# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Georgia v. Carr

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1075%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 506 U.S. 801

## Text

preme Court, U.S.
FILED

| MAR 10 1993

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

ALEX STEINBERGH AND R. STANLEY BOWDEN,
TRUSTEES OF 16 CHAUNCY TRUST

Petitioners,

CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND THE RENT
CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE,

Respondents,

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

PATRICIA RANDALL FREDERICK B. Hayes, Ill
Hamilton, Dahmen & Randall Hayes, Clark, Hunt & Embry
73 Tremont Street 43 Thorndike Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02141
(617) 523-3716 (617) 494-4800

Counsel of Record

No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
October Term, 1992
ALEX STEINBERGH AND R. STANLEY BOWDEN,
TRUSTEES OF 16 CHAUNCY TRUST
Petitioners,
ae
CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND
RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Alex Steinbergh and R. Stanley
Bowden, Trustees of 16 Chauncy Trust,
petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review
the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court

of Massachusetts.

QUESTION PRESENTED
1. Whether an unconstitutional regulatory
taking of property occurs under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and the standards
established by this Court in Nollan v.

California Coastal Commission, when an

owner is not compensated for’ losses
sustained as a result of the application to
his property of a provision of a municipal
rent control ordinance later invalidated by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as
"not necessary" to the administration of

rent control Cambridge, Massachusetts.

a3

LIST OF PARTIES
The caption of the case contains the
names of all parties to the proceeding in
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

whose judgment is sought to be reviewed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ii
LIST OF PARTIES iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vv
OPINION BELOW 2
JURISDICTION 2

iii

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND ORDINANCE

PROVISIONS INVOLVED 3
Fifth Amendment 3
Fourteenth Amendment 3
Cambridge Rent Control Act 4
Cambridge Ordinance 5

Cambridge Ordinance, Subsectionc 1/2 8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 9
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 21

CONCLUSION 59

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management

Agency, 854 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.

1988) 52
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.

255 (1980)

30, 31, 34

Builders Service Corp. v. Planning and

Zoning Commission of the Town of
East Hampton, 208 Conn. 267;

545 A. 2d 530 (Conn. 1988) 54

Commercial Builders of Northern California
v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872,

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
U.S. ; 112 S.Ct 1997
(1992). 51, 52

Department of Natural Resources v.
Indiana Coal Council, Inc.
542 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1989) 55

Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
939 F. 2d 165 (4th Cir.
1991) cert. denied, U.S.
; 2a2 8.0e. J0ar
(1992) 38, 39

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987) 23

Vv

Flynn v. Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152; 418 N.E.

2d 335 (1981) 24, 25
Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Callahan, 464 U.S. 875,
appeal dismissed, (1983) 45-46
Grand Forks - Traill Water Users, Inc. v.

Hjielle, 413 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987)
appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1053
(1988) 56, 57

J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson,
121 N.H. 581; 432 A2d 12
(1981) 33

Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) 44-45, 46

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. 458 U.S. 419 (.982)
44, 45, 46, 53

McKay Creek Valley Assoc. v. Washington
County, 114 Or. App. 95; 834 P.2d
482 (Or. App. 1992) 57-58

Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City
of Durham, 844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir.
1988) 52

Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 502
(1928) 30

vi

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987)
41, 30, 33, 33, 33, 30, 48, 46, 99, $3

Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 30

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988) 42-43

Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131
(11th. Cir. 1992) 53-54

River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh,
326 N.C. 100; 388 S.E.2da 538

(N.C. 1990) 56

Saunders v_City of Jackson, 511 So. 2nd
902 (Miss. 1987) 55, 56

Seawall Associates v. City of New York,
74 N.Y. 2d. 92; 544 N.Y.S. 2d 542;
542 N.E.2d 1059 (1989),cert. denied,
493 U.S. 976 (1989) 47

St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of
New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
U.S. ,5 an.8 8B. Wes 2208
(1991) 52

vii

. v. City of Cambridge,
et al., 413 Mass. 736; 604 N.E. 2d
1269 (1992)
10, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 36, 37,
38, 40-41, 44, 51-52, 58

Steinbergh, et al. v. Rent Control Board of
j 406 Mass. 147;
546 N.E. 2d 169 (1989)
10, 16, 17, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,

34, 35, 43

United States v. General Motors Corp.
323 U.S. 373 (1945) 46
Yee v. City of Escondito, U.S. ;
112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992) 42, 45, 47

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 3, 18
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14 3-4
STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) 2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 28, a2

Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 79 18
viil

No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
October Term, 1992
ALEX STEINBERGH AND R. STANLEY BOWDEN,
TRUSTEES OF 16 CHAUNCY TRUST
Petitioners,
Vv.
CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND
RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Alex Steinbergh and R. Stanley
Bowden, Trustees of 16 Chauncy Trust,
petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review
the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court

of Massachusetts.

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts is reported at 413
Mass. 736; 604 N.E.2d 1269 (1992). A copy
of the opinion appears as Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
The opinion and order of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts were
entered on December 10, 1992. (Appendix A)
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a), because a title,
right, privilege or immunity was claimed
under the Constitution of the United States
by the plaintiffs below, which claim was
denied by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.

The petitioners claim that the

2

decisions of this Court are contrary to

that result and that the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts should be so
instructed.
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND ORDINANCE
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in relevant
part:
No person shall... be deprived
of...property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be
taken... for public use, without just
compensation.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in
relevant part:

Section 1. All persons born or

3

naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

The Cambridge Rent Control Act,
Massachusetts St. c 36 of 1976, provides
for the control of rents and evictions for
certain rental units within the city of
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Its text is set

out, in relevant part, in the Appendix as

4

Appendix C.
The Cambridge Removal Permit

Ordinance, Ordinance 966, as amended, is

intended tc prevent the "removal" of
"controlled rental units" from the
Cambridge rental market. It provides in

relevant part:

(b) Definitions. As used in this

section:
(1) "Act" means Chapter 36 of the
Acts of 1976, as amended from time to time.
(2) “Board" means the Rent Control
Board established by section 5 of the Act.
(3) “Controlled rental unit" means
any unit included in the definition under
section 3(b) of the Act.
(4) "Removal from the market" as

applied to a controlled rental unit,

5

includes but is not limited to:

(1) occupy, as an owner of a unit
which is a condominium unit, if the most
recent occupant was a tenant, even if the
prospective owner-occupant is the tenant,
unless the prospective owner-occupant is
the current tenant of the unit who has
continuously occupied it as a tenant since
before August 10, 1979 and intends in good
faith to occupy it indefinitely as its
owner; or

(ii) demolish, but no unit has been
removed from the market by demolition until
its physical destruction has begun; or

(iii) rehabilitate, repair or
improve, other than as required by the laws
of the Commonwealth or the city, in such a

way as to prevent residential occupancy

6

during the course of the rehabilitation,
repair or improvement. This provision
shall not apply to rehabilitation, financed
at least in part by Community Development
Block Grant funds, of a building owned by a
non-profit corporation and intended for
owner-occupancy by low and moderate income
persons; or

(iv) convert to a cooperative, as the
term is used in section 3(b) (4) of the Act,
all or part of any building which contains
any controlled rental unit; or

(v) cause a unit, not the primary
residence of a legal unit owner, to be
vacant for one hundred twenty (120) days or
more by refusing to rent or to offer for
rent such unit in good faith or, when a

unit is cited as unfit for human

habitation, by failure to perform repairs
required to restore said unit to habitable
condition. The existence of a vacancy for
one hundred twenty (120) days or more,
without a showing of good cause, shall
constitute removal from the market....

(c) Removal reguiated.

No owner or other person shall remove
from the market any controlled rental unit,
unless the Board after a hearing grants a
permit....

Subsection c 1/2 of Cambridge
Ordinance 966, as amended, regulated the
sales of certain rent controlled
condominium units. It provided in relevant
part:

(c 1/2) Prohibited acts by

developers.

After August 1, 1981, no owner of a
building for which a condominium master
deed has been recorded shall directly or
indirectly sell, or offer for sale, or
agree to sell any controlled rental unit
therein, unless the Board has granted a
removal permit for that unit, or unless the
sale or offer is to, or the agreement is
with, a current tenant of the unit who
holds an exemption certificate.... Nothing
in this subsection shall prevent an owner
of a building or any portion thereof from
conveying his entire interest in the
building in good faith to one purchaser,
who shall then be subject to the provisions
of this subsection to the same extent as
the original owner.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

9

This Petition seeks review of an
opinion and order of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts dated December 10,
1992. In that opinion the court held that
an invalid municipal rent control
ordinance, which prevented the petitioners
from selling their condominium units for
over two years, did not effect an
unconstitutional regulatory taking of that
property despite the court’s prior holding
that the disputed ordinance was invalid as
it was "not necessary" to the advancement

of rent control. Steinbergh et al v. _City

of Cambridge, et al., 413 Mass 736, 747;

604 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Mass. 1992)
(Steinbergh II). (Appendix A) Petitioners
contend that the decision is contrary to

the requirement that a governmental land

10

use regulation must "substantially advance"
a "legitimate state interest", Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825, 834 (1987), to avoid being an
unconstitutional taking of property.
Petitioners contend that as a matter of
constitutional law, a municipal ordinance
which has been judicially invalidated as
"not mecessary" to a legitimate state
interest cannot be deemed to "substantially
advance" that interest and hence avoid the
constitutional command of compensation for
loss.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background.

This case has its genesis in 1976. In
that year the Massachusetts legislature

adopted St. 1976, c.36, the Cambridge Rent

11

Control Act ("Act"), which allowed the city
of Cambridge to control rents and restrict
evictions for certain residential rental
units within the city. In 1979, citing a
continuing loss of rental housing, the
Cambridge City Council enacted the so-
called "Removal Permit Ordinance"

("Ordinance") which, inter alia, regulates

the conversion of controlled rental units
to condominiums; forbids the
owner-occupancy of any units so converted;
prevents the demolition of these units; and
prohibits owners from withdrawing these
units from the rental market for vacancies

of more than 120 days.' (Appendix C).

The Ordinance has subsequently
been codified as Cambridge City

12

In 1981, the city amended the
Ordinance by adding subsection ¢c 1/2. The
subsection provided that an owner of
controlled rental units which had been
converted to condominium units in a
building could not seli less than all of
his or her units in the building without
first obtaining a removal permit from the
Rent Control Board ("board"). The
provision was passed despite the existing
Ordinance and Act which, as noted above,

already prevented such units from being

Ordinance Chapter 8.44 et seq.
For purposes of continuity with
the decision in question it will
be referred to herein under its
previous style.

13

owner-occupied, demolished, kept vacant or
rented for more than the legal maximum
rent. The subsection did not affect the
status of the units under the Act or the
Ordinance in any manner, except to prevent
individual unit sales.

B. Procedural History

1._Steinbergh v. Rent Control Board of
Cambridge ("Steinbergh I"). (Appendix B).

In August, 1986 the petitioners
purchased rieey-thses controlled
condominium units in a building at 16
Chauncy Street, Cambridge. The petitioners
wished to sell separate units to individual
investors, not as a block, and requested
the board’s permission to do so. In the
administrative hearing the owners first

raised their claim that a refusal to allow

14

individual unit sales would be an
unconstitutional regulatory taking of their
property under the state and federal
constitutions and would violate their
rights to due process and equal protection.
On September 14, 1987 the board denied the
owners’ request.

In accordance with the Act, the
petitioners appealed the board’s decision
to the Massachusetts Superior Court for
Middlesex County. The petitioners argued
that the city lacked the statutory
authority under the Massachusetts Home Rule

Amendment, G.L. Const. Amend. Act. 2

Section 7 (5) as amended by Art. 8, to
enact subsection c 1/2 since it was not
"necessary" for the furtherance of rent

control. The petitioners also renewed their

15

constitutional claims. Steinbergh II,
supra at 740; 604 N.E.2d at 1273. The
Superior Court, without opinion, affirmed
the board’s decision. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, upon application
for Direct Appellate Review, reversed.

Steinbergh v. Rent Control Board of

Cambridge, 406 Mass. 147, 546 N.E. 2d 169

(1989) (Steinbergh I). (Appendix B)

In Steinbergh I the court agreed with
one of the owners’ ntigmanke that the city
lacked the statutory authority to enact
subsection c 1/2, since it was "not
necessary to the achievement of rent

control objectives." Steinbergh I, supra at

151; 546 N.E.2d at 172. The court opined
that the subsection did "absolutely

nothing to change the status of the units

16

whose sale it regulates", Id. at 152; 546
N.E. 2d at 172 and that its relationship to
rent control was "minimal". Id. The
subsection was declared "invalid". Id. at
155; 546 N.E.2d at 174. Since the matter
was decided on the basis of the city’s
authority, the court found it "unnecessary
to consider the other points argued", Id.
at 148; 546 N.E.2d at 170 including the
owners’ claim that the subsection and the
board’s actions had effected a taking of
their property.

a. Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge

("Steinbergh II"). (Appendix A).

After the decision in Steinbergh I, the

petitioners filed a second complaint in the
Superior Court against both the city of

Cambridge ("the city") and the board. In

17

the complaint, the owners alleged that the
board had wrongfully prevented them from
selling any of their 53 #£=individual
condominium units as separate units between
the board’s decision in September, 1987
until the decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court on November 20, 1989 in Steinbergh I.
The owners claimed that as a result they
were entitled to compensation from the city
for their substantial monetary losses
caused by the 26 month delay. The owners
sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 79
Claiming a temporary regulatory taking of
their property. The owners alleged
violations of the just compensation clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, and the Reasonable

18

Compensation Clause of Article 10, Part 1
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
The owners also claimed that the b ard’s
action violated their rights to due process
and equal protection under the respective
constitutions and that they were therefore
entitled to damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

The city and_ board (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the city")
answered and denied the owners’ right to
damages. After some discovery, the city
moved for Summary Judgment claiming that
there were no genuine issues as to material
facts and that the owners as a matter of
law could not prevail on their
constitutional claims. The city also
claimed that the complaint was procedurally

barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.

19

The owners filed an Opposition and
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The
owners Claimed that as a matter of law they
were entitled to a Partial Summary Judgment
Since the action by the city had violated
their constitutional rights. The owners
further contended that they were entitled
to a triai on damages.

The Superior Court denied the city’s
procedural arguments but agreed that as a
matter of law the owners were not entitled
to damages. Summary Judgment was entered

for the defendants. The owners’ cross-

motion was denied. Steinbergh IJ, supra at

739; 604 N.E.2d 1269.

The owners appealed. The city
cross-appealed the denial of their
procedural arguments. The matter was

accepted by the Massachusetts Supreme

20

Judicial Court upon the petitioners’
Application for Direct Appellate Review.
Id.

Upon review, the court upheld the
decision of the Superior Court. Steinbergh
II, supra at 739; 604 N.E.2d at 1272. The
court held on federal constitutional
grounds that the action of the board did
not require compensation under the Just
Compensation Clause or damages for
violations of due process or equal
protection. Steinbergh II, supra at 795;
604 N.E.2d at 1278.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE

DECISION OF THIS COURT IN NOLLAN V.

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION AS TO THE

APPLICATION OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL

21

ADVANCEMENT" STANDARD IN JUST COMPENSATION

CASES.

In Steinbergh II, the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court in its decision
opines that tthe Nollan decision does
require a heightened level of scrutiny in

regulatory taking cases, Steinbergh II,

supra at 745; 604 N.E. 2d at 1276. The
court, citing Nollan, formulates the test
as “whether the regulation advanced the
objects of rent control and did so

substantially." Steinbergh II, supra at

746; 604 N.E.2d at 1276. Having stated its
concurrence with the standard however, the
court does little more than analyze the
subsection as being rationally related to
rent control. That this is so requires

little more than a brief review of the

22

interplay of the Act, the Ordinance,

subsection c 1/2 and a comparison of the

language used in Steinbergh I and
Steinbergh II. °

With few delineated exceptions, all
rental housing in Cambridge which was

constructed before 1969 is subject to the

The court did not reach, but

* appears to assume, that if a
"temporary taking" were found,
the owners would be entitled to

damages under First English

Evangelical Lutheran Church

of Glendale v. County of

Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304

(1987). Steinbergh II, supra at

742, n.6; 604 N.E.2d at 1274,-

23

Cambridge Rent Control Act. The Act, which
was purportedly enacted to assure decent,
affordable rental housing, sets limits on
rent increases and evictions. In that
manner the Act seeks to regulate the cost
and availability of such rental housing.
Flynn v. Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152; 418 N.E.
2d 335 (1981).

However, prior to 1979, even under the
Act rental units could be legally "removed"
from the rental housing market by a variety
of means, e.g. demolition, commercial
rental, or combination of units. One
additional way in which units could be
"removed" was by conversion of the building
to the condominium form of ownership and
subsequent occupancy of the units by the
unit purchasers.

As a result, perceiving that this last

24

manner of “removal" was a _ threat to the
"rent control experiment", Steinbergh I,
supra at 154; 546 N.E.2d at 173, Cambridge,
in 1979, enacted the so-called "Removal
Permit Ordinance". With few exceptions the
Ordinance makes it illegal to owner-occupy
rent controlled condominiums or to withdraw
such units from the rental market for more
than one hundred and twenty (120) days.

Ordinance, § 1(b)(4). See Flynn, supra at

155-156; 418 N.E.2d. at 335. The
prohibition on such owner-occupancy was
purportedly enacted to prevent the
conversion of such units from rental to
owner-occupied housing. Id. at 159; 418
N.E.2a at 337.

Thus the stated purpose of the Act is
to assure the supply of affordable rental

housing by restricting rent increases and

25

evictions on those units controlled. Act
at § l. In contrast, the Ordinance seeks
to preserve the supply of rental housing
stock by assuring that the number of
controlled rental units may not be reduced,
by any means, including owner-occupancy,
unless with permission of the _ board.
Ordinance at § 1 (b) (4). The board, and
the city, were invested with a "panoply of
powers" to assure that no such units were
lost - including the right to seek
declaratory and injunctive relief as well

as criminal and civil penalties. Ordinance

at § 1(g); Steinbergh I, supra at 154; 546

N.E.2d at 173. In combination, the Act and
the Ordinance make it impossible to evict a
tenant for the purpose of owner-occupancy -
unless the board approves.

Subsection c 1/2, which was enacted in

26

- nn srl

1981, did “absolutely nothing to change the
status of the controlled units whose sale
it regulates." Steinbergh I, supra at 152;
546 N.E. 2d at 172. Those units remained
under rent control protection. The
subsection did not modify the provision on
illegal owner-occupancy. Such occupancy
remained forbidden under the other sections
of the Ordinance. All subsection c 1/2 did
was to require any owner of more than one
rent controlled, condominium unit in a
building which was subject to the
ordinance, to sell them all, at the same
time, to the same purchaser, unless the
board granted a permit otherwise. The
subsection had no effect whatsoever on the

rent control/ordinanced status of the

units. Ordinance, at subsection c 1/2.

In Steinbergh I, the Massachusetts

27

Supreme Judicial Court agreed and concluded
that the language and "regulatory mechanism
established in subsection c 1/2 is not

ess to the achievement of rent
control objectives." Id. at 151; 546 N.E.2d
at 172 (emphasis supplied). The court
stated that the subsection created no
change in the status of the units to which
it applied, much less a change deemed
"necessary -to the furtherance of rent
control." Id. at 152; 546 N.E.2d at-172.
The court also rejected the assertion that
subsection c 1/2 was "necessary" as an
enforcement tool:

"It is unreasonable to suggest that
Simply because eieletions might be
continuing to occur despite this
panoply of powerful enforcement

mechanisms, a new remedy, of a drastic

28

= a

~— a ae

nature, is ‘necessary’ to save the rent
control experiment from failure".
Id. at 154; 546 N.E.2d at 173.

Indeed, precisely because subsection c
1/2 was "not necessary" to rent control, it
was deemed to be an unauthorized and
impermissible municipal action and was held
to be "invalid". Id. at 155; 546 N.E.2d at
174.

In Steinbergh I the court never
reached the takings issue. Id. at 148; 546
N.E.2d at 170. However, when Steinbergh I
is analyzed according to Nollan, there can
be little doubt that subsection c 1/2
effected an uncompensated regulatory
taking.

The axiom that a governmental
regulation may be a taking if it fails to

substantially advance a legitimate state

29

interest has long been recognized by this

Court. See, e.g. Nectow v. Cambridge 277
U.S. 183, (1928); enn

Transportation Company v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, (1978); ins v j fe)

Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255; (1980). The concept
was most thoroughly explored in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, supra, where
this Court clearly stated that if a
governmental regulation did not
"substantially advance a legitimate
governmental interest" that failure in
itself was a sufficient basis to find a
taking. Id., at 834. The Nollan decision
was also explicit that the standard against
which "substantial advancement" was to be
measured was much higher’ than~ the
traditional "rational relationship" test

recited in due process and equal protection

30

cases. Id. at 834, n.3.

In Nollan , this Court held that the
California Coastal Commission’s
conditioning of a building permit upon the
granting of an easement was a violation of
Fifth Amendment rights and failed the
"substantial advancement" standard. Id. at
842. In explanation, this Court first
noted that a "land use regulation does not
en a taking if it "substantially

advance[s] legitimate state interest..."Id.

at 834 citing Agins, supra, at 260. (1980).
The case specified that there must be a
clear connection - a "nexus" - between the
state interest and the challenged
regulation necessary to pass constitutional
scrutiny; in effect the regulatory action
must serve the same purpose which is

alleged to be the "legitimate state

31

interest." Id. at 837. In addition, Nollan
specified that for there to be sufficient
connection between the regulation and the
state interest to be served, the regulation
must “substantially advance" that interest.
Id. at 834.

This Court warned that the phrase
"substantially advance" is not to be taken
lightly:

"As indicated earlier, our cases

Gescribe the condition for

abridgement of property rights

through the police power as a

‘substantial advanc(ing)’ of a

legitimate State interest. We are

inclined to be particularly careful
about the adjective where the actual

conveyance of property is made a

condition to the lifting of a land

32

use restriction, since in that context
there is a heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than
the stated police power objective."
Id. at 841. (emphasis in original). Nollan
held that if the restriction does not
"Substantially advance" the legitimate
state interest which forms the original
purpose of the restriction "the..««
restriction is not a valid regulation of
land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of

Secercacn...""* i4. at 837, citing J.£.D.

Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581,

584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981). The Court
expressly rejected the proposition that the
restriction need only be "rationally
related" to the state interest to survive

scrutiny. Nollan, supra at 834, n. 3.

33

In short, if, as in this case, a
regulation is being challenged as an "as
applied" taking of property, constitutional
doctrine, as stated in Agins and Nollan,
requires an examination of the relationship
between the challenged law and the state
interest sought to be advanced. If the law
does not "substantially" advance the state
interest, a taking has occurred even if the
owner has not been denied all use of his

land. Agins, supra at 260.

The court’s analysis in Steinbergh I

precludes approval under the ollan
standards. As noted above, instead of

finding that the subsection substantially

advanced rent control the court held that
the subsection produced "little incremental
enforcement advantage" for detecting

violations. Steinbergh I, supra at 153;

34

546 N.E.2d 173. To the contrary, the court
did not find that the subsection advanced
cone: control at all. Rather, the court
found that the subsection did "absolutely
nothing to change the rent control status
of the units whose sale it regulates." Id.
at 152; 546 N.E.2d 172. The subsection
"merely sets up another regulatory obstacle
which owners must overcome before they
legally may alienate their property." Id.
at 152; 546 N.E.2d 172.

The best that could be said for the
subsection was that it might ease the
enforcement of existing laws. But that
ease of enforcement was found by the court
to be unnecessary given the existing
enforcement powers contained in the

Ordinance. Id. at 154; 546 N.E.2d 169.

Under the Nollan analysis, the only

35

legitimate conclusion is that subsection c
1/2 did not substantially advance rent
control and resulted in a_e regulatory
taking.

Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court, in Steinbergh II, reached a
contrary result. In Steinbergh II the

"unnecessary" subsection was transformed
into a municipal enactment which
"substantially advanced the purpose of rent
control." Id. at 746; 604 N.E. 2d at 1276.
The analysis used by the court to reach
that conclusion reveals much about how the
court - despite its language to the
contrary - has failed to carry out the
Nollan admonition.

First, the court notes that the city
council in 1981 had information that some

owners of rent-controlled units were

36

en

unlawfully occupying them, and second, that

the task of monitoring new sales was

"intrusive" "impossible" and "financially
burdensome". Steinbergh II, supra at 746.;
604 N.E.2d. at 1277. Next, the court

opines that the city council could have
concluded that "developer sales are
tantamount to removal from the rental
market." Id. Therefore, by permitting only
group-~ sales "the ordinance provision
eliminated one circumstance (developer
sales) by which people had been owner-
occupying rent-controlljed condominium
units". Id. at 746-747; 604 N.E.2d 1277.
As a result the court states that the
subsection, though not "necessary" under
state law, is sufficient to meet the
heightened constitutional standard. Id. The

reason for approval is clearly stated:

37

"The elimination ... of conditions
that created a substantial risk of
difficult-to-discover violations of
an aspect of the rent control law
substantially advanced the operation
of the Cambridge rent control law."

Id. at 746-747; 604 N.E.2d 1269.
The court attempts to buttress its

conclusion by citing Esposito v. South

Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F. 2d 165.

(4th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, __ U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 3027, (1992) and finding
that the ordinance had the "essential
nexus" required by Nollan since’ the
ordinance provision was a "logical and
sufficiently well-founded approach to
dealing" with the problem of unlawful
occupation of rent-controlled condominium

units. Steinbergh II supra at 747, 604

38

N.E. 2d at 1277 citing Esposito, supra at
169.

This citation and reasoning are
misplaced. It is true that the precise
"fit" needed between a regulation and a
governmental goal has not been delineated

by this Court. Nollan, supra at 834. It

is also true that "a broad range of
governmental purposes and regulations
satisfies these requirements". Id. at
835.

But that analysis, as shown in

Steinbergh II, clearly misses the point.

The "nexus" requirement means that the

regulation must, at least in a rational

way, have some connection with’ the
legitimate state interest to be served.
Nollan, supra at 837. But a rational

connection between the regulation and the

39

goal is not enough. Once the connection is
established, by whatever test, the
challenged regulation must "substantially
advance" the goal to be served. Though a
rational relation between the subsection
and rent control is arguably present, the
more important and telling inquiry is
whether the regulation substantially
advanced the goal of rent control. More
than a "logical and well founded"
relationship must be shown. However, no
such "substantial advancement" is
demonstrated here and in fact, was not
found in Steinbergh I. Indeed, even the

court in Steinbergh II admits that all that

was produced by the subsection was an
"incremental enforcement advantage of the
regulation" which "was too little to

constitute a necessary provision for

40

regulating unlawful occupation of rent-
controlled units." Steinbergh II, supra at
747; 604 N.E.2d at 1277.

In effect, after comparing Steinbergh
I and Steinbergh II it is apparent that the
Massachusetts court concluded that the
standard for determining whether an
ordinance is "necessary" to the enforcement
of a statutory scheme is ae stricter
standard than whether an ordinance
"substantially advances" a statutory
scheme. This method of analysis is backward
and directly contrary to the Nollan
decision.

In addition, the language’ used,

clearly demonstrates that in Steinbergh II

the court, despite language to- the
contrary, simply examined the relationship

of subsection c 1/2 to rent control under a

41

“rationally related" standard. Nowhere
does the opinion demonstrate that rent
control was "substantially advanced" by
restricting bulk sales. In short, an
unnecessary incremental advancement of rent
control cannot be deemed to be a
substantial advancement. The court,
despite its pronouncement, has only found a
rational relationship. The decision fails
the constitutional test.

There is a second, fundamental flaw in
the court’s analysis which is whether the
subsection advanced a legitimate
governmental interest. If the real
governmental interest being served by the
Subsection had been rent control that
interest might have sufficed. Yee v. City

of Escondito, B.8. : 122 8.ct.

1522, 1529 (1992); Pennell v. City of San

42

Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12 (1988). However even
the Massachusetts court recognized that the
subsection did "absolutely nothing to
change the rent control status of the units
whose sale it regulates." Steinbergh I,
Supra at 152; 546 N.E.2d at 172. The
relationship between rent control and the
subsection was characterized in that
decision as "minimal". Id. at 155; 546
N.E.2d at 174.

The rea] governmental purpose served
by the subsection was to prevent "the
owners of rent-controlled condominium units
(from) unlawfully occupying them by various

devices." Steinbergh I, supra at 149; 546

N.E.2d at 171. The goal of the subsection
was to eliminate "one circumstance by which
people had been illegally (owner) occupying

rent-controlled condominium units."

43

Steinbergh II, supra at 746-747; 604
N.E.2d. 1269. The true purpose of
subsection c 1/2 was to preclude owner-
occupancy so that owners would be forced to
rent their apartments as required under
Ordinance section 1(b) (4) (v).

The problem, in a_ constitutional
sense, is that neither precluding owners
from occupying their own property nor
forcing them to rent is a legitimate
governmental interest. It is well
established that governmental regulations
or actions which terminate an owner’s right

to exclude third parties constitute a per

se taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419; 435-436
(1982). This prohibition extends to

governmental action which eliminates the

right to exclude the general public. Kaiser

44

Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979); Nollan, supra at 832. In Yee,
supra, this Court reaffirmed this
conclusion and was explicit that if a rent
control ordinance required an owner to rent
property, the ordinance would amount to a
"compelled physical occupation giving rise
to a right to compensation..." Id. at 1530-
1531. Such a law would amount to a per se
taking requiring compensation even if the
economic impact were "minimal." Loretto,

supra at 434-435.°

Chief Justice Rehnquist has
previously expressed his belief
that the Cambridge Ordinance
"effected a permanent physical
invasion" in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

45

This conclusion is based upon the
clearly established doctrine that property
rights in a physical thing are "the right
to possess, use and dispose of it."
Loretto, supra at 435, citing United

t Vv e -, 323 U.S.
373, 378 (1945). In addition "the right to
exclude [others is} one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as

property." Nollan, supra at 831; citing

Loretto, supra at 433; quoting Kaiser

Aetna, supra at 176. As this Court

suggested in Yee, a statute that requires

Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc.

v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 877,

appeal dismissed, (1983)
" (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

46

an owner "to rent his property or to
refrain in perpetuity from terminating a
tenancy" may constitute a physical taking.

Yee, supra, at 1529. See also Seawall

Associates v. City of New York; 74 N.Y. 2d.
92; 544 N.Y.S. 2d 542; 542 N.E. 2a 1059;

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989)
(mandatory rental requirement a per se
physical taking).

It has been well established that
government has no right, unless
compensation is paid, to require that
owners either suffer the intrusion of
others upon their property or be precluded
from occupying the property owned. It is
impossible, in light of these well-reasoned
and well-established precedents, to
conclude that subsection c 1/2 did not

effect a taking. The sole purpose of the

47

subsection was to impermissibly prevent
Owner-occupancy and therefore force owners
to comply with the similarly impermissible
requirement that they suffer tenancies they
do not want. There can be no "legitimate
governmental purpose" in requiring owners
to surrender long-protected property rights
without compensation.

Thus, subsection c 1/2 failed the
Nollan constitutional formula in two ways.
First, the subsection failed to
substantially advance the Act’s’ stated
governmental interest - the control of
rents and evictions. Second, the
governmental interests it purported to
serve - the mandatory exclusion of owners
from their property and the mandatory
rental of those properties - are not

"legitimate" unless compensation is paid.

48

The Massachusetts court, with its

conclusions to the contrary, is in error.

THE MASSACHUSETTS DECISION IS_ IN

DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF
SEVERAL UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS AND
SEVERAL STATE COURTS OF LAST RESORT
REGARDING THE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY TO
BE APPLIED IN REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES.

Supreme Court Rule 10(.1) provides in
part as follows:

A petition for a writ of certiorari

will be granted only when there are

special and important reasons

therefor.
Rule 10(.1)(b) contains the following
example of a type of "special and
important" reason which will be considered:

When a state court of last resort has

49

decided a federal question in a way
that conflicts with the decision of
another state court of last resort or
of a United States court of appeals.
The petitioners contend that a
regulation affecting rights in real
property must meet the criteria set out in
Nollan to avoid being an uncompensated
taking of property. Therefore, any such
regulation must "substantially advance a

legitimate state interest" to avoid the

compensation requirement. Nollan, supra

at 834. Furthermore, petitioners read
Nollan as requiring a higher level of
nove iy from that utilized in due process
or equal protection cases to determine if
the constitutional command has been met.
Though petitioners dispute whether the

Nollan test was properly used by the

50

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Steinbergh II (see Argument, supra), the
court did opine that the "substantial
advancement" test was appropriate in this
case, where it was claimed that a
regulation resulted in a non-physical

"taking". Steinbergh II, supra at 746;

604 N.E.2d at 1276. The position is at

odds with many federal and state courts.
This conflict is pointed out in

Steinbergh II itself where a citation to

Commercial Builders of Northern California

v._ Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, (9th Cir.
neeae, Gere. GCenied, vU.s._., i112
S. Ct. 1997 (1992) notes that the Ninth
Circuit has rejected the argument that
Nollan materially changed the level of
scrutiny to be applied to non-physical

takings cases. Steinbergh II, supra at

a4

745, n. 8, 604 N.E.2d at 1276.

Commercial Builders, in turn, notes
that three other circuits appear to have
rejected the proposition that Nollan
changed the level of scrutiny in non-
physical takings cases. St. Bart fe) ‘s
Church v. City cf New York,, 914 F.2d 348,

357 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, sub

nom., Committee to Oppose Sale of St.

Bartholomew’s Church v_ Rector, U.S.
; aah’ BS. 0G... 2403,. .63991).5 Ado Wi.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854

F.2d 732, 737 (5th Cir.1988); Naegele

Outdoor Advertising, inn. wv, ity oF

Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir.1988).

Commercial Builders suggests that the

Nollan standard applies only to physical
takings cases. This is particularly

erroneous since this Court has repeatedly

52

held that in cases of permanent physical
occupation neither public benefit nor
minimal economic impact obviates’ the
compensation requirement. Nollan, supra at

831-832; Loretto supra at 434-435. In any

event, a conflict between the Massachusetts
view and these four circuits now exists.
At least one other circuit would also

appear to be in conflict. In Reahard v.

Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992),

the court denied that the Nollan
substantial advancement test is ever used
in “just compensation" cases. In Reahard,
the court held that any "claim for ‘just
compensation’... necessarily involves a
regulation that substantially advances a
legitimate government interest..." and
that such claims "admit and assume that the

subject regulation substantially advances a

53

legitimate government interest." Id. at
1136. Therefore, according to the Reahard
court, the "only issue in just compensation
claims" is whether an owner has been denied
all use of his property. ld. This holding
is at wide variance both with Massachusetts
and the other circuits as well as with the
pronouncements of this Court.

The Steinbergh II decision is also in
conflict with numerous state courts.

The Connecticut Supreme Court in

Builders Service Corp. v. Planning and

Zoning Commission of the Town of East

Hampton, 205 Conn. 267; 545 A. 2d 530
(Conn. 1988), held that Nollan does not
apply in zoning cases. The court then .-
applied a rational basis standard in
determining a challenge to a minimum foot-

area ratio ordinance.

54

The Indiana Supreme Court in

Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana

Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E. 2d 1000 (Ind.

1989), when analyzing the effect of the
state’s restrictions on mining in an
archaeologically sensitive area, noted that
the Nollan case had not mandated a change
in the level of scrutiny for regulatory
takings claims or, at most, only required
enhanced scrutiny when a governmentally
mandated conveyance was involved.
Mississippi has also rejected the
"substantial advancement" test. In

Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2nd

902 (Miss. 1987), the Mississippi Supreme
Court, reviewing a zoning denial case,
opined that the Nollan decision did not
require an analysis of a city’s actions

beyond the question of whether the actions

a

were “arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable or whether...(they were)
fairly debatable." Saunders at 907, n. 3.

North Carolina has also failed to
follow Nollan in a case concerning land
development. In River Birch Associates v.
City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100; 388 S.E.2d
538 (N.C., 1990), a case concerning an
ordinance provision that an owner convey
certain common areas to a homeowners
association, the court, citing Nollan and
North Carolina law, found no taking where
the ordinance had a "rational relation" to
the stated open space goal and was
"reasonably related" to that goal. Id. at
121; 388 S.E.2d. at 550.

North Dakota also appears to have

misinterpreted Nollan. In Grand Forks -

Traill Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413

56

a

N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987), appeal dismissed,
484 U.S. 1053 (1988), the court opined that
Nollan was not applicable to ae case
involving a state highway setback law. In
its reasoning the court found the Nollan
analysis unhelpful since the case at bar
was not a "permanent physical occupation"

case. Grand Forks, supra at 347-348.

Finally, in Oregon, in McKay Creek

Valley Assoc. v. Washington County, 114 Or.

App. 95; 834 P.2d 482 (Or. App. 1992), the
court rejected a takings claim when the
building of a farm dwelling was conditioned
on a provision that the parcel be " planted
in perennials capable of producing upon
harvest, an average of at least $10,000 in
gross annual income." Id. at 97; 834 P.2d
at 483. The court rejected a takings claim

under Nollan and held that the proper Fifth

57

Amendment test was whether the “exaction"
bears a reasonable relationship to the
impacts and public needs that are created
by the activities regulated. Id. at 100;
834 P.2d at 485.

The Massachusetts formula is in sharp
contrast to that used by the noted federal
courts and many of the states as noted
above. In this case, which did not
directly involve a physical taking, the
court formulates the test as "whether the

regulation advanced the object of rent

control and did so substantially"
Steinbergh II, supra at 746; 604 N.E.2d at
746. The court appears to reject but

actually applies the erroneous conclusion
found in Commercial Builders et al that in

a non-physical taking case ae higher

standard of scrutiny is not required. The

58

Massachusetts decision, taken at its word,
is in direct conflict with the methodology
used by the lower federal courts) and
numerous other states. This conflict can
only be resolved by this Court.
CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be
granted.

Respectfully submitted,

“7 =

A 4 SO Me A
‘Patricia Randall —
Hamilton, Dahmen & Randall
73 Tremont Street

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 523-3716

Counsel of Record

_ — Ly 2 7 _
' Z
ff =z Ae
Frederick B. Hayes, III
HAYES, CLARK, HUNT & EMBRY
43 Thorndike Street
Cambridge, MA 02141
(617) 494-4800

59

APPENDIX A

Alex Steinbergh & another’, trustee’, vs.
CITY OF CAMBRIDGE & another.?

Middlesex. September 15, 1992 - December
10, 1992.

Present: Liacos, C.J., Wilkins, O’Connor &
Greaney, J.J.

Due Process of Law, Taking of property,
Rent Control.
Constitutional Law, Taking of property,
Equal protection of laws, Rent Control.
Municipal Corporations, Rent control.

Real Property, Condominium. Judgment,
Preclusive effect. Regulation.

Rent Control, Damages.

Civil action commenced in the Superior
Court Department on February 9, 1990.

The case was heard by Wendie I.
Gershengorn, J., on motions for summary
judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted a

R. Stanley Bowden.
Of 16 Chauncy Trust.
Rent Control Board of Cambridge.

We shall refer to the defendants
collectively as the "city."

request for direct appellate review.

Frederick B. Hayes, III, for the
plaintiffs.

Thomas J. Urbelis (Devra G. Bailin
with him) for the defendants.

WILKINS, J. In Steinbergh v. Rent

Control Bd. of Cambridge, 406 Mass. 147
(1989) (Steinbergh I), this court held that

the city of Cambridge lacked authority to
adopt a particular ordinance provision
intended to discourage the unlawful removal
of rent-controlled housing units from the
rental market. That provision, a
subsection of the city’s ordinance
concerning the removal of rent-controlled
properties form the market, purported to
restrict the sale of individual condominium
units by a property owner owning more than

one condominium unit in a building. The

2

ordinance provision denied such an owner
the right to sell individual condominium
units unless the rent control board of
Cambridge (board) granted a removal permit
or the tenant had an exemption certificate.
See id. at 148 n.4, for the specific
provision.

In this action, commenced on February
9, 1990, the same plaintiff property owners

who were involved in Steinbergh I seek an

award of damages against the city on the
theory that the city’s unlawful restriction
on their right to sell individual
condominium units was unconstitutional and
deprived them, to their financial
detriment, of the right to sell individual
condominium units from September 14, 1987

(the date the board denied the plaintiffs’

3

application for removal permits) until
November 20, 1989 (the date this court’s
opinion in Steinbergh I was released
invalidating the challenged portion of the
ordinance).

The plaintiffs’ principal contention
is that the city’s application to their
property of the challenged ordinance
provision constituted an uncompensated,
temporary regulatory taking of property in
violation of art. 10 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights and the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, applicable to the States through

the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.

R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
The plaintiffs further claim a denial of

due process of law under the State and

4

Federal Constitutions and a denial of equal
protection of the laws under the
Constitution of the United States.

Our discussion of these issues will
focus on the claimed violations of the
Constitution of the United States. The
plaintiffs do not argue that, acting under
the Constitution of the Commonwealth, this
court should apply any principle different
from that established by the United States
Supreme Court. In considering whether
economic regulations satisfy due process,
we have established no- substantially
Gdifferent guiding standards under’ the
Commonwealth’s Constitution than the
Supreme Court has established under the

Constitution of the United States. See

Opinion of the Justices, 408 Mass. 1215,

5

1217-1218 (1990); Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc.

Vv. oa egi n
Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 373 n.8

(1979). Although a similarity in standards
under the "takings" clauses of the two
Constitutions has not been as clearly
established, the plaintiffs have advanced
no reason why we should create takings
principles more favorable to them than
those developed under the Federal
Constitution.

The case was heard below on cross
motions for summary judgment.‘ The city

contended that the judgment entered in

Steinbergh I barred the plaintiffs’ claims

The plaintiffs sought judgment in
their favor on the issue of
liability only.

oe |

for damages and that, in any event, as a
matter of law there had been no
uncompensated taking or other
constitutional violation. There appears to
be no dispute of material fact. The motion
judge cojackes the city’s argument that the
plaintiffs were barred by the earlier
judgment from presenting their
constitutionally-based claim for damages
but agreed with the city that its conduct
did not amount to a taking or to a denial
of due process of law or equal protection
of the laws. We allowed the plaintiffs’
application for direct appellate review of
the judgment entered in the city’s favor.
We affirm the judgment.

The city’s rent control regulations

are authorized by St. 1976, c. 36. The

7

provision in the city’s regulations whose
effect is in controversy here was adopted
on June 29, 1981. The plaintiffs purchased
the fifty-three condominium unit property
at 16 Chauncy Street on August 1, 1986. On
September 14, 1987, the board ruled that
the challenged regulation barred the
plaintiffs from selling individual
condominium units without permission from
the board. During the period from
September, 1987, to November, 1989, the
plaintiffs received net income from the
property of approximately $120,000. After

Steinbergh I was decided in November, 1989,

the plaintiffs sold thirty-six units to
individual buyers and on December 31, 1989,
they still owned seventeen units. The

plaintiffs assert that the market value of

8

their condominium units declined between
September, 1987, and November, 1989, and
seek recovery from the city for their
losses, which they allege to be
approximately $374,000.

# The judge was correct in
concluding that this action was. not
foreclosed by the judgment entered in
Steinbergh I. The plaintiffs’ claim for
damages for a temporary regulatory taking
is precluded only if their damage claim was
or should have been adjudicated in

Steinbergh I. Heacock v. Heacock, 402

Mass. 21, 23 (1988).
The damages claim was not adjudicated

in Steinbergh I. The plaintiffs’ amended

complaint in Steinbergh I, which was an

action for judicial review of the board’s

9

|

determination, pursuant to St. 1976 c. 36 §
10, did not seek damages for a temporary
taking of their property or for any other
constitutional violation. That is hardly
surprising in an appeal from the decision
of an agency that had no authority to award
damages. The amended complaint alleged
that, in ruling that the regulation applied
to the plaintiffs, the board acted in
excess of its statutory authority and, in
various other ways, in violation of law
(including in violation of the State and
Federal Constitutions). By that complaint,
the plaintiffs sought a ruling that they
were exempt from the challenged ordinance
provision, but they made no allegation or
prayer concerning an award of damages

because of a taking of property or other

10

constitutional violation. Indeed, a
precise determination of damages prior toa
final ruling that the regulation was
invalid and that a damage award was
appropriate would not have been possible.
The plaintiffs were not obliged, at
their peril, to include in Steinbergh I a
Claim for damages based on constitutional

violations. Steinbergh I was an appeal

governed by G.L.c. 30A and based on the
agency record. This court expressly did
not reach the plaintiffs’ constitutional
challenges to the regulation, after
concluding that the regulation was beyond

the rent board’s authority. Steinbergh I,

Supra at 148. The plaintiffs were not
reasonably able to seek damages until the

basis for their takings claim was

11

established. Only after the regulation was
ruled unlawful could the plaintiffs
determine precisely whether the delay had
caused them any harm. A regulatory takings
Claim often is not mature until the
validity of the challenged local regulation
has been determined. See Corn v.
Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 587 (11th
Cir. 1990). Claim preclusion principles do
not reach such a contingent claim so as to
reguire that it be asserted in the first
action, if it is to be asserted at all.

2. The city did not make a taking of
property for which the plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation under the takings
clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions. The general concept that a

government regulation that “goes too far"

12

is a taking was expressed seventy years
ago. See Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The problem over
the years has been to define how far "too
far" is. When the claim is that government
conduct, not amounting to a _ permanent
physical occupation or confiscation of
property, involves a regulatory taking, the
analysis is peculiarly fact dependent,
involving "essentially ad hoc, factual

inquiries." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See

Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the
Commonw h, 403 Mass. 203, 209 (1988).
The alleged taring does not fall
within either of the two categories of
governmental regulatory action that

constitute compensable takings without

13

regard to other considerations, such as the
public interest sought to-be advanced. See
Lucas v. th oli s a
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). First, the
challenged regulation did not authorize,
direct, or otherwise involve a physical
intrusion into the plaintiffs’ property.

See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Loretto v.

Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.

419, 432-433 n. 9 (1982); Fragopoulos v.
ent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 408 Mass.

302, 309 (1990). Second, the challenged
regulation did not deny all economically
beneficial or productive use of the
plaintiffs’ interest in the property. See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
supra at 2893-2895; Agins v. Tiburon, 447

14

heen.

a

U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The plaintiffs
collected rents while they pursued their
challenge to the regulation; they received
a return on their investment during that
time; and they could seek rent adjustments
in order to obtain "a fair net operating
income for such units" (St. 1976, c. 36, §
7 {a]). This is not, therefore, a case in
which a local regulation denied all use of
the affected property while the lawfulness
of a regulation was being challenged. See
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482

U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (landowner who
successfully challenges, as a temporary
taking, land use regulation that denies all

use of its property may recover damages

15

incurred while challenge is pending.) °

If the governmental regulation neither
results in a physical invasion of the
property nor deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial use of land, there
may nevertheless be a regulatory taking
based, in part, on the regulation’s
economic impact on the property as a whole
and the extent to which the regailation has

interfered with a property owner’s distinct

The opinion of the Court of Appeals

of New York in Seawall Assoc.

v. City of N.Y., 74 N.Y¥.2d 92,
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989),

on which the plaintiffs rely,
provides no guidance on the proper
disposition of this case. For
example, there the cumulative
effect of the local regulations
amounted to a denial of
economically viable use of the
regulated property. Id. at 108-110.

16

investment-based expectations.° See Penn

We shall assume that this principle
applies to an alleged temporary
regulatory taking in the same
manner that it applies to an
alleged permanent regulatory
taking. The United States Supreme
Court’s Fifth Amendment takings
principles concerning permanent
takings are applicable to
regulatory conduct that temporarily
denies a landowner all use of his
property. See First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County o s Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). That
Court has not explicitly stated,
however, what principles apply when
a temporary regulatory taking does
not deny all economically
beneficial use of property. There
is authority that the two
situations differ for

_ takings purposes. See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353,
1367 (1989), cert. denied.
493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Shopco Group
v. Springdale, 66 Ohio App. 3d 702,
707-708 (1990). But see Poirier v

Grand Blanc Township, 167 Mich.
App. 770, 772, 777 (1988) (Michigan

17

; sp. Co. v. New York City, supra

at 124-125, 130-131; Flynn v. Cambridge,
383 Mass. 152, 160 (1981). Cf. Wheeler v.

Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982)
(ordinance that confiscated landowners’ |
right to construct previously authorized
apartment complex is an unconstitutional
taking). The challenged regulation did not
interfere with the plaintiffs’ investment-
based expectations. They acquired the
property when the regulation was already in
effect. See Fragopoulos v. Rent Control
Board of Cambridge, supra at 308. The

price that they paid for the property

should have reflected whatever adverse

+

Constitution).

18

impact the regulation had on the fair
market value of the property. See Flynn v.
Cambridge, supra at 160. Moreover, if, as
seems reasonably inferable, their
investment expectations were based on the
ultimate invalidation of the regulation in
a judicial proceeding, the plaintiffs’
investment expectations had to reflect the
anticipated delay in the litigation

process.’

It should not be assumed that we
would reach a different result if a
challenge were advanced by one who
had acquired an interest in rent-
controlled condominium units before
the adoption of the regulation.
Compare Flynn v. Cambridge, 383
Mass. 152, 160-161 (1981) (local
regulation barring owner of rented
condominium unit from occupying it
does not constitute taking, even as
to one owning and renting unit when
regulation enacted), with Polednak

v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge,

19

In considerable measure, the delay to
which the plaintiffs were subject is the
same kind of delay that commonly occurs in
seeking regulatory approvals or changes in
local ordinances and by-laws, which are
government-imposed processes that have not
traditionally been viewed as constituting
regulatory takings. See First English

Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

County of Los Angeles, supra at 321 ("We

397 Mass. 854, 861-862 (1986)
(taking involved if ordinance were
to be applied retroactively to
thwart condominium unit owner’s
primary expectation of continuing
to occupy it after she bought it).
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)
("the [local regulation] does not
interfere with what must be
regarded as [the landowner’s]
primary expectation concerning the
use of the parcel").

20

Ae nL.

of course do not deal with the quite
different questions that would arise in the
case of normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like which are not
before us"); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d
1124, 1126 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 851, 868 (1988) ("absent extraordinary
circumstances not presented by this case,
[even lengthy] delays in issuing a building
permit do not result ina ‘’taking’"). Cf.

Wilson v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 352, 355

(1992) (unreasonable agency delay in
processing application could peasibiy be
regulatory taking, where delay caused total
destruction of the property). The fact
that the plaintiffs could not’ make

immediate optimum use of their property

21

(and thus were unable to sell the units at
prices higher than those at which they
could sell them after the regulation was
invalidated) does not constitute a taking.
See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66
(1979); Flynn v. Cambridge, supra at 160-

161.

It is, of course, true that in this
case the delay was caused, not by the
necessity of obtaining mandated
governmental approvals, but by the process
of presenting a judicial challenge to a
municipal regulation. That legal challenge
resulted in invalidation of the regulation
as beyond the authority of the city to
adopt, but not because the municipal
regulation was unconstitutional as

violating rights to due process or equal

22

protection of the laws. Steinbergh I,
Supra at 148. The plaintiffs make no

reasoned argument that, simply because a
municipal regulation is not authorized by
law, there is a compensable temporary
taking of property, even though the
regulation restricts the sale of reduces
the market value of the property until the
regulation is successfully challenged in

court. See _Estate of Himelstein v. Fort

Wayne, 898 F.2d 573, 576-577 n.4 (7th Cir.
1990) (delay attributable to legal
challenge to zoning laws not a taking of
property).

The plaintiffs make an_- entirely
separate takings argument based on the
principle that a taking occurs when a land-

use regulation "does not’ substantially

23

advance legitimate state interests." Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). In
Ollan v. iforni s ‘n, 483
U.S. 825, 834-835 (1987), the Court
observed that "a broad range of
governmental purposes and regulations
satisfies these requirements." The Court
also noted that its "cases have not
elaborated on the standards for determining
what constitutes a ‘legitimate state
interest’ or what type of connection
between the regulation and the state
interest satisfies the requirement that the
former ‘substantially advance’ the latter."
Id. at 834. The plaintiffs do not argue
that the control of rents in Cambridge

through local regulation is not a

‘legitimate state interest. They focus

24

rather on the requirement that a land-use
regulation must substantially advance a
state interest and argue that the
restriction on the sale of their
condominium units as individual units did
not substantially advance the
administration of the Cambridge Rent
Control law.

The requirement that a regulation
substantially advance the state interest
may express a higher standard at least in
certain circumstances than the rational
basis test commonly applicable in deciding
whether an exercise of the police power

satisfies due process or equal protection

25

requirements. Id. at 834 n.3.° It may be
that the degree of substantially required
varies depending on the character of the
state’s interest in relation to the
reduction that the local regulation causes
in the value and quality of the affected

property. See id. at 841." L. Tribe,

But see Commercial Builders of
N.Cal.. v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d
872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992)
(rejecting argument that Nollan
materially changes level of
scrutiny; no Circuit Court of
Appeals has interpreted Nollan "as
changing the level of scrutiny to
be applied to regulations that do
not constitute a physical
encroachment on land").

Regarding the phrase "substantial
advanc[{ing]", the Court stated,
"We are inclined to be
particularly careful about the
adjective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a
condition to the lifting of a

26

ii ca

American Constitutional Law § 9-4, at 599
n.20 (2d ed. 1988). In the case before us,
unlike the Nollan case, the city has not
attempted to acquire an interest in land at
no cost to the public, nor has Cambridge
sought to regulate the plaintiffs’ property

for a reason that has no- connection

land-use restriction, since in
that context there is heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance
of the compensation requirement,
rather than the stated police
power objective." (Emphasis in
Original.) Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841
(1987). The Nollan case involved
a condition that landowners convey
an easement across their property
in order to obtain a permit to
construct a dwelling. The Court
concluded that the governmental
purpose in requiring the grant of
an easement was not the same as
the governmental purpose in
regulating construction of the
dwelling, and thus there was a
taking. Id. at 836-842.

27

whatever with the reason for rent control.

Uneer traditional principles, the
burden is on the plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the regulation fails to meet the
constitutional standard (that is,
substantially advance the regulation of
rents in the city). They rely heavily on
language in this court’s opinion in

Steinbergh I. There we were concerned with

whether the regulation was necessary to the
operation of the rent control law, in which
case the city would have had implied

authority to adopt it. Steinbergh I, supra

at 151. The city had express authority to
regulate rents but only such authority to
regulate the removal of units from rent
control as was necessary to regulate rents.

We conciuded that the ordinance provision

28

barring an owner of a group of condominium
units from selling individual condominium
units separately was not necessary for that
purpose. Thus the city had no implied
authority to adopt it. In the case before
us, the standard is not one of necessity.
The test is rather whether the regulation
advanced the objects of rent control and
did so substantially."®

We conclude that the challenged
ordinance substantially advanced the
purpose of rent control. We may rely on

information available to the city council

The plaintiffs, we think rightly,
do not contend that a local land
use regulation that is ultra vires
cannot, as a matter of law, be
viewed for takings purposes as
substantially advancing a state
interest.

29

at the time of its enactment of the

regulation."

Here the legislative record,
which includes a May 28, 1981, report to
the city council, indicated that owners of
rent-controlled condominium units’ were

unlawfully occupying them by various

It is not clear that for this
purpose we may properly attribute
to the city council any apparent
reasonable ground for its action,
at least if that action is not
contradicted by facts established
on the summary judgment record.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywall
Co., 366 Mass. 539, 541 (1974) (all
rational inferences are made in
favor of legislation whose
constitutionality is challenged on
due process and equal protection
grounds). Accord Matter of Tocci,
413 Mass. 542, 549 (1992). We
would be unwilling to attribute to
a yovernment agency a reason for
its action that is inconsistent
with its stated reasons for its
action. See Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm’n, supra at 840.

30

devices. The task of monitoring the
occupancy of newly-sold units was "an
intrusive and impossible task" and
financially burdensome. The report states
further that evidence supports a
presumption that "developer sales are
tantamount to removal from the rental
market." By permitting the sale of rent-
controlled condominium units on!’ as a
group, except a sale to a current tenant or
when the board grants a removal
certificate, the ordinance provision
eliminated one circumstance by which people
had been illegally occupying rent-
controlled condominium units. The
elimination, through the adoption of an
economically feasible restriction, of

conditions that created a substantial risk

31

of difficult-to-discover violations of an
aspect of the rent control law
substantially advanced the operation of the

Cambridge rent control law. '? The

12

After Steinbergh I had been
decided, by St. 1990 c. 52, § 2, in
language substantially identical to
the challenged regulation, the
Legislature enacted a restriction
on the sale of individual units by
an owner of a Cambridge building
with condominium units. In § 1 of
the act, the General Court made
legislative findings to the effect
that (a) it was necessary to
regulate the removal of controlled
rental units from the market, (b)
the city’s existing powers to
regulate such removals had proven
inadequate, (c) since Steinbergh I,
"hundreds of individual condominium
units have been transferred or sold
thereby creating a substantial risk
of the removal of controlled rental
housing units from the rental
market, and "(d) [1i]n order to
regulate such removals effectively,
it is necessary to regulate the
sale of condominium units by the
owners of rent controlled

32

incremental enforcement advantage of the
regulation was sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional standard. Although in

Steinbergh I that advantage was too little

to constitute a necessary provision for

regulating unlawful occupation of rent-

buildings, for the reasons stated
in the Report of the Cambridge City
Council Committee on Rent Control
dated May 28, 1981.

Although these findings made after
the adoption of the challenged
ordinance provision are not
supportive legislative history, the
do justify a judicial conclusion
that the ordinance substantially
advanced the operation of the
Cambridge rent control law. These
findings also make no longer
correct the dicta in Steinbergh I
that the challenged regulation had
"minimal" logical connection to
preserving Cambridge’s rental
housing stock. See Steinbergh v.
Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 406
Mass. 147, 155 (1989)

33

controlled units, it was nevertheless a
“logical and sufficiently well-founded
approach to dealing" with the problem for
us to find, under the Nollan case, that the
"essential nexus" between "the State’s
interest and its chosen means is present in

this case." Esposito v. Sout arolina

Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 169 (4th

Cir. 1991), cert, denied, ii12 8. Ct. 3027
(1992) (prohibition on building seaward of
setback line not taking when adopted to
ameliorate beachfront erosion).

3. We need not discuss at length the
plaintiffs’ claims that they were denied
due process of law and equal protection of
the laws. In light of our conclusion that
the challenged regulation substantially

advanced the object of rent control in

34

Cambridge, it is apparent that’ the
regulation satisfied the due _ process
requirement that a law have foundation in
reason and not be an exercise of power not
rationally related to a valid legislative

purpose. See Smithfield Concerned Citizens

for Fair Zoning v. Smithfield, 907 F.2d

239, 243-244 (1st Cir. 1990). See also

Commonwealth v. B.& W. Transp. Inc., 388

Mass. 799, 805, appeal dismissed sub nom.

Burke Distrib. Corp. v. Massachusetts, 464

U.S. 957 (1983); Gilbert v. Cambridge, 932

F.2d 51, 65-66 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 192 (1991). The facts that the
regulation was ruled to be beyond the
city’s authority to enact and that the
plaintiffs suffered a financial loss

because they could not sell individual

bt

condominium units while their judicial
challenge was in process do not amount to a
denial of substantive due process. There
is no claim that the city acted in bad
faith or with some other improper animus.
The regulation was of general application
and adopted before the plaintiffs purchased
their property.

For reasons already given, there was a
rational basis, for equal protection of the
laws purposes, in limiting the sale of
individual condominium units by a multiple
owner and not doing so as to an owner of
only one condominium unit. The purpose was
not to restrict sales of a _person’s
investment in one or more condominium units
but to reduce the illegal occupation of

rent controlled units by persons purchasing

36

such units. The two classes of owners were
treated equally because members of each
Class were free to sell their entire

ownership interests.

Judgment affirmed.

APPENDIX B

ALEX STEINBERGH & another’, trustees® vs.
RENT CONTROL BOARD of CAMBRIDGE & others. >

Middlesex. October 4, i989. - November 20,
1989.

Present: Liacos, C.J., Wilkins, Nolan,
Lynch, & Greaney, J.J.

Municipal Corporations, Rent Control. Real
Property, Condominiun. Rent Control,
Removal of unit from market. Cambridge.

The city council of Cambridge exceeded the
authority conferred on it by St. 1976, c.
36, when it adopted an amendment to the
city’s rent control ordinance providing
that no owner of a controlled condominium
unit or units may sell less than his entire
interest in such unit or units without
first obtaining a removal permit from the
rent control board. [149-155]

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior
Court Department on October 9, 1987.
The case was heard by Edward M.

1

2

3

R. Stanley Bowden.
Of Sixteen Chauncy Trust.

The residents of the building at 16
Chauncy Street in Cambridge.

Ginsburg, J. Yhe Supreme Judicial Court
granted a request for direct appellate
review.
Frederick B. Hayes, III for the
plaintiffs.
Patricia A. Cantor (Carol Wagner with
her) for Rent Control Board of
Cambridge.
James M. Shannon, Attorney General,
Robert L. Bowens, Evelynne L. Swagerty
& Harvey D. Cotton, Assistant
Attorneys General, for the
Commonwealth, amicus curiae, submitted
a brief.
Philip S. Lapatin, for Greater Boston
Real Estate Board, amicus curiae,
submitted a brief.

Jeffrey W. Purcell, for Massachusetts

Tenants Organization & another, amici

curiae, submitted a brief.

GREANEY, J. The plaintiffs, trustees
of a fifty-three unit building at 16
Chauncy Street in Cambridge which has been
converted to condominium units, appeal from
a summary judgment of the Superior Court.

That judgment upheld a decision of the rent

control board of Cambridge (board) which

2

determined that’ sales of individual
condominium units within the building are

subject to subsection c 1/2 of § 1° of

This specific provision is
entitled "Prohibited acts by
developers" and seads as follows:
"After August 1, 1981, no owner of
a building for which a condominium
master deed has been recorded shall
directly or indirectly sell, or
offer for sale,or agree to sell any
controlled rental unit therein,
unless the Board has granted a
removal permit for that unit, or
unless the sale or offer is to, or
the agreement is with, a current
tenant of the unit who holds an
exemption certificate. The Board
shall issue an exemption
certificate to any person who files
with it an affidavit in a form
prescribed by the Board, stating
that he is a current tenant of the
unit, that he occupied it as a
tenant before August 10, 1979, and
that he intends in good faith to
occupy it indefinitely as its
owner. No person shall file a
false affidavit under this
subsection. Nothing in

this subsection shall prevent an

3

Cambridge Ordinance 966 which regulates the
"Removal of Controlled Rental Units from
Market" (hereafter subsection c 1/2). The
plaintiffs make several arguments’ that
subsection c 1/2 is invalid. We agree with
their contention that subsection c 1/2
exceeds the board’s authority in the rent
control area, and, aS a consequence, is
invalid. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to consider the other points
argued.

This litigation is the latest in a

long series of disputes surrounding the

owner of a building or any portion
thereof from conveying his entire
interest in the building in good
faith to one purchaser, who shall
then be subject to the provisions
of this subsection to the same
extent as the original owner."

4

establishment and operation of rent control
ordinances in various communities of the
Commonwealth. See, e.g. Perry v. Boston
Rent Equity Bd., 404 Mass. 780 (1989);
Greater Boston Real Estate Bd., v. Boston,
397 Mass. 870 (1986); Bannerman v. Fall

River, 391 Mass. 328 (1984); Flynn v.

Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152 (1981); Grace v.

Brookline, 379 Mass. 43 (1979). The

instant chapter begins with the enactment
of St. 1976, c. 36 (Rent Control Act), a
special statute which granted Cambridge the
power to continue controlling rents and

evictions.?

Cambridge first enacted rent and
eviction control ordinances based
upon the authority conferred by St.
1970, c. 842. That statute, which
applied to all cities and towns
with populations in excess of

5

i

After several years of rent and
eviction controls had apparently proven
insufficient to preserve its stock of
affordable rental housing, Cambridge turned
its attention toward regulating removal of
controlled units from the rental housing
market. In 1979, the city council of
Cambridge (city council) adopted § 1 of c.
23 of the Cambridge City Code, Ordinance
966 (ordinance). Section C of the
ordinance provides that "[n]o owner or
other person shall remove from the market

any controlled rental unit, unless the

50,000, lapsed in 1976, and was not
renewed. The Legislature, reacting
to its perception that "a serious
public emergency exists with
respect to the housing of a
substantial number of

citizens in the City of Cambridge."
then enacted St. 1976, c. 36.

6

Board after a hearing grants a permit."
"Removal from the market" is defined to
include occupancy of a controlled
condominium unit by its owner, if the last
previous occupant was a tenant. Id. at § b
(4) (1). Thus, the ordinance generally
prevents the legal owner occupancy of
controlled condominium units in Cambridge.

In Flynn v. Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152

(1981), we upheld the ordinance against a
challenge that Cambridge lacked the
authority to adopt it. While we implicitly
found tnat St. 1976, c. 36 did not provide
express authority for removal provisions
such as those set forth in the ordinance,
we held that the grant of express powers in
that statute carried with it a grant of

those implied powers necessary to

7

effectuate the statutory goals. One such
implied power is the ability to regulate
removal of controlled units from the
rental housing market. Without this
implied authority, we reasoned, "the power
conferred by c. 36 to control rents would
steadily and irreversibly be transformed
into the power to control nothing." Id. at
159. We thus held that the power to
regulate removals from the rental housing
market was conferred by implication in the
Rent Control Act. Id.

Despite the strict removal regulations
imposed by the ordinance, the city council
concluded that the city’s housing stock
still was not adequately protected. In
particular, widespread owner occupancy of

controlled condominium units was said to

8

— |

exist, in direct violation of the
ordinance. In an attempt to remedy this
perceived problem, the city council amended
the ordinance on June 29, 1981, by addina
subsection c 1/2, the provision at issue in
this case. The amendment provides that no
owner of a controlled condominium unit or
units shall sell anything less than his or
her entire interest in such unit or units
without first obtaining a removal permit
from the board.® Subsection c 1/2 appears

to rest on an assumption that sales of

Subsection c 1/2 also permits sales
of less than an owner’s full
interest if the buyer is a current
tenant who has occupied the unit
Since August 10, 1979, and who
holds an exemption certificate.
This exception is not relevant to
the facts in the case and does not
affect our analysis of the appeal.

9

individual condominium units’ inevitably
result in illegal owner-occupancy of those
units.

The plaintiffs appealed to’ the
superior Court pursuant to St. 1976, c. 36
§ 10 (judicial review provision of Rent
Control Act.) After stipulating that there
were no genuine issues of material fact,
the parties each moved for summary judgment
pursuant to Mass. R.Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass.
824 (1974). The Superior Court judge
granted the board’s motion.

The plaintiffs desire to sell less
than all of their fifty-three units at 16
Chauncy Street to individual investors.
They requested a decision from the board
stating that their property was exempt from

subsection c 1/2. After conducting an

10

inquiry, a hearing examiner recommended
that the plaintiffs’ request be denied.
The board accepted this recommendation, and
concluded that the plaintiffs’ units could
not be individually sold.

We discern merit in the plaintiffs’
argument that the city council lacked
authority to adopt subsection c 1/2. Like
any other municipality in this
Commonwealth, Cambridge may exercise only
those powers which have been affirmatively

granted to it. See Atherton v. Selectmen

of Bourne, 337 Mass. 250, 255-256 (1958).

See also O.M. Reynolds, Local Government
Law, § 49, at 135-136 (1982). Thus, in
order for subsection c 1/2 of the ordinance
to be upheld as valid, there must be some

positive law source’ authorizing its

11

adoption.

The board relies primarily on the Rent
Control Act, as providing the authority
necessary to support the adoption of

subsection c 1/2. ’

We previously have
held that the ordinance can be supported
only by implied authority granted in the

Rent Control Act. See Flynn v. Cambridge,

supra. Thus, subsection c 1/2, an
amendment to the ordinance, canbe
supported, if at all, only by implication
from the authority conferred by the Rent

Control Act.

The board does not seem to rely on
the Home Rule Amendment, art. 89 of
the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution, as Cambridge did in
defending the ordinance in the
Flynn decision. Id. at 155.
Consequently, we have no occasion
to address any home rule issues.

12

The standard we must’ apply in
determining whether authority to adopt
subsection c 1/2 is to be implied from the
Rent Control Act is straightforward: such
power exists only if it is "necessary" to
carry the purpose expressed in the
authorizing statute. See Flynn v.

Cambridge, supra at 158; Greater Boston

Real Estate Bd. v. Boston, 397 Mass. 870,
877 (1986). This standard appears in the
Rent Control Act itself. See St. 1976, c.
36, § 5 (c) ("(tjhe rent control
board...shall recommend to the city, for
adoption, such ordinances as may _. be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this
act*). Thus, subsection c 1/2 can be
upheld as a valid exercise of implied

statutory authority only if restrictions on

13

piecemeal sales of controlled condominium
units are reasonably necessary to the
preservation of the affordable rental
housing stock in Cambridge.

Turning directly to the question
presented, we have little trouble in
concluding that the regulatory mechanism
established in subsection ¢ 1/2 is not
necessary to the achievement of rent
control objectives. We note initially, and
most importantly, that subsection c 1/2
does absolutely nothing to change the rent
control status of units whose sale it
regulates. The plaintiffs, for example,
own a structure containing fifty-three
controlled condominium units. Those units
are now controlled, and will remain subject

to the exact same controls regardless

14

whether they are sold off as a block,
individually, or anywhere in between.
Subsection c 1/2 creates no change in legal
status of the units to which it applies,
let alone a change that can be deemed
"necessary" to the furtherance of rent
control objectives. Rather, it merely sets
up another regulatory obstacle which owners
must overcome before they legally may
alienate their property.

The board set forth eight reasons in
support of its contention that subsection c
1/2 is necessary to achieve the objectives
of rent control. Of those eight, we find
only two which possibly could support the
rationale the board seeks: (1) that "[b]y
allowing a court to enjoin illegal sales,

offers, and agreements, [subsection c 1/2]

15

provides a meaningful civil remedy short of
an order requiring an owner-occupant to
vacate," and (2) that subsection c 1/2
“simplifies and reduces the cost of
enforcement by limiting proof of violation
to the recording of an initial unit deed
after July 1, 1981, without the issuance of
either a removal permit or an exemption

certificate. "® These claims amount to an

The remaining six reasons put forth
by the board - that subsection c
1/2 (1) does not further hurt
condominium owner occupancy; (2)
imposes a reasonable liability on
developers; (3) protects innocent
purchasers against unscrupulous
developers; (4) clears future
titles on resale; (5) prevents
harassment of older and poorer
tenants; and (6) prevents
fragmented ownership of rental
housing - are either at best only
minimally relevant to the goals of
the Rent Control Act or lack
adequate substantiation in the

16

assertion that the extra layer of
regulation added by subsection c 1/2 is
absolutely necessary to facilitate the
effective enforcement of other provisions
of the ordinance.

We regard this "ease of enforcement"
claim with suspicion, because we deem it an
attempt by the board to extract a second
level of derivative powers from the
language of the Rent Control Act. The
power to regulate removal at all, it will
be recalled, is derivative of the power to
regulate rents and evictions expressly
granted in the Rent Control Act. The board

now would have us hold that they also

record before us. We do not
consider any of them sufficieiit to
sustain subsection c 1/2.

17

possess additional implied authority to
enforce a power that is itself a creature
of implication. This, we conclude,
impermissibly extends the legislative grant
of power in the Rent Control Act beyond
what its language reasonably will bear.
Furthermore, even if we were persuaded
that enforcement considerations must
furnish some basis for upholding subsection
c 1/2, we are not convinced that the
alleged enforcement advantages are _ so
Significant that they outweigh the interest
of the owner in transferring ownership of
his condominium to an investor. The crux
of the board’s argument is that subsection
c 1/2 enables them to determine in advance
whether a proposed condominium sale is

likely to result in illegal owner

18

occupancy. To obtain the required removal
permit, a potential buyer would have to
appear before the board and c avince it
that his intention to maintain the unit as
rental property was bona fide. If the
board was not convinced, it simply would
deny the required permit, and monitor the
local registry of deeds to ensure that the
proposed sale was not consummated.

A close analysis of this argument
reveals that subsection c 1/2 actually
produces little incremental enforcement
advantage. First, the investigative forum
provided by the removal permit hearing
already is available under the provisions
of the ordinance. The board is empowered
to conduct hearings, to subpoena witnesses

and documents, and to require any owner or

19

landlord to furnish under oath ~= any
information or records the board deems
necessary. See ordinance, § 1 (5) (qd).
Subsection c 1/2, for the most part, merely
replicates these preexisting enforcement
mechanisms. Second, the alleged advantage
of having a "new" remedy - the power to
enjoin an illegal condominium sale before
it occurs - is not reasonably "necessary"
to fulfil the aims of the Rent Control Act.
The board already has at its disposal the
power to seek fines of $500 a day, or
imprisonment for up to ninety days, against
both illegal owner-occupiers and persons
who knowingly supply it with false
testimony or documents. See ordinance, §
i2 (¢é}. Furthermore, the board may seek

Civil damages, injunctive, or declaratory

20

relief against violators of the ordinance.
See ordinance, § 11 (d). It is
unreasonable to suggest that simply because
violations might be continuing to occur
despite this panoply of powerful
entoresnent mechanisms, a new remedy, of a
drastic nature, is "necessary" to save the
rent control experiment from failure. It
appears to us that the more likely solution
lies in more effective utilization of
existing enforcement procedures.

Our conclusion in this case follows
logically from our earlier holding in

Greater Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Boston,

397 Mass. 870 (1986). In the Greater
Boston decision, we invalidated a Boston
ordinance that banned the sale of

controlled rental units to investors who

21

had not first obtained a removal permit.’

The board attempts to distinguish
the Boston ordinance by noting
that, unlike subsection c 1/2, it
required that removal permits be
granted to any purchaser seeking to
occupy a unit as owner and denied
permits to any investor who planned
to continue renting the unit. This
fact, the board contends, explains
the Greater Boston court’s
inability to find any

logical nexus between the Boston
ordinance and the goals of rent
control.

We acknowledge this factual
distinction between the two
ordinances, but do not consider it
legally relevant. As we noted in
the Greater Boston decision, the
issue presented was "whether the
city has the authority to bar
{sales to investors], including
those that do not involve the
eviction of tenants nor the actual
removal of rental dwelling units
from the market"(emphasis added).
Id. at 874. Like Boston, Cambridge
is attempting to regulate the sales
of rental units, even when such
sales result neither in evictions
nor in removal of units from the
rental housing stock. And while

22

Like subsection c 1/2, the Boston ordinance
rested on implied rather than express
powers, and thus, to be valid, was required
to be “essential and not merely convenient
to the implementation of express powers
conferred by statute." Id. at 877. In
applying this standard, we concluded that
the ordinance had only "minimal" logical

connection to preserving Boston’s rental

the procedure selected by Cambridge
is a removal permit requirement
rather than an outright ban, the
practical effect of the two is
likely to be virtually

identical. A was noted in the
report of the committee on rent
control to the Cambridge city
council: subsection c 1/2 "would
tend to prevent future developer
sales to such investor, because
they would be unlikely to meet the
current tests for removal of such
apartment from the rent-controlled
market."

23

housing stock since it prohibited investors
"from obtaining permits necessary for
condominium...transfers even in
circumstances where no tenant is evicted
and no unit is in fact removed from the
rental market." i, ee. S876. This
reasoning applies with equal force to
subsection c 1/2. It follows from what
has been said that Cambridge exceeded the
authority conferred on it by the Rent
Control Act when it adopted subsection c
1/2 of the ordinance.

The judgment is’ vacated. A new
judgment is to be entered setting aside the
decision of the board because subsection c
1/2 has been determined to be invalid, and
adjudging that the plaintiffs’ property at
16 Chauncy Street in Cambridge, while

24

otherwise subject to the provisions of the
Cambridge rent control and removal
ordinances, is not subject to subsection c
1/2 of the removal ordinance.

So ordered.

APPENDIX C
Chapter 36
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the year One Thousand Nine Hundred

and Seventy-Six.

AN ACT ENABLING THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE TO
CONTINUE TO CONTROL RENTS AND EVICTIONS.
ENACTED MARCH 31, 1976.

Section 1. Declaration of Emergency.
The general court finds and declares that a
serious public emergency exists with
respect to the housing of a _ substantial
number of citizens in the City of
Cambridge, which emergency has been created
by housing demolition, deterioration of a
substantial portion of the existing housing
stock, insufficient new housing

construction, increased costs of

construction and finance, inflation, influx
of young people and the desirability of
Cambridge as a place to live, and which has
resulted in a substantial and increasing
shortage of decent rental housing
accommodations especially for families of
low and moderate income and for elderly
people on fixed income and abnormally high
rents; that unless residential rents and
eviction of tenants are regulated and
controlled, such emergency and the further
inflationary pressures resulting therefrom
will produce serious threats to the public
health, safety and general welfare of the
citizens of Cambridge and in other adjacent
communities; that such emergency should be
met by the Commonwealth immediately and

with due regard for the right’ and

responsibilities of the City of
Cambridge...

SECTION 3. Definitions. The following
words or phrases as used in this act shall
have the following meanings:

(a) "Rental units", any building,
structure, or part’ thereof, or land
appurtenant thereto, or any other real or
personal property rented or offered for
rent for living or dwelling purposes,
including houses, apartments, rooming or
boardinghouse units, and other properties
used for living or dwelling purposes,
together with all services connected with
the use or occupancy or such property.

(b) "Controlled rental units", all
rental units except:

(1) rental units in hotels, motels,

3

inns, tourist homes and rooming or boarding
houses which are rented primarily to
transient guests for a period of less than
fourteen consecutive days ;

(2) rental units the construction of
which was completed on or after January
one, nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, or
which are housing units created by
conversion from a non-housing to a housing
use on or after said date;

(3) rental units which a governmental
unit, agency, or authority either:

(i) owns or operates; or

(ii) regulates the rents, other than
units regulated:

(a) under the provisions of this
act, or

(b) under the provisions of any

4

other general or special law authorizing
municipal control of rental levels for all
or certain rental units within a
municipality; or
(iii) finances or subsidizes, if the

imposition of rent control would result in
the cancellation or withdrawal, by law, of
such financing or subsidy;

(6) the rental unit or units in an
owner-occupied two or cthree-family house;

(7) that the City of Cambridge may
exempt those rental units for which the
rent charges exceed limits specified by
said municipality; provided that in no
event shall more than twenty-five per cent
of the total rental units in Cambridge be
exempted under this subsection.

SECTION 5. Rent Board.

5

(a) This act shall be administered by a
rent control board...

(c) The rent control board, hereinafter
called the board, shall be responsible for
carrying out the provisions of this act...
shall promulgate such policies, rules and
regulations as will further the provisions
of this act, and shall recommend to the
city, for adoption, such ordinances as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this act.

(e) The board shall have the power to
issue orders and promulgate regulations to
effectuate the purposes of this act.

SECTION 9. Evictions.

(a) No person shall bring any action to
recover possession of a controlled rental

unit unless:

(1) the tenant has failed to pay the
rent to which the landlord is entitled;

(2) the tenant has violated an
obligation or covenant of his tenancy not
inconsistent with Chapter 93A of the
General Laws or this act, or the regulation
issued pursuant thereto, other than the
obligation to surrender possession upon
proper notice and has failed to cure such
violation after having received written
notice thereof from the landlord;

(3) the tenant is committing or
permitting to exist a nuisance in or is
causing substantial damage to, the
controlled rental unit, or is creating a
substantial interference with the comfort,
safety, or enjoyment of the landlord or

other occupants of the same or any adjacent

7

accommodations;

(4) the tenant is convicted of using
or permitting a controlled rental unit to
be used for any illegal purpose;

(5) the tenant, who had a written
lease or rental agreement which terminated
on or after this act has taken effect has
refused, after written request or demand by
the landlord, to execute ae written
extension or renewal thereof for a further
term of like duration and in such terms
that are not inconsistent with or violative
of any provision of Chapter 93A of the
General Laws or this act, or the
regulations issued pursuant thereto;

(6) the tenant has’ refused the
landlord reasonable access to the unit for

the purpose of making necessary repairs or

8

improvements required by the laws of the
Commonwealth, or any political subdivision
thereof, or for the purpose of inspection
as permitted or required by the lease or by
laws, or for the purpose of showing the
rental unit to any prospective purchaser or
mortgagee;

(7) the person holding at the end of
a lease term is a subtenant not approved by
the landlord;

(8) the landlord seeks to recover
possession in good faith for use and
occupancy of himself, or his children,
parents, brother, sister, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-
law; except that no action shall be brought
under this clause to recover possession of

a condominium unit from a tenant who is

9

sixty years of age or older and who
occupied the unit continuously since before
the recording of the master deed.

(9) the landlorc seeks to recover
possession to demolish or otherwise remove
the unit from housing use; and

(10) the landlord seeks to recover
possession for any other just cause,
provided that his purpose is not in
conflict with the provisions and purpose of
Chapter 93A of the General Laws or this
act, or the regulations issued pursuant
thereto. Recovery of possession in order
to convert an apartment unit to a
condominium unit shall not be a valid
reason to recover possession of a
controlled rental vnit.

(b) A landlord seeing to recover

10

possession of a controlled rental unit
shall apply to the board for a certificate
of eviction...

(c) A landlord who seeks to recover
possession of a controlled rental unit
without obtaining such certificate of
eviction shall be deemed to have violated
this act, and the board may initiate a
criminal prosecution for such violation.

(e) The provisions of this section shall
be construed as additional restrictions on
the right to recover possession of a
controlled rental unit. No provision of
this section shall entitle any person to
recover possession of such a unit.

SECTION 10. Judicial Review.

(a) Any person who is aggrieved by

any action, regulation or order of the

11

board may file a complaint for judicial
review against the board either in the
third eastern Middlesex division of the
district court department or the superior
court department for Middlesex county....
Judicial review of adjudicatory decisions
shall be conducted in accordance with
section fourteen of chapter thirty A of the
General Laws. Judicial review of
regulations shall be in accordance with
section seven of said chapter thirty A.

SECTION 11. Civil Remedies.

(d) The board may elect to enforce the
provisions of this act or any rule or
regulation promulgated hereunder either in
a civil action for damages for declaratory
or injunctive relief or under the

provisions of section twelve.

12

SECTION 12. Criminal Penalties.

(a) It shall be unlawful for any
person to demand, accept, receive or retain
any rent for the use or occupancy of any
controlled rental unit in excess of the
maximum rent prescribed therefor under the
provisions of this act or any order or
regulation hereunder promulgated, or
otherwise to do or omit to do any action in
violation of the provisions of this act or
any order or regulation hereunder
promulgated.

(c) Whoever willfully violates any
provision of this act or any rule or
regulation hereunder promulgated, or
whoever knowingly makes any false statement
in any testimony before the rent board or

whoever knowingly supplies the rent board

13

with any false information shall be
punished by a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not
more than ninety days or both; provided,
however that in the case of a second or
subsequent offense, such person shall be
punished by a fine of not more than three
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not

more than one year, or both.

14

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_1075%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
