# Appendix — City of Akron v. Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 801

## Text

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) FILED
IN THE JAN 28 DST

Supreme Court of the Tuners *

OCTOBER TERM, 19

Crry oF AKRON, STATE OF OHIO; HEALTH COMMISSION,
Crry oF AKRON; HEALTH DEPARTMENT, CITY OF
AKRON; C. WILLIAM KECK, as Director of Health of
the City of Akron; HAROLD K. StTusss, as Director of
Law of the City of Akron,

. Appellants,

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION ;
AKRON SELLE COMPANY,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

JERRY D. ANKER
WALD, HARKRADER & Ross
1300 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 828-1200

Counsel of Record

HAROLD K. STUBBS
Director of Law

JANICE EF. CROSSLAND
Assistant Director of Law

161 South High Street

202 Ocasek Government Office
Building

Akron, Ohio 44308

(216) 375-2030

Attorneys for Appellants
January 28, 1987

(NS Sen TTY
W#Leon - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
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Opinion of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division ............ 22a
Judgment of the Court of Appeals ......................-......------ 60a
Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing........ 6la
SN He IUD. .sschssicsncacessetinteclimciassttiadadacantenntiabiiaitestadaiiioheninls 62a

Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.. 63a

Chapter 1830, Codified Ordinances of the City of
I I icici oc ee edna lles esenaetaacaaes 64a

Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970 2.000000... 89a

Hazard Communication Standard ........00000000000000eeee ee 100a

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION ;
AKRON SELLE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellunts,
Vv.

CITY OF AKRON, STATE OF OHIO; HEALTH COMMISSION,
CITY OF AKRON; HEALTH DEPARTMENT, CITY OF
AKRON; C. WILLIAM KECH, as Director of Health of
the City of Akron; HAROLD K. STusss, as Director of
Law of the City of Akron,

Defendants-A ppellees-

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio

Decided and Filed September 17, 1986

Before: MARTIN and GUY, Circuit Judges; and
BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.

GUY, Circuit Judge, Plaintiffs appeal the district
cwirt’s judgment in favor of defendants entered after the
court determined that the Akron “Right to Know” Ordi-
nance, regulating hazardous and toxic substances in the
workplace, was not preempted by the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSH Act) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651,
et seq., or the Occupational Safety and Health Agency’s
(OSHA) Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.

2a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Plaintiffs are the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, a
non-profit membership association representing 61 em-
ployers in the City of Akron, classified within Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes 20 through 39, and
Akron Selle Company, an Akron contract metal stamping
company employing 20 persons and classified within SIC
Code 34.1 Defendants are the City of Akron; Akron’s
Health Commission; Akron’s Health Department; C. Wil-
liam Kech, M.D., Director of Health; and Harold K.
Stubbs, Director of Law. The latter four defendants
share responsibility for the enforcement of the ordinance.
Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the Akron ordinance
is preempted by federal law.? Although we reject many
of plaintiffs’ contentions, as did the trial court, we none-
theless find preemption and reverse.

I.
A. The Akron Right to Know Ordinance

Akron’s Right to Know Ordinance, enacted in Decem-
ber of 1984, regulates the presence of hazardous and

1SIC Codes 20 through 39~-consist primarily of categories of
manufacturers as set forth in the Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion Manual published by the United States Office of Management
and Budget.

2In the district court and on appeal, amici curiae briefs were
submitted by several Akron community groups, including the Rub-
ber Manufacturers’ Association; the Chemical Manufacturers’ As-
sociation; the National Paint and Coatings Association Inc.; the
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc.; Flexible Packaging Associa-
tion and the National Screw Machine Products Association
(jointly) ; and by the Akron Catholic Commission; The Akron-
Medina County Labor Council, (AFL-C1O); the Ohio Public In-
terest Campaign; the Opportunity Parish Ecumenical Neighbor-
hood Ministry; the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Work-
ers of America and the United Rubber Workers, Local 2 Retirees
(jointly). On appeal the Secretary of Labor was permitted to file
an amicus curiae brief.

3a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

toxic substances in the workplace. The purposes of the
ordinance are twofold: to protect workers by requiring
employers to provide information to their employees and
designated representatives about hazardous chemicals to
which the employees may be exposed; and to protect pub-
lic health officials, and the public in general, by requiring
employers to provide information to the City’s Fire Divi-
sion and Health Department about the hazardous chemi-
cals manufactured, used, or stored inside the workplace
and the hazardous chemicals discharged from the work-
place or stored as chemical waste.

The Akron Health Commission is charged with admin-
istration and enforcement of the ordinance. The commis-
sion is first directed to compile a master list of hazardous
chemicals including all of the chemicals listed in (1)
OSHA’s list of Toxic or Hazardous Substances, at 29
C.F.R. 1910. Subpart Z: (2) the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation’s Hazardous Materials Table, 49
C.F.R. § 172.101; (3) the American Conference of Gov-
ernmental and Industrial Hygenists’ list entitled “Thresh-
old Limit Value for Chemical Substances and Physical
Agents in the Workplace;” (4) the International Agency
for Research on Cancer’s sublist entitled “Substances
found to have at least sufficient evidence of carcinoge-
nicity in animals;” and (5) the National Toxicology Pro-
gram’s list of chemicals published in the annual report
on carcinogens.

Under the ordinance, employers are required to post
signs notifying employees that they have a right to in-
formation from their employers regarding the toxic or
hazardous effects of the chemicals and the circumstances
under which these effects may be produced. Employers
are also required to ensure that each container of hazard-
ous chemicals in the workplace is labeled, tagged, or
marked: (1) with the chemical name, if not a trade
secret; (2) with the Department of Transportation’s re-

da
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

quired labels for substances it regulates; (3) with a
cancer warning for all materials that pose a cancer haz-
ard; and (4) with warnings for materials which pose a
reproductive hazard.

The ordinance also imposes employer filing and report-
ing requirements. Each January, employers are ordered
to file with the Health Department a list of all work
areas where hazardous chemicals are manufactured, used,
or stored, specifying by chemical name all such chemi-
cals in each work area. Furthermore, employers must
immediately report to the Health Department informa-
mation concerning any spill, leak, discharge, or emission
of any hazardous substance which is required to be re-
ported to or filed with any federal or state agency under
applicable !aw.

Employers are required to obtain or develop a material
safety data sheet (MSDS) for each hazardous chemical
which they manufacture, use, or store. Each MSDS must
contain, among other things, the following information:
(1) the identity used on the label and, except as necessary
to protect trade secrets, whether the chemical is a single
substance or a mixture which has been tested as a whole
to determine iis hazards, its chemical and common names;
or, if the hazardous chemical is a mixture, the chemical
and common names of all ingredients; and the chemical
and common names of all ingredients set forth on the
master list which have been determined to be physical
hazards; (2) the physical and chemical characteristics
of the hazardous chemical, including its potential for fire,
explosion, and reactivity; (3) the known acute and
chronic health effects of exposure to the hazardous chemi-
cal; (4) the primary route of entry and permissible ex-
posure limit for hazardous chemicals; (5) any precau-
tions for safe handling and use which are known to the
employer or preparer; (6) any control measures which
are known to the employer or preparer; and (7) emer-

5a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

gency and first aid procedure. A MSDS is required to be
updated within 90 days of the employer obtaining new
and significant information regarding the health hazard
of a chemical. Employees are entitled to be given a copy
of a MSDS upon request. :

The ordinance requires that employers maintain an em-
ployee training and education program designed to pro-
vide employees who may be exposed to hazardous sub-
stances or mixtures the information necessary to under-
stand their hazards. Training must also include the
hazard communication methods used by the employer,
appropriate work practices, protective measures, emer-
gency procedures, and the methods employees may use to
receive information under the ordinance.

In addition to enforcing the ordinance, the commission
is charged with the obligation of forwarding all informa-
tion to the Fire Department pertinent to the performance
of its duties. A provision also speaks to the protection of
trade secrets.

The final substantive provision enumerates employee
rights under the ordinance, including the employee’s right
to receive requested information, protection from dis-
charge for filing a complaint, requests for inspection by
the Health Commission, and the right to maintain a pri-
vate cause of action for violations of the ordinance.

B. The OSH Act and The Hazard Communication
Standard

Section 6 of the OSH Act directs the Secretary of
Labor to promulgate occupational safety and health
standards to further the purpose of the Act ‘to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions... .”
29 U.S.C. § 651(b). To that end, the Secretary of Labor
has established the Hazard Communication Standard,

6a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (7), and set forth at 29
C.F.R. § 1910. The relevant history of the promulgation
of this standard began in 1974, when the National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health, an agency cre-
ated by section 22 of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671,
recommended that the Secretary promulgate a standard
requiring employers to inform employees of potentially
hazardous materials in the workplace, 47 Fed. Reg. 12095
(1982). Later that year the Secretary appointed an ad-
visory committee to develop standards for implementa-
tion of the statutory provision requiring labels or other
appropriate forms of warning. That advisory committee
issued its report on June 6, 1975, recommending a classi-
fication of hazards, the use of warning devices such as
labels and placards, disclosure of chemical data, and
employee training programs. Id. at 12096.

On January 16, 1981, OSHA published a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking entitled “Hazards Identification.” 46
Fed. Reg. 4412-53. This initial proposal was withdrawn
by the Secretary on February 12, 1981, for further con-
sideration of regulatory alternatives, 46 Fed. Reg. 12214.
On March 19, 1982, a notice of proposed rulemaking en-
titled “Hazards Communication” was published, 47 Fed.
Reg. 12091.

The standard was published in its final form on No-
vember 25, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 53280. It requires that
chemical manufacturers and importers “evaluate chemi-
cals produced in their workplaces or imported by them to
determine if they are hazardous.” 29 U.S.C. § 1910.1200
(d) (1). It refers to several compilations of toxic ma-
terials. These lists establish certain toxic substances
which chemical manufacturers or importers must treat
as hazardous. Id. at § 1910.1200(d) (3). Chemicals not
included in the designated compilations must be evalu-
ated to determine if they are hazardous by reference to
“available scientific evidence.” Id. at § 1910.1200(d). A

Mieie in.

Ta,
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

manufacturer or importer of hazardous chemicals must
“ensure that each container . . . leaving the workplace
is labeled” with the chemica! identity, with appropriate
hazard warnings, and with the name and address of the
source. Jd. at § 1910.1200(f) (1). Manufacturers or im-
porters must also prepare a material safety data sheet
(MSDS) containing the chemical common names of each
hazardous ingredient, and information necessary for safe
use of the product. Id. at § 1910.1200(g). The MSDS
must be provided to each employer in the manufacturing
sector (SIC Codes 20-39) purcnasing a hazardous chem-
ical. That employer must in turn make the MSDS avail-
able for employee inspection, id. at § 1910.1200(g) (8).
and “shall provide employees with information and train-
ing on hazardous chemicals in their work area... .” Id.
at § 1910.1200(h). The rvie allows an exception from
the labeling and MSDS ingredient disclosure require-
ments when a chemical manufacturer or importer claims
that the chemical identity is a trade secret, id. at
§ 1910.1200(i), and sets forth the procedure for disclo-
sure of trade secrets when necessary. Id.

The rule provides expressly that

[t]his occupational safety and health standard is
intended to address comprehensively the issue of
evaluating and communicating hazards to employ-
ees in the manufacturing sector, and to preempt any
state law pertaining to this subject.

29 C.F.R. § 1019.1200 (a) (2).
II.

The supremacy clause of article VI of the Constitution
is the source of the federal doctrine of preemption of
state law. Under the supremacy clause, federal preemp-
tion may occur in a number of ways. Preemption can be
express or implied, “explicitly stated in the statute’s lan-

SR 6

8a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

guage or implicitly contained in its structure and pur-
pose,” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977). First, when acting within constitutional limits,
Congress is empowered to preempt state law by so stat-
ing in express terms. Jd. at 525. In the absence of
express preemptive language, Congress’ intent to pre-
empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred
where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that
Congress “left no room” for supplementary state regula-
tion, Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs., 105
S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985). Preemption of a whole field also
will be inferred where the field is one in which “the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state law on the
same subject.” Jd. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Even where Congress
has not completely displaced state regulation in a spe-
cific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises
when “compliance with both federal and state regula-
tions is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 182, 142-43 (1963),
or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-
jectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941). Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that state laws can be preempted by federal regula-
tions as well as by federal statutes. Hillsborough County,
105 S. Ct. at 2375.

In the present case, two of these “varieties” of pre-
emption are alleged: express congressional preemption
and express agency preemption.

A. Preemption by Congress

Plaintiffs contend that the Akron ordinance has been
expressly preempted by Congress in the OSH Act. The

9a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Act does provide that once the Secretary of Labor has
promulgated a standard, states are expressly preempted
from regulating in that field except pursuant to section
18:

(a) Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any
state agency or court from asserting jurisdiction
under state law over any occupational safety or
health issue with respect to which no standard is
in effect under section 655 of this title.

(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to
assume responsibility for development and enforce-
ment therein of occupational safety and health stand-
ards relating to any occupational safety or health
issue with respect to which a Federal standard has
been promulgated under section 655 of this title
shall submit a State plan for the development of
such standards and their enforcement.

29 U.S.C. § 667. The courts which have addressed the
question have found that state “Right to Know” statues
are preempted by the Hazard Communication Standard
as applied to employers in SIC Codes 20-39. United
Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d
Cir. 1985); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v.
Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 593 (8d Cir. 1985).

Plaintiffs argue that since states are preempted from
regula:ing once OSHA issues a standard, a state’s politi-
cal subdivisions are necessarily precluded as well. Be-
cause political subdivisions are simply extensions of the
state, which derive their power from the state, preemp-
tion must extend to these agencies of the state. De-
fendants, on the other hand, rely on the definition of
state set forth in the OSH Act as section 3, where state
is defined to “[include] a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands,” 29 U.S.C. § 652(7). Defendants point

no

10a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

out that Congress could easily have defined “states” to
include their political subdivisions if it wished to pre-
clude local regulation.

Plaintiffs also argue that because section 3 provides
that the term “state” includes a State of the United
States, etc., that the use of the word “includes” indicates
that Congress foresaw an expansive reading of the term
“state.” In this regard, plaintiffs rely on Mayor of Boon-
ton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D. N.J.
1985), where the court addressed whether municipalities
could recover under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response. Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seg. In CERCLA, as in the OSH
Act, state is defined to “include the several States of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the
United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas, and any other territory or posses-
sion over which the United States has jurisdiction,” 42
U.S.C. § 960127). Nevertheless, the Drew court held
that since Congress employed the term “include,” the
definitional section explicitly contemplated an expansion
of the illustrative list by the courts to the fullest extent,
621 F. Supp. at 666.

The trial judge rejected plaintiffs’ position. As to the
first argument, that “states” necessarily includes their
political subdivisions, the trial court pointed out that in
numerous other statutes, Congress has expressly pre-
empted “states and their political subdivisions” from reg-
ulating. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1982); Medical Device Amendments
of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 860k (1982); Poison Prevention
Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1476 (1982); Lead-Based
Paint Poison Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4846 (1982);
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1920(a) (1982); Egg Products Inspection Act, 21

lla

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1982); Consumer Products Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982); Flammable Fabrics Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1203 (1982). In addition, other portions of
the OSH Act refer to “states and their political subdi-
visions.” See § 655(b) (1) (Secretary may promulgate
standards based upon information submitted by a politi-
cal subdivision) ; § 667(c) (6) (an approved state plan
must assure the Secretary that the state will establish
an occupational safety and health program protecting
employees of political subdivisions) ; § 673(b) (2) (Secre-
tary may make grants to political subdivisions for devel-
opment and administration of statistical programs).
Based on Congress’ practice of explicitly preempting po-
litical subdivisions and the fact that political subdivisions
are referred to in other sections of the OSH Act, the
trial court concluded that Congress did not simply over-
look including political subdivisions or that it implicitly
included them in the word “state.” We concur in the
trial court’s conclusion.

We also reject plaintiffs’ second argument premised
on Drew. The Drew court expansively defined “state,”
finding such a reading to be consistent with Congress’
intent and with the remedial intent of CERCLA:

It would be anomalous for this far reaching reme-
dial statute to give states a cause of action for dam-
ages to natural resources owned by the State but for
it to exclude cities from access to such a cause of
action while expressly including resources owned by
“local governments” within the scope of the pro-
tected subject of § 9607(a) (4) (C). As I have pre-
viously noted in my June 24 ruling, CERCLA should
be given a broad and liberal construction.

621 F. Supp. at 666. Thus, the Drew court identified
several reasons not present here for reading the term
“state” expansively so as to give municipalities a claim
for relief under CERCLA, not the least of which was

et

12a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

that resources owned by local governments were pro-
tected under the Act.

We would also point out that if the term “state,” as
used in section 18 to preempt state regulations in the
absence of an approved state plan implicitly includes
political subdivisions as plaintiffs urge, then political
subdivisions should also be able to regulate by submitting
a “state” plan and obtaining the Secretary’s approval.
Otherwise, plaintiffs’ argument would result in the word
“state” having two different and distinct meanings at the
same time.

The legislative history of section 3 gives no indication
that regulation by political subdivisions was contem-
plated by Congress. When introducing the section which
contains the definition of “state,” Senator Javits of New
York stated:

Mr. President, the sole purpose of this amend-
ment is to make eligible to file what is called a State
plan those territories and possessions of the United
States which are spelled out in the amendment. This
matter is not otherwise defined in the bill.

Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History
of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, at
504 (1971) (emphasis added). The only expansive read-
ing indicated by the legislative history would be that
which would encompass “territories” and “possessions”
within the definition.

Plaintiffs also argue that because municipalities are
not sovereigns, but are merely agencies of the state, they
cannot regulate where the state is precluded from regu-
lating. Plaintiffs’ reliance on authorities relating to
other fields of law and on cases discussing the nature

13a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

and source of municipal power to legislate is simply not
persuasive in the context of preemption analysis.*

Plaintiffs additionally urge that express congressional
intent to preempt local regulation can be found in Con-
gress’ desire to achieve uniformity of regulation. While
acknowledging that Congress’ primary intent in enacting
the OSH Act was worker safety, plaintiffs argue that a
further purpose, that of uniformity, may be discerned
in certain provisions of the OSH Act and in comments
made by the drafters of the Act. They submit that the
Act’s authors felt that uniformity would be necessary to
promulgate an effective national standard and to avoid
undue burden on interstate commerce.

Congress declared the purpose of the OSH Act in sec-
tion 2:

The Congress declares it to be its purpose and
policy, through the exercise of its powers to regu-
late commerce among the several states and with
foreign nations and to provide for the general wel-
fare, to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources....

29 U.S.C. § 651(b). In American Textile Manufacturers
Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1980), the Supreme
Court stated that “[w]hen Congress passed the Occu-

3 For instance, plaintiffs and amici argue that in constitutional
analysis, political subdivisions are automatically encompassed with-
in the term “state” for purposes of “state action” under the four-
teenth amendment and other constitutional provisions. While this
is so, political subdivisions are not included within the meaning of
“state” under the eleventh amendment. Mt. Healthy Board of
Education v. Doyle, 427 U.S. 274, 280 (1976). Moreover, in Mt.
Heathy, the Court distinguished Ohio cities and counties, as “politi-
cal subdivisions,” from other types of governmental agencies which
are mere “arms of the state.” Jd.

14a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

pational Safety and Health Act in 1970, it chose to place
pre-eminent value on assuring employees a safe and
healthful working environment, limited only by the feas-
ibility of achieving such an environment.” Id. at 540.

Congress also set forth the considerations to be
weighed by the Secretary when devising standards under
the Act:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents
under this subsection, shall set the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on
the basis of the best available evidence, that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has reg-
ular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such stand-
ard for the period of his working life. Develop-
ment of standards under this subsection shall be
based upon research, demonstrations, experiments,
and such other information as may be appropriate.
In addition to the attainment of the highest degree
of Lealth and safety protection for the employee,
other considerations shall be the latest available
scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and
other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable,
the standard promulgated shall be expressed in
terms of objective criteria and of the performance
desired.

§ 655 (b) (5).

While the legislation and its history do illustrate that
a national standard was felt to be essential to achieve the
goals of the Act, they also indicate that this was to as-
sure that the states would at least meet the minimum
requirements of the federal standards, and not attempt
to undercut each other. This conclusion is well supported
by legislative history of section 18:

15a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Moreover, whenever a State wishes to assume respon-
sibility for developing or enforcing standards in an
area where standards have been promulgated under
this act, the State may do so under a state plan ap-
proved by the Secretary of Labor. The plan must
contain assurances that the State will develop and
enforce standards at least as effective as those devel-
oped by the Secretary, that the State will have the
legal authority, personnel and funds necessary to do
the job, and that a right of entry into workplaces is
provided. . . . In addition, the plan must contain
assurances that the State will, to the extent possible
under its law, establish and maintain an occupa-
tional safety and health program applicable to all
employees of the State and its political subdivisions,
and that such program will be as effective as that
applicable to provide employers covered by the plan.

As an encouragement for State action, the bill pro-
vides Federal financial support to assist the States
in assuming their own programs for worker health
and safety. Planning grants with up to 90 percent
Federal participation, and program grants with up
to 50 percent Federal participation are provided.

The 90 percent grant is designed to aid the States
in identifying needs, developing State plans and pro-
grams for collecting statistical data, increasing per-
sonnel capabilities, and improving administration
and enforcement. The 50 percent Federal grant is
made available to assist States in carrying out the
occupational safety and health programs contained
in their plans, as well as programs concerning occu-
pational safety and health statistics.

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, 5194-95 (1970). This same
Senate Report discusses the preemptive effect of the OSH

16a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Act. Political subdivisions are not mentioned in any re-
gard.

In short, we cannot accept plaintiffs’ contention that
Congress expressly preempted local regulation by these
provisions establishing a national standard. Furthermore,
we agree with the trial court to the extent that express
preemption, by definition, must be clearly manifested,
especially when local health and safety provisions are
endangered. Jones, 430 U.S. at 525. There is, in fact,
little in the legislation or its history to indicate Congress’
intent as to whether state preemption includes preemption
of local acts as well.

B. Preemption by OSHA Regulations

Our inquiry does not end with devining congressional
statutory intent, however, since state (or local) laws can
be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal
statutes. Hillsborough, 105 S. Ct. at 2373. We must
therefore determine whether the agency itself preempted
local regulation when it promulgated the Hazard Com-
munication Standard. We conclude that it did.

The Hazard Communication Standard is self described
as a comprehensive hazard communication program:

(2) This occupational safety and health standard
is intended to address comprehensively the issue of
evaluating and communicating chemical hazards to
employees in the manufacturing sector, and to pre-
empt any state law pertaining to this subject. Any
state which desires to assume responsibility, in this
area may do so only under the provisions of section
18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29
U.S.C. 651 et seq.) which deals with state jurisdic-
tion and state plans.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a) (2). Once again, we are faced
with the term “state” and its meaning as intended by

17a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

OSHA. This time, however, some guidance has been pro-
vided.

In the preambles to both the proposed regulations and
the final regulations, OSHA made evident its intent to
preempt both state and local regulations. For instance,
in the final regulations, while making clear that the pri-
mary intent of the standard was to protect employees, the
agency also noted:

Another reason many participants in the rule-
making support the need for a Federal standard is
the recent proliferation of state and local right-
to-know laws. Most companies in the manufacturing
sector have business dealings which involve inter-
state commerce, and are thus subject to numerous
different and potential conflicting regulations.

48 Fed. Reg. 58,283 (1983).

Approximately twelve states and six local govern-
ments have some type of regulation related to the
identification of hazardous substances. About thir-
teen other states and three other local governments
have introduced proposed legislation either in this
legislative session or in previous sessions. They cover
different lists of substances, have different reporting
requirements, serve different purposes, have different
labeling and material safety data sheet requirements,
and have different educational and training require-
ments.

The potential for conflicting or cumulatively bur-
densome State and local laws has been acknowledged
by industry representatives to be immense. As stated
above, this subject was cited in many comments sub-
mitted prior to the hearing, in presentations made
during the hearings, and in post-hearing comments.

18a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

By promulgating a Federal standard, OSHA is in
a position to reduce the regulatory burden posed by
multiple state laws. In the final standard, OSHA
preempts State laws which deal with hazard commu-
nication requirements for employees in the manufac-
turing sector, except in those States with a State
plan which have a standard that regulates in this
area.

Id. at 53,284.

The trial court refused to give effect to OSHA’s inten-
tion to preempt as set forth in the preamble for two
reasons. First, citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281 (1979), the court determined that it was prohibited
from relying on the preamble in order to construe
OSHA’s intent in § 1910.1200(a) (2). -This court ruled
that express preemption found outside the text of the
regulations was not effective.

Brown, however, is not controlling. The regulations
under review in Brown were essentially treated by the
agency as interpretative rules, and interested parties
were not afforded the notice of proposed rulemaking re-
quired by substantive rules under the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Because the regula-
tions were not properly promulgated as substantive rules,
and therefore were not the product of procedures which
Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to give a
regulation the binding effect of law, they could not be
relied upon. 441 U.S. at 315.

Here, there is no question as to whether the regulations
were validly promulgated. Moreover, both the proposed
and final regulations, along with the preambles indicating
OSHA’s intent to preempt state and local laws, were pub-
lished, and thus interested parties were given notice. In
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 158 (1981), the Court made clear that the
preamble to a regulation is valid evidence of the admin-
strative construction of the regulation.

pie Me»

19a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

The trial court rejected De La Cuesta, stating that the
preamble cannot have preemptive effect. We need not
decide whether this is a correct ruling or not since the
preamble here only stands as evidence of OSHA’s intent
as to the regulation which expressly states its compre-
hensive effect. In other words, we look to the preamble
only after it becomes clear that OSHA intended the regu-
lation to have preemptive effect: the preamble does not
establish that intent, hut only assists in determining the
scope of OSHA’s “comprehensive” standard.

The second reason the trial court gave for rejecting
OSHA’s attempt to preempt both state and local regula-
tions was that such preemption would not be within
OSHA’s authority. Relying on the structure, provisions,
and legislative history of the OSH Act, the trial court
concluded that Congress intended that the law of political
subdivisions should not be expressly preempted. Since
OSHA’s attempt to extend the preemptive effect of its
regulations to localities, when localities are not expressly
preempted by section 18 of the OSH Act, contradicted
Congress’ intent as construed by the trial court, the court
held that the regulations could not operate to preempt
the Akron ordinance.

The trial court was correct that OSHA may not pre-
empt local law if that position is inconsistent with clearly
expressed congressional intent. Nevertheless, as indicated
above, we have been able to find no indication of con-
gressional intent on this question. And if Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, or
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the spe-
cific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s action is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Division, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).

“The power of an administrative agency to administer
a congressionally created . . . program necessarily re-
quires the formulation of policy and the making of rules

20a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

to fill any gap left, implictly or explicitly, by Congress.”
Id. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).

If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency
to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to
the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute. Sometimes legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than ex-
plicit. In such a case, a court may not-substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a rea-
sonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.

467 U.S. at 843-44. The Court has long recognized that
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is en-
trusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations “has been consistently fol-
lowed by the Court whenever decision as to the meaning
or reach of a stautory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting
the matters subjected to agency regulations.” Jd. at 844
(citations omitted).

Thus, if the choice made by the agency represents a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should
not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned. Jd. at 845. The respon-
sibility for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices
and resolving the struggle between competing views of
the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitu-
tion vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”
Id. at 866 (citing 7VA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 1538, 195
(1978) ).

21a
Opinion of the Court of Appeals

OSHA’s desire to achieve uniformity, when not charged
by Congress with such a goal, does not undercut the pre-
emptive effect of the regulation. OSHA could legitimately
determine that uniformity would aid in the administra-
tion and enforcement of, and compliance with, its stand-
ard. In other words, we cannot assume that OSHA has,
in violation of its statutory mandate, put the desire for
uniformity, i.e, minimizing the burden on commerce,
ahead of its mission to provide a safe and healthful work-
place. The regulations do not suggest that this is the case.
In the absence of any clearly expressed congressional in-
tent to the contrary, and giving OSHA the deference to
which it is entitled, we hold that the Hazard Communi-
cation Standard preempts local regulation in SIC Codes
20-39.

III.

Because of the nature of the trial judge’s disposition of
this case, she did not reach the question as to whether the
entire ordinance is preempted. It is clear that the ordi-
nance is preempted to the extent that it attempts to regu-
late employee safety in the workplace in SIC Codes 20-39.
However, the ordinance also had as its purpose protection
of the public and the providing of information to city fire
fighters and public health officials regarding toxic and
hazardous substances. It must also be determined whether
the preemption provisions may be severed from the bal-
ance of the ordinance.

We decline to make the determinations for the first
time on appeal. Rather, we will remand this matter to
the district court to determine which portions of the
ordinance are preempted and whether those portions that
are not preempted are severable.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the
district court for further consideration consistent with
this opinion.

ee

22a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. C85-3658A

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,

ws. Plaintiffs

CITY OF AKRON, et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

[Filed February 7, 1986]
ALDRICH, J.

This case is before the Court on an expedited basis
following the December 5, 1985 issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining defendants from enforcing
Akron, Ohio Codified Ordinnaces ch. 1830 (“Chapter
1830” or “the Akron ordinance’), entitled “Hazardous
and Toxic Substances,” on its effective date of December
17, 1985.’ Plaintiffs are the Ohio Manufacturers’ Asso-
ciation, a non-profit membership association representing
sixty-one employers in the City of Akron which are classi-
fied within Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC’’)
Codes 20 through 39, and Akron Selle Company, an
Akron contract metal stamping company employing twenty
persons and classified within SIC Code 34.? Defendants

1 The parties agreed to abide by the terms of the temporary re-
straining order until plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion was resolved by this Court. Subsequently they agreed to con-
solidate the resolution of the motion with a trial on the merits
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (2).

2SIC Codes 20 through 39 consist primarily of categories of
manufacturers as set forth in the Standard Industrial Classifica-

23a

Opinion of the District Court

are the city of Akron; Akron’s Health Commission;
Akron’s Health Department; C. William Kech, M.D.,
Director of Health; and Harold K. Stubbs, Director of
Law. The latter four defendants share responsibility for
the enforcement of Chapter 1830. Nine Akron community
groups have been permitted to file a brief as amici
curiae.®

The complaint summarizes the plaintiff’s claims:

The basis for plaintiffs’ action is that Chapter
1830 1) violates the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution in that it conflicts with and has
been preempted by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (hereinafter “OSH Act’), 29 U.S.C. §651
et seqg., and the Hazard Communication Standard
promulgated pursuant to the OSH Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200; 2) violates the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution in that it constitutes
an excessive and undue burden on interstate com-
merce; and 3) violates Article XVIII, Section 3, of
the Ohio Constitution in that certain applications of
it conflict with and have been preempted by Ohio
Revised Code Section 3745.05 (D) (3).

Subsequent to oral argument on January 17, 1986, the
parties stipulated a dismissal of the third cause of action.
However, plaintiffs still seek a declaration that Chapter

tion Manual published by the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget.

3 The amici curiae participating in the brief are the Akron Cath-
oli¢ Commission; the Akron-Medina County Labor Council, AFL-
CIO; Council of Block Club Presidents; International Chemical
Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Ohio Public Interest Campaign; Oppor-
tunity Parish Ecumenical Neighborhood-Ministry (“OPEN-M”);
United Rubber Workers, Local 2 Retirees; United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America; and Akron Summit Com-
munity Action Agency. Many of these organizations were active
in the sponsorship, drafting, and review of the Akron Ordinance.
All assert that their constituencies will be affected by the resolution
of this case. Brief of Amici Curiae at 2-6.

—eeeeeee

24a
Opinion of the District Court

1830 is unconstitutional both on its face, and as applied
to certain employers.

Upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth below,
the plaintiffs’ motion is denied, and judgment is entered
for the defendants.

Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).

I.
A.

Akron’s “Right-to-Known” ordinance, No. 771-1984, is
designated “Chapter 1830: Hazardous and Toxie Sub-
stances.” Its preamble indicates that the ordinance was
promulgated to protect workers, firefighters, other public
officials, and the public against the dangers of toxic sub-
stances used in Akron workplaces. Chapter 1830 is ap-
plicable to employers within the City of Akron which
are categorized by the enumerated Standard Industrial
Classification Codes (“employers”). &§ 1830.01, 1830.03
(i). Among explicitly exempted employers and substances
are federal, state, and local governments and their units
(not including Akron itself) laboratories, goods trans-
ported through Akron, consumer products and food in-
tended for consumption by the general public, and de
minimis amounts of hazardous substances. § 1830.02.
The “hazardous chemicals” regulated by the ordinance
are designated in a master list to be produced by Akron’s
Health Commission in accordance with a minimum list
established by Chapter 1830. §1830.05. The Health Com-
mission is appointed administrator and enforcement agent
of the ordinance. § 1830.04.

Chapter 1830 requires employers to label each con-
tainer of hazardous material with its chemcial name,
any applicable Department of Transportation labels, and
cancer ard reproductive warnings when appropriate
$ 1830.07\a). Placard or signs may replace labels when

25a

Opinion of the District Court

stationary containers within a work area have the same
hazards, or when labels are susceptible to damage.
$§ 1830.07(b), (c).

Each employer is mandated to either obtain or create
a material safety data sheet (“MSDS”) for each hazard-
ous chemical it uses, manufactures or stores. The MSDS
for chemicals not classified as trade secrets must report
relevant health and safety information, including chemi-
cal and common names of ingredients, physical and chemi-
cal characteristics, known acute and chronic health effects
of exposure, primary routes of entry, permissible ex-
posure limits established by the Occupation Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”), precautions for safe
handling and use, control measures, and emergency and
first aid procedures. § 1830.10(a). Employees who re-
quest to see an MSDS shall be provided with a copy by
their employers by the end of the next weekday following
the request. § 1830.10(b). Processors, users or storers of
hazardous chemicals who have not been provided with an
MSDS by their suppliers or manufacturers must take
prescribed steps to procure a copy following an employee
request. § 1830.10(d).

Employers governed by Chapter 1830 who manufac-
ture, use, or store hazardous substances must estab-
lish workplace training programs for their employees.
§ 1830.06(b). These programs must explain the hazards
of chemicals to which employees are exposed; the em-
ployer’s method of hazard communication; appropriate
work practices and protective measures; and emergency
procedures. § 1830.11(a). Employees shall also be in-
formed of their rights to receive information on hazard-
ous chemicals in their workplace, to request an inspection
of the workplace, and to be free from retaliatory dis-
charge, discipline, or other discrimination for exercising
a Chapter 1830 right. §§ 1830.11(b), 1830.15.

Each January, employers subject to the ordinance are
required to file a list of all work areas in the workplace
which contain hazardous chemicals. § 1830.09 (a) (1).

SS Ee

26a
Opinion of the District Court

Any spill, leak or emission of a toxic substance which
must be reported to a federal or state agency pursuant
to applicable law must also be reported to Akron’s Health
Commission designee immediately. § 1830.09 (a) (2).

Temporary variances, subject to renewal, to the label-
ing provisions of Chapter 1830 may be obtained upon
either a showing of undue or unnecessary hardship for
a specific employer, workplace, or work area, or for a
pre-existing program in substantial compliance. $1830.08
(a). Trade secret protection is also available to employers
upon special showing. A specific chemical name of an
eligible substance may be withheld if its properties and
effects are disclosed upon the MSDS and if it is not a
designated carcinogen. § 1830.14(a). However, an em-
ployer cannot refuse to provide the specific chemical iden-
tity to medical or fire personnel in an emergency, nor to
an employees who is regularly exposed to the toxin who
agrees to execute a confidentiality agreement. §§ 1830.14
(f), (i). Upon a showing that an employee requesting
the chemical identity of a substance for which trade
secrecy is claimed is eligible for such information, the
Director of Health’s designee may subject the employer
to citation. § 1830.14(n).

Enforcement of Chapter 1880 is delegated to the Health
Department, the Health Commission, and the Law Di-
rector of Akron. §§ 1830.12, 1830.13. Compliance with
the ordinance was required of employers of fifty-one or
more employees within one year of passage, i.e., Decem-
ber 17, 1985, and for employers of fifty or fewer em-
ployees, by June 17, 1986. § 1830.17.

B.

Pursuant to his power to promulgate standards pro-
vided in § 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1982) (“OSH Act”), the Sec-
retary of Labor (‘Secretary’) issued an occupational

27a
Opinion of the District Court

health and safety standards entitled “Hazard Communi-
eation Standard” (“Standard”) on November 25, 1983.
See United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d
728, 7385 (3d Cir. 1985). The stated purpose of the
Standard is “to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals
produced or imported by chemical manufacturers or im-
porters are evaluated and that information concerning
their hazards is transmitted to affected employers and
employees within the manufacturing sector.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200(a) (1985).* The Standard expressly intends
“to preempt any state law pertaining to this subject.
Any state which desires to assume responsibility in this
area may also do so under the provisions of section 18
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act . . . which

deals with state jurisdiction and state plans.” § 1910.1200
(b).

The Standard applies to a specified class of employers
who are involved in manufacturing using hazardous
chemicals. Chemical manufacturers and importers are
required to assess the hazards of their products; dis-
tributors must transmit relevant information with the
products; and employers in SIC Codes 20 through 39 are
instructed to provide information about the hazardous
chemicals to exposed employees. § 1910.1200(b). Regula-
tion of laboratories is less stringent, § 1910.1200(b) (3),
and certain products, such as foods, regulated pesticides,
and tobacco products, are partially or entirely exempted

from regulation by the Standard. §§ 1910.1200(b) (3)-
(5).

Instead w° defining which chemicals are “hazardous”
by the creation of a master list by OSHA or its desig-
nee, the responsibility for making hazard determinations
is delegated to chemical manufacturers and importers.

*Unless otherwise indicated, al! regulations contained in the
Standard are located in Volume 29 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, in the 1985 edition.

———————eee een

28a
Opinion of the District Court

§ 1910.1200(d). Employers are expected to make these
determinations only if they choose not to rely upon the
determinations of the chemical manufacturers or im-
porters. § 1910.1200(d)(1). The Standard enumerates
lists of presumptively hazardous chemicals which persons
evaluating chemical dangers should consider established
as hazardous. § 1910.1200(d) (3). While including some
of the same lists of hazardous chemicals as those which
the Akron Health Commission is required to review un-
der the Akron ordinance when creating its master list,
the Standard’s lists are not identical.

The Standard mandates that chemical manufacturers,
importers and distributors label hazardous chemicals
with the substance’s identity, “appropriate” hazard warn-
ings, and their names and addresses. § 1910.1200(f) (1).
Employers must label each container of hazardous chemi-
cals in the workplace with the chemical’s identity and
hazard warnings. § 1910-1200 (f) (4).

MSDS requirements are also part of the Standard.
The federal regulations require a list of information
similar to Akron’s ordinance: chemical and common
names; physical and chemical character; physical haz-
ards; primary route of entry; OSHA permissible expo-
sure limit; potential carcinogens; generally applicable
precautions and controls; and emergency and first aid
procedures. § 1910.1200(g) (2). Chemical manufactur-
ers and importers are directed to provide MSDS’s to
distributors and manufacturing purchasers, § 1910.1200
(g) (6), and employers are expected to make them read-
ily accessible to employees during each work shift.
§ 1910.1200(g) (8).

Employers must develop written communications pro-
grams to administer the labeling, MSDS, and employee
information and training requirements of the Stand-
ard. § 1910.1200(e). Employees must be informed about
the availability of this written program, the require-

29a
Opinion of the District Court

ments of the Standard, and the presence of hazardous
chemicals in their work area. § 1910.1200(h) (1). Em-
ployee training should explain the physical and health
hazards, protective measures available to employees, and

the details of the hazard communications program.
§ 1910.1200 (h) (2).

Like the Akron ordinance, the Standard makes trade
secret protection available when the properties and ef-
fects of an eligible chemical are disclosed and the specific
chemical identity will be made available to health profes-
sionals. § 1910.1200(i). In an emergency, a chemical
manufacturer, importer, or employer must immediately
disclose the chemical identity to treating health profes-
sionals without a written statement of need or an exe-
cuted confidentiality statement. § 1910.1200(i) (2). Ina
non-emergency situation, health professionals may only
learn the identity of a trade secret by submitting an
elaborate written statement and an executed confiden-
tiality agreement. § 1910.1200(i) (3).

The Chemical Hazardous Communication Standard re-
quires chemical manufacturers, importers, and distribu-
tors to be in compliance with its provisions by November
25, 1985. Employers in the manufacturing sector must
comply by May 25, 1986. § 1910.1200(j).

II.

Plaintiffs argue that Chapter 1830 is invalid as ap-
plies to employees in SIC Codes 20 through 39, since
these employers are covered by the federal standard reg-
ulating hazard communication in the workplace.’ First,
they assert that Akron’s ordinance is expressly preempted
by 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982) and 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b)

5 Plaintiffs clearly are not challenging the applicability of Chap-
ter 1830 to employers in other SIC Codes. Plaintiffs’ Brief in
Support of Temporary Restraining Order at 20.

Se

80a
Opinion of the District Court

(1985). Alternatively, they argue that Chapter 1830 is
impliedly preempted by the goals of the OSH Act and
the Standard, by Chapter 1830’s “true regulatory in-
tent,” and by a conflict between the two regulations. On
consideration, and for the reasons set forth below, this
Court cannot agree that Chapter 1830 is expressly pre-
empted, and it does not find any portion of the ordinance

is impliedly preempted.
A. Standards for Federal Preemption of States’ Regu-
latory Power

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Under the preemption analy-
sis derived from the Supremacy Clause, “[t]he purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, US. ;
, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2393 (1985) (quoting Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 485 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) ).

“Pre-emption may be either express or imr’ied, and ‘is
compelled whether Congress’ command is exp! .citly stated
in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.’” Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153
(1982) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U/S.
519, 525 (1977)). Federal regulations are entitled to
the same preemptive effect enjoyed by federal statutes.
Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 153-154.

8la

Opinion of the District Court

Implied preemption is implicated when there is an
“actual conflict” between state and federal law.

Such a conflict arises when “compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossi-
bility,” Floride Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 182, 142-143 (1963), or when state
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, [312 U.S. 52, 67.
(1941)]. See generally Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.

Crisp, 467 U.S. , , 104 S.Ct. 2694,
(1984).
Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Lab-

oratories, Inc., US. : , 105 S.Ct. 2871, 2875
(1985). See also L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d
201, 207 (6th Cir. 1985).

Traditionally states have been permitted considerable
latitude to regulate public health and safety pursuant to
their police power. Metropolitan Life Insurance,
U.S. at , 105 S.Ct. at 2398. To strike down a state’s
health and safety regulation, Congress’ intent must be
clearly manifested. Southern Pacific Co. v. State of Ari-
zona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945); see Jones, 430 U.S. at
525.

B. Express Preemption by the OSH Act

Plaintiffs rest their argument that Chapter 1830 is
expressly preempted upon §18 of the OSH Act, 29
U.S.C. § 667 (1982) (“§ 18”), which provides:

~(a) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State
agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under
State law over any occupational safety or health is-
sue with respect to which no standard is in effect
under Section 655 of this title.

(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume
responsibility for development and _ enforcement
therein of occupational safety and health standards

32a
Opinion of the District Court

relating to any occupational safety or health issue
with respect to which a Federal standard has been
promulgated under section 655 of this title shall
submit a State plan for the development of such
standards and their enforcement.

The Secretary of Labor shall approve a state plan sub-
mitted pursuant to §18(b) which meets the conditions
listed in § 18(c). 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1982).

Plaintiffs argue that because the Standard regulates
the area of chemical hazard communication and because
Akron has not had, and cannot have, its ordinance ap-
proved by the Secretary, Akron is precluded from using
Chapter 1830 to regulate such matter. They buttress
their contention by citing the Secretary’s regulations in-
terpreting §18. Title 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2 (1985) pro-
vides in relevant part:

Section 18(a) of the Act is read as preventing any
State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction
under State law over any occupational safety or
health issue with respect to which a Federal standard
has been issued under section 6 of the Act.

The Standard itself indicates its preemptive effect:

This occupational safety and health standard is
intended to address comprehensively the issue of eval-
uating and communicating chemical hazards to em-
ployees in the manufacturing section, and to prevent
any state law pertaining to this subject. Any state
which desires to assume responsibility in this area
may only do so under the provisions of section 18
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29
U.S.C. 651 et seg.) which deals with state jurisdic-
tion and state plans.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a) (2) (1985) (“§ 1910.1200 (a)
(2)”).

The courts which have considered the preemption of
state right-to-know acts by the Hazard Communication

—————

33a
Opinion of the District Court

Standard have held that these state statutes are pre-
empted as applied to employers in SIC Codes 20 through
39 on matters of workplace safety dealt with in the
Standard. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 736, cited in New Jersey
State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587,
593 (3d Cir. 1985) (New Jersey Right-to-Know Act) ;
Manufacturers Association of Tri-County v. Knepper,
No. 85-1027, slip op. (M.D. Pa. Dee. 12, 1985) (Pennsyl-
vania Right-to-Know Act). Defendants, however, distin-
guish these cases as involving state, rather than munici-
pal, right-to-know statutes.

Defendants’ contention is that the word “state” as it
is used in the preemption provisions of the OSH Act and
the Secretary’s regulations excludes political subdivisions
such as the City of Akron. They rely upon the definition
of “State” set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 652(7) (1982):

The term “State” includes a State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

The failure to include politiical subdivisions within this
definition, the defendants argue, means that Congress did
not intend to preempt municipalities in § 18. The legis-
lative history, however, demonstrates that the definition
of “state” was not drafted with the intent of exempting
political subdivisions from preemption. When introducing
this definition as an amendment, Senator Javits of New
York stated:

Mr. President, the sole purpose of this amendment
is to make eligible to file what is called a State plan
those territories and possessions of the United States
which are spelled out in the amendment. This matter
is not otherwise defined in the bill.

Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative History

aii

84a
Opinion of the District Court

of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, at
504 (1971) (emphasis added). Given Senator Javits’
purpose for defining “state”, the definition obviously does
not reflect at all upon Congress’ willingness or unwill-
ingness to preempt municipal ordinances.

Nevertheless, the absence of language regarding the
preemption of laws of political subdivisions in the OSH
Act is remarkable. As defendants point out, Congress
has explicitly included political subdivisions in other pro-
visions of the OSH Act 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1) (1982)
(Secretary may promulgate standards based upon infor-
mation submitted by a political subdivision) ; 29 U.S.C.
§ 667(c) (6) (1982) (an approved state plan must assure
the Secretary that the state will establish an occupational
safety and health program protecting employees of polit-
ical subdivisions) ; 29 U.S.C. § 673(b) (2) (1982) (See-
retary may make grants to political subdivisions for de-
velopment and administration of statistical programs).
Furthermore, countless federal regulatory statutes con-
tain preemption provisions whieh explicitly include politi-
cal subdivisions. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7548 (1982), Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1982); Poison Preven-
tion Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1476 (1982) ; Lead-Based
Paint Poison Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4846 (1982) ;
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1920(a) (1982); Egg Products Inspection Act,
21 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1982); Consumer Products Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982); Flammable Fabrics Act,
lo U.S.C. § 1203 (1982) ° Congress’ practice of explicitly

®In their brief, plaintiffs cite Rollins Environmental Services,
Inc. v. Parish of Saint James, 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985), and
Warren County v. State of North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276
(E.D.N.C. 1981), for the proposition that federal regulations pre-
empting state law also preempt the laws of political subdivisions.
Defendants correctly respond that these cases interpreted §18 of
the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2) (B)

35a
Opinion of the District Court

preempting political subdivisions, then, militates against
the inferences that Congress either forgot to include polit-
ical subdivisions in § 18 or implicitly included them in the

9 7

word “state’’.

The purposes of the OSH Act also support the conclu-
sion that § 18 does not include political subdivisions. The
statute provides:

The Congress declares it to be its purpose and
policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate
commerce among the several States and with foreign
nations and to provide for the general welfare, to
assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our human resources... .

29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). This overriding purpose of
the OSH Act is exhaustively documented. See e.g., S.
Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.

(1982), which specifically preempts laws of a “State or political
subdivision of a State.”

™The absence of discussion of the preemption of the laws of
political subdivision in the 1277-page legislative history of the
OSH Act also undermines the assertion that Congress meant to
expressly include political subdivisions in the preemption provision.

At oral argument, plaintiffs proffered the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Aniendment to the United
States Constitution as an example of language which has been
interpreted to apply to localities as well as states, although words
denoting political subdivisions do not appear in the text. Plaintiffs
might just as aptly point out that the First Amendment applies to
the states, although it purports to limit the activities of Congress.
These examples of constitutional interpretation are inapposite to
determine whether “Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the
statute’s language.” Jones, 480 U.S. at 525. Plaintiffs’ argument,
in the words of defendants’ counsel, “asks the Court to find express
what is not express.” The doctrine of express preemption by its
terms requires strict construction, rather than the expansive con-
struction routinely applied to constitutional provisions.

—_—

36a
Opinion of the District Court

Code Cong. & Ad. News 5117 (1970); McClintock, Fore-
word, and Meeds, A Legislative History of OSHA, 9
Gonz. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1974).

Plaintiffs argue, however, that another important goal
of the OSH Act was “to establish healthy work environ-
ments in a uniform way with minimum burden on inter-
state commerce.” Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Tempo-
rary Restraining Order at 22. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals has acknowledged that a desire to reduce regu-
latory burdens is apparent in the Standard, but it con-
cluded:

That purpose is arguably at odds with congres-
sional intention that the OSH Act provide a federal
f.oor for safety in the workplace. Reduction of bur-
dens posed by mulitple state laws does not appear to
have been a significant congressional concern; rather,
Congress favored a uniform federal law so that those
states providing vigorous protection would not be dis-
advantaged by those that did not. Subcomm, on
Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative History of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.L.
No. 91-596, at 144, 418, 444 (1971).

Auchter, 763 F.2d at 734. See also Hughey, 774 F.2d
at 593. This viewpoint is shared by at least one com-
mentator, who dismissed the argument that the OSH Act
intended to minimize regulatory burdens:

Inconvenience to employers is an invalid objection,
because Congress did not intent to protect employers’
convenience. If it had, Congress would have pre-
empted all state standards.

Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in
Regulatory Federalism, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 1431, 1457-
1458 (1984).

-

87a

Opinion of the District Court

In a different context, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the OSH Act’s purpose was to provide protection to
workers, despite high costs to business. In American
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490
(1981), the Court construed § 6(b) (5) of the OSH Act,
which provides in pertinent part:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents
under this subsection, shall set the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or func-
tional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard
for the period of his working life. . . .

29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1982). In order to reach its
holding that this provision required the Secretary to con-
duct a feasibility analysis rather than a cost-benefit anal-
ysi , the Court found that Congress placed “the ‘benefit’
of worker health above all other considerations save those
making attainment of this ‘benefit’ unachievable.” Jd. at
509. This holding was mandated by the Court’s lengthy
and painstaking review of the legislaitve history of the
OSH Act:

The congressional Reports and debates certainly
confirm that Congress meant “feasible” and nothing
else in using that term. Congress was concerned that
the Act might be thought to require achievement of
absolute safety, an impossible standard, and there-
fore insisted that health and safety goals be capable
of economic and technological accomplishment. Per-
haps most telling is the absence of any indication
whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA to conduct
its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a
toxic material or harmful physical agent standard.
The legislative history demonstrates conclusively that

38a
Opinion of the District Court

Congress was fully aware that the Act would impose

real and substantial costs of compliance on industry,

and believed that such costs were part of the cost of

doing business.
Id. at 514 (emphasis added). The Court concluded,
“When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and
Health Act in 1970, it chose te place pre-eminent value on
assuring employees a safe and healthful working environ-
ment, limited only by the feasibility of achieving such an
environment.” Jd. at 540.*

The conclusion that worker safety, rather than a con-
cern about regulatory burden created by inconsistency,
motivated Congress to pass the OSH Act is substantially
supported by legislative history, academic commentary,
and the OSH Act itself. Section 18 of the OSH Act sets
a federal floor on occupational health and safety that
covers every state and territory of this country. With
the floor established, states are free to enact more strin-
gent requirements via a § 18(c) approved plan. See 29
_U.S.C. 667(c) (2) (1982) (standards promulgated under
approved state plan must be “at least as effective in pro-
viding safe healthful employment and places of employ-
ment as the standards promulgated under section 655.

. .”’). A municipality’s freedom to also promulgate
higher standards would not undercut that floor, but would
support the policy of creating safer workplaces.’

Plaintiffs advance numerous unpersuasive reasons for
not interpreting Congress’ purpose as one of providing

* The Supreme Court's construction of the OSH Act in Donovan
is similar to the method used by this Court. The Supreme Court
contrasted other federal statutes explicitly requiring cost benefit
analysis, id. at 510-511, and it analyzed the policy of the OSH Act
to reach the decision that the word “feasible” should be strictly
construed.

* Less stringent municipal standards would be impliedly pre-
empted, since they would act as an obstacle to Congressional policy.
See discussion of standards for implied preemption, supra at 11.

39a

Opinion of the District Court

a “federal floor’. -They argue that legislative history
demonstrates that Congress rejected the idea that the
OSH Act should operate as a floor, apparently relying
upon the following statement:

Both versions of the bill allowed agreements be-
tween the Secretary and a State whereby the State
could continue enforcement of its health and safety
standards pending final action on the State plan. The
Senate bill limited such agreements to standards
which were not in conflict with Federal standards.
The Senate bill also provided that a State standard
which was more stringent than a Federal standard
was not to be regarded as one in conflict with that
Federal standard. The Senate receded.

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 5238 (1970). However, this
Court cannot agree that Congress’ failure to adopt the
Senate’s bill indicates an over-riding interest in uniform-
ity, particularly in light of its willingness to permit states
to enforce their own more stringent rules after the Sec-
retary has approved their programs pursuant to § 18(b).

Second, plaintiffs argue that if the OSH Act were in-
tended to provide only minimum protections for workers,
there would be no reason for Congress to include § 18,
since the OSH Act itself would accomplish that goal in
the absence of state participation. The legislative history
shows, however, that Congress intended to shift the en-
foreement of occupational health and safety regulations
to the states, and that it promulgated § 18 with that in-
tention:

As an encouragement for State action, the bill pro-
vides Federal financial support to assist the States
in assuming their own programs for worker health
and safety. Planning grants with up to 90 percent
Federal participation, and program grants up to 50
percent Federal participation are provided.

40a
Opinion of the District Court

The 90 percent grant is designed to aid the States
in identifying needs, developing State plans and pro-
grams for collecting statistical data, increasing per-
sonnel capabilities, and improving administration and
enforcement. The 50 percent Federal grant is made
available to assist States in carrying out the occupa-
tional safety and health programs contained in their
plans, as well as programs concerning occupational
safety and health statistics.

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 5195 (1970). Moreover, an
appellate court construing § 18 observed:

In the application of a new federal statute, there
is a likely Congressional contemplation of maximiz-
ing use of existing state machinery. “Federalism”
cannot be invoked categorically where it would defeat
the national objective. A sensitivity to state partici-
pation has value, however, where the state adminis-
tration can be integrated with federal application—
either as a supplement, or as a stopgap measure, or
as a delegation under federal control.

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, Industrial Union Department v. Marshall,
570 F.2d 1030, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Given the obvious
rationale for § 18, plaintiffs’ contention that there would
be no purpose for § 18 if the OSH Act meant to provide
minimum, rather than uniform, standards is wholly un-
tenable.

Third, plaintiffs cite the remarks of several senators
in the legislative history for the proposition that uni-
formity was an intent when they wrote the OSH Act.
The Court is not persuaded that these few statements of
individual debaters indicate that the OSH Act has the
subsidiary purpose plaintiffs attribute to it. Further-
more, the Court is not convinced that all of the state-

4la
Opinion of the District Court

ments refer to the unfairness of regulatory burden on
employers rather than the unfairness that “efforts of the
more vigorous states are inevitably undermined by the
shortsightedness of others.” S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at
5180 (1970).

Finally, plaintiffs rely on Township of Greenwich v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1981), in
which the court held that the township’s right to enforce
its zoning ordinance and building code was not preempted
by the OSH Act. Enroute to its decision that preemption
of those ordinances would be contrary to Congressional
intent as evidenced in the legislative history, the court
stated, “We agree that if plaintiff Township sought,
through the issuance of Notices of Violation, to control
the working areas of defendant Mobil’s refinery, plain-
tiff’s attempt to regulate would be preempted by the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act.’’ This remark was un-
necessary to the resolution of the Greenwich case, and
this Court doubts that the issue was subjected to the
exhaustive briefing and argument afforded in this case.
The Court, therefore, is unpersuaded by the dictum of the
New Jersey district court.

Plaintiffs also cite a multitude of cases holding that
preemptions of state law are to be broadly construed in
order to give life to the Supremacy Clause. However, this
argument ignores the fact that express preemption, by
definition, must be clearly manifested, especially when
local health and safety provisions are endangered. Jones,
430 U.S. at 525. When § 18 of the OSH Act is construed
in light of its motivating purpose—worker safety—and
in comparison to other federal preemptory provisions
which routinely preempt the laws of political subdivisions
in explicit terms, this Court cannot conclude that Con-
gress’ intent to preempt laws such as Chapter 1830 is
“clearly manifested.” Accordingly, this Court holds that

dng

42a

Opinion of the District Court

§ 18 does not expressly preempt Akron’s ordinance, which
regulates matters already regulated in OSHA’s standard.

C. Express Preemption by the Standard

Plaintiffs urge that in the event this Court finds that
the Akron ordinance is not expressly preempted by § 18
of the OSH Act, it should construe § 1910.1200(a) (2) of
the Standard as expressly preempting Chapter 1830 by
virtue of OSHA’s language reported in the Federal Reg-
ister and the Congressional Record. This Court does not
agree that interpretative language which is not part of
the regulation accords the Standard preemptive effect,
over political subdivisions. Moreover, even if such lan-
guage could be construed to mean that the regulations
were intended by OSHA to have preemptive effect over
municipalities, this Court would not accept such an in-
terpretation because of its obvious inconsistency with the
clear Congressional policy in the OSH Act.

1.

To support its position that OSHA expressly preempts
laws of political subdivisions despite § 1910.1200(a) (2)’s
failure to explicitly mention them, plaintiffs rely heavily
upon OSHA’s preambles to interim and final drafts of the
Standard. In particular, they cite OSHA’s language ex-
plaining the purposes of the Standard, which explicitly
states policies of uniformity. In the preamble to its reg-
ulations, OSHA states that its purpose was “to establish
uniform requirements for hazard communication in one
segment of industry, the manufacturing division.” 48
Fed. Reg. 53281 (1983). Various statements throughout
the report echo the rationale that “the promulgation of
a cost-effective federal standard is likely to reduce the
cost of complying with the various state and local right-
to-knew laws.” 48 Fed. Roe. 53329 (1983). Plaintiffs
identify “OSHA’s strongest expression of preemptive

48a

Opinion of the District Court

effect” as its explanation of the preemption lauguage in
its summary of the Standard as promulgated:

This preemption will serve to reduce the burden
on interstate commerce produced by conflicting state
and local regulations and will insure that all em-
ployees in the manufacturing sector are accorded the
same degree of protection. OSHA will examine care-
fully any state requests to regulate in this area to
determine any potentially burdensome impact on in-
terstate commerce as well as to ascertain whether
there is a compelling need for separate regulation.

48 Fed. Reg. 53334 (1983).

Plaintiffs also rely upon two cases in which the Su-
preme Court evaluated language in preambles to regula-
tions to decide what preemptive effect the regulations had.
In Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 141, the Court looked at
the preamble accompanying a regulation promulgated by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to resolve “any
ambiguity in [the regulation’s] language... .” In Hills-
borough County, Florida, USS. at , 105 S.Ct. at
2371, the Court evaluated language in the preamble of
regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration to determine that local regulation of the collec-

tion of blood plasma was not intended to be preempted by
the agency.

However, the Supreme Court had earlier held that giv-
ing administrative language which was not within the
body of the regulations the same effect as if it were part
of the regulations violates the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §$§ 551-559. Chrysier Corp v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 (1979). When asked to interpret the phrase
“authorized by law” in § 7(b) of the Trade Secrets Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (“§ 7(b)”), the Court refused to read
“interpretive regulation of general statement of agency
policy” as authorization for purposes of § 7(b). Jd. at

44a
Opinion of the District Court

315-316. It distinguished interpretive language from
the substantive portions of regulations, since “such reg-
ulations are not properly promulgated as substantive
rules, and therefore not the product of procedures which
Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to giving
a regulation the binding effect of law.” Jd. at 315 (foot-
note omitted). Thus, the Court found that the failure
to subject interpretive language of the agency to public
scrutiny during rulemaking as required by 5 U.S.C. § 553
(b) precluded reliance on this language.

In light of Brown, the cases relied upon by plaintiffs
are distinguishable. The Court in Fidelity Federal, 458
U.S. at 158, n .18, recognizes the continuped vitality of
Chrysler Corp.:

Citing Chrysler Corp v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315-
316 (1979), appellees characterize the preamble as
an interpretive regulation that does not have the
binding force of law and therefore cannot pre-empt
state law. But Chrysler Corp. is not on point be-
cause we conclude that § 545.8-3(f) itself supersedes
contrary state due-on-sale law; we look to the pre-
amble only for the administrative construction of the
regulation, to which “deference is . . . clearly in
order.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). We
need not consider, therefore, the pre-emptive effect
of the preamble standing alone.

In the present case, the plain words of § 1910.1200(a)
(2), without considering the preamble, will not support
an inference that, the Standard has a larger preemptive
effect than § 18 of the OSH Act. In effect, the plaintiffs
urge this Court to construe the Standard to preempt the
laws of political subdivisions because of OSHA’s inter-
pretation and analysis of its regulations—precisely the
case distinguished by the Court in Fidelity Federal.

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ citation to Hillsborough is also
inapposite. Hillsborough did not involve the interpreta-

See ey oe

Pl ee et ea ea |

45a
Opinion of the District Court

tion of an ostensibly “expressly” preemptive regulation;
instead, it looked to the interpretive language of an
agency to determine whether its comprehensive regula-
tion of the field was intended to preempt all state and
local regulation:

Moreover, because agencies normally address prob-
lems in a detailed manner and can speak through a
variety of means, including regulations, preambles,
interpretive statements, and responses to comments,
we can expect that they will make their intentions
clear if they intend for their regulations to be ex-
elusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to the
question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying
that the mere volume and complexity of its regula-
tions indicate that the agency did in fact intend to
pre-empt.

—— US. at , 105 S.C. at 2377. Determining
whether a regulatory scheme is so exhaustive that it is
meant to preempt state or local regulation in its field of
law is an inexact science at best. Reliance on interpretive
statements by the agency is justified by the nature of the
analysis. Deciding whether preemption is express is, by
its terms, a much narrower inquiry. Thus, Hillsborough
does not require the conclusion that an agency’s preamble
to regulations can be read in conjunction with its pre-
emption provision to find that the regulations expressly
preempt local law.

Chrysler Corp., then, prohibits this Court from con-
struing § 1910.1200(a) (2) by reading OSHA’s preambles
into the Standard. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
that Chrysler Corp. has been eroded, or that express pre-
emption may be found by reading language outside the
text of the regulations.

2.

Even if this Court could construe the Standard as ex-
pressly preempting the laws of political subdivisions such

46a
Opinion of the District Court

as Chapter 1830, it would not agree that OSHA was
within its authority when assigning the Standard such a
preemptive effect. It is true that a preemptive regula-
tion’s force does not depend upon express Congressional
authorization to replace state law. Fidelity Federal, 458
U.S. at 154. However, when reviewing OSHA’s construc-
tion of the OSH Act, this Court must first consider
whether Congress has already directly addressed this
issue. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., US. ’ , 104 S.Ct. 2778,
2781-2782, reh’g denied, —— U.S. ——, 105 S.Ct. 28-
29 (1984). The judiciary, rather than the agency, is the
final interpreter of statutory meaning, and it must re-
ject administrative interpretations which are contrary to
clear Congressional intent. Jd. at 2782, n. 9. If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, de-
cides that Congress had an intent regarding a specific
issue, that intention must be given effect. Jd.

In the present case, this Court has reviewed the struc-
ture, provisions, and legislative history of the OSH Act
before concluding that Congress intended that the law
of political subdivisions should not be expressly pre-
empted. OSHA’s contrary interpretation, then, is not
afforded the deference due when it is filling interstices
created by Congress. Since OSHA’s attempt to extend the
preemptive effect of its regulations to localities, which
are not expressly preempted by $18 of the OSH Act,
contradicts Congress’ intent as construed by this Court,
the regulations cannot operate to expressly preempt
Chapter 1830.

Courts have consistently refused to abrogate the clear
intent of Congress, even where the rejection of an
agency’s actions or construction of the statute would

ee oe ee

a

47a
Opinion of the District Court

prove very troublesome and costly. In the celebrated
“snail darter case,” Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 158 (1978), the Supreme Court was urged to
prohibit the completion and operation of the Tellico Dam
in Tennessee because of the threat to the existence of a
species of three-inch fish known as snail darters, which
were protected by the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1548. Although Congress had already
expended more than $100 million on the nearly-built dam,
the Court enjoined its completion. In doing so, it relied
upon the plain terms of the statutory provision. Jd. at
173. Although the Court’s majority did not believe that
it was necessary to look at the legislative history of the
Endangered Species Act since the statute was plain and
unambiguous on its face, id. at 184, n. 29, it stated:

While there is no discussion in the legislative his-
tory of precisely this problem, the totality of con-
gressional action makes it abundantly clear that the
result we reach today is wholly in accord with both
the words of the statute and the intent of Congress.
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute
was to halt and reverse the trend towards species
extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not
only in the state policies of the Act, but in literally
every section of the statute.

Id. at 184.

As the Supreme Court in Hill did, this Court must
enforce the decisions made by Congress when the OSH
Act was promulgated over fifteen years ago. Congress
clearly intended in the OSH Act to further the policies
of worker health and safety, not to reduce the adminis-
trative burden on business caused by a lack of uniformity.
Both the legislative history and the plain words of the
statute compel the conclusion that Congress did not in-
tend to expressly preempt laws of municipalities. Thus,

48a
Opinion of the District Court

this Court must hold that § 1910.1200(a) (2) of the
Standard does not expressly preempt Chapter 1830.

D. Implied Preemption

Since Chapter 1830 is not expressly preempted by the
OSH Act, each disputed provision ® of the Akron ordi-
nance must be analyzed in light of the federal regula-
tions to determine whether Chapter 1830 produces an
“actual conflict,” making compliance a “physical im-
possibility,” or frustrates the federal policy of the OSH
Act. Hillsborough, —— US. at , 105 8.Ct. at 2375.
The unlikelihood of making either finding when evaluat-
ing a local regulatory standard which is more stringent
than corresponding federal regulations was noted by the
Third Circuit in its review of the New Jersey Right-to-
Know legislation. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 734. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has observed the incongruity of “pre-
vent[ing] States from taking supplementary efforts” to-
wards Congressional goals, thus “interpret[ing] federal
statutes to negate their own stated purposes.” New
York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405, 419-420 (1973).

1) Exemptions

Plaintiffs submit that some of the employers and sub-
stances exempted by § 1830.02 from regulation under the

10 The following provisions either are uncontested by plaintiffs
or raise no plausible preemption issue:

1830.01 Application
1830.03 (a)-(h), (j), (1)-(0)
Definitions
1830.04 Powers and Duties of the Commission
1830.06 Hazard Determination and Communication Program
1830.08 Variances
1830.16 Sunset Provision
1830.18 Conflict and Invalidity
1830.19 Separability
1830.20 Penalties

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49a
Opinion of the District Court

Akron ordinance are only exempted from labeling require-
ments under the Standard. In addition, some substances
exempted by the Standard are regulated by Chapter
1830. Complaint at 24. This discrepancy does not,
however, make compliance a “physical impossibility.”
The OSH Act, rather than Akron, creates the federal
floor on hazard communications by promulgation of the
Hazard Communication Standard, so it is not necessary
for Chapter 1830 to regulate all potentially hazardous
substances. Further, since §18(a) of the OSH Act re-
veals Congress’ intention to permit states to fill inter-
stices in federal law, Akron’s regulation of substances
exempted by the Standard does not frustrate the federal
policy of the OSH Act, but rather contributes to the goal
of worker safety.”

2) Application to “Employers”

The term “employer,” characterizing the persons and
entities to which Chapter 1830 is made applicable by
§ 1830.01, is defined as ‘“‘the City of Akron and any per-
son, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
entity in the City of Akron which is in any of the fol-
lowing Standard Industrial Codes (SIC): 7, 13 through
17, 20 through 39, 41, 42, 45, 48 through 50, 53, 54, 55,
70, 72, 516, 517, 7333, 7342, 7349, 75, 80, 863.” § 1830.03
(i). As discussed above, this classification results in the
application of Chapter 1830 to a much broader group
of employers than the Standard, which is limited to the
manufacturing sector. It is indisputable that this ex-

11 This Court has accepted the premise that worker health and
safety, rather than the alleviation of regulatory burdens on em-
ployers, is the policy animating the OSH Act. See supra at 15-20.
Since any more stringent provision of the Akron ordinance will
generally foster that goal, the Court will not repetitively announce
that most of the provisions do not frustrate the policy of the OSH
Act. Rather, consistency with federal policy will be discussed in
the text only when there is a plausible argument to be weighed.

50a
Opinion of the District Court

pansion of employers subject to hazard communication
laws is valid. Hughey, 774 F.2d at 593; Knepper, slip
op. at 11-12.

3) Determination of “Hazardous Chemicals”

The “hazardous chemicals” which will be regulated by
Chapter 1830 are defined as those contained on a list
promulgated by the Health Commission pursuant to
$1830.05. §1830.03(k). This “Master List of Hazardous
Chemicals” (‘Master List’) shall include chemicals on
lists developed by various governmental and research
groups identifying hazardous substances, and the Com-
mission is entitled to recommend revisions to the list.
§1830.05. In contrast, substances regulated by the Stand-
ard are to be determined by chemical manufacturers and
importers in accordance with the procedure set forth in
§1910.1200(d). These different_methods of determining
which substances are toxic will probabiy result in differ-
ent chemicals being regulated by the Standard and Chap-
ter 1830. Nevertheless, Chapter 1830’s list will not ‘“con-
flict”’ with those chemicals requiring warnings under the
Standard, but merely supplement them. Hughey, 774
F.2d at 594.

4) Labeling and Placards

Section 1830.07 mandates that each container of haz-
ardous chemicals be labeled, or in some situations marked
with a sign or placard, with its chemical name, Depart-
ment of Transportation required labels, and cancer and
reproductive warnings when applicable. Section 1910.1200

12 The Third Circuit has ordered the Secretary to consider ap-
plying the Standard to other SIC Codes and to order its applica-
tion if he cannot advance reasons why that is not feasible. Auchter,
763 F.2d at 739. Since municipalities are not expressly preempted
by § 18, however, such an expanded application of the Standard
would have little, if any, effect on the validity of Akron’s ordinance.

5la
Opinion of the District Court

of the Standard requires that each container leaving a
chemical manufacturer, importer, or distributor be labeled
with the chemical’s identity, “appropriate hazard warn-
ing” and the company’s name and address. Employers
are responsible for ensuring the labeling of the first two
requirements. The Akron and federal provisions do not
appear to be at all inconsistent. The Standard specifically
requires labeling consistent with Department of Trans-
portation regulations. § 1910.1200(f) (2). Furthermore,
“appropriate hazard warnings” must include information
on carcinogenic and reproductive risks, since such charac-
teristics require a finding that a substance is a “hazard-
ous chemical” under the Standard. § 1910.1200(c). There
does not appear to be an actual conflict between these
labeling provisions. See Hughey, 774 F.2d at 595-596;
Knepper, slip op. at 18 (both cases holding that labeling
requirements of a state law are not preempted by federal
law except as applied to the manufacturing sector).

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Standard’s provision
establishing responsibility for compiling MSDS’s and its
effective dates make compliance with the labeling require-
ment impossible for the employers for whom Chapter
1830 was scheduled to become effective in December, 1985.
The Standard provides that MSDS8’s shall be produced by
chemical manufacturers and importers and provided to
distributors and manufacturing purchasers. § 1910.1200
(g) (6). The Standard became effective in November,
1985 for the manufacturers and importers, and it will not
become applicable to “downstream” employers until May
12, 1986. Plaintiffs assert that this six-month period be-
tween effective dates was designed to permit the down-
stream employers to have ample time to receive the infor-
mation from their suppliers. They argue that this infor-
mation may not yet be available to employers for whom
Chapter 1830 was scheduled to become effective in De-
cember, 1985. Defendants cogently respond that there
are other avenues for employers to obtain information

52a
Opinion of the District Court

needed to comply with Chapter 1830’s labeling require-
ments, such as requesting chemical names for substances
found on the Master List from the International Union of
Pure and Applied Chemistry or the Chemical Abstract
Service. Moreover, there is apparently no relation what-
soever between the effective date of the Akron ordinance
and the date on which the Standard would be applied.
Chapter 1830 was not scheduled to become effective as to
any employer until one year after its enactment.
§1830.17. Certainly this passage of time should have been
ample for large employers to gather the information
which they are needed for compliance. The Court does not
agree that the need to independently take steps to obtain
information which would later become available through
the operation of the Standard makes compliance with the
two regulations “physically impossible.” **

Plaintiffs wishing to contend that the labeling require-
ments will “confuse” workers who are bombarded with a
myriad of information, must present evidence on this
factual issue. Hughey, 774 F.2d at 596. Plaintiffs here
have not done so. Accordingly, the labeling requirements
of Chapter 1830 are not preempted by the Standard.

5) Employer Filing and Reporting Requirements

Section 1830.09 contains provisions compelling the fil-
ing of reports annually and after spillage or leakage of
a hazardous chemical. Employers must also file certain
construction or operating permits and pay an annual fil-
ing fee. These filings are made available to the fire
department pursuant to § 1830.12(g). There are no com-
parable provisions within the Standard, so there are no

18The Court also rejects plaintiffs’ assertion that the labeling
provision of Chapter 1830 frustrates the policy of the federal law
by placing oneorous costs upon employers who must comply with
additional labeling requirements. Worker safety is the goal which
the OSH Act fostered; administrative ease is not.

:
:
:
_

53a
Opinion of the District Court

actual conflicts. Moreover, since these reports can be
utilized for providing information to fire and other public
officials, § 1830.09 may be construed as a regulation pro-
tecting environmental, rather than workplace, health and
safety." A funding provision similar to that in the Akron
ordinance was specifically upheld by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals because it did not “interfere with com-
pliance with the OSH Act or impose obstacles to the ac-
complishment of the OSH Act’s purposes.” Hughey, 774
F.2d at 595.

6) Material Safety Data Sheets

Chapter 1830 requires each employer to develop or
obtain an MSDS for each hazardous chemical the em-
ployer manufactures, uses, or stores. § 1830.10(a). The
information it shall contain is similar, though not iden-

tical, to the MSDS’s prescribed by the Standard. See. x

§1830.10(b) and §1910.1200(g) (2). There is no conflict

14 Notwithstaanding plaintiffs’ characterization of the purpose
of these provisions, many of these regulations protect the com-
munity as well as workers. The regularity of chemical spills and
fires which destroy large areas or cause many illnesses is con-
sistently documented by the media. Moreover, Frank Slayton of
the Akron Health Department testified that the information col-
lected pursuant to Chapter 1830 will be used to trace latent dis-
eases; for zoning purposes (to regulate the proximity of toxic
chemicals to population areas, schools, and nurseries) ; and to avoid
contamination of the environment. Captain Charles Strum of the
Akron Fire Department testified that Chapter 1830’s labeling re-
quirements would help firefighters to identify chemicals on sight
and to know the location of hazardous chemicals before going to
the scene of a fire. Captain Strum’s affidavit confirms that such
information would protect firefighters’ safety and permit them to
make informed evaluations about danger to the community. But see
Hughey, 774 F.2d at 595 (recognizing that furnishing workplace
surveys to firefighter and other officials implicates a “broader pur-
pose” than the Standard, but holding such a requirement expressly
preempted because New Jersey has distinguished between environ-
mental and workplace surveys).

54a

Opinion of the District Court

between the two provisions, and the Akron MSD§8’s will
not undercut the federal policy of worker safety.

Section 1830.10(b) requires that any employee, his or
her designated representative, and the Health Commis-
sion are entitled to receive a copy of the MSDS8’s by the
close of business on the next weekday after their requests.
If an MSDS is not avaifable from a supplier, a down-
stream employer may be exempted from this requirement
by a renewed application to the supplier within ten days
of a request. In contrast, the Standard mandates that an
MSDS be made available to a requesting employee within
fifteen days of his or her request. §§ 1910.1200(g) (10),
1910.20(e). Obviously, an employer can comply with both
regulations by providing the requested MSDS’s by the end
of the business day following the employee’s request.
Plaintiffs argue that compliance with Akron’s regulation
may be impossible if large companies with many MSDS§8’s
are forced to gather them within twenty-four hours.
Regardless of the correctness of that assessment, implied
preemption occurs when compliance with a federal law is
impossible when one attempts to also comply with a com-
peting state or local law, not because compliance with the
local law itself is impossible: Instead of asserting pre-
emption, employers in a situation where they cannot
physically comply with such a rule should argue that the
ordinance does not satisfy minimal due process require-
ments, since the regulation as applied would have no
“rational relationship” with Akron’s objective. See Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 43 (1955).

7) Employer Training Program and Employee Rights

Section 1830.11(6) requires that employers subject to
the ordinance create a training program to explain the
hazards of the substances to which employees are exposed;
the availability and function of labels, MSDS’s and any
other hazard communication devices; appropriate work
practice; protective measures and emergency procedures.

55a
Opinion of the District Court

The components of the employee training program man-
dated by the Standard are substantially identical. Thus,
there is no conflict which preempts the Akron provision.

Employers are also required to supply employees with
a copy of § 1830.15, dealing with employee rights.
§ 1830.11(b). That provision guarantees an employee
the opportunity to inspect, information which the em-
ployer is required by Chapter 1830 to release; protects
an employee from discrimination or discipline for exer-
cising any rights under the Chapter, and permits the
commencement of legal action if rights are violated; and
allows an employee to request an inspection by the en-
forcement agents when the employee believes there is a
violation of Chapter 1830 in the workplace. § 1830.15.
There are no comparable requirements in the Standard,
but the facilitation of the federal worker safety goal by
these provisions is obvious.

8) Enforcement of Chapter 1830

Section 1830.12 establishes enforcement procedures for
the Health Commission and the Health Department to
implement, including random inspections, investigations
prompted by employee complaints, and reporting duties
to the Akron City Council. The Law Director is also
given authority to institute legal actions involving the
Akron ordinance. § 1830.13. Plaintiffs adduce no evi-
dence that the enforcement of Chapter 1830 by these
Akron officials would impede the enforcement efforts of
federal regulators. Indeed, an additional set of enforce-
ment agents may well deter violations of the Standard
as well as of Chapter 1830.

9) Protection of Trade Secrets

Chapter 1830 contains a carefully drafted trade secret
protection provision which exempts disclosure of the spe-
cific chemical identity of eligible substances, but which

56a
Opinion of the District Court

also permits otherwise protected information to be di-
vulged to fire fighters, health professionals and exposed
employees in certain situations. § 1830.14. Its trade
secret provisions deviate from those of the Standard in
several respects. First, the Standard does not share
Chapter 1830’s requirement that a chemical must be non-
carcinogenic to be afforded trade secret protection. See
1830.14(a) and § 1910.1200(i) (1). This difference can-
not be preemptive, however, since the Third Circuit has
held that the Standard cannot afford broader substantive
trade secret protection than state law. Auchter, 763
F.2d at 741.

The Standard allows exceptions to trade secret protec-
tion only for treating physicians and nurses in emer-
gency situations, and for various medical personnel treat-
ing employees in non-emergency situations and who follow
enumerated procedural steps $$ 1910.1200(i) (2) and (i)
(3). Akron’s ordinance permits access to trade secrets
by both fire and medical personnel involved in an emer-
gency where the information is needed for treatment or
where the personnel will be exposed to hazardous chemi-
cals, and to employees regularly exposed to the substance
who execute confidentiality statements. Although the pro-
visions of Chapter 1830 and the Standard which permit
different categories of persons to have access to trade
secrets appear to be inconsistent, the Third Circuit has
invalidated the Standard’s limitations of access to trade
secret information to health professions. Auchter, 763
F.2d at 743. Further, permitting medical and fire person-
nel who are exposed to hazardous chemicals in an emer-
gency to learn the specific chemical identity of those
substances implicates a community, rather than work-
place, purpose. Since plaintiffs have not demonstrated
how this access to information by endangered emergency
personne] presents an obstacle to the federal purposes of
the Hazard Communication Standard, such provision is
not preempted.

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57a
Opinion of the District Court

Chapter 1830 also requires that Akron’s Director ot
Health be automatically supplied by the employer with a
copy of a written request for a specific chemical identity,
a copy of the written denial furnished to the requesting
person, and reasons for the decision, within thirty days
of a denial if this information was requested by a regu-
larly exposed employee, or if the denial was based upon
a decision that a substance has trade secret protection.
§§ 1830.14(c) and (k). The Standard permits a health
professional denied trade secret access to initiate a re-
view by OSHA. § 1910.1200(i) (a). Neither the review
of a denial by Akron’s Health Director nor the manda-
tory nature of the review create a conflict with a review
by OSHA. In addition, this additional reviewing pro-
cedure provided by the Akron ordinance supports the
federal policy of denying access to trade secret informa-
tion only where appropriate.

No other sections of § 1830.14 present preemption
problems.

This Court cannot find, then, that ary of the provi-
sions of Chapter 1830 are impliedly preempted by the
Standard. In fact, most of them supplement the Standard
admirably. The Court now turns to plaintiffs’ argument
that Chapter 1830 violates the commerce clause.

III.

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges that the dupli-
cative and costly nature of Akron’s system for regulat-
ing hazardous chemicals communications constitutes an
undue burden on interstate commerce. When presented
with similar arguments, the court reviewing Pennsy]l-
vania’s Right-to-Know statute responded:

In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 187, 142,
25 L.Ed.2d 174, 178, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847 (1970) the
Supreme Court established the following criteria for
determining whether a state statute violates the
Commerce Clause:

58a
Opinion of the District Court

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. Huron
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 US 440, 448, 4 L
Ed2d 852, 856, 80 S. Ct. 813, 78 ALR2d 1294.

We should also note that safety regulations are en-
titled to “a strong presumption of validity,” Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524, 3 L.
Ed.2d 1003, 1007, 79 S.Ct. 962, 965 (1959). Kassell
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 750 U.S. 662, 67
L.Ed.2d 580, 101 S.Ct. 1309 (1981).

In the instant case, the Right to Know Act op-
erates evenhandedly and thus the relevant inquiry is
whether the burden on interstate commerce out-
weighs the local benefit. Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that the Right to Know Act will sub-
stantially burden interstate commerce. While we
recognize that implementation of the Act may be
costly and in that sense may burden interstate com-
merce, we cannot conclude that the burden outweighs
the benefit. As a result we find that the Right to
Know Act does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Knepper, slip op. at 25-26. This Court is confronted
with a similar evidentiary situation. Plaintiffs have
proffered no evidence of the effect of Chapter 1830 on
interstate commerce. Therefore, the extent of any impact
upon interstate commerce is speculative, at best, while
the benefits to Akron workers and the community are
tangible and direct. Thus, this Court cannot find that
the burden of Chapter 1830 upon interstate commerce
is excessive in comparison to the local benefits. Since the
regulation is “evenhanded,” Chapter 1830 does not vio-
late the commerce clause.

59a
Opinion of the District Court
IV.

This Court concludes that Chapter 1830 (Akron’s
“right-to-know” ordinance) is not preempted by federal
law, nor does it violate the commerce clause of the fed-
eral Constitution. Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary in-
junction is denied; judgment is entered for the defend-
ants; defendants’ motion to assess costs against plaintiffs
is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ann Aldrich
ANN ALDRICH
United States District Judge

60a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191
[Filed September 17, 1986]

OHIO MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION ;
AKRON SELLE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv.

City oF AKRON, STATE OF OHIO, et al.,
Defendants-A ppellees.

Before: MARTIN and Guy, Circuit Judges; and BROWN,
Senior Circuit Judge.

JUDGMENT

ON APPEAL from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from
the said District Court and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of
the said District Court in this case be and the same is
hereby reversed and the case is remanded for further
consideration consistent with this opinion.

It is further ordered that Plaintiffs-Appellants recover
from Defendants-Appellees the costs on appeal, as itemized
below, and that execution thereof issue out of said Dis-
trict Court, if necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/ John P. Hehman

JOHN P. HEHMAN
Clerk

6la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191
{Filed October 31, 1986]

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ AsSoc., et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
v.

CITY OF AKRON, et al.,
Defendants-A ppellees

ORDER

Before: MARTIN and Guy, Circuit Judges and Brown,
Senior Circuit Judge

The Court having received a petition for rehearing en
bane, and the petition having been circulated not only to
the original panel members but also to all other active
judges of this Court, and no judge of this Court having
requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc,

this petition for rehearing has been referred to the origi-
nal hearing panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehear-
ing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition
were fully considered upon the original submission and
decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/ John P. Hehman

JOHN P. HEHMAN
Clerk

62a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191
[Filed January 7, 1987]

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants
Vv.

CITY OF AKRON, et al.,
Defendants-A ppellees

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that Defendants-Appellees, the
City of Akron, the Health Commission of: the City of
Akron, the Health Department of the City of Akron, -
C. William Keck as Director of Health for the City of
Akron, and Harold K. Stubbs as Director of Law of the
City of Akron, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States from the final judgment of this Court
entered on October 17, 1986, reversing the judgment of
the District Court.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).
Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD K. STUBBS
_ Director of Law

/s/ Janice E. Crossland
JANICE E. CROSSLAND
Assistant Director of Law
202 Ocasek Government Bldg.
161 S. High Street
Akron, OH 44308
(216) 375-2030
Attorneys for Defendants-

Appellees

63a

ARTICLE IV, CLAUSE 2 OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be s
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

64a

THE ARRON ORDINANCE

ORDINANCE NO. 771-1984 amending and/or supple-
menting the Codified Ordinances of the City of Akron,
Ohio, 1975, by the addition of a new Chapter 1830, en-
titled “Hazardous and Toxic Substances;” and declaring
an emergency

WHEREAS, there are numerous chemicals used in the
work places within the City of Akron which may be
hazardous to employees and the public; and

WHEREAS, the City firefighters in the course of their
duties frequently require information concerning toxic or
hazardous substances; and

WHEREAS, the labeling of toxic and hazardous sub
stances and the availability of information about such
substances to employees, public ‘officials and other affected
persons is essentia! to protect the public safety and health
of the citizens of Akron.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the Coun-
cil of the City of Akron:

Section 1. That the Coditied Ordinances of the City of
Akron, Ohio, 1975, are hereby amended and/or supple-
mented by the addition of a new Chapter 1830, “Hazard-
ous and Toxic Substances” which shall read as follows:

“CHAPTER 1830
“HAZARDOUS TOXIC SUBSTANCES

“1830.01 Application.

“1830.02 Exemptions.

“1830.03 Definitions.

“1830.04 Powers and Duties of the Commission.

“1830.05 Master List of Toxic and Hazardous Sub-
stances.

“1830.06 Hazard Determination and Communication
Program.

65a

Codified Ordinances of Akron

“1830.07 Labels and Placards.

“1830.08 Variances.

“1830.09 Employer Filing and Reporting Require-
ments.

“1830.10 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS).

“1830.11 Employer Training Program.

“1830.12 Enforcement Authority of the Commission
and Health Department.

“1830.18 Remedies Available to Law Director.

“1830.14 Trade Secrets.

“1830.15 Employee Rights.

“1830.16 Sunset Provision.

“1830.17 Compliance Dates.

“1830.18 Conflict and Invalidity.

“1830.19 Separability.

“1830.20 Penalties.

“1830.01 APPLICATION.

“(a) This Chapter, in appropriate sections, requires
employers to provide information to their employees and
the designated representatives of these employees about
hazardous chemicals to which these employees are ex-
posed by means of a hazard communication program,
labels, placards, work area hazardous chemical list, ma-
terial safety data sheets, and information training.

“(b) This Chapter in appropriate sections, requires
employers to provide information to the City’s Fire Di-
vision and Health Department about the hazardous chemi-
cals manufactured, used or stored inside the workplace
and the hazardous chemicals discharged from the work-
place or stored as chemical waste at the workplace by
means of hazardous chemical lists, hazardous chemical
discharge permits and reports and material safety data
sheets, if requested.

66a

Codified Ordinances of Akron
“1830.02 EXEMPTIONS.

“(a) This Chapter shall not apply to any employer
which is an educational institution, a federal, state or
county government, or any department, agency, board, or
commission thereof, but shall apply to the City of Akron,
its agencies, departments and subdivisions.

“(b) This Chapter shall not apply to any laboratory
operated by an otherwise covered employer, including re-
search laboratories, analytical laboratories, medical labor-
atories, so long as the names of materials in such labora-
tories are available to the employees.

“(c) This Chapter shall not apply to any person or
entity who employs domestic workers or casual laborers
solely at a residence.

“(d) This Chapter shall not apply to hazardous chemi-
cals in the process of being transported in, into, or
through the City of Akron.

“(e) This Chapter shall not apply to substances which
are consumer products, food stuffs or tobacco products,
packaged for distribution to, and intended for use by,
the general public. This includes any product used by an
employer in the same physical form, approximate amount,
concentration and manner as used by consumers, and to
which, in the employer’s knowledge, employee exposure is
not significantly greater than that of the consumer in
foreseeable consumer uses of the product.

“(f) This Chapter shall not apply to toxic or hazardous
substances in containers having a volume of one gallon
or less liquid, or a weight of ten pounds or less, except
that such substances must be identified for the employees,
and must be identified on an area list.

“(g) This Chapter does not apply to chemicals which
are foods, drugs, cosmetics, or tobacco products intended

for personal consumption by employees while in the work-
place.

67a

Codified Ordinances of Akron
“1830.03 DEFINITIONS.

“(a) ‘Chemical name’ is the scientific designation in
accordance with the nomenclature system developed by
the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
(IUPAC) or the Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS)
rules of nomenclature for those substances listed in Sec-
tion 1830.05.

“(b) ‘Commission’ when used in this Chapter means
the Health Commission established by Section 78 of the
Charter of the City of Akron.

“(e) ‘Common name’ means any designation of identi-
fication, such as code name, code number, trade name,
brand name or generic name used to identify a chemical
other than by its chemical name.

“(d) ‘Container’ means any bag, barrel, bottle, box,
ean, cylinder, drum, storage tank, reaction vessel, or the
like that contains a hazardous chemical. For purposes of
this sections, pipes, piping systems or transfer containers
used in production are not considered to be containers.

“(e) ‘D

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0506%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
