# Amicus Curiae Brief — Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 892

## Text

"Supreme Court U.S.

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4) YJ ar SEP I? 1995
Nos. 84-921, 84-926 and 84-929

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

Fe.

NORTHEASTERN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.,
AND ARROW AIR, INC., APPELLANTS

Vv.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

5S

— -_
o ss 2 mei * >
inBeen Pie

F.ASTERN AIRLINES INC., APPELLANT
Vv.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

DELTA AIR LINES, INC., APPELLANT
Vv:
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY |

ON APPEAL FROM
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS
AMICUS CURIAE

CHARLES FRIED
Acting Solicitor General
ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR.
Assistant to the Solicitor Genero!
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
JIM J. MARQUEZ
General Counsel
Department of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20590

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a sales tax imposed by Florida on aviation
fuel purchased within that State violates the Interstate
Commerce Clause.

2. Whether Florida’s scheme of fuel taxation violates
the Equal Protection Clause by treating airlines dif-
ferently in some respects than other carriers.

3. Whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in deter-
mining that appellant in No. 84-926 lacks standing
under Florida law to challenge the validity of a tax
statute governing tax refunds to certain farmers and
fishermen.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EE ER aerera are 1
ES is whe aoe sae beens 2
CUT SGN TES. ae tiv st vawae vee sede 2
BEETS OC ERE Pc ena ee 5
tid TES ASR Ra re rr ra 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Allen v. Wright, No. 81-757 (July 3, 1984) ... 9
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n,
es, aay wb nas Rene aoe 5
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
en ig ne ely be 60 8 88 8 6, 7
Hastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina
Taz Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147. ...........00. 6
Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289
TM aa ar 6
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
RGIS SS ae Oe a 7
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
I ge SL Uns de sah + bees eo os 8
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 .......... 8

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, No.
Seg Se |) 9
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 6238 6

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const.:
Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3:
Foreign Commerce Clause ......... 7
Interstate Commerce Clause ....... 4

(111)

IV

Statutes — Continued:

Equal Protection Clause ...........
Fla. Stat. Ann. (West 1971):
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Fla. Stat. Ann. (West Supp. 1985):
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1985 Fla. Laws 85-348:

§ 2 (to be codified at Fla. Stat. 206.9855) . 5

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 84-921

NORTHEASTERN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.,
AND ARROW AIR, INC., APPELLANTS

Vv.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

No. 84-926
EASTERN AIRLINES INC., APPELLANT
Vv.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

No. 84-929
DELTA AIR LINES, INC., APPELLANT
Vv.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE |

ON APPEAL FROM
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS
AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is filed in response to the Court’s order in-
viting the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in No.
84-921 (J.S. App. la-4a) is unreported. The opinion of
the Florida Supreme Court in No. 84-926 (J.S. App.
2-14) is reported at 455 So. 2d 311. The opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court in No. 84-929 (J.S. App. la-12a)
is reported at 455 So. 2d 317. The opinions of the
Broward County Circuit Court (84-921 J.S. App. 6a-19a)
and of the Leon County Circuit Court (84-926 J.S. App.
15-16; 84-929 J.S. App. 25a-37a) are unreported.

(1)

en

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was
entered in each case on June 14, 1984. Timely motions |
for rehearing were denied in each case on September
12, 1984 (84-921 J.S. App. 20a; 84-926 J.S. App. 33;
84-929 J.S. App. 24a). Notices of appeal in the Florida
Supreme Court were filed respectively on December 6,
1984 (84-921 J.S. 11; J.S. App. 80a-81a), on November
28, 1984 (84-926 J.S. App. 34-35), and on October 30,
1984 (84-929 J.S. App. 48a-49a). The jurisdictional
statement in No. 84-921 was filed on December 10,
1984, and the jurisdictional statements in Nos. 84-926
and 84-929 were filed on December 11, 1984. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28: U.S.C.
1257(2).

STATEMENT

1. Florida for many years has imposed a variety of
taxes on different types of fuel purchased within that
State. Prior to April 1, 1988, gasoline and diesel fuel
were subject to an excise tax at the flat rate of 8¢ per
gallon. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 206.01 et seg. (West 1971).
This tax was paid principally by individual motorists,
bus lines, and trucking companies. Other carriers, such
as railroads, maritime shipping companies, and airlines,
were exempt from this tax. Instead, they paid the
general sales tax—technically imposed on the seller for
the privilege of doing business in Florida, but required
to be passed on to purchasers—at a rate of 5% of the
fuel’s retail price. Id. §§ 212.05, 212.07. The sales tax,
as applied to fuel purchased by these carriers, was pro-
rated on a mileage basis. That is, a carrier paid only that
portion of the otherwise-payable tax that represented
the ratio of its Florida mileage to its total mileage for
the previous fiscal year. Id. § 212.08(4)

a

3

Effective April 1, 1983, Florida amended its fuel tax
regime in the following relevant respects:

(a) The scheme governing railroads and maritime
shipping companies remained basically the same. They
continued to pay the 5% general sales tax on the actual
price of the fuel they purchased, and their tax continued
to be prorated on a mileage basis.

(b) The scheme governing roadway users was changed
considerably. Gasoline and diesel fuel remained subject
to the flat excise tax, but the rate was reduced from 8¢
to 4¢ a gallon (84-926 J.S. App. 3). In addition, gasoline
and diesel fuel were made subject, for the first time, to
the 5% general sales tax (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.62 (West
Supp. 1985)). Rather than being applied to the actual re-
tail price, however, the 5% levy was applied in the case
of gasoline and diesel fuel to an “initially established
price” of $1.148 per gallon (id. § 212.62(3)c)). This “ini-
tially established price” was to be adjusted for inflation
beginning June 1, 1985 (id. § 212.62(3)(a)). No provision
was made for prorating the sales tax, as applied to
gasoline and diesel fuel, on the basis of mileage. See 1d.
§ 212.08(4). Thus, the aggregate tax burden on these
items was effectively increased from 8¢ a gallon to 9.7¢
a gallon.

(c) The scheme governing airlines was also changed
considerably. They remained exempt from the flat ex-
cise tax, and they remained subject to the 5% general
sales tax. However, the method of computing their sales
tax liability was assimilated to the newly-established
method of computing the sales tax on gasoline and
diesel fuel. That is, the 5% rate was applied, not to the
actual retail price of jet fuel, but to an “initially
established price” of $1.148 per gallon, the same figure
used for diesel fuel and gasoline. See Fla. Stat. Ann.
§§ 212.02(22), 212.62 (West Supp. 1985). And the
mileage proration formula, while remaining in effect for
railroads and maritime shipping companies, was re-

4

pealed in the case of airlines. Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. J
§ 212.08(4) (West 1971) with Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.08(4) ;
(West Supp. 1985). Finally, a new credit against the d

State’s corporate income tax was created, providing for
an offset against that tax equal to one-half the carrier’s
fuel tax liability, up to a maximum credit of $5 million
(id. § 220.189). This credit was made available only to
air common carriers who had their home office in
Florida and who maintained a work force of more than
1,200 employees in the State. [bid.; see 84-929 J.S. App.
2a.

2. Appellants in these three cases are domestic air-
lines incorporated under the laws of various states and
registered to do business in Florida (84-921 J.S. 1, 16;
84-926 J.S. 4; 84-929 J.S. App. 28a). Delta Air Lines, ap-
pellant in No. 84-929, has its home office in Georgia
(J.S. 8). Northeastern International Airways and Arrow
Air, appellants in No. 84-921, have their home offices in
Florida but have fewer than 1,200 employees based
there (J.S. App. 11a). Eastern Airlines, appellant in No.
84-926, has its home office in Florida and also has more
than 1,200 employees based in that State. Appellants
are principally engaged in interstate commerce, but also
fly on some foreign routes (84-921 J.S. 16; 84-926 J.S. 4;
84-929 J.S. 8).

Appeliants brought these actions in Florida trial
court, challenging various aspects of the State’s fuel tax .
regime under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Inter- .
state Commerce Clause, and on miscellaneous state-law
grounds (84-921 J.S. App. 10a-lla; 84-926 J.S. App.
15-16; 84-929 J.S. App. 25a). The trial courts upheld the
statute in all respects (84-921 J.S. App. 18a-19a; 84-926
J.S. App. 15-16; 84-929 J.S. App. 36a-37a). The cases
were certified directly to the Florida Supreme Court
(84-921 J.S. App. la; 84-926 J.S. App. 2; 84-929 J.S.
App. 2a), which affirmed in part and reversed in part.

+)

It rejected appellants’ federal constitutional challenges
to the fuel tax itself (84-921 J.S. App. la-4a; 84-926 J.S.
App. 2-13; 84-929 J.S. App. 2a, 6a-12a). However, it sus-
tained a challenge, mounted by carriers other than
Eastern, to the constitutionality of the income tax
credit, holding that the credit “clearly discriminates
against interstate commerce because [it] provides a
direct commercial advantage to Florida-based air com-
mon carriers over non-Florida-based carriers” (84-929
J.S. App. 4a, citing Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (emphasis in original)).
The credit provision was severed from the statute
(84-929 J.S. App. 6a, 12a) and the statute as thus
modified was sustained. The airlines:have appealed the
Florida Supreme Court’s judgment insofar as it is un-
favorable to them; Florida has not cross-appealed as to
the corstitutionality of the income tax credit.!

DISCUSSION

1, Appellants contend that Florida’s sales tax on avia-
tion fuel places an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce, pointing out that the fuel they buy is con-
sumed on interstate flights and that Florida’s levy is no

! Florida recently enacted, effective July 1, 1985, further amend-
ments to its scheme of aviation fuel taxation. 1985 Fla. Laws
85-348. The amendments exempt aviation fuel from sales tax, but
impose upon it a new excise tax in approximately the same amount.
Compare id. §§ 2 and 3 with Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.62 (West Supp.
1985). The invalidated income tax credit is replaced with a provi-
sion allowing refund of the new excise tax in an amount “not [to]
exceed six-tenths of one percent of the wages paid by the carrier to
employees located or based within this state” (1985 Fla. Laws
85-348, § 2 (to be codified at Fla. Stat. § 206.9855)). Enactment of
these amendments, which apply only prospectively (id. § 9), does
not moot the instant appeals, which continue to present a live
controversy concerning appellants’ sates tax liability from April 1,
1983, to July 1, 1985. We of course intimate no view as to the con-
stitutionality of the 1985 amendments.

6

longer prorated to reflect that fact. This contention is
insubstantial in light of this Court’s decision in Hastern
Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285
U.S. 147 (1932). The Court there upheld a nondiscrim-
inatory, unapportioned sales tax as applied to aviation
fuel purchased within South Carolina for use in inter-
state commerce, reasoning that the taxable event was
sale of the fuel and that such sales were “purely intra-
state transactions” (285 U.S. at 152). Accord, United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 628, 629 (1973) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to state use tax as applied
to aviation fuel “withdrawn from storage for consump-
tion in an interstate vehicle”); Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport, Inc., 289 U.S. 249, 252 (1933) (same).

Appellants attempt to dismiss these cases as “out-of-
date” (84-929 J.S. 13-14) because they were decided
under the “direct burden” approach to interstate com-
merce which this Court abandoned in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). However,
the “direct burden” approach was a doctrine that had ~
been used mechanically to strike down state laws which,
as drafted, technically imposed a levy on “the privilege
of doing [an interstate] business” (430 U.S. at 278-279
(original quotation marks omitted)). In repudiating that
doctrine, obviously, the Court cast no doubt on the con-
tinuing validity (at least as to result) of decisions that
had sustained state taxes under the old rubric.

In any event, there is no merit to appellants’ sugges-
tion (84-921 J.S. 35-36; 84-929 J.S. 10-18) that Florida’s
tax fails Complete Auto’s “fair apportionment” or “fair.
relation” tests. See 430 U.S. at 279. Because the taxable
event—sale of the fuel—takes place wholly within
Florida, no other state could undertake to impose a tax
on that transaction, and apportionment is thus not con-
stitutionally required. Appellants’ contention that
Florida’s tax is not “fairly related to the services

7

provided by the State” (Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279)
is based on assertions that the tax is really a user fee,
that the proceeds of the tax are devoted to road con-
struction, and that airlines do not derive from Florida’s
roads a benefit proportional to the tax they pay. See
84-921 J.S. 37-89; 84-929 J.S. 11-17. As the courts
below pointed out, however, each of these assertions is
erroneous. See 84-921 J.S. App. lla-12a; 84-929 J.S.
App. 7a, lla, 29a, 34a. The tax is plainly a sales tax
because its legal incidence is upon the fuel seller and is
imposed for the privilege of selling fuel in Florida. The
proceeds of the tax are not devoted to “the construction
and maintenance of state roads,” as was once true (Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 206.46 (West 1971)), but go into a trust
fund to “be used for transportation purposes” (Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 206.46 (West Supp. 1985)). And appellants do
enjoy, not only the benefits of Florida’s public transpor-
tation network, but also “the benefits of a trained work
force and the advantages of a civilized society” (Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445
(1979)).?

2. Appellants’ equal protection challenge is also in-
substantial. They contend that Florida’s fuel tax regime

Although appellants appear to engage in foreign as well as in-
terstate commerce (see 84-926 J.S. 4; 84-929 J.S. 8), they did not
contend in either court below that Florida’s tax as applied to them
violates the Foreign Commerce Clause. See, e.g., 84-921 J.S. App.
2a. Ina brief filed at the Court’s invitation contemporaneously with
this one, we express the view that Florida’s tax, as applied to avia-
tion fuel purchased by foreign airlines for use exclusively in foreign
commerce, is unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce
Clause as interpreted in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979). See 84-902, 84-922 & 84-1041 Br. 30-35.
The Court in Japan Line specifically declined to reach “questions
as to the taxability * * * of domestically owned instrumentalities
engaged in foreign commerce” (441 U.S. at 444 n.7). Since ap-
pellants did not raise this question below and consequently do not
present it for review here, we have no occasion to address it.

places a heavier burden on airlines than on railroads and
maritime shipping companies, since the latter (a) have
their sales tax reduced by application of a mileage pro-
ration formula, a benefit airlines no longer enjoy, and
(b) pay tax based on the actual price of their fuel, rather
than (as is true for airlines) on an “initially established
price” of $1.148 per gallon (84-921 J.S. 29-34; 84-926
J.S. 5-6; 84-929 J.S. 18-22). And appellants contend that
Florida’s fuel tax regime places a heavier burden on
airlines than on trucking companies, even though both
pay sales tax at 5% of an “initially established price” of
$1.148 per gallon without mileage proration, since the
market price of jet fuel during the relevant period was
lower than that of diesel fuel and gasoline (84-921 J.S.
32-33; 84-929 J.S. 7 & n.4, 17). In appellants’ view, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that all carriers be
treated identically.

It was long ago established that “in taxation, even
more than in other fields, legislatures possess the !
greatest freedom in classification.” Madden v. Ken- |
tucky, 309 U.S. 88, 88 (1940). “The burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.” An equal pro-
tection challenge can prevail “only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and op-
pressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes.” Ibid. Accord, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-365 (1973) (citing
cases).

The courts below correctly concluded that appellants
“failed to demonstrate that a hostile and oppressive j
discrimination has been made” (84-926 J.S. App. 5).
Florida’s fuel tax regime, as revised effective April 1,
1983, does appear to impose a heavier burden on
airlines than on other carriers, although the differential
burden depends in part on the relative market prices of

Oe

9

various fuels, whose fluctuations are of course beyond
the Florida Legislature’s control. Florida’s overall tax
system, however, treats airlines more favorably in other
respects. See 84-921 J.S. App. 18a-14a; 84-929 J.S.
App. 3la. The State, moreover, cannot be said to have
lacked a rational basis for repealing the mileage prora-
tion formula in the case of interstate air carriers, since
“proration of mileage for aircraft has proven difficult in
the past because of flight patterns over the Gulf of Mex-
ico and Atlantic Ocean to avoid accumulation of in-
trastate mileage” (84-929 J.S. App. 31a). Although state
taxes are not altogether immune from equal protection
scrutiny (see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, No.
83-1274 (Mar. 26, 1985)), the tax regime challenged
here, relieved of the income-tax-credit provision struck
down by the Florida Supreme Court, neither
discriminates against out-of-state competitors nor lacks
a rational relationship to Florida’s legitimate purpose of
raising money for public transportation.

3. Appellant in No. 84-926 challenges the holding that
it lacks standing to contest the constitutionality of pro-
visions governing fuel tax refunds to certain fishermen
and farmers (J.S. iv, 4-5). Appellant did not allege that
it competed, directly or indirectly, with farmers or
fishermen (84-926 J.S. App. 11), and the Florida
Supreme Court accordingly denied it standing to raise
this challenge, reasoning that “the constitutionality of
* * * a statute cannot be tested by a party whose rights
or duties are not affected by it” (id. at 11-12). In so rul-
ing, the court relied exclusively on Florida law. See id.
at 11-13. In any event, its ruling is fully consistent with
this Court’s decisions. See Allen v. Wright, No. 81-757
. (July 3, 1984).

10 |

CONCLUSION

The appeals should be dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question.

Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Acting Solicitor General
ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR.
Assistant to the Solicitor General

JIM J. MARQUEZ
General Counsel
Department of Transportation

SEPTEMBER 1985

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0114%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
