# Opposition Brief — Shultz v. Cooper

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 479 U.S. 1014

## Text

vs —
¢ Supreme Court, U.S, ..
Rerpep

in, 86406 , AUG 22 196

JOSEPH F. SPA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED me hence

»)

ie

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE,
Petitioner,
— »
MARGUERITE COOPER, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
fer the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BRUCE J. TERRIS
(counsel of Record)
KAREN H. EDGECOMBE
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE
Terris, Edgecombe,
Hecker & Wayne

1121 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202)682-2100

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .cccccccccccecee il

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .ccccccccccccee 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......2252252- 11

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PETITION
RAISES NO IMPORTANT ISSUES
WARRANTING REVIEW BY THIS
COURT ccccccccccccepecccccsecs 14

II. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN
PENNSYLVANIA v. DELAWARE
VALLEY CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR
CLEAN AIR DID NOT CHANGE THE
LAW WITH RESPECT TO AN
UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR
QUALITY AND DOES NOT JUSTIFY
A REMAND .cccccccccccccccccce 21

III. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY
CERTIORARI ON THE ISSUE OF
THE CONTINGENCY ADJUSTMENT... 32

TV. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE
TO ADDRESS AN ISSUE NOT
RAISED BEFORE OR ADDRESSED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ..... 37

CONCLUSION -ccccccccccccccccnssecccees 40

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144 (1970)......-2222-- 39, 40
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886

Dit ce cree e see gecsescoes PROSGIN
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d

880 (D.C. Cir 1980)............ 15, 16
Duignan v. United States,

274 U.S. 195 (1927) ....-- 22 eee 39
EEOC v. Federal Labor Relations

Authority, 54 U.S.L.W. 4408

Ca BPG LEGG) ccc veces scvcccs 39
Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d

ver (446c Cir. 1964)...... beow ee 29
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

teh, 33 eee ee. Se eee eee passim
Huty v. United States, 282 U.S.

i Gs ehh veh een eeeeeces 39

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
a0 F.20 4 {0.C. Cir. 19394),
certiorari denied, 105 S. Ct.

i re ee ke eke a én eee 6 0 8 eee
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
Soe NESSO i cebucs hay) Se a 39

Library of Congress v. Shaw,
54 U.S.L.W. 4951 (July 1,
Dl cieebaw ee Cee ede esessecees 8
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator Standard
Sanitary Corp., 48/7 F.2d 161
PEs BOI OP cbc ensaseninesese 16

ii

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator Standard
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102
(30 Cis LPFG sctcececsetanseses 15, 16

Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159
. (1923) cc reece cereccccesescecee 20
Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d

1423 (D.C. Cir. 1984)........-. 36
National Ass'n of Concerned

Veterans v. Secretary of

Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C.

Clr. 1982)... cee eeeeeeeeeeseeee 15
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

Citizens' Council for Clean

Air, 54 U.S.L.W. 5017

(JULY 2, 1966) .csccccos TeTereT passim
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613

SROWET bee 4 Woks boRS enesteeeeance oF
STATUTES

Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e,
Ct SCGeceseeeeeee (aseveestevsess £26 32

RULES

Rules of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
Rule G(£) axcves TESTE TT TCC err 19

TREATISES

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court
Practice (Sth Bau, i878) ccc cwus 33

iii

No. 86-86
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE,
Petitioner,
Vv.
MARGUERITE COOPER, 1/ ET AL.,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

/

Respondents, on behalf of a class of
female Foreign Service Officers ("FSOs")

and female applicants to become FSOs,

1/ The case was originally captioned
"Marguerite Cooper King, et al. v. United
States, et al." in the district court.
Subsequently, Ms. King notified the.
district court that she had legally
changed her name to Marguerite Cooper,
and the caption was modified.

brought this action in 1976 alleging that
the Department of State discriminated
against women both in their opportunities
for hire as FSOs and in their employment
opportunities after hire, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et
seq. All claims relating to the initial
hiring of female FSOs at the entry ‘level
were resolved on October 12, 1983, when
the District Court for the District of
Columbia approved a consent decree which

provided, inter alia, that petitioner

would appoint 75 class members as FSOs
during the calendar years 1984 through
1987. The district court found that the
settlement "eliminat[ed]) seven previous
years of hiring disparities, and
carr[ied] a conservatively estimated

monetary value of $8.6 million."

a

2/
Pet. App. i2a. The Consent Decree

further provided that its entry by the
court constituted a final ection on the
entry-level hiring portion of the case
and entitled respondents to move the
court for attorneys' fees and costs.
In December 1983, respondents
applied for $416,736.03 in fees and ex-
alae This reguest included hourly

rates ranging from $75 to $150 per hour,

depending on the level of experience of

2/
~ "Pet. App." refers to the Appendices to
the government's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari. "Pet." refers to the gov-
ernment's brief in support of its
Petition.

3/

Respondents supplemented this request
in July 1984 and again in December 1984,
seeking an additional $52,966.81 in fees
and expenses, thereby bringing respon-
dents' total request to $469,702.84.

the individual attorney, and a 24% con-
tingency adjustment. Respondents did not
at that time seek an upward adjustment
for the quality of representation on the
ground that "[t]he quality of an attor-
ney's work in general is a component of
the reasonable hourly rate." Pl. App.
for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses, p. 29 (December 12, 1983).
Petitioner did not oppose either respon-
dents' entitlement to an award of attor-
neys' fees and expenses as a prevailing
party or the reasonableness of the hours
spent by respondents' counsel. It
challenged only the hourly rates at which
compensation was sought, the contingency |
multiplier, and certain expenses.

On September 17, 1984, the gistrict

court awarded attorneys' fees and

expenses for all hours claimed at the
hourly rates sought by respondents but
allowed only a 20% upward adjustment for
contingency rather than the 24% re-
quested. The district covrt found that
respondents' proposed rate schedule,
ranging from $75 to $150 an hour de-
pending upon the individual attorney's
years of experience, was consistent with
prevailing market rates for the
Washington, D.C. community and accurately
reflected both the complexity of the
litigation and the "skill, experience and
reputation" of counsel. Pet. App. 29a-
34a.

Thereafter, the attorneys' fees
litigation in these consolidated cases
followed a tortuous path. Just 11 days
after the district court's September 17,

1984, opinion, the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit decided

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746

F.2d 4 (1984), certiorari denied, 105
S.Ct. 3488 (1985), which held that an
attorney's actual billing rate is
presumptively the market rate for his
services. Petitioner moved for a stay of
the district court's order awarding fees

and moved for reconsideration in light of

Laffey, supra. Due to the lengthy delay

which would be necessitated by the dis-
trict court's consideration of the new
court of appeals' decision and any subse-
guent appeals, respondents moved the
district court for an interim award of
the uncontested portion of their fees and
expenses. As a result, the district
court made an award of $219,439.40, which
represented the uncontested number of

hours multiplied by counsel for

respondents' actual historic billing rates,
plus expenses. Pet. App. 22a. In addi-
tion, in a separate interim order, the
district court awarded respondents
$38,222.81, which represented the dif-
ference between counsel's current and
historic billing rates for these same
hours. Pet. App. 20a.

Petitioner appealed both of the
district court's interim orders. Peti-
tioner presented no legal arguments in
Support of its appeal of the uncontested
amount. Both orders were summarily
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Pet. App.
18a. Petitioner thereafter paid the
uncontested amount and petitioned for a
writ of certiorari as to the use of cur-
rent rates. This Court granted the peti-

tion and vacated the judgment of the

=

court of appeals as to the use of current

rates as compensation for delay in light

of its decision in Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 54 U.S.L.W. 4951 (July 1, 1986).
While the uncontested and current
rates issues were on appeal, the district
court issued its decision on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in light of

Laffey, supra. Pet. App. 7a. Respon-

dents argued that Laffey did not require ~
the use of counsel's actual billing rates
in this case, but that, if the court
found to the contrary, it should adjust
the lodestar upward by 55% to reflect the
quality of counsel's representation. The
district court found that counsel's
actual current rates should be used to
calculate the lodestar, but adjusted the
lodestar upward by 54.75% in order to

reflect its finding that counsel's

“services were equal in quality to those of
attorneys charging that [higher] rate"
and "far superior to what could be rea-~
sonably expected of attorneys charging a
maximum of $65 per hour for associates
and $80 per hour for partners." Pet.
App. 12a.

The district court's total award
after reconsideration, therefore, did not
differ significantly from its original
award. Since Laffey did mt address the
issue of the use of current versus his-
toric rates, the district court did not
reconsider its decision upholding the use
of current rates. It used the law firm's
current actual billing rates to arrive at
the lodestar, then separately multiplied
the merits lodestar by the 54.75%

adjustment for quality and the 20%

contingency adjustment. No enhancements
were made of the lodestar for the time
spent litigating the attorneys’ fee
application itself.

Petitioner appeaied and respondents
cross-appealed the district court's modi-
fied award. In a brief unpublished
opinion, the court of appeals (Judges
Ginsburg, Scalia and Buckley) suggested
that its own interpretation of Laffey
might have led it to conclude that the
use of counsel's actual billing rates was
not appropriate in this case as "the
firm's own rate may have fallen below the
rate brackets indicated by the charges of
other firms for similar work in this
community." Pet. App. 2a. However, in
light of the “reasonable result achieved"
and the “large respect we owe to

district court assessments in these

10

matters," the court declined to disturb

the award. Ibid.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondents submit that the peti-
tion should be denied for the following
reasons:

First, the litigation over this
1984 district court award of attorneys'
fees and expenses has already been pro-
tracted. The government's petition for
a writ of certiorari raises no questions
of substantial importance. In fact, the
government's petition does not even seek
plenary review by this Court but merely
asks the Court for summary reversal and a
remand in light of other recent, and in
the case of the contingency adjustment,
pending decisions by this Court. This
strategy will only serve to further pro-

11

long this litigation and, therefore,
respondents submit that this Court should
deny the government's petition. |
Second, the government seeks a
remand of the upward adjustment for qual-
ity awarded by the district court in
light of this Court's recent decision in

~

Delaware Valley. That case does not

represent any change in the law since
this court's earlier decision in Blum v.
Stenson upon which the district court
relied. Moreover, the award in this
case, namely -- a lodestar based on
counsel's normal hourly rates which the
district court found to be far below
prevailing market rates coupled with a
quality adjustment intended to compensate
counsel at market rates does not result
in double counting and therefore is not

affected by Delawaxe Valley.

12

Third, the government seeks a
remand of the upward adjustment for con-
tingency in light of this court's impend-
ing decision based on reargument in Dela-

ware Valley. The district court cor-

rectly found, pursuant to this court's
decision in Blum v. Stenson, that this
was an exceptional case which justified
an upward adjustment for contingency.
The district court's findings should
therefore only be disturbed if there was
an ébuse of discretion. The government's
petition does not claim such an abuse.
Here, the government seeks certiorari
based only on the possibility of a future
change in the law, which may or may af-
fect the factual findings of the district
court in this case.

Finally, the government seeks
review of the fact that the lodestar, by

13

which the two upward adjustments in this
case were multipled, was calculated based
on counsel's current billing rates as a
form of compensation for delay.
Petitioner failed to present this issue
to the court of appeals and the court,
therefore, did not address it. As this
court has frequently held, issues neither
raised before nor considered by the court
of appeals should not be addressed by
this Court.
ARGUMENT

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PETITION RAISES NO

IMPORTANT ISSUES WARRANTING REVIEW BY

THIS COURT

The courts have repeatedly warned
against making attorneys' fee litigation
as complex and difficult as the litiga-

tion on the merits. As this Court stated

in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

437 (1983), and reiterated in Blum v.

1.4

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 902, n. 19 (1984)
a "request for attorney's fees should not
result in a second major litigation."

See also National Ass'n of Concerned

Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675

F.2€ 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Cope-

land v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 896 (D.C.

Cir. 1980) (Copeland III); Lindy Bros.

Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator

Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102,

116 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Lindy II"). As the
Third Circuit stated in Lindy II, supra
(540 F.2d at 116):

[W]e did not and do not intend
that a district court, in
setting an attorneys' fee, be-
come enmeshed in a meticulous
analysis of every detailed
facet of the professional
representation. It was not
and is not our intent.on that
the inguiry into the adequacy
of the fee assume massive
proportions, perhaps even
dwarfing the case in chief.

a

15

|

The courts have also repeatedly
emphasized that, in reviewing attorneys'
fee awards, appellate courts should not
reverse unless the district court has
committed a clear abuse of discretion.

As this Court stated in Hensley, supra,

461 U.S. at 437:

We reemphasize that the district
court has discretion in determining
the amount of a fee award. This is
appropriate in view of the district
court's superior understanding of
the litigation and the desirability
of avoiding frequent appellate re-
view of what essentially are
factual matters.

See also Blum v. Stenson, supra, 465 U.S.

at 886; Copeland v. Marshall, supra, 641

F.2d at 901; Lindy II, supra, 540 F.2d at

116; Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Ameri-

Can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,

487 F.2d 161, 166 (3rd Cir. 1973) ("Lindy
5”) .

The broad discretion of the district

16

f

courts in making attorneys' tee awards is
based on two considerations. First, the
district court has far more familiarity

with both the case and the activities and

skill of counsel in the case. Hensley,

supra, 461 U.S. at 437; Blum, supra, 465

U.S. at 886. Second, if the appellate
courts substitute their judgment for that
of the district courts, the losing
parties will be encouraged to appeal
all awards in the hope that the appellate
court will come to a different result on
at least some part of the district
court's decision. The result will be to
protract further attorneys' fee litiga-
tion and to burden further the caseloads
of the appellate courts contrary to the
frequently stated desires of the courts.
We submit that this Court should not

encourage the government to prolong the

17

"second major litigation" it has already
created in this case by granting this
petition for certiorari. There are no
special and important reasons for
granting a writ of certiorari from the
decision of the court of appeals. R. of
S.Ct. 17. It raises no important, novel
or recurring questions, nor does it
present a conflict among the federal
courts of appeals. Instead, this case
basically involves whether there has been
an abuse of discretion by the district
court on what are essentially factual
matters.

The court of appeals stated that the
issues presented “occasion no need for an
Opinion by this court." Pet. App. la.
Consequently, the court issued a one-
paragraph memorandum in support of its

affirmance of the district court's

18

decision awarding attorneys' fees and
expenses to respondents. According to
the Rules of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, this unpub-
lished memorandum may not be cited in
briefs or memoranda of counsel as prece-
dent, except for such purposes as appli-

cation of the doctrines of res judicata,

collateral estoppel and law of the case.
D.C. Cir. R. 8(f£). Therefore, the gov-
ernment is in effect asking this Court to
review a district court decision which
the court of appeals did not even deem of
enough general importance to warrant a
published opinion.

Moreover, the government is not
asking this Court to decide any of the
issues it has presented, but merely to
remand the case to the lower courts for

further consideration. It is not un-

19

ee

likely that, after such reconsideration,
the losing party will seek review in this
Suck The opportunity for continued
delay in the final resolution of the

attorneys' fees at issue here is obvious.

As stated by this Court in Magnum Co. v.

Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923):

The jurisdiction [of the
Supreme Court to review cases
by way of certiorari] was not
conferred upon this Court
merely to give the defeated
party in the Circuit Court of
Appeals another hearing.

The district court, which had exten-
sive first-hand knowledge of this case

and of the work of respondents' counsel

over seven years of litigation, carefully

4/

~ For this reason, respondents request
that, in the event this Court agrees to
grant a writ of certiorari, it should
grant plenary review rather than simply
remand the case to the court of appeals
for further consideration. See
Respondents' Cross-Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, pp. 17-21.

20

set forth its reasoning for each aspect

of its award. The court of appeals found
(Pet. App. 2a):

In view of the large respect
we owe to district court
assessments in these matters,
and the reasonable result ac-
hieved, we can find no abuse
of discretion in the fees and
expenses awarded in the order
on review.

Respondents submit that this Court
should similarly give substantial weight
to the well-exercised discretion of the
district court and finally resolve this
portion of the litigation by denying the
government's petition for a writ of
certiorari.

II. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN
PENNSYLVANIA v. DELAWARE VALLEY
CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR DID
NOT CHANGE THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO

AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR QUALITY AND
DOES NOT JUSTIFY A REMAND

Petitioner contends (Pet. 8) that a
writ of certiorari should be granted and

21

a remand ordered concerning the upward
adjustment made by the district court for
quality of representation because of this

court's recent decision in Pennsylvania

v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council

for Clean Air, 54 U.S.L.W. 5017 (July 2,

1986). We submit that Delaware Valley

did not change significantly, if at all,
the prior law on this issue and a remand
is not warranted. Both Blum v. Stenson,

Supra, and Delaware Valley, 54 U.S.L.W.

at 5022, hold that "considerations con-
cerning the quality of a prevailing
party's counsel's representation normally
are reflected in the reasonable hourly
rate * * *" used to calculate the lode-
star. Indeed, the government's petition

for a writ of certiorari quotes Delaware

Valley, which, in turn, is quoting Blum.
Pet. 7. On this issue, therefore, there

22

has been no change in the law since Blum

was decided in 1984.

Moreover, Blum was decided prior to
the district court's consideration of
respondents' fee request and was correct-
ly applied by that court. This Court

held in Blum that (465 U.S. at 896, n.

ll):

[T]he burden is on the fee appli-
cant to produce satisfactory evi-
dence--in addition to the attor-
ney's own affidavits--that the re-
quested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community
for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, exper-
ience and reputation. A rate
determined in this way is normally
deemed to be reasonable, and is re-
ferred to--for convenience--as the
prevailing market rate.

In its original opinion, the dis-
trict court found that "[s]ome firms,
including plaintiffs' counsel, charge
rates that are ‘reduced to reflect the
financial constraints of their

23

clientele,' * * * and others--the ‘public

interest' bar-- charge nothing at all"
(citation omitted). Pet. App. 3la.
Citing Blum, the district court con-
cluded that "actual rates do not neces-
sarily reflect 'market value,' and market
value is the touchstone of the fee
inquiry." Id. at 32a.

In its subsequent opinion on recon-
Sideration in light of Laffey, the dis-

trict court felt constrained by the
holding of that case to apply the firm's
actual rates in its calculation of the

5/
lodestar. Pet. App. lla. It held,

5/

~ Respondents believe that the district
court erred insofar as it held that
Laffey required it automatically to apply
the rates charged by respondents' counsel
rather than market rates despite the fact
that the evidence showed that the rates
charged by respondents' counsel were far
below prevailing market rates. This
issue is dealt with in respondents’
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari,
at pages 11-17.

24

however, that those rates did not ade-

quately reflect the quality of counsel's
representation and the excellent results
obtained. Id. at 12a. Moreover, it
noted that, pursuant to its original
opinion, it viewed counsel's services as
of the caliber of firms charging pre-
vailing market rates in the Washington,
D.C. legal community for similarly com-

nlex federal litigation. The court's

decision was based on considerable evi-
dence in the record as to prevailing
market rates, as well as its first-hand
knowledge of the case and of counsel's
work throughout the seven-year duration
of the litigation. See Pet. App. 12a,
33a-34a. These findings should not be
disturbed unless they are clearly er-
roneous.

In Blum, this Court held that "[t]Jhe

25

'guality of representation[]' * * *
generally is reflected in the reasonable
hourly rate" which in that case was
found to be $95 to $105 per hour for
attorneys who had 1 1/2 years of ex-
perience or less as practicing attorneys.
It therefore held that it was improper
for the district court to award an
additional 50% upward adjustment for the
quality of representation, which would
have been a clear example of double-
counting.

Here, in contrast, the district
court clearly did not engage in double-
counting. Having previowsly determined
that the work of respondents' counsel was
superior and justified an award at pre-
vailing Washington, D.C. rates (Pet. App.
33a), but believing itself constrained to
award respondents' counsel a lodestar

26

amount based on substantially lower hour-
ly rates, the court found that an upward
adjustment equal to the difference
between these two sets of rates was
justified. The district court's use of
an upward adjustment for quality was,
therefore, simply a means of compensating
for the fact that the lodestar amount did
not reflect "the reasonable hourly rate"
for respondents' counsel's services.

Delaware Valley is likewise inappo-

site. In that case this Court noted that,
although the lower court had found the
quality of representation to be superior,
this finding was contradicted by the
court's finding that only 324 out of 620
hours should be compensated. 54 U.S.L.W.
at 5022. In contrast, in this case, the

government conceded the reasonableness of

the hours expended. In addition, the

27

district court independently reviewed the
hours and found all hours claimed to be
justified (Pet. App. 28a, n. 1):

Plaintiffs claim a total of
2746.63 hours devoted to merits
issues, and 642.25 hours to the fee
litigation. The application care-
fully distinguishes between time
devoted to the 'employee' and to
the 'applicant' portions of the
case, and offers a reasonable
method for compensating efforts
common to both claims. Further-
more, counsel's ‘billing judgment,'
as articulated and as applied,
cannot be criticized. Counsel
exercised it in a conscientious
and fair manner throughout.
[citations omitted]

In Delaware Valley, this Court also

considered the fact that the lower court
found that a substantial number of hours
were performed by a more experienced
attorney but "could have been done by an
attorney working at the associate

level" and other work "required little or

no legal ability." 54 U.S.L.W. at 5022.

28

LDN es MN OD ti oes

ne ee ee

In contrast, in this case, the district
court found that "[b]ecause of the firm's
policy of assigning primary responsibili-
ty at any given time to one or two asso-
Cliates, attorneys in the 4-7 and 8-10
year categories ($95-110) [per hour]
performed most of the work." Pet. App.
29a.

Furthermore, the opinions of the
courts below in this case are fully con-
sistent with the only other court of
appeals' decision since Blum on this
issue. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727,
739-740 (lst Cir. 1984), is remarkably
Similar to the case at bar. In that
case, the district court had awarded
lodestar hourly rates of $60 per hour and
$45 per hour based on counsels' normal
billing rates and then adjusted the lode-

Star upward to reflect the quality of the

29

representation and the exceptional re-
sults. Id. at 739. While suggesting, as
did the court of appeals in this case,
that “certain of the qualities sought to
be recognized by the bonuses might better
have been recognized by means of more
adequate hourly rates," the Firsc Circuit
affirmed the lower court's award due to
the fact that there was no double count-
ing, there were exceptional results and
both counsel's request and the district
court's decision were well documented.
Id. at 740.

Similarly, in this case, there was
no double counting. The district court's
award of an upward adjustment does no
more than bring counsel's rates up to the
level of prevailing market rates. More-
over, the district court found the re-

sults to be exceptional and pointed out

30

ye

that the settlement "eliminat[ed] seven
previous years of hiring disparities, and
carr[ied] a conservatively estimated
monetary value of $8.6 million." Pet.
App. 12a. Respondents' request for

fees was also well-documented (Pet. App.
45a):

In this case plaintiffs filed a
comprehensive, reasonable and
thoroughly documented fee request.
Plaintiffs attached all the
required baggage. There are affi-
davits, resumes, and time slips.
It was an eminently professional
effort, fully in accord with the
letter and spirit of Copeland III
[Copeland v. Marshall, supra] and
Concerned Veterans [National
Association of Concerned Veterans
Ve Secretary of Defense, supra].

In short, the district court faith-
fully followed the law on quality adjust-
ments as promulgated by this Court. It
made all the relevant findings based on a
careful review of the evidence. Its

proper exercise of discretion should not

31

be disturbed.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI
ON THE ISSUE OF THE CONTINGENCY
ADJUSTMENT

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 8) that
this case should either be held in this

Court or remanded to the court of appeals

and held there until the issue of con-

tingency adjustments in Delaware Valley

has been decided by this Court in the
6 /
coming Term. 54 U.S.L.W. at 5023.

6/

~ Respondents submit that, due to the
interrelationship of the issues in this
case, it is undesirable that a portion of
this litigation be retained by this Court
while other issues are summarily re-
manded, as requested by petitioner.
Fragmentation of this case, while pro-
posed as a means of expediting considera-
tion of those issues that appeared to be
relatively simple, has resulted in the
division of the attorneys' fee litigation
in this case into several smaller cases
that have proceeded independently through
the court system. Respondents urge the
Court not to fragment this portion of the
case even further.

Pe Ge Nine

Respondents submit that this issue does
not justify further delay in the resolu-
tion of the attorneys' fee issues in this
case.

This Court, of course, does not sit
to correct all errors which might be
contained in lower court decisions, but
only to decide important questions of
law. See, e.g., Stern & Gressman,
Supreme Court Practice,:p. 258 (5th ed.
1978). Here, the important issues as to
contingency adjustments will be decided
in another case. The amount involved in
this case ($36,364.03) is plainly not
enough to make this case of intrinsic
importance separate from any legal issues

7/
involved. Consequently, regardless how

7/

While this sum is insignificant in the
context of the United States Government's
budget, it is by no means insignificant

33

the issues regarding contingency ad-

justments are resolved in Delaware Val-

ley, there is no reason for granting the
petition for a writ of certiorari here
because of the contingency adjustment.
Moreover, the district court issued
a careful, well-reasoned opinion justi-

fying the 20% upward adjustment for

to respondents’ counsel and we strenuous-
ly object to the jovernment's assertion
that “withholding a final disposition
here pending the outcome in Delaware
Valley would not delay payment in an
inequitable manner." Pet. 8, n. 6. The
inequity is even clearer now in light of
this Court's decision in Library of Con-
ress v. Shaw, supra, that sovereign
immunity bars a Claim for post-judgment
interest on the sums at issue in this
case. The district court's initial award
was made almost two years ago. Even
assuming a modest simple interest rate of
8%, the delay has already cost respon-
dents and their counsel almost $25,000 in
lost earning power. Further delay of the
entire case for the purely speculative
purpose of awaiting reargument in Dela-
ware Valley of an issue which is con-
tained in only a part of the present case
is obviously inequitable.

34

ee aor Ne

contingency in this case. Pet. App. 36a-
43a. This analysis was undertaken subse-
guent to this Court's decision in Blum,
which made clear that such adjustments
were only appropriate in exceptional
cases. The district court's findings
that such exceptional circumstances ex-
isted in this case should, therefore,
only be disturbed if there was an abuse
of discretion.

The court stated several cogent
reasons why a 20% upward adjustment for
contingency was appropriate. First, as
the court noted, there was both legal and
factual uncertainty "on the critical
issue of employment test validation."
Pet. App. 43a. Second, Title VII
"[c]lass actions involve efforts beyond
those associated with an ordinary law-

suit," including the need for massive and

35

expensive expert statistical evidence.

Ibid. At the time the Consent Decree was
entered, there were in excess of 30,000
members of the class. Therefore, the
district court concluded that "a contin-
gency adjustment is ‘necessary to facili-
tate the filing’ of cases of this type,
where both the scope of the claims and
the number of complainants are atypical."

Ibid. (quoting Murray v. Weinberger, 741

F.2d 1423, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1984)}).
Respondents submit that there is no
justification for a writ of certiorari to
be granted simply because of the possi-
bility of a future change in law, which
may or may not affect the facts of this
case. The government's petition offers
no authority for holding a case open in
anticipation of a decision which has not

even been rendered.

36

A aNt eS aie se eehe

Peta ae

aie

IV. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS
AN ISSUE NOT RAISED BEFORE OR
ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner also requests (Pet. 6-7)
that a writ of certiorari be granted
because the lodestar by which the two
upward adjustments were multiplied was
calculated based on counsel for respon-
dents' current billing rates at the time
of its application for an award of attor-

neys' fees in December 1983 rather than
the appropriate historic rates throughout
the pendency of the litigation on the
merits from 1976 through October 1983.

In its brief in the court of
appeals, petitioner stated the issues it
sought to present to that court as fol-
lows (Gov. C.A. Br., unnumbered page
entitled "Issues Presented"):

Whether the District Court erro-
neously awarded a 54.75% enhance-

ment of the attorneys' fees lode-

37

star for "quality of representa-
tion" concerning the settled por-
tion of the merits of the case, and
a 20% upward adjustment for "con-
tingency," characterizing this case
as “exceptional” under Blum v.
Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), on
both counts.

Petitioner neither raised, nor sub-
stantively addressed in its brief the
issue whether current billing rates were
appropriately used to arrive at the
merits lodestar to which the multipliers
were added. On the contrary, petitioner
specifically stated tnat "the District
Court's use of current rates to calculate
the attorneys' fees lodestar is not an
issue in this appeal," apparently because
the law concerning that issue in the
District of Columbia was settled. Gov.
C.A. Br. 5, n. 1. Petitioner attempted,
by way of a footnote in its Reply Brief
in the court of appeals, to preserve the

issue by simply asserting that it did not

38

Waive the issue. Gov. C.A. Rep. Br. 10,
n. 5. As a result, the court of

appeals did not even mention this issue
in its opinion.

As this Court has held, issues
neither raised before, nor considered by,
the court of appeals are not properly
before this Court. EEOC v. Federal

Labor Relations Authority, 54 U-S.L.W.

4408, 4409 (April 29, 1986); Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628, n. 10 (1982);

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 147, n. 2 (1970); Lawn v. United

states, 355 U.S. 339, 362-363, n. 16

(1958); Huty v. United States, 282 U.S.

694, 701-702 (1931); Duignan v. United
States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927).
In circumstances similar to those

here, the petitioner in Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., supra, sought to amend his

39

complaint in district court to include a
Claim for liquidated damages under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875. The record showed that the
petitioner had never raised the issue
before the court of appeals, apparently
because of the existence of settled law
on point. 398 U.S. at 147, nh. 2. This
Court declined to address the issue on
the grounds that it had not been raised
before or addressed by the court of
appeals. Ibid.
CONCLUSION

None of the Court's reasons for
granting a writ of certiorari are present
in this case. There exists no conflict
among the circuits. There are no ques-
tions of substantial importance under the
Constitution, statutes or treaties of the
United States. There is not even a re-

40

ported decision of the court of appeals
which could serve as precedent in

other, future cases. In these circum-

stances, the government's petition for a
writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE J. TERRIS
(Counsel of Record)
KAREN H. EDGECOMBE
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE
Terris, Edgecombe,
Hecker & Wayne

1121 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-2100

August 22, 1986

#124.

41

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0403%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
