# Opposition Brief — Lastimosa v. Hughes Aircraft Co.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0703%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 486 U.S. 1050

## Text

No. 87-1263
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM. 1987

CATALINO LASTIMOSA,
Petitioner,

vs.

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY
AND JACK CURTIS,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

“PETER H. BENZIAN
DEANNE P. GEORGE
KRISTINE P. NESTHUS
LATHAM & WATKINS
Suite 2100
701 “B” Street
San Diego, California 92101
(619) 236-1234
Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

Lawyers Brief Service / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the court below err in affirming the district
court’s judgment for respondents on the ground that
petitioner’s wrongful discharge claim under state law was
essentially a claim that he was discharged in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement, and thus was preempted
by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185, where petitioner claimed he was discharged in
violation of safety provisions contained in a collective
bargaining agreement?

2. Did the court below err in holding that the district
court need not imply an amendment of petitioner’s
complaint to allege an essential element of a claim under
federal law, where petitioner represented to the district
court that he made no such allegation and did not seek
leave to amend in the district court?

aad
RULE 28.1 LISTING

Parties to the proceedings below were: plaintiff-appellant
Catalino Lastimosa and defendants-appellees Hughes
Aircraft Company (““HAC’’) and John Curtis. The parent
company of HAC is GM Hughes Electronics Corporation,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors Corporation.
HAC’s subsidiaries (except wholly-owned subsidiaries) and
affiliates presently include ACCSO S. A.; Alliance
Development Corporation; Atlantic Satellites Ltd.;
ELEKLUFT Elektronik-und Luftfahrtgerate GmbH;
ELTRO GmbH; HBH Services Corporation; Japan
Communications Satellite Company, Inc.; Japan Satellite
Communications Network Corporation L-T Ranches, Inc.;
Nippon Avionics Co., Ltd.; and UKADGE Systems
Limited. HAC also has an interest in the following joint
venture partnerships: AMRAAM International Licensing
Company; Earth Observation Satellite Company; HBH
Company, a Joint Venture of Hughes Aircraft Company,
The Bendix Corporation and Holmes & Narver, Inc.; HKV,
a Joint Venture of International Electronics Systems, Inc.
and A/S Kongsberg Vaapenfrabrikk; Hughes Information
Systems, a Partnership of International Electronics
Systems, Inc. and Hughes Systems Management Interna-
tional; MET, a Joint Venture of Hughes Aircraft Company
and Texas Instruments Incorporated; Project 436 Joint
Ventures (two classified joint ventures); T.A.D. Communi-
cations Company, a Joint Venture of Hughes Aircraft
Company and the International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation; T.A.D. Communications Company Interna-
tional, a Joint Venture of International Electronics Systems,
Inc.. AVCRON; and Western Alliance Air Defense.

—iii—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
eR OE EEN RIED conecnessvcyscacaoencnacasaseccnrseccesseensesees 1
NT Te cu cuncinsdpanconwevsenavecaionenessdiveedsuase il
I DB MOD oo ciccscccsasecsssccvssscecocssssecnnaccanses vi
OPINION AND JUDGMENT BELOW ....................0...... 1
es eee ee OEP Ee BEM YP, V ECLD on... ..ccccccsscccncescecess 2
:: Ee GPE BEE CARE. nc ccccnccccscccssesccsssnccscens 2
Sy ig AYR BS ee Ce) E | ® 3
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................... 6
Il. REASONS REVIEW SHOULD BE

inal dusilnaseeaeusatanneneniivasicnace 11

A. LASTIMOSA’S CLAIM UNDER

STATE LAW IS PREEMPTED BY

SECTION 301 BECAUSE IT IS ESSEN-

TIALLY A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF

THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
sec cnanianionunionninaebodeuciies 11

1. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This
Action Does Not Conflict With The
EPECISINS CE EER COUAEE. ...0.04..000.ccccsccccccccsce..s 11

peat Seem

Page
a. The Decision Does Not Conflict
MAE MIE a viccnicrniarsdnconessescrcssace 1]
b. The Decision in This Action is
Consistent With Allis-Chalmers ........ 14
c. State Law Supports the Decision
RE ROSS RE Sane Seen OE 16
d. The Other Authorities Cited by
Lastimosa Are Inapposite .................. 18
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This
Action Does Not Conflict With Other
CE WN GE oii si ckekecbncccknidcecicns 20
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
ERR IN REFUSING TO IMPLY AN
AMENDMENT OF - LASTIMOSA’S
| |g aa ARAN em ee ot AICS, a ee 24
26

| es GN Rancsteatinnsiscovnrasantnenenenebecommenseeaianien

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page
APPENDIX A
29 U.S.C.§ 185
Section 301, Labor Management Relations
pO DEAL a SINO OLR AEA ios EBB LEN CI ET ARN LEAPED ETO RR OG A-1
29 US.C.§ 157
Section 7, National Labor Relations Act. ...... A-1
29US.C.§ 158
Section 8, National Labor Relations Act ....... A-2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, ............................sc000 A-2

APPENDIX B

Excerpts from Deposition of Catalino Lastimosa. .......... B-1

=

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

7G EE aes. Btw CODD \ cccorececcsscvssenssscessannedais 14, 15, 18
Bale v. General Telephone Co. of Calif...

795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1985) ......cccc eee. 23
Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984) oo... 8
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

482 U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) ............ 11-14
Davis v. United States,

EET Goie DOS COPED cccivevisecacsiccssscccsievsvasscorueinsicinnns 20
De Soto v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.,

BIT F.2G 1333 (SUR Car. 19ST) c.rccscccccccsccccssess 22-24
Friday v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

188 Cal.App.3d 117,

SED CORR, TRBET.. GD CIDR) cccsscsresecscsssccccscesssccss 17, 22
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,

726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den.

MEE UE. TORR CED) cercessscscsnnnassorcssccaccssecsessec . 21-23

Internat’! Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Hechler,
107 S.Ct. ZIGT CUGBTZ) ....cccrcccccccsrsccccscccrscessesesceses 1S

Page

Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB,

GID FAG 122 CGE Cae. FSG) wvccccccressccccsccccsscnccccns 8
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), ceri.

granted, 108 S.Ct. 226 (1987) ....ccccccceccseeeeeeeeeees 19
NLRB vy. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,

BS CIS, Ba Ce cceciscnvnaniecdcsccinsciesenctsnssocssscescscsces 8
Oglesby v. RCA Corp.,

roe Beer By Ee Ae). penne 22
Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.,

740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) .............. 19, 22, 23
Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co.,

826 F.2d 857 (9h Cir. 1987) .......... 11, 20-22, 24
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

i> SR Gb 2 i, RRR Ce ee ererrenverere 8, 18
Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines,

pi ee” Bes oO, ORS | renee 23
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety

and Health Appeals Board,

32 Cal.3d 762, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387,

G58 Be ST CEG cccscsksccsccssccinnnicticisesntenssnsns 18, 19

Vaca v. Sipes,
SOG UTS. O91 COGGT): cccreiincrssnscciccicssscsscosccssssnens 18, 25

_

— viii

Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc.,
830 F.2d 993 (9h Cir. 1987)

Statutes
Federal

29 U.S.C. § 185(a), Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act

29 U.S.C. § 157, Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), Section 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act

State

California Labor Code
§§ 6300, ef seq.
§ 6400
§ 6310

Rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1‘S(a)

United States Supreme Court Rule 17

Page

No. 87-1263

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987

CATALINO LASTIMOSA,
Petitioner,
VS.

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY
AND JACK CURTIS,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents Hughes Aircraft Company (“HAC”) and
Jack Curtis (collectively the “respondents”’) respectfully
request that this Court deny the petition of Catalino
Lastimosa (“‘Lastimosa”’) for a writ of certiorari, seeking
review of the decision and opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit filed in this
proceeding on October 30, 1987.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT BELOW

The original opinion (an unpublished memorandum
decision) and judgment of the Court of Appeals, the order
amending such opinion and denying petitioner’s Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc (the
“Petition for Rehearing’’), and the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the United States District Court for

oe, oe

the Central District of California are reproduced in the
Appendix to Lastimosa’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the
‘*Petition’’), and are therefore not reproduced herein.

STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

Pertinent portions of the California Occupational Health
and Safety Act, California Labor Code §§ 6300, et seq. are
reproduced in the Appendix to the Petition and are
therefore not reproduced herein. The pertinent portions of
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a), Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158, and Rule 15 (a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in
Appendix A hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE!

As the question before this Court is whether this action
raises any issues which merit the Court’s review,
respondents will not attempt to state here all of the facts
relevant to this action. However, the foilowing factual
statement is necessary to consider the issue now before the
Court.

| The facts set forth herein are supported by documentary evidence,
deposition testimony, and declarations presented to the district court in
connection with respondents’ motion for summary judgment in this
action. Lastimosa presented no evidence in the district court which
contradicted that presented by respondents.

bd tens
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Lastimosa was employed by HAC from June 1978 until
June 1984. At all relevant-times, HAC was engaged in the
business of, among other things, manufacturing delicate
electronic circuits used in products such as travelling wave
tubes. At the time of his discharge, Lastimosa worked as a
furnace operator in what is known in the electronics
industry as a Class 100,000 clean room. The air in a Class
100,000 clean rocm is specially filtered to be roughly 10
times cleaner than the outside air. HAC maintained the
furnace room in this manner because the furnaces were used
to braze electronic circuits, which are particularly
susceptible to contamination from dust and other particu-
lates. In addition to filtering the air, HAC required furnace
room employees to wear special clothing and prohibited
smoking in the room. Access to the room was gained
through an air lock, and daily “‘wet downs” and cleanings
of the furnace room were also performed. One wall of the
furnace room included several large glass windows, and
HAC customers occasionally passed by these windows on
tours of the facility or on business visits. HAC marketed its
products in part by indicating the ciean conditions under
which these delicate electronic circuits were processed,
including the clean room status of its furnace room
operation.

Lastimosa claims in his Petition that the external surfaces
of the furnaces were ‘‘wrapped in asbestos.” The evidence
before the courts below showed that actually, some of the
surfaces of five of eleven furnaces in the furnace room were
wrapped in a “sleeve” composed of transite, which is a
hard, cement-like compound, partially composed of
asbestos. The transite served as a heat shield. Furnace
operators did not come in contact with the transite while
operating the furnaces, no moving parts were made of this

“iain

asbestos material, and the transite was never used as a
working surface. Lastimosa also asserts that in June 1984,
HAC “began replacing the asbestos on the furnace with-new
asbestos, thereby increasing the risk of asbestos exposure.”
This statement presumably refers to the fact that at one
time, certain furnaces used asbestos gaskets, which were
replaced on occasion. HAC presented undisputed evidence
that the use of asbestos gaskets in the furnaces was
discontinued at least 18 months prior to Lastimosa’s
termination, and that in any event, the furnaces were always
removed from the furnace room when the gaskets were
replaced.

Throughout his employment at HAC, Lastimosa was a
member of a labor organization, the Electronic and Space
Technicians, Local 1553 of the AFL-CIO (the ‘“Union”’),
which was the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of Lastimosa and certain other HAC employees. At all
times relevant to the issues herein, there was a written
collective bargaining agreement in effect between HAC and
the Union (the “CBA’”’), which governed Lastimosa’s wages,
hours and working conditions.

Article XXI of the CBA dealt with safety in the
workplace. HAC agreed in this Article to conduct safety
inspections, provide safety devices, and take other specific
steps to maintain “high standards of safety.” One of HAC’s
specific obligations under this Article was:

[T]o provide modern and appropriate safety
devices and protective equipment to safeguard
and protect its employees; and, the use of such
safety devices and protective equipment, when
furnished, shall be mandatory.

Article XXI also stated that:

An employee, or the employee’s Department
Steward who believes that a job assignment is

—

unsafe, shall report such conditions to the
immediate Supervisor who will institute an
investigation immediately.

Article II of the CBA provided that employees could be
discharged ‘for cause,” and that HAC had the right to
establish work procedures and methods. The CBA also
provided a final and binding grievance and arbitration
procedure for settling disputes between an employee and
HAC, including disputes over an employee’s rights under
the CBA. Lastimosa had received a copy of the CBA and
had utilized its grievance procedure on many occasions.

In 1984, Lastimosa complained to HAC about what he
thought was a safety hazard in his workplace: he claimed
that there were asbestos particles in the furnace room air.
At Lastimosa’s request, HAC provided him with protective
paper dust masks to wear pending an investigation of his
complaint. Lastimosa also made an anonymous complaint
to the State of California’s Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (‘‘Cal-OSHA”), which conducted a surprise
inspection of HAC’s facility for the purpose of determining
whether there was any asbestos exposure danger. The
inspection conducted by Cal-OSHA resu!ted in no citation
or violations to HAC, and showed no safety hazard or
asbestos detected in Lastimosa’s workplace. In fact, Cal-
OSHA determined that levels of asbestos in the furnace
room were lower than what Lastimosa encountered in the
air outside the buiiding, and so advised Lastimosa.

The results of the 1984 Cal-OSHA inspection were
consistent with a prior inspection by the same agency, and
earlier testing conducted by HAC. In 1983, Cal-OSHA had
made a surprise inspection of the same furnace room in
response to an anonymous complaint, and had found no
violation of safety regulations. Moreover, HAC conducted
air sampling tests in the furnace room in 1980 and 1982. A
certified, independent laboratory reported to HAC on both

—

occasions that no asbestos within detectable limits was
found in the air samples collected.

Following Cal-OSHA’s 1984 inspection, Lastimosa was
advised about the results of the inspection and told that he
would no longer be permitted to wear a dust mask. HAC
took the position that there was no asbestos hazard, as borne
out by the inspections and testings; that Lastimosa had not
presented any medical documentation to indicate he was
suffering from asbestos exposure or that he was unable to
work in the furnace room; and that continued wearing of a
dust mask was detrimental to HAC’s ability to ensure the
integrity of its clean room to customers. Lastimosa then
filed a written grievance under the CBA, stating that he
should be allowed to wear a dust mask. In its response,
HAC stood by its position that Lastimosa would not be
allowed to wear a dust mask.

Subsequently, Lastimosa began wearing a dust mask
again. When Lastimosa refused to remove the mask after
being reminded of the Cal-OSHA test results, he was
suspended pending further notice. He then received a
telegram from HAC in which he was given one last chance
to report to work without a dust mask, or submit medical
documentation of the need to wear one; he was also advised
that if he failed to do so he would be discharged. Lastimosa
then met with supervision and Union representatives. At
this meeting, Lastimosa maintained that he would not work
without a dust mask and did not submit any medical
documentation. HAC therefore discharged Lastimosa at the
conclusion of the meeting.

B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lastimosa challenged his discharge through the CBA’s
grievance process and by filing unfair labor practice charges
against HAC and the Union with the National Labor

pas, ea

Relations Board (““NLRB”). In both forums, he claimed
that he was discharged for wearing the dust mask, and that
his discharge violated Article XXI of the CBA, which
stated that the use of safety devices, when provided by
HAC, was “mandatory.” The Union’s Executive Commit-
tee reviewed his grievance and concluded that it lacked
sufficient merit to place it into formal arbitration. The
NLRB dismissed Lastimosa’s charges and denied his
subsequent appeal for lack of sufficient evidence to
establish that he was discharged for any reason other than
failure to comply with instructions.

Lastimosa then filed this action in the California Superior
Court for the County of Los Angeles, alleging a single
cause of action for “wrongful discharge.”” The Complaint
referred to “company rules” which Lastimosa claimed were
violated by HAC and which, he alleged, entitled him to use
the dust masks; Lastimosa testified in his deposition that the
“rules” referred to Article XXI of the CBA. Lastimosa
further testified that he was discharged in violation of the
CBA for wearing a safety mask whose use was, according to
his interpretation of Article XXI, mandatory. Lastimosa
disclaimed in his deposition the argument that he was
discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint with Cal-
OSHA and indeed, his complaint to the agency was made
anonymously. The following quotes dramatically illustrate
the inconsistency between Lastimosa’s argument and the
undisputed facts (emphasis has been added). Additional
deposition excerpts showing the nature of Lastimosa’s
claim are set forth in Appendix B hereto.

Q. ... Have you told me all the information you have
upon which you're basing your claim that you were
fired from Hughes for reporting them to Cal-OSHA
about asbestos?

A. I never claimed I was fired for reporting it to Cal-
OSHA. I — I was fired for wearing a safety mask.

Q. Did you call [the Carpenters’ Union] to complain
about asbestos at Hughes?

A. No. I called to complain that I was terminated for
wearing a safety mask because of the asbestos
exposure.

HAC removed the Complaint to federal district court on
the ground that Lastimosa’s alleged state law claim was
preempted by federal labor law. HAC then moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that federal labor law
preempied Lastimosa’s alleged state law claim, or
alternatively, because Lastimosa’s claim was preempted by
the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) and
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 158(a)(1).?

2 This second ground, based on the NLRA, was not addressed by
either the district court or the Ninth Circuit in their decisions, and
Lastimosa has not raised the issue in his Petition. Respondents contend
that NLRA preemption provides a separate, independent ground for the
decision of the Ninth Circuit. Lastimosa’s allegations amount to
protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, because he was
invoking a right arising under the CBA. Further, Lastimosa alleged in
his NLRB proceedings that HAC and his Union committed unfair labor
practices under Section 8 of the NLRA. Controversies under Sections 7
and 8 are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, and state
claims based on the same activity are preempted. San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959)(states must defer to
the exclusive competence of the NLRB); NLRB vy. City Disposal
Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984)(employee acting alone may engage in
protected activity). See also Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d
122 (6th Cir. 1980) (employee claiming layoff in retaliation for filing
safety complaints with Michigan Occupational Safety and Health
Administration held to be engaged in protected activity under Section 7);
Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (Mh Cir. 1984)
(employee’s wrongful discharge claim properly removed and dismissed
based on NLRA preemption where plaintiff claimed retaliation for
voicing complaints about employer practices).

=—

The district court granted summary judgment to
respondents, holding that “[dJeposition testimony makes
clear that plaintiff's claim in reality is essentially that he
was discharged in violation of the provisions of the CBA
pertaining to safety and discharge.” (Petition, Appendix A
at A-13.) Thus, Lastimosa’s claim was preempted by Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (the
“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The court further held that
even if Lastimosa’s state law claim was recharacterized as a
claim for breach of the CBA under Section 301, it failed as a
matter of law because the grievance and arbitration
procedures set forth in the CBA were final and binding on
Lastimosa, absent any allegation that the Union had
breached its duty of fair representation in processing
Lastimosa’s grievance. (Petition, Appendix A at A-19 to A-
20.)

Lastimosa appealed the district court's decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Lastimosa continued to
argue that his claim for wrongful discharge was not
preempted, and, for the first time, argued that if his state
claim was preempted the district court had improperly
denied him the opportunity to amend his Complaint to
plead that the Union had breached its duty of fair
representation.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court in a memorandum decision, concluding that the
action had been properly removed and subsequently
dismissed by the trial court. The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court properly applied the artful pleading doctrine
to determine that Lastimosa was asserting a claim grounded
in the safety provisions of the CBA, even though his claim
was framed as a state law tort and contract action. The

=" a

Ninth Circuit concluded that Lastimosa’s rights in his state
wrongful discharge action would “substantially depend on
analysis of the terms” of the CBA. (Petition, Appendix A at
A-3to A-4.)

The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that the state statutes
relied upon by Lastimosa were directed not at the general
public, but at employers and the employment relationship,
and that the CBA provided no less protection to Lastimosa
than did these state statutes. The Ninth Circuit finally
concluded that federal labor policies favoring uniform
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and
exclusivity of union-employer procedures mandated that
Lastimosa not be allowed to pursue his state law claim.
(Petition, Appendix A at A-4 to A-6.)

As to Lastimosa’s proposed amendment to _ the
Complaint, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did
not err by failing to imply an amendment to include an
allegation of breach of the duty of fair representation,
because Lastimosa had asserted in the district court that he
was alleging no such breach. Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Lastimosa had not raised the issue in
the district court, and had not requested leave to amend his
Complaint from such court at any time. (Petition, Appendix
A at A-7.) Thereafter, Lastimosa filed his Petition for
Rehearing with the Minth Circuit, which was denied-
(Petition, Appendix A at A-9.)

—(
II

REASONS REVIEW SHOULD BE
DENIED

A. LASTIMOSA’S CLAIM UNDER STATE
LAW IS PREEMPTED BY SECTION 301
BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Lastimosa argues that certiorari should be granted in this
action because the Ninth Circuit “refused to consider” the
decision by this Court in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987), another Ninth Circuit
decision, Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co. 826 F.2d 857 (%h
Cir. 1987), and “other generally applicable principles of
Federal Pre-emption.” (Petition at i.) The Ninth Circuit not
only considered, but properly applied, principles set out in
this Court's decisions on Section 301 preemption, including
this Court's decision in Caterpillar. Furthermore, the
decision in this action is consistent with Paige and other
Ninth Circuit decisions. Therefore, Lastimosa’s Petition
does not present any question suitable for this Court's
review.

1. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This
Action Does Not Conflict With The
Decisions of This Court

a. The Decision Does Not Conflict
With Caterpillar

Lastimosa claims that the Ninth Circuit “refused to
consider” Caterpillar. However, the Ninth Circuit's

=x =

decision in Caterpillar was fully discussed in the appellate
briefs of the parties to this action (before this Court
affirmed), and the Ninth Circuit cited this Court's decision
in Caterpillar in its decision in this action. Clearly the
Ninth Circuit did consider the principles set forth in
Caterpillar, and did not act in conflict with such principles.

In Caterpillar, the plaintiffs claimed that while they were
management employees, Caterpillar made certain promises
to them concerning the length of their employment. The
plaintiffs were later downgraded to hourly positions
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, and then laid
off from those positions. The plaintiffs filed an action in
California state court claiming breach of the individual
employment contracts. Caterpillar’s removal of the action
to federal court on the ground that any individual
employment contracts were merged into and superseded by

the collective bargaining agreement was upheld by the trial
court. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the

plaintiffs’ state-law claims were neither directly nor
indirectly grounded upon rights created by the collective
bargaining agreement, did not require interpretation or
application of that agreement, and therefore did not arise
under Section 301. This Court affirmed.

Generally, when federal preemption is raised as a defense
to allegations in a pleading, removal is not justified.
However, in Caterpillar, this Court recognized that claims
brought by a plaintiff under state law may in reality be
Section 301 claims which are completely preempted by
federal law. Under the “complete preemption™ doctrine,
such claims may only be considered as federal claims
arising under federal law, and are properly removable. 107
S.Ct. at 2430. That is, Section 301 governs claims founded
on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, as
well as claims “substantially dependent on analysis of a

==

collective bargaining agreement.” Jd. at 2431. As to such
claims, Section 301 has complete preemptive effect.

[W)hen “(the heart of the [state law) complaint [is]

a... Clause in the collective bargaining
agreement,” ... that complaint arises under
federal law:

“[T)he pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful
as to displace entirely any state cause of action
‘for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization.” Any such suit is
purely a creature of federal law, notwithstand-
ing the fact that state law would provide a cause
of action im the absence of § 301."

Id. at 2430 (citations omitted)? Applying these principles to
the facts in Caterpillar, this Court concluded that the
plaintiffs’ claims were not “completely preempted™ Section
301 claims, because the plaintiffs were claiming rights
under individual employment contracts, and not a collective
bargaining agreement. /d. at 2431.

The facts of the present action are quite different.
Lastimosa was, throughout his employment at HAC, a
bargaining unit employee, and does not rely on any
separate, individual contract as the source of his state law
claim. Moreover, Lastimosa’s wrongful discharge claim is
firmly based on HAC’s alleged breach of the CBA, and is
entirely dependent upon analysis of the safety and
discharge provisions thereof. Lastimosa consistently

* Lestimosa contends that under Caterpillar he is “master of his
complaint.” and may choose whether to bring his claim under state or
federal law. However, this Court in Caterpillar recognized that such a
chonce caists only when preemption ts ransed as a defense to a static law
claim which ts not completely preempted Lastumosa has invoked a nght
created by the CBA and asserted a claim which arises under federal law
He therefore cannot “choose™ to bring a state law claim instead

= =

maintained, on the job, in his deposition testimony, and in
his Union grievance and NLRB charges that he was
asserting a right under Article XX1 of the CBA to wear the
dust mask and that he was discharged in violation of
Articles XXI and II (the safety and discharge provisions) of
the CBA. Although Lastimosa now attempts to argue that

he is relying upon independent state rights, his own
testimony and conduct show otherwise.

Finally, Lastimosa focuses on this Court's statement in
Caterpillar that not every dispute concerning employment
or “tangentially involving™ the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement is preempted by Section 301. (Petition
at 16.) This argument is without merit. Lastimosa’s claim
more than tangentially involves the CBA. It concerns
matters of workplace safety, matters over which HAC and
the Union specifically bargained during the collective
bargaining process, and over which the parties reached
agreement as set forth in the CBA. Moreover, the CBA's
safety and discharge provisions can reasonably be read to
prohibit retaliatory discharges of employees who make
safety complaints. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 US
202, . 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1913 (1985) (“The assumption that
the labor contract creates no implied rights is not one that
state law may make ... . There is no reason to assume that
the labor contract as interpreted by the arbitrator would not
provide such relief .”).

b. The Decision in This Action is
Consistent With Allis-Chalmers

Lastimosa further argues that the rights against
retahatory discharge afforded him under Cal-OSHA are
rights afforded every California employee which exist
independent of the CBA, and thus his state action asserting
such rights is not preempted. He also argues that his state

——————————————

=—"

claim is an action in tort and thus separate from the CBA
(Petition at 17.) Both arguments fail under this Court's
decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp, 105 S.Ct. at 1904, a
decision which Lastimosa fails to mention in his Petition. In
Allis-Chalmers, a union employee brought a state law tort
action against his employer for bad faith handling of an
insurance claim. The claim had been made pursuant to an
insurance plan contained in the collective bargaining
agreement between the plaintiff's union and the employer
The Court held that federal labor law preempts not only
state contract claims, but also state tort claims which “us
applied, would frustrate the federal labor-contract scheme
established in § 301." 105 S.Ct. at 1910. This Court held
that the plaintiff's tort claim was preempted by federal
labor law because the claim was “inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” 105
S.Ct. at 1912. See also, Internat’! Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Hechler, 107 $.Ct. 2161 (1987) (state law tort
claim based on allegation that union failed to provide safe
workplace preempted by Section 301 because claim not
sufficiently independent of the collective bargaining
agreement)

The Court emphasized in Allis-Chalmers that preemption
was necessary to preserve “the central role of arbitration”
in the collective bargaining system, expressing concern that
plaintiffs could simply bypass arbitration by “re-labeling™ a
claim arising out of a labor contract as a tort claim. 105
S.Ct. at 1915

A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep
available grievance procedures would cause
arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, .. . as
well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-
contract law under § 301 that it is the arbitrator,
not the court, who has the responsibility ‘o
intefpret the labor contract in the first instance

105 S.Ct. at 1916 (citation omitted).

In the present action, Lastimosa’s state claim is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of
the CBA because it is derived from the CBA itself. The fact
that Lastimosa has chosen to label his claim a tort claim,
and has gone to considerable length to find some state
statute which purportedly protects him, ‘cannot alter this
state of affairs.

c. State Law Supports the Decision in
This Action

Lastimosa invokes state policies set forth in the California
Labor Code. Section 6400 of that Code provides that
‘{elvery employer shall furnish employment and a place of
employment which are safe and healthful for the employees
therein.” Labor Code § 6310 prohibits, inter alia, the
discharge of an employee because such employee has made
safety complaints. However, the language of Labor Code
Section 6310 evinces a specific intent on the part of the state
legislature not to prevent the operation of collective
bargaining processes in connection with retaliation claims
under the Labor Code. Section 6310 provides in pertinent
part as follows:

(b) ... Any employer who willfully refuses to
rehire, promote, or otherwise restore an employee
or former employee who has been determined to be
eligible for such rehiring or promotion by a
grievance procedure, arbitration, or hearing
authorized by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the state specifically envisioned
that in the case of union employees, enforcement of the
policy set forth in Section 6310 would come through the
grievance and arbitration procedures contained in collective
bargaining agreements. To hold that Lastimosa can invoke

—

those procedures and then ignore their binding effect by
subsequently pursuing a state law wrongful discharge action
would not only undermine a method of enforcement
specifically recognized by the state statute in question, but
would pose a significant threat to the collective bargaining
process.

Moreover, the California Court of Appeals has held that
where a collective bargaining agreement deals specifically
with safety issues, state wrongful discharge claims based on
state safety statutes are preempted. Friday v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 188 Cal.App.3d 117, 225 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1986)
(appeal to California Supreme Court dismissed and this
opinion ordered published by Supreme Court). In Friday,
an employee brought a state claim for wrongful termination,
claiming that he was terminated for reporting violations of
the hazardous waste provisions of the California Health and
Safety Code to his employer. The plaintiff’s employment
was governed by a CBA which contained express safety
provisions substantially similar to those in the present
action, since the plaintiff was also employed by HAC and
represented by the same union as Lastimosa. The California
Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s state action was
preempted by Section 301 despite the state’s interest
expressed in its Health and Safety statutes.

We find the facts reported in Friday’s declaration
imply nothing more than complaints about the
safety of his workplace, a subject expressly
covered by article XXI of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.

... allowing Friday’s wrongful termination action
to go forward would involve consideration of the
terms of the labor contract and directly interfere

with federal regulation of disputes arising out of
collective bargaining agreements.

188 Cal.App.3d at 124.

d. The Other Authorities Cited by
Lastimosa Are Inapposite

Lastimosa vaguely refers in his Petition to ‘well
established federal law concerning preemption” which the
Ninth Circuit failed to consider in this action, but does not
detail how the decision in the preseni action conflicts with
such federal law. The two cases he cites in support of this
argument — Vaca y. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), and United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Healih Appeals
Board, 32 Cal.3d 762, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387, 654 P.2d 157
(1982) — do not support his Petition.

Lastimosa misstates the holding in Vaca. This Court
stated in Vaca that ‘this preemption doctrine, however, has
never been rigidly applied to cases where it could not fairly
be inferred that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to
lie with the NLRB,” not the federal courts as stated by
Lastimosa. 386 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added). The
preemption doctrine referred to was not Section 301
preemption, but preemption based on the _ exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB under San Diego Building Trades
Council vy. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). These two
doctrines involve different considerations and _ tests;
‘““Garmon and like cases have no application to § 301 suits.”
386 U.S. at 184. See also Allis-Chalmers, 105 S.Ct. at 1913
n.9 (the balancing test applied in Garmon preemption cases
is “irrelevant” to suits under Section 301, in which Congress
has mandated that federal law should govern).

The California Supreme Court decision in United
Airlines involved a jurisdictional conflict between Cal-
OSHA and the Federal Aviation Administration (the

—

‘“FAA”) over regulation of employee safety at an airport
ground maintenance facility. The California Supreme Court
rejected an argument by United that Cal-OSHA could not
regulate airport employee safety because of jurisdictional
limits set forth in the Federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act (‘“‘Fed-OSHA”’), reasoning that Fed-OSHA
specifically provides an exception to federal preemption
where a state has enacted a federally approved plan. The
decision in United Airlines does not address the question of
federal labor law preemption, nor does it address the
question of federal preemption where the relevant federal
statute (in the present case, Section 301) does not
specifically provide for limited state regulation.*

4 As a final note, respondents wish to refer to a Seventh Circuit case,
not addressed in the Petition, in which certiorari has been granted by
this Court. In Lingie v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 226 (1987), the Seventh Circuit
held that state law retaliatory discharge claims are preempted where the
plaintiff is subject to a collective bargaining agreement which regulates
discharge. The court reasoned, as the Ninth Circuit did in Olguin v.
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984),
and other decisions, that these state claims require interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreements’ discharge provisions, that such
agreements provide protection equal to that of state statutes and policies
prohibiting retaliatory discharge, and that the interests of federal labor
policy require that such state claims be preempted. In the present action,
the undisputed facts available to the courts below are much more
compelling than in Lingle, and make clear that Lastimosa’s claim is not
a claim that he was discharged in retaliation for exercising rights under
a state statute. Instead, Lastimosa claims that he was discharged for
asserting a right under the CBA, a claim completely preempted by
Section 301.

— ex

2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This
Action Does Not Conflict With Other
Decisions of the Circuit

Lastimosa also seeks review by this Court based on the
assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this action
conflicts with the decision of another Ninth Circuit panel in
Paige. Although conflict between the federal courts of
appeal is a consideration governing this Court’s review (see
Rule 17 of this Court), ordinarily an intracircuit conflict is
not a sufficient basis for granting a writ of certiorari. See
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 340 (1974) (petition for
certiorari denied in earlier proceeding where party claimed
intra-circuit conflict). There is no reason in the present
action to depart from that usual practice. A party’s remedy
for such conflict is to seek hearing en banc by the court of
appeals, which court will presumably resolve any perceived
inconsistencies. Lastimosa filed such a petition, and the
Ninth Circuit in its responsive order declared that “no
judge of [the Ninth Circuit] has requested a vote to rehear
the matter en banc.” (Petition, Appendix A at A-10.)

In any event, the decision here does not conflict with the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Paige, and is consistent with
other Ninth Circuit decisions on the issue of Section 301
preemption. In Paige, plaintiffs claimed that they were
fired because they refused to refuel generators on a
construction site in a way that they believed was
unnecessarily and illegally hazardous. The plaintiffs based
their action for wrongful discharge on Cal-OSHA
provisions providing for regulation of safety on the job.
Defendants removed the action to federal court. The district
court held that the plaintiffs’ wrongful discharge claims
were in fact claims under Section 301 and dismissed them.
The Ninth Circuit reversed.

a

The collective bargaining agreement in Paige did not
contain specific provisions governing worker safety, but
merely a statement requiring the employer to comply with
all state and federal health and safety laws, including
OSHA. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that the
employees’ claim was not “intertwined or substantially
dependent upon consideration of the terms of the labor
contract.” 826 F.2d at 863. The Ninth Circuit further
reasoned that because the employees were concerned about
the potential for a serious explosion at the jobsite, the
employer’s alleged conduct jeopardized the safety of others
on the site, and not just the plaintiffs’ safety. The
employees’ conduct thus implicated California’s interest in
protecting its citizens, rather than its interest in regulating
the employment relationship. Jd.

The Court thus compared the facts in Paige to the facts
in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. den. 471 U.S. 1099 (1985). In Garibaldi, a
truck driver subject to a collective bargaining agreement
alleged that he was discharged because he refused to deliver
a load of spoiled milk in violation of a state statute. As in
Paige, the Court of Appeals concluded that a state law
claim based on such conduct “‘pose{d] no significant threat
to the collective bargaining process,” and “‘further{ed] the
state’s interest in protecting the general public — an interest
which transcended] the employment relationship.” 726
F.2d at 1375.

The facts in Paige and Garibaldi are distinguishable. In
Paige and Garibaldi, the plaintiffs were not relying on
rights specifically set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement. In addition, the employers’ conduct in Paige
and Garibaldi threatened the general public, persons
beyond the employee, and transcended the employment
relationship between the companies and the plaintiffs. By
contrast, Lastimosa claims that he had a right under the

==

CBA to wear a dust mask, and that he was wrongfully fired
for insisting on this right. Contrary to the claims alleged in
Garibaldi and Paige, the claim alleged by plaintiff
encroaches upon the collective bargaining process because
workplace safety and employee termination are expressly
governed by the CBA, and Lastimosa specifically invoked
those provisions.°

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case is also consistent
with and supported by its other decisions, particularly
Olguin vy. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. 740 F.2d
1468 (9th Cir. 1984), and De Soto v. Yellow Freight
Systems, Inc, 811 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987). In Olguin,
decided after Garibaldi, the plaintiff alleged that he was
unjustly discharged in retaliation for safety complaints, in
violation of federal policy set forth in mine safety statutes
and general state policy. Olguin’s allegations were very
similar to those in Lastimosa’s Complaint, except that
Lastimosa did not refer to any federal policy. The Ninth
Circuit held that the allegations in Olguin were insufficient
to invoke any state policy. The Court also remarked that
Olguin had already filed a complaint with the NLRB, just
as Lastimosa did in this case, and with the federal mine
safety agency. The Court held as follows: “... Olguin
complained to both the NLRB and the FMHSA. He cannot
now seek protection in state law, because he acted in behalf
of no state law or policy.” 740 F.2d at 1475 (emphasis

> See also Friday, 188 Cal.App.3d at 124 (state wrongful termination
claim preempted where plaintiff did not rely on a statute for the
protection of the general public, but instead ‘‘complained of what he
perceived to be unsafe internal practices in the handling of chemicals”);
Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Garibaldi applies only when the state policy is “independent of the
employment relationship”); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F. 2d 272 (7th
Cir. 1985)(Section 301 preempted state claim of employee who alleged
wrongful discharge motivated by his safety complaints).

|

added). See also Bale v. General Telephone Co. of Calif,
795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1985)(state tort claims of bargaining
unit employees preempted where employees had sought
intervention of their union in regard to their termination).

The Ninth Circuit further reasoned in Olguin that it was
“apparent that the true nature of Olguin’s wrongful
discharge complaint concerns the terms and conditions of
employment as they are set out in the collective bargaining
agreement,” so that his complaint was “‘in fact” a Section
301 suit. 740 F.2d at 1474-75. Finally, the Ninth Circuit
found that federal law preempted state law because “(t]he
[collective bargaining] agreement provides the same or
greater protection of job security that state tort law seeks to
provide for nonunionized employees.” 740 F.2d at 1474.
Cf., Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, 702 F.2d 189, 191
(9th Cir. 1983)(state claims preempted by Railway Labor
Act where dispute concerned “topics discussed in the
collective bargaining agreement”’).

In De Soto, a truck driver was terminated when he
refused to drive a trailer which he mistakenly believed
lacked proper registration. The Ninth Circuit held that the
plaintiff's state claim for wrongful discharge was preempted
by Section 301. The Court declined to follow its holding in
Garibaldi, reasoning:

Unquestionably, DeSoto thought he was doing the
right thing in refusing to take the trailer out.
Unfortunately for him, he was mistaken. He was
not acting in defense of a public policy of the State
of California, but incorrectly asserting his own
interpretation of the law. It is just this kind of
dispute over what is the appropriate management
response to difficult behavior by an employee that
should be the subject of a grievance procedure. It
is not the kind of case that should become either a
federal case or a State tort action.

a

811 F.2d at 1336. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Paige, in
distinguishing DeSoto:
The fact that [the plaintiff in DeSoto] was
mistaken as to the law was central to the court’s
decision; no such mistaken belief is alleged here.
Furthermore, health and safety concerns were not
present in the case. Any potential health and
safety problems from driving a truck with an
unregistered trailer were negated by the fact that
the trailer did indeed have the proper permits.

826 F.2d at 863 n. 11.

In the present action, the undisputed facts show that
Lastimosa’s fear for his health was completely unfounded
and unsubstantiated. Testing by a private laboratory and
Cal-OSHA itself had indicated that there was no risk to
Lastimosa, and there was no evidence that Lastimosa had a
medical problem related to asbestos or dust exposure. Thus,
as in DeSoto, Lastimosa’s concerns were unfounded. In any
event, Lastimosa was not acting in defense of the Cal-
OSHA statutes, but as he specifically testified, he was
asserting his mistaken interpretation of the CBA.
Lastimosa’s insistence on wearing a dust mask, despite
evidence that it was unnecessary and in disregard of HAC’s
business interests, is the type of “difficult behavior by an
employee” which should be and was settled by way of the
CBA'’s grievance procedure.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
ERR IN REFUSING TO IMPLY AN
AMENDMENT OF LASTIMOQOSA’S
COMPLAINT

Lastimosa also seeks review of the decision of the Ninth
Circuit that the district court did not err by failing to imply
an amendment of the Complaint to include a claim of

= =

breach of the duty of fair representation by his Union, a
prerequisite to suit under Section 301. Lastimosa merely
argues that the Ninth Circuit erred; his argument does not
raise any important questions of law, nor does Lastimosa
point to any conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and the decision of any other court.

Lastimosa argues that “neither the Court of Appeal nor
the district court, gave any justifiable reason for not
allowing [Lastimosa] to proceed” on his Section 301 claim,
and that both courts thus abused their discretion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to deny amendments
to his Complaint. (Petition at 23-24.) Lastimosa’s assertions
are simply untrue. The district court properly held that
“[slince the CBA provides that the grievance and
arbitration procedures are his sole remedy for breach,
Lastimosa can only bring a § 301 suit against Hughes if he
also makes a claim that the union breached its duty of fair
representation with respect to the handling of his grievance.
Since no such claim has been made against the union, an
action cannot be maintained against Hughes.” (Petition,
Appendix A at A-19 to A-20.) Vaca, 386 US. at 184. The
district court never denied Lastimosa leave to amend
because he never sought such leave.

When Lastimosa argued on appeal that the district court
should have sua sponte “implied” the required allegation
into his Complaint, the Court of Appeals disagreed and
affirmed the district court, reasoning that Lastimosa had
not raised the issue below and that “‘in the district court he
asserted that ‘no breach of the duty of fair representation is
alleged.’ ” (Petition, Appendix A at A-7.) Thus, each court
explained its decision on this issue, and acted within its
discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1S(a).

=
Il!
CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully submit that Lastimosa has
wholly failed to sustain his burden of establishing under
Rule 17 of this Court's rules that there are special and
important reasons why review should be granted. The
decision below is not in conflict with the decisions of this
Court or other decisions of the Ninth Circuit. Given the
clear evidence supporting the decision below, the Petition
poses no important question of federal law which should be
settled by this Court. For the foregoing reasons, respondents
respectfully request that Lastimosa’s petition for a writ of
certiorari be denied

DATED: February 26, 1988
Respectfully submitted,
“PETER H. BENZIAN
DEANNE P. GEORGE
KRISTINE P. NESTHUS
LATHAM & WATKINS

Attorneys for Respondents

“Counsel of Record

APPENDIX A

.
Pe
‘
r.
2 ‘
‘
’
+ : '
* 4
i;
-
‘
;
1
' re
'
' ’ - 7
=
—
4
'
{
‘
v ‘
Nee Ae, ~ 2 . ; .
ae aS — . aoe aK #4 7 Pee ee Oe ie ae a oe oo.
bale Pages , pe vs poe Ce ee nad ee 8 ae : F 7 :
int poh erie) fe es ES re ae bP ee ee ee a a ee SE os AE a ett) ye ‘
nd Tila nS ne : 5 s ss

2 am i Sa a ? 5 eo 8 a ae ee ee ee ee ee eS 6 a ee ee ee ee ae ee ee

eae (ee

— soe

29 U.S.C. § 185
(in pertinent part)

§ 185. Suits by and against labor organizations
Venue, amount, and citizenship

(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without -regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 157

§ 157. Right of employees as to organization,
collective bargaining, etc.

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 158(a)(3) of this title.

a © oe

29 U.S.C. § 158
(in pertinent part)

§ 158. Unfair labor practices
(a) It shall be an unfair practice for an employer—

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title;

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15
(in pertinent part)

(a) Amendments. A party may amend the party’s
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action
has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may
so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A
party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within
the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise
orders.

APPENDIX B

eas
Fie,

= <=

Excerpts From Deposition of
Catalino Lastimosa

Lastimosa: Okay. During this time when I
showed my supervisor —

Respondents’

Attorney: The brochures?

Lastimosa: Yeah — the document that I made

copies of, I also showed him a union
contract, on page 63, paragraph B,
where it says, you know — I can’t
remember what it says, exactly, but I
brought that to his attention.

Lastimosa’s

Attorney: I'll paraphrase it, if I can recall it.
“If safety equipment is furnished, it
must be worn.”

Respondents’
Attorney: _ Is that what you're referring to?
Lastimosa: Yes.
Respondents’
Attorney: Q. Something to that effect?
A. Yes.
Q. And you showed it to [your
supervisor]?

A. Several times.
*~_ * *

Q. Now, even after you had the
meeting with your supervisor and
your union and you were told you
can’t wear this mask any more,
you insisted on wearing the mask;
is that right?

Q >

>

—

That’s correct, according to the
union contract.

And June 22nd, you were
suspended because you didn’t want
to work without the mask; is that
right?

. That’s correct.

And then Mr. Carillo, I gather,
suspended you that day because
you would not take off the mask;
is that right?

Yes.

And what did you and he Say at
that time?

I don’t understand.

I take it you had a conversation
with Mr. Carillo. And just relate
to me what you and he said at
that time, the day you were
suspended.

. He says, “I warned you about

wearing the safety mask.” And I
said, ““This is a hazardous area.
The union contract states that I
am allowed to wear it, if it was
given to me.”

*_ * *

. So what was said to you in this

meeting on June 28th?

. I can’t remember exactly what was

said.

=— 7 oe

Q. Can you remember, in general,
what was said?

A. Generally, they told me to go to
work in there, without the safety
mask. And I told them the safety
mask was given to me by the
safety officer, and according to the
union contract, it’s mandatory that
I wear it. And I’m wearing it for
my own protection. It’s not
affecting my job in any way.

*_ * *

Q. After that, you filed charges with
the NLRB against the company
and the union; is that right?

A. That’s correct.

And those were initially dismissed
by the NLRB for insufficient
evidence?

A. That’s correct.

©

2

And against the company, your
complaint was that you’d been

unfairly fired and the company
wasn’t complying with the union
contract about the safety thing?
A. Yes, because the union contract

states that I should be able to

wear the mask.

*- * &

Q. Let me just show this to you, and
we'll mark this Exhibit 17. Is that
a copy of the appeal you sent to
the NLRB?

liens

=

Lastimosa: Yes.
Respondents’
Attorney: Q. Now, you attached a page from

the union contract to this; right? Is
this what you were referring to
earlier? [Referring to Article XXI
of the CBA]

Yes.

Q>

And you were talking about
Section A, number Ib there?
A. Yes.

Q. And your appeal was also
dismissed by the NLRB; is that
right?

A. That's correct.

e

Now when you say, in there, you

were following union policy, you're
talking about this specific part of
the union contract that’s attached?

A. Yes. [Referring to Article XXI of
the CBA ]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0703%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
