# Jurisdictional Statement — Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 805

## Text

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upreme Court, U.S.

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86 4915 f EILED

MAY 27 1987

In the Supreme Coi7t.::..""" |

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

BOHEMIAN CLUuB,
Appellant,

VS.

FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DEPARTMENT OF FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING;
and MARK GUERRA, as Director,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the
Court of Appeal of the State of C.lifornia

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

WILLIAM I. EDLUND

MICHAEL H. SALINSKY
COUNSEL OF RECORD

KEVIN M. FONG
225 Bush Street
Mailing Address

P.O. Box 7880

PILLSBURY, MADISON & San Francisco, CA 94120
SUTRO Telephone: (415) 983-1462
225 Bush Street Counsel for Appellant

Mailing Address
P.O. Box 7880

San Francisco, CA 94120
Of Counsel

BOWNE OF SAN FRANCISCO. INC. + 190 NINTH ST. + S.F.. CA 94103 » (415) 864-2300
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
enacted by Congress to protect the freedom of association of
members of bona fide private clubs, preempt inconsistent state
laws prescribing the employment practices of such private clubs?

2. Does the freedom of association guaranteed by the First
Amendment protect from governmental intrusion the selection by
private club members of employees involved in the members’
private, social, associational activities?

3. Is a state court constitutionally required to make an inde-
pendent review of the administrative record in determining
whether a statute violates the freedom of association of private
club members?*

* The parties are named in the title of this jurisdictional statement.
Appellant Bohemian Club is a private, non-commercial, social associa-
tion of men only, with approximately 2,000 members.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Constitutional provisions and statutes involved ........... 2
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The questions are substantial ...... 2... cc cc ccccscssenss 7

The application of state employment discrimination laws to
regulate the employment practices of bona fide private
membership clubs is inconsistent with, and preempted by,

§ 701(b) of Title VII, in which Congress intended to
protect the freedom of association of private club members 9

II
This case also presents an important constitutional question:
whether the freedom of association protects from govern-
mental intrusion the selection by club members of
employees involved in the members’ private, social, associ-
stiomel acta ..... ..0.000404s40ude nee eeeees 13

Ill
A state court is constitutiona!ly required to make an indepen-
dent review of the administrative record in determining
whether a statute violates the freedom of association of
grivake GhOD GROGNDOND o.oo. once pansccnsuaneaeeaween 19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Page
A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717....... 20
Adcock v. Board of Education, 10 Cal.3d 60 ........... 19
eee VW. Meeryeeee, 37S UB. ZOB 2... ccc cccccccccccsss 14
Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 55

U.S. Law Week 4606, CS i ntwe 5 snk hv O 8, 14, 15
Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment and Housing

Commission, 187 Cal.App.3d 1.................. 2, passim
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ........ aon neues per 17
California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 107

I, ce EE ss pa dessa esse sesee 12
EEOC v. St. Joseph Hospital East Inc., 19 FEP Cases 1439 9, 10
ROU Ws PUI, UE PS AO cc ccc ccc swccecccccen 14
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 428 F.Supp.

EN Cs Seva ewukseudn sad en de k0da'ssddnes 8, 10, 12
Florida Avocado Geveen * Pam, eo Ue. 132 ......5. 13
Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786............... 13
Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F.Supp. 1280 ................ 11
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332.......5.......000000- 9
Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 ............. 18
Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F.Supp. 313 .... 11
Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F.Supp. 256 ...........0.c0000. 8, 11
Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d

ES LIE SE 19
Local 246, Util. Wkrs. U. v. Southern California Edison

bac kebseccececcesecccvens 13
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 ........... 13,14
ek A 14, 17
NAACP vy. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886...... 19
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609... 13, 14, 15, 19
I I ER BOD coc ow ccccscucacasccsccess 17
a 13

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iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 ............
Thomas Pub. Ce. v. Division of Human Rights, 456

Pe BUI 6c Sd ccc nencnneasepresaasssesandenss 13
Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 3
Constitution

United States Constitution
PE I A ccvedencccesabiadccassecsens i, passim
Statutes
California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cali-
fornia Government Code § 12900, et seq. ......... 1, passim
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ............ 8, 11
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title I, 42 US.C. § 2000a, of ang. ................. 10
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 20000, et seq. ............. i, passim
Section 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) ......... i, passim
Section 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7................. 3,12
Title XI
Section 1104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 ............. 3, 10, 12
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 501(c), 26 U.S.C.
DDL iee ih ius bake eek b bond gs 6ecaecnndaspeduas 3, 10
United States Code
Be IE SEPTEEE ccc cc pctecocccaaandacnaes 2
Title 28, Section 2103 ............. ee eee eee eee eee 2
Other Authorities
Bernard, The Sex Game: Communication Between the
CH, SOURED. Soi cere det neneadesenscaas 6

Congressional Record, Volume 110 (June 13, 1964) 13697 10

No.

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, ‘1986

BOHEMIAN CLUB,
Appellant,

VS.

FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DEPARTMENT OF FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING;
and MARK GUERRA, as Director,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the
Court of Appeal of the State of California

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant Bohemian Club appeals from a final judgment of the
Court of Appeal of the State of California. The California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, as applied by the California Fair
Employment and Housing Commission to the Club, prohibits the
Club from employing only men in jobs integrally involved with
the private, social, all-male associational activities that are the
purpose of the Club’s existence. The Court of Appeal held that
the Act, as so applied, is constitutional and does not violate the
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment. The
Court of Appeal also held that the Act, as so applied, is not
preempted by § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, in which Congress intended to protect the freedom of
association of private club members.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California,
First Appellate District, Division One ((1986) 187 Cal.App.3d
1), is printed in Appendix A. The order of the Supreme Court of
the State of California denying review of the Court of Appeal’s
decision is printed in Appendix B.

The following other opinions were rendered in the case: The
opinion of the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of Sonoma, is printed in Appendix C; the opinion of appellee
California Fair Employment and Housing Commission is printed
in Appendix D.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California
was filed and entered on November 20, 1986 (Appx. A), and the
order of the Supreme Court of the State of California was filed
and entered on February 26, 1987 (Appx. B). A notice of appeal
to this Court was timely filed in the Court of Appeal on May 19,
1987 (Appx. E).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 1257(2) of Title 28 of
the United States Code. Appellant raised the claims in the
proceedings below that the California Fair Housing and Employ-
ment Act “as applied to the Club, is preempted by conflicting and
superseding provisions of Federal law and violates the members’
Federal and state constitutional rights to privacy and free associa-
tion” (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, p. 467).

In the alternative, appellant respectfully submits that this
statement should be regarded and granted as a petition for writ of
certiorari pursuant to § 2103 of Title 28 of the United States

Code.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED

First Amendment, United States Constitution:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the

3

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”

Section 701(b), Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
§$ 2000e(b) ):

“The term ‘employer’ * * * does not include * * * (2) a bona
fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)

which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26
sess”

Section 708, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-7):

“Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment
provided by any present or future law of any State or political
subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.”

Section 1104, Title XI, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000h-4):

“Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field
in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on
the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or
any provision thereof.”

Pertinent provisions of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act, California Government Code § 12900, et seq., are
printed in Appendix F.

' The First Amendment is applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., Va. Pharmacy Bd.
v. Va. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 749, n.1).

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Bohemian Club is the epitome of a bona fide private club.
As the California Court of Appeal stated,

“The Bohemian Club is a distinguished private nonprofit
association whose membership is limited to men professing
devotion to the arts. It has a long and honorable history since
its inception more than a century ago and it occupied an
important place in the history of literature in early-day San
Francisco. Its approximately 2,000 members are chosen by a
highly selective process. Potential members are interviewed
extensively and must be devoted to the arts, or willing to
participate in artistic activities” (Appx. A, p. 3).

And

“(T]he consequent relationship among members is undoubt-
edly ‘intimate’ in associational terms” (Appx. A, p. 10).

Although carefully selected for their dedication to the arts, -
Club members are men of diverse backgrounds’, races and
religions.? Membership cannot be purchased, and selection is not
based upon business success, wealth, or status (Appx. C, p. 32).
The Club is strictly noncommercial; it prohibits all commercial or
business activities (Appx. D, p. 45). “It is mot a ‘business’
commercial luncheon club” (Appx. C, p. 32; emphasis added).

? The membership includes the famous and the unknown. Past mem-
bers include John Muir and Jack London (Admin.Record, p. 368);
recent members include Herman Wouk, Seiji Ozawa, former Governor
Edmund G. Brown, and William F. Buckley, Jr. (Admin.Record,
pp. 168, 460). The Club is aot “just a club for very wealthy men”
(Admin.Record, p. 363), and the membership includes musicians,
writers, actors, artists, teachers, doctors, and men from a wide variety of
other professions and occupations (Admin.Record, pp. 167-169,-290).

3 The Club does not discriminate in employment (Appx. D, p. 49) or
membership based on “race, religious creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, physical handicap, marital status, citizenship, or sexual orien-
tation” (Appx. C, pp. 27, 45).

5

The Club’s purposes are and always have been male fellowship
and participation in the arts in a men-only environment (Appx. C,
p. 33). Participation in artistic activities is an obligation of
membership; all members participate in Club activities (Appx. C,
p. 33). All possible measures are taken to insure complete privacy
of Club members (Appx. D, p. 47).

Important Club activities take place at the Grove, a rustic,
completely private camping area, during two all-male summer
retreats when members, approved guests, and employees live at
the Grove (Appx. C, p. 33). Members participate in artistic,
musical, and dramatic performances, both serious and for en-
tertainment, on “virtually a 24-hour-a-day basis throughout the
Grove” (Appx. C, p. 33; Appx. D, p. 47). The retreats include
concerts, theatrical productions, and oratorical presentations; in-
formal musical entertainment, singing, and dancing is performed
extermporaneously throughout the day and night in outdoor thea-
tres and along the walks and paths (Appx. C, p. 33; Appx. D, pp.
47-48).° Many of these activities take place during meal times
and are an integral part of the camaraderie in which employees
are involved throughout the Grove (Appx. C, p. 33).

To protect the members’ associational and privacy interests, the
Club employs only men at the Grove (Appx. C, p. 37).° Employ-
ees are necessarily involved with and integral to the all-male

* Guests may be invited to the Midsummer Encampment only upon
written application by a member and approval by the Club board of
directors of the proposed guest’s merits and qualifications (Ad-
min.Record, pp. 733-734).

> All conversations and events at the Grove are “off-the-record”
(Admin.Record, p. 185); “it is both explicit and implicit that the whole
operation is entirely private” (Admin.Record, p. 437).

° The Club employs women at its City Club in all positions which do
not require intrusion into the all-male atmosphere of camaraderie that
distinguishes Club activities (Appx. C, p. 37). In accordance with the
policy, the Club regularly employs women in its print shop, in account-
ing and administrative positions in its business office, in maintenance
positions, and as food servers in the private rooms for members’ parties
(Appx. A, p. 3; Appx. C, p. 37).

6

society at the Grove (Appx. C, p. 36). Employees are present
during all of the 24-hour-a-day performances and festivities
(Appx. C, p. 36). Employees work before, during, and after meal
times in the open dining area, where dramatic and musical events
take place (Appx. C, p. 35). Other informal gatherings and
performances occur throughout the Grove while employees work
and serve refreshments, necessarily involving them in the com-
pany of members (Appx. C, p. 35).

Women are not permitted at the Grove during the men-only
retreats (Appx. C, p. 37). The intrusion of women would funda-
mentally change the nature and purpose of the Club—its collegi-
ality, camaraderie, and fellowship (Appx. C, p. 37). The presence
of women at the Grove would fundamentally alter and inhibit the
participation by members and would bring about a completely
different social and emotional environment from that which is at
the heart of the Club’s purpose (Appx. C, pp. 37-38).’ Some
changes in the environment would be subtle, and others would be
dramatic, but the presence of women would significantly alter the
activities, attitudes, and experiences for which the Club was
formed and exists (Appx. C, p. 38).

Proceedings below

Appellee California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing accused the Club of discriminatory hiring, in violation of
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Appx. A,
p. 1). In response, the Club asserted, among other things, that

7 Dr. Bernard, a sociologist specializing in family and community
organizations, makes the same point in her book, The Sex Game:
Communication Between the Sexes (Atheneum, 1972) p. 47 (quoted at
Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, pp. 524-525). For example, the trial court
found that “Club members and guests would be inhibited in taking
women’s roles and performing generally in theatricals, musicals, serious
drama, skits and other artistic productions if women were present;
members now comfortably portray female as well as male roles because
they are within the private social atmosphere reflecting the Club’s spirit
and traditional objectives; attendance and member participation in such
associational activities would decrease if women were present”
(Appx. C, p. 38).

7

gender is a bona fide occupational qualification for jobs at the
Grove and other jobs that involve the collegial gatherings that are
at the core of the Club’s purpose and existence and, in any event,
the Act (as applied to the Club) is preempted by conflicting and
superseding federal laws and violates the members’ constitutional
rights of privacy and free association (see Appx. A, p. 1).

The administrative law judge who heard the case credited the
testimony of the Club witnesses and determined that the Club’s
employment practices were bona fide, that the Club had not
engaged in illegal employment discrimination, and that gender
was a bona fide occupational qualification (Admin.Record, pp.
1304-1334). The Fair Employment and Housing Commission,
without hearing or seeing any witnesses or taking any evidence,
rejected the administrative law judge’s decision, and ordered the
Club to institute an affirmative action program to employ women
throughout the Club (Appx. A, p. 2).

The California Superior Court issued a writ of mandate com-
manding the Commission to set aside its decision and to dismiss
the accusation against the Club (Appx. C). Because the Com-
mission’s decision substantially affected the Club members’ con-
stitutional freedom of association (Appx. C, p. 26), the Superior
Court made findings pursuant to its independent judgment
(Appx. C, pp. 30-39).

The California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and
directed the Superior Court to reinstate the Commission’s find-
ings (Appx. A). On February 26, 1987, the California Supreme
Court denied a petition for review (Appx. B).

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

This case presents the important unresolved question whether a
state may regulate the employment practices of bona fide private,
non-commercial, membership clubs in a manner that is inconsis-
tent with the purpose of federal law, and accordingly preempted
by federal law. Section 701(b) of Title VII exempts “bona fide
private membership clubs” from the coverage of Title VII; the
legislative history demonstrates that § 701(b) was designed to
protect the freedom of association of bona fide private member-

8

ship clubs. Contrary to the congressional intent to protect private
clubs from regulation by employment discrimination laws, the
ruling below holds that Title VII is “neutral” on private club
employment practices (Appx. A, pp. 14, 17). But Title VII is not
“neutral”: Congress has expressed in § 701(b) its purpose of
preserving a “small non-commercial enclave for the unfettered
exercise of the freedom of association” (see Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Delaware, Inc. (D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573, 577).

The ruling below not only conflicts with congressional intent,
but also creates a serious conflict with the decision in Kemerer v.
Davis (E.D.Mich. 1981) 520 F.Supp. 256 that application of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to the employment
practices of a bona fide private membership club would be in
“irreconcilable conflict” with § 701(b). If a federal law such as
§ 1981 would be inconsistent with Title VII when applied to
private membership clubs, a fortiori a state law that purports to
regulate bona fide private membership clubs is no less inconsis-
tent with the congressional purpose to preserve the associational
rights of club members. Any law, whether state or federal, which
purports to regulate employment by private clubs is inconsistent
with the purpose of § 701(b) and may not stand.

— — —

The decision is of crucial importance to bona fide private, non-
commercial, associational groups throughout the country. There
are hundreds of such clubs, all totally unlike the Rotary Clubs and
United States Jaycees considered by this Court in prior decisions
(see Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte (U.S.
May 4, 1987) 55 U.S. Law Week 4606, 4609, n. 6, ___ US.
____). The ruling below gives states carte blanche to destroy
members’ freedom of association by intruding into the selection of
employees who will necessarily become involved in bona fide
private associational activities. The court below has created a
dangerous precedent by approving the state’s attempt to force a
bona fide private social association of men to employ women,
even though the presence of women at the Club’s retreats would
destroy the very purpose and reason for existence of the associa-
tion—pursuit of the-arts in an all-male environment.

This is not a case where the state is regulating a business club
or an organization with chapters across the nation. Rather, the

all

9

state is attempting to regulate the long-standing private social
activities of an entirely non-commercial group, thus interfering
with relationships among members that are “undoubtedly ‘inti-
mate’ in associational terms” (Appx. A, p. 10). If the ruling
below is left unreviewed, the state may not only require an all-
male group to hire women to participate in its previously all-male
retreats, but also require a women’s club to hire men to join in
previously all-female activities, or require an all-black sorority to
hire whites to work and live in a private dormitory intended to
provide a supportive all-black environment for black students.
Many private groups formed for associational purposes will cease
to exist because their purposes can no longer be achieved. States
will have the power to regulate out of existence those totally non-
commercial social clubs that Congress intended to preserve as “a
refuge for private associational values” (EEOC v. St. Joseph
Hospital East Inc. (W.D.Tenn. 1979) 19 FEP Cases 1439, 1440).
Such a blatantly overreaching use of state employment discrimi-
nation laws is without precedent. A summary dismissal or affirm-
ance by this Court would convert the ruling below into a
precedent binding upon all other courts (Hicks v. Miranda
(1975) 422 U.S. 332, 344-345).

Clearly, the issues presented are of crucial importance to the
administration of employment discrimination laws, the freedom of
association of members of all varieties of private clubs and,
indeed, to the pluralistic nature of our society.

THE APPLICATION OF STATE EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAWS TO REGULATE THE EMPLOY-
MENT PRACTICES OF BONA FIDE PRIVATE
MEMBERSHIP CLUBS IS INCONSISTENT WITH, AND
PREEMPTED BY, §701(b) OF TITLE VII, IN WHICH
CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROTECT THE FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE CLUB MEMBERS.

The issue—whether a state, contrary to the purposes of Title
VII, may require a bona fide private membership club to hire
employees whose presence would undermine the purpose of the

10

club—is-of crucial importance to private clubs and associations
throughout the country.

All state laws “inconsistent with any of the purposes of [the
Civil Rights Act of 1964], or any provision thereof” are pre-
empted (Title XI, § 1104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4; emphasis ad-
ded). Here, the application of California’s employment law to
private clubs is inconsistent with the purpose of § 701(b) of Title
VII. Section 701(b) defines an “employer” to exclude “a bona
fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of [the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954]” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) )—the
Club is such a tax-exempt private membership club (Appx. C,
p. 27). Thus, Congress exempted non-commercial private mem-
bership clubs from Title VII’s coverage. The purpose of § 701 (b)
was to protect the freedom of association of private membership
clubs; Title VII’s sponsor, Senator Humphrey, emphasized that
the private club exemption was designed to protect “the genuine
privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose member-
ship is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis” (110
Cong.Rec. (June 13, 1964) 13697; emphasis added).

The courts have confirmed the congressional objective: “The
legislative history of Title VII rather clearly indicates that Con-
gress drafted § 701(b) to preserve social and fraternal organiza-
tions of self-controlled membership as a refuge for private
associational values” (EEOC v. St. Joseph Hospital East Inc.
(W.D.Tenn. 1979) 19 FEP Cases 1439, 1440). The Title VII
exemption and the parallel Title II (public accommodations)
exemption for private clubs have similar purposes:

“In Title II, Congress sought to preserve a small non-
commercial enclave for the unfettered exercise of the free-
dom of association * * *. By including a similar exemption in
Title VII, Congress made it possible, in this limited setting,
for those who wish to restrict the universe of their personal
associates to also determine with whom they would associate
in their employer-employee relationships” (Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Delaware, Inc. (D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573,
577).

Peon.

1]

Given the clear congressional intent to protect the freedom of
association of private club members, it necessarily follows that
laws which impose employment practices on private membership
clubs are “inconsistent” with the purpose of § 701(b). One court
has expressly recognized that government regulation of private
club employment is in conflict with the private club exemption in
§ 701(b). Kemerer v. Davis (E.D.Mich. 1981) 520 F.Supp. 256
holds that application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, to the employment practices of a bona fide private
membership club would be in “irreconcilable conflict” with
§ 701(b) (520 F.Supp. 258):

“If applied literally, [§] 1981 would reach within private
establishments protected by the 1964 Act, the two statutes,
thus, are in conflict” (520 F.Supp. 258).

The court therefore held:

“[P]rivate membership clubs are impliedly exempted from
the provisions of [§] 1981 by virtue of the explicit, conflict-
ing and therefore superseding exemption of Title VII * * *”
(520 F.Supp. 260).

The California Court of Appeal is wrong in asserting that
Kemerer merely discusses the reconciliation of two federal stat-
utes (Appx. A, p. 14). As the above-quoted language from
Kemerer demonstrates, laws that would reach into the employ-
ment practices of private membership clubs are inconsistent with
§ 701(b) (see Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club (W.D.N.C.
1982) 535 F.Supp. 313; but see Guesby v. Kennedy (D.Kan.
1984) 580 F.Supp. 1280). The inevitable conclusion from the
Kemerer reasoning is that any law, whether state or federal, that
purports to regulate employment by bona fide private clubs is
inconsistent with the purpose of § 701(b) and may not stand.

Contrary to the suggestion of the ruling below, Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85 does not hold that Title VII
never preempts state employment discrimination laws because
Title VII is “neutral” in those areas not covered by its terms
(Appx. A, pp. 14, 17). Title VII is not “neutral” on the subject of
employment practices of private membership clubs. Congress has
expressed in § 701(b) its purpose of preserving a “small non-

12 -

commercial enciave for the unfettered exercise of the freedom of
association” (see Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.
(D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573, 577).

The crux of the ruling below is the erroneous rationalization
that “Title VII’s overriding objective of eliminating employment
discrimination,” results in preemption only of “[l]aws which
hinder the protection of civil rights” (Appx. A, p. 16). The ruling
below totally ignores the critical language of § 1104 of Title XI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964—that all state laws “inconsistent
with any of the purposes of * * * any provision” of the Civil
Rights Act are preempted (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4; emphasis
added). The issue thus presented is not whether state regulation
of private club employment hinders “civil rights,” but whether
such regulation is inconsistent with any of the purposes of any
provision—in this case, § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.

The reliance of the ruling below upon the “savings clause” of
§ 708 of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7) highlights the need for
review by this Court. California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra (1987) 107 S.Ct. 683, ____ U.S. —___-_ leaves open the
question whether Title VII’s preemptive scope is governed only by
§ 708, or by the express preemption provision in § 1104 of Title
XI, in conjunction with § 708. Part III-A of Just'ce Marshall’s
opinion in California Federal, joined by Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and O’Connor (107 S.Ct. 689-691), necessarily suggests
that sections 1104 and 708 must be considered together in
determining Title VII’s preemptive effect. Justice Scalia’s con-
curring opinion concludes that § 708 is the only provision gov-
erning Title VII preemption (107 S.Ct. 697), and Justice
Stevens’ concurring opinion notes, but does not reach, the issue
(107 S.Ct. 696, n.1}. The dissenting opinion of Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, cites both
sections 708 and 1104 (107 S.Ct. 698, 702, n. 12), but also does
not expressly address this issue. Thus, the proper interpretation of
the provisions governing Title VII’s preemptive scope is in-a state
of confusion.

No doubt the error of the ruling below stemmed from the
novelty of this important issue and the lack of guidelines as to

13

Title VII’s preemptive scope. The need for this Court’s resolution
of this issue is thus clear.

II

THIS CASE ALSO PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT CONSTI-
TUTIONAL QUESTION: WHETHER THE FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION PROTECTS FROM GOVERNMEN-
TAL INTRUSION THE SELECTION BY CLUB MEM-
BERS OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN THE
MEMBERS’ PRIVATE, SOCIAL, ASSOCIATIONAL
ACTIVITIES.

The ruling below, endorsing the intrusion by the state into the
hiring practices of a private club, violates important freedom of
association rights.

It is beyond dispute that the essence of the Club is its all-male
functions; the central purposes of the Club have always been the
enjoyment of male fellowship and the appreciation of the arts in
an all-male atmosphere (Appx. C, p. 33). The freedom of
association under the First Amendment guarantees the right to
conduct private, social activities without governmental intrusion.
This Court has always recognized “the right of the individual to
pick his own associates so as to express his preferences and
dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and

* None of the lower court cases cited in the ruling below (Appx. A,
pp. 15-16) involved situations where Congress had affirmatively ex-
pressed its intent to leave an area free from government regulation (see
Grann v. City of Madison (7 Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 786, certiorari denied
(1984) 469 U.S. 918; Thomas Pub. Co. v. Division of Human Rights
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) 456 F.Supp. 1104; Local 246, Util. Wkrs. U. v.
Southern California Edison Co. (C.D.Cal. 1970) 320 F.Supp. 1262).
The ruling below also cites several inapposite decisions of this Court that
do not involve employment (Appx. A, p. 16; Savage v. Jones (1912) 225
U.S. 501; Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132; Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 467 U.S. 163) or do not involve a truly
private club protected by the freedom of association (Appx. A, p. 16;
Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609).

14

groups as he chooses” (Evans v. Newton (1966) 382 U.S. 296,
298).”

“The associational rights which our system honors permit all
white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.
* * * Government may not tell a man or woman who his or
her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as
he desires” (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 US.
163, 179-180, Douglas, J., dissenting; cited with approval in
Beard of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte (U.S.
May 4, 1987) 55 U.S.Law Week 4606, 4609, n. 6, ____ US.

nmaniie

This constitutional protection applies without regard to the
popularity or social utility of a club’s ideas, beliefs, or objectives
(N.A.A.C.P. v. Button(1963) 371 U.S. 415, 444-445). The courts
must carefully scrutinize a state’s attempt to regulate private
clubs because of the threat that the state may single out clubs that
endorse unpopular ideas or philosophies. The trial court expressly
found that the Fair Employment and Housing Commission had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in an intentional attack on the
Club and the beliefs of the members:

“The Commission has * * * engaged in arbitrary and
capricious conduct by its prejudgment and bias against the
Club, * * * and its announced motivation and bias against
clubs which discriminate by having only men as members”
(Appx. C, p. 39).

This Court has never delineated the scope of the freedom of
association of truly private associations. The Court has approved
regulation of the United States Jaycees, a nationwide organization
whose local chapters are “large and basically unselective groups”
(Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 621), and
of Rotary Clubs, which “rather than carrying on their activities in
an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their ‘windows and doors

°“Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any
person * * *” (Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 313, Goldberg,
Warren & Douglas, JJ., concurring).

15

open to the world’ ” (Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club
of Duarte (U.S. May 4, 1987) 55 U.S.Law Week 4606, 4609,
__ U.S. ___). The United States Jaycees and Rotary Clubs,
howevc ~. stand in sharp contrast to the Bohemian Club, a non-
commercial private club that has “extremely selective” member-
ship policies (Appx. A, p. 10) and “takes all measures necessary
to insure privacy for members” (Appx. D, p. 47).

The freedom of association protects personal relationships
“distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high
degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S.
609, 620). The key factors include “size, purpose, policies, selec-
tivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular
case may be pertinent” to a particular association (468 U.S. 620).
Under these criteria, the Club is a paradigm of the truly private,
non-commercial, social association protected by the freedom of
association:

Size. The Club’s by-laws strictly limit membership to
1,100 regular members and approximately 900 non-resident,
associate, and other members (Admin.Record, pp. 713-719).
The wait for admission is as long as thirteen years in some
categories (Admin.Record, p. 680).

Purpose. The Club activities are considered as “retreats
from the outside world, and the Grove has been seen as a
natural, rustic setting in which to enjoy male fellowship and
celebrate the arts” (Appx. D, p. 48).

Policies. The Club’s “rules and traditions prohibit mem-
bers and guests from engaging in commercial, trade or
business activities while at the Club or its functions” (Appx.
D, p. 45). The Club by-laws and rules strictly restrict all
disclosure of Club activities to the public (Admin.Record,
pp. 235-238, 737, 741). “At the Grove, access roads leading
into the living and camping area are fenced, the entry roads
have locked gates, and signs are posted along the perimeter
to identify the area as private property. Fourteen security
guards patrol the Grove at all times during the summer

16

events to prevent uninvited persons from entering”
(Appx. D, p. 47).'°

Selectivity. “[{M]embership in the Club is open only to
men connected professionally with or devoted to the arts.
*** Memberships are not based upon business achieve-
ments, and memberships cannot be purchased or sold. * * *
The Club’s membership standards and rules are strictly
enforced” (Appx. D, p. 44). Even a guest at the Grove must
be approved by the board of directors based on his merits and
qualifications (Admin.Record, pp. 733-734).

Congeniality. The Club has a “warmth of fellowship
unmatched in social club history” (Admin.Record, p. 658).
“There is a suspension of disbelief at the Grove; a certain
kind of magic; a certain kind of special illusion which is
created there. This is part and parcel of the setting and the
camaraderie and the psychological intimacy that the Grove
allows” (Admin.Record, p. 365).

Thus, the Club’s private social activities place it far into the
protected end of the spectrum of personal associational relation-
ships. The courts below and the Commission acknowledge that
the Club’s “common purpose is to enjoy the arts in an atmosphere
of male camaraderie” and that “relationship among members is
undoubtedly ‘intimate’ in associational terms,” necessarily receiv-
ing constitutional protection (Appx. A, p. 10). The ruling below
also acknowledges the credibility of the testimony that the pres-
ence of women would intrude upon the “intimate” associational
activities of Club members (Appx. A, p. 19, n. 12).""

'° The Club by-laws provide that “none of the facilities shall at any
time or in any manner be made available to the general public or to any
outside group or organization” (Admin.Record, pp. 735, 738).

'! Club member William F. Buckley, Jr., testified that the presence of
women at the Grove “would make so critical a difference as far as I can
see that I would certainly forfeit my sense of allegiance to it” (Ad-
min.Record, p. 441). Former Governor Edmund G. Brown, who “disa-
gree[d] with almost everything [Mr. Buckley] says,” agreed with Mr.
Buckley’s testimony about the Club and its associational values (Ad-
min.Record, p. 464). Governor Brown testified that the ‘presence of

ee

17

The ruling below holds, however, that the members’ freedom of
association is not violated, as “the Club members’ relationship
with employees cannot reasonably be termed ‘intimate’” (Appx.
A, p. 11; emphasis added). This misses the point: It is the
“intimate” relationship among members that is threatened by the
state regulation of the Club’s employment practices. The state’s
intrusion into those protected activities (by requiring female
employees pervasively throughout the Club’s encampment)
would destroy this “intimate” relationship among members. The
reasoning of the ruling below proves too much: Under that
reasoning, the state could, for example, require the Club to admit
state officials to monitor all Club activities, under the theory that
the Club members’ relationship with the state monitors would not
be “intimate.”

The ruling below suggests, in the alternative, that any infringe-
ment of freedom of association “would be justified by the state’s
compelling interest in eradicating employment discrimination”
(Appx. A, p. 11). However, government regulations limiting
fundamental rights “must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake” (Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S.
113, 155; see Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 US. 1, 44-45;
NAA.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438). The ruling
below concedes that the application of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act to the Club is “ambiguous” and “is not clear”
(Appx. A, p. 4). The state has failed to draw with narrow
specificity a statute covering the Club and its selection of employ-
ees involved with the Club’s associational activities (see
NA.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438)."?

women employees “would change the spirit of the organization” and
would “destroy the Bohemian feeling” (Admin.Record, pp. 466, 468).

'2 Moreover, as discussed above (supra, p. 14), the state’s motivation
in applying the Act to the Club was not to eradicate employment
discrimination. The trial court found that the state’s “action before filing
its accusation and in prosecuting the Club before the Commission
reflects arbitrary and capricious conduct designed to unfairly and preju-
dicially bring enforcement proceedings against the Club because of its
membership” (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, p. 1034). The state singled
out the Club as “a juicy target” simply because state officials viewed the

18

This Court should determine the important and novel question
whether the freedom of association protects from governmental
intrusion the selection by a private club of employees involved in
the Club’s private, social, associational activities.

Club members as “very, very rich and very, very famous” (Ad-
min.Record, p. 1489). That is certainly not a “compelling interest.”

The ruling below relies upon Hishon v. King & Spaulding (1984) 467
U.S. 69 as its sole authority for “the proposition that the impact, if any,
of forced hiring of female employees on Club members’ associational
rights could be justified by the state’s compelling interest in eliminating
employment discrimination” (Appx. A, p. 12). But Hishon holds no
such thing:

“(I]n Hishon v. King and Spaulding, supra,* * * we readily
rejected a large commercial law firm’s claim to First Amendment
protection for alleged gender-based discriminatory partnership de-
cisions for associates of the firm. We found no need to inquire into
any connection between gender as a condition of partnership and
the speech of the law firm, and we undertook no weighing of
‘compelling’ state interests against the speech interests of the law
firm. As a commercial enterprise, the law firm could claim no First
Amendment immunity from employment discrimination laws, and
that result would not have been altered by a showing that the firm
engaged even in a substantial amount of activity entitled to First
Amendment protection” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984)
468 U.S. 609, 637, O’Connor, J., concurring; emphasis added).

In Hishon, the defendant law firm, a commercial business, had simply
“not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function [working as
commercial lawyers] would be inhibited by a requirement that it
consider petitioner for partnership on her merits” (467 U.S. 78). Here,
the Club’s function would be destroyed if—as required by the Commis-
sion—the Club is compelled to hire women throughout the Club
regardless of its activities.

19

Il

A STATE COURT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD IN DETERMINING
WHETHER A STATUTE VIOLATES THE FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE CLUB MEMBERS.

In resolving First Amendment issues, the courts must make an
independent examination of the whole record (NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 915-916, n. 5).
Because of its erroneous view that, “as a matter of law,” the
freedom of association does not protect against governmental
intrusion into the selection of private club employees, the Court of
Appeal refused to make an independent examination of the record
(Appx. A, p. 7 & n. 3).

Moreover, the Court of Appeal erroneously rejected the trial
court’s independent review of the record, on the erroneous theory
that, as a matter of law, the associational rights affected by the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission decision “do not rise
to the level of fundamentally vested interests” (Appx. A, p. 7).
Clearly, the freedom of association is “protect[ed] as a funda-
mental element of personal liberty” (Roberts v. United States
Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 618; see Adcock v. Board of
Education (1975) 10 Cal.3d 60, 66). If the Court of Appeal
intended to say that Club members’ freedom of association was
not “affected” by the application of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act, the Court of Appeal is wrong. The trial court found
—and the evidence is overpowering—that the Club members’
associational activities would be drastically affected by the pres-
ence of female employees at private gatherings (Appx. C, p. 38).

Independent review is especially important in this case, where
the evidence is contained in the administrative record before the
Fair Housing and Employment Commission, rather than in a trial
record before a jury or trial judge.

““When the executive or the administrative process abridges
constitutional rights, it is subject to closer scrutiny than
otherwise, and ultimately it is the court rather than agency
that must balance the competing interests’” (Lebron v.

20

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. (D.C. Cir. 1984) 749
F.2d 893, 897, n. 7; quoting A Quaker Action Group v.
Morton (D.C. Cir. 1975) 516 F.2d 717, 723).

The Court of Appeal’s total rejection of any independent
examination of the record by the courts is without precedent. In
considering the merits of the First Amendment issues in this case
this Court should make independent examination of the whole
record or, at the very least, remand the case to the Court of
Appeal for such a review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should note probable
jurisdiction of this appeal or, in the alternative, regard and grant
this jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM I. EDLUND

MICHAEL H. SALINSKY
COUNSEL OF RECORD

KEVIN M. FONG
Counsel for Appellant

PILLSBURY, MADISON & SUTRO
Of Counsel

(Appendices follow)

x

Appendix A
Certified for Publication

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California
First Appellate District
Division One
A024988

Super.Ct.No.
119026

Bohemian Club,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Vv.

Fair Employment and Housing Commission,
State of California,
Defendant and Appellant,

Department of Fair Employment
and Housing et al.,
Intervenors and Appellants.

[Filed Nov. 20, 1986]

NEWSOM, J.—The Department of Fair Employment and Hous-
ing (hereafter Department) filed an accusation against the Bohe-
mian Club (hereafter Club) for alleged violations of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (hereafter FEHA). The accusa-
tion alleged that the Club, as an employer covered by the FEHA,
had—in violation of the act—pursued a discriminatory hiring
policy which systematically excluded women from all temporary
and permanent jobs at its Monte Rio camp and most of such
positions at its San Francisco location.

The Club denied that it is a covered employer, and, in the
alternative, asserted that male gender is a bona fide occupational
qualification. It also asserted that the FEHA is preempted by
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (Title
VII), which does not include private clubs in its definition of
employers subject to its antidiscrimination provisions.

A-2

The procedural background may be summarized as follows. An
administrative law judge heard the case and ruled that male
gender is a bona fide occupational qualification at the Club. The
Fair Employment and Housing Commission (hereafter Commis-
sion) rejected the judge’s findings and conclusions and issued its
own findings and decision ordering the Club to institute an
affirmative action program to employ women in both San Fran-
cisco and Monte Rio.

Pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Club filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the superior court.

The petition did not name the Department and its director as
real parties in interest; they, however, opposed the petition and
filed their own petition in intervention to set aside the Commis-
sion’s ruling purporting to deny classwide backpay. While the
Commission agreed that the backpay ruling should be set aside,
the trial court, in granting the Club’s petition, denied the petition
in intervention as moot.

On December | and 3, a hearing was held, after which the trial
court issued a tentative ruling granting the Club’s petition. In the
aftermath of attendant publicity, the Commission learned for the
first time that the trial judge had participated in the Club’s
activities, and the Commission’s request that he disqualify him-
self was denied.

The Club’s petition was granted. The trial court held that:
(1) Title VII preempts the FEHA; and (2) even if the FEHA is
not preempted, male gender is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion. The court did not merely order the Commission to set aside
its decision, but also dismissed the underlying accusation against
the Club. While the Club was awarded costs, its cost bill was
subsequently taxed insofar as it claimed attorney’s fees.

Both the Commission and the Department appealed.’ The
Club also appealed from the order denying it attorney’s fees.

' We will hereafter refer to the Commission and Department together
as appellants. :

A-3

A review of the pertinent factual context reveals the following.
The Pohemian Club is a distinguished private nonprofit associa-
tion whose membership is limited to men professing devotion to
the arts. It has a long and honorable history since its inception
more than a century ago and it occupied an important place in the
history of literature in early-day San Francisco. Its approximately
2,000 members are chosen by a highly selective process. Potential
members are interviewed extensively and must be devoted to the
arts, or willing to participate in artistic activities.

The Club’s activities take place at two different locations: the
City Club in San Francisco and the Grove, a 2,500 acre camping
area near Monte Rio, California. Members attend concerts,
theatrical and musical productions, oratorical presentations, lake-
side talks and other functions.

The Club permanently employs 90 men in managerial, clerical,
craft, food preparation and service, cleaning and personal service
positions at its San Francisco location. Women are employed in
positions which do not require their presence at Club functions. In
accordance with this policy, women work in accounting and
administrative positions and at the print shop. Women also clean
rooms and may be hired as food servers for members’ private
parties. At the Grove, a permanent work force of about 10
employees is maintained. These permanent staff members super-
vise a temporary work force of 250 men hired during the annual
retreats at the Grove.

The Club’s general manager testified that employees are prima-
rily hired through union referrals and from the area around the
Grove. When the union cannot provide an employee, the Club
goes to the state employment department and sometimes even
hires “off the street.” Don Hiemforth, a member of the local Food
Servers’ Union, who has frequently worked at the Club, testified
that, to his knowledge, referrals from the union have never been
refused.

One waiter frequently employed at the Club testified concern-
ing the Club’s policy against fraternization between employees
and members and guests. Waiters, for example, are not permitted
to remain in the dining room at the City Club during the

A-4

Thursday night club functions staged after dinner has been
served. Such employees are strictly instructed to maintain rela-
tions with members at a minimal, exclusively business level.

Similar rules at the Grove prohibit fraternization between
employees and members. The Club’s general manager conceded
that Grove employees are prohibited from fraternizing with mem-
bers, and testified as well that employees are not permitted use of
the swimming facilities.

The first legal question to be addressed in the present appeal is
whether the Bohemian Club, as a private nonprofit corporation, is
subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act. (Gov. Code, § 12920 et seq.)

The Fair Employment and Housing Act is a comprehensive
scheme for the realization of the state’s public policy “to protect
and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek,
obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridge-
ment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status,
sex, or age.” (Gov. Code, § 12920.)

Under Government Code section 12926, subdivision (c), the
term employer “does not include a religious association or corpo-
ration not organized for private profit.” The Club accordingly
contends that, as a nonprofit corporation, it is exempted from the
antidiscrimination provisions of the FEHA. Appellants assert
however, that the word “religious” modifies both “association”
and “corporation not organized for private profit.” (Gov. Code
§ 12926, subd. (c).) Thus, under appellants’ interpretation the
exemption would only apply to the Club if it were a religious
nonprofit corporation. The language at issue is ambiguous; it is
not clear whether “religious” only modifies “association” or
whether it also refers to a nonprofit corporation. This ambiguity is
resolved, however, by a review of the pertinent legislative history.
(Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570 [194
Cal.Rpir. 480, 668 P.2d 787].}

When Government Code section 12926, subdivision (c) was
originally enacted, the term employer did not “include a social
club, fraternal, charitable, educational or religious association or

Bie.»

A-5

corporation not organized for private profit.” (Lab. Code, § 1413,
subd. (d).) Under the amended version, however, the Legislature
deleted social clubs, as well as fraternal, charitable, and educa-
tional organizations from the statutory exemption. “Where the
amendment of a statute consists of the deletion of an express
provision, the presumption is that a substantial change in the law
was intended.” (Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com.
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 842, 844 [31 Cal.Rptr. 477, 382 P.2d 597]
citing Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 231
[273 P.2d 5]; see also Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25
Cal.3d 14, 26 [157 Cal.Rptr. 706, 598 P.2d 866]; Ladd v. Board
of Trustees (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 984, 990 [100 Cal.Rptr. 571 ].)

By specifically deleting “social clubs” from the statutory ex-
emption, it appears that the legislature no longer wished to afford
such entities an exemption from the nondiscrimination policies of
the FEHA. Moreover, the deletion of charitable organizations,
which are by nature nonprofit, clearly indicates that the term
religious was intended to modify both “association” and “corpora-
tion not organized for private profit.” Had the legislature simply
intended, as respondent suggests, to exempt all nonprofit corpora-
tions, it seems unlikely that it would have deleted charitable
organizations from the exemption provision. In any event, we
conclude that the adjective “religious” must be read as modifying
both “association” and “corporation not organized for private
profit.” And, upon this reading of the statute, we conclude that
only religious associations or nonprofit corporations are exempt
from the antidiscrimination provisions of FEHA, and that appel-
lants do not fall within this exempt category.’

? The Club relies on Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985)
40 Cal.3d 72 [219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212] for the proposition that
nonprofit corporations are not considered employers under the FEHA.
In Isbister, the Boys’ Club argued that the FEHA coniained an express
exemption for “‘association[s] or corporation[s] not organized for
private profit” and that “by excluding ‘nonprofit’ groups from the
housing and employment laws, the Legislature demonstrated its intent
that the phrase ‘business establishments,’ as used in the Unruh Act,
should have a strictly commercial meaning.” (/d., at p. 83.)

A-6

Appellants assert that the trial court was limited to determining
whether substantial evidence supported the Commission’s find-
ings, and that it erred in using the independent judgment standard
of review.

Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes
judicial review of administrative decisions. When it is claimed
that the administrative findings are not supported by the evidence,
“the statute contemplates that the court will apply either the
independent judgment test or the substantial evidence test... .”
(Kerrigan v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1979) 91
Cal.App.3d 43, 48 [154 Cal.Rptr. 29].) “[I]f the order or
decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested
right, the court, in determining under section 1094.5 of the Code
of Civil Procedure whether there has been an abuse of discretion
because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an
abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight
of the evidence. If, on the other hand, the order or decision does
not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial
court’s inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not
the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the
whole record.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Re-
tirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 44-45 [112 Cal.Rptr. 805,
520 P.2d 29].) “Whether an administrative decision substantially
affects a fundamental, vested right so as to require independent
judgment review must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”

The court rejected this contention and cited the FEHA’s express
provision that “ ‘nothing contained in this part shall be construed, in any
manner or way, to limit or restrict the application of Section 51 of the
Civil Code [i.e., the Unruh Act].’” (/d., at p. 84.) Thus, the court did
not interpret the FEHA’s exemption provision. And significantly, the
exemption provision was only quoted in part; the word “religious,” which
precedes, and thus modifies, “association and corporation not organized
for private profit,” was omitted. It is thus clear that our high court did
not address the question here at issue—namely, whether the legislative
history of the FEHA indicates an intent to exempt a private social club,
which also happens to be a nonprofit corporation, from the Act’s
antidiscrimination provisions.

A-7

(Kerrigan v. Fair Employment Practice Com., supra, 91
Cal.App.3d at p. 49.)

The Club contends that “it is the constitutional right of every
person to close his... club to any person... .” (Bell v. Maryland
(1964) 378 U.S. 226, 313 [12 L.Ed.2d 822, 848, 84 S.Ct. 1814]),
and that accordingly, the forced hiring of women would violate
the Club members’ right of freedom of association, a fundamental
right triggering the independent judgment test.

In Adcock v. Board of Education (1973) 10 Cal.3d 60 [109
Cal.Rptr. 676, 513 P.2d 900], our high court stated that it is
“essential to adopt a special rule or standard to review administra-
tive decisions when constitutional rights are assertedly limited.
[ Citations. ]” (/d., at pp. 65-66; see also Kerrigan v. Fair Employ-
ment Practice Com., supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 52; Franklin v.
Leland Stanford Junior University (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 322,
330-331 [218 Cal.Rptr. 228].) Because the protected constitu-
tional right of free speech was manifestly implicated in Adcock,
the court concluded that the independent judgment test was the
proper standard of review. (10 Cal.3d at p. 69.)

For reasons we will discuss at length later in this opinion, we
find in the present record that such associational or privacy
interests of members as are implicated do not rise to the level of
fundamental vested interests for which an independent judicial
evaluation and judgment are traditionally required. We conclude,
on the contrary, that the conventional substantial evidence test
was the proper standard for the trial court’s review of the
administrative record.3-4

3 We will add, however, that our conclusions on the substantive issues
presented in this appeal do not depend upon which standard of review
should have been employed by the trial court. As will be apparent, given
the state of the evidence we are able to resolve such issues as a matter of
law and without regard to whether the trial court was obliged to limit its
review by the substantial evidence rule or free to exercise its indepen-
dent judgment.

4 As was said in Guesby v. Kennedy (D.Kan. 1984) 580 F.Supp. 1280,
“We believe that in the context of an employment relationship, the

A-8

Among the Club’s principal substantive contentions is that the
forced hiring of women violates members’ constitutional right of
association; therefore, it is argued the FEHA’s inclusion of private
clubs in its antidiscrimination provisions is unconstitutional. In so
arguing, the Club relies on the following language from Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery (1974) 417 U.S. 556 [41 L.Ed.2d 304, 94
S.Ct. 2416]: “ “The associational rights which our system honors
permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be
formed. ... Government may not tell a man or woman who his or
her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he
desires.’” (Jd., at p. 575 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 320]; quoting Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 U.S. 163, 179-180 [32 L.Ed.2d
627, 641, 92 S.Ct. 1965] (dis. opn. of Douglas, J.) The Club also
directs us to the following language of our Supreme Court:
“[p]rejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable... [al-
though] it is the constitutional right of every person to close his
home or club to any person...” (Bell v. Maryland, supra, 378
U.S. 226, 313 [12 L.Ed.2d 882, 848] (conc. opn. of Goldberg,

J.).)

Quite apart from the fact that Gilmore and related
cases—unlike the case at bench—involve the relationship of
member to member and not member to employee, these sweeping
statements have been significantly modified by subsequent deci-
sions of our high court. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees
(1984) 468 U.S. 609 [82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244], in
upholding the application of a Minnesota human rights statute
compelling the Jaycees to accept women as full voting members,
the court flatly rejected the Jaycees’ claim that the inclusion of
women would violate their right to freedom of association, observ-
ing that the Constitution protected only “intimate” and “expres-
sive” associational rights. The first aspect of associational freedom
protects “the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly
personal relationships....” (Jd. at p. 618 [82 L.Ed.2d at
p. 471].) An individual’s choice “to enter into and maintain
certain intimate human relationships must be secured against
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relation-

scope of the right of association is much more limited than in the
context of membership in an organization.” (/d., at p. 1284.)

A-9

ships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme.” (/d., at pp. 617-618 [82 L.Ed.2d at p.
471].) The second aspect of associational freedom encompasses
an individual’s “right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, as-
sembly, petition for the redress of grievences [sic], and the
exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of
association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving
other individual liberties.” (Jd., at p. 618 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 471].)

Because the Jaycees did not have selective membership stan-
dards, the only criteria being age and sex, the court found that no
“intimate” associational rights would be infringed by the inclusion
of women as full voting members. (/d., at p. 621 [82 L.Ed.2d at
p. 473].) The Roberts court also rejected the Jaycees’ claim that
their right of “expressive” association would be violated by the
inclusion of women. While recognizing that the Jaycees dominant
purpose had been to further the social and political views of young
men, the court refused to entertain what it termed “stereotypical”
assumptions that the presence of women members would thwart
or stultify these “expressive” activities necessary to implementing
that purpose. (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S.
at p. 628 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 479].)

It bears repetition that we are of course confronted here with
the impact of women employees upon the Club, and nothing in
the discussion which now follows bears upon the wholly separate
issue of women as members. And, in assessing this impact, our
first inquiry is whether hiring females would unduly interfere with
the Club’s “intimate” associational rights under Roberts.’ Also, in
determining the intimacy of a relationship, and the corresponding
entitlement to protection from state intrusion, pertinent factors we
should consider include: “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, con-

* Our high court held that “even if enforcement of the Act cause[d]
some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate
purposes.” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 628
[82 L.Ed.2d at p. 478].)

A-10

geniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may
be pertinent.” (/d., at p. 620 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 473].)

As we have said, the Club’s membership consists of approxi-
mately 2,000 men whose common purpose is to enjoy the arts in
an atmosphere of male camaraderie. But while the Club’s mem-
bership policy is extremely selective, and the consequent relation-
ship among members is undoubtedly “intimate” in associational
terms, the same cannot be said for the associational rights of
members vis 4 vis employees. As the Club’s manager testified,
little is known concerning employees at hiring. Such testimony
was corroborated by a member of the local food servers union who
declared that, to his knowledge, the Club had never refused
anybody referred by the union. In short, the record amply demon-
strates that the Club’s hiring procedure is not selective.

We are obliged to carefully consider as well whether the Club’s
purposes of promoting male fellowship and appreciation of the
arts would be undermined by hiring female employees in selective
capacities. In this respect, it seems highly relevant that, according
to the Club’s manager, employees are prohibited from fraterniz-
ing with the members. It is difficult to understand how, for
example, the presence of women cooks or food servers would
inhibit realization of the Club’s purposes in view of this non-
fraternization rule. Indeed, the existence of that rule renders
implausible any assertion that the Club’ s “intimate” associational
rights would be infringed by hiring female employees. Nothing in
the present record demonstrates that the members have so
“highly personal a relationship” with employees as to warrant
protection from state intrusion.

The Club nevertheless contends that the mere presence of
women on a regular basis “would change the spirit of the
organization” and would “destroy the Bohemian feeling.” The
eminent author and editor, William F. Buckley, Jr.—himself a
Bohemian—testified that the presence of women employees at
the Grove “would make so critical a difference as far as I can see

A-11

that I would certainly forfeit my sense of allegiance to it.” Such
feelings,—however sensitive and genuine,—are not afforded con-
stitutional protection, however, for—we repeat—the right to free-
dom of association only protects “highly personal” relationships
(Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 618 [82
L.Ed.2d at p. 471]),’ and the Club members’ relationship with
employees cannot reasonably be termed “intimate” within the
letter or spirit of the high court’s careful exegesis of that term.

The Club makes a corollary contention that hiring women
employees would violate its privacy rights, citing White v. Davis
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 757 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222], for the
proposition that “‘[t]he right of privacy... [encompasses the]
freedom to associate with the people we choose.’” (Jd., at
p. 774); as we have already said, however, Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, establishes the rule that the
constitutional right of association protects only “intimate” rela-
tionships, while here members’ relationships with employees are
neither “highly personal” nor “intimate.”

Even were we to assume arguendo that the members’ associa-
tional rights would somehow be constricted by the Club’s forced
hiring of women, we think such infringement would be justified by
the state’s compelling interest in eradicating employment dis-
crimination. Again we are guided by high authority. In Hishon v.
King & Spalding (1984) 467 U.S. 69 [81 L.Ed.2d 59, 104 S.Ct.
2229], plaintiff asserted that she had been unlawfully denied
partnership status in a law firm on the basis of sex. The Supreme
Court found that plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim under
Title VII and rejected the law firm’s claim of infringement of its
associational rights, stating: “ ‘[I]nvidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of associa-

° It may be observed that, as the record here shows, during World
War II the Club employed women without apparent damage to its
tradition.

’ We need not address the question of whether the Club’s “expres-
sive” right of association would be infringed because the thrust of the

Club’s argument is that the presence of women would destroy the
initimate all-male atmosphere.

A-12

tion protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.’” (/d., at p. 78
[81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 68-69].) In a concurring opinion, Justice
Powell noted that laws barring discrimination may well infringe
first amendment rights: “The court’s opinion properly reminds us
that ‘invidious private discrimination . . . has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protections.’ . . . This is not to say, how-
ever, that enforcement of laws that ban discrimination will always
be without cost to other values, including constitutional rights.
Such laws may impede the exercise of personal judgment in
choosing one’s associates or colleagues.” (/d., at p. 80, fn. 4 [81
L.Ed.2d at p. 70].) We read Hishon as authority for the proposi-
tion that the impact, if any, of forced hiring of female employees
on Club members’ associational rights could be justified by the
state’s compelling interest in eliminating employment
discrimination.

The Club also asserts that the Fair Employment and Housing
Act’s inclusion of private clubs within its antidiscrimination
provisions is inconsistent with, and thus superseded by, Title VII,
which in section 701, subdivision (b) specifically exempts private
clubs from its antidiscrimination strictures.’

In deciding whether a federal law preempts a state statute,
“[o]ur task is ‘to determine whether, under the circumstances of
this particular case, [the State’s] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.’ ” (Jones v. Rath Packing Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 519,
526 [51 L.Ed.2d 604, 614, 97 S.Ct. 1305].) The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “[c]ongress enacted
Title VII to assure equality of employment opportunities without
distinction with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” (Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. (1982) 456
U.S. 461, 468 [72 L.Ed.2d 262, 272, 102 S.Ct. 1883], citing

* Section 701, subdivision (b) of Title VII provides that the term
“employer” does not include “a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under
section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954....” (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b).)

A-13

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36, 44 [39
L.Ed.2d 147, 155, 94 S.Ct. 1011] and McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 800 [36 L.Ed.2d 668, 676-677, 93
S.Ct. 1817].) With these principles in mind, we examine the
question of whether the FEHA is preempted by Title VII.

As the Club observes, the private club exemption in Title VII
was, in the words of Senator Humphrey, designed to protect “the
genuine privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose
membership is genuinely seiective on some reasonable basis.”
(110 Cong.Rec. (June 13, 1964) 13697.)° Accordingly, the Club
argues, under section 1104 of Title XI, a preemption provision of
the Civil Rights Act, the FEHA’s inclusion of private clubs is
fatally inconsistent with Title VII and cannot stand. Section 1104
provides: “[N]othing contained in any title of this Act shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to
occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion
of State laws on the same subject matter, not shall any provision
of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law
unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of
this Act, or any provision thereof.” (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4.)
(Italics added. )

The Club also cites Kemerer v. Davis (E.D. Mich. 1981) 520
F.Supp. 256, for the proposition that application of antidis-
crimination legislation to private clubs is inconsistent with Title
VII. In Kemerer, the court held that the application of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981) to the employment
practices of a private club would conflict with section 701,
subdivision (b) of Title VII. The court stated: “If applied
literally, 1981 would reach within private establishments pro-

*See also EEOC v. St. Joseph Hospital East Inc. (W.D. Tenn. 1979)
19 F.E.P. 1439, 1440 (“The legislative history of Title VII rather clearly
indicates that Congress drafted § 701(b) to preserve social and fraternal
organizations of self-controlled membership as a refuge for private
associational values.”); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.
(D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573, 577 (“In Title II, Congress sought to
preserve a small non-commerical enclave for the unfettered exercise of
the freedom of association... .”)

A-14

tected by the 1964 Act; the two statutes, thus, are in conflict.”
(/d., at p. 258.) The court concluded that private clubs were
impliedly exempted from the provisions of 1981 by virtue of the
conflicting and therefore superseding exemption set forth in Title
VII. (/d., at p. 260.) (See also Hudson v. Charlotte Country
Club, Inc. (W.D.N.C. 1982) 535 F.Supp. 313, 317.)"°

Kemerer involved two federal statutes, however. In Kemerer v.
Chemical Construction Corp. (1981) 456 U.S. 461 [72 L.Ed.2d
262, 102 S.Ct. 1883], the court discussed the relationship be-
tween two federal statutes and observed that “whenever possible,
statutes should be read consistently.” (/d., at p. 468 [72 L.Ed.2d
at p. 271].) This was accomplished in Kemerer by finding the
earlier federal statute preempted by the later, thereby effectively
incorporating a subsequently enacted exemption into the 1866
Civil Rights Act. (See also Hunter v. Erickson (1969) 393 U.S.
385, 388 [21 L.Ed.2d 616, 620, 89 S.Ct. 557].) The question
presented here, however, is whether states have the power to
enact broader antidiscrimination legislation than that provided by
Title VII.

In arguing that the states retain such power, appellants rely on
section 708, the “savings” clause of title VII, which provides as
follows: “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt
or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-
ment provided by any present or future law of any State of
political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be
an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.”

In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85 [77
L.Ed.2d 490, 103 S.Ct. 2890], our nation’s high court said of
section 708: “... Title VII does not itself prevent States from
extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by
Title VII, see § 708, 78 Stat 262, 42 USC § 2000e-7 ... . Quite
simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employment
practices it does not prohibit.” (Jd. at p. 103 [72 L.Ed.2d at

'° For a contrary view, see Guesby v. Kennedy, supra, 580 F.Supp.
1280, 1286, where the court held that Title VII’s private club exemption
does not apply to § 1981 actions.

ee Sen sa atl «

A-15

p. 505].) Thus, states may extend “their nondiscrimination laws
to areas not covered by Title VII ....” (Jbid.) In Government
Code section 12926, subdivision (c), California’s Act extends its
nondiscrimination policies to private clubs, an area not covered by
Title VII, a result section 708, as interpreted in Shaw, permits.

A number of cases have interpreted section 708 as preserving
state laws which further Title VII's objective of eliminating
employment discrimination. In Grann v. City of Madison (7th
Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 786, for example, the court held that section
708 was designed to save state laws which are “consistent with the
goals of Title VII while invalidating those that hindered protec-
tion of civil rights.” (Id., at p. 792.) The court also noted that
section 1104, the preemption provision upon which the Club
relies, “should not be construed to undermine state efforts [in
eliminating employment discrimination.]” (Jd., at p. 791.)

We find further support for appellants’ position in Thomas Pub.
Co. v. Division of Human rights (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 456 F.Supp.
1104, rejecting the argument that Title VII preempted New
York’s Human Rights Law and holding that “even if the Human
Rights Law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were inconsis-
tent with respect to pregnancy disabililty benefits, this inconsis-
tency would not be of a nature requiring supersedure or
preemption of the state law by federal law.” (/d., at p. 1108.) The
court concluded that the Human Rights Law in no way interfered
with Title VII's purpose of eliminating employment discrimina-
tion and hence was not subject to preemption. (/bid.) And in
Local 246, Util. Wkrs. U. v. Southern California Edison Co.
(C.D.Ca. 1970) 320 F.Supp. 1262, 1264, it was held that the
purpose of section 1104, the preemption provision, and section
708, the “savings” clause, “is to insure preservation of state laws
which parallel the Federal Act in prohibiting employment dis-
crimination, such as California’s recently amended Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act.”

We similarly find that, even though the FEHA’s inclusion of
private clubs may be facially inconsistent with Title VII, the
inconsistency is not “of a nature requiring supersedure or preemp-
tion of the state law by federal law.” (Thomas Pub. Co. v.
Division of Human Rights, supra, 456 F.Supp. at p. 1108.) The

A-16

inclusion of private clubs in no way hinders Title VII’s overriding
objective of eliminating employment discrimination. Contrary to
the Club’s simplistic interpretation of section 1104, the term
“inconsistent” must be interpreted by focusing primarily upon
whether a law furthers Title VII’s goal of eliminating employment
discrimination. Laws which hinder the protection of civil rights
are inconsistent with Title VII’s purpose, and thus subject to
preemption. (Grann v. City of Madison, supra, 738 F.2d at p.
792.)

In our view, the fact that Congress has acted to limit the scope
of federal regulation does not necessarily indicate an intent to
preempt a state’s exercise of its police power. As our high court
has stated: “[T]he intent to supersede the exercise by the state of
its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legisla-
tion is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has
seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited
field.” (Savage v. Jones (1912) 225 U.S. 501, 533 [56 L.Ed.
1182, 1195, 32 S.Ct. 715]; see also Florida Avocado Growers v.
Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 146 [10 L.Ed.2d 248, 259, 83 S.Ct.
1210].) In the area of discrimination, the police power of states to
regulate private discrimination has often been sustained despite
lack of federal coverage of such discrimination, either by congres-
sional choice or constitutional limitation. In Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, supra, 407 U.S. 163, for example, the court held that the
equal protection clause could not be invoked to prohibit the
discriminatory actions by a private club which held a state liquor
license. In contrast, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra,
468 U.S. 609, the state's right to regulate discrimination in a
private club’s membership selection was upheld.

Appellants contend, and we agree, that limited federal regula-
tion of discrimination does not necessarily indicate a congres-
sional intent to preempt state laws with broader
antidiscrimination provisions. We subscribe to the view that
congressional reluctance to extend coverage of this antidis-
crimination law to private clubs acting as employers is not a
purpose of the statute. And as one commentator in the field has
succinctly said, “... congressional concern... [over] congres-
sional refusal to extend a federal statute to include particular

A-17

entities is hardly a prohibition of the states doing so.” (Garcia,
Title VII Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Private Club
Employment Practices (1983) 34 Hastings L.J. 1107, 1130.)

We follow the authority of the United States Supreme Court:
“Quite simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employ-
ment practices it does not prohibit.” Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
supra, 463 U.S. at p. 103 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 505]. Because states
can extend antidiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title
VII, we conclude that the FEHA is not preempted by Title VII."
(Ibid.)

Another of the Club’s key contentions is that male gender is a
bona fide occupational qualification for Club employees which
justifies its exclusion of female employees.

The Fair Employment and Housing Act provides that a dis-
criminatory employment practice is not unlawful if it is based
upon a “bona fide occupational qualification” (hereafter BFOQ).
(Gov. Code, § 12940.) At the same time, however, the availabil-
ity of a BFOQ defense is “an extremely narrow exception to the
general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.”
(Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 334 [53 L.Ed.2d
786, 800, 97 S.Ct. 2720]; see also County of Alameda v. Fair
Employment & Housing Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 499, 506
[200 Cal.Rptr. 381]; Long v. State Personnel Bd. (1974) 41
Cal.App.3d 1000, 1016 [116 Cal.Rptr. 562].) Hence, “the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination requires . . . that in order to rely on the
bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has
the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved.” (Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Company (Sth Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 228, 235; see also

'! The Club further contends that the state may not exercise its police
power to regulate private discrimination when such regulations are
inconsistent with the purpose of federal law. This contention, however, is
subsumed within the general question of whether Title VII preempts the
Fair Employment and Housing Act and accordingly, need not be
separately addressed.

A-18

Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. (Sth Cir. 1976) 531 F.2d 224,
228 fn. 10.) Even if an employer can demonstrate that certain
jobs require members of one sex, the employer must also “bear
the burden of proving that because of the nature of the operation
of the business they could not rearrange job responsibilities . . .”
in order to reduce the BFOQ necessity. (Hardin v. Stynchcomb
(11th Cir. 1982) 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-1371; see also Gunther v.
Iowa State Men's Reform. (8th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d 1079, 1086,
cert. den. (1980) 446 U.S. 966 [64 L.Ed2d 825, 100 S.Ct.
2942].)

The Fair Employment and Housing Commission has inter-
preted the BFOQ defense in a manner incorporating all of the
federal requirements necessary for its establishment. Under the
Commission’s regulations: “Where an employer or other covered
entity has a practice which on its face excludes an entire group of
individuals on a basis enumerated in the Act (e.g., all women or
all individuals with lower back defects), the employer or other
covered entity must prove that the practice is justified because all
or substantially all of the excluded individuals are unable to safely
and efficiently perform the job in question and because the
essence of the business operation would otherwise be under-
mined.” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2, § 7286.7, subd. (a).)

“(a) Among situations which will not justify the application of
the BFOQ defense are the following:

“(3) Customer preference for employees of one sex;

“(4) The necessity for providing separate facilities for one sex;
or

“(5) The fact that members of one sex have traditionally been
hired to perform the particular type of job.

“(b) Personal privacy considerations may justify a BFOQ only
where:

“(1) The job requires an employee to observe other individuals
in a state of nudity or to conduct body searches, and

A-19

“(2) It would be offensive to prevailing social standards to
have an individual of the opposite sex present, and

“(3) It is detrimental to the mental or physical welfare of
individuals being observed or searched to have an individual of
the opposite sex present.

“(c) Employers or other covered entities shall assign job
duties and make other reasonable accommodation so as to mini-
mize the number of jobs for which sex is a BFOQ.” (Cal. Admin.
Code, tit. 2, § 7290.8).

The standards of the Commission are thus seen to be in
harmony with federal law regarding the availability of a BFOQ
defense. And, as the Commission correctly observes, its interpre-
tation of the act it enforces is entitled to great respect. Gay Law
Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458,
491 [15u Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592]; Dermegerdich vy. Rank
(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 848, 851 [199 Cal.Rptr. 30].

The Club argues that the presence of women employees would
undermine the essence of its business operation, and that accord-
ingly, male gender is a valid BFOQ under the FEHA. The Club
cites the following testimony in support of its contention that the
presence of women would destroy the essence or character of its
operations. In the words of former Governor Edmund G. Brown:
“*( W Jhat really is important is the spirit of camaraderie, the male
camaraderie where men get together and they are free of the
element of the battle of the sexes or the competition or distraction
of having the other sex present. It is a single-sex gathering, and
that is a very special thing.” Yet another member commented: “It
is a social experience, the kind that this particular club seeks to
provide you, that requires a total affinity of gender. People do
behave differently where there are women... It’s an argument
tha’ when there are women waitresses, the situation alters. And it
would certainly alter in the dining circle or in the auditorium or
anywhere else in that camp.”’? Other testimony, however, indi-
cated that the Club had never received complaints about one of

'2 We intend no denigration of the sincerity or accuracy of such
sentiments. They are, however, to be measured against the counter-

A-20

the Club’s longstanding female employees, Ms. Lily Lum, who
works as a food server during lunch at the City Club. Two cases
cited by appellants, Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (5th
Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 385, cert. den. (1971) 404 U.S. 950 [30
L.Ed.2d 267, 92 S.Ct. 275], and Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.(9th
Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 1273, refute the Club’s legal contention that
customer preference can form the basis of a BFOQ defense.

In Diaz, an employer attempted to justify its exclusion of male
flight attendants by claiming that female flight attendants pro-
vided a more pleasant environment. Despite evidence produced
by the airlines that passengers overwhelmingly preferred female
flight attendants, the court rejected the BFOQ defense, explain-
ing: “We do not feel this alone justifies discriminating against all
males. . .. Before sex discrimination can be practiced, it must not
only be shown that it is impracticable to find the men that possess
the abilities that most women possess, but that the abilities are
necessary to the business, not merely tangential.” (442 F.2d 385,
388-389.) Thus, because the essence of the airline’s business was
the safe transport of passengers, and the pleasant atmosphere
created by female flight attendants was merely tangential thereto,
the court concluded that female gender was not a BFOQ (Jd., at
p. 389.)

In Fernandez, the court again rejected a BFOQ defense, in the
face of evidence which showed that South American customers
might refuse to deal with women. The court found “no factual
basis for linking sex with job performance.” (653 F.2d 1273,
1276; italics added.) Customer preference was considered irrele-
vant because a woman could perform the job as readily as a man.
Both Fernandez and Diaz stand for the proposition that BFOQ
defenses cannot be established on the basis of stereotypical
gender-based assumptions. ~

In the case at bench, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes
that club members prefer male employees. The preference is
presumably based upon assumptions concerning the inhibiting
effect women employees might have upon men. These are,

vailing constitutional rights of persons to be free from invidious discrimi-
nation in hiring.

A-21

however, mere stereotypical assumptions, lacking in any factual
basis. Moreover, because of the nonfraternization policy and lack
of selectivity in hiring employees, such male tellowship as might
exist between club members and employees is clearly in a legal
sense tangential. (Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., supra,
442 F.2d at pp. 388-389.)

The trial court erred in disregarding the principles laid down in
Fernandez and Diaz as inapposite for the reason that, in its view,
those cases dealt with commercial enterprises. That the Club is a
private club does not exempt it from high legal authority which
unequivocally declares that employment decisions cannot be
predicated upon “stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”
(Dothard v. Rawlinson, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 333 [53 L.Ed.2d at
p. 800]; see also City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart (1978) 435 U.S. 702, 707 [55 L.Ed.2d 657, 664-665, 98
S.Ct. 1370], on remand 577 F.2d 98; Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pacific Company (9th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-1225;
Thorne v. City of El Segundo (9th Cir. 1983) 726 F.2d 459, 468,
cert. den. 469 U.S. 979 [83 L.Ed.2d 315, 105 S.Ct. 380].) As an
employer subject to the provisions of the FEHA, the Club must
abide by the same rules which govern all California employers.

As we have already said, while the relationship among club
members is certainly not commercial, that between employees
and members can be described as almost exclusively commercial
in nature. Employees are hired “sight-unseen” through union
referrals. As earlier noted, the Club’s own manager testified that
very little is known about employees when they are hired. Most
positions do not require written applications. The parties, in fact,
stipulated that applications, when required, ask for only minimal
personal information, and the only selection criteria in the hiring
process are gender and the appearance of ability to de the job. At
Monte Rio, employees are hired as seasonal laborers. The rela-
tionship between members and employees can fairly be described
as transitory and business-like, rather than intimate.

The Club also contends that its members’ privacy interests
establish a BFOQ, noting that many shower and bathroom
facilities are unenclosed and that members walk about the camp
in various states of undress. Claims of-a BFOQ based on privacy

A-22

interests have been upheld if the job actually requires the em-
ployee to carry out such intimate duties. (Fese/ v. Masonic Home
of Del. Inc. (D.Del. 1978) 447 F.Supp. 1346, affd. (3d Cir.
1979) 591 F.2d 1334.)

Club members’ privacy interests, however, need not be
threatened because enclosed shower and bathroom facilities are
available. If a member chooses not to use the enclosed facilities,
no legally enforceable right of privacy is impaired. Thus, in Forts
v. Ward (2d Cir. 1980) 621 F.2d 1210, 1217, the court ordered
shower screens and sleeping garments for prison inmates, refusing
to hold that the inmates’ privacy interests encompassed a prefer-
ence for sleeping nude, when such preference would eliminate
equal employment opportunities for male guards. Similarly, Club
members’ privacy interests do not encompass a legally protectible
right to use unenclosed bathroom or shower facilities.

In sum, Diaz and Fernandez establish that customer preference
cannot from the basis of a BFOQ defense. Finding the reasoning
of these authorities persuasive, and for all of the reasons we have
stated, we also conclude that male gender is not a BFOQ for Club
employees.

Two remaining issues require only brief discussion.

First is the Club’s contention that, in finding appellants’ con-
duct arbitrary and capricious, the trial court bound itself to award
the Club attorney fees under Government Code section 800, and
erred in refusing such fees. We disagree, first, because the word
“may” in section 800 indicates that the award is discretionary
(Fair v. Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 876 [172
Cal.Rptr. 379]) and second, because the court also—and we
think correctly—concluded that “the case involve[d] . . . novel
and complicated issues...” and that it was a “bona fide legal
dispute of great importance... .”

Finally, we are asked by appellants to permit correction of
errors contained in the petition on intervention. For the following
reasons we agree.

The instant case was initiated by the Director of the Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing, who filed a complaint

~~ 6 be A ae eh

A-23

authorized by Government Code section 12960. The Director
then issued an accusation based on the complaint, which chal-
lenged the club’s practices of excluding female employees. The
complaint and accusation therein did not name any women as
parties or seek backpay on their behalf.

The Commission, while the case was pending before it, re-
ceived a class action notice, in a separate complaint filed against
the Club by one Carol Esses, a woman who had been denied
employment by the Club. Carol Esses’ complaint was mistakenly
included in the record of the instant case. When ruling on this
case, the Commission also ruled on the Esses complaint and
denied an award of backpay.

The portions of the Commission’s decision which denied
backpay to members of Carol Esses’ class action complaint were
challenged in the petition in intervention. The Commission agrees
that it had no authority to decide issues not raised in a pending
case and which concern persons who are not parties.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission is
only empowered to hold a hearing and issue a decision when an
accusation, based upon a complaint, is pending before the agency.
(Gov. Code, §§ 11503 and 12967.) Since no accusation was ever
filed on the Esses complaint, the commission lacked authority to
decide the issues it raises. The case is accordingly remanded to
the Commission for rectification. (Department of Alcoholic Bev.
Control v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d
720, 727 [173 Cal.Rptr. 582]; Flaherty v. Board of Retirement
(1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 397, 406 [18 Cal.Rptr. 256].)

That part of the judgment denying the Club attorney’s fees is
affirmed. In all other respects the judgment is reversed with
directions to the trial court to reinstate the Commission’s findings.
The parties shall bear their own costs."

Racanelli, P. J., and Holmdahl, J., concurred.

'3 This judgment in no way precludes the Club from attempting to
demonstrate that male gender is a BFOQ for particular employment
positions.

A-24

APPENDIX B

Order Denying Review

After Judgment by the Court of Appeal
lst District, Division 1, No. AO24988 |
In the Supreme Court of the State of California
In Bank

Bohemian Club,
Appellant,

Vv.

Fair Employment and Housing Commission et al.,
Appellants.

[Filed Feb. 26, 1987]
Petition for review of appellant Bohemian Club DENIED.

LUCAS
Chief Justice

A-25

Appendix C

In the Superior Court of the
State of California,
in and for the County of Sonoma

No. 119026

Bohemian Club,
Petitioner,

vs.

Fair Employment and Housing Commission,
State of California,
Respondent.

Department of Fair Employment
and Housing and Joanne A. Lewis,
Director and Complainant,
Real Parties in Interest
and Intervenors.

STATEMENT OF DECISION
[Filed Sept. 12, 1983]

This matter came on for trial before the Court on December 1
and 3, 1982 on the petition of the Bohemian Club (“petitioner” or
“Club”), pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, for a writ of mandamus commanding the Fair Employment
and Housing Commission (“respondent” or “Commission”) to
set aside its decision and order dated October 14, 1981 in
Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Bohemian Club
(No. FEP 78-79, A5-1632S and N-15159) and to dismiss the
underlying accusation dated May 15, 1980 (as amended on July
30, 1980 and September 30, i989) (“accusation”) of real parties
in interest and intervenors Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (“Department”) and its Director, Joanne A. Lewis

(“Lewis”).

The Club moved for a stay of the Commission’s order, and
after briefing and the submission of declarations by the parties,
this Court, pursuant to stipulation of the Commission and the
Club, ordered that the Commission order be stayed pending the

A-26

entry of judgment. Thereafter, the Commission demurred to, and
moved to strike the Club’s Petition, which demurrer was over-
ruled and motion to strike denied by this Court’s ruling dated July
27, 1982. The Commission filed its Return to the Club’s Petition
on August 3, 1982.

Pursuant to stipulation by the Club and the Commission at
hearing before this Court on February 11, 1982, intervenors
Department and Lewis filed on March 2, 1982, their Petition in
Intervention dated February 2, 1982. The Commission filed on
March 4, 1982, its Return to the Petition in Intervention, and the
Club filed its Answer to the Petition on March 19, 1982.

Pursuant to an agreed schedule, the parties have submitted
written briefs, further declarations and supporting papers in sup-
port of their pleadings on the merits. The Court has reviewed the
pleadings, has read, considered and reviewed the Administrative
Record as well as all of the briefs, declarations and supporting
papers, and has heard the arguments presented by counsel for
each of the parties on December 1 and December 3, 1982. The
Court affirms the evidence rulings of Administrative Law Judge
Robert S. Kendall, and except as to the evidence excluded by
Judge Kendall, all of the evidence in the Administrative Record
and each of the declarations previously submitted by the parties in
this proceeding is admitted into evidence.

The Court has exercised its independent judgment on the
evidence. The Club has raised at every stage in the proceeding
before the Department and the Commission as well as before this
Court the Club members’ rights of freedom of association and
privacy as protected by the United States and California Consti-
tutions. The Commission’s order substantially affects the Club
members’ rights of freedom of association and rights of privacy,
and those rights are fundamental vested rights for purposes of
review under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5. Similarly, the
Club’s rights with respect to its continued existence and its vital
and substantial stake with respect to possible monetary awards or
judgments against it also raise fundamental vested rights for
purposes of such review.

~ ee ee oe

A-27

The Court has carefully considered, reviewed and assessed all
of the evidence, including Administrative Law Judge Kendall’s
January 19, 1981 Proposed Decision and the findings and assess-
ment of evidence made by Judge Kendall. After making its own
independent judgment on all of that evidence, and for the reasons
set forth below, the decision of this Court is that a peremptory
writ of mandamus shall issue commanding the Commission to set
aside and vacate its decision and order, and to dismiss the
accusation against petitioner Bohemian Club. It is further the
decision of this Court that the Petition in Intervention of the
Department and Lewis be denied.

First, petitioner is, and always has been, a bona fide private
membership Club which is tax-exempt under section 501(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code and the laws of California. The Club
possesses all the attributes of a bona fide private membership club
and, throughout its history, the Club has exercised in good faith
those attributes as a distinctly private social association dedicated
to and supportive of male fellowship and appreciation of litera-
ture, music, drama, and the arts generally. Membership in the
Club is open only to men connected professionally with or
devoted to the arts, and the Club’s membership standards are
stricily and honestly enforced. All members are professionally
connected with, or devoted to, the arts, and participate in the
Club on that basis. The Club has no membership restrictions
concerning race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical handicap, marital status, citizenship, or sexual orienta-
tion. Membership cannot be purchased or sold, and the Club
receives no public funds. It is a self-governing orgainzation which
vests responsibility for its affairs, including admission to member-
ship, in its Board of Directors. The facilities at which the Club’s
membership activities take place, the San Francisco City Club
and the Bohemian Grove camping area near Monte Rio, Califor-
nia, are owned by the Club and are operated for the exclusive and
private use and enjoyment of members and their guests. The Club
and its members maintain that private social environment at the
City Club and the Grove. The Club is noncommercial, and has
resisted attempts to make it commercial or a business club. The
Club’s facilities are never rented out to the public or otherwise
made-available for public use. The common associational objec-

A-28

tives of the Club’s members—the enjoyment of male fellowship
and the appreciation and support of, and participation in, the
arts—are bona fide and the members’ activities are rigorously
directed to those objectives.

As such a tax-emempt, bona fide private membership club,
petitioner is exempt from coverage under Title VII of the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et
seq.). The Federal Civil Rights Act supersedes the provisions of
any state laws which are inconsistent with any of the purposes or
any of the provisions of the Federal Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4).
The clear congressional purpose in exempting bona fide private
membership clubs from Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act
was to protect the associational and privacy rights of the members
of bona fide private clubs. The provisions of the Act are mani-
festly intended to assure those rights to genuinely private non-
commercial, bona fide social associations. The Court holds that
respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction because respon-
dent’s construction of the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”) as applied to petitioner, a bona fide private member-
ship club whose members have always genuinely exercised their
rights of privacy and association directed toward their announced
common objectives, is inconsistent with, and superseded by Fed-
eral law. The Commission has not, therefore, proceeded in the
manner required by law and its order is not supported by its
findings.

Second, and in any event, even assuming that respondent
Commission has jurisdiction over petitioner, which the Commis-
sion has found to be an “employer” within the meaning of the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov.Code, § 12926(c)), the
Court determines that respondent abused its discretion in con-
cluding that the Club failed to establish that gender is a bona fide
occupational qualification under Government Code § 12940 for
those employment positions involved with, or which touch and
concern, petitioner’s all-male associational activities at the City
Club and Bohemian Grove. Respondent’s conclusions constitute
an abuse of discretion in that Commission Findings No. 24 (last
sentence), 25 (last sentence), 36 (last sentence), 37, 40 (last two
sentences), 41, 42, 43, 44 (the first sentence and the second

oe et te kt ome.

i ee

A-29

clause of the second sentence), 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51,
which findings of fact were made by the Commission to support
the conclusions of law reached by the Commission in its decision
and order, are neither supported by the weight of evidence nor by
any substantial evidence. The Court further determines that, to
the extent certain of respondent’s other findings are supported by
the evidence and are consistent with the facts found herein,
respondent has abused its discretion in that its own findings do not
support its decision or order.

Third, and in any event, based upon its independent judgment,
and the facts set forth herein, this Court finds that in the positions
where the Club has employed only men, those employees are
present during and integrally involved with the all-male associa-
tional activities. The employment of men in those positions at the
City Club and the Bohemian Grove is essential to preserve the
members’ rights of privacy, the integrity of the Club’s objectives,
its bona fide associational activities dedicated to and supportive of
the arts, and the all-male atmosphere which is indispensable to,
and the essence of those activities. The Commission’s contrary
conclusions are neither supported by the weight of the evidence or
any substantial evidence, nor by such of the Commissions’ own
findings as have support in the evidence.

The Court further determines that the Commission’s conclu-
sion that a una fide occupational qualification has not been
established erroneously relies upon regulations and judicial deci-
sions concerning commercial or business employers. The Com-
mission’s conclusion is not supported by the weight of the
evidence, or any substantial evidence, that the Club is or should
be treated as a commercial or business institution or association,
or that the Club members engage in commercial, trade or
business activities at the Club or its functions. The Commission’s
conclusions are not supported by its own findings. The Court finds
that the bona fide occupational qualification provision
(Gov.Code, § 12940) applies to the policy and practices of the
Club as a private noncommercial, bona fide social association in
employing men in those positions involved with the all-male
associational activities at the Club. The Commission has not

A-30

proceeded in the manner required by law in its contrary conclu-
sion in its order and decision.

For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the facts set forth
herein, the Court holds that male gender is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for all positions at petitioner's Bohemian
Grove and all those positions at respondent’s City Club which are
involved with and touch and concern the members’ traditional all-
male associational activities. On the basis of its independent
judgment, the Court concludes that this narrow limited bona fide
occupational qualification applies to petitioner’s employment pol-
icy and practices and they are not in violation of the FEHA.

Fourth, and in any event, the Court further determines that, to
the extent they are not inconsistent with the facts stated herein,
all of the findings of Administrative Law Judge Kendall are
supported by the weight of the evidence.

In accordance with long-established principles of decision mak-
ing, the Court declines to decide if the Constitutions of the
United States and California preclude any governmental intrusion
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act into respondent’s
employment decisions as a violation of the Club members’ rights
of freedom of association and privacy. Intervenors Department
and Lewis have also petitioned the Court to issue a peremptory
writ ordering the Commission to set aside its Findings of Fact 6, 8
and 9, and its decision and order insofar as the Commission
recognized the chilling effect of its decision upon the Club’s
constitutional freedoms of association and privacy, and deter-
mined that backpay shall not be awarded to a complainant and
other women similarly situated. The Court denies the intervenors’
petition because of its rulings on the petition of the Club and
because it has declined to decide if any intrusion by the State
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act violates the Club’s
and its members’ constitutional freedoms of association and

privacy.
In addition to the facts already stated, the Court finds as
follows:

1. Intervenor Department is an administrative agency of the
State of California empowered to issue accusations under the

A-31

FEHA, but not deriving its adjudicatory power from the Califor-
nia Constitution.

2. On May 18, 1979, Intervenor Joanne A. Lewis, in her
official capacity as Director of the Department, filed a complaint
with the Department alleging that the Club had violated the
FEHA within the preceding year by discriminating against wo-
men in filling positions of office clerk-typist at the Grove.

3. On February 25, 1980, the Director amended her com-
plaint to allege that the Club had pursued a practice and pattern
of discrimination against females in hiring, transfers, promotional
opportunities and recruitment at the San Francisco City Club and
the Bohemian Grove.

4. On May 15, 1980, the Department issued an Accusation
against the Club and on June 2, 1980, the Club served a Notice of
Defense and Objections to the Accusation.

5. The Department filed an Amended Accusation and a
Second Amended Accusation on July 30, 1980, and September
30, 1980, respectively.

6. Petitioner placed a job order for an office clerk-typist with
the California Employment Development Department on August
4, 1978. The Club specified that only male applicants were
acceptable for the position and requested that only men be
referred to it. Qualified women were available for referral at that
time. But for the prerequisite established by the Club these
persons would have been available to apply for the position.

7. The Club is a bona fide private social association of men
founded in San Francisco in 1872. The Club has always been
organized as a nonprofit corporation and presently is a nonprofit
mutual benefit corporation organized and acting under Part 3,
Division 2, Title 1, California Corporations Code.

8. The Club is a tax-exempt organization under the laws of
the State of California and the United States. The Club’s Consti-
tution and By-Laws provide that membership in the Club is open
only to men connected professionally with or devoted to the arts.

A-32

9. All of the Club’s membership standards and rules are
strictly enforced. All members must be connected professionally
with or devoted to the arts, and participate in the Club’s associa-
tional activities on that basis. The Club receives no public funds.
The Club has never been convicted of any crime or wrongdoing.
The Club has approximately 2,000 members.

10. Petitioner is a private, noncommercial social association.
It rigorously maintains its noncommercial status. It is not a
“business” commercial luncheon club. Memberships cannot be
purchased or sold, and are not based upon business or commercial
success, wealth or status.

11. Petitioner prevents commercial exploitation of Club activ-
ities and guards the privacy of its members. All of the Club
proceedings or happenings are maintained privately. Neither
members nor guests exploit the Club activities for commercial
purposes.

12. Petitioner is a self-governing private organization which
vests responsibility for its affairs in its Board of Directors elected
by the membership. All of the Club’s policies and the implement-
ing Committee actions are devoted to its associational objectives
of appreciation of literature, music, drama, and the arts generally.

13. The Board of Directors establishes petitioner’s employee
personnel policies, which are implemented by the Club’s general
manager and staff. Those policies are in accord with and directed
to the accomplishment of the Club’s associational objectives.

14. The Club members’ associational activities take place at
two locations: the City Club at 624 Taylor Street, San Francisco,
California, and the Grove, a large rustic camping area near Monte
Rio, California. Both the City Club and the Grove are owned and
privately maintained by petitioner.

15. The City Club is a five-story building which contains
sleeping accommodations for Club members’ use; several dining
rooms (Main Dining Room, Anza Room, Balboa Room, Cabrillo
Room, Bohemian Room, Board Room, Grove Room, Red Room
and Owl Room); several other meeting, association and activity
rooms (Music Room, Green Room, Domino Room, Main Card

ine Hae eh lame

A-33

Room and Main Lounge); a theatre (Jinks Theatre); a bar and
stage (Cartoon Rvom); a library; an archives; a barbershop; and
an art gallery.

16. The Grove comprises more than 2,500 acres and includes
a small well-defined living and camping area containing about 125
group living areas (“camps”), various buildings, shelters and
other associational activity areas, including a large open-air dining
area, various other eating areas, several bars, stages and theatres.
Each camp is a voluntary fraternal smaller group of members
living and associating together.

17. The purposes of the Club are the enjoyment of male
fellowship and the appreciation of, and participation in the arts.
Participation is an obligation of membership. There is extensive
participation in Club associational activities by all members.

18. Petitioner’s associational activities are based upon and
follow traditions over 100 years old. In general, the Club’s main
associational activities at the Grove are two all-male retreats (the
three-day Spring Jinks weekend in June and the seventeen-day
Midsummer Encampment in July), during which members and
guests live at the Grove and participate in artistic, musical and
theatrical activities. During the Spring Jinks ar.d the Midsummer
Encampment, Club associational activities proceed on virtually a
24-hour-a-day basis throughout the Grove. There are many
scheduled as well as informal activities: concerts, theatrical and
musical productions, oratorical presentations, Lakeside talks,
readings, art appreciation discussions, singing, and many other
similar activities. In addition to the major theatrical and musical
productions (which may take over two years in the process of
production), there is a regular artistic production every evening,
and the annual retreats are characterized by an extensive variety
of informal musical entertainment, singing and dancing per-
formed extemporaneously by members and their guests through-
out the day and night at individual camps, at various
entertainment areas, and along the walks, paths and all of the
nearby areas. Many of these informal activities take place during
mealtimes and are associated with camaraderie, refreshments and
conversation at the large common dining area, in the Grill
(a restaurant, bar and stage) and at the individual camps. Club

A-34

members and guests go from one camp to another to participate
in the ongoing associational activities.

19. Petitioner’s primary all-male associational activities at the
City Club take place in connection with artistic, musical, literary
and theatrical presentations. There are at least thirty-six weekly
Thursday evening theatrical and musical productions, weekly
musical entertainment on Tuesday evenings, concerts and talks,
readings by authors, poets and dramatists, classes in photography,
art and other subjects and many other formal and informal
artistic, theatrical and musical events.

20. To accommodate the Club activities at the Grove and at
the City Club, members rehearse, perform and associate together
in all areas in the Grove and at the City Club in the Cartoon
Room, the Jinks Theatre, the Main Dining room, various re-
hearsal rooms, the Art Gallery, and in other available rooms.

21. The activities restricted to members and their male guests
are the Spring Jinks and the Midsummer Encampment at the
Grove and all of the Club’s regular all-male associational activi-
ties taking place in the Main Dining Room, the Cartour Room.
the other activity rooms and the rehearsal rooms of the City Club.

22. Petitioner’s facilities at the Grove and the City Club are
private and for the exclusive use of members and their guests. The
Club takes all measures necessary to ensure privacy for members
and their guests. Nonmembers and uninvited persons are not
permitted and, if they enter, are not allowed to remain. Access
roads at the Grove leading into the living and camping area are
fenced, the entry roads have locked gates, signs are posted along
the perimeter to indentify the area as private property and
security guards patrol the Grove to prevent uninvited persons
from entering. Privacy and seclusion are emphasized to assure the
special environment of retreat and sanctuary.

23. During the Midsummer Encampment and Spring Jinks,
the Grove becomes the home of up to 2,500 Bohemians and their
male guests. These events are retreats by members and guests
away from the outside world in a natural, rustic setting to create
an ambience and intimacy where men join together to celebrate
the arts.

ee ee

A-35

24. Grove participants live together in approximately 125
camps, consisting of cabins, tents, tepees and open sleeping
porches; some are assembled for the retreats and taken down
afterwards. The camps are rustic and, in many camps, toilet and
shower facilities (some of which are completely open and un-
shielded, or only partially shielded from view) are separate from
the sleeping quarters. Some of the toilet facilities have stalls with
doors and some do not. Men urinate without the benefit of even
the existing rudimentary toilet facilities. Members and guests at
times walk about the Grove in various states of dress and undress:
from the sleeping quarters in one camp to the toilet and shower
facilities which may be removed some distance away; from the
camps to the swimming area; and from camp to camp.

25. Members and guests who attend the Grove eat in an
open-air, unenclosed dining area from which they view and
participate in dramatic, musical and other such events that take
place before, during and after the dining hours at the dining site
itself. Food service preparation and food service employees, all
male, work in and around the dining area and adjacent areas
before, during and after the hours when food is served. There are
informal and extemporaneous social activities throughout the rest
of the Grove, in the camps and other areas where male employees
work, serve drinks and refreshments, and assist in connection with
the associational activities.

26. At the City Club, petitioner employs approximately 90
individuals, both male and female, in managerial, clerical, craft,
food preparation and service, cleaning and personal service posi-
tions. This staff is supplemented, as necessary, by temporary
employees hired to work at Club

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0575%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
