while Aerojet and the Cordova subsidiaries filed claims against
CPC. 97-296 Pet. 5. The district court, which consolidated the
actions for resolution in three phases (liability, remedy, and in-
surance coverage, 97-296 Pet. App. 139a-140a), has not resolved
any of the contribution claims brought by the companies
against each other. Jbid.; see id. at 8la. The district court dis-
missed contribution claims brought by CPC and Aerojet against
the MDNR under CERCLA, holding that the MDNR was not
liable as an operator under Section 107(a)(2) or as an arranger
for disposal of hazardous waste under Section 107(a)(3). See
97-296 Pet. App. 127a-131a, 138a. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court’s decision regarding arranger liability, the
only claim against the MDNR that was appealed. See id. at

13a-14a.

8

MDNR, 536 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal
denied, 554 N.W.2d 319 (Mich. 1996) (Table).

The MDEQ’s petition indicates that the MDEQ
does not seek relief against Aerojet, but seeks review
of only that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment
pertaining to the liability of CPC as an operator of
the Muskegon site under Section 107(a)(2) of
CERCLA. See 97-296 Pet. ii, 4. As CPC’s conditional
cross-petition suggests, the MDEQ appears to have
limited its requested relief in that way to avoid sub-
jecting itself to potential liability as Aerojet’s indem-
nitor. See 97-464 Pet. 5 & n.4. The United States, by
contrast, has sought relief against both CPC and
Aerojet because, in the United States’ view, they are
both directly liable as “operators” under CERCLA.’
See 97-454 Pet. 20-21.

4. As the foregoing discussion indicates, the
United States has the predominant interest in the
outcome of this case under the CERCLA framework,
but the MDEQ also has substantial interests under
CERCLA. The MDEQ’s position in this case appears
to be affected, however, by its potential financial
obligations under an indemnity agreement with one of
the respondents, which has prompted CPC to file its
conditional cross-petition. The United States sub-

3 This does not mean, of course, that they ultimately would
be subject to the same monetary assessment for the conditions
at the Muskegon site. Under CERCLA’s statutory contribu-
tion provisions, if CPC and Aerojet are found to be jointly and
severally liable, they would be entitled as a matter of con-
tribution to obtain an equitable allocation of their respective
shares of the response costs. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42
U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”).

mits that, if (as we urge) the Court decides to grant
review in this case, it can most effectively accommo-
date the various interests of the parties by holding
the MDEQ’s petition and CPC’s cross-petition until
the Court resolves the issue set out in the United
States’ petition for writ of certiorari. That procedure
would place all of the relevant parties and claims
before the Court.

The United States’ petition and the MDEQ’s peti-
tion present an identical legal question for the
Court’s review. They differ only ir that the United
States seeks reversal of the court of appeals’ judg-
ment with respect to both CPC and Aerojet, while the
MDEQ seeks reversal solely with respect to CPC.
Hence, the MDEQ could pursue its specific claim
against CPC as a respondent supporting the United
_ States’ position under Rule 12.6 of the Rules of this
Court, while the MDEQ’s own petition remains pend-
ing for appropriate relief should that position prevail.
At the same time, the United States’ request for
relief against both CPC and Aerojet would also
satisfy CPC’s concern that the Court also consider
the potential liability of Aerojet. Because the United
States’ petition effectively places all of the relevant
parties and issues before the Court, there is no
need to follow the procedurally cumbersome course
of granting two petitions and a conditional cross-
petition to achieve the same result.*

* In light of CPC’s concerns about its liability vis-a-vis
Aerojet, we note that the United States had settlement dis-
cussions with the MDEQ and Aerojet before filing its petition
in this caSe, and those discussions are likely to continue. The
United States is, of course, receptive to resolving the liability
of potentially responsible parties through settlement on rea-
sonable terms and in accordance with the provisions of

10

CERCLA. Under CERCLA’s provisions, such settlements af-
fect the rights of other parties to contribution from the settling
parties. See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(2). In the
event that the United States, the MDEQ, and Aerojet should
ultimately reach agreement respecting Aerojet’s liability, the
proposed settlement agreement would be formalized in a
proposed consent decree that would be subject to public notice
and comment before receiving final approval. See CERCLA
§ 122(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9622(d)(2)(B); 28 C.F.R. 50.7.

Under the United States’ standard practice in CERCLA
cases, a proposed consent decree is lodged in the district court
in which the action is pending, and the United States publishes
a notice of the proposed consent decree in the Federal
Register. Persons who are not parties to the proposed consent
decree are given at least 30 days before its entry as a final
judgment to provide comments. The United States considers,
and files with the court, all such comments, and the United
States may withhold its consent to the proposed decree if the
comments “disclose facts or considerations which indicate that
the proposed judgment is inappropriate, improper, or in-
adequate.” CERCLA § 122(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9622(d)(2)(B);
see 28 C.F.R. 50.7. Furthermore, in approving a consent de-
cree, a district court must determine that the settlement is rea-
sonable, fair, and consistent with the purposes that CERCLA is
intended to serve. See, e.g., United States v. Charter Int'l Oil
Co., 83 F.3d 510, 515 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Hercules,
Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1992); see also H.R. Rep. No.
253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 3, at 19 (1985).

Hence, in the event that settlement discussions resume while
this case is pending before the Court and an agreement is
reached, CPC would have a full opportunity to comment on the
proposed terms and raise objections before the agreement is
entered as a final consent decree.

11

5 CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 97-296
and the conditional cross-petition in No. 97-464 should
be held and disposed of in accordance with this
Court’s disposition of the United States’ petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 97-454.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General

NOVEMBER 1997

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1374%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
